1

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA,
MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Apollo T . Tria for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
A petition for original registration of title over a parcel of land under Presidential Decree 1529, the Property Registration Decree, was dismissed by
the land registration court for want of jurisdiction for failure to comply with the provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation. The notice was only published in the Official Gazette. The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the case and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of the private respondent. It ruled that although the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force
that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; that the other requirements of publication in the
Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing and posting at the site and other conspicuous places were all complied with.
The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 23 of PD 1529 clearly provides that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. However, absent any publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration
court cannot validly confirm and register the title of private respondents. This is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due
process rationale behind the publication requirement. A land registration proceeding is a proceeding in rem and is validated essentially through
publication. The rationale behind the newspaper publication is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation. There was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law. The Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The application for land registration was dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
Judgment reversed, without prejudice.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; P.D. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE); LAND REGISTRATION; PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF INITIAL HEARING IN OFFICIAL
GAZETTE AND IN NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION, MANDATORY. The law (Section 23 of P.D. 1529) used the term "shall" in prescribing
the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The
said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute
rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term
must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide. Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1599 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied
with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if
mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law
included such requirement in its detailed provision.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LAND REGISTRATION, A PROCEEDING IN REM; VALIDATED ESSENTIALLY THROUGH PUBLICATION. It should be
noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all
persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would
be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty
in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he
is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. He must prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests
upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or interests; in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of
due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties
must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
3. CIVIL LAW; P.D. 1529 (PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE); LAND REGISTRATION; RATIONALE BEHIND PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION. It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the
case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally,
such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the
notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LAND REGISTRATION DISMISSAL OF ACTION WARRANTED FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PUBLICATION
REQUIREMENT IN NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION. Admittedly. there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of
the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses.
Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear Time and
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
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Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 3,
1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The
dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered
confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro,
to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a
decree be issued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the
Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the
applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

". . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the
Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit E'
was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits 'F' and 'G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it
has not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion provides: 8
"It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is
mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional;
while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the
Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As
to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to
assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also
in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm."
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel
anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of
Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. 9
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding
". . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of
general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication."
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published both in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is
a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13
". . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation is couched in
mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court."
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it
justified its disposition in this wise: 14
". . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the
other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other
 3

conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of
the application for registration."
The Court's Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
"Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an
order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days
from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication.
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and 'to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx"
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon
the land registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land
registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2)
mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with "If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining
properties, and occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision. LexLib
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land
as against allpersons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely
affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the
inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the
identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. 18 He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have
rights to or interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should not be
granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the
name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is
due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of
neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even
if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. 19 There is no
alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Chairman, Davide, Jr ., Melo, and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
||| (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102858, [July 28, 1997], 342 PHIL 239-249)
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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 171631. November 15, 2010.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and
GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents' application for registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of
land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented
by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of land 3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529)
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated
at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and
3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following
documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey
is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on January 03,
1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng
Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10, 1979; (8)
Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public land application; and (9) Certification by the Office of the
Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid. EAIaHD
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng
Pagkakaloob 4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the
said property from their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga
Pag-aari ng Namatay 5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land
and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it
in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period
of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented documentary evidence to prove
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for
registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that
the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a
portion of public domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there was no other oppositor
to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default 6 against the whole world except as against the Republic.
Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of the subject property. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and
CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and
residents of and with postal address at No. 65 Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and
bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping,
containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at Barangay
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes and other charges due on the
land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken. aAHSEC
SO ORDERED. 7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 8 The CA, in its Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that
respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient
evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition
raising the following grounds:
I
 5

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE
CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME
CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. 9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The
subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open,
notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994
and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's
Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the
annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should
not consider in a petition for review under Rule 45. TAacHE
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. 10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion. 11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. 12 These the respondents
must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence. 13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private
person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. 14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject
of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. 15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan
Ccn-00-000084 16(Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation: SIaHTD
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,
Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the
conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside
the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient
and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation, 18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly
the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at
 6

bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the
certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever
with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche, 19 the Court held that the applicant bears the burden of proving the
status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the
DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and
that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to prove that the subject land
falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to establish
that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove
that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain. 20
Anent respondents' possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed to show that the respondents
by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. CDAcIT
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject property consists of the
testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents'
predecessors-in-interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19,
1939, 21 testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them. 22 Amado
testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, 23 and on about the same year, he knew that the
respondents were occupying the subject land. 24
Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-
in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their
parents Zosimo and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show
Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of
possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice. 25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the
application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land. 26
Respondents' earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in
the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier. 27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject properties in
the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in
the names of the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership. 28
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land
of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of
the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied. STaCcA
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206,
affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio
R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five
(25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Carpio Morales, * Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, [November 15, 2010], 649 PHIL 106-120)
 7

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108998. August 24, 1994.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; PUBLIC LAND ACT; CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE; REQUIREMENTS; POSSESSION IS TACKED TO THAT
OF APPLICANTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST; CASE AT BAR. It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves," "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest."
Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case
at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession
of the land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were
acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since
1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to
confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to
establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid
taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta
Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her
father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was presented in
evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable and
disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA G.R. No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE THAT BEFORE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE, THE OCCUPANT IS NOT IN THE JURIDICAL SENSE THE TRUE OWNER OF
THE LAND, ALREADY ABANDONED. At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant
consideration. There, it was held that before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the
land since it still pertains to the State. Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in the 1986
case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606
[1991]) where the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that: "(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive
and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of
the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .
"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) '. . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title . . . .' No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more
than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to
private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete. As was so well put in Cario, '. . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.'" (Emphasis supplied)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPEN, CONTINUOUS AND EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION FOR AT LEAST 30 YEARS OF ALIENABLE PUBLIC LAND IPSO JURE CONVERTS THE
SAME TO PRIVATE PROPERTY. Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive possession
for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992];
Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41
[1993]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of
Lands v Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such,
the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
5. ID.; ID.; TORRENS SYSTEM OF LAND REGISTRATION; NOT A MEANS FOR ACQUISITION OF TITLE TO PRIVATE LAND. In other words, the Torrens
system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely
confirms, but does not confer ownership.
6. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC LAND ACT; BUYCO RULING (216 SCRA 78 [1992]) NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat
respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra)
supports petitioner's thesis. We disagree. In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of their supposed acquisition of the property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract
of land under the provisions of the Land Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration
court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on
review and we reversed. Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American citizens at the
time of their application therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or
possession in such a manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American
 8

citizens, they have acquired no vested rights over the parcel of land. In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession
in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private
respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapia's mother.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN WHO HAS LOST HIS
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE A TRANSFEREE OF PRIVATE LANDS. But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the
Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit: "Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." "Sec. 8. Notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of
private lands, subject to limitations provided by law." (Emphasis supplied) Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to
Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads: "Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide." Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides: "Sec. 2. Any
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one
hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein
granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed. "In the case the
transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural
lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized." From
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the
properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the
registration thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the
public domain. They are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and
exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban,
or one (1) hectare in case or rural land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a
private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not
significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question.
What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they
could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering that private respondents were
able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for
registration of title must perforce be approved.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 6 OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 185 PRIMARILY DIRECTED TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS THAN TO APPLICANT.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it
refers to Section 6, which requires the submission of the relevant sworn statement by the applicant. The Court is of the view that the requirements
in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom compliance
therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the requirements must likewise be submitted before the
land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application for registration of title before a land
registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land
registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is issued. And that is the time when the
requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree of registration is the one that is
submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of
registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the decree of registration is yet
to be issued.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from
a vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of
the court a quo in granting application of respondent spouses for registration over the lots in question. llcd
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D, as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San
Pablo City, from one Cristela Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase, respondent spouses were then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San
Pablo City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision
confirming private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this court hereby approves the said application and confirms the title and possession
of herein applicants over Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapia and Flor de Vega, all of
 9

legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo
City and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
"Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be
issued, there shall be annotated an easement of 6.25 meters road right-of-way."
"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino citizens when they bought the land in controversy
from its former owner. For this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens could not apply. In
justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large
sum of money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm their title over the land, for, as has been
passed upon, they had been the owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is
intended merely to confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of Victorias vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that title and
ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of
their purchase, not later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now cannot be taken against them for
they were not disqualified from acquiring the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November 11,
1987)." (Rollo, pp. 27-28)

Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented
therein. prcd
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle that land of whatever classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, before the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation of title would the land become
privately owned land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land, depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
"The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land
applied for registration of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is
conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over the two adjacent parcels of land
are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate
of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree."
(Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
"The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable and disposable zone established by the
Bureau of Forest Development (Exhibit `P'). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural Resources District
(IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied by the applicants `whose house of strong materials stands thereon';
that it had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses since 1979; that they acquired the same by
means of a public instrument entitled 'Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan' duly executed by the vendor, Cristeta Dazo Belen, on
June 17, 1978 (Exhibits 'I' and 'J'); and that applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of land for
more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is
the circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in 1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such
that when they filed their application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had already passed to
them." (Rollo, p.27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and argues:
"17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent spouses only
since 1979. However, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership. (citing
cases)
"18. Then again, the appellate court found that applicants (respondents) and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration.' This is not, however, the
same as saying that respondents have been in possession 'since June 12, 1945.' (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA No.
141; see also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession. They fall short of the required possession
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession prior to the filing of
their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when,
according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation purposes in their name." (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner, any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law provides. cdll
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
 10

"Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereof under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this charter." (Emphasis supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
"Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945."
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the
terms "by themselves", the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been
in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied
with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner
does not deny this except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be registered only in 1987 and
therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their
predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes
of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an
imperfect title. cdphil
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875 [1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before
the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already been abandoned in 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court(146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
"(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. . . .
"Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
". . . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as
by free patent. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
'As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens
title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.'
"Nothing can be more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the
statute itself (Section 48[b]) that the possessor(s) '. . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . . .' No proof being admissible to overcome a
conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would
not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period
of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cario, '. . . (There are indications that registration was expected from
all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." (Emphasis
supplied)

Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable
public land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC, 214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This
means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his predecessors-in- interest, vest title on such applicant so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218 SCRA 41 [1993]). Cdpr
 11

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above
stated, must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]).
When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the
public domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149
SCRA 32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were
able to establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had
paid taxes on the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9"). A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by
Cristeta Dazo and her sister Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo
from her father Pedro Dazo with the conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from the Bureau of Lands was
presented in evidence together with a letter from the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were part of the alienable
and disposable zone of the government and that no forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the ruling
in the Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of
the property. But this is where the similarity ends. the applicants in Buyco sought to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The land registration court decided in favor of the applicants
and was affirmed by the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter before us on review and we reversed. LibLex
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
"As we could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do not rely on fee simple ownership based on
a Spanish grant or possessory information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not
present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the 'titulo
real' or royal grant (b) the 'concession especial' or special grant; (c) the 'composicion con el estado' title or adjustment title;
(d) the 'titulo de compra' or title by purchase; and (e) the 'informacion posesoria' or possessory information title, which
would become a 'titulo gratuito' or a gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The primary basis
of their claim is possession, by themselves and the predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
"If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both
courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
'. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest (Cario v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935 [1909]; 212 U.S. 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.'
'. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended)
is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period ipso jure.' (Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
"It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cario and Susi, or for the
period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37
[1989]), adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . . , that an
applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the Government that the
lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the
burden of the applicant to prove its positive averments.
"In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the application is an
alienable and disposable land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and therefore inalienable under the
then 1973 Constitution).
". . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their imperfect title to the property in question. Their
allegation of possession since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to possession, specifically
'immemorial possession,' it means possession of which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he
has learned form his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never present in the case of private respondents. . . .
". . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest possessed the land for more than eighty (80) years. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property
allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of
partition of his estate among his heirs - in such manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cario and
Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May 1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with
respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private
 12

respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in
their application. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it goes without saying that they had
acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship."
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the applicants in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely because they were American citizens at the time of their application
therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a manner
that the property has been segregated from public domain; such that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired no
vested rights over the parcel of land. llcd
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by
their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapia's mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the
contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
"Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
"Sec. 8 Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa may provide."
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of which provides:
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to
enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one thousand
square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the
case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both shall avail of the same,
the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
"In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential purposes, he shall be entitled to be a transferee of
an additional urban or rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein authorized."
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what
governs the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185. LLpr
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view
of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in
character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof
under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his
Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq. m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land,
to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer
and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers
to Section 6, which provides:
"Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the registration of titles to lands, no private land shall
be transferred under this Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the province or city where the
property is located a sworn statement showing the date and place of birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his
spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any;
his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he
is presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act."
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to
the register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted. Nowhere in the provision is it stated much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An
application for registration of title before a land registration court should not be confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of
deeds. It is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the application for registration has become final that a decree of
registration is issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should be complied with by the
applicants. The decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor
 13

of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for
registration of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued. LibLex
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, [August 24, 1994])
 14

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159595. January 23, 2007.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land
registration case. It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would
unsettle precedent. We deny certiorariand instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July 1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental
rendered a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros. 1 In the
decision, the CFI, acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who
had established their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the corresponding decree of registration. 2 Among these lots was Lot
No. 771 of the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents
of Sibulan, Negros Oriental. 3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra, eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the
parents of Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through
various purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to 1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate
Deeds of Absolute Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra. 4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the
fact that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration
has ever been issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus, Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the
issuance of the corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the
Director of Lands, though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a few months before the commencement of the
Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December of 1941. ESCacI
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and
simultaneously deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the case was set for hearing and in all subsequent
proceedings. 5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently presented
by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 6 finding merit in the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the
1941 Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation
and registration based on the 1941 Decision.
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The
OSG further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have established that a request for issuance of a decree of registration before the
Administrator of the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court in its Decision 7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the
Court of Appeals reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of
judgments by motion, refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land registration cases. The Court of Appeals also
noted that it would have been especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to comply with the 1941 decision considering that it had
been established that the original records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do
apply to land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. 8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and
executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, after which time it may be enforced by
action before it is barred by statute of limitations. 9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or
Nillas's acquisition of the rights of the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property is inalienable or otherwise still
belonged to the State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of Appeals 10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro. 11 Shipside was cited since in that
case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the
judgment sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article
1144 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other
hand, Heirs of Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the subsequent action by one set of applicants for the
issuance of the decree of registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become final. The Court dismissed the subsequent
action, holding that laches had set in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7) years. cEDIAa
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters
the rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case." 12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a
decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and
enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his
theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of
10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the
 15

Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years,
by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The
decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. . . .
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . .
that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse
party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the reason that no motion therefor has been filed
can not prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered. 14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a decision in a land registration case was reiterated five (5) years
after Sta. Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al. 15 In that case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a
decree of registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others, barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument,
the Court was content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years
later in Rodil v. Benedicto. 16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc., and Poras 17 and Manlapas and Tolentino v.
Llorente, 18 respectively, that the right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a writ of possession of the land never
prescribes. 19

Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been
repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier, the Sta. Ana doctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later,
namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano, 20 Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals. 22 The doctrine of stare decisis compels
respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the
Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is insisted that
the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land registration cases either
by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. 23 The Republic further observes that Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should apply to
land registration proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the
current arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the
purpose of such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating
such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to
order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence,
the application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does
not specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need
for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable
to land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. After the judgment directing the registration of title to land has
become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue
the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry
of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the Commissioner to issue the
corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been amended,
reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of
registration as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The original certificate of
title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner,
entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by
the Commissioner and shall be sent, together with the owner's duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book. EHTADa
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No
obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The
obligations provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in
turn the corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner),
 16

and the Land Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register
of Deeds). All these obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment
or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing
party from ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land
registration system is geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an
additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is
complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced
by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to
file a petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption
that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue
the decree of registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land
registration court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the
Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of years has passed since the promulgation of the land
court's unimplemented decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance of the decree of
registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a
determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of registration. IcESaA
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez? Even though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and
laches in those cases, it should be observed that neither case was intended to overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express
declaration to such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts, quite distinct from the general situation that marked
both Sta. Ana and the present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise from an original action for land registration, but from a successful motion
by the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose
in a land registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in
the course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of
prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation
that the judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier. However, the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good
reason, as the significantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring the revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer
held interest in the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion Development Authority prior to the filing of the action for
revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the rules of prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on still another point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the
proper execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to
employ the rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases. It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated
in 2001, the Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved even more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property
involved therein was the subject of two separate applications for registration, one filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party
in 1967. It was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this accomplished as early as 1968. 24 On the other hand, the
petitioners were able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the property had already been registered in the name of
the other claimant, thus obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of prescription and laches arose because the
petitioners filed their action to enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing title only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the
five (5)-year prescriptive period provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay
in filing the action for the execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that score. IHSTDE

Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part,
the earlier in date must prevail . . . ," and indeed even if the petitioners therein were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the
1979 judgment in their favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners
with their pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose
the other application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment within the five (5)-year reglementary period.
Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that negates its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract
from Sta. Anaas a general rule for that matter. The execution of the judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have
entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had already been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by
a Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a "ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to
effectuate the judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said that their right of ownership as confirmed by the
judgment in their favor was indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the same property accorded to a different party.
The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the general presumption that the final judgment, with which the corresponding decree of registration is
homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption obtains in this case as
well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent. 25
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of
prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta.
Ana as a general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement of a final judgment in a land registration case, especially
 17

when the said judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately or inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier
stands not so much as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in stating the obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the 1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to
the adjudicates' title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of
registration was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final decision's status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very
own execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty
terminology aside, the Republic's arguments on this point do not dissuade from our central holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to
effectuation by the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its
effectuation and the reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the then Land Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of
registration. In this case, all that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the original adjudicates her predecessors-in-
interest-in order to entitle her to the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original prevailing parties who are her predecessors-in
interest. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic does not offer any compelling
argument to dispute such proof. cCESaH
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio-Morales and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Republic v. Nillas, G.R. No. 159595, [January 23, 2007], 541 PHIL 277-293)
 18

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 168913. March 14, 2007.]
ROLANDO TING, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO,
ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the
Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982
directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses
Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same
lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N. 1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A.
Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner's application by Branch 21 of the Cebu
RTC, filed their Answer 2 calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on January
29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of respondents, dismissed petitioner's application on the
ground of res judicata. 3
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in
LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has
been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA); 4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of
respondents' motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N; 5 and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the
ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment pass[d] into extinction." 6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata. 7
The petition fails.
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The judgment rendered in a land registration
proceeding becomes finalupon the expiration of thirty days 8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the
judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance
with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied) SaHTCE
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the
title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the
whole world. 9 It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration. 10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not
issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and
all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first be approved by the Land Management Services of the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before
said resurvey may be used in court; and that the spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted to the court a
mere special work order. 11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration
court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is
ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of
the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt
upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court.
They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court.
They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings." 12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the
same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie. ISHaTA
 19

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 13 enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it supports his
theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of
10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the
Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years,
by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is
secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a
status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce
said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The
decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Ting v. Heirs of Lirio, G.R. No. 168913, [March 14, 2007], 547 PHIL 237-244)
 20

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123346. December 14, 2007.]
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 134385. December 14, 2007.]
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRI-CULTURE, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS
COMPULSORY HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO,
ALSON AND VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON;
REGISTER OF DEES OF MALABON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J p:
The stability of the country's Torrens system is menaced by the infestation of fake land titles and deeds. Any decision of this Court that breathes life
into spurious or inexistent titles all but contributes to the blight. On the contrary, the judicial devotion is towards purging the system of illicit titles,
concomitant to our base task as the ultimate citadel of justice and legitimacy.
These two petitions 1 involve properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the
Maysilo Estate. 2The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the
Vatican. 3 Despite their prime location within Metropolitan Manila, the properties included in OCT No. 994 have been beset by controversy and
sullied by apparent fraud, cloudy titles and shady transfers. It may as well be renamed the "Land of Caveat Emptor."
The controversy attending the lands of OCT No. 994 has not eluded this Court. Since 1992, our findings and ruling in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals 4 have stood as the Rosetta Stone in deciphering claims emanating from OCT No. 994, as was done in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 5 and in
the Court's Decision dated 29 November 2005 (2005 Decision) in these cases. 6 Yet in the course of resolving these motions for reconsideration
came the revelation that OCT No. 994 was lost in translation following MWSS. Certain immutable truths reflected on the face of OCT No. 994 must
emerge and gain vitality, even if we ruffle feathers in the process.
I.
A recapitulation of the facts, which have already been extensively narrated in the 2005 Decision, is in order. For clarity, we narrate separately the
antecedent facts in G.R. Nos. 123346 and 134385.
A. G.R. No. 123346, Manotok Realty, Inc.
and Manotok Estate Corporation, vs.
CLT Realty Development Corporation
On 10 August 1992, CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation
(Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate in an action filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129. 7
CLT's claim was anchored on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-177013 issued in its name by the Caloocan City Register of Deeds, which title in
turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito (Hipolito) by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988. Hipolito's title
emanated from Jose Dimson's (Dimson) TCT No. R-15169, a title issued pursuant to an order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City,
Branch 33. Dimson's title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994. 8
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that Dimson's title, the proximate source of CLT's title,
was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over
Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority. 9 The Manotok title likewise
traced as its primary source OCT No. 994 which, on 9 September 1918, was transferred to Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio who had previously
acquired the property on 21 August 1918 by virtue of an "Escritura de Venta" executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Llopis. 10 On 3
March 1920, Ruiz and Leuterio sold the property to Francisco Gonzalez who held title thereto until 22 August 1938 when the property was
transferred to Jose Leon Gonzalez, Consuelo Susana Gonzalez, Juana Francisca Gonzalez, Maria Clara Gonzalez, Francisco Felipe Gonzalez and
Concepcion Maria Gonzalez under TCT No. 35486. The lot was then, per annotation dated 21 November 1946, subdivided into seven (7) parcels
each in the name of each of the Gonzalezes. 11
The trial court, ruling for CLT, adopted the factual findings and conclusions arrived at by the majority commissioners appointed to resolve the
conflict of titles. It was established that the entire Maysilo Estate was registered under Act No. 496 by virtue of which OCT No. 994 was issued by
the Register of Deeds of Rizal; 12that Lot 26 was transferred to CLT by Hipolito whose title was derived from the Dimson title and that on the basis
of the technical descriptions of the property appearing in the Manotok titles, the latter's property indeed encroached on the property described in
CLT's title. 13
The Manotoks appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. 14 Their motion for reconsideration having been
denied, 15 they filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, ascribing error to the appellate court in upholding the trial court's decision
which decided the case on the basis of the majority commissioners' report and overlooked relevant facts in the minority commissioner's report. 16
B. G.R. No. 134385, Araneta Institute
of Agriculture, Inc. v. Heirs of
Jose B. Dimson, et. al.
On 18 December 1979, Dimson filed with the then CFI of Rizal, Branch 33, Caloocan City a complaint for recovery of possession and damages
against Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta). Dimson alleged that he was the absolute owner of part of the Maysilo Estate in Malabon
covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Alleging that Araneta had been illegally occupying the land and that the
latter refused to vacate the same despite repeated demands, he prayed that Araneta be ordered to vacate the same and remove all improvements
thereon and to return full possession thereof to him. Araneta for its part admitted occupancy of the disputed land by constructing some buildings
thereon and subdividing portions thereof in the exercise of its right as absolute owner. He alleged that Dimson's title to the subject land was void
and hence he had no cause of action. 17
 21

The trial court ruled for Dimson in its Decision dated 28 May 1993 with these findings: first, there were inherent technical infirmities or defects in
the titles that formed each link in the chain of ownership that culminated in the Manotok title, i.e., that the technical descriptions in the titles were
written in Spanish whereas those in the alleged mother title, OCT No. 994, were in English, which, an abnormal state that deviated from the usual
practice in the issuance of titles; and second, it was established procedure to indicate in the certificate of title, whether original or transfer
certificate, the date of the original survey of the mother title together with the succeeding date of subdivision or consolidation. Thus, the absence
of the original survey dates of OCT No. 994 on Manotok's chain of titles, the trial court added, should mean that OCT No. 994 was not the mother
title not only because the original survey dates were different but also because the original survey date must always be earlier than the issue date
of the original title. OCT No. 994 was issued on May 3, 1917 which was much ahead of the survey date indicated in the succeeding titles, which is
December 22, 1917. 18
Undaunted, Araneta interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, on 30 May 1997, affirmed the lower court's decision. 19 In so holding, the
appellate court declared that the title of Araneta to the disputed land is a nullity. It noted that Dimson's TCT No. R-15169 was derived from "OCT
No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917" and that the same was obtained by Dimson simultaneously with other titles, viz: TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, and
15168 by virtue of the Decision dated October 13, 1977 and Order dated October 18, 1977, in Special Proceedings No. C-732. It was also pointed
out that Araneta's TCT No. 13574 and 21343 were both derived from "OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917" which was previously "declared null
and void by the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals." 20
Araneta then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court attributing error to the Court of Appeals in failing to recognize that it had a better
right of possession over the property than did Dimson. 21
As both petitions involved interrelated challenges against the validity of the parties' separate titles to portions of the greater Maysilo Estate, they,
along with G.R. No. 148767, 22 were consolidated per Resolutions dated 21 April 1999 and 6 March 2002. Also in 2002, the Republic of the
Philippines sought and was allowed intervention in these cases.
On 29 November 2005, the Third Division of the Court rendered the 2005 Decision, 23 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED. 24
The Court acknowledged that the paramount question raised in the petitions is whether the titles issued in the name of Dimson and of CLT are
valid. Noting that this question is one purely of fact, the Court held that the same was beyond its power to determine and so, the factual findings of
the trial courts in these cases as affirmed by the Court of Appeals must be accorded the highest degree of respect and not disturbed at all.
Nonetheless, the Court proceeded to discuss the absence of merit of the petitions. First, particularly with respect to G.R. No. 123346, the Court
upheld the validity of the trial court's adoption of the commissioners' majority report as part of the decision inasmuch as the same is allowed by
Section 11, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court and that a case of overlapping titles absolutely necessitates the assistance of experts in the field of
geodetic engineering who, on account of their experience and expertise, are in a better position to determine which of the contending titles is
valid. For this reason, the Court emphasized, the trial court may well rely on their findings and conclusions. Second, the Court pointed out that the
titles of respondents in all three cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City registered on 19 April 1917.
However, because the validity of said mother title was upheld by the Court itself inMWSS and reiterated in Heirs of Gonzaga, the Court chose not
to delve anymore into the correctness of the said decisions which had already attained finality and immutability.

The Manotoks and Araneta duly filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On 5 June 2006, the cases were elevated to the Court en banc,
which heard oral arguments on 1 August 2006. The Court formulated the issues for oral argument, thus:
From the above petitions, the following principal issues are gathered:
I.
Which of the Certificates of Title of the contending parties are valid:
A. Petitioner's titles:
1. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 7528, 7762, 8012, 9866, C-17272, 21107, 21485, 26405, 26406, 26407,
33904, 34255, C-35267, 41956, 63268, 55896, T-1214528, 163902 and 165119 in the name of Manotok
Realty, Inc., and TCT No. T-232568 in the name of Manotok Estate Corporation;
2. TCT Nos. 737 and 13574 in the name of Araneta Institute of Agriculture; and
3. TCT Nos. T-158373 and T-158374 in the name of Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.
All these titles were derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 in the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City covering Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, same city.
B. Respondents' Title:
1. TCT No. T-177013 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation;
2. TCT No. R-15169 in the name of Jose B. Dimson; and
3. TCT No. T-1770 in the name of CLT Realty Development Corporation.
All these titles were derived from OCT No. 994 registered earlier, or on April 19, 1917, covering the same Lot No. 26 of the
Maysilo Estate.
II.
Can this Court still overturn at this point its Decision in Metropolitan Water Works and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 103558, November 17, 1992) and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 96259, September
3, 1996) sustaining the validity of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917 and nullify the same OCT No. 994 registered later,
or on May 3, 1917?
III.
 22

How will the Reports of the Department of Justice and the Senate Fact-Finding Committee, not presented in evidence before
the trial courts concluding that the valid title is OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917, affect the disposition of these cases?
Will it be necessary to remand these cases to the trial courts to determine which of the Certificates of Title are valid? If so,
which trial court? 25
A crucial fact emerged during the oral arguments. The Republic, through the Solicitor General, 26 strenuously argued that contrary to the
supposition reflected in the Advisory, there was, in fact, only one OCT No. 994.
. . . In this particular case, it appears that on December 3, 1912, the Court of Land Registration, the Judge Norberto
Romualdez presiding, acting on Land Registration Case No. 4429 rendered judgment ordering the GLRO to issue a decree.
Pursuant to this order, the GLRO prepared Decree No. 36455 and issued the same on April 19, 1917 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning, at Manila, Philippines. It may be observed that at the face of the OCT 994 which was then on file at the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan and now kept in the LRA, the following entry can be seen. Received for transcription at the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal this 3rd day of May 1917 at 7:30 a.m. Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of
inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. It appears that the transcription of
the decree was done on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. There is no other date to
speak of. In the records of the Land Registration Authority, there is only one OCT 994, on its face appears the date of
transcript, May 3, 1917. The validity then of all subsequent titles tracing their origin from OCT 994 should be tested in the
light of these set of facts. . . . 27
On the other hand, the counsel for CLT stated during the same oral argument that he had seen a photocopy of an OCT No. 994 that was dated 19
April 1917, 28and manifested that he could attach the same to CLT's memorandum. 29 At the same time, on even date, the Court directed the
Solicitor General and counsel for CLT to submit to the Court "certified true copies of the Original Certificate of Title No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and
April 19, 1917, respectively, on or before Friday, August 4, 2006." 30
In response to this directive, both the Solicitor General and the counsel for CLT submitted their separate "Compliance" to this Court, with their
respective copies of OCT No. 994 attached thereto. Both copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the Solicitor General and CLT indicate on their face
that the decree of registration issued on 19 April 1917 was received for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
on 3 May 1917. Indeed, there is no evident variance between the copies of OCT No. 994 submitted by the OSG and CLT, and CLT admits just as
much in its Memorandum dated 3 September 2006. 31
The claim of the Solicitor General that there is only one OCT No. 994 was duly confirmed though belatedly by CLT itself. Even the ponente of the
2005 Decision has recognized this fact, as indicated in her present Dissenting Opinion. The emergence of such fact, contrary as it is to the crucial
predicate underlying the issues presented in the Court's Advisory, has changed the essence and complexion of the controversy. The key to grant or
deny the motions for reconsideration is the answer to the question: which is the true date of OCT No. 994, 17 April 1917 or 3 May 1917?
II.
We turn to the date of OCT No. 994 as reflected in the quoted portion of the certified true copy thereof submitted by the Republic of the
Philippines: 32
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration
Act in the name of said . . .
'Witness: the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, Associate Judge of said Court, the 3rd day of December, A.D. nineteen
hundred and twelve.
'Issued at Manila, P.I., the 19th day of April A.D. 1917 at 9:00 A.M.
ATTEST: ENRIQUE ALTAVAS
Chief of the Land Registration Office of Justice
Received for transcription at the office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of P.I. this third day of May, nineteen
hundred and seventeen at 7:30 A.M. (emphasis supplied)
As evident on the face of OCT No. 994, the decree of registration was issued on 19 April 1917, and actually "received for transcription" by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. Interestingly, even as CLT admits that there is only one OCT No. 994, that which the Solicitor General had
presented to the Court, 33 it maintains that the OCT should be deemed registered as of the date of issuance of the decree of registration, 19 April
1917, instead of the date it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. The argument is based on the theory that it is
"the decree of registration [that] produces legal effects," though it "is entered before the transmittal of the same for transcription at the Register
of Deeds." 34
This argument marks a radical departure from CLT's earlier theory that there were two OCTs No. 994, one dated 19 April 1917 and the other 3 May
2007, a theory which was likewise reflected in the Court's earlier Advisory on the issues prior to the oral argument. 35 Yet the argument smacks of
plain sophistry.
The process involved is what this Court called "the method of giving a paper title." 36 It is spelled out in detail in Sections 41 and 42 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act:
SEC. 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof, under the seal
of the court, to the register of deeds for the province, or provinces, or city in which the land lies, and the register of deeds
shall transcribe the decree in a book to be- called the 'registration book,' in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order,
shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book in each case shall be the
original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the court. All certificates of title shall be
numbered consecutively, beginning with number one. The register of deeds shall in each case make an exact duplicate of the
original certificate, including the seal, but putting on it the words 'Owner's duplicate certificate,' and deliver the same to the
owner or to his attorney duly authorized. In case of a variance between the owner's duplicate certificate and the original
certificate the original shall prevail. The certified copy of the decree of registration shall be filed and numbered by the
register of deeds with a reference noted on it to the place of record of the original certificate of title: Provided, however,
 23

That when an application includes land lying in more than one province, or one province and the city of Manila, the court
shall cause the part lying in each province or in the city of Manila to be described separately by metes and bounds in the
decree of registration, and the clerk shall send to the register of deeds for each province, or the city of Manila, as the case
may be, a copy of the decree containing a description of the land within that province or city, and the register of deeds shall
register the same and issue an owner's duplicate therefor, and thereafter for all matters pertaining to registration under this
Act the portion in each province or city shall be treated as a separate parcel of land.
SEC. 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land shall be
entitled in the registration book 'Original certificate of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration,
dated at' (stating time and place of entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the date
of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled
'Transfer from number' (the number of the next previous certificate relating to the same land), and also the words 'Originally
registered' (date, volume, and page of registration.")

With the plain language of the law as mooring, this Court in two vintage and sound rulings made it plain that the original certificate of title is issued
on the date the decree of registration is transcribed. In the first ruling, it was held that there is a marked distinction between the entry of the
decree and the entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the
certificate of title is made by the register of deeds. 37 Such difference is highlighted by Sec. 31 of Act No. 496 as it provides that the certificate of
title is issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. In the second, it was stressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript
of the decree of registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry. 38
Otherwise stated, what is actually issued by the register of deeds is the certificate of title itself, not the decree of registration, as he is precisely the
recipient from the land registration office of the decree for transcription to the certificate as well as the transcriber no less. Since what is now
acknowledged as the authentic OCT No. 994 indicates that it was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on 3 May 1917, it is
that date that is the date of registration since that was when he was able to transcribe the decree in the registration book, such entry made in the
book being the original certificate of title. 39 Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of
title is to take effect.
The textbook writers and authorities on Land Registration are unanimous on the matter. The late Commissioner Antonio Noblejas, widely
acknowledged as the leading authority on the subject during his time, wrote, thus:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the Registrar of Land Titles transcribes the same in
the registry book called the "Registration Book" and issues an owner's duplicate certificate of title to the applicant upon
payment by him of the necessary registration fees. The entry made by the Registrar of Land Titles in his registry book is
actually the original copy of the original certificate of title and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal of the Court
and of his office. Pursuant to Rep. Act No. 113, the Registrar of Land Titles may now use only the seal of his office, dispensing
with the court seal. 40
Professor Florencio Ponce, who was also once Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Deputy Register of Deeds of Manila, was of the same
conviction:
A decree of registration is an order issued under the signature of the Commissioner of Land Registration (formerly Chief,
G.L.R.O.) in the name of the Judge to the fact that the land described therein is registered in the name of the applicant or
oppositor or claimant as the case maybe. When this is transcribed or spread in toto in the registration book and signed by
the register of deeds, the page on which the transcription is made become the "original certificate of title," more
commonly called the Torrens title.
xxx xxx xxx
The land becomes a registered land only upon the transcription of the decree in the original registration book by the
register of deeds, the date and time of such transcription being set forth in the process and certified to at the foot of each
entry or certificate of title.
xxx xxx xxx
The issuance of the original and owner's duplicate certificates are basic for the valid existence of the title. Issuance of
additional copies are permissive and their non-existence does not affect the status of title. A certificate of title is deemed as
regularly issued with the issuance of the original copy and owner's duplicate. 41
So was Professor Francisco Ventura:
Immediately upon the issuance and entry of the decree of registration, the Commissioner of Land Registration sends a
certified copy thereof, under seal of the said office, to the Register of Deeds of the province where the land lies, and the
register of Deeds transcribes the decree in a book, called the Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive
order should be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the Register of Deeds in said book constitutes the
original certificate of title and is signed by him and sealed with the seal of his office. 42
The same view came from Professor Narciso Pea, also a former Assistant Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission and Acting Register
of Deeds of Manila, as he wrote, thus:
Thus, Section 42 of Act No. 496 provides that the certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in
regard to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book "Original Certificate of Title, entered pursuant to decree
of the Court of Land Registration, dated at (stating time and place of entry of decree and the number of the case). This
certificate shall take effect upon the date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same
land shall be in like form, but shall be entitled. "Transfer from number (the number of the next previous certificate relating to
the same land)," and also the words "Originally registered (date, volume, and page of registration). 43
 24

The dissent has likewise suggested that the variance between these two dates is ultimately inconsequential. It cannot be so for otherwise, the
recent decision of the Court in Alfonso v. Office of the President 44 would simply be wrong. In Alfonso, the Court precisely penalized Alfonso, the
former register of deeds of Caloocan because she acquiesced to the change of the date of registration of OCT No. 994, as reflected in several
subsequent titles purportedly derived from that mother title, from 3 May 1917 to 19 April 1917. If indeed the difference in dates were
"inconsequential," then it should not have really mattered that Mrs. Alfonso, as found by the Court, had invariably issued certificates of title,
reflecting either the 19 April or 3 May date, a circumstance which, the Court concluded, was irregular. But if the Court were to accede to the
dissent and agree that it did not really matter whether the date of registration of OCT No. 994 was 3 May or 19 April, then poor Mrs. Alfonso
should be spared of the penalty of dismissal from the service which the Court had already affirmed.
III.
Even the dissent does not insist, as the 2005 Decision did, that there is an OCT No. 994 registered or dated 19 April 1917. This new stance squarely
contravenes or deviates from the following unequivocal pronouncement in the 2005 Decision:
We noted in the beginning of this Decision that the issue in all these three (3) cases involves the validity of the parties'
overlapping titles. The titles of the respondents in these cases were derived from OCT No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of
Caloocan City registered on April 19, 1917. The validity of such mother title has already been upheld by this Court in G.R.
No. 103558, MWSS v. Court of Appeals, et al. dated November 17, 1992 earlier cited in the assailed Decisions. Significantly,
the ruling in MWSS was reiterated in G.R. No. 96259, Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appealsdated September 3, 1996.
We cannot delve anymore into the correctness of the Decision of this Court in MWSS. The said Decision, confirming the
validity of OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917 from which the titles of the respondents in the cases at bar were derived, has
long become final and executory. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. 45
This new conclusion likewise differs from what the Court had to say regarding OCT No. 994 "dated April 19, 1917" in the adverted MWSS v. Court of
Appeals 46decision:
It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No.
994 registered on May 3, 1917. Upon the other hand, private respondents' title was derived from the same OCT No. 994
but dated April 19, 1917. Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails . .
. In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the
person claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the
prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of priority of issuance, private respondents' title prevails
over that of petitioner MWSS. 47
Four years later, the Court promulgated the Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals 48 decision, which essentially reaffirmed foregoing factual
pronouncements made in MWSS.
Notwithstanding the emerging error in fact that informed the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, the dissent now claims that said decisions confirmed
"the validity of the OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917." But if we examine MWSS closely, it appears to be beset with semantic confusion. We
make the following relevant references from that decision, presented sequentially:
(1) "Jose B. Dimson was the registered owner of a parcel land situated in Balintawak, Kalookan City with an area of 213,012 square meters, more or
less, and covered by TCT No. C-15167 which was registered on June 8, 1978. Said parcel of land was originally Lot 28 of the Maysilo Estate (OCT)
No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in Land Registration Case No. 4429." 49

(2) Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area of 599 square
meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34, while private respondents' title was derived from OCT No.
994 issued on April 19, 1917; 50
(3) "It must be observed that the title of petitioner MWSS was a transfer from TCT No. 36957 which was derived from OCT No. 994 registered on
May 3, 1917. Upon the other hand, private respondent's title was derived from the same OCT No. 994 but dated April 19, 1917;" 51
(4) "Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for
the same is in existence. 5 Since the land in question has already been registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void;" 52
In one (1) out of the four (4) times that reference was made to the mother title of Dimson in MWSS, it was "OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917"
which is the language preferred by the dissent since it hews to the date of issuance of the decree of registration in the authentic OCT No. 994.
However, the same decision inconsistently refers to it also as OCT No. 994 "registered on April 19, 1917", "dated April 19, 1917," and "registered
under OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917." Notably, the context of MWSS in making the final citation, "registered under OCT No. 994 dated April 19,
1917," was to point out that as a result "the subsequent registration of the same land on May 3, 1917 is null and void;" hence, no other conclusion
can be reached than that the Court deemed Dimson's mother title as having been registered on a date earlier than 3 May 1917.
Since the dissent and even CLT now acknowledge that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was registered by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on 3
May 1917, the earlier factual finding in MWSS is indefensible. MWSS recognized an OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917, a title that never
existed and, even assuming that it did exist, is now acknowledged as spurious.
Gonzaga primarily relied on the ruling of the Court in MWSS upon a finding that the case involved "facts that are exactly the same as those that we
have passed and ruled upon in the [MWSS case]." The title which was affirmed by the Court in Gonzaga, TCT No. C-26806 in the name of Lilia
Sevilla, was "a transfer from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917 pursuant to Decree No. 36455." 53 It
was further observed by the Court that "on the one hand, [therein] petitioners' titles indicate original registration to have been made on May 3,
1917, but on the other hand, private respondents' title indicates original registration to have been made on April 19, 1917." 54
 25

It was the title originally registered on 19 April 1917 which was made to prevail in Gonzaga, following MWSS. Since there is no OCT No. 994
originally registered on 19 April 1917, as now acknowledged, it follows that Gonzaga, like MWSS, is no longer reliable as well.
The argument has been raised by the ponente of the 2005 Decision that the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 must be distinguished from "OCT No. 994
dated May 3, 1917 involved in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases" because the former title was "based on the Cadastral Survey of Kalookan City under
Cadastral Case No. 34, also covering the Maysilo Estate." It is elemental to note that assuming said 3 May OCT was somehow flawed because it was
based on Cadastral Case No. 34, it does not mean that the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994 is valid or had existed in the first place. Since even
the dissent now discounts the existence of the so-called 17 April 1917 OCT No. 994, it should necessarily follow that any title that is sourced
from the 17 April 1917 OCT is void. Such conclusion is inescapable whatever questions there may be about the veracity of the 3 May 1917 OCT
based on Cadastral Case No. 34.
It would be especially incoherent for the Court to reiterate MWSS and Gonzaga when they effectuated the OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917
and acknowledge at the same time that the same OCT never existed, the genuine OCT No. 994 being that which was registered on 3 May 1917. We
need not go as far as to revive the MWSS or Gonzaga decisions, but certainly we can decline to infuse further validity to their erroneous basic
premise that there was an OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. The dissent proposes that we perpetuate the erroneous premise even as the
error is plainly acknowledged, a stance that will not serve the Court well should it prevail.
Moreover, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions now before us. Undisputedly, the two cases involved different parcels of land.
The present petitioners could not be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and and their properties were not
involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is basic that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers
to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. 55
We can take instruction from the tack previously taken by this Court in dealing with municipalities created by executive orders. Beginning
with Pelaez v. Auditor General, 56 the Court declared as a general principle that the President had no power to create municipalities through
executive orders. However, instead of nullifying the creation of all municipalities created in the same manner, the Court only annulled those
municipalities whose creation was specifically attacked in the petition filed by then-Vice President Pelaez. 57 With respect to the other
municipalities which were not annulled in Pelaez, the Court would, in the next few decades, annul only the municipalities which were specifically
challenged in petitions raised before the Court. 58 However, after the adoption of the Local Government Code of 1991 that gave statutory
recognition to the de facto municipalities which had not yet been annulled, the Court started to affirm the legal existence of such municipalities. 59
As in Pelaez, the operative effect of the "doctrines" pronounced in MWSS and Gonzaga can extend only to the parties and properties involved in
said cases, even if it can be argued that the rights involving other parties and properties are afflicted with inconsistency as regards the legal rulings
therein, similar to the municipalities created which though created by void executive orders were not however annulled. Yet with the emergence of
a new fact the enactment of the Local Government Code vis--vis Pelaez, or the present acknowledgment that only the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994
exists vis--vis MWSS and Gonzaga subsequent rulings would be informed primarily by the new developments, rather than by the previous
precedents that were not able to take into account the true or new factual premises.
IV.
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by
the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise
should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT
differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the
"law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.
This approach immensely differs from that preferred by the 2005 Decision and the dissenting view, which dwells in the main on the alleged flaws in
the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta, without making a similar inquiry into the titles held by CLT and the Heirs of Dimson. Since the decision
in favor of CLT and the Heirs of Dimson was ultimately grounded on a factual predicate now acknowledged as erroneous, it follows that the primary
focus should have been whether the titles held by CLT and the Dimsons are valid and with force and effect. To that end, we need only examine the
titles relied upon by CLT and the Dimsons.
In the Manotok petition, CLT had originally filed a complaint for annulment of the titles in the name of the Manotoks, alleging that it was the
registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. T-177013 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. Reproduced below is what
appears on the face of TCT No. T-177013: 60
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April, in the year, nineteen hundred and
seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume 36455, page ____, as Original
Certificate of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ____ Record No. _____ in the name of
___________.
This certificate is a transfer from Trans. Certificate of Title No. R-17994/T-89, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as
the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at City of
Kalookan
Philippines, on the 15th
day of March In the year
nineteen hundred and
eighty-nine at 19:48 a.m.
CLT further alleged that it derived TCT No. T-177013 on 10 December 1988 from Estelita Hipolito whose title, TCT No. R-17994, is depicted, thus: 61
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and
seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page NA, as Original Certificate
of Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429, Record No. ________.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-15166/T-75, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as
the above-described land is concerned.
 26

Entered at the City of Caloocan

Philippines, on the 12th
day of December in the
year nineteen hundred
and seventy-eight at 3:30
p.m.

Dimson's original complaint for recovery of possession against Araneta was founded on the claim that he was the absolute owner of a parcel of
land located at Malabon, comprising fifty (50) hectares of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT No. R-15169 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Said TCT No. R-15169 is reproduced below: 62
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and
seventeen, in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA, page ___, Original Certificate of
Title No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455, issued in LRC Case No. 4429, Record No. __
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. [illegible] which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the
above-described land is concerned.
Entered at Caloocan City
Philippines, on the 8th
day of June in the year
nineteen hundred and
seventy-eight at 10:34
a.m.
It is evident from all three titles CLT's, Hipolito's and Dimson's that the properties they purport to cover were "originally registered on the
19th day April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." Note, as earlier
established, there is no such OCT No. 994 originally registered on 19 April 1917.
The conclusion is really simple. On their faces, none of these three titles can be accorded recognition simply because the original title commonly
referred to therein never existed. To conclude otherwise would constitute deliberate disregard of the truth. These titles could be affirmed only if it
can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed. CLT and the Dimsons were given the opportunity to submit such
proof before this Court, but they did not. In fact, CLT has specifically manifested that the OCT No. 994 they concede as true is also the one which
the Office of Solicitor General submitted as true, and that is OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917.
Given this essential clarification, there is no sense in affirming the 2005 Decision which sustained the complaints for annulment of title and/or
recovery of possession filed by CLT and the Dimson when their causes of action are both founded on an inexistent mother title. How can such
actions prosper at all even to the extent of dispossessing the present possessors with title?
The dissent is hard-pressed in defending the so-called 19 April 1917 OCT from which the Dimson and CLT titles are sourced. As earlier mentioned,
the focus is instead placed on the purported flaws of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta notwithstanding that said parties swere the
defendants before the lower court and, therefore, the burden of proof did not lie on them. The established legal principle in actions for
annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and
convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. 63 In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. 64
V.
The dissenting view perceives a material difference between the present acknowledgment of the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 and the
titles involved in the Gonzaga and MWSS cases. It dwells on the fact that the titles debunked in the MWSS and Gonzaga cases, which find
origination from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, seem to have been derived from Cadastral Case No. 34 also covering the Maysilo Estate. It is in
fact the theory of the dissent that there are, in effect, two competing sources of title the OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 arising from the
issuance of Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429; and OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 based on the Cadastral Survey of Caloocan
City in Cadastral Case No. 34. It is further opined that the registration of lands pursuant to Cadastral Case No. 34, even if the date of such
registration is 3 May 1917, is void since such registration could not supplant the earlier decision of the land registration court.
The supposition blatantly runs counter to long-established principles in land cases. Had it been adopted by the Court, the effect would have been
to precipitate the utter astonishment of legal scholars, professionals and students alike.
The reality that cadastral courts may have jurisdiction over lands already registered in ordinary land registration cases was acknowledged by this
Court inPamintuan v. San Agustin. 65 Such jurisdiction is "limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the description of the lands,
provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a
registered owner of his title." 66It was further clarified in Timbol v. Diaz 67 that the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court over such lands even
extends to the determination of "which one of the several conflicting registered titles shall prevail[, as such] power would seem to be necessary for
a complete settlement of the title to the land, the express purpose of cadastral proceedings, and must therefore be considered to be within the
jurisdiction of the court in such proceedings." 68
The question raised in Sideco v. Aznar 69 concerned the validity of an order of a cadastral court directing the issuance of new certificates of title in
the name of Sideco and his children, at Sideco's own prayer, over land previously registered in the name of Crispulo Sideco. This Court ruled that
such order was valid and did not amount to a readjudication of the title. After the cadastral proceedings therein had been initiated, the chief
surveyor had reported to the cadastral court that the land was covered by a decree in a land registration proceeding and registered in the name of
Sideco; the surveyor recommended that the title be cancelled and a new one issued in the names of such persons as the court may determine. In
ruling that the new titles were valid, the Court stated that "[t]he proceedings did not in any way purport to reexamine the title already issued, or to
readjudicate the title of the land. They were precisely predicated on the finality of the title already issued, because it was the registered owner who
was asked to express his desire with respect thereto, and the court's order precisely followed the petition of the registered owner." 70
 27

The eminent U.P. law professor Francisco Ventura, himself a former Register of Deeds, explains why cadastral courts have jurisdiction to order the
issuance of new titles in place of the title issued under voluntary registration proceedings:
"Inasmuch as the land is identified in the plan by cadastral number, it is necessary that a new title be issued, giving the lot its
cadastral number in accordance with the cadastral survey. This does not mean that the court has the power to alter the
decree entered in the previous registration proceeding. The court cannot change or modify the said decree. It does not
adjudicate the title anew. It simply deals with the certificate of title. This is for the convenience of the landowner because it
is easier for him to identify his property inasmuch as all the lands brought under the cadastral survey are designated by
cadastral numbers." 71
What is prohibited in a cadastral proceeding is the registration of land, already issued in the name of a person, in the name of another, divesting
the registered owner of the title already issued in his favor, or the making of such changes in the title as to impair his substantial rights. 72 Yet such
prohibition does not mean that the cadastral court will not have jurisdiction over the action involving the previously registered land, as explained
in Pamintuan and Timbol, or that the cadastral court may not issue a new title at all even if it would not impair the rights of the previously
registered owner, as emphasized in Sideco. The dissent contents itself with the simplistic conclusion that because there was a cadastral case
covering the Maysilo Estate from which the titles emanated, such titles could not have been valid. It is clear that there could be such titles issued,
and they would be valid for so long as they do not impair the rights of the original registrant to whom OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917 was issued.
VI.
From these premises, the Court is able to make the following binding conclusions. First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record,
that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as
the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree
of registration on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and
CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent
OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on
the dates appearing on their respective titles.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard
to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions
in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or
similar to that at bar.

With these conclusions, what then is the proper course of action to take with respect to the pending motions for reconsideration? Considering that
CLT and the Dimsons clearly failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and recovery of
possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court. However, such solution may not
satisfactorily put to rest the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate.
More pertinently, after the instant petitions were filed with this Court, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, had sought to intervene.
The Republic did not participate as a party when these cases were still before the trial courts and the Court of Appeals. While the Republic had
originally prayed for the grant of the petitions filed by all the petitioners in these consolidated cases, instead it presently seeks of the Court the
promulgation of a new ruling upholding the validity of OCT No. 994 issued 73 or registered 74 on May 3, 1917. Rather than suggest whether the
petitions be granted or denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration from this Court that it is the 3 May 1917 mother title that is valid, "a
remand of this case to the Court of Appeals, to settle which among the private parties derived their titles from the existing OCT 994, is proper" 75
Notably, both the Manotoks and Araneta are amenable to the remand of the petition, albeit under differing qualifications. The Manotoks submit
that there should be a remand to the court of origin, consolidating all the present petitions, and that a full trial be conducted by the trial
court. 76 On the other hand, Araneta proposes four (4) options for the Court to consider: (1) the dismissal of the original complaint filed by Dimson;
(2) a ruling granting Araneta's appeal and dismissing Dimson's complaint, but at the same time remanding the case to a new division of the Court of
Appeals for factual determination pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; (3) the suspension of the resolution of the present motion
for reconsideration while the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for factual determination; or (4) the remand of the proceedings to the Court
of Appeals for the reception of further evidence, particularly the Senate and DOJ Reports, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, and
the consequent resolution by the appellate court of the instant petitions.
The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the motion for reconsideration, then Chief Justice Panganiban suggested that a remand may
be required to determine the status of the original title. 77 Considering that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued on/registered on/dated 3 May
1917, a remand would be appropriate to determine which of the parties, if any, derived valid title from the said genuine OCT No. 994. On the one
hand, the appreciation of facts is beyond the province of this Court, since it is not a trier of fact 78 as well as not capacitated to appreciate evidence
at the first instance. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals has the competence to engage in that undertaking.
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, 79 the Court may, whenever necessary to resolve factual issues,
delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The delegate need not
be the body that rendered the assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. 81 Its conclusions as to findings of fact are generally accorded great
respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary
evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 82 this Court commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more
particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which
are 'open spaces' and/or areas reserved for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the respective
 28

measurements of the areas referred to." 83 The Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's
Report" shortly thereafter. 84 Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present
case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other
than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. 85 The order of
reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of
evidence. 86 The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of
reference. 87 In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result can
obtain herein.
VII.
The OSG likewise adverts to the findings reached in the respective investigations and reports by the Department of Justice and the Philippine
Senate, components of the two other co-equal branches of the government. Both the DOJ Report dated 28 August 1997 and the Senate Report
dated 25 May 1998 conclude that there is only one (1) OCT No. 994 issued or registered on 3 May 1997. The OSG argues that the contents of both
of these reports may be considered as evidence. It also points out, with basis, that these reports may be taken judicial notice of by this Court,
following Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, it cannot be disputed that these reports fall within the ambit of "the official acts of the
legislative [and] executive. . . departments." 88
It bears noting that the DOJ and Senate Reports were rendered on 28 August 1997 and 25 May 1998 respectively. They were issued some years
after the trial courts had promulgated their respective decisions in the Manotok and Araneta cases, and even after the Court of Appeals handed
down its decision against the Manotoks which is assailed in its present petition. 89 In Araneta's case, the Court of Appeals had first ruled against
Araneta in its Decision dated 30 May 1997, or just shortly before the rendition of the DOJ and Senate Reports.
Since this Court is not a trier of fact, we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these
are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. The Court, in the
2005 Decision, refused to take into account the reports on the regrettable premise that they could somehow "override" the judicial decisions
earlier arrived at. 90 The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as
evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate
should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo
judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. The
Manotoks and Araneta advert to certain factual allegations relating to their titles and backstories to advance their respective positions. Still, if it
indeed emerges from the determination of the Court of Appeals on remand that notwithstanding the clear flaws of the title of respondents the
titles of petitioners are cut from the same counterfeit cloth, then the Republic of the Philippines, an intervenor in these cases, is armed anyway
with any and all appropriate remedies to safeguard the legitimate owners of the properties in question.
VIII.
The definitive conclusions reached by the Court thus far in these cases are spelled out in Part VI of this Resolution. Said conclusions serve to guide
the Court of Appeals in hearing these cases on remand.
The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear these cases on remand. The Special Division shall be composed of
three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, namely; Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior
Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member.
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the following determinations based on
the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are borne by the
evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and
valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?

iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance
of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government
through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with
Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., took no part due to relationship to one of the counsels.
Ynares-Santiago, J., took no part.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see my dissenting opinion.
Carpio, J., took no part and is on leave.
 29

Corona, J., see my concurring and dissenting opinion.

Velasco, Jr. and Reyes, J., We join the dissent of J. A.S. Gutierrez.
Nachura, J., took no part. As a Solicitor General appeared in the oral argument.
G.R. No. 123346 MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners, versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 134385 ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., petitioners, versus HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, represented by his Compulsory
Heirs: His surviving spouse, ROQUETA R. DIMSON and their children, NORMA and CELSO TIRADO, ALSON and VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA and
CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA and RENE POLICAR and ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, respondent.
G.R. No. 148767 STO. NIO KAPITBAHAYAN ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, versus CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
||| (Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 123346, 134385, [December 14, 2007], 565 PHIL 59-164)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123346. March 31, 2009.]
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
[G.R. No. 134385. March 31, 2009.]
ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JOSE B. DIMSON, REPRESENTED BY HIS COMPULSORY
HEIRS: HIS SURVIVING SPOUSE, ROQUETA R. DIMSON AND THEIR CHILDREN, NORMA AND CELSA TIRADO, ALSON AND
VIRGINIA DIMSON, LINDA AND CARLOS LAGMAN, LERMA AND RENE POLICAR, AND ESPERANZA R. DIMSON; AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J p:
In the Court's Resolution dated 14 December 2007, 1 the Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the
instant case on remand. The Special Division was composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, with Justice Josefina Guevara-
Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member. We
instructed the Special Division to proceed as follows:
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its
findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to make the following
determinations based on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings
before it, to wit: ICASEH
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917?
ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the 2005 Decision, are
borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks
and Araneta?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are
true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the
issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
Government and whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the Government
through expropriation.
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings
in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED. 2
The Special Division proceeded to conduct hearings in accordance with the Resolution. The parties to these cases, namely CLT Realty
Development Corporation (CLT), Manotok Realty Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (the Manotoks), the Heirs of Jose B. Dimson (Heirs of
Dimson), and Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc. (Araneta), were directed by the Special Division to present their respective evidence to the
Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the Special Division rendered a 70-page Report 3 (Report) on 26 November 2008. The Special Division submitted
the sealed Report to this Court. EHaCID
Before taking action on the Report itself, we dispose of a preliminary matter. On February 17, 2009, the Manotoks filed a motion
beseeching that copies of the report be furnished the parties "so that they may submit their comments and objections thereon in accord with
the principle contained in Sec. 10, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court". We deny the motion.
It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in
accordance with Rule 32. Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral of the case to a commissioner "by written consent of both
parties", whereas in the cases at bar, the Court did not endeavor to secure the consent of the parties before effectuating the remand to the
Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, our earlier advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adopted procedure does not hew strictly to that
Rule, owing to our power under Section 6, Rule 135 to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears conformable to the
spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary processes and other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect. HEaCcD
 30

Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not serve any useful purpose. It would only delay the
promulgation of the Court's action on the Sealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In any event, the present Resolution quotes
extensively from the sealed Report and discusses its other substantive segments which are not quoted.
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues referred to the Special Division. It is a more than
adequate basis for this Court to make the following final dispositions in these cases.
I.
We adopt the succeeding recital of operative antecedents made by the Special Division in its Report:
THE PROCEDURAL ANTECEDENTS
DIMSON v. ARANETA
CA-G.R. CV. NO. 41883 & CA-G.R. SP No. 34819
[SC-G.R. No. 134385]
On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First Instance ["CFI"] of Rizal a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages against ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON amended his complaint and included Virgilio L. Enriquez
["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-plaintiff.
In said Amended Complaint, DIMSON claimed that he is the absolute owner of a 50-hectare land located in Bo. Potrero,
Malabon, Metro Manila covered by TCT No. R-15169, [Lot 25-A-2] of the Caloocan Registry of Deeds. Allegedly, DIMSON had
transferred the subject property to ENRIQUEZ by way of an absolute and irrevocable sale on 14 November 1979.
Unfortunately though, DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ discovered that the subject property was being occupied by ARANETA
wherein an "agricultural school house" is erected and that despite repeated demands, the latter refused to vacate the parcel
of land and remove the improvements thereon. IECcaA
ARANETA, for its part, refuted said allegations and countered that it is the absolute owner of the land being claimed by
DIMSON and that the real properties in the Araneta Compound are "properly documented and validly titled". It maintained
that it had been in possession of the subject parcel of land since 1974. For this reason, the claims of DIMSON and ENRIQUEZ
were allegedly barred by prescription.
During the trial, counsel for ARANETA marked in evidence, among others, certifications from the Land Registration
Commission attesting that TCTs Nos. 13574 and 26538, covering the disputed property, are in the names of ARANETA and
Jose Rato, respectively. ARANETA also offered TCT No. 7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered owner of the land
described therein.
On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the title of DIMSON over the disputed property . . .
Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was later
consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-related issues of the two cases.
In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON
finding that the title of ARANETA to the disputed land is a nullity. In CA-G.R. SP No. 34819, the Court of Appeals likewise
invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying on the Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v.
Court of Appeals, which declared null and void the certificates of title derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may 1917. It
was also held that ARANETA failed to sufficiently show that the Order sought to be nullified was obtained through extrinsic
fraud that would warrant the annulment thereof. SIHCDA
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial espousing therein as basis for its entreaty the
various letters from different government agencies and Department Order No. 137 of the Department of Justice, among
others.
On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered
DIMSON to maintain status quountil the finality of the aforesaid judgment.
Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court. Refuting the factual finding of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, ARANETA contended that there is only one OCT 994 covering the Maysilo Estate issued on 3 May 1917
pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by the Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and added that there were
subsequent certifications issued by the government officials, notably from the LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the
Senate Committees' Joint Report which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that which had been issued on 3 May
1917. AHDTIE
CLT v. MANOTOK
CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255
[SC-G.R. No. 123346]
On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] A COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of
Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against the MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds of Metro Manila District II
(Calookan City, Metro Manila) ["CALOOCAN RD"].
In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-177013, a derivative title of OCT No. 994. As a basis of its proprietary claim, CLT
averred that on 10 December 1988, it had acquired Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito ["HIPOLITO"],
by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. HIPOLITO's title was, in turn, a direct transfer from DIMSON, the
registered owner of TCT No. 15166, the latter having acquired the same by virtue of a Court Order dated 13 June 1966 issued
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557. CAaDSI
 31

On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of their titles, which were all derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering
over twenty (20) parcels of land located over a portion of Lot 26 in the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it was contented that
the title of CLT was an offspring of an ineffective grant of an alleged undisputed portion of Lot 26 by way of attorney's fees to
its predecessor-in-interest, Jose B. Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in this connection, further contended that the portion of Lot 26,
subject of the present controversy, had long been disposed of in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio and hence,
there was nothing more in said portion of Lot 26 that could have been validly conveyed to Dimson.
Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the MANOTOKS alleged that TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994,
had been issued in the names of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio on September 1918 by virtue of an Escritura De Venta
executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly covered an
approximate area of 19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On even date, TCT No. 4211 was transferred to Francisco Gonzales
on the strength of an Escritura de Venta dated 3 March 1920 for which TCT No. T-5261, covering an area of 871,982 square
meters was issued in the name of one Francisco Gonzales, married to Rufina Narciso.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was issued to Rufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was later
replaced with the names of Gonzales six (6) children. The property was then subdivided and as a result of which, seven (7)
certificates of titles were issued, six (6), under the names of each of the children while the remaining title was held by all of
them as co-owners.
Eventually, the properties covered by said seven certificates of title were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines.
These properties were then later subdivided by the National Housing Authority ["NHA"], into seventy-seven (77) lots and
thereafter sold to qualified vendees. As it turned out, a number of said vendees sold nineteen (19) of these lots to Manotok
Realty, Inc. while one (1) lot was purchased by the Manotok Estate Corporation.
During the pre-trial conference, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, approved the creation of a commission
composed of three commissioners tasked to resolve the conflict in their respective titles. Accordingly, the created
Commission convened on the matter in dispute.
On 8 October 1993, Ernesto Erive and Avelino San Buenaventura submitted an exhaustive Joint Final Report ["THE MAJORITY
REPORT"] finding that there were inherent technical infirmities or defects on the face of TCT No. 4211, from which the
MANOTOKS derived their titles (also on TCT No. 4210), TCT No. 5261 and TCT No. 35486. Teodoro Victoriano submitted his
Individual Final Report ["THE MINORITY REPORT"] dated 23 October 1993.
After the conduct of a hearing on these reports, the parties filed their respective comments/objections thereto. Upon order
of the trial court, the parties filed their respective memoranda. caHCSD
Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, on 10 May 1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of CLT and
ordered, among others, the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the MANOTOKS.
The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28
September 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, except as to the award of damages which was deleted. The
MANOTOKS then moved for reconsideration, but said motion was denied by said appellate court in its Resolution dated 8
January 1996. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, the MANOTOKS filed a Petition for Review before the
Supreme Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, * separately filed by the MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Nio
Kapitbahayan Association, Inc., ["STO. NIO"], were consolidated.
Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the report of the Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August 1997
and the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 which concluded that there was only one OCT No. 994
issued, transcribed and registered on 3 May 1917.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2005 DECISION"], the Supreme Court, through its Third
Division, affirmed the RTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, which declared the titles of CLT and DIMSON as
valid.
In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, the Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the factual and
legal findings of the trial courts, which had heavily hinged on the imputed flaws in said titles. Considering that these trial
court findings had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the same were
accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, should not be disturbed on appeal.
Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the Supreme Court was not a trier of facts, it was not within its
function to review factual issues and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties.
THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION
Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 2005
Decision.
Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the Solicitor General ["OSG"] intervening on behalf of the
Republic, the Supreme Court, in its Resolution of 14 December 2007 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2007 RESOLUTION"] reversed
and nullified its 2005 Decision and categorically invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, which was the basis of the
propriety claims of CLT and DIMSON. However, the Supreme Court resolved to remand the cases to this Special Division of
the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence. EHCDSI
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following binding
conclusions:
 32

"First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration
of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the
decree of registration on (19) * April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the
date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated (19) April 1917
casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to
invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates
appearing on their respective titles.
Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the
cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar. 4
II.
The parties were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence before the Special Division. The Report names the evidence
submitted to the Special Division for its evaluation: ACHEaI
CLT EVIDENCE
In its Offer of Evidence, [ 5 ] CLT adopted the documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence of witnesses submitted in the
case filed by CLT against STO. NIO in Civil Case No. C-15491, ["CLT-STO NIO CASE"]. These pieces of evidence include,
among others, the Majority and Minority Reports, the Formal Offer of Evidence in the presentation of the evidence-in-chief
and rebuttal evidence in the CLT-STO NIO CASE consisting of various certificates of titles, plans by geodetic engineer, tax
declarations, chemistry report, specimen signatures and letters of correspondence.
MANOTOKS EVIDENCE
The MANOTOKS sought admission of the following evidence: Senate and DOJ Committee Reports; certificates of title issued
to them and their vendees/assignees, i.e., Republic of the Philippines, the Gonzalezes, Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio,
Isabel Gil del Sola and Estelita Hipolito; deeds of absolute sale; contracts to sell; tax declarations and real property tax
receipts; the Formal Officer of Evidence of Philville Development & Housing Corporation; ["PHILVILLE"], in Civil Case No.
15045; this Court of Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606 between CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of Judge Palma dated
13 June 1966 and 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557 and the billing statements of SSHG Law Office. They also submitted in
evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental Affidavits of Rosa R. Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix B. Lerio,
Atty. Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a copy of a photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of
coordinates and reference point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad Estate and TCT No. 177013 of CLT. [ 6 ] SCDaHc
DIMSON EVIDENCE
In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence, [ 7 ] DIMSON submitted the previous decisions and resolutions passed relative to
these cases, various certifications of different government agencies, OCT 994, subdivision plan of Lot 25-A-2, observations of Geodetic
Engineer Reggie P. Garcia showing the relative positions of properties within Lot 25-A; the Novation of Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage
dated 15 January 1948 between Rato, Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta Institute of Agriculture; copies of various certificates of titles to
dispute some of the titles held by ARANETA; several letter-requests and official receipts.

ARANETA EVIDENCE
ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title, specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No. 21857; TCT
No. 26538; TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT No. 13574. It also marked in evidence the certified true copies of
Decree No. 36577; the DOJ and Senate Reports; letters of correspondence to the Land Registration Commission and the
Register of Deeds of Malabon City; survey plans of Lot 25-A and TCT r-15169 of Dimson and; the affidavit of Engineer Felino
M. Cortez and his curriculum vitae. ARANETA also offered the certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 in the name of Victoneta,
Inc.; TCT No. 13574 in the name of ARANETA; certifications issued by Atty. Josephine H. Ponciano, Acting Register of Deeds of
Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy of Judge Palma's Order dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17
(which pertains to the rules on reconstitution of titles as of 19 February 1947) and its official receipt and; the owner's
duplicate copy of OCT No. 994. [ 8 ] 9 DHETIS
III.
We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the Special Division. To repeat, the Special Division was tasked to
determine the following issues based on the evidence:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 dated 3 May
1917:
ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in the Supreme Court 2005
Decision, are borne by the evidence. Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient to defeat said claims?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true
and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of the Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance
of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so, what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the
 33

Government, and is any of the parties able to trace its title acquired by the government through
expropriation? DaTICE
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals was to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were
entitled to claim ownership over the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto. One set of properties was disputed between CLT
and the Manotoks, while the other set was disputed between Araneta and the Heirs of Dimson.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an order in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City on the basis of which he was able to register in his name properties belonging to the Maysilo Estate. Judge
Sayo's order in turn was sourced from a 1966 Order issued by Judge (later Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the CFI of
Rizal. Dimson's titles reflected, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. 10 Among these properties was a fifty (50)-hectare
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 151169, which apparently overlapped with the property of Araneta covered by TCT
No. 13574 and 26538. 11 Araneta was then and still is in possession of the property. The Araneta titles state, as their mother title, OCT No.
994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for recovery of possession against Araneta.
Another property in Dimson's name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in
turn sold the same to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-177013, which also reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917. 12 Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property covered by titles in the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks
traced their titles to TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting, as their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May
1917. acHDTA
It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied on the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the
basis of their claim of ownership. However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held that OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 was inexistent. The
proceedings before the Special Division afforded the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike the opportunity to prove the validity of their respective
claims to title based on evidence other than claims to title the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994. Just as much was observed by the Special
Division:
Nonetheless, while the respective certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT refer to OCT 994 issued on 19 April 1917 and that
their previous postulations in the present controversies had been anchored on the supposed validity of their titles, that
which emanated from OCT 994 of 19 April 1917, and conversely the invalidity of the 3 May 1917 OCT 994, the Supreme Court
has yet again allowed them to substantiate their claims on the basis of other evidentiary proofs:
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of proving in this special proceedings, by way of the evidence already
presented before and such other forms of evidence that are not yet of record, that either there had only been an error in the
course of the transcription or registration of their derivative titles, or that other factual and legal bases existed to validate or
substantiate their titles aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917. 13
Were they able to discharge such burden?
A.
We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear that the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on the OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917.
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayo's Order dated 18 October dated 18 October 1977, was issued separate certificates
of title, i.e., TCT Nos. 15166, 15167, 15168 and 15169, covering portions of the Maysilo Estate. Pertinently, with respect to
TCT No. 15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot 25-A-2 of the said estate, the following were inscribed on the face of the
instrument.
"IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th day of April in the year nineteen
hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA page NA,
as Original Certificate of Title No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No. 4429 Record No.
______
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994/NA, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far
as the above-described land is concerned. [ 14 ] HCIaDT
From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT No. 15169, the certificate of title of DIMSON covering the
now disputed Lot 25-A-2, is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Manifestly, the certificate of title issued to DIMSON,
and as a matter of course, the derivative title later issued to CLT, should both be voided inasmuch as the OCT which they
emanated had already been declared inexistent. 15
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19
April 1917. At the same time, it rejected CLT's explanation that the transcription of the erroneous date was a "typographical error".
As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their successor-in-interest CLT, had failed to present evidence before
this Court to prove that there had been a mere typographical error in the transcription of their respective titles with regard
to the date of registration of OCT No. 994. CLT specifically harps on this assertion that there had only been a typographical
error in the transcription of its title. [ 16 ] On the other hand, while DIMSON had refused to categorically assert that there
had been such a typographical error causing the invalidity of their title, their failure to proffer any reason or argument which
would otherwise justify why their title reflects 19 April 1917 and not 3 May 1917 leads this Court to conclude that they
simply had no basis to support their proprietary claim.
Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to what led to the erroneous entry of the registration dated of OCT
994, DIMSON are left without any recourse but to substantiate their claim on the basis of other evidence not presented
during the proceedings below, which would effectively prove that they had a valid proprietary claim over the disputed
properties. This is specifically true because DIMSON had previously placed reliance on the MWSS doctrine to prove the
validity of their title. 17
 34

Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly constrained to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was
allegedly sourced from the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz Palma. On that issue, the Special Division made the following determinations: cDTSHE
It should be recalled that in their appellee's brief in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically denied
the falsity of TCT No. R-15169 alleging that the contention "is already moot and can be determined by a controlling
decision". [ 18 ] Jose Dimson expounded on his reliance as follows:
"In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (for brevity MWSS) case, Jose B. Dimson's (as private respondent)
title TCT No. 15167 issued for Lot 28 on June 8, 1978 derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, is
overlapping with MWSS title TCT No. 41028 issued on July 29, 1940 derived from the same OCT 994, registered on
May 3, 1917.
(Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. Dimson' (plaintiff-appellee) title TCT No. R-15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on
June 8, 1978, is overlapping with defendant-appellant's title TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not derived from OCT No.
994." [ 19 ]
So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the transcription or annotation on their respective certificates of title, the
present inquiry then hinges on whether the Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by then Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557 ["PALMA ORDER"] and Judge Sayo's Order dated 18 October 1977 ["SAYOS 18
OCTOBER 1977 ORDER"], can be validated and authenticated. It is so since the brunt of the proprietary claims of both
DIMSON and CLT has its roots on said Orders.
Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to
wit: IcHDCS
"Whether the factual and legal bases of Palma's 13 June 1966 Order and Sayo's 18 October 1977 Order are true
and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?"
As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be validly traced from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994, DIMSON point
out that their title was issued pursuant to a court order issued by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557 and entered in the
memorandum of Encumbrance of OCT No. 994. DIMSON also insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and 26538 were mere
microfilmed or certified copies and, therefore, inadmissible. Lastly, DIMSON reiterated the flaws and irregularities which
voided the titles of the ARANETA in the previous proceedings and focused on the burden of ARANETA to present evidence to
defeat their titles.
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal basis. * As we see it, Sayo's 18 October 1977 Order, which
apparently confirmed Palma's 13 June 1966 Order, raised serious questions as to the validity of the manner by which it was
arrived at.
It is worthy to note that as early as 25 August 1981, counsel for the ARANETA applied for a subpoena duces tecum addressed
to the Clerk of Court of CFI Pasig for the production of the records of LRC Case No. 4557 for purposes of determining the
genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma and also of her Order granting the confirmation. A certain Atty.
Contreras, Officer-in-Charge of the said court, appeared and manifested in open court that the records pertaining to the
petition for Substitution of names of Bartolome Rivera, et al. could no longer be located inasmuch as they had passed hands
from one court to another.
What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire records of Case No. 4557 but the admission of Judge Sayo
that he had not seen the original of the Palma Order. Neither was the signature of Judge Palma on the Order duly proven
because all that was presented was an unsigned duplicate copy with a stamped notation of "original signed". Equally
perplexing is that while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file, said file pertained not to an LRC case but to a simple civil case.
[ 20 ] Thus:
"Atty. Directo:
The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is to present your Honor the Order Order (sic) of Judge Palma in order to
determine the genuineness and authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma in this court order and which order
was a basis of a petition in this court to be confirmed. That is the reason why we want to see the genuineness of
the signature of Judge Palma. EACTSH
COURT:
No signature of Judge Palma was presented in this court. It was a duplicate copy not signed. There is a stamp only of original
signed.
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see the original.
Court:
I did not see the original also. When the records of this case was brought here, I checked the records, there were so many
pages missing and the pages were re-numbered but then I saw the duplicate original and there is a certification of a
woman clerk of Court, Atty. Molo. EcHIDT
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see this document, we are surprised why it is missing.
Court:
We are surprised also. You better ask Judge Muoz Palma.
Atty. Contreras:
 35

May I make of record that in verifying our records, we found in our original vault LRC application no. N-4557 but the
applications were certain Feliciano Manuel and Maria Leao involving Navotas property because I was wondering
why they have the same number. There should be only one.
Atty. Directo:
Aside from that, are there other cases of the same number?
Atty. Contreras:
No, there should be only number for a particular case; that must be a petition after decree record.
Atty. Ignacio:
This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple civil case.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist that Palma's 13 June 1966 Order had been recalled by a subsequent
Order dated 16 August 1966, ["RECALL ORDER"], [ 21 ] wherein the trial court dismissed the motion filed by DIMSON on the
court's findings that ". . . whatever portion of the property covered by OCT 994 which has not been disposed of by the previous
registered owners have already been assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his assignees, as a result of which
there is no portion that is left to be given to the herein supposed assignee Jose Dimson".
However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence and due execution of the Recall Order considering that its original or
even a certified true copy thereof had not been submitted by either of the two parties relying on it despite having been given
numerous opportunities to do so. STaIHc
Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall Order was ever issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of the
DIMSON titles over the properties in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful in light of the fact that the supposed "share" went
beyond what was actually due to Jose Dimson under the Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should be recalled that
Palma's 13 June 1966 Order approved only the conveyance to Jose Dimson of "25% of whatever share of Bartolome Rivera
has over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT 994 . . . subject to availability of undisposed portion of the said lots." [ 22 ]
In relation to this, We find it significant to note the observations contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 that,
based on the assumption that the value of the lots were equal, and "(C)onsidering that the share of Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal was only 1-189/1000 percent of the Maysilo Estate, the Riveras who claimed to be the surviving heirs of Vidal will
inherit only 197,405.26 square meters (16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as their share. [ 23 ] Even if we are to
base the 25% of Jose Dimson on the 19.7 hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would appear that Jose Dimson would only be
entitled to more or less five (5) hectares of the Maysilo Estate. Obviously, basing only on TCT No. 15169 of Dimson which
covered a land area of 50 hectares (500,000 square meters), [ 24 ] it is undisputable that the total properties eventually
transferred to Jose Dimson went over and beyond his supposed 25% share.
What is more, Palma's 13 June 1966 Order specifically required that ". . . whatever title is to be issued herein in favor of Jose
Dimson, the same shall be based on a subdivision plan duly certified by the Land Registration Commission as correct and in
accordance with previous orders issued in this proceedings, said plan to be submitted to this court for final approval.
Interestingly however, despite such requirement, DIMSON did not submit Survey Plan LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 4429 SWO-5268
which allegedly was the basis of the segregation of the lands, if only to prove that the same had been duly approved and
certified correct by the Land Registration Commission. What was submitted before the RTC and this Court was only the
Subdivision Plan of Lot 25-A-2 which notably does not bear the stamp of approval of the LRC. Even an inspection of the
exhibit for CLT does not bear this Survey Plan, which could have, at the very least, proven the authenticity of the DIMSON
title.
Indeed, We find the absence of this piece of evidence as crucial in proving the validity of the titles of DIMSON in view of the
allegation of contending parties that since the survey plan upon which the land titles were based contained the notation
"SWO", meaning that the subdivision plan was only a product of a "special work order", the same could not have passed the
LRC. Neither was it duly certified by the said office. 25 ISTDAH
In addition, the Special Division took note of other irregularities attending Dimson's TCT No. R-15169.
[Firstly], OCT No. 994 showed that Lot 25-A of the Maysilo Estate was originally surveyed on "September 8-27, 1911, October
4-21 and November 17-18, 1911". Yet, in said TCT No. R-15169, the date of the original survey is reflected as "Sept. 8-27,
1911" and nothing more. [ 26 ] The variation in date is revealing considering that DIMSON's titles are all direct transfers from
OCT No. 994 and, as such, would have faithfully adopted the mother lot's data. Unfortunately, no explanation for the
variance was ever offered.
Equally worthy of consideration is the fact that TCT No. 15169 indicates that not only was the date of original registration
inexistent, but the remarks thereon tend to prove that OCT No. 994 had not been presented prior to the issuance of the said
transfer certificate. This manifest from the notations "NA" on the face of DIMSON's title meaning, "not available". It bears
emphasizing that the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to the purchaser without the production of the owner's
duplicate is illegal (Rodriguez v. Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and does not confer any right to the purchaser (Philippine National
Bank vs. Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The Registrar of Deeds must, therefore, deny registration of any deed or voluntary
instrument if the owner's duplicate is not presented in connection therewith. (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19
[1926]; Hodges vs. Treasurer of the Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927]. [ 27 ]

In has also been held that, in cases where transfer certificates of title emanating from one common original certificate of title
were issued on different dates to different persons or entities covering the same land, it would be safe to conclude that the
transfer certificate issued at an earlier date along the line should prevail, barring anomaly in the process of registration. [ 28 ]
Thus, "(w)here two certificates purport to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails. . . . . In successive registration,
 36

where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder or whose claim is derived directly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. . . ." [ 29 ]
xxx xxx xxx
Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title over Lot No. 25-A is that the issuance of the Sayo Order allegedly
confirming the Palma Order was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the records, DIMSON filed the Motion only on 10 October
1977, or eleven (11) years after obtaining the supposed sanction for the issuance of titles in this name. Besides, what was
lodged by Jose Dimson before the sala of then Judge Palma was not a simple land registration case wherein the only purpose
of Jose Dimson was to establish his ownership over the subject parcels of land, but, as reflected in the Palma Order, the
subject of the case was the confirmation of Jose Dimson's claim over the purported rights of Rivera in the disputed
properties. The case did not partake of the nature of a registration proceeding and thus, evidently did not observe the
requirements in land registration cases. Unlike in a land registration case, therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an action
before Judge Sayo to seek "confirmation" of Palma's Order dated 13 June 1966.
So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of laches or the statute of limitations in land registration cases, [ 30 ]
as well as Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to its provisions on revival of judgment applies only to ordinary
civil actions and not to other or extraordinary proceedings such as land registration cases, is clearly not applicable in the
present case. The legal consequences of laches as committed by DIMSON and their failure to observe the provisions of Rule
39 should, therefore, find application in this case and thus, the confirmation of DIMSON's title, if any, should fail.
Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further show that they derive the validity of their certificates of title from
the decreased Jose Dimson's 25% share in the alleged hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera ["RIVERA"] as an alleged
grandson of Maria Concepcion Vidal ["VIDAL"]. However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of
Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that
Rivera was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496). [ 31 ] It can thus be
deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On the other hand,
Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born only on 1905. This alone creates an unexplained
anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Rivera's alleged grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her
alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a share in the
disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate. 32
These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice Renato Corona in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion on our
2007 Resolution. To wit: TcDaSI
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-
17994 issued in the name of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer from TCT No. R-15166 in
the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in turn, was supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917.
Annotations at the back of Hipolito's title revealed that Hipolito acquired ownership by virtue of a court order dated October
18, 1977 approving the compromise agreement which admitted the sale made by Dimson in her favor on September 2, 1976.
Dimson supposedly acquired ownership by virtue of the order dated June 13, 1966 of the CFI of Rizal, Branch 1 in Civil Case
No. 4557 awarding him, as his attorney's fees, 25% of whatever remained of Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 that were
undisposed of in the intestate estate of the decedent Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, one of the registered owners of the
properties covered by OCT No. 994. This order was confirmed by the CFI of Caloocan in a decision dated October 13, 1977
and order dated October 18, 1977 in SP Case No. C-732.
However, an examination of the annotation on OCT No. 994, particularly the following entries, showed:
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extencion superficial de
3,052.93 metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros cuadrados, y descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro
Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha
expedido el certificado de Titulo No. 4210, pagina 163, Libro T-22.
Fecha del instrumento Agosto 29, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918
10.50 AM
AP-6665/0-994 Venta: Queda cancelado el presente Certificado el cuanto a una extencion superficial de
871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el lote no. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el
primer casado con Deogracias Quinones el segundo con Josefa Garcia y se ha expedido el certificado de Titulo No.
4211, pagina 164, Libro T-22. IcTEaC
Fecha del instrumento Agosto 25, 1918
Fecha de la inscripcion September 9, 1918
10:50-AM
Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of 891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total
area sold in 1918 pursuant to the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at the time the order of the CFI of Rizal was made on
June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26 remained undisposed of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal to convey to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey to Hipolito who, by logic, could not transmit
anything to CLT.
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate described in Hipolito's certificate of title
was not approved by the chief of the Registered Land Division as it appeared to be entirely within Pcs-1828, Psd-5079, Psd-
 37

5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. How Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore perplexing,
to say the least.
All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial and appellate courts. The circumstances called for the
need to preserve and protect the integrity of the Torrens system. However, the trial and appellate courts simply disregarded
them. 33
The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the validity of Jose Dimson's titles, which he obtained consequent to
the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due legal recognition to any and all titles supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate
obtained by Dimson upon the authority of either the purported 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma or the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
B.
Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS and their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and those of
DIMSON, on the other, the titles held by ARANETA and the MANOTOKS must prevail considering that their titles were issued much earlier than
the titles of the latter.
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and even invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive
ownership from the Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the properties they laid claim on from Estelita Hipolito who in turn
acquired the same from Jose Dimson. Just as much was concluded by the Special Division as it evaluated CLT's claims. DEIHAa
For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court level, it maintained that there was only one OCT No. 994 from where
its claim emanates. It argued that its case against the MANOTOKS, including that of STO. NIO, was never decided based on
the doctrines laid down in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals [ 34 ] and Heirs of Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals. [ 35 ]
Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the MANOTOKS failed to submit "new" competent evidence and, therefore,
dwelling on the alleged flaws of the MANOTOK's titles, "the findings and conclusions of the court-appointed commissioners as
adopted by the trial court, then upheld by the Honorable Court in its Decision dated 28 September 1995 and finally affirmed in
the Supreme Court's Decision dated 29 November 2005, therefore stand, as there is no reason to disturb them".
Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge Palma and Judge Sayo are no longer open to attack in view of their
finality. Lastly, CLT asserts that the properties covered by the MANOTOKS' titles and those covered by the expropriation
proceedings did not property pertain to and were different from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it maintains that the
MANOTOKS cannot use as basis for the validity of their titles the expropriation undertaken by the Government as a means of
staking their claims.
To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of land covered by TCT No. T-177013 [ 36 ] located in Malabon,
Caloocan City and designated as "Lot 26, Maysilo Estate, LRC Swo-5268". TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother titles is
OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita Hipolito executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of CLT on 10 December 1988. By virtue of this transfer, Hipolito's TCT No. R-17994 [ 37 ] was cancelled and
in lieu thereof, CLT's TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT No. R-17994. Hipolito, on the other hand, was a transferee of the
deceased Dimson who was allegedly the registered owner of the subject land on the basis of TCT No. 15166. SIcTAC

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of DIMSON, the title of CLT should also be declared a nullity
inasmuch as the nullity of the titles of DIMSON necessarily upended CLT's propriety claims. As earlier highlighted, CLT had
anchored its claim on the strength of Hipolito's title and that of DIMSON's TCT No. 15166. Remarkably and curiously though,
TCT No. 15166 was never presented in evidence for purposes of tracing the validity of titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the
present remand proceedings remain damning to CLT's claim of ownership.
Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried annotations identical to those of DIMSON and consequently included
the defects in DIMSON's title, the fact that whatever typographical errors were not at anytime cured by subsequent
compliance with the administrative requirements or subjected to administrative correction bolsters the invalidity of the CLT
title due to its complete and sole dependence on the void DIMSON title. 38
IV.
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims of the Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the
Special Division to ascertain as well the validity of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta, titles which had been annulled by the courts
below. Facially, these titles of the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as their valid mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless,
particular issues were raised as to the validity of the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of their reliance on the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994
vis--vis the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994.
A.
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted the observations of the trial court, which upheld Dimson's
claim over that of Araneta, citing the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, from which Araneta derived its titles,
thus: ISAcHD
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato from where defendant was said to have
acquired TCT 13574 and TCT 7784 now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta and the other documents related thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record No. are both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also shows
that it has Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429,
issued for Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on March 31, 1911 in CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A Bartolome
Rivera et al.)
How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in
Court of First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna, respectively.
 38

2) TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato are not annotated in the Original Certificate of Title 994,
where they were said to have originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was only
registered and was stamped received by the Office of the Securities and Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953 when the
Deed of Sale & Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and the Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale
and Mortgage executed on November 13, 1947 (Exh. M). So, that when Philippine Land Improvement was allegedly given a
special power of attorney by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the said two (2) documents, the said
Philippine Land Improvement Company has not yet been duly registered.
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma. Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never presented in
Court if only to have a clear tracing back of the titles of defendant Araneta.
5) If the subject matter of the Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit 5 defendant) is TCT 26539, why is it that TCT 13574 of
defendant Araneta cancels TCT 6196 instead of TCT 26539. That was never explained. TCT 6196 was not even presented in
Court. IDASHa
6) How come TCT 26538 of Jose Ma. Rato with an area of 593,606.90 was cancelled by TCT 7784 with an area of only 390,282
sq.m.
7) How was defendant Araneta able to have TCT 7784 issued in its name, when the registration of the document entitled
Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage (Exhibit M) was suspended/denied (Exhibit N) and no title was received by
the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948 (Exhibit N and N-
1).
Under Sec. 55 of Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) now Sec. 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, no new certificate of title
shall be entered, no memorandum shall be made upon any certificate of title by the register of deeds, in pursuance of any
deed or other voluntary instrument, unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented for such endorsement.
8) The sale by Jose Ma. Rato in favor of defendant Araneta is not reflected on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT
26538 (Exhibit 7-defendant) meaning that TCT 26538 still exists and intact except for the encumbrances annotated in the
Memorandum of Encumbrances affecting the said title (Exhibits 16, 16-A and 16-N David & Santos)
9) In the encumbrances annotated at the back of TCT 26539 (Exhibit 4-defendant) there appears under entry No. 450 T-6196
Victoneta, Incorporated covering parcel of land canceling said title (TCT 26539) and TCT 6196 was issued (. . .) which could
have referred to the Deed (sic) of Sale and Mortgage of 8-23-47 (Exhibit 5-defendant) entered before Entry 5170 T-8692
Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company, with Date of Instrument: 1-10-29, and Date of Inscription: 9-21-29.
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the
document, Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not appear. IcaEDC
Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the value of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the
Philippine Land Improvement Company. Said entry was also entered on TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents presented by defendant Araneta are not in possession of
said defendant, for according to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate officer of the said defendant Araneta since 1970,
his knowledge of the land now in possession of defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its documents marked in
evidence which were obtained only lately when they needed for presentation before this Court. [ 39 ] 40
The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual contentions, and ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to title
was wholly valid. We adopt in full the following factual findings of the Special Division, thus:
As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains that it has established by direct evidence that its titles were validly
derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it asseverates that these were unfounded
and thus, labored to refute all of them. ARANETA further expounded on the nullity of the Palma and Sayo Orders which was
the basis of DIMSON's titles.
The documentary exhibits it proffered traced its certificates of title to OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. From the titles
submitted, its predecessor-in-interest was Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon ["RATO"], one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994, who
was allotted the share of nine and five hundred twelve one thousandths (9-512/1000) percent share of the Maysilo Estate.
[ 41 ] For this reason, to ascertain the legitimacy of the derivative title of ARANETA, the origin and authenticity of the title of
RATO need to be reassessed.
Verily, attesting to RATO's share on the property, Entry No. 12343/O-994 of the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994,
records the following:
"12343/O-994 Auto: Jose Rato y Tuason Queda cancelado el presente seartificado en cuanto a una estension
superficial de 1,405,725.90 metro Cuadrados mas o menos descrita en el Lote No. 25-A-3, an virtud del auto dictado
por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Riza, de fecha 28 de Julio de 1924, y que en au lugar se had expedido el
Certificados de Titulo No. 8692, folio 492 del Tomo T-35 del Libro de Certicadads de Transferencia. ASCTac
Date of Instrument Julio 28, 1924.
Date of Inscription Agosto 1, 1024 10:19 a.m.
SGD. GLICERIO OPINION, Register of deeds
Agosto 19, 1924" [ 42 ]
In accordance with the decree, RATO was issued on 1 August 1924, TCT No. 8692 [ 43 ] which covers "Lote No. 25 A-3 del
plano del subdivision, parte del Lote No. 25-A, plano Psu-(not legible), "Hacienda de Maysilo", situado en el Munisipio de
Caloocan, Provincia del Rizal . . . ." [ 44 ] The parcel of land covers an approximate area of "UN MILLION CUATROCIENTOS
CINCO MIL SETECIENTOS VEINTICINCO metros cuadrados con NOVENTA decimetros cuadrados (1,405,725.90) mas o
 39

menos". As reflected under Entry No. 14517. . . T-8692, [ 45 ] the parcel of land covered under this certificate of title was
subdivided into five (5) lots under subdivision plan Psd-6599 as per Order of the court of First Instance of Rizal. Consequently,
TCT Nos. 21855, 21856, 21857, 21858 and 21859 were issued.
Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this certificate of title issued in RATO's name, [ 46 ] cancelled TCT No.
8692 [ 47 ] with respect to the property it covers. On its face, TCT No. 21857, [ 48 ] was a derivative of OCT No. 994 registered
on 3 May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of subdivision plan Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A-3, G.L.R.O Record No.
4429. Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No. 26538 [ 49 ] and TCT No. 26539 [ 50 ] which were both issued in
the name of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17 September 1934.
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title showed that it covered a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of
the subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an approximate area of 581,872 square meters. [ 51 ]
Thereafter, TCT No. 26539 was cancelled by TCT No. 6196 [ 52 ] whose registered owner appears to be a certain Victoneta,
Inc. This parcel of land has an area of 581,872 square meters designated as section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114,
being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. CAcIES

As shown on its face, TCT No. 6196 issued on 18 October 1947 in the name of Victoneta, Inc. and its mother title were traced
from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Later, TCT No. 6196 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 13574 was
issued in favor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture on 20 May 1949. [ 53 ] It covers a parcel of land designated as section No. 2
of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C. It has an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters.
On the other hand, appearing under Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 of TCT No. 6196 is the following:
"Entry No. 16086/T-No. 13574 SALE in favor of the ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE, vendee: Conveying the
property described in this certificate of title which is hereby cancelled and issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 13574, page 74, Book T-345 in the name of the vendee. (Doc. No. 149, page 98, Book II, S. of 1949 of
Notary Public for Manila, Hospicio B. Bias).
Date of Instrument May 18, 1949
Date of the Inscription May 30, 1949 at 11:00 a.m. [ 54 ]
TCT No. 26538 [ 55 ] in turn showed on its face that it covers a parcel of land designated as Section 1 of subdivision plan Psd-
10114 being a portion of Lot 25-A-3-C having an area of 592,606.90 square meters. [ 56 ]
On 4 March 1948, TCT No. 26538 was cancelled by TCT No. 7784, which was issued in favor of Araneta Institute of
Agriculture. TCT No. 7784 covers four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,282 square meters. [ 57 ] It would
appear from the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 34819 consolidated with CA-G.R. CV No. 41883 that TCT No. 7784 was eventually
cancelled by TCT No. 21343. [ 58 ] As per attachment of ARANETA in its Answer dated 6 March 1980 filed in Civil Case No.
8050, a mere copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that it covers a parcel of land designated as Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan Psd-
24962 being a portion of Lot 6, described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429 with an approximate area of 333,377
square meters. [ 59 ] However, for reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No. 21343, whether original or certified true copy
thereof, was not submitted before this Court. aAEHCI
In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one of the co-owners of the property covered by OCT NO. 994, was
assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His evidence of ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692 issued in his name. RATO held title to these
parcels of land even after its subdivision in the 1930's. Further subdividing the property, RATO was again issued TCT No.
21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still covering Lot No. 25 A-3-C. In all his certificates of title, including those that
ultimately passed ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the lot as either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 was
retained, thereby proving identity of the land.
More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles showed that all of them were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on
3 May 1917. For purposes of tracing ARANETA's titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear that the evidence presented ultimately
shows a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and 13574 to said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin and legitimacy of the
proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well substantiated by the evidence on record and on this note, said titles deserve
validation.
Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to evaluate the imputed flaws which had been the previous bases of the trial
court in invalidating ARANETA's titles.
One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETA's predecessor-in-interest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in
Rato's name refer to Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, as basis of their issuance. This is being questioned inasmuch as
Decree No. 4429 refers to a decree issued by the CFI of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land
Registration Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of Laguna.
Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the same was a mere typographical error and did not have any effect on
the validity of their title. It further contended that the number "4429" was the case number of Decree No. 36455 and was
used interchangeably as the record number.
This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to the Decree and Record Number appearing on the title of ARANETA's
predecessor-in-interest cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of ARANETA's predecessors-in-interest and ultimately, that of
ARANETA. To the mind of this Court, the incorrect entries alluded to would not have the effect of rendering the previous
titles void sans any strong showing of fraudulent or intentional wrongdoing on the part of the person making such entries.
Fraud is never presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence. [ 60 ] The strongest suspicion cannot
sway judgment or overcome the presumption of regularity. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks
upon it is without rudder or compass. [ 61 ] cDCHaS
 40

The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc. [ 62 ] acknowledged that certain defects on a certificate of title,
specifically, the interchanging of numbers, may occur and "it is certainly believable that such variance in the copying of
entries could be merely a typographical or clerical error". In such cases, citing with approval the decision of the appellate
court, the technical description in the title should prevail over the record number. [ 63 ]
Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the designation and the technical description of the land, as stated on the face of
the title, had not been shown to be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the source of titles. In ARANETA's case, all the
titles pertaining to Lot No. 25 had been verified to be an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all located in Tinajeros,
Malabon. At any rate, despite the incorrect entries on the title, the properties, covered by the subject certificates of title can
still be determined with sufficient certainty.
It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. 994 from
which said titles had supposedly originated. It should be stressed that what partially cancelled OCT No. 994 with respect to
this subject lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539 but TCT No. 8692 issued on 1 August 1924. In fact, TCT Nos. 26538 and
26539 are not even the immediate predecessors of OCT No. 994 but were mere derivatives of TCT No. 21857. Logically
therefore, these two certificates of title could not have been annotated on OCT No. 994, they not being the preceding titles.
In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, which pertains to Jose Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical
condition of the copy submitted to this Court, the entry remains illegible for us to make a definite conclusion. [ 64 ] On the
other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994 found on the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the issuance
of TCT No. 8692 over Lot No. 25-A-3. [ 65 ] CTDAaE
The other flaws noted on ARANETA's certificates of title pertained to its failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and 21343.
As we have discussed, ARANETA offered in evidence a certified microfilm copy of TCT No. 21857 and a certified true copy of
TCT No. 6196 marked as Exhibits 5-A1A and 19-A1A, respectively. However, it failed to submit a copy of said TCT No. 21343.
Be that as it may, we will not hasten to declare void TCT No. 7784 as a consequence of such omission, especially so since TCT
No. 21343 appears to be a mere derivative of TCT No. 7784. Given that the validity of TCT No. 7784 had been preponderantly
proven in these proceedings, the authenticity of said title must be sustained. Besides, ARANETA's failure to submit TCT No.
21343 had never been put into issue in these proceedings.
With respect to the difference in the area of more than 200,0000 * square meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538,
we find that the trial court failed to consider the several conveyances of portions of TCT No. 26538 before they finally passed
on to ARANETA. Thus, on the Memorandum of Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that portions of this piece of
land had been sold to various individuals before the same were transferred to ARANETA on 4 March 1948. Naturally, since
the subject land had been partially cancelled with respect to the portion disposed of, it could not be expected that the area
of TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at the time of its transfer to ARANETA. Even assuming that the entire area covered by
TCT No. 26538 had been disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend * us to conclude that the conveyance was irregular. An
anomaly exists if the area covered under the derivative title will be much more than its predecessor-in-interest. Evidently,
this is not so in the case before us.
The trial court, relying on Exhibit "N", further asserted that ARANETA should not have been issued TCT No. 7784 considering
that the registration of the Novation of Contract, deed of Sale & Mortgage was suspended/denied and no title was received
by the Register of Deeds of Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on March 4, 1948. A perusal of
Exhibit "N" submitted before the trial court, shows that the suspension or denial was merely conditional considering that the
person seeking registration had give days * within which to correct the defects before final denial thereof. As we see it, the
Notice merely contained a warning regarding the denial of the registration of the voluntary deed but, in no way, did it affect
the vested rights of ARANETA to be land. The fact that the title to the land was subsequently issued free from any notation of
the alluded defect creates a reasonable presumption that ARANETA was in fact able to comply with the condition imposed.
This is especially true since the notice itself contained a note, "Just Completed", written across the face of the letter.
Records also reveal the RTC's observation with regard to Araneta's failure to disprove the result of the plotting made on the
subject land (Exhibit K) to the effect that TCT 26538 overlaps 1/2 portion of TCT 15159 and TCT 26539 also overlaps the other
1/2 portion of said TCT R-15169. The trial court further noted that "TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) and TCT 26539 (Jose Rato) and
TCT 21343 (Araneta) are overlapping each other within Lot 25-A. That portion of TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) along bearing
distance points to 17 to 18 to 19 to 20 to 21 to 1 and 2 shaded in yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT 21343
(Araneta)". [ 66 ] SCHTac
Scrutinizing Exhibit "K", it becomes apparent that the said evidence relied upon was only a private survey conducted by
Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands and was based only on
photocopies of relevant land titles. [ 67 ] What is more, said geodetic engineer also failed to adequately explain his
observations, approach and manner of plotting the relative positions of the lots. [ 68 ] From all indications, the conclusions
reached by said geodetic engineer were anchored on unfounded generalizations.
Another defect cited on ARANETA's title was the absence of any entry on the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No.
26538 of the alleged sale between RATO and ARANETA. As pointed out by ARANETA, the copy of TCT No. 26538 submitted to
the trial court contained entries only up to the year 1947, thus, explaining the (1) lack of entry with regard to the issuance of
TCT No. 7784 in favor of ARANETA considering that the same was issued a year later and; (2) entry pertaining to Convenio
Philippine Land Improvement Company which was entered way back on 21 August 1929.
Nonetheless, it still cannot be denied that Rato and ARANETA together with Don Salvador Araneta, entered into a voluntary
agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the subject property. Moreover, no conclusion should have
been reached regarding the total cancellation of TCT No. 26538 inasmuch as TCT No. 7784 cancelled the former certificate of
title to the extent only of Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Two (390,282) square meters.
 41

Notably also, with the evident intent to discredit and refute the title of ARANETA, DIMSON submitted TCT Nos. 26538 [ 69 ]
and 21857, [ 70 ] which are both derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 and cover parcels of land located in
Malabon, Rizal. However, these certificates of title reflect different registered owners and designation of the land covered.
Pertinently, Exhibit "M-Dimson" relating to TCT No. 26538, registered on 12 June 1952, points to one Angela Bautista de
Alvarez as the registered owner of a 240 square meter of land designated as Lot No. 19, Block 14 of the subdivision plan Psd-
5254 being a portion of Lot No. 7-A-1-A. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 14112/T-348 and refers to a certain TCT No.
30473 on the inscriptions. EIAScH
Exhibit "N-Dimson", on the other hand, pertaining to TCT No. 21857 was issued on 30 March 1951 to one Angela I. Tuason de
Perez married to Antonio Perez. This certificate of Title covers a parcel of land described as Lot No. 21, Block 16 of the
consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-140, G.L.R.O. Record No. 4429. It has an area of 436 square meters and cancels TCT
No. 21856.
Exhibit "Q-Dimson" [ 71 ] consisting of TCT No. 8692 covers two parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1 and 2 of Block No. 44
of the consolidation Subdivision Plan Pcs-188 with a total area of 3,372 square meters. It was issued to Gregorio Araneta,
Incorporated on 7 May 1948. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 46118.
Comparing these titles to those of the ARANETA, it is apparent that no identity of the land could be found. The Supreme
Court, in the case of Alonso v. Cebu City Country Club, Inc. [ 72 ] agreeing with the Court of Appeals' dissertation in said case,
ruled that there is nothing fraudulent for a certificate of title to bear the same number as another title to another land. On
this score, the Supreme Court elucidated as follows:
"On the question that TCT No. RT-1310 (T-1151) bears the same number as another title to another land, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that there is nothing fraudulent with the fact that Cebu Country Club, Inc.'s reconstituted
title bears the same number as the title of another parcel of land. This came about because under General Land
Registration Office (GLRO) Circular No. 17, dated February 19, 1947, and Republic Act No. 26 and Circular No. 6, RD
3, dated August 5, 1946, which were in force at the time the title was reconstituted on July 26, 1946, the titles
issued before the inauguration of the Philippine Republic were numbered consecutively and the titles issued after
the inauguration were numbered also consecutively starting with No. 1, so that eventually, the titles issued before
the inauguration were duplicated by titles issued after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic . . . ." cCaSHA
Parenthetically, in their Motion for Partial Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated 30 October 2008, DIMSON
objected to the admissibility of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A on the ground that ARANETA failed to submit the original copies of
these certificates of title and contended that the "originals" contain different "contents" from their own Exhibits M, N and Q.
[ 73 ] The fact that the entries contained in ARANETA's pieces of evidence are different from that of DIMSON's do not
automatically make ARANETA's exhibits inferior replications or a confirmation of their falsity. Interestingly, the objection
regarding the non-submission of the "original copy" had not been raised by DIMSON in their Comments/Objections to
Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence (Of Araneta Institute of Agriculture, Inc.). [ 74 ] In any case, we find the objections
unwarranted considering that certified true copies or certified microfilm copies of Exhibits 4-A1A to 7-A1A had been
submitted by ARANETA in these proceedings.
Lastly, on the alleged non-registration of Philippine Land Improvement Company at the time the special power of attorney
was executed by Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the deed of conveyances, the same only proves that
Philippine Land Improvement Company was not yet registered and this does not go as far as proving the existence or non-
existence of the company at which time it was executed. In effect, the company was not precluded to enter into contracts
and be bound by them but it will do so at the risk of the adverse effects of non-registration under the law.
Ultimately, the question of whether the aforesaid certificates of title constitute as clouds on ARANETA's titles are not for this
Court to rule upon for purposes of the present remand. Needless to state, it is not for the Heirs of Dimson to rely on the
weakness of ARANETA's titles and profit from it. Rather, they should have focused on the strength of their own titles since it
is not within our office to decide in whose hands the contested lands should go, our task being merely to trace back the
parties' claims to OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. 75
There is no question that the Araneta titles were derived from OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917, particularly from the share of Jose
Ma. Rato y Tuazon, one of the co-heirs named in OCT No. 994. The Special Division correctly assessed, among others, the reference to Decree
No. 4429 and Record No. 4429 in some of the antecedent titles of Araneta 76 as mere clerical errors that could not have invalidated said titles,
"4429" being the case number of Decree No. 36455, and the designation and the technical description of the land on those titles not having
been shown to be erroneous or variant with the source title. The Special Division also correctly considered that the trial court had failed to
take into account the several conveyances of TCT No. 26538 before it was ultimately transferred to Araneta in 1948, which explain the
difference in area between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538. The imputed overlap of TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 with the titles held by
Dimson was based on a private survey which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands. The alleged absence of any entry on the
Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the sale of the property between Rato and Araneta did not, according to the Special
Division, discount the fact that Rato and Araneta entered into a voluntary agreement with the intention of transferring the ownership of the
subject property. Finally, the Special Division noted that the titles derived from OCT No. 994, which Dimson had submitted as evidence to
discredit the Araneta claim, pertain to properties wholly different from those covered by the Araneta titles.
There is no cause to dispute the factual findings and conclusions of the Special Division on the validity of the Araneta titles, and we
affirm the same. HEIcDT
B.
It appears that the claim to title of the Manotoks is somewhat more controversial. The Special Division did not discount the fact that
there could have been flaws in some of the intervening titles between the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 and the present titles of the Manotoks.
However, the significant event was the expropriation proceedings undertaken by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947. At least
 42

some of the titles in the name of the Manotoks were sourced from the titles issued to and subsequently distributed by the Republic. The
Special Division explained the milieu in full:
VALIDITY OF THE MANOTOK TITLES
The notation under Entry No. 6655/O-994, found on page 17 of OCT 994 of the Owner's Duplicate Copy, shows that Lot No.
26 had been a subject of sale in favor of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano P. Leuterio. [ 77 ] The notation reads:
"Ap. 6655/O-994 Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extension superficial de
3,052.93 Metros cuadrados y 16,512.50 metros Cuadrados y descrita en el Lote No. 26 vendida a favor de Alejandro
Ruis y Mariano P. Leuterio, el primar casado con Diogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be
expedido el Certificado de Titulo No. 4210, Pagina 163, Libro T-22.

Date of the Instrument Aug. 29, 1918

Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m.
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
"Ap. 6665/O-994-Venta: Queda Cancelado el presente Certificado en cuanto a una extension superficial de
871,982.00 metros cuadrados, descrita en el Lote No. 26, vendida a favor de Alejandro Ruiz y Mariano P. Leuterio, el
primar casado con Deogracias Quinones y el Segundo con Josefa Garcia y se be expedido el Certificado de Titulo No.
4211, Pagina 164, Libro T-No. 22.
Date of Instrument Aug. 21, 1918
Date of Inscription Sept. 9, 1918 10:50 a.m.
(SGD.) L. GARDUNIO, Register of Deeds"
As a result, TCT No. 4211 was cancelled by TCT No. 5261 which was issued in the name of Francisco Gonzales. Inscribed on
the "Memorandum of the Incumbrances Affecting the Property Described in this Certificate" was the sale executed in favor
of Francisco Gonzales dated 3 March 1920. Thus, on 6 April 1920, TCT No. 5261 was issued in the name of Francisco
Gonzales. [ 78 ]
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married to Maria
P. Gutierrez, Consuelo Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana Francisco Gonzales y Narciso married
to Fortunato de Leon; Maria Clara Gonzales y Narciso married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco Felipe Gonzales y Narciso married
to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion Andrea Gonzales y Narciso married to Melquiades M. Virata, Jr. aEACcS
Appearing on the "Memorandum" of TCT No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap 2111 which reads as follows: [ 79 ]
"A/2111 Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este certificado de titulo, a Rufina Narciso Vda. de Gonzales, a cuenta
de la participacion de osia esta en (not legible) los tienes de la eseledad de genanciales. Habida entre la misma y el
finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una orden del Hon. Fernando Jugo, Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Manila Sala II, dienada el 20 de Septiembre de 19 (not legible), en el Expidiente de intestado del nombrado
Francisco J. Gonzales, No. 49034, se cancela el presente certificado de tituto y se expide otre a hombre decha Rufina
Narciso, con (not legible) No. 35486, folio 86, Tomo T-168 del libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia de
dicha orden da que se ha heche referencia en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
(SGD.) TEODORO GONZALES,
Registrado de Titulos." ICASEH
The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with subdivision plan Psd-21154. [ 80 ] Partitioning the lots
among the co-owners, TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof six (6) certificates of titles were
individually issued [ 81 ] to Francisco Gonzales's six (6) children, specifically, TCT Nos. 1368-1373 while TCT No. 1374 was
issued in favor of all the children. [ 82 ]
As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374 were expropriated by the Republic of the
Philippines and were eventually subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by MRI from the
years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the lot covered by TCT No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC acquired from
PhilVille Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue of Deed of Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT
No. 232568 was issued on 9 May 1991.
The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as follows:
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828
which has an area of 4,988 square meters. MRI purchased this lot from one Basilio Caina who was issued TCT No.
7526 which cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. [ 83 ]
2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI from one Narcisa Buenaventura. The Parcel of land has an
approximate area of 2,876 square meters. Buenaventura's ownership was evidenced by TCT No. 7525, [ 84 ]
deriving the same from TCT No. 36657-63. [ 85 ]
3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters. [ 86 ] This
certificate of title was traced from one Filemon Custodio who held TCT No. 7792. Custodio was in turn a transferee
of Guillermo Rivera, the latter having been issued TCT No. 7760 by virtue of sale between him and then People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation ["PHHC"]. The latter title eventually cancelled TCT No. 36557-63 of the
Republic. [ 87 ] SADECI
4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters. MRI's
certificate of title was derived from TCT No. 9854 registered in the name of Filemon Custodio, a transferee of Jose
Dionisio, who was issued TCT No. 9853. Dionisio's title in turn cancelled the Republic's TCT No. 36657-63. [ 88 ]
 43

5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired the
same by virtue of sale between him and Francisco Custodio, holder of TCT No. 21040. Francisco Custodio was a
transferee of Lorenzo Caina, registered owner of TCT No. 21039 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale between Caina and
the PHHC, the latter's certificate of title canceling TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic. [ 89 ]
6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale between it and Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT
No. 21484. The certificate of title covers Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters Custodio was in
turn a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, the latter being the registered owner of TCT No. 21013 by reason of sale
between him and PHHC. [ 90 ] Under Entry No. 6277/T-21485, it would appear that portions of the property
covered under TCT No. 21485 and TCT No. 232568 had been subject of an expropriation proceedings to which the
Manotok Estate Corporation, et al. interposed no objections subject to the payment of just compensation. [ 91 ]
7) TCT Nos. 26405 [ 92 ] and 26406, [ 93 ] both registered in the name of MRI, cancelled TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774,
respectively. TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774 were registered in the names of Romulo, Rosalina, Lucila, Felix and Emilia all
surnamed Jacinto, ["JACINTOS"], before the same were transferred to MRI by reason of sale in favor of the latter.
The JACINTOS' certificates of title were in turn derived from TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 issued in the name of Filemon
Custodio [ 94 ] Both TCT Nos. 8014 and 8015 cancelled TCT 7792/T-39. However, for purposes of tracing TCT No.
7792/T-39 to the Republic's certificate of titles, this certificate of title was not submitted in evidence. EcATDH
8) TCT No. 26407 [ 95 ] issued to MRI was traced back to the title of Lourdes Mercado Cloribel who was the
registered owner of TCT No. 8404 by virtue of sale between the two, thereby transferring ownership to MRI. On the
fact of TCT No. 8404, it would show that it cancelled TCT No. 8013/T41 but there is no showing in whose name TCT
No. 8013 was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.
9) TCT No. 33904 [ 96 ] of MRI cancelled TCT No. 8017 of Filemon Custodio by virtue of sale between the latter and
MRI. [ 97 ] We note that TCT No. 8017 cancelled TCT No. 7792/T-39 but there is no showing whether the same
could be traced back to the Republic's certificates of title.
10) TCT No. 34255, covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters, reflects MRI as the
registered owner. This certificate of title cancels TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic. [ 98 ]
11) TCT No. 254875 [ 99 ] bears MRI as the registered owner of Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910
square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT No. 41956 which covers Lot 55, also registered in the name of
MRI. It would appear that MRI acquired the lot covered under TCT No. 41956 from one Joaquin Caina who was the
registered owner of TCT No. 25715 being a vendee of PHHC. [ 100 ]
12) TCT No. 53268 of MRI covered Lot No. 15, [ 101 ] which was purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta
who held TCT No. 53155. Villacorta in turn acquired the same land from one Eufrocina Mackay whose TCT No. 7827
was eventually cancelled by Villacorta's land title. [ 102 ] It would appear that TCT No. 7827 cancelled TCT No.
7826/T-40 but there is no trace to whom the latter title was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled.
13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner of Lot 3 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828
of the Maysilo Estate covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. This certificate of title cancelled TCT
No. 53122 in the names of MRI (19,531 square meters) and one Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No.
53122 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the names of Jesus Hipona (19,531 square meters) and
Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). Notably, TCT No. 21347 cancelled TCT No. 21315/T-107 but there is no
indication to whom TCT No. 21315 was registered and what certificate of title it cancelled. [ 103 ] cIECaS
14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered owner of Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850
square meters. MRI's certificate of title cancelled TCT No. C-17234 registered in the names of MRI (27,750 square
meters), Roberto S. David (3,0000 * square meters) and Jose Madulid (500 square meters). It would appear that
TCT No. C-17234 cancelled TCT No. 53124 registered in the names of MRI, Spouses Priscila and Antonio Sebastian
and Jose Madulid. [ 104 ] MRI also submitted in evidence a Deed of Partition between itself, Roberto David and
Madulid thereby subdividing the property into Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as per subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091.
[ 105 ] Again, we note that TCT No. 53124 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107 but the records are bereft of any
indication what certificate of title it cancelled and to whom the same was registered.

15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707
square meters, was a by-product of TCT No. 25146, also registered in the name of MRI, after the same was
subdivided into two lots, namely, Lot Nos. 56-A and 56-B. TCT No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145 registered in the
name of Quirino Labing-isa by virtue of sale in favor of MRI. In turn, TCT No. 21545 cancelled TCT Nos. (36557)
12836 to (36563) 12842. [ 106 ]
16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272 which
has an approximate area of 4,650 square meters. It was previously registered in the names of MRI (4,650 square
meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters) under TCT No. 53123 by
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, Branch XII and as per agreement of the parties in Civil
Case No. C-424. TCT No. 53123 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21346 whose registered owners were Conchita Umali
(1,000 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Jesus Hipona (4,650 square meters). [ 107 ] Like some
of the other titles, TCT No. 21346 cancelled TCT No. 21316 but there is no trace of this latter certificate of
title. aCcEHS
17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI, covers Lot No. 4-B-2 and has an area of more or less 6,354
square meters and a by-product of TCT No. 9022, also in the name of MRI, after the same was subdivided under
 44

subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT No. 9022, in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of
Filemon S. Custodio whose ownership thereon was transferred to MRI by virtue of a voluntary sale. [ 108] TCT No.
8894 cancelled TCT No. 8846/T-45 but this latter certificate of title was not submitted in evidence for purposes of
tracing back to the Republic's title.
18) TCT No. 165119 [ 109 ] was issued to MRI by virtue of a Deed of Sale between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and
Juan Ignacio [SPOUSES IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of which, TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO was
cancelled. [ 110 ] It would appear that TCT No. C-39690 cancelled TCT No. 35266/T-173 but TCT No. 35266/T-173
was not submitted in evidence.
19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate Corporation, covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152
with an area of 23,206 square meters, was derived from the certificate of title held by PhilVille Development and
Housing Corporation under TCT No. 197357. MEC acquired the subject parcel of land by virtue of Deed of Exchange
between it and PHILVILLE DATED 9 May 1991. [ 111 ] TCT No. 197357 cancelled TCT No. 195730/T-974 but there is
no trace what certificate of title the latter title cancelled.
By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the MANOTOKS, including their derivative titles, were all traced to OCT
No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared all the lots covered by such titles for taxation purposes. Without
doubt, MRI had successfully traced back some of their certificates of title to the valid OCT No. 994, they having acquired the
lots from some of the vendees of the PHHC after the same were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes. TCcSDE
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No.
539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Jose
Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by
TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No.
539 for resale to tenants is beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose
Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by
TCT Nos. 1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation which were later consolidated
and subdivided into 77 lots for resale to tenants. No sign of protest was ever raised by CLT on this point. 112
The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the State by way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of
whatever previous flaws may have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 113 and then Associate
Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno reiterated in Reyes v. NHA: 114 "In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary
conveyance". 115 This doctrine was derived from the opinion of then Chief Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer
in Cadorette v. U.S., 116 which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carmack 117that "[b]y giving notice to all
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance". 118
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However, TCT
No. 4211 was issued decades before the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that may have attended that particular title
would have been purged when the property covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through eminent domain. The Special
Division noted as much: DcTAIH
As it is, the validity of most of MRI's certificates of title should be upheld because they were derived from the Republic's valid
certificates of title. In fact, some of the MANOTOKS' titles can be traced back to the Government's titles as a result of the
expropriation in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of the MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of their
acquisition resulting from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain that need not be granted even by the
fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the State of its
inherent power did not affect or render invalid the subsequent transfers after the forced sale. Indeed, when land has been
acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former
owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former owner. 119
The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the
trial court to examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority Report had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from
which the Manotok titles were derived. 120 The Special Division, however, concluded that such report was in fact tainted by the fact that it
was determined "outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties". To wit:
In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the "opinion" with regard to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch as
the majority report submitted before the trial court was made outside the scope of the tasks which the trial court confined
them to perform. The MANOTOKS also argued that before this proceeding on remand, CLT failed to introduce evidence of
such flaws neither were the concerned geodetic engineers presented as witnesses. Moreover, the MANOTOKS further
maintained that CLT failed to submit any factual or legal bases to prove the authenticity and validity of the Palma and Sayo
Orders. They insisted that the Palma Order was a void one for being conditional and having resulted to the issuance of
"duplicate certificates of land title".
With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS' titles which were based on the Majority Report, we find that the bases
of the alleged defects proceeded from unreliable sources thus, tainting the veracity of the said report.
 45

The records of the case between CLT and the MANOTOKS reveal that the parties approved the creation of a commission to
resolve only these two issues, to wit:
"xxx xxx xxx
These issues to be resolved by the 3 Commissioners are as follows:
1) Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates of Title of defendants pertain to or
involve Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate presently titled in the name of the plaintiff; and
2) Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff and the property covered by the titles of
the defendants overlap. [ 121 ] ACTIcS
Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial court's conclusions were based, it would appear that the findings
therein were outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties. Specifically, the deductions with regard
to the technical infirmities and defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261 and 35486 do not involve the question of whether or
not the subject properties were identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo estate or whether there was overlapping of titles.
Records bear out that the MANOTOKS took exception to the procedure taken citing therein the "ultra vires" acts of the two
Commissioners.
In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged flaws and inherent technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and
35486, ranging from the language of the technical descriptions, absence of subdivision plan, lot number and survey plan.
Evidently, these defects go only as far as the certificates of title issued prior to those of the Republic. Remarkably, no specific
flaw was found on the MANOTOKS' titles indicating any irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the Commissioners who signed
the majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261, 35486, 1368 thru 1324 (sic) [ 122 ] were irregularly
and questionably issued without any reference to the MANOTOKS' certificates of title. [ 123 ] Otherwise stated, the imputed
flaws affect only those certificates of title issued prior to those registered in the name of the Republic. No flaw had been
specifically identified or established in the proceedings below, which would taint the titles held by the MANOTOKS in so far
as the regularity of their issuance is concerned. 124

At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the
particular titles which could not be retraced to the titles acquired by the Republic of the Philippines by way of expropriation.
Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the vendees of PHHC, there are, however, some certificates of title
which could not be traced back to the titles previously held by the Republic specifically, MRI's TCT Nos. 26405 and 26406,
26407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C-17272, T-121428, 163903, 165119 and MEC's TCT No. T-232568. As to these certificates of
title, the MANOTOKS failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to
whose names they were subsequently transferred and registered. Thus, we find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to
their origins. 125 TaSEHD
V.
The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise summary of its conclusions:
In prcis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and the evidence on record clearly establish the failure of DIMSON
and CLT to substantiate their titles and overcome the onus of proving that said titles are derivatives of OCT 994 registered on
3 May 1917, and not 19 April 1917, as what is reflected in their titles. In contrast, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, both of
which had consistently anchored their proprietary claims on OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917, have, in this remand
proceeding, been able to support their claims of ownership over the respective portions of the Maysilo Estate. Except in the
case of the MANOTOKS which had failed to substantiate the validity of some of their certificates of title, the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA presented evidence proving the identity, the extent and the origin of their titles. HSIDTE
Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court relative to the tenability of the respective imputed flaws in the titles of
the MANOTOKS and ARANETA and whether such flaws are sufficient to defeat said claims, this Court finds that, as discussed
above, such flaws are inconsequential and ineffectual in invalidating the MANOTOKS and ARANETA titles.
Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of herein contending parties are contradictory to each other and stand
to refute the validity of their opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that said certificates of title have correspondingly been
subjected to dispute on the basis of separate and distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial difference between the imputed
flaws allegedly tainting said contending titles, DIMSON and CLT on one hand, and the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the
other, is that the imputed flaws purportedly beleaguering the respective certificates of title of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA
relate to the mechanical and technical aspect of the transcription of their titles and are therefore inconsequential to the
import and validity thereof. Said imputed flaws do not depart from the fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the
MANOTOKS and ARANETA had been clothed with the right of ownership over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.
On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of DIMSON and CLT primarily stem from infirmities attending or otherwise
affecting the very crux of their claim of ownership. Having derived their titles from RIVERA, whose title is questionable and
dubious to the core, DIMSON and CLT cannot rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws are hard to overcome as
they delve into the substance of their proprietary claims. As stated, DIMSON and CLT miserably failed to overcome their onus
and instead opted to hap on the supposed flaws of the adverse parties. For these reasons, the titles of DIMSON and CLT
should be declared a nullity. aSDCIE
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing evaluation and in conformity with the Supreme Court 2007 Resolution, this Court arrived at the following
conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances:
 46

1. As categorically declared by the Supreme Court, there is only one OCT 994, the registration date of which had
already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917. OCT 994 which reflects the date of 19 April
1917 as its registration date is null and void.
2. In view thereof and in addition to other grounds we have already discussed, the certificates of title of the
deceased Jose Dimson and his successor-in-interest, CLT, having been traced back to OCT 994 dated 19 April 1917,
are NULL and VOID and thus vest no legal right or claim in favor of DIMSON and CLT.
3. The 13 June 1966 Palma Order and the 18 October 1977 Sayo Order, on which DIMSON and CLT anchor the
validity of their respective titles, do not substantiate their proprietary claims. While the existence of said Orders are
admitted, the legal import thereof nonetheless fails to confer a semblance of legality on the titles of DIMSON and
consequently, of CLT, more so, a superior right to defeat the titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, respectively.
4. Portions of Lot No. 26 pertinent to this controversy, particularly that being disputed by the MANOTOKS and CLT,
were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for
resale to tenants. The MANOTOKS, thus as successor-in-interest of the Republic, were able to establish that some
of their certificates of title had indeed originated or were derived from said expropriated parcels of land. ADSTCI
5. The evidence on record confirm that the certificates of title covering the land being claimed by ARANETA were
derived from OCT NO. 994 registered on 3 May 1917 thereby ultimately showing a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and
13574 to said mother title. By reason of which, that is either belonging to or portions of Lot 25-A-3 as previously
owned by RATO, had been well substantiated and proven to be superior to that of DIMSON.
6. For reasons above-stated and in view of the established rights of ownership of both the MANOTOKS and
ARANETA over the contested properties, we find that the imputed flaws on their titles cannot defeat the valid
claims of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA over the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate. 126
Inasmuch as we agree with the factual findings and evaluation of the Special Division, we likewise adopt the above conclusions. As
we earlier stated, it was incumbent on the Heirs of Dimson and/or CLT to establish their claim to title for reasons other than the fact that OCT
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 is extant. They failed to do so. It should be noted that the instant cases arose from separate actions filed by Jose
Dimson and CLT seeking the recovery of possession and/or annulment of title against Araneta and the Manotok Group. Thus, the burden of
evidence was on Dimson and CLT to establish the strength of their respective claims of ownership, and not merely to rely upon whatever
weaknesses in the claims of the Manotoks and Araneta for their causes of action to prosper. The well-settled legal principle in actions for
annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and
convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. 127 In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. 128
We now proceed to tackle the recommendations submitted by the Special Division. They are as follows:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Apropos to said conclusions, this Court hereby respectfully makes the following recommendations regarding the validity of
the conflicting proprietary claims as interposed by the herein contending parties:
1. To declare with finality that the certificates of title of DIMSON and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their
successors-in-interest, if any, are NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land. SEHACI
2. To declare LEGAL and VALID the proprietary claims the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following
certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828
which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters.
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and has an approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters.
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters.
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707
square meters.
With regard to the following certificates of title, namely: ASaTCE
3.A. MANOTOK REALTY INC.
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,0000 * square meters.
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters.
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters.
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of
3,163 square meters.
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an
area of more or less 20,531 square meters.
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters.
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of
4,650 square meters.
 47

i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of
TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio.
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale
between said Spouses and MRI.
3.B. MANOTOK ESTATE CORPORATION
a) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.
The foregoing certificates of title (3.A and 3.B), failing to make specific references to the particular certificates of
title which they cancelled and in whose name they were registered, may be declared NULL and VOID, or in the
alternative, subject the same to further technical verification.
4. To declare LEGAL and VALID the title of ARANETA respecting parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title:
a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a
portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters; cHSTEA
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters. 129
The first, second and fourth recommendations are well taken as they logically arise from the facts and conclusions, as determined by the Special
Division, which this Court adopts.
The third recommendation that eleven (11) of the titles held by the Manotoks be declared null and void or subjected to further technical
verification warrants some analysis.
The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third recommendation do not, as stated by the Special Division, sufficiently indicate that
they could be traced back to the titles acquired by the Republic when it expropriated portions of the Maysilo Estate in the 1940s. On the other
hand, the Manotok titles that were affirmed by the Special Division are traceable to the titles of the Republic and thus have benefited, as they
should, from the cleansing effect the expropriation had on whatever flaws that attached to the previous titles. However, although the Special
Division did not concede the same benefit to the other Manotok titles named in the third recommendation, at the same time it did not conclude
that such titles were false or fraudulently acquired. Absent such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate step of annulling those titles.
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a valid mother title OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in stark contrast
with the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which all advert to an inexistent mother title. On their face, the Manotok titles do not reflect
any error or fraud, and certainly the Special Division do not point to any such flaw in these titles. Nothing on the face of the titles gives cause for
the Court to annul the same. DCSTAH
It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the Majority Report earlier rendered in the case between the Manotoks and CLT,
said report having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in the antecedent TCTs from which the Manotoks derived their claim. The Special Division
concluded that such findings had been reached by the Commissioners in excess of their original mandate and, thus, ultra vires. Assuming that such
flaws were extant, they existed on the titles and anteceded the expropriation of the properties by the Government. As stated earlier, such
expropriation would have cleansed the titles of the prior flaws. But even if the Manotok titles enumerated in the third recommendation could not
be sourced from the titles acquired by the Republic through expropriation, still the rejection of the Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted
to therein could not form the basis for the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed, the Special Division's rejection of the Majority Report further
diminishes any ground to annul the Manotok titles referred to in the third recommendation.
Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired by the
Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow. In addition, the Court is aware that the ground utilized by the Special
Division in rejecting the Majority Report that the determinations were made outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the
parties does not categorically refute the technical findings made therein. Those circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul the Manotoks'
titles listed in the third recommendation, should be sufficiently made public.
Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Division's third recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to require the Registers
of Deeds concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles so as to sufficiently notify the public of their unclear status, more particularly the
inability of the Manotoks to trace the titles without any gap back to OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should be any cause for the
annulment of those titles from a proper party's end, then let the proper case be instituted before the appropriate court. aETAHD
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special Division and issues the following reliefs:
1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including other derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if
any, are declared NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over the subject parcels of land;
2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the parcels of land covered by the following certificates of title are declared
LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828
which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
b) TCT No. 7762 covering Lot 1-C, with an approximate area of 2,287 square meters.
c) TCT No. 8012 covering Lot No. 12-1 having an area of 20,000 square meters.
d) TCT No. 9866 covering Lot No. 21 and having an approximate area of 23,979 square meters.
e) TCT No. 21107 covering Lot 22 with an approximate area of 2,557 square meters.
f) TCT No. 21485 covering Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276 square meters.
g) TCT No. 34255 covering Lot No. 11-Bm, Psd-75797 with an area of 11,000 square meters.
h) TCT No. 254875 covering Lot 55-A with an area of approximately 1,910 square meters. AScHCD
i) TCT No. C-35267 covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707
square meters.
3) The following certificates of titles in the name of ARANETA are hereby declared LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
 48

a) TCT No. 13574 covering a parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of subdivision plan Psd-10114, being a
portion of Lot 25-A-3-C with an aggregate area of 581,872 square meters;
b) TCT No. 7784 covering four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 390,383 square meters.
4) On the following titles in the name of Manotok Realty, Inc. or Manotok Estate Corporation, to wit:
a) TCT No. 26405 covering Lot No. 12-E with an area of 1,000 square meters;
b) TCT No. 26406 covering Lot No. 12-F with an area of 1,000 square meters;
c) TCT No. 26407 covering Lot No. 12-B with an area of 1,000 square meters;
d) TCT No. 33904 covering Lot No. 12-H with an area of 1,802 square meters;
e) TCT No. 53268 covering Lot No. 15 purchased by MRI from one Maria V. Villacorta with an approximate area of
3,163 square meters;
f) TCT No. 55897 covering Lot 3 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate covering an
area of more or less 20,531 square meters; cCHITA
g) TCT No. C-17272 covering Lot 6-C which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters;
h) TCT No. T-121428 covering Lot No. 5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315278, which has an approximate area of
4,650 square meters;
i) TCT No. 163902 covering Lot No. 4-B-2 with an area of more or less 6,354 square meters allegedly a by-product of
TCT No. 9022, which in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of Filemon S. Custodio;
j) TCT No. 165119 which allegedly cancelled TCT No. C-36960 of the SPOUSES IGNACIO by virtue of a Deed of Sale
between said spouses and MRI;
k) TCT No. T-232568 covering Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206 square meters.
the Registers of Deeds concerned are ordered to annotate that as determined in the foregoing Resolution, the registered owners of the said
titles "failed to make any specific reference to the preceding certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose names they were
subsequently transferred and registered", thereby leading the Supreme Court "to find no sufficient basis to make a conclusion as to their
origins". 130
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., took no part due to relationship to counsel.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Nachura, JJ., took no part.
Austria-Martinez, J., is on official leave.
||| (Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 123346, 134385 (Resolution), [March 31, 2009], 601 PHIL 571-638)
 49

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142549. March 9, 2010.]
FIDELA R. ANGELES, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
THE REGISTER OFDEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three
Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches
over three cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican." 1 What we have before us now is touted as
"one of the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history." 2
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this infamous estate has made the job of deciding this
particular petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but complicated, on the other hand,
as such applicability must be determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and fair conclusion to a
controversy that has now lasted for almost forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order 3 dated January 8, 1998 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order),
which was issued a Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the
municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the property
otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120. THIcCA
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also
had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v.
Court of Appeals, 4 reiterated in Heirs ofLuis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 5 the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and
not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in
that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all
the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred
Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the
Court, and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners' Report dated
October 21, 1997 and Supplemental Commissioners' Report dated December 30, 1997 that the following lots with transfer
certificates of title to be issued by the Register ofDeeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be sold and the
proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to their respective interest in the property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the
names of all the co-owners for the following lots, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order
because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA
Administrator to direct said Registers ofDeeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-reply 7 dated March 27, 2000, with two
attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement 8 dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then
Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11 9 issued to all
Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part: SHDAEC
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st
Indorsement dated 22 September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding
Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by
the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration
Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers ofDeeds, copy
attached, stating the following:
xxx xxx xxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, . . . had recommended to
the Office of the Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and
Urban Planning in its Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 . . . . 10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees
on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings:
 50

i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.,
former Deputy Registrar ofDeeds of Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as
government findings showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad
faith, by issuing "certifications" and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on April 19,
1917 when in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith,
when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No. 994.
Malice was evident because she had previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals which were derived
from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned the falsity ofApril 19, 1917 as the correct date of the
registration of OCT No. 994. 11 (Underscoring in the original.)
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and tampering."
We quote the last portion of said letter-reply: HESAIT
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in
making it appear that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2) OCT
No. 994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance oftransfer certificates of title covering the subdivided portions of the
Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as the
protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to
further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land registration.
With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer
from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the
issuance of various certificates of title in the names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands were
not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency but merely sketch plans, in
violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title
covering land previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not
declare the nullity of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates
the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer
certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate action in court for the
declaration of nullity of certificates of title pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 874), "there are too many fake titles being
peddled around and it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to
it that this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion,
honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large." 12
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement, 13 made a substantive modification of the ruling made
by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even
the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of the land." According
to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the
Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on "what is the
valid OCT No. 994." Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend,
modify, much less set aside the same" and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered the
Order of no effect. 14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11
dated October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest,
and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for "condemnation and reproof of the highest degree." 15
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, other than this action."
In his Comment, 16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made
by the committee created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an independent
fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in
existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages. 17 IDaEHC
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the
mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said
position and could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and
duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a
committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed
 51

for the investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate.
According to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City as well
as the issuance and regularity of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding of the
irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against
person(s) and/or officials and employees of this Department or its agencies who may appear to have participated therein,
and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department,
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and other units and attached agencies of this
Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the
courts affecting the Maysilo Estate." 18
Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding
investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the
Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles,
including those that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committee's report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the
subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must
follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer
certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance ofthe DOJ; thus, it could not be said
that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated
January 18, 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as her rights and interests were non-existent at that time.
Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to
petitioner's counsel to present petitioner's case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies
the requirements of due process, as the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the
course of a trial where petitioner's claim for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such being
the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages the amount of which she did not even
specify. As it is, such claim should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for
her claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim should be outrightly dismissed. 20
In her Reply, 21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be named as private respondent because he was the
cause of public respondents' failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A private respondent is "the person interested in sustaining the
proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the
public respondents affected by the proceedings . . . ." He is not charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief
prayed for by petitioner shall require private respondent's active participation. 22
Anent private respondent's argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable
Court, petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private respondent . . . resulted in the altering or supplanting of a
judgment of this Court." The complaints praying that an investigation be conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate
were made to the private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court had
rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent's claim, she is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the
respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument:
RULE 65
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with
the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution
may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin,
on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or
orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to
issue the writ of execution.
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that did not belong to the Executive Department, because he
had caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that had already become final and executory.
Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its
functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit. 23 DAEaTS
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City filed their Comment 24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful
 52

owners of the property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-
interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the
proportionate share, ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue
statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the
DOJ, which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the
conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names. 25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth
Congress of the Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not and cannot be
true heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). . . . .
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been partitioned and divided among the true owners,
namely, Gonzalo Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Baos, Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose
Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz,
Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la
Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patio, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia O'Farrell y
Patio, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason,
Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their respective shares,
as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION
PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex "D", and its faithful translation
into English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex "E", and both made integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same subject parcels of land were legally issued in the
names of above-enumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Order of the lower court.
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending before the lower court has been held in abeyance
to await the resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate. 26
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to
issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded
petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public
respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it
was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial
duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt
exists. 27 It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct
the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. 28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus;
or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents' refusal to comply with said Order. Did public
respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner's request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority 29 instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance
in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable
duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. AcDaEH
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is
a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious,
objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial
doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. 30 (Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial
duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case,
which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC
 53

Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the
rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the
Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that
cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his
refusal to grant petitioner's request. 31 There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order,
given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the
civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty,
Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation 32 (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution 33 in the same case dated March
31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotokcase), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994
have been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and
conclusions set forth in said resolutions. HIcTDE
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court 34 which have held that there are two existing
OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier,
hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioner's claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not
the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April
1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate
concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the
case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents. 35
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the
following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the
Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the
title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the
decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when
the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The
fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the
validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. . . . .
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases
at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge
as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind
any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar. 36 (Emphases supplied.)
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this
Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even
consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon
the initiative of the parties. . . . The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible
they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces ofevidence submitted by the parties. The
fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without
inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the
courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to the
Court of Appeals. . . . . aHcACT
xxx xxx xxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its
findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution. 37
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latter's
conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only one
OCT No. 994, the registration date ofwhich had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically
concluded that "OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void."
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear
several attempts ofdifferent individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be attributed to her advanced age and potential
access to a vast sum of money, should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a
portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above
that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.
The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss
the petition for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Angeles v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 142549, [March 9, 2010], 628 PHIL 381-401)