CASE DIGEST: THE 1987 CONSTITUTION presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
1. FRANCISCO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
[G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.]
FACTS:
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed with the Office of
the Secretary General of the House of Representatives, a verified impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and seven (7) other Associate
Justices of the Court for violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and,
committing high crimes. The House Committee on Justice subsequently dismissed
said complaint on October 22, 2003 for insufficiency of substance.
The next day, or on October 23, 2003, Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr., First District, Tarlac and Felix William B. Fuentebella, Third District,
Camarines Sur, filed another verified impeachment complaint with the Office of
the Secretary General of the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
alleging underpayment of the COLA of the members and personnel of the
judiciary from the JDF and unlawful disbursement of said fund for various
infrastructure projects and acquisition of service vehicles and other equipment.
Subsequently, several petitions were filed with this Court by members of
the bar, members of the House of Representatives and private individuals, asserting
their rights, among others, as taxpayers, to stop the illegal spending of public funds
for the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice.
Petitioners claim:
That the filing of second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice was barred under Article XI, Sec. 3 (5) of the 1987 Constitution which states
that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year. That calling for a legislative inquiry
into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF infringes on the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional
principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
Respondents claim:
Asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or
enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal
branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases.
Senate of the Philippines filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is
concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact,
adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Locus standi of petitioners;
2. Ripeness (prematurity; mootness);
3. Political question/justiciability;
4. Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
5. Constitutionality of the House Rules on
Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution; and
6. Judicial restraint
RULING:
1. YES
The present suits involve matters of first impression and of
immense importance to the public considering that, as
previously stated, this is the first time a Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is being subjected to an impeachment
proceeding which, according to petitioners, is prohibited by
the Constitution. Obviously, if such proceeding is not
prevented and nullified, public funds amounting to millions of
pesos will be disbursed for an illegal act. Undoubtedly, this is
a grave national concern involving paramount public
interest. The petitions are properly instituted to avert such a
situation.
2. YES
The petitions were justiciable or ripe for adjudication
because there was an actual controversy involving rights
that are legally demandable. A case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture. The instant
petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing
of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which
1
 is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out.
The Court ruled that upon the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action,
the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy
even without any other overt act.
3. YES
The resolution of the issues involves the construction of
the word "initiate." This, in turn, involves an interpretation of
Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution, in relation to
Sections 3(1) and 3(2). The issue as to the construction of Rule
V of the 2001 House Rules of Procedure affects a person
other than the Members of the House of Representatives,
namely, Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. These questions
are of necessity within the jurisdiction of the Court to resolve.
4. NO
This Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its
officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. Respondents' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6)
of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional
questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less
the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned.
5. YES
6.
An impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
complexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and
an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of
impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those
deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the
filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on
Justice. It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to
start with the filing of the complaint.
In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong
explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to
initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text
of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by
the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph
(2), Article XI of the Constitution.
The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is
the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already
been done. The action of the House is already a further step
in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow. Having concluded that the
initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of
the members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a
one year period.
NO
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is
not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
2
 declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor
can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to
which the controversy may be referred."Otherwise, this Court
RULING:
would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2)
of the Constitution.
More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is
duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. Even
in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule
upon the challenge because no other office has the
authority to do so. On the occasion when this Court had
been an interested party to the controversy before it, it had
acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the
discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness.
2. CHREA vs. CHR [G.R. No. 155336. July 21, 2006.]
FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided
for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal
Autonomy.
On the strength of this special provisions, the Commission on
Human Rights promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998,
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected
positions in the Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed
creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV
position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four
Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with
Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the Department of Budget and Management [DBM] with a
request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied
the request.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the phrase "THE APPROVED ANNUAL
APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED. Is equivalent
to fiscal autonomy?
2. Whether or not respondent CHR must conform to the Salary
Standardization Law?
1. NO
After reviewing the deliberations of the ConCom on
Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987 Constitution, in its
entirety, not just bits and pieces thereof, this Court is
convinced that the ConCom had intended to grant to the
respondent the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations automatically and regularly released, but
nothing more. While it may be conceded that the automatic
and regular release of approved annual appropriations is an
aspect of fiscal autonomy, it is just one of many others.
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require.
It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the
highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay
plans of the government and allocate and disburse such
sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in
the course of the discharge of their functions.
The first sentence of Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of
the 1987 Constitution, expressly granting fiscal autonomy to
constitutional commissions, does not have the same
meaning as the second sentence, directing the automatic
and regular release of their approved annual appropriations.
2. YES
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal
autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government
offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law. Being a member of the fiscal autonomy
group does not vest the agency with the authority to
reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of
the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to
formulate and implement the organizational structures of
3
 their respective offices and determine the compensation of
their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position
Classification and Compensation System established
under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation
Standardization Law.
If the judiciary, a co-equal branch of government, which
was expressly granted by the Constitution with fiscal
autonomy, is required to conform to the Salary
Standardization Law and is subject to the scrutiny of the
DBM, sagaciously, the respondent cannot be deemed to
enjoy a better position than the Judiciary. The respondent
must, likewise, toe the line.
3. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR [G.R. No. 83896.
February 22, 1991.]
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 on July
25, 1987 which provides that:
"SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this
limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.
"SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or
assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive
Department holds more positions than what is allowed in
Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in
favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no
case shall any official hold more than two positions other than
his primary position.
"SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the
government in government-owned or controlled corporations,
at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such
corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary."
Petitioners Claim:
That this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit
subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:
"Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with,
or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
That it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those
provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions
against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution.
Respondents Claim:
That Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and
assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in
the boards of government corporations:
(a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in
the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8,
paragraph 1, Article VIII; or
(b) if allowed by law; or
(c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective
positions.
4
 ISSUE:
1. Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional and not runs
counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution?
2. Whether the prohibition on the Members of the Cabinet also
applies to other government employees covered by the Civil
Service Commission?
RULING:
1. NO
Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions
that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to
not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually
allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
As keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during
the deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling
points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its
ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that
the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding
multiple positions in the government and collecting
unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would
be discontinued.
2. NO
The prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and
private office or employment.
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on
the President and his official family, which prohibitions are
not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees
such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are
proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office.
4. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS [G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
FACTS:
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad.
Respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and
that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition
and mandamus. The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
Petitioners Claim:
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also
argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
5
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by
the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.
Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it
has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate
that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids
provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms
of price per share.
Respondents Claim:
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement
of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, there must be existing laws "to lay down
conditions under which business may be done."
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does
not fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, sheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine
wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and
second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
Third, Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part
of the national patrimony.
Fourth, the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had
not yet taken place.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the provisions of the constitution is self- executing
2. Whether or not the shares of Manila Hotel is part of the national national
economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term State, hence, mandated to
implement section 10, paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Constitution
4. Whether or not the Filipino First policy should be applied
RULING:
1. YES.
In case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self- executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of
the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give
the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which
could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in
another.
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. It is per se judicially enforceable.
When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if
there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy.
2. YES.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty,
independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our
6
national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management
of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the
hotel and the land on which the hotel edi ce stands.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.
3. YES.
In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when
the activity it engages in is a " public function", (2) when the government is so-signi
cantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for
his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of "state action." Without
doubt therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in
fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but
also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case
the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive
Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its
authority from the State.
4. YES
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional at is omnipresent to be imply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the
1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.
***GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid
of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.
5. MABANAG vs. VITO. [G.R. No. L-1123. March 5, 1947.]
FACTS:
Three (3) of the plaintiff senators and eight (8) of the plaintiff
representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on
Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections. The
3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first
session of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in
their election. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit
in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same
reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that
resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the present
petition was filed.
As a consequence these 3 senators and 8 representatives did not take
part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership
reckoned within the computation of the necessary 3/4 vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would
have been short of the necessary 3/4 vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed for the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution
amending the Constitution as it allegedly contrary to the Constitution. However,
respondents argues that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the
Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill.
7
ISSUE: Whether the court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the
resolution proposing an amendment of the Constitution.
RULING:
No. It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by
express constitutional or statutory provision. This doctrine is predicated on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters
fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the
scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions
of the political departments of the government.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which
leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each
other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is
no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to
its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent
of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous
attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less
reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of a
ratification.
As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals
from each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the
disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a
law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190
as amended. The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution
(enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill
shall prevail over those of the journals.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the
secretary of state.
6. KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA [G.R. No. 113375. May 5, 1994.]
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction which seeks to
prohibit and restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" executed by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation (PGMC) in connection with the on- line lottery system,
also known as "lotto."
Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct "charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO decided to
establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base
and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning
that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya
Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public
companies in Malaysia,"became interested to offer its services and resources to
PCSO." As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees)
organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation
known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was
intended to be the medium through which the technical and management
services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.
The bid of PGMC was later on approved which resulted to the petitioners
objection.
Petitioners Claim:
That the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease with
the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and
conduct the on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the
PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint venture
with any person, association, company or entity, foreign or domestic." Even
granting arguendo that a lease of facilities is not within the contemplation of
"collaboration" or "association," an analysis, however, of the Contract of Lease
clearly shows that there is a "collaboration, association, or joint venture between
respondents PCSO and PGMC in the holding of the On-Line Lottery System," and
that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent
PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO."
8
 That paragraph 10 of the Contract of Lease requires or authorizes PGMC to
establish a telecommunications network that will connect all the municipalities and
cities in the territory. However, PGMC cannot do that because it has no franchise
from Congress to construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to
Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended. Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned
or controlled corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that
purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Respondents Claim:
It is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, (i.e., the building
and maintenance of a lottery system to be used by PCSO in the operation of its
lottery franchise); and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-
operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise, 'in
collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGMC as such statutory limitation
is viewed from the context, intent, and spirit of Republic Act 1169, as amended by
Batas Pambansa 42." It further claims that as an independent contractor for a
piece of work, it is neither engaged in "gambling" nor in "public service" relative to
the telecommunications network, which the petitioners even consider as an
"indispensable requirement" of an on-line lottery system.
That the execution and implementation of the contract does not violate the
Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise
granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be
ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not appear to have the
legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs
sought."
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the locus standi to file the petition.
2. Whether or not the challenged Contract of Lease violate or contravene
the exception in Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42,
which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in
collaboration, association or joint venture with" another.
RULING:
1. YES
The instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral
well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the
counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery
system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the
respondents tried to take advantage of.
2. YES.
The challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is,
therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. The language of Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way
of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease
such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the
PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of
the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may
be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
The very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that
any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the
technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while
the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is
not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate its
title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture
for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery
system.
7. TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 188456. September 10, 2009]
FACTS:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission
on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at
which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years(18
years) "shall be submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent
implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force
and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by
also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed
9
and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be
null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention
of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the
purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution,
namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16,
1967 and June 17, 1969, respectively. The delegates to the said Constitution were
all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation
thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No. 2 read as
follows:
"SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be
composed of two elective Delegates from each representative
district who shall have the same qualifications as those required
of Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
"SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention
shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at
which they are submitted to the people for their ratification
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution."
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent
the different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No. 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the
Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of
election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over,
as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on
September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of
September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading
thus:
"CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
"A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING
AGE TO 18.
"BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention:
"Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the
Philippines is amended to as follows:
"Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male)
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and
are able to read and write, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for one year and in the
municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least
six months preceding the election.'
"Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the
Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local
elections in November 1971.
"Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age
qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without
prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the
future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions
of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire
Constitution.
"Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the
sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended funds
for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided,
however that should there be no savings or unexpended sums,
the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2
days per diem.'"
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust
being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions
subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections,
on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the
Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and
may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of
the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution is violated by
the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1.
2. (Intervenors questioned the jurisdiction of the court) Whether or not the
Court can entertain the issue on this case being a political question and
that the Convention being a legislative body of the highest order is
10
 sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the
control of the Congress and the courts
HELD:
1. Yes. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting
the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not
authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of
the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null
and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is
sufficiently clear. It says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a
constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose
"may propose amendments to this Constitution, "thus placing no
limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the
Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely
provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people
for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how
many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any
amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent
assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision
unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the
wisdom and appropriateness of this provision. As already stated,
amending the Constitution is as serious and important an
undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed, any
amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it,
if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and
harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the framework of the
government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately
formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive
articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and
national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people,
on the other. It is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any
country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its
other parts.
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the
purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play
in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to
them, more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated whole, and they
can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it
before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as
a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form
part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the
proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its
parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding
already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident
that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be
concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the constitution
to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of
suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment, although it may already be observed
that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the voting age to
eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he
does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication
whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future
action, what kind of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to
approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether
the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or
not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for
each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the
difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every part and
aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the
effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the
Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification
of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter
not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of
the amendment per seas well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution
with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of
things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of
hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to
present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with
this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people
are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We
11
reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of
reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the
sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to
take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the
Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language
of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in
Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission"
2. The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work
of the Constitutional Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass
judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow these eighteen years
old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the
people under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate oases
with appropriate parties whether or not the mandates of the
fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has
given Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned
plebiscite before it has finished, and separately from, the whole draft of
the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention
implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV
that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification
of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not
denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment;
We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution,
the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together
with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present
Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic
Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing
acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of
a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent
Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null
and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and
Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any
action in compliance with the said organic resolution.
8. JAVELLANA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 73, submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating
funds therefor, as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of
the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
In December 23, the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution and
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free
and open debate on the proposed Constitution.The Court deemed it fit to refrain,
for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date
nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially.
Josue Javellana, a Filipino and a registered voter sought to enjoin the
Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the said constitution.
Javellana alleged that the President ordered the immediate implementation of
the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, and that the latter are acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution. He construed
that the President is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; to approve
the proposed Constitution; proclaim the ratification; and that the election held to
ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD:
The basic issues and the votes of the SC justices were:
(1) Whether the validity of Proclamation 1102 is a political or a justiciable
question
- Six justices said it is justiciable, three said it is political, and one
justice qualified his vote.
(2) Whether the new Constitution was validly ratified (with substantial if not
strict compliance) conformably with the 1935 Constitution
- Six justices said no, three said there was substantial compliance,
and one qualified his vote.
(3) Whether the people had acquiesced in the new Constitution (with or
without valid ratification)
- Four justices said the people had already accepted the new
Constitution, two said that there can be no free expression by the people
qualified to vote of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed
Constitution under martial law, one said he is not prepared to state that a
new Constitution once accepted by the people must be accorded
recognition independently of valid ratification, and three expressed their
12
 lack of knowledge or competence to rule on the question because under
a regime of martial law with the free expression of opinions restricted, they
have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the
people have accepted the Constitution.
(4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to relief
- Six justices voted to dismiss the petitions, while four were for
giving due course to the petitions.
(5) Whether the new Constitution is already in force
- Four said yes by virtue of the peoples acceptance of the same,
four said they could not with judicial certainty whether or not the people
had accepted the Constitution, and two declared that the new
Constitution is not in force, with the result that there are not enough votes
to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
The SC decision concluded: Accordingly, by virtue of the majority of six
votes x x x. with four dissenting votes x x x all of the aforementioned cases are
hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
9. SALIDAD VS COMELEC [G.R. No. L- 44640 October 12, 1976]
FACTS:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for Citizens Assemblies (barangays )to resolve
the issues on martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence , the length of the period for the existence
by the President of his present powers.
The President issued PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, b declaring
the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976.
The Decree recites in its whereas clauses that the peoples continued
opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire
to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite
on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as
Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on
October 16, 1976.
Petitioners Claim:
That under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to
the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is
political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.
HELD:
YES. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the
period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular
National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments
becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars.
1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed.
Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a
constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of
amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in
lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a
contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033,
which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as
invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one,
within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new
Constitution provides: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court
en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared
unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..
The Supreme Court said that if the President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative powers of the interim (National) Assembly (which was never convened),
there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the functions of the Assembly
to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, though peculiar,
to its gross legislative power x x x (W)ith the interim National Assembly not
convened and only the President'and the Supreme Court in operation, the urge of
13
absolute necessity renders it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and 11. Lawyers League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner vs.
in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1

10. Philippine Bar Association vs. COMELEC [140 SCRA 455 January 7, 1986]
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25,
1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
FACTS: 11 petitions were filed for prohibition against the enforcement of BP 883
assumption of power by stating that the new government was installed through a
which calls for special national elections on February 7, 1986 (Snap elections) for
direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
the offices of President and Vice President of the Philippines. BP 883 in conflict with
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is
the constitution in that it allows the President to continue holding office after the
illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
calling of the special election.

Issues:
Senator Pelaez submits that President Marcos letter of conditional resignation
Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.
did not create the actual vacancy required in Section 9, Article 7 of the
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
Constitution which could be the basis of the holding of a special election for
President and Vice President earlier than the regular elections for such positions in
Discussions: In order that the citizens actions may be allowed a party must show
1987. The letter states that the President is: irrevocably vacat(ing) the position of
that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath office ten (10) days after
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.
his proclamation. The unified opposition, rather than insist on strict compliance
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was
with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign,
the people that made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus,
vacate his office and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as
the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
acting President, their standard bearers have not filed any suit or petition in
intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. They have not
Ruling: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of
insisted that President Marcos vacate his office, so long as the election is clean, fair
action. The holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding
and honest.
that they did not have a cause of action. The legitimacy of the Aquino
government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
ISSUE: Is BP 883 unconstitutional, and should the Supreme Court therefore stop and
only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
prohibit the holding of the elections
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto
HELD: Yes. The petitions in these cases are dismissed and the prayer for the
government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
issuance of an injunction restraining respondents from holding the election on
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.
February 7, 1986, in as much as there are less than the required 10 votes to declare
BP 883 unconstitutional. The events that have transpired since December 3,as the
Court did not issue any restraining order, have turned the issue into a political
12. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997]
question (from the purely justiciable issue of the questioned constitutionality of the
act due to the lack of the actual vacancy of the Presidents office) which can be
DOCTRINE: RA 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
truly decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution isconcerned.
election, since there is no issue more political than the election. The Court cannot
stand in the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give
FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
the incumbent president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition). The Delfin Petition
alleged, among others, that the provisions soughtto be amended are Sections 4
14
and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the
Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the
deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition: DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF
ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4
AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION? After complying with the order of the
COMELEC, the petition was set for hearing. After hearing their arguments, the
COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. The petitioners herein (Santiago, Padilla,
Ongpin) filed a special civil action for prohibition for the ff. reasons:
1. The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed;
2. It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative,
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative
on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which
are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III;
3. Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after
publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only
laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take
effect only upon ratification and not after publication;
4. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 adopted to govern "the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the
COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the
exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law;
5. The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term
limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of
the people's initiative;
6. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's
initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government
department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the
purpose.
ISSUE: WON RA 6735 is sufficient insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
RULING:
No. Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides for the exercise of the right
of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative.The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This
provision is not self-executory. The Court agrees that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history
reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
However, it is not in full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to
"provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.
First, contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section
reads: Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of
initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or
in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied). The inclusion of the word
"Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum
on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded
the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
"laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second, unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not
provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5,
paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought
to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be.
It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third, while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter
simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on
national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy
of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted
or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local
initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or
15
resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. Hence, to
complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. As to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twentythree sections, merely (a) mentions,
the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and
includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the
constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the petition;
and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition. There was,
therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service. 5
13. SALONGA vs. PANO [G.R. # L-59524]
FACTS:
On Sept 6, 1980, a bomb exploded inside the room of Victor Lovely Jr.,
who was a Philippine-born American citizen. He and his brother were seriously
injured. After said explosion, he was brought to the AFP Medical Center. Lovely
and his two brothers, Baltazar and Romeo were charged with subversion, illegal
possession of explosives, and damage to property. His room was found with several
pictures of petitioner Jovito Salonga and his wife with Lovely at the birthday party
of former Congressman Raul Daza.
On Sept 12, 1980, another bomb exploded in Rustans Makati killing an American
and injuring several others. According to Romeo, he drove Victor to Salongas
residence on two occasions implying the latters participation in the said
bombings.
After several days, Lovely was transferred to the office of Col. Madella.
Several bombing also occurred and Arrest, Search, and Seizure Orders (ASSO)
were issued against those who were implicated by Lovely in the bombings, one of
which was petitioner.
On Oct. 21, 1980, the military arrived at the hospital room of Salonga where he was
confined for asthma and he was arrested without being informed of the charge/s
against him. His lawyers were not even allowed to visit him until the Court issued an
order for them to be able to do so. On Nov. 2, Salonga was transferred to Fort
Bonifacio, he claims that he was not informed of the reason for his transfer and
detainment, nor was he investigated or questioned.
On No. 27, he was released from military custody and placed under house
arrest. On Dec 10, the Judge Advocate General sent Salonga a Notice of
Preliminary Investigaton stating that the case had been set on the 12th. He still
received no copy of the charges against him. On Feb 24, 1981, respondent City
Fiscal filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. 1700 or the Anti-
Subversion Act. The preliminary investigation was set for March 17. Salonga was
allowed to leave the country for comprehensive medical examinations after
serious injuries during the Plaza Miranda Bombing.
On March 26, petitioners counsel was furnished a copy of the amended
complaint signed by Gen. Olivas charging the petitioner and 39 others of the
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act.
On Oct. 15, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him for failure of
the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. It was denied on Dec
2, and on Jan. 4 1982, respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an
information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act against 40 people.
ISSUES:
1.) W/N petitioners certiorari pleading for his motion to dismiss should be given due
course since the MD is a mere interlocutory order
2.) W/N there was sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against
petitioner
HELD:
1.) The Supreme Court held that generally, interlocutory orders may not be the
questioned by certiorari since the issue of dismissal will once again be decided by
the court and that movant has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. However, in this case, the SC held into account certain
exceptions: recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus to question the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in
the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was so declared in
"Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969."
Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal
procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest
and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The
integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in
the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence
linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists.
16
In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty
of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional
rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made against him, justifies
the favorable consideration of this petition by this Court.
2.) The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the
facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a
conviction. The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the
respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor
Lovely. Col. Diegos testimony was only based on hearsay as well.
Lovely had two different versions of Salongas participation in the handling of the
bomb materials to him along with Atty. Tanada. The first version in court included
him being in Salongas house and being dropped of by both Tanada and Salonga
at the Broadway Centrum with Salonga personally handing him the alleged bag of
materials. The second, given in a radio interview, only involved Tanada handing
Lovely the bag and leaving him at the Centrum without the personal involvement
of Salonga. The two testimonies clearly contradicted Salongas involvement.
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in
subversive activities in the United States is not only inexplicable but without
foundation.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner
Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism. There is no proof of his direct
participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons-
(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and
(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines
being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President Marcos
immediately."
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by
association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that Senator Salonga was a
leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because
some plotters, masquerading as visitors, have somehow met in his house or office
would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be
the basis of criminal indictments. It will only constitute prima facie evidence of
membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring
with other members in furtherance of a plan to overthrow the government by illegal
means, however, there was no proof of such plan in this case.
14. TAAADA vs ANGARA [G.R. # 118295]
FACTS:
On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade
and Industry, representing the Philippine Government, signed in Marrakesh,
Morroco the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations (Final Act). This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on December 14
via Resolution No. 97 whereby the Senate concurs in the ratification by President
Fidel Ramos of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is
composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments
included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are
integral parts thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only
the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments
in Financial Services.
The WTO gives access to the Philippines the foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products. It provides new opportunities for the service sector cost
and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the probable benefits as reflected in the agreement and a free
market espoused by the WTO.
Petitioners, however, viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and
impairs Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First
policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading
intervention. They argue that the WTO agreement violates Sec. 19m Article II,
providing for the development of a self-reliant and independent national
economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Art XII, providing for the Filipino First policy
ISSUE: W/N Resolution No. 97 approving the WTO is unconstitutional
HELD:
No. By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and
state policies. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan,
Incorporated vs. Moratothe principles and state policies enumerated in Article II
17
and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard of
which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody
judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad
constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and
the lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making.
While the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor,
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an
isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the
country, it does not prohibit them either.
The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does
not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community.
15. SALNAKAS vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. # 159085]
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, around 300 officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of
the Oakwood Building in Makati and publicly complained about the corruption in
the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government. They
demanded the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense, and the PNP
Chief. President GMA proclaimed a state of rebellion and called out the armed
forces to suppress the same under Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
On August 1, 2003, PGMA issued Proclamation No. 435 declaring the cessation of
rebellion despite the Oakwood mutiny ending on the very same day.
However, the instant petitioners were filed contending that Sec. 18 of Art VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the
AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such declaration since the mutiny had
already abated and eventually died out. Furthermore, they contend that the
same section does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion, since it is
used to circumvent the report requirement of the President to Congress within 48
hours of the declaration of martial law.
ISSUE: W/N Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional
HELD:
YES. Section 18, Art VII does not expressly prohibit declaring a state of rebellion. The
President in addition to the Commander-in-Chief powers is conferred Executive
powers as the Chief Executive. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity of
such. None of the petitioners have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that
the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the
report is of no merit since there is no illustration that the President has attempted or
has exercised martial law powers. The issue of usurpation of legislative power is also
of no merit since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out
the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers.
These are purely executive powers, vested on thePresident by Sections 1 and 18 of
Article VII.
16.) DAVID VS. ARROYO [G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, on the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP
1017.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the
conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
Seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were
filed against the respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President
Arroyo as respondent.
Arguments of the petitioners:
1. It encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;
18
 2. It is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and
3. It violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,
of speech and of assembly.
4. Challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as
a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed
that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon,
hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no
emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
5. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation
of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo
"gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces
without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."
ISSUE:
1.) WON the issue is already moot and academic as defense of the
respondents.
2.) WON the orders issued are unconstitutional based on FACIAL
CHALLENGE
HELD:
1.) NO. The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution;31second, the exceptional character of the situation and
the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue
raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public;33and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of
jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues
being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic
rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court
has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines
or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in
the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions
are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices very
statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party
raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or
damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this
exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
2.) NO. Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its
"overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached on both
unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the
American Law as First Amendment cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the US Supreme Court held
that "we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context
of the First Amendment" (freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally
unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be
held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the
plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is
an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one
at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the
State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct
even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
19
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to
be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The
reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not
be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.108 A writer
and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes
it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the
Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its
actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and
requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-
by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can
be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even
attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness.
This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which
holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the same
principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague
in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence
cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
17.) SENATE VS. SEC. ERMITA [G.R. NO. 169777 April 20, 2006]
FACTS: In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through
its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of
the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued
invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on
September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked
by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to
investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract
covering the North Rail Project.
***On September 28, 2005 the president issued an E.O which prohibits its cabinet
members and other officials covered by the executive privilege without its prior
consent from attending any hearing to be conducted by the congress in aid of
20
legislation. The said E.O takes effect immediately without being published in official
gazette or newspaper.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials
of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the
NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the
required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled
date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter 9 to
Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security,
informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of
National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any
Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the
President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP
officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen.
Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and
Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all
the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyo's order barring military personnel from testifying before
legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were
relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial
proceedings.
Several petitioners questioned its constitutionality including some of the members
of house of representatives and the senate. The respondent on the otherhand
questioned their legal standing.
ISSUE:
1.) WON the petitioners have locus standi
2.) WON there was an actual case or controversy since the respondent alleged
that there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually withheld her
consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials. That it merely
informed the Senate President that they have not secured the consent of the
president.
HELD:
1.) YES. That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only
for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially
for sound legislation is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of
the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.
Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct
interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate
the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro
Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis),
Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to
question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an
investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was
aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient
that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties
as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement
as it obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and
is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the
declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and
enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their
petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners COURAGE and CODAL is
rendered unnecessary.
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an
organization of citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members, invoke their constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to
information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise
of other constitutional rights and to the maintenance of the balance of power
among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and
balances.
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing
the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations,
must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives, this Court
held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
2.) YES. The Court finds respondents' assertion that the President has not withheld
her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in
determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is
concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent
or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from
appearing before Congress.
21

As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the
absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it
would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present
case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this
Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
18.) BAYAN VS. SEC. ERMITA [G.R. 169881 April 25, 2006]
FACTS:
Factual Arguments: The petitioners here come in three groups Bayan et al., Jess Del
Prado et al., and Kilusang Mayo Uno et al.,. On different dates, these petitioners
alleged that their rights to peaceful assembly were violated because the
policemen dispersed their assembly even prior its start. In dispersing the said rallies,
the policemen invoked Batas Pambansa B.P. 880 which prohibits a public assembly
without permit issued by the Mayor of the City or Municipality where the assembly
is to be held. Some of the petitioners alleged that their members were injured
during the confrontation with the policemen.
Legal Arguments: Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a
signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public
assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It
also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as
it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words "lawful
cause," "opinion," "protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause
not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows
that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny
test.
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional
as it is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of
grievances because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also
characterizes public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and
allows their dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually
prohibitions.
Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear
standards. The two standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and
imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the
standard of maximum tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for
being vague and for lack of publication.
Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right
to assembly and therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of
securing a permit. And even assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right,
the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit
on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long
as certain events require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue
would possibly wane.
As to the CPR policy (Calibrated Preemtive response), they argue that it is
preemptive, that the government takes action even before the rallyists can
perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the
policy. Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880
and violates the Constitution as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the
people of the right to peaceably assemble.
***The respondents officials argued that Petitioners have no standing because they
have not presented evidence that they had been "injured, arrested or detained
because of the CPR," and that "those arrested stand to be charged with violating
Batas Pambansa [No.] 880 and other offenses." They further alleged that the law
does not violate the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
1.) WON the petitioners have the locus standi
2.) WON the law is constitutional
HELD:
1.) YES. Petitioners' standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens
to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed
by theConstitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit for all
who would publicly assemble in the nation's streets and parks. They have, in fact,
purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their
claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the
Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such
22
action as contrary to law and dispersed the public assemblies held without the
permit.
Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 4.No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these
rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all
the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
2.) YES. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec, where the Court
referred to it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers
to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to
"lawful cause" does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to
be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the
definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject.
The words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of
the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health.
19. Roque vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 188456. September 10, 2009]
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as
taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec's award of
the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of
Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International
Corporation (Smartmatic) and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and
Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award.
From the petition, the Court gathers the following facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing
the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national
and local elections and onwards. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national and local
polls, however, came and went but purely manual elections were still the order of
the day. On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369 was passed authorizing
anew the Comelec to use an AES. The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2000
elections, as funds were not appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due
to time constraints.
Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released the Request
for Proposal (RFP), also known as Terms of Reference (TOR), for the nationwide
automation of the voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and
canvassing of votes for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. What is referred to also in the RFP and other contract documents as
the 2010 Elections Automation Project (Automation Project) consists of three
elaborate components, as follows:
Component 1: Paper-Based AES. 1-A. Election Management System
(EMS); 1-B Precinct-Count Optic Scan (PCOS) System and 1-C.
Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS);
Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of Election Results
using Public Telecommunications Network; and
Component 3: Overall Project Management
And obviously to address the possibility of systems failure, the RFP
required interested bidders to submit, among other things: a continuity
plan and a back-up plan.
Under the two-envelope system designed under the RFP, each
participating bidder shall submit, as part of its bid, an Eligibility Envelope that
should inter alia establish the bidder's eligibility to bid. On the other hand, the
second envelope, or the Bid Envelope itself, shall contain two envelopes that,
in turn, shall contain the technical proposal and the financial proposal,
respectively.
23
 Meanwhile, Congress enacted RA 9525 appropriating some PhP11.3
billion as supplemental budget for the May 10, 2010 automated national and
local elections.
Of the ten (10) invitation-responding consortia which obtained the bid
documents, only seven (7) submitted sealed applications for eligibility and
bids which, per Bid Bulletin No. 24, were to be opened on a pre-set date,
following the convening of the pre-bid conference.
Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and
Smartmatic, the former incorporated under the Corporation Code of the
Philippines. Smartmatic, on the other hand, was organized under the laws of
Barbados. For a stated amount, said JV proposed to undertake the whole
automation project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200 PCOS machines. After the
conclusion of the eligibility evaluation process, only three consortia were found
and thus declared as eligible.
After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the
SBAC then directed the joint venture to undertake post-qualification
screening, and its PCOS prototype machines the Smarmatic *Auditable
Electronic System (SAES) 1800 to undergo end-to-end testing to determine
compliance with the pre-set criteria.
Soon after, TIM wrote Comelec expressing its desire to quit the JV partnership. In
time, however, the parties were able to patch up what TIM earlier described as
irreconcilable differences between partners.
What followed was that TIM and Smartmatic, pursuant to the Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA), caused the incorporation of a joint venture corporation (JVC)
that would enter into a contract with the Comelec. Later on, the Comelec and
Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract for the lease of
goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of
PhP7,191,484,739.48, payable as the "Goods and Services are delivered and/or
progress is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments". 35 On the
same date, a Notice to Proceed was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM
Corporation.
Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse which,
for all intents and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the July 10,
2009 Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract adverted to.
Among others, petitioners pray that respondents be permanently enjoined from
implementing the automation project on the submission that the public
respondents COMELEC and COMELEC-SBAC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in awarding the 2010
Elections Automation Project to private respondents TIM and SMARTMATIC for the
following reasons:
. . . COMELEC DID NOT CONDUCT ANY PILOT TESTING
OF THE . . . PCOS MACHINES OFFERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, IN VIOLATION OF
[RA] 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369)
THE [PCOS] MACHINES [THUS] OFFERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS . . . DO NOT SATISFY THE MINIMUM
SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SET BY [RA] NO. 8436 (AS
AMENDED BY [RA] 9369).
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS . . . DID NOT SUBMIT THE
REQUIRED DOCUMENTS DURING THE BIDDING PROCESS
THAT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE DUE EXISTENCE,
COMPOSITION, AND SCOPE OF THEIR JOINT VENTURE,
IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 159139, Jan. 13,
2004).
THERE WAS NO VALID JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
[JVA] BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC
AND TIM DURING THE BIDDING, IN VIOLATION OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
COMELEC . . . WHICH REQUIRES A JOINT VENTURE TO
INCLUDE A COPY OF ITS [JVA] DURING THE BIDDING.
THE ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE COMPOSED OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, DOES NOT
SATISFY THE SUPREME COURT'S DEFINITION OF A "JOINT
VENTURE" IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC . . .
WHICH "REQUIRES A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER".
ISSUE:
24
Whether or not the COMELEC-SMARTMATIC-TIM Corporation automation serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the
Contract is invalid or unconstitutional due to the alleged COMELECs grave administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, .
abused its discretion when it awarded the 2010 Election Automation Project to . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the
SMARTMATIC and TIM. [Comelec] the initiative which by constitutional and legal
mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the
independent character of the Commission . . . requires that the
HELD: power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a
general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate
NO. Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation
cases. . . .
law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law,
which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing
to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the would go wrong, that a successful automation election unmarred by fraud,
corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse of violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the moment on May 10,
discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the
surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign voting machines and the integrity of the counting and consolidation software
company as partner. DAaHET embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part
of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct
constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys
and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome
a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however,
functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of
towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and
laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with
bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would
restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of
accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of
lesser responsibility. It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough
all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec
wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that would enable it to
personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like
accomplish the great objective for which it was created to promote free,
anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed,
orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often,
credibly.
Comelec has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address
unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from
interfering with the Comelec's exercise of its power which, by law and by the
nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion on Comelec's part, as here, the Court should refrain
from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the
acts of that body. This gem, while not on all fours with, is lifted from, the Court's
holding in an old but oft-cited case:

. . . We may not agree fully with [the Comelec's] choice of

means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross
abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a
practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory [or
speculation]. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems.

Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will

25