Leave Division of OCA vs Heusdens HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was
C ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong
A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011
Facts:
Respondent left for abroad without waiting for the result of her application. It turned out
that no travel authority was issued in her favour because she was not cleared of all her
accountabilities as evidenced by the SC Certificate of Clearance. The OCA found
respondent to have violated the OCA Circular for failing to secure the approval of
her application for travel authority.
Issue:
What are the inherent and statutory limitations on the constitutional right to travel?
Ruling:
The exercise of ones right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and
inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6 provides that neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law. Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that
naturally emanate from the source. An example of such inherent limitation is the power of
the trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a crime to leave the country. Some of
these statutory limitations are the following:
1. The Human Security Act of 2010 or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372.
2. The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239.
3. The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 or R.A. No. 9208.
4. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or R. A. No. 8042, as
amended by R.A. No. 10022.
5. The Act on Violence against Women and Children or R.A. No. 9262.
6. Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043
Imelda Marcos v. Sandiganbayan
247 s 217
Facts:
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious
transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The
division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate
justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favour
of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to
include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena
to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request,
Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario
who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to
immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc
for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority
has already decided on Imeldas favour. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due
process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural
flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision
convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5)
justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At
that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the
new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different
view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice
Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but
the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices
Amores and Del Rosario. It may be true that Justice Del Rosario had already expressed
his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as
aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more,
petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding
Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.
Estrada vs. Escritor (August 4, 2003)
Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253,
RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumours that Escritor has been
living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a
son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she
entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another
woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las
Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such
act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on
July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the
congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible
for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was
completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by
three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross
and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on
religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining
among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs
(Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override respondents plea of religious
freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be
discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is
within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court
cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also
apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator.
The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the
opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious
belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override
respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts
in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The
rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's
receipt of this Decision.
Estrada v. Escritor
A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
Facts:
1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The
complainant Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not
her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in
arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which
tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years
ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted
having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct
because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society,
2) That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs, and 3) That
the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.
3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness'
in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have
been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus
makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world
except in countries where divorce is allowed.
Held:
Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. Escritors
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests
must be upheld in order that freedomsincluding religious freedommay be enjoyed.
In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to
an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so
compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the

freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-691 September 10, 1993
SULU ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION OF MASJID LAMBAYONG, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE NABDAR J. MALIK, Municipal Trial Court, Jolo, Sulu, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
On June 5, 1992, Imam Hashim Abdulla, Imam Hadji Tambing, Hatib Illih Musa, an
officers and members of the Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong, filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Nabdar J. Malik, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Jolo, Sulu, charging him with violation of R.A. 2260 (An Act to Amend and
Revise the Laws Relative to Philippine Civil Service) and serious misconduct committed
as follows:
1. Nepotism by recommending the appointment of Omar Kalim, his
nephew, and Hanina Kalim, his niece-in-law, as process server and
clerk, respectively;
2. Graft and Corruption by using Omar Kalim to extort money from
court litigants, e.g.:
a. P13,000.00 in exchange for the freedom of Datu
Tating Erwin, who had been charged an accessory in
a robbery case;
b. demanding P10,000.00 thru a certain P/Sgt. Duran
Abam Tating, Erwin's brother-in-law; and
c. blackmailing litigants;
3. Immorality engaging in an adulterous relationship with another
woman with whom he has three children.
In his letter/comment dated October 19, 1992, Judge Malik alleged that the complainants
are fictitious persons and that the charges against him are false and fabricated. He asked
that the complaint be dismissed.
The Supreme Court referred the case to Judge Harun Ismael of the Regional Trial Court
of Jolo, Sulu, for investigation report and recommendation.
On April 7, 1993, Judge Malik addressed a letter to Judge Ismael, enclosing affidavits of
four witnesses, namely : (1) Imam Hashim Abdulla; (2) Mrs. Jamura Tambing; (3) Mr.
Mirad Tambing; and (4) Marina Balais Malik.
He alleged that Datu Tating Erwin is the nephew of Kaya B. Sarabi who had previously
filed "many fabricated charges" (p. 235, Rollo) against him which had been dismissed by
the Supreme Court. He implied that Erwin was being used by Sarabi, and that the affidavit
was false.
Imam Hashim Abdulla, one of the "complainants," denied any knowledge of, or
participation in, the filing of the complaint against Judge Malik. He disowned his supposed
signature in the complaint as a forgery. He alleged that Judge Malik is his neighbor and he
knows him to be "honest and righteous" (p. 238, Rollo).
Illih Musad, another "complainant," died on February 24, 1991 yet. His widow, Jamura
Musad, executed an affidavit certifying that she knows Judge Malik personally because he
has been her neighbor for many years. It was physically impossible for her late husband to
have signed the complaint dated June 5, 1992 against Judge Malik because her husband
died more than a year before the signing of the complaint.
The signature of another complainant, Imam Hadji Tambing Arong, was impugned by his
son, Mirad Tambing. He said his father could not have signed the complaint because he
had been sick and bedridden for five years before his death. In fact, he died on August 15,
1992.
Marina Balais Malik, wife of respondent Judge N. Malik, disowned her supposed affidavit
which she supposedly signed before Notary Public Attorney Rodrigo Martinez in
Zamboanga City, in February 1991 (p. 250, Rollo).
She, however, denied having appeared before the Notary Public to subscribe said affidavit
which attacks the "honor and integrity of her beloved husband" (p. 251, Rollo).
After conducting an investigation of the charges, Judge Ismael on May 25, 1993,
submitted a Report to the court. Of the three (3) charges against Judge Malik, only the
charge or nepotism holds.
On the charge or graft and corruption, Judge Ismael observed that:
. . . practically all of those who testified denied any knowledge of any
particular instance that Judge Malik extorted or received bribe money
from litigants having pending cases before his sala. Mrs. Beatriz Abbas,
Clerk of Court II of Municipal Trial Court of Jolo, Sulu presided by Judge
Malik, testified that the people praised highly Judge Malik because of
his honesty. She attests to this because she was, at one time told by
Judge Malik to return to litigants something which litigants wanted to
give to Judge Malik. However, one of those who testified confided, but
refused to be quoted in his testimony for fear of reprisal, suggested that
in order for the Court to be spared of any ill suspicion, Omar Kalim
should be transferred to another Municipal Circuit Trial Court branch
where Judge Malik has no supervision. Accordingly, it's just not nice and
good looking to have Omar Kalim where he is now. This information is
worth considering. The only obstacle is Judge Malik is Acting Judge in
all Municipal Circuit Trial Court branches except Siasi, Sulu.
However, no hard evidence was adduced linking Judge Malik to graft
and corruption as alleged in the complaint. (p. 51, Rollo.)
With regard to the charge of adultery or immorality, the investigating Judge observed that
under Muslim Law the marriage of a Tausug (the tribal group to which Judge Malik
belongs) to as many as four (4) wives in sanctioned provided the man can support them
and does not neglect any or them. Judge Ismael's report states:
As regards the claim that Judge Malik has two (2) wives, all those who
testified at the investigations confirmed the same. Mrs. Marina Balais-
Malik, the first wife, admitted that Judge Malik has a second wife
(Lourdes) but she does not mind them since she and her children are
financially taken cared of all their eight children are going to school
and three (3) have reached college level. Moreover, under the Muslim
Shari'a (Law) marrying more than one wife is allowed provided the man
can afford financially and can give equity and justice to the wives. Mrs.
Marina Balais Malik claims that Judge Malik is financially capable.
The Holy Qur'an (the Muslim Holy Scripture) provides in Surah 4:3
(Chapter 4, verse 3) thus:
3. And if ye fear
that ye shall not.
Be able to deal
justly
With the orphans,
Marry women of
your choice
Two, or three, or
four;
But if, ye fear that
ye shall not
Be able to deal
justly (with them)
The only one, or
That which your
right hand
possess
That will be more
suitable,
To prevent you
From doing
injustice.
Strictly, Islam enjoins only monogamous marriage. While Islam allows
marrying more than one wife, it however sets limitation, i.e., not more
than four at a time and the man be financially capable in order for him to
provide equity and justice to the wives. Theme revelations came to the
Prophet Muhammad after the Battle of Uhud whereby
many Mujahideens died thus leaving more widows and orphans. This
particular revelation serve, as it was then, as a remedy to the impending
situation of the widows and orphans left unattended. By allowing
the mujahideens to take them in marriage helped prevent them from
engaging in illicit marital relations like fornication. Marrying more than
one wife does not per se create any stint (sic) of social immorality, since
this marriage, like any other ordinary marriages, is made public and are
(sic) accepted by the people in the community. Any issue out of this
marriage is legitimate before the eyes of the Almighty Lord and the
people.
True, Islam sanctions such marriage but very few Muslim males practice
it. Worst yet today, however, this permissible marriage is used as a
means of building social standing in the community. As a judge, there is
no doubt that Judge Malik has acquired higher respect and social
standing in the community, and is deemed financially capable. Hence,
he can marry more than one wife in accordance with the Muslim Shari'a.
(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)
Mrs. Marina Malik consented to her husband's wish to contract, a second marriage
because he does not neglect to support her children. Three of them are in college. She
has no ill-feelings against Malik's second wife, who married her husband under Muslim
law. Since Art. 180 of P.D. No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
laws of the Philippines, provides that the penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy "shall
not apply to a person married . . . under Muslim Law," it is not "immoral" by Muslim
standards for Judge Malik to marry a second time while his first marriage exists.
The charge of nepotism, however, is a different matter.
Judge Nabdar Malik was appointed and confirmed as Judge of Municipal Court of Jolo on
May 29, 1972. He assumed office on May 29, 1972. 1 On June 16, 1978, he
recommended the appointment of his nephew, Omar Kalim, the son of his older sister,
Nuridjan Ambutong, to the position of Janitor of his court. He falsely certified that Kalim
was not related to him by affinity or consanguinity within the third degree:
This is to certify that Mr. Omar Kalim, a proposed appointee for the
position of Janitor in the Municipal Court of Jolo, Branch 1, is not related
to the undersigned within the third degree either by affinity or
consanguinity.
xxx xxx xxx
NABDAR J. MALIK
Municipal Judge
(Certification dated June 16, 1978, 201 File.)
The truth is that, being his sister's son, Kalim is related to Judge Malik by consanguinity
within the third degree.
Later, Omar Kalim was promoted an MTC Aide and still later, in 1985, he became a
Process Server. 2 In support of Kalim's promotion, Judge Malik again issued a false
certification that Kalim in not related to him by affinity or consanguinity.
This is to certify that MR. OMAR N. KALIM, a proposed appointee for
the position of MTC PROCESS SERVER in the Office of the Municipal
Trial Court of Jolo, is not related to the undersigned appointed official
either by affinity or consanguinity. (Certification dated January 2, 1985,
201 File.)
Similarly, Kalim falsely denied his relationship to Judge Malik in answer to question No. 23
in his Personal Data Sheet.
Are you related within the third degree of consanguinity or of affinity to
the appointing or recommending authority, or to the chief of bureau or
office, or to the person who has immediate supervision over you in the
Office, Bureau or Ministry you are to be appointed?
His answer was "No".
The prohibition against nepotism in the government service is found in Section 59,
Chapter 7, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments in the national, provincial,
city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, made
in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of
the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family
referred to are those related within the third degree either of
consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on
nepotism: (a) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers,
(c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission.
The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be applicable to the
case of a member of any family who, after his or her appointment to any
position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the
same office or bureau, in which event the employment or retention
therein of both husband and wife may be allowed.
(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions, cases of
previous appointments which are in contravention hereof shall be
corrected by transfer, and pending such transfer, no promotion or salary
increase shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who were
appointed in violation of these provisions.
In the case of Layno vs. People (213 SCRA 686, 696-697), the incumbent Mayor, of
Lianga, Surigao, appointed his legitimate son as Meat Inspector, but certified that the
appointee was not a relative by consanguinity or affinity. He was prosecuted criminally
and punished for falsification of public document (Art. 171, par. 4 or the RPC).
One of the legal issues raised was whether the appointing authority is obliged to disclose
his true relationship to the appointee., That question was answered by this Court in the
affirmative:
The law on nepotism, as provided in Section 49(a) or PD No. 807,
prohibits the appointing or recommending authority from making any
appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or
in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, in favor of his (appointing or recommending
authority's) relative within the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity. Thus, in order to guarantee that the law is duly observed, it is
required, among others, that the appointment paper should be
accompanied by a certification of the appointing or recommending
authority stating therein that he is not related to the appointee within the
third degree of consanguinity or affinity. Although Section 49(a) or PD
No. 807 does not explicitly provide that the appointing or,
recommending authority shall, disclose his true relationship with the
 appointee in the form or a certification, nonetheless, in the light of the
rulings in the aforecited cases, the legal obligation or the appointing or
recommending authority to state the true facts required to be stated in
the certification is inherent in the law on prohibition against nepotism
and the nature and purpose of such certification.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Memorandum
The general purpose of P.D. No. 807 is to "insure and promote the
constitutional mandate that appointments in the Civil Service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness, to provide within the public
service a progressive system of personnel administration, and to adopt
measures to promote moral and the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, efficiency, and professionalism in the Civil Service."
(Section 2, PD No. 807.)
The civil service laws are designed to eradicate the system of
appointment to public office base on political considerations and to
eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship and personal
favoritism in making appointments. These laws intend to establish a
merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of the appointment; to
secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better
government. (Meran vs. Edralin, 154 SCRA 238 [1987])..
Indeed, there are many cases wherein local elective officials, upon
assumption to office, wield their new-found power by appointing their
own protegees, and even relatives, in violation of civil service laws and
regulations. Victory, at the polls should not be taken as authority for the
commission of such illegal acts. (Mendoza vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No.
78053, June 4, 1990, citing Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, 26 SCRA 1 [1968]).
By making untruthful statements and certifications regarding their relationship to each
other, Judge Malik and his nephew, Omar Kalim, committed the crime of falsification
under Article 171, subparagraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
Nepotism is a ground for disciplinary action under Section 46, subpar. 30, Chapter 5, Book
V of the Administrative Code of 1987:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. (a) No officer or employee in
the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause an
provided by law and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
xxx xxx xxx
(30) Nepotism as defined in Section 59 of this Title.
Section 67 (Penal Provision) of the Administrative Code provides the following penalty
therefor:
Sec. 67. Penal Provision. Whoever makes any appointment or
employs any person in violation of any provision of this Title or the rules
made thereunder or whoever commits fraud, deceit or intentional
misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service
matters, or whoever violates, refuses or neglects to comply with any
of such provisions or rules, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine
not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of
the court. (Executive Order 292, Emphasis ours.)
Disclosure of one's relatives in the Government is required of every public official or
employee:
Sec. 8. . . .
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. It shall be the duty of
every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the best of
his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the
form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil service
Commission. (Sec. 8 (B), Rep. Act 6713 [Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees].)
Judge Malik did not merely fail to disclose his relationship to Omar Kalim, but he falsely
certified that he was not related to the latter.
Kalim, likewise, falsely denied his relationship to Judge Malik. Their acts violated the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and are punishable
under Section 11 of the Code, with removal from office.
Sec. 11. Penalties. (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of
whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary,
holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this
Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6)
months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal
depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by
the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a
heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the
latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or both, and, in the
discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold
public office.
 (b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative
proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public
official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against
him. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws, classifies nepotism as a grave
offense punishable with dismissal from the service, even as a first offense.
Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, less grave, and light, depending on the gravity of
its nature and effects of said acts on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties:
xxx xxx xxx
(m) Nepotism [1st Offense, Dismissal]
Moreover, by committing nepotism and covering up his malfeasance by falsely disavowing
any relationship to the appointee, Judge Malik is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and falsification and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that "a judge
shall not allow family, social, or other relationship to influence his judicial conduct or
judgment" (Canon 2, Rule 2.03) and enjoins a judge to "be faithful to the law" (Canon 3,
Rule 3.01). Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious offenses punishable by
any of the following sanctions under Section 10-A, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended:
1. Dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits (except accrued
leaves) and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation;
2. Suspension for three (3) to six (6) months without salary and benefits;
or
3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00.
With respect to Judge Malik's niece-in-law, Hanina M. Hailidani Kalim, her appointment did
not violate the law against nepotism.
Hanina began her service in the judiciary on August 6, 1973. She was then known as
"Mrs. Hanina M. Hailidani-Ainin," for she was married to Hadji Abubakar Ainin, clerk of the
Municipal Court, Branch 1. Omar Kalim entered the service in 1978 or five years after
Hanina. She was already a widow when she and Kalim met and married in a ceremony
performed by Judge N. Malik on July 24, 1982. Evidently, when Hanina was appointed as
a member of Judge Malik's staff in 1973, she was not yet related to him by affinity or
consanguinity. Her marriage to Omar Kalim after both had entered the government service
is expressly excluded from the prohibition against nepotism. Section 59 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that:
Sec. 59. . . .
(2) . . . "The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be
applicable to the case of a member of a family who, after his or her
appointment to any position in an office or bureau, contracts marriage
with someone in the same office or bureau, in which event the
employment or retention therein of both husband and wife may be
allowed.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Nabdar J. Malik GUILTY of nepotism, falsification
and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His Process Server and nephew, Omar
Kalim, is likewise found GUILTY of falsification and deceit. The Court hereby orders their
DISMISSAL from the service, with prejudice to re-employment in the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and privileges (if any), except the money value of their earned leave credits.
Respondent Judge is ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any
order or decision, or continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective
immediately upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Noco
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization composed of men
and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs), as a party list based on moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to
the Supreme Court, Comelec alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their
application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Partys application for registration should be granted.
Comelecs citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioners application was a
violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the
Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a secular
purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is detrimental or
dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their
allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested
rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based
on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws
to which do we adhere.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they
are considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
1. WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
2. WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our
non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it
noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement
of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest.
 2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

Imbong vs Ochoa 6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; 7. The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the
Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause Constitution.
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; 8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule Constitution

IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014 PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their
minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and 1. Power of Judicial Review
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners, 2. Actual Case or Controversy
vs. 3. Facial Challenge
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, 4. Locus Standi
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, 5. Declaratory Relief
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, 6. One Subject/One Title Rule
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Issue/s:
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
2012.
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said
violating the:
Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: 1. Right to life

2. Right to health
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. 3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy) by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
6. Due process clause action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
7. Equal protection clause some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but
PROCEDURAL:
also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of
the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious

1. Actual Case or Controversy freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the

2. Facial Challenge right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are
externalized.
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
5. One Subject/One Title Rule interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
Discussions: controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of

PROCEDURAL issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is

petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary

at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the

case. matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of

paramount public interest.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to

lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or

tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied

substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute

as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature,

of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has

of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to

direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for cripple or impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that

adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed the title of a law must not be so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or
scope of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is,
in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view:
Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul
or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to
recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no
existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The
Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of
a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as
law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express
their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It
shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional
meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that
life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at
fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they
did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was
to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot
interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits
abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH
Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives
under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives
are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH
Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following
a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory
only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the
FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient
and effective.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation
in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)
right or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the
authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause.
This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law
even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content),
intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found
a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition,
the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of
parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or
next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family
planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their
minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the
information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation
in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case
be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has
not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other
interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that
the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health
care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health
care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as
provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23
(a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services
on reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of
the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7
of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number
of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend
to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious
beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but
also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope
to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary,
ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there
exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise
directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi
is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have
been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the
social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and
responsible parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the
RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of
all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right
to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health,
the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible
parenthood which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human
development as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except
with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from
their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow
a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of
the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or
one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive
health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of
pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.