The rapid growth of Europes urban sprawl poses significant prob-

lems for NATO defense planners. Defense plans, tactical doctrine

and weapons sgstems designed far battle an open, rolling terrain
mag be hindered &g this urban growth. A stud~ of militarg opera-
tions on urban terrain (MOUT) as it occurred in Lebanon prouides
some insights into bOth problems we mag face and solutions to
those problems.

on:
MOUT
if!li Case Studv

dini and R. D. McLaurin

traditional military corridors were open

Introduction plains apd valfeys. For centuries, these
attack routes have been used by fighting

o
men, whether eastbound or westbound.
VIIR the last decade, increasing Fields of fire and mobility were excellent,
numbers of military analysts in the protection relatively dependent on
United States and Europe have come to organic firepower. But Europe bas
realize that the nature of the combat changed, and with the extraordinary
eqvironrnent in Europe has changed. The socioeconomic developments of the past

2
 .,
two decades that have so altered the
behavior of Europeans has come a sig-
nificant change in the face of Europe.
Urbanization has spread spread well
; beyond Europe, in fact, to most of the
countries of.the world. Concomitant with
the move to the cities has been that phe-
nomenon so familiar to Americans that
we might call suburbanization that is,
both the cities and the areas around cit-
ies have been built up enormously. More-
over, with the revolution in communi-
cation and transportation of the last two
decades, towns and villages previously
isohi ted or nearly isolated have grown to-
3
LEBANON
ward, then to, then across lines of com-
munications such as roads. The result is
urbanization of much of what was the
countryside of Europe,
The miIitary significance of the urban- .
ization of European terrain can hardly be
overemphasized. We have not fought a
war in Europe for over 30 years, yet
American forces remain stationed in and
are fundamental to the defense of West.
ern Europe. These forces, even together
with their European allies, confront a
Warsaw Pact force very substantially
larger. To fight outnumbered and win,
the United States and its NATO aflies

MILITARY REVIEW
must certainly optimize the use of their
resources, including planning.
It was in this connection that the
United Statee began to take note o i the
changes in Europe since World War 11.
First, many felt the United States had
had limi~ed experience in urban warfare
and was not prepared for itwas not
planning on itin Europe. By contrast,
I!F,
Lett, tripb 20mm automat!c antmrcratl
some thought the Soviet Unitm had ex-
tensive urban warfare experience, plan-
ning and train ing. Second, recognizing
the advantages to the defenders in mili-
tary operations (conducted ) on urbanized
terrain (MOUT ), some began to feel the
new, urbanized Europe might be, in
effect, a force multiplier for outmanned
Western armies. Consequent upon these
lines of thought, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency ( DAR PA)
undertook a research program in the
early 1970s designed to measure the
state of the artWhat do we know?
How are we using it? What do we know
+
about the Soviets thinking on the sub-
ject? The program wae successful in
terms of laying bare our knowledge
. perhaps we should say ignorance-of the
subject 4and in terme of mobilizing some
limited service interest in it.
Since the effective transfer of the pro-
gram to the US Army Materiel Develop
ment and Readiness Command (DAR-
gun, right. destruchon caused by ixplosmn 01106mm mortar (Ashrahyeh)
COM ) and the US Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC ), limited
research has continued in this area. An-
nual DA RCOM-TRADOC conferences
coordinated by the US Army Human En-
gineering Laboratory at Aberdeen Prov-
ing Ground, Maryland;] semiannual
Military Operations Research Sympo-
sia; the concern and perseverance of
individuals who see MOUT as a critical
issue; and personal contact among these
individuals have provided the continuity
in thinking and studying MOUT.
It is cafe at this point to say that
DARPA and later supporters of the pro-
4

gram have not yet been successful in per-
suading policy makers, planners and
weapons designers of the pervasive sig-
nificance of MOUT to Western military
forces and US security. One of the rea-
sons is the well-known tendency to plan
the last war. Our last war in Europe was
fpught over 30 years ago. J$orea in the
early 1950s and Vietnam in the Iate
Ml13IIITel Zaatal M42aimaircralt
1960s were not principally urban wars
either.
Recognizing that a data and experi-
ence base is necessary to serious military
planning, MOUT analysts sought recent
experience in fighting in builtup areas.
There were, for example, many World
War 11 battles and much after-action
writing in US, European and Russian
Literature. In the Korean War, Seoul
experienced some extensive combat.1~
Yet even the Korean War took place over
20 years ago with very different weapons
systems and doctrine than would be em-
ployed today.
LEBANON
Recent American experience is largely
confined to Hu6 in 1968. i1 Apart from ,
the fact that the fighting in Hu6 is now .
over a decade old, it was also rather
brief. Yet this ie the sum and substance
of new US MOUT experience.2 In an
effort to increase the experience base for
MOUT planning, we have recently un-
dertaken an extensive etudy of MOUT in
gun, wldn!y used and highly pralaod kmg urban lighting
the Lebanese Civil War. 13 This article
will discuss some of the findings and con-
clusions of that study. We shall first dis-
cuss tbe approach used.
Following the discussion of.method, -
we shall generally describe the back-
ground to and nature of the Lebanese
Civil War, including certain anomalies
that affected the conduct of urban war-
fare. Finally, we ehall note specific
findings and conclusions.
I The approach taken to study Lebanese
MOUT has incorporated two principal
steps. The first was to systematically
catalog the questions that a study of ur-
.5
 MILITARY KEVIEW
ban operations in Beirut might reason-
ably be expected to answer given com-
plete and perfect knowledge. 14 These
questions were both general (for exam-
. pie, Was smoke used? Which floors did
,snipers prefer? To what extent did the
presence of people interfere with military
operations? ) and specific (for example,
How were specific holes, once made,
., ,
, }
and M42approaching
AMX13 Tel Zaatar
use~? Which floor in which building was
preferred by snipers in a specific battle?).
Once the list of questions was com-
pleted, we sifted through the literature in
search of answers. To accomplish this
step in data collection, we were forced
first to the construction of a painfully de-
tailed chronology of the Lebanese CiviI
War. ) After we completed the literature
search in English, French and Arabic,
and turned up, it is safe to say, very
little detailed information that was re-
liable, we set about collecting additional
data through interviews with a number
of participants and observers. Tbe ma-
6
terial in this article reflects and is baeed
almost wholly upon these interviews.
The LebaneseCivil War: Background
We do not wish to burden readers with
copious historical and sociological infor-
Obstruction at Td Zaatar. Note trmchas.
mation about the conflict. However, it is
important in analyzing the war and in re-
viewing our findings and conclusions to
take into account come of the unique as-
pects of the war. Every war has its idlo-
syncracies, but it is a mistake to
disregard them or minimize their impact.
Lebanon is a smell, predominantly
Arab country located on the eastern
Mediterranean shore. It is heavily West-
ernized, and the capital, Beirut
(population about 800,000 to 1,000,000),
is very much a French city in many
ways, with expensive boutiquee of Yves
Saint-Laurent and sidewalk cafes.

I
IMI-U,. st,rudllr(xj are, ,(). the most,
rt, similar to thoss of France, reflect-
%
I g the period of the French mandate
( 1921-43) in architecture, city planning
and meet aspects of civil engineering.
The structures of this period tend to be
four or five-story sandstone. Newer
buildings show American design influ-
ence, with many 30 to 40-story hotels
Panhard
wih truck-mounted
and with exteneive use of reinforced
concrete with glaee or cinder block cur-
tain walls.
The war in Lebanon can be divided in-
to three phases the domestic conflict
phase (spring to falI 1975), the pre-Syr-
ian phase (fafl 1975-June 1976) and the
Syrian phase (June 1976-). The first
phase was a true civil conffict, but tbe
latter two periods were, in many re-
Apecte, a regional war fought in Lebanon.
Constraints on the nature of fighting
derived from the Israelie willingness to
intervene. Consequently, there was no
uee of air power at all, nor were chemical
I
LEBANON
or biological elements used, Flame was
generally eschewed in the fighting for
cultural reasons, imd .TIOfighting took
place in the sewer systems for the same
reaeons.
The combatants alignments have been
kaleidoscopic. A group generally
though not with technical accuracy
described as an amalgam of Muslim left-
Hispano-Suiza
in background
ists and Palestinians confronted another
group of Lebanese who were Christians,
mostly Maronites, in the first and second
phases. Tbe third pbaee saw the Syrians
intervene againet the leftiet-Palestinian
alliance, then turn to confront the Chris-
tian side. In no case have the names
applied to the sides been truly descrip-
tive of the affiances. Yet it is important
to note that three regular or near-regular
armies have fought in Lebanon the
Lebanese army, the Syrian army and the
Palestine Liberation Army. (We are not
dealing at all with the Israeli military
action in the epring of 1978. )
7
.
MILITARY REVIEW
In addition, a number of relatively
well-organized ,and very-well-equipped
C1-aietian militias, a similar number of
organized and well-equipped Pa/eetinian
groups and ill-organized and inconsis-
tently equipped Lebanese leftist groups
also participated. , less intense ehelling, the Lebanese
Equipment employed by these forces
included relatively modern ( though not
The AMX13
\ I
generally first-line ) materiel of ~France,
the United States and the Soviet Union.
It ranged from small weapons to tanks,
armored personnel carriere (APCS),
heavy artitlery and even mieeiles. Com-
munications gear included US and
French equipment. (The Syrian army
used land line$ to a large extent. )
In Beirut as in other recent examples
of urban warfare, the advantages that
accrue to the defense from the effective
use of urban characteristics were reaf-
firmed. Perhaps the best example was
the Syrian siege of Ashrafi~eh. Apart from
the months of intermittent conflict, there
were approximately three weeks of in-
tensive artillery shelling. Yet, through.
out this period, 10 percent or fewer of the
buildings in the Ashrafiyeh district were
seriously damaged or destroyed. And, in
those three weeks, as in the months of
Christian defenders of~shrafiyeh c&tin-
ued to both control their area and to re.
tank (105mm gun)
eist Syrian demands and objectives.
Indeed, some measure of the strain on
mifitary logistics caused by attacking for-
tified builtup areas may be evident in the
fact that 50 to 120 tru$ks carrying 250 to
500 metric tons of artillery ammunition
daily were required for what proved to be
the futile Syrian siege. Equally revealing
is the Syrian estimate that the capture of
the6-square-kilometer area of Ashrafiyeh
would entail at least 3,000 casualties.
The logistics support necessary to sus-
tain the offense in MOUT presents an at-
tractive target profile if the offense does
not have, or has only intermittent, con- I

trol of the air. The asymmetry of the
combatants and their tactical objectives
and guidelines in Beirut prevented Ash-
rafiyehs defenders from disrupting Sy-
rian supply lines.
Weapons
In the Beirut fighting, both sides found
antiaircraft artillery (AAA ) a particu-
larly effective weapon when used in di-
rect-fire roles. The systems most fre-
quently commended were the US M42,
the. Soviet ZU23 and ZU57, the Swiss
Oerlikon 37 and the Hispano-Suiza 30.
Although all are towed except the M42, a
self-propelled 40mm, they were mounted
on trucks. These weapons were employed
against outside walls with devastating
effect; they denuded structures with
their high volume of firepower.
In addition, used in a direct-fire capa-
city by firing the length of streets, AAA
was a strong deterrent to assaults. It is
strange both because of the degree of
effectiveness and because of its ubiquity
among modern armed forces that AAA
has been neglected as artillery in pre-
vious MOUT studies.
The Soviet man-portable antitank
rockets, RFG6 and RPG 7, were also
found to be extremely useful both
against armor, as they were designed to
be employed, and against barricades and
walls where they served as portable artil-
lery. Valued as multipurpose weapons,
the 106mm recoilless rifle ( RR) and its
Soviet counterpart, the B1O, were used
extensively to make holes in walls.
High-explosive shells proved them-
selves against hewn rock or older sand-
stone walls, while high-explosive anti-
tank rounds employed against first-floor
level (generally reinforced concrete I struc-
9
LEBANON
tures exploded with devastating effect.
Unfortunately, the 106mm RR is being
widely replaced with the TOW, which is
widely believed to be less effective in
breaching urban structures. While cur-
rent and future US infantry antitank/as- .
sault weapons have a substantial back-
blast, recent studies suggest they can
stilt be used in a MOUT environment. IS
By contrast with rockets and recoifless
rifles, mortars smaller than 120mm were
generally ineffective instruments in the
Lebanese conffict. However, medium ar-
tillery for example, 130mm and 155mm
howitzers were used to penetrate build-
ings to destroy equipment. Explosions
following penetration generally demol-
ished pieces of the building. Eveh great-
er cratering was seen on the streets. Both
the Ml 13 APC and the Panhard armored
car operated effectively in Beirut. The
ease with which the Parzhard is dri~,en
and repaired, and the absence of tracks,
provide the mobility desirable in an ur-
ban environment.
Communications
The literature concerning commrmica-
tions in MOUT has focused on problems
of co-unicating in cities where build-
ings interfere with line-of-eight transmis-
sions and where dead spots abound. Very
high frequencygenerally, tactical
communications are seen in the literature
ae particularly susceptible to interference
inherent in the cityscape.s
Our interviews and survey of available
data dieclosed little concern over com-
munic&tions problems in Lebanon.
Christian forces had the best equipment
available to the Lebanese army, as well
as experienced signal personnel, and
carefully deployed communications ae-
MILITARY REVIEW
sets in advance with an eye to effective
netting. Tactical communications by the
Christians utilized the AN/PRC77,
AN/\RC46 and AN/VRC47, citizen
band (CB) radios and General Electric
portables, as well as telephones, but de-
centralizatioti of command significantly
reduced theneed for extensive contact.
Syrian forces, consistent with their
practice, laid and relied heavily on land
lines as soon as possible. In addition to
eliminating radio reception problems, Sy-
rian land lines were intended to preclude
Christian intercepts of Syrian communi-
cations. {Christian forces were active in
intercepting and even cooking Muslim
and Palestinian communications. ) The
fact we do not encounter statements of
problems in this area, even in response to
explicit questions, leads us to note that
communications did not present a major
uroblem to the combatants in Beirut.
It should be noted, however, that Sy-
rian communications over land lines were
frequently intercepted by tapping. Land
lines are more secure in most types of
warfare, but, as Beirut proved, singu-
larly insecure in an urban environment.
Similarly, Palestinians, whoused CB ra-
dios extensively, were regularly inter
ceptedby Christian forces.
Throughout much of the warfare in
Beirut, the telephone was a valuable
military communications resource. Both
the commercial telephone system and the
Lebaneee army phone system were used
for artillery forward observation, tactical
communications and relay.
A wide variety of communications
equipment was used, from the CB radio
to relatively low-level communications
intercept equipment. One of the most ef-
fective units was the General Electric
hand (portable) radio. Light, it could be
carried by soldiers who were also man-
ning and firing weapons.
Conclusions
The degree to which one can transfer
lessons of the combat in Beirut to other
environments is, as we have noted, limi-
ted by the nature of the conflicts in-
volved. Yet some of the more important
findings and implications of this study
certainly could bear on other MOUT en-
vironments such as Europe.
Until recently, toolittle attention has
been devoted to weapon versatility and
backblast. Many of our most advanced
weapons, and current generations of older
eysteme, have significant backblasts
although they could, if necessary, be em-
ployedin MOUT warfare. Moreover, sig-
natures, minimum arming ranges and
similar factors render others impractical
for MOUT. They are often unable to
shift from one type of ammunition to an-
other. Ammunition versatility is an im-
po~tant asset in MOUT, and weapons
such as the 90mm RR, the old BIO and
Bl(, and US jeep-mounted 106mm RRs
have potentially va}uable roles to play.
Even apart from weapons, some tac-
tics and techniques employed in the Bei-
ru~ fighting appear to merit further
study as possible resources or dangers
for MOUT in other regions and circum-
sta~ces. For example, sniping was ex-
treinely effective. Used by Palestinians/
M@im leftists, Christians and the Sy-
rian army, sniping frequently tied down
large numbers of opposing troops. The
Le&Enfield was the preferred sniping
weapon, and the model A416 available to
Beirut combatants was not well thought
of because of the tumbling effect many
Lebanese officers believed it had.
Weapons were sometimes sandbagged
carefully back from immediate window
openings. While this technique reduced

fields of fire, it was an effective protec-
tion against sniping, reduced enemy de-
tection possibility and diminished incom-
ing fragment effecte on weapons
operators.
Evacuation/retreat should be under-
taken with systematic destruction of
transport and communications resources
specific to cities. In Beirut, for example,
elevators were used to carry weapons to
upper floors of buildings and, generally,
formability within city structures. Tel&
phone, electricity and plumbingall
these are building resourcee without
which military operations are complicated
inside structures. Thus, in retreat, these
resources should be denied the enemy.
Elevators should be destroyed, power
lines to-the building cut, and so forth.
Preplanning for MOUT requires con-
sidering building resources differently
from the past. Perhaps elevators should
have a reserve power supply in order to
safeguard this valuable troop and equip-
ment mover. Buildings might, similarly,
have safe reserve water supplies. Tele-
phone and power systems could be sector-
based so that these resources can be
denied to a district once it is evacuated.
Decentralization of command among
MOUT units facilitates communications
si;ce it reduces the volume of traffic CJ
NOTES
1 L,I,M Dz,rk.ls, Konr.d Ke,,e. and Horst Me.aersna. sen
M,l,t.,v Ooerat,om 8. Bum UP Areas Es$aYs o Some Pasr Pre.
wt. and F.t.,e Pmwects Rand GorDoratlon Santa Mo. Ica.
Cahf 1976, esDectally chapter IV
2 80,0 Chapters II ana 111,C N Donnelly, S..,.1 Tech.wes
for Combat m B.#lt. uP Areas. l.ter.affo.al De fe. se Rev,eti. APr,l
1977 m 23842 wprmtea m MC1!IW Re.,e., No.wnQer 1977. w
37 48), M.,or A E HemM1.Y, SO!el !.411!IWVOP.r.!,OnS ,. BUIII
uo A.e. s, Delme inteltrgence Report DDI 110015577. Defense
,n,ell,gece Agency, WashmgtO D C July 1977 ,0 COlOel
John C Sctwfen and F. MchaelJ Deane. To F,ght Ru$sm.. ,.
Cttres, K..* T.e, r Tactrcs, Mann. CorQs Gazelle, January 1977,
CID3842
3 SW George S~hec.teCs IwJer mesentea at !he 420 M!lllary -
Owrat,.ns Reseamh Symposa (MORS).
, LEBANON
(command, control, communications) ,
nets must cm-ry. Wehave indicated some
particularly effective radio types in Bei-
rut. Light, man-portable radios are ideal,
especially if they do not preclude carry-
ing weapons. Communications should, of
course, be established on high ground,
and communications points in buildings
on the higher stories.
Medical kits should be made more $
widely available. In MOUT situations;
medical evacuation is often impossible so
that wounded personnel must be treated
by others in their units.
Finally, the Beirut fighting showed
over and over again that indivi$rale who -
were intimately familiar with ckies, who
had grown up or lived much of their lives
in cities, were far more able to optimize
urban warfare resources. Their mobility
was far greater, and their instincts more
refined. By contrast, the less sophisti-
cated, the rural, those unaccustomed to
city structures were unable to exploit
these same city characteristics and were
indeed often victimized by them. Ideally,
this suggests the formation of MOUT
units from urban personnel. If this is not
feasible, at least our findings reaffirm
the importance of exhaustive and realis-
tic training for MOUT..
%
4 A woo Dt0!80graPhY ,$ Mw C S Delgrosso, Coceot, .1
O!xrafr.ns for L3ncfwIg forces in urban Env,rommn!s m fhe M,d
flange, Heaowmters, US M.wne Corm W.wngmn, D C, 1977,
volumes 1and 11,Annex A
5 As we have mdtcated below, me US Army Mater,el Develw
rnent ..0 Read, ness Comnm.a [DA RCOM1 ad me US Army
Tratnq ma Docm.e Command IT RADOC) earned on the re
search p~ogram mat me Defense Aa.anceo Research Pro)ects
Agency IDARPA1, m effect, tra. sferrea to them
6 Compare Donald 0 Egner. MJl!farv Opemt!ons ,. B.,lt UP
Areaa Stalu$ ad Prwosed Tasks, US Army Human Eng,neenng
l.aboralo+, Aberdeen PrOvmg Grouna, Md, 1976, MOSA Team,
Prweeamgs of me S....0 DARCOMITRADOC Co.rdmef,o.
conference on Mclrtarv Operal#o.s t. BUM UP Areas (MOBA) 79
20 July 1977, US Army Human E.g,.eer,ng Laboratory. Aberdeen
 I

MILITARY REVIEW I

P,ovm$ G,oo, Md 1977, .0 Brenda K Them PrOCe.dm9S 0! Svra. use. N Y. 1979. Paul A Jure,a,w southern Lebanon Its
me Th,ra DA RCOM!TRADOC COO,O,W,. co. ?.,..., O. w), Internal ma Reg$o.a Imol,catl on.., Abbott Associates SR29,
lary Oper.t!o.s m B.,lt UP A,eas hVOBAl 7617 May 1978, US !977. Paul A J.re,LIm ad Wtll(am E Haze.. LeDanon% D ). ..1.
Army Hum, Eg, neer,.g Laboratory AbeIL!ee. Prov,ng Gro. no 1!0 Futures and Co,eq.e, e., Abbott Asmwmtes 1.. , Ale,
Ma 1978 andr!a. VA 1976, Paul A Jureld!n! end R D McLa.r!n, ,, Exter.a!
7 WOrk,ng grouo A 701 t~: MORS R., bee $,holly Oeoted to I.tervent, o. ,. Inter..! Gonfllct Syr#a. Policy r. me Lebanese
MOUT km several year, Vortex, torthcom, ng .,,,.,,, James M P,, ce, F1OW01 Events ,
8 TDew ,w,,, dual, ,nclude ,,, ),.,3 aa m,l, tary Dersonnel. the Lebanese Co.ll, ct A Chronology of me Lebanese Cwl war. -
some of mom have been very helpful m CIar,fymg our thoughts Abbo,, Assoc,$tes SR35, August 1978, .0 FelwII, Saad. The
Thus *, SiTOUW,,,. to ackowleage 1., as$, stace 01 Gerald E,,!,? Front IIIIQI)c.l ,0, .1 the S,!a,P./eSt,,a!JorO.ra
S.l I, V.11.OUSDR&E George Schechter, A.. IY1,CS I.. Donald 0 Ente.le ..0 me Lebanese c,.,! War, Abbo!t Associates 1.. Alex
Lwe. w.,t.g J McJ, to.. EJ,s*.rt. Sfianh and nre.da~ The,.1 .Or#a, Va 1976
m. US Army !!.ma Enqme.rmg Latmra<my Aoerueen Pmvmg $4 m me fQrmuIa!con .f the q.estto.na!re, we recewed sub.
Ground and Colonel Ronald Becker US Army, c,urrelly .ss,0,0 stat Ial and ,nva..we ass, stmce from .ers. nm+ of m. s Armv
to the Wm. Wg.tie ..nm. EIIglneerl.g Laboratory, Aberdeen Prov,rIg Gin.. fJ, Alex:
9 Del. rosso. . . c,, .mdr,a .3
10 W,;DWIS [f),,,, ,. C,,,,,, IN TREC 1, .1 Pumshed. 15 James M Prtce, Mmlwy ODemt,o.s ,. Lebanon A C.ro
1974, and US Army .0 US h!,.,.. CO,D, 0,,,,,,, ,s!0,,,, ., ,, nolcqy .,5 ,cluded ,. tne 1,., cePorl to, ttte study noted r Pr,ce,
Korean w., COncemmg the Hbe!at, o..+ Seoul F,OW o, Events , the Lebanese CO fl,, t A C!mool. gy01 ,?3,
11 L(e!eat Gene,., V#llard Pear$on The War , ,he Pwrtl) Lebanese C,V,I War 00 c,!
e, Pro,,.. 19b6 7!368. Dewr!menl of ,, Army $@, ng, on 16 Comtwe Lebanon , Cr,sls Pmtrwanfs and Issues. OP cd,
D C 1915 Weaimn% Ellecfs ,. Crt!es 0. c!! ena Map, Rorj .0 John Bulloch Death of a Country, We, aenlela 8 N,c.al, on,
Cbr, stma,, A Com Pw, Gomma saw Remembers the Batt,e ,., Lonoon, Eg 1978
. . . Mar,., COrD, G.>,!,. February 1977 CD 1926 17 The US Army Be,,, Br,qaw has been allowed !. ,.,., the
12 me . . . ...1 DeacekeeD,. g OWr.t, on m S..1. Dom, noo 90rnm reco,lles$ nlle for ,ts ulque, largely urban warfare role
(1965, ,, .o,merea l), some to mertt COn%,deratt.n es e MOiJT 18 Recent st.dies .! AbeJdeen Proww GrounO ..0 elsewhere
e,erc, se, a, n@lf See Delom,so . . ,>1 vo, ume 1 ?,e. t,on3 7 wggest mat. *h!le QackQlast Co.t, n.es t. be a pronounced prob
13 Th,s $t.ti, M,,, Ia,yODe,a,, o, , B.,,, LID4!,,.s Study .0 tern hen f,r,g from eclos.,e, the ,.1,,,1 0( the bachblakl orob
A.d, s,, of M,!,,., OPerat, ons , ,he LeUaeSe C,,,l War lerr ,3s bee exaggerated Most neaPon$ otherwse su, table 10,
D4AKI! 78 C 0036 ..s,, ).,,$ a mlegr.a, D.,, 01 Abbott As..,, such .,, have or,agreeaDle but tolerable bachbla$t elfect,
ales 1.0 .onmwg. ,. depth study .0 a.a,ys Is of the nature an. 13 Delgro, so, op .,1, vorume 1,pp 7 laad 719
,mDI,c,a,Ions o, the . ..!.,., I. Lebanon 0,.,, Abbott Associates 20 Other st.a, es @ e.mnple, !0,01 and papem have made ttms
lnc Lwb[,cabo. s dealing w!h !he subject lmcl.de e+eral contr, Doml Recent research and e. Perlme. ts shorn tiwt some .1 me
C.t,on, to Lebanon ! C{),(S Parllc!wnts .0 15s..5 ,Orlea b, P strong and .wdely held vwvs about ?+s!em detwanc,es I. MOUT
Ed. a,o Haley .0 Lew. W Sn,der S,ra,.,C un,,e, w,y P,,., e(romets .!. .K.+ggerated, hOWeW

Photos court..> f..thnrs

Paul A Jureidiru u uice prewdent of Abbott Asso.

crates Inc , Akxandna, Virgnna He rectz~ed a B.A.
from the American Uru uewty of Beumt, an M,A. from
the University of Virgima and a Ph. D from Th~
American Urziuerszty, He has written extensively on
the Mtddle .?ast and is co-author of CoId Wsr in the
MiddleEast. ImpIicat]ons for the UnitedStatesand
Middle East Confkct Scenarios and United States , ~.<
ZG
p , -. Defense Options, publlshed m 1978 ~. ..
R L) McLaunn is a semor staff member, Abbott Q
Associates Inc., Alexandria, Virginia He received a
B A from the University of Southern California, an
A. M., and M A.L.D. and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher
~& !3
School, Tufts Umuersity. The author of many articles
and research studies, he is the author of The Middle 1
East in Soviet POIICV, and co-author of Foreum Policy
Making in the MiddleEast and ThePoMcal Roleof
Minontiesin theMiddleEast.

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