Wessmer vs Velez

Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided
to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage, Velez left a note for
his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez
did not appear and was not heard from again.
Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared in default.
Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff P2.000 as actual damages P25,000
as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorneys fees.
Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but failed,
thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally
set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of
it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable
to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary
damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in wanton, reckless
and oppressive manner.

Velayo vs Shell
100 Phil 168 Civil Law Torts and Damages Obligations arising from human relations
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL
offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that
time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI
was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the
creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order
of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI
but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay
them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working
committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided
amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell
USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of
$79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell
Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell
USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment
which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell
Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine
Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This
prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets.
CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being
attached. Alfredo Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency
proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction
against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the
attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double
the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not
liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning
its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which
states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does
not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages
(Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a
willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.

G.R. No. L-18193 - BERNALDES, SR vs. Bohol Land Transportaion Inc.

FACTS:

Appellant, Jovito Bernaldes and his brother, Nicasio, boarded one of appellee's passenger
trucks(B.L.T. Co. No. 322 with plate No. 1470) in the town of Guindulman, Bohol, on the way to
Tagbilaran, the bus fell off a deep precipice in barrio Balitbiton, municipality of Garcia-
Hernandez, resulting in the death of Nicasio and in serious physical injuries to Jovito. A complaint
for damages against apellee, Bohol Land Transportation Co. was filed. Defendant moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on two grounds,namely, that the cause of action alleged therein was
barred by a prior judgment, and that it did not state a cause of action. At the hearing on the motion
to dismiss, it was established that in Criminal Case No. 2775 of the same court, the driver of the
bus involved in the accident, was charged with double homicide thru reckless imprudence but was
acquitted on the ground that his guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt, and that
appellees, through their attorneys, intervened in the prosecution of said case and did not reserve
the right to file a separate action for damages. The lower court sustained the motion on the ground
of bar by prior judgment, and dismissed the case. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON a civil action for damages against the owner of a public vehicle, based on breach of contract
of carriage, may be filed after the criminal action instituted against the driver has been disposed
of, if the aggrieved party did not reserve his right to enforce civil liability in a separate action.

WON whether the intervention of the aggrieved party, through private prosecutors, in the
prosecution of the criminal case against the driver who was acquitted on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence will bar him from suing the latter's employer for damages for breach of
contract, in an independent and separate action.

HELD:

1. YES. Article 31 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that when the civil action is based
uponan obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
This provision evidently refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a
felony in a criminal case but to one based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law
or contract. Upon the other hand it is clear that a civil action based on contractual liability of a
common carrier is distinct from the criminal action instituted against the carrier or its employee
based on the latter's criminal negligence. The first is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code,
and not by those of the Revised Penal Code, and it being entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, the same may be instituted and prosecuted independently of, and regardless of the
result of the latter. In the case at bar, the civil action instituted against appellee is based on alleged
culpa contractual Incurred by it due to its failure to carry safely the late Nicasio Bernaldes and his
brother Jovitoto their place of destination, whereas the criminal action instituted against appellee's
driver involved exclusively the criminal and civil liability of the latter arising from his criminal
negligence. In other words, appellant's action concerned the civil liability of appellee as a common
carrier, regardless of the liabilities of its driver who was charged in the criminal case. The failure,
on the part of the appellants, to reserve their right to recover civil indemnity against the carrier
cannot in any way be deemed as a waiver, on their part, to institute a separate action against the
latter based on its contractual liability, or on culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. (Parker, et al. vs. Panlilio, et al.,G.R. No. L-4961, March 5,1952). As a matter of fact, such
reservation is already implied in the law which declares such action to be independent and separate
from the criminal action. Moreover, it has been held that the duty of the offended party to make
such reservation applies only to defendant in the criminal action, not to persons secondarily liable
(Chaves, et al. vs. Manila Electric, 31 Phil. 47).

2. YES. Appellants, through private prosecutors, were allowed to intervene in the criminal action
against appellee's driver, but if that amounted inferentially to submitting in said case their claim
for civil indemnity, the claim could have been only against the driver but not against appellee who
was not a party therein. As a matter of fact, however, inspite of appellee's statements to the contrary
in its brief, there is no showing in the record before Us that appellants made of record their claim
for damages against the driver or his employer; much less does it appear that they had attempted
to prove such damages. The failure of the court to make any pronouncement in its decision
concerning the civil liability of the driver and/or of his employer must therefore be due to the fact
that the criminal action did not involve at all any claim for civil indemnity .Lastly, as appellee's
driver was acquitted only on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages against him may be
instituted for the same act or omission (Rule 107, par. [d]; Art. 29, New Civil Code). If such is the
rule as against him, a fortiori, it must in the case of his employer

Carandang v. Santiago
G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M.
Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await the result
of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas
Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person
of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals where the case is now pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the
civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault
and battery under American law. But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to
designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide,
and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the
body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed
is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is
attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages
arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.

HELD:
Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries."
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in
the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two
terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in
the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it
is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime
defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would
have used terms in the same article some in their general and another in its technical sense. In
other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime
of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

FORTICH CELDRAN v CELDRAN

FACTS: Plaintiffs were the children of the deceased, Pedro Celdran, Sr. from the first marriage.
Defendants were Josefa Celdran, spouse of the decreased by the second marriage and their seven
children. When the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, Ignacio Celdran withdrew as one of
the plaintiffs, alleging that the documents was falsified. On March 6, 1959, the parties an
amicable settlement, except Ignacio Celdran, recognizing as valid for being satisfied by Ignacio,
upon receipt of P10,000 plus two residential lots. Ignacio appealed to the CA. On March 22,
1963, at the instance of Ignacio, an information for falsification of public documents was filed by
the first marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial
question be suspended, for the reason that the alleged falsification of document of withdrawal is
at issue in the case pending in the CA.
HELD: The court held the action poses a prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution for
alleged falsification. The authenticity of the document was assailed in the same civil action. The
resolution in the civil case be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal suit pending. As such, it is a prejudicial question which should be first decided before
the prosecution can proceed in the criminal case. Prejudicial question is one that arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal; it is determinative of the case before the court and
jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in another. The decision of the CA under review is
affirmed. The administrative case was held in abeyance of the high court.

JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

MENANDRO V. LAPUZ, respondents
FACTS: On June 23, 1982, petitioner Jose Lagon purchased two parcels of land located at
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi. A few months after the sale,
private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat. Private respondent claimed that he
entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over three parcels of land in Sultan
Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. It was agreed upon that private respondent will put up
commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by
those tenants, would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi
for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but was allegedly renewed. When Bai
Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed
administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals
from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing
himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus
filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs of BaiTonina Sepi to
sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Petitioner denied the
allegation, thus contending that the heirs were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of
the deceased. He also denied interfering with private respondent's leasehold rights as there was
no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal investigation and
inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject lots. On July 29, 1986, the RTC
decided in favor of the private respondent. Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification. It held for
petitioner liable for damages, reasoning that he must have known of the lease contract and must
have also acted with malice or bad faith when he bought the subject parcels of land.
ISSUE: Whether or not the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed
existence of private respondent's lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted
tortuous interference for which petitioner should be held liable for damages
HELD: NO The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid down the elements
of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of
the third person without legal justification or excuse .As regards the first element, the existence
of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court
a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal. While the contract appeared as duly notarized,
the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but not the veracity
of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioners counsel and after
the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract
presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the late Bai
Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear,
strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of
the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery. The second element, on the other hand,
requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists. Knowledge
of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous
interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he
is unaware of. While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware
of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the
contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers (the
heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner meritorious. He
conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance
that would have made acautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over
the property. An examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold
interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the same. Assuming
ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient
to make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to
our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal
justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To
sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have
been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of
interference cannot be justified. Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private
respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The
word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of
conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late
Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did
absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not offer any
evidence to support his claim.
In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease
contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the
part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was
never established.

PHIL. MATCH CO., LTD., vs. CITY OF CEBU & JESUS ZABATE (Acting City
Treasurer)
G.R. No. L-30745 January 18, 1978
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Cebu
Aquino, J.:
Facts: Petitioner, engaged in manufacturing of matches, assails the legality of the tax which the
city treasure collected on out-of-town deliveries of matches by virtue of the city ordinance which
taxes good stored and/or sold within the city. The company sought refund of the sales tax and for
damages against the city treasurer fo r not following the advise of the city fiscal, as legal adviser
of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not subject to sales tax. The trial court
dismissed the complaint against the city treasurer.

Issue: WON the city treasurer can be held liable for damages under art. 27 of the CC

Ruling: Judgment AFFIRMED.

Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that "any person suffering material or moral lose because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken." Article 27 presupposes that the refuse or
omission of a public official is attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In the case at
bar, the records clearly show that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified under
the ordinance to collect taxes. The fiscals opinion on the legality of such or any other ordinance
is merely advisory and has no binding effects.
As a rule, Where an officer is invested with discretion in matters brought before him and when
so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result
or an erroneous or mistaken decision, provided the acts complained of are done within the scope
of the officer's authority and without malice, or corruption. It has been held previously by the SC
that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad
faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages Cabungcal vs. Cordovan 120
Phil. 667).