G.R. No.

129008 January 13, 2004

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and
ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in
this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as its Resolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties located
in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City.3 He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on
July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso
"Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P.
Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.4
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner
Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the
subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued
Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista,
Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan
of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the
extra-judicial settlement.7
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration docketed as S.P.
Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.8
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985
and 63984 and Other Related Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register
of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.9
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the property subject
of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora
Riofero10 and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register
them in his name.11 Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but
rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. 12 On April 29, 1996,
petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13 on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real
parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners
moved for its reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise denied.16
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.17 Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the
annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the
respondents.18
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997, stating that it discerned no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners motion to set
affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.20 Hence, the petition before this Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights
belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings.21
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary hearing on their
affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be
stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from
the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a
motion to dismiss had been filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of the preliminary
hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.23Subsequently, the electivity of
the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in the
discretion of the Court", apart from the retention of the word "may" in Section 6,24in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts doorstep for not hearing petitioners affirmative
defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others by his will or by operation of law.25
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not
yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation, namely Section 3, Rule 326 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v.
Young,28 this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under
administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of
the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in
which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special
proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In
such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to
see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or
dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is
unwilling or refuses to bring suit;30 and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of31 and
he is made a party defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as
compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either
disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the
pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as
in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to this Court is not
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104482 January 22, 1996

BELINDA TAEDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and sisters, and TEOFILA CORPUZ TAEDO, representing
her minor daughter VERNA TAEDO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M. TAEDO AND TERESITA BARERA TAEDO,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a sale of future inheritance valid? In multiple sales of the same real property, who has preference in ownership? What is the
probative value of the lower court's finding of good faith in registration of such sales in the registry of property? These are the
main questions raised in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside and reverse the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV NO. 24987 promulgated on September 26, 1991 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Third Judicial Region, Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No. 6328, and its Resolution denying
reconsideration thereof, promulgated on May 27, 1992.
By the Court's Resolution on October 25, 1995, this case (along with several others) was transferred from the First to the Third
Division and after due deliberation, the Court assigned it to the undersigned ponente for the writing of this Decision.
The Facts
On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo,
and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of
P1,500.00, "one hectare of whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of Tarlac
and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the said property being his "future inheritance" from his
parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his father Matias, Lazaro executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980
(Exh. 3) to "re-affirm, respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962." On January 13, 1981, Lazaro executed
another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his "undivided ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land
known as Lot 191 . . . " (Exh. 4). He acknowledged therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In February 1981,
Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December
29, 1980 (Exh. E). On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in their favor in the Registry of Deeds
and the corresponding entry was made in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451 (Exh. 5).
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of
private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father.
Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated December 29, 1980 (Exit. E). Conveying
to his ten children his allotted portion tinder the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included
the land in litigation (Lot 191).
Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated December 28,
1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaro's)
children (Exh. A); (2) a typewritten document dated March 10, 1979 signed by Lazaro in the presence of two witnesses, wherein
he confirmed that he would voluntarily abide by the wishes of his father, Matias, to give to his (Lazaro's) children all the
property he would inherit from the latter (Exh. B); and (3) a letter dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela,
stating that his share in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children, petitioners herein
(Exh. C).
Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale" dated March 12, 1981 (Exh. 6),
wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the reason that it was "simulated or fictitious without any
consideration whatsoever".
Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G) which virtually repudiated the contents of
the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale (Exh. 6) and the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private respondents. However, Lazaro
testified that he sold the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his
children after giving him five pesos (P5.00) to buy a "drink" (TSN September 18, 1985, pp. 204-205).
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to adduce a proponderance of evidence
to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale
dated January 13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.
The Issues
Petitioners raised the following "errors" in the respondent Court, which they also now allege in the instant Petition:
I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962 (Exhibit 7, Answer) is merely
voidable or annulable and not void ab initio pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the New Civil Code involving as
it does a "future inheritance".
II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants-appellees acted in good faith in registering the deed of sale of
January 13, 1981 (Exhibit 9) with the Register of Deeds of Tarlac and therefore ownership of the land in question
passed on to defendants-appellees.
III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and documentary evidence of plaintiffs-
appellants which clearly established by preponderance of evidence that they are indeed the legitimate and lawful
owners of the property in question.
IV. The decision is contrary to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions drawn from the established facts are
illogical and off-tangent.
From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:
1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?
2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the Registry of Property) of a deed of
sale covering the same property to the same buyers valid?
3. May this Court review the findings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the buyers acted in good faith in
registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b) in "failing to consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the conclusions
of the respondent Court "illogical and off-tangent"?
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, let it be clear that the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court in this petition for review on certiorariare only
those allegedly committed by the respondent Court of Appeals and not directly those of the trial court, which is not a party
here. The "assignment of errors" in the petition quoted above are therefore totally misplaced, and for that reason, the petition
should be dismissed. But in order to give the parties substantial justice we have decided to delve into the issues as above re-
stated. The errors attributed by petitioners to the latter (trial) court will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to the
appellate court's assailed Decision and Resolution.
The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the assailed Decision conceded "it may
be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null and void."3
But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be
entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law."
Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation
between the parties.
Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also
useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the same infirmity." Even private respondents in their
memorandum4 concede this.
However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 in favor of
private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance of one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was
subsequently registered on June 7, 1982; and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the
same property. These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and after a deed of extra-
judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words,
these dispositions, though conflicting, were no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.
Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was only one-half hectare out of Lot No. 191, citing as authority the
trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is on review in these proceedings by this Court is the Court of Appeals'
decision which correctly identified the subject matter of the January 13, 1981 sale to be the entire undivided 1/12 share of
Lazaro in Lot No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of on December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners.
Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration of the sale in favor of private
respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple sales, as follows:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law, ownership shall belong to the buyer who
in good faith registers it first in the registry of property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was
later than the one in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of registration. On
the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.
Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents never took possession thereof.
As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not
registered his title, even if the latter is in actual possession of the immovable property.5
As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless contended that it was done in bad faith.
On this issue, the respondent Court ruled;
Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that defendants-appellees acted in bad faith
when they registered the Deed of Sale in their favor as appellee Ricardo already knew of the execution of the deed of
sale in favor of the plaintiffs; appellants cite the testimony of plaintiff Belinda Taedo to the effect that defendant
Ricardo Taedo called her up on January 4 or 5, 1981 to tell her that he was already the owner of the land in question
"but the contract of sale between our father and us were (sic) already consumated" (pp. 9-10, tsn, January 6, 1984).
This testimony is obviously self-serving, and because it was a telephone conversation, the deed of sale dated
December 29, 1980 was not shown; Belinda merely told her uncle that there was already a document showing that
plaintiffs are the owners (p. 80). Ricardo Taedo controverted this and testified that he learned for the first time of
the deed of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of his children "about a month or sometime in February 1981" (p. 111,
tsn, Nov. 28, 1984). . . .6
The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's findings, refused to overturn the latter's assessment of the testimonial
evidence, as follows;
We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court upholding Ricardo Taedo's testimony, as it involves a
matter of credibility of witnesses which the trial judge, who presided at the hearing, was in a better position to
resolve. (Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 6.)
In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by petitioners, both in their basic petition and in their
memorandum, as follows:
1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact that respondent Ricardo "by fraud and deceit and with
foreknowledge" that the property in question had already been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro execute the deed of
January 13, 1981;
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of the purchase price of P10,000.00 was paid at the
time of the execution of the deed of sale, contrary to the written acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith;
3. There is allegedly sufficient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of the sale in favor of petitioners "was
tainted with fraud or deceit."
4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private respondents "took undue advantage over the weakness
and unschooled and pitiful situation of Lazaro Taedo . . ." and that respondent Ricardo Taedo "exercised moral
ascendancy over his younger brother he being the eldest brother and who reached fourth year college of law and at
one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while his younger brother only attained first year high school . . . ;
5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners' evidence, especially Lazaro Taedo's Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating that Ricardo Taedo deceived the former in executing the deed of sale in favor of
private respondents.
To be sure, there are indeed many conflicting documents and testimonies as well as arguments over their probative value and
significance. Suffice it to say, however, that all the above contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence and
credibility of witnesses, which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In
petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised and passed upon. Absent
any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless the lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the lower courts
be amply demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not disturb their findings. At most, it appears that petitioners have shown that
their evidence was not believed by both the trial and the appellate courts, and that the said courts tended to give more
credence to the evidence presented by private respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting aside such findings. We
are far from convinced that both courts gravely abused their respective authorities and judicial prerogatives.
As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock Construction and Development Corp.7
The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among the exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts found by
the lower courts is allowed are when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; when the findings went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. After a careful study of the case at
bench, we find none of the above grounds present to justify the re-evaluation of the findings of fact made by the courts below.
In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al.8 is equally applicable to the present case:
We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. . . . (I)t is not the function of this
Court to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties,
particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.
(emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.