STANDARD OF CARE
described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
(1104a)
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-12219 || March 15, 1918 || Street, J.
FACTS:
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It
appears that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over
said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from
the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile
approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would
move to the other side. The defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse
without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left
hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider
was thrown off with some violence. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of
P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the
defendant.
Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union: absolving the defendant from
liability
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above
damage done;
HELD:
YES. and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant started across
the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to
the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated
to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that
it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the
nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some
distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff
to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the
situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring
his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the
bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid
the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he
was almost upon the horse.
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen the effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
Furthermore, it goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault,
for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. In the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359) This
Court there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person injured
did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the
damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party.
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the
sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here
awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest
on the whole to the date of this recovery.
LOPE SARREAL, SR., vs. JAPAN AIRLINES CO., LTD., and HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, respondents.
G.R. No. 75308 || March 23, 1992 || GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Page | 1
Petitioner alleged that he is a prominent international boxing matchmaker and
business manager of world champion boxers which require him to take frequent
international trips.
He was in LA negotiating a possible championship match between Zapata and
Caada in Manila. This agreement was to be confirmed by the petitioner through
overseas call in Manila on July 2, 1980.
Petitioner flew from LA to Tokyo. At the Narita Airport Officer, petitioner inquired if
there was a Japan AirLines flight from Bangkok to Manila and explained that he had a
very important business in Manila.
JAL employee looked into her schedule book and put a stamp on petitioners ticket
and said not to worry since she has endorsed his JAL ticket to the Thai International
leaving Bangkok to Manila. Petitioner then proceeded to Bangkok. At the time of his
supposed flight, Thai International refused him to board because he was told that his
ticket was not endorseable.
Since he failed to reach Manila on July 2, the transaction was cancelled. The fight will
happen in Japan instead. Petitioner alleged that he wouldve earned around $120k
net.
Petitioner filed an action for damages in RTC Pasay against JAL on the ground of
breach of contract of carriage.
RTC ruled that JAL had to pay the petitioner since the employee was liable for
breaching the contract of carriage when it issued the ticket to the petitioner. JAL
undertook the obligation to carry petitioner to his destination. CA reversed the ruling.
ISSUE: WON JAL is liable for breach of contract of carriage
HELD: NO.
The evidence on record reveals that the ticket is not an assurance that petitioner
would get a seat in Thai International flight from Bangkok to Manila on July 2.
The stub that the lady employee put on the petitioners ticket showed among other
coded items, under the column "status" the letters "RQ" which was understood to
mean "Request." Clearly, this does not mean a confirmation but only a request. JAL
Traffic Supervisor explained that it would have been different if what was written on
the stub were the letters "ok" in which case the petitioner would have been assured of
a seat on said flight. But in this case, the petitioner was more of a wait-listed
passenger than a regularly booked passenger.
The petitioner is said to be a well-traveled person who averaged two long trips to
Europe and two trips to Bangkok every month since 1945. He claims to have used
practically all the airlines but mostly Philippine Airlines whenever he travels abroad in
connection with his occupation as international boxing matchmaker and manager of
world-champion boxers. Certainly, a man of such stature was aware of the
restrictions carried by his ticket and the usual procedure that goes with
travelling. The petitioner ought to know that it was still necessary to verify first from
Thai International if they would honor the indorsement of his JAL ticket or confirm with
the airline if he had a seat in the July 2 flight. The petitioner left Narita on June 26,
1980. He was scheduled to leave for Manila on July 2, 1980. It is standard procedure
for any passenger with a two day stop over in a foreign city to confirm the validity of
his ticket and the availability of a seat on his next flight out of that city. Unfortunately,
the petitioner failed to take these standard precautions. JAL can not now be
faulted for the petitioners omission or negligence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
respondent court is AFFIRMED.
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 119602 || October 6, 2000 || BUENA, J.:
FACTS
Sometime in February 1988, the Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc., private respondent herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela,
to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was ready
to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official pilot of Venezuela,
was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine
Roxas through the Orinoco River. He was asked to pilot the said vessel on February
11, 1988 boarding it that night at 11:00 p.m.
The master (captain) of the Philippine Roxas, Captain Nicandro Colon, was at the
bridge together with the pilot (Vasquez), the vessel's third mate (then the officer on
watch), and a helmsman when the vessel left the port at 1:40 a.m. on February 12,
1988. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was under way.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque
Channel at mile 172.The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the
watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel.
Between mile 158 and 157, the vessel again experienced some vibrations. These
occurred at 4:12 a.m. It was then that the watch officer called the master to the
bridge.
The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the
centre of the channel. He then went to confirm, or set down, the position of the vessel
on the chart. He ordered Simplicio A. Monis, Chief Officer of the President Roxas, to
check all the double bottom tanks.
At around 4:35 a.m., the Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus
obstructing the ingress and egress of vessels.
As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner
Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that
day.
Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company
(the underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned
profits, and interest thereon amounting to US $400,000.00 plus attorney's fees, costs,
Page | 2
and expenses of litigation.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. CA reversed, dismissing the case. Hence this
Petition.
ISSUE
W/N there was negligence on the part of the private respondent
HELD
NO. CA affirmed.
Standard of care as a general rule
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on the part of the private respondent that
would warrant the award of damages.
There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only
the diligence required of a good father of a family in accordance with the provisions of
Article 1173 of the New Civil Code, thus:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an
ordinary prudent man would exercise with regard to his own property. This we have
found private respondent to have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the
"main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" were checked and found to be in
good running condition; when the master left a competent officer, the officer on watch
on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when
the master ordered the inspection of the vessel's double bottom tanks when the
vibrations occurred anew.
Standard of care in the present case
Since the ship ran aground in Orinoco River, a compulsory pilotage channel, the
Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services shall apply:
Sec. 11.Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage. -- On compulsory pilotage
grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the
damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his negligence or
fault. He can be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or
natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent
or minimize the damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds
whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot
on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at
ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and
liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse
against said Master.
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by
competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
In the present case, The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel
necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every
shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar
Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official pilot in the Harbour at Port Ordaz,
Venezuela,and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) years.He also had experience
in navigating the waters of the Orinoco River.
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order or
command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the Philippine Roxas deemed it
best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel, mayhap, because the latter had
assured him that they were navigating normally before the grounding of the
vessel.Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of his experience he was
very familiar with the configuration of the river as well as the course headings, and
that he does not even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco River.
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master chose not
to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of the Orinoco River,
Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide the
vessel safely.
Thus, the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. As previously ruled in
Homer Ramsdell Transportation Company vs. La Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique: if it is compulsive upon the master to take a pilot, and, a fortiori, if he
is bound to do so under penalty, then, and in such case, neither he nor the owner will
be liable for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the pilot.
Conclusion
The doctrine of res ipsa loquiturdoes not apply to the case at bar because the
circumstances surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the part of
the private respondent. For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must
be met:
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not
have happened except for defendant's negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.
As has already been held above, there was a temporary shift of control over the ship
from the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two
of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence and control, to
render the respondent liable, are absent.
Page | 3
 JOSE PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 52159 || December 22, 1989 || PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
P was boarded on Rs bus on September 16, 1971 at about 6 PM. On the way to
Naga City, upon reaching the vicinity of the cemetery of Baao, Camarines Sur, an
unidentified bystander hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit P above his
left eye. Rs personnel brought P to the hospital.
He was treated by Dr. Malabanan in Iriga, and was subsequently brought to V. Luna
Hospital in QC. Despite several treatments, P lost partially his left eye's vision and
sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
P filed an action for recovery of damages against R, arguing that the nature of the
business of a transportation company requires the assumption of certain risks, and
the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to P is one such risk from which
the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability.
TC ordered R to pay P. CA reversed.
ISSUE: W/N R is liable for damages NO
RATIO:
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are required to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passenger transported by them, according
to all the circumstances of each case. The requirement of extraordinary diligence
imposed upon common carriers is restated in Article 1755. Further, in case of death
of or injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers to be at fault or
to have acted negligently.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the
safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against
them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of
its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human
care and foresight can provide.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, is a mere presumption
disputable by (1) proof of exercise of extraordinary diligence or (2) that the injury was
due to a fortuitous event.
Re: Whether R was able to rebut presumption of fault of negligence YES
Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in no way due
to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to the
negligent or willful acts of Rs employees, and therefore involving no issue of
negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent
employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which
the carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the
presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule
otherwise would make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers which is not the intention of the lawmakers.
GR: Common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence
Exc: When intervening acts of strangers directly cause the injury
Under CC 1763, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger
does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's
employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been
foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted
that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the
instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for
the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
P: R should have installed mesh-work grills on its windows
SC: NO
Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of,
the rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged
with its exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against
unlawful acts of strangers. The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or
maintaining vehicles as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers.
Where the carrier uses cars of the most approved type, in general use by others
engaged in the same occupation, and exercises a high degree of care in maintaining
them in suitable condition, the carrier cannot be charged with negligence in this
respect.
P: If R goes scot-free, the public will lose confidence in transpo system
SC: Such policy would be better left to Congress
LEAH ALESNA REYES, ROSE NAHDJA, JOHNNY, & minors LLOYD
& KRISTINE, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, LEAH ALESNA
REYES, petitioners, vs. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, SISTER ROSE
PALACIO, DR. MARVIE BLANES, & DR. MARLYN RICO, respondents (2000; J.
Mendoza; G.R. No. 130547)
FACTS: Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other
petitioners were their children.
Five days before his death on Jan. 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a recurring
fever with chills. After he failed to get relief from some home medication (analgesic,
antipyretic, antibiotics) he was taking, he decided to see the doctor.
Jan. 8, 1987: Jorge went to the Mercy Community Clinic w/ his wife. He was attended
to by respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on duty.
She noted that at the time of his admission, Jorge was conscious, ambulatory,
oriented, coherent, and with respiratory distress. Suspecting that Jorge could be
Page | 4
suffering from typhoid fever (since it was then prevalent in their locality), Dr. Rico
ordered a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to be performed on
Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and malarial smear were
also made. Based on the results of the test, Dr. Rico concluded that Jorge was
positive for typhoid fever. As her shift was only up to 5PM, Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge
to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.
Dr. Blanes also took Jorges history and gave him a physical exam. Like Dr. Rico,
her impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted
treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with chloromycetin
be done on Jorge. Said test was administered by nurse Josephine Pagente who also
gave the patient a dose of triglobe. As she did not observe any adverse reaction by
Jorge to chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first 500 mg of said antibiotic to
be administered on him at around 9PM. Another dose was administered 3 hrs.
later.
Jan. 9, 1987, 1AM: Dr. Blanes was called as Jorges temperature rose to 41C. He
also experienced chills, respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr.
Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered
hydrocortisone. When he regained consciousness, Jorge was asked by Dr. Blanes
whether he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the
past. He replied he did not.
After 15 mins., however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed restlessness, and his
convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before
and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the
treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or
mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At 2AM Jorge died
(cause of death: Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid
fever),
June 3, 1987: Petitioners filed before the RTC (Cebu City) a complaint for damages
against respondents Sisters of Mercy, Sister Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico, and nurse
Pagente. Subsequently, they impleaded respondent Mercy Community Clinic as
additional defendant and dropped the name of Pagente (resigned from hospital).
Petitioners contentions:
o Jorges death was due to the wrongful administration of
chloromycetin. Had respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence,
they would not have recommended and rushed the performance of the Widal
Test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and
administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the
patients compatibility with said drug.
o Respondent clinic and its directress, Sister Rose Palacio, were
negligent in failing to provide adequate facilities and in hiring negligent
doctors and nurses.
After the pre-trial conference, the case was then heard by the RTC during which, in
addition to the testimonies of the parties, the testimonies of doctors as expert
witnesses were presented.
Petitioners offered the testimony of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares.
- Dr. Vacalares Chief Pathologist (in a training hospital)
>> He performed an autopsy on Jorge. However, he did not open the skull to examine
the brain. His findings showed that the gastro-intestinal tract was normal. He testified
that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. He also stated that he had not seen a
patient die of typhoid fever within 5 days from the onset of the disease.
Respondents offered the testimonies of Dr. Peter Gotiong and Dr. Ibarra Panopio.
1. Dr. Gotiong diplomate in internal medicine; expert in microbiology and
infectious diseases; consultant (in a hospoital); associate professor of medicince; had
treated over a thousand cases of typhoid patients
>> Jorges history & positive Widal Test results ratio of 1:320 would make him
suspect that the former had typhoid fever.
>> As to Dr. Vacalares observation regarding the absence of ulceration in Jorges
gastro-intestinal tract, he said that such hyperplasia in the intestines of a typhoid
victim may be microscopic. Since the toxic effect of typhoid fever may lead to
meningitis, Dr. Vacalares autopsy should have included an examination of the brain.
2. Dr. Panopio member of the American Board of Pathology; examiner of Phil.
Board of Pathology; fellow of the Phil. Society of Pathologist; chief pathologist of the
Andres Soriano Jr. Memorial Hospital; associate professor of medicine
>> Although he was partial to the use of the culture test for its greater reliability in the
diagnosis of typhoid fever, the Widal Test may also be used. Like Dr. Gotiong, he
agreed that the 1:320 ratio in Jorges case was already the maximum by which a
conclusion of typhoid fever may be made. No additional information may be deduced
from a higher dilution.
>> Dr. Vacalares autopsy on Jorge was incomplete and thus inconclusive.
(Note: The physicians credentials are important to establish that they are expert
witnesses.)
RTC Decision: absolved respondents from the charges of negligence; dismissed
petitioners action for damages and respondents counterclaim (RTC: In seeking
damages from respondents, petitioners were impelled by the honest belief that
Jorges death was due to the latters negligence.)
Petitioners brought the matter to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. Hence this
petition for review.
[Petitioners action is for medical malpractice, a form of negligence which consists in
the failure of a physician/surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of
care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar
conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. To successfully pursue such a
claim, a patient must prove that the physician/surgeon either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician/surgeon would have done, or
that he/she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon
would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.
There are 4 elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury, and
proximate causation.
Here, a physician-patient relationship existed. Respondents were duty-bound to use
at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to
treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is breach of this duty which
constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the
Page | 5
determination of the reasonable level of care and its breach, expert testimony is
essential (to support the conclusion re. causation).]
ISSUES:
WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case NO
WON specific acts of negligence were committed by respondents -- NO
WON physicians and surgeons should employ extraordinary diligence -- NO
RULING: Petition denied; CA affirmed (Note: In resolving the first 2 issues, the SC
heavily relied on Ramos vs CA. Ergo, I included snippets from that case in case Sir
asks about the similarities/distinctions between this and that case. Ergo. long digest.
Sorry.)
I. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Discussion on res ipsa loquitor -- Ramos vs CA: Although generally, expert
medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has
done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides
the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of
expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical
science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which
may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find
a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, w/o the aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a
resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur w/o medical evidence, which is
ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove
a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant w/o need
to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.
Petitioners claim: All requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were
present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality/agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person in charge; (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
SC: Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately
apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The
question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of the
standard of care required by the circumstances.
This case is different from Ramos vs CA. In that case, the question was whether an
anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the comatose condition of a
patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. The patient was given anesthesia prior to her
operation. Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time of her
operation, the SC applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental brain
damage does not normally occur in a gallblader operation in the absence of
negligence of the anesthesiologist. Taking judicial notice that anesthesia
procedures had become so common that even an ordinary person could tell if it was
administered properly, the Court allowed the testimony of a witness who was not an
expert.
In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional
medical assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary
about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers
and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics
given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious
illness and professional medical help came too late for him.
Furthermore, on the issue of the correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of
negligence can be applied to Dr. Rico.
o Ramos vs CA: Res ipsa loquitur is generally restricted to situations in
malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if
due care had been exercised It must be conceded that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician/surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to
explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.
II. SPECIFIC ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE
Petitioners claims:
(1) Dr. Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the Widal test, diagnosed Jorges
illness as typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed the administration of the
antibiotic chloromycetin.
(2) Dr. Blanes erred in ordering the administration of the second dose of 500 mg of
chloromycetin barely 3 hrs. after the first was given.
SC: (1) While petitioners presented Dr. Vacalares as an expert witness, the Court
does not find him to be so as he is not a specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid
fever. Furthermore, although he may have had extensive experience in performing
autopsies, he had yet to do one on the body of a typhoid victim at the time he
conducted the postmortem on Jorge. It is also plain from his testimony that he has
treated only about 3 cases of typhoid fever. Thus, he is not qualified to prove that
Dr. Rico erred in her diagnosis. Both lower courts were therefore correct in
discarding his testimony, which is really inadmissible.
In Ramos vs CA, the defendants presented the testimony of a pulmonologist to prove
that brain injury was due to oxygen deprivation after the patient had bronchospasms
triggered by her allergic response to a drug, and not due to faulty intubation by the
anesthesiologist. As the issue was whether the intubation was properly
performed by an anesthesiologist, the Court rejected the opinion of the
pulmonologist on the ground that he was not: (1) an anesthesiologist who could
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enlighten the court about anesthesia practice, procedure, and their complications; nor
(2) an allergologist who could advance expert opinion on allergic mediated processes;
nor (3) a pharmacologist who could explain the pharmacologic and toxic effects of the
drug allegedly responsible for the bronchospasms.
On the other hand, the doctors presented by respondents clearly were experts
on the subject. They vouched for the correctness of Dr. Ricos diagnosis.
According to Dr. Gotiong, when a case of typhoid fever is suspected, the Widal test
is normally used, and if the 1:320 results of the Widal test on Jorge had been
presented to him along with the patients history, his impression would also be that
the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. As to the treatment of the disease, he
stated that chloromycetin was the drug of choice. He also explained that
despite the measures taken by respondent doctors and the intravenous
administration of two doses of chloromycetin, complications of the disease
could not be discounted.
Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Panopio who stated that, as a
clinical pathologist, he recognized that the Widal test is used for typhoid patients,
although he did not encourage its use because a single test would only give a
presumption necessitating that the test be repeated, becoming more conclusive at the
second and third weeks of the disease. He corroborated Dr. Gotiongs testimony
that the danger with typhoid fever is really the possible complications which
could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as liver and cerebral
complications. As regards the 1:320 results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes, Dr.
Panopio stated that no additional information could be obtained from a higher ratio.
He also agreed with Dr. Gotiong that hyperplasia in the payers patches may be
microscopic.
Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit
among all known practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to
the least experienced, but the reasonable average merit among the ordinarily
good physicians. Here, Dr. Rico did not depart from the reasonable standard
recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due care required
under the circumstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it remains a
standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy
through repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the
patient. The results of the Widal test and the patients history of fever with chills
for five days, taken with the fact that typhoid fever was then prevalent as
indicated by the fact that the clinic had been getting about 15 to 20 typhoid
cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill the
impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever.
Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the administration of chloromycetin,
the drug of choice for typhoid fever. The burden of proving that Jorge was
suffering from any other illness rested with the petitioners. As they failed to
present expert opinion on this, preponderant evidence to support their
contention is clearly absent.
(2) As held by the CA: That chloromycetin was likewise a proper prescription is best
established by medical authority. Chlorampenicol (which is the generic of
chloromycetin) is the drug of choice for typhoid fever and that no drug has yet proven
better in promoting a favorable clinical response. Chlorampenicol (Chloromycetin) is
specifically indicated for bacterial meningitis, typhoid fever, etc The dosage likewise
including the first administration of 500 mg. at around 9PM and the second dose at
around 11:30PM was still within medically acceptable limits, since the recommended
dose of chloromycetin is 1 gram every 6 hours. The intravenous route is likewise
correct.
As regards anaphylactic shock, the usual way of guarding against it prior to the
administration of a drug, is the skin test of which, however, it has been observed:
Skin testing with haptenic drugs is generally not reliable. Certain drugs cause
nonspecific histamine release, producing a weal-and-flare reaction in normal
individuals. Immunologic activation of mast cells requires a polyvalent allergen, so a
negative skin test to a univalent haptenic drug does not rule out anaphylactic
sensitivity to that drug. What all this means legally is that even if the deceased
suffered from an anaphylactic shock, this, of itself, would not yet establish the
negligence of the appellee-physicians for all that the law requires of them is
that they perform the standard tests and perform standard procedures. The law
cannot require them to predict every possible reaction to all drugs
administered. The onus probandi was on the appellants to establish, before the trial
court, that the appellee-physicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed
and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the
competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated.
III. PHYSICIANS & EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE
Petitioners claim: Since the law imposes upon common carriers the duty of
observing extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of
the passengers, physicians and surgeons should have the same duty toward their
patients.
SC: The practice of medicine is a right earned through years of education, training,
and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional board
examinations. Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by the
government. In addition to state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly
governed by the Hippocratic Oath.
Given these safeguards, there is no need to expressly require of doctors the
observance of extraordinary diligence. As it is now, the practice of medicine is
already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And, as we have already
noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average
merit among ordinarily good physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors
or the reasonable skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar
locality . . . should apply.
Spouses CANLAS v CA, ASIAN SAVINGS BANK
28 Feb 2000 || Purisima, J.
FACTS
1982, P, Osmundo S. Canlas, and PR, Vicente Maosca, ventured into business and
raised the capital needed. P executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing the PR
to mortgage two parcels of land in San Dionisio, (BF Homes) Paranaque, each with
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semi-concrete residential house, one covered by TCT in Ps name and one covered
by TCT in wifes name.
Subsequently, P agreed to sell lands to PR, in consideration of 850k, 500k of which
was payable in one week, and the balance of 350k to serve as his Ps investment in
the business. Checks issued by PR for 40k and 460k to pay the consideration of 500k
were not sufficiently funded.
September 3, 1982, PR mortgaged lands for 100k to a certain Attorney Manuel
Magno, with impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Canlas.
September 29, 1982, PR loaned 500k from R, Asian Savings Bank, with lands as
security, and with the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the
Canlas spouses. When the loan it extended was not paid, respondent bank
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged.
January 15, 1983, P wrote a letter informing R bank that the execution of subject
mortgage was without their (Canlas spouses) authority, and request that steps be
taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage, and asked the office of Sheriff
to cancel the auction sale scheduled on February 3, 1983. But R bank refused to
heed P and proceeded.
RTC ruled in favour of P, reversed by CA.
ISSUE
TORTS: WON P not entitled to relief because they were negligent - YES
WON R bank exercised due diligence in granting PRs loan
application - NO
OTHERS: WON mortgage was valid no, if done by impostors
WON R bank acted with bad faith in proceeding with foreclosure
no longer discussed
WON R bank deserved moral damages no longer discussed
RULING
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
Degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family.
The business of a bank is affected with public interest, holding in trust the money of
the depositors. But from the evidence, R bank did not observe the requisite diligence
in verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses
Canlas. R banks Assistant VP (assistant na VP pa) admitted that not even a single
identification card was exhibited by impostors; and yet, the bank acted on their
representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures
which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to Atty.
Magno.
Negligence of R bank was magnified by the fact that the deed of mortgage (used for
checking the genuineness of the signatures of Canlas spouses) did not bear the tax
account number of the spouses nor their Community Tax Certificate.
Under the doctrine of last clear chance, R bank must suffer the resulting loss. In
essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought
about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences
arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm
by the exercise of due diligence.
Under the attendant facts and circumstances, however, Osmundo Canlas was
undoubtedly negligent, which negligence made them (petitioners) undeserving of an
award of Attorneys fees.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO, petitioners, v.
SPOUSES RICHARD AND CARMEN HUANG and STEPHEN HUANG,
respondents
G.R. 172122, June 22, 2007
FACTS:
- Mercury Drug Corporation is the registered owner of a six-wheeler 1990
Mitsubishi Truck. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando del Rosario as
driver. Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen
Huang, and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan. These two
vehicles figured in a road accident on December 20, 1996 at around
10:30PM within the municipality of Taguig.
- Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, northbound, coming from the general
direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the left innermost
lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly
swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The
collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around,
and landed on the opposite lane. At the time of the accident, petitioner Del
Rosario only had a Traffic Violation Receipt, his drivers license had been
confiscated because he had been previously apprehended for reckless
driving. The car, valued at P300,000.00, was a total wreck. Respondent
Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face,
and lungs. Despite a series of operations, respondent Stephen Huang is
paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continues medical and
rehabilitation treatment.
- In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident was respondent Stephen Huangs recklessness. According to
petitioner Del Rosario, he was driving on the left innermost lane when the
car bumped the trucks front right tire. The truck then swerved to the left,
smashed into an electric post, crossed the center island, and stopped on the
other side of the highway. The car likewise crossed over the center island
and landed on the same portion of C-5. Further, petitioner Mercury Drug
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 claims that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of all its employees.
- RTC and CA: Mercury Drug and Del Rosario jointly and severally liable to
pay the Huangs for damages.
ISSUE:
- WON Del Rosario and Mercury Drug are liable
HELD:
- The evidence does not support petitioners claim that at the time of the
accident, the truck was at the left inner lane and that it was respondent
Stephen Huangs car, at its right, which bumped the right front side of the
truck. (There were photographs showing the contrary).
- Del Rosarios negligence as the direct and proximate cause of the injuries
suffered by respondent Stephen Huang. Del Rosario failed to do what a
reasonable and prudent man would have done under the circumstances,
and it is highly improbable that the car swerved since it would not have
leaped across the other lane if that would have occurred.
- We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of Del
Rosario. In the case of petitioner Del Rosario, however he took the driving
tests and psychological examination when he applied for the position of
Delivery Man, but not when he applied for the position of Truck Man.
Further, no tests were conducted on the motor skills development,
perceptual speed, visual attention, depth visualization, eye and hand
coordination and steadiness of petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and police
clearances were also presented. Lastly, petitioner Del Rosario attended only
three driving seminars. In effect, the only seminar he attended before the
accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve years ago in 1984.
- Petitioner Mercury Drug likewise failed to show that it exercised due
diligence on the supervision and discipline over its employees. In fact, on the
day of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving without a license. He
was holding a TVR for reckless driving. He testified that he reported the
incident to his superior, but nothing was done about it. He was not
suspended or reprimanded. No disciplinary action whatsoever was taken
against petitioner Del Rosario. It also appears that Mercury Drug does not
provide for a back-up driver for long trips. At the time of the accident, Del
Rosario has been out on the road for more than thirteen hours, without any
alternate. We therefore affirm the finding that petitioner Mercury Drug has
failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee.
- The SC thus recommended patronizing Watsons instead. Jk
Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v New India Assurance Company, Ltd.
GR No. 156978, August 24, 2007
Facts:
October 31, 1980: M/V P. Aboitiz sank on her voyage from HK to Malaysia. New India
is the insurer of the lost cargoes on board consigned to General Textile, Inc. After
indemnifying General Textile, Inc., New India was subrogated to its rights, interests,
and actions against Aboitiz,
New India filed action for recovery before RTC.
RTC: Aboitiz liable for total value of cargoes instead of applying the doctrine of limited
liability.
CA: affirmed in toto RTC, denied MR
SC: denied petition for lack of merit, affirmed CA (May 2006 decision)
Aboitiz: we were advised it was safe to travel, but while at sea, received
report of typhoon
Ruling: After investigation, cause of sinking was found to be vessel's
unseaworthiness.
Aboitiz filed MR, alleging the SC disregarded earlier rulings in the cases of GAFLAC
and Monarch, where it was ruled that petitioner's liability was limited to the claimants'
pro rata share in the insurance proceeds in view of the doctrine of limited liability.
Issue: WON the limited liability doctrine applies in this case
Held: No. The factual findings of this case were different from GAFLAC. Here,
petitioner was found concurrently negligent with the ship captain and crew, while in
GAFLAC, there is no such finding.
From the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, common carriers
are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according
to all the circumstances of each case. In the event of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the insured goods, common carriers are responsible, unless they can
prove that the loss, destruction or deterioration was brought about by the causes
specified in NCC 1734. In all other cases, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence.
The weather was moderate when M/V P. Aboitiz sank. The lower courts also ruled
that the M/V P. Aboitiz sank due to its unseaworthiness and not due to typhoon. To
limit petitioners liability to the amount of the insurance proceeds, it has the burden of
showing that the unseaworthiness of the vessel was not due to its fault or negligence.
But it failed to do so. Where the shipowner fails to overcome the presumption of
negligence, the doctrine of limited liability cannot be applied.
WHEREFORE, petitioners motion for reconsideration and referral to the Court En
Banc is DENIED WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings shall be allowed. SO
ORDERED.
DOMINGA ROQUE and JOSE G. ZAPLAN, complainants,
vs. MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, respondent.
A.M. No. 1664 March 30, 1979
FACTS
Magtanggol Gunigundo was the counsel of the plaintiffs in a civil case, for the
recovery of a lot and an accounting of the fruits thereof.
July 23, 1974: Gunigundo received a copy of the order dismissing the case
Page | 9
August 22, 1974 (last day of the period to appeal or file a motion for new trial):
Gunigundo filed a motion for an extension of 15 days (up to Sept. 6) within which to
file a motion for reconsideration
the motion was granted; however, Gunigundo was not able to file said MR,
instead, on September 6 he sent thru registered mail a motion for a second
extension of 10 days.
September 16, 1974 (last day of the 2nd extension sought by Gunigundo): he filed a
motion for a third extension of 48 hours; the motion for reconsideration was mailed on
September 18, 1974, the last day of the third extension.
TC denied the second and third motions for extension as the order of dismissal was
already final. It also denied Gunigundo's MR of the orders denying his motions for
extension.
Gunigundo filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders
denying his motions for extension. CA dismissed the petition, on the ground that the
filing of a motion for extension of the period to file the record on appeal does not
suspend the period for appeal. SC upheld CA.
[In short, his clients lost their right to appeal because of Gunigundos failure to file an
appeal/MR within the period prescribed].
Plaintiff spouses then filed a joint affidavit charging Gunigundo with gross
negligence for not seasonably filing the MR and for not perfecting an appeal from the
TC's dismissal. Subsequently, the sps executed an affidavit of desistance, alleging
that their complaint for disbarment was due to a misunderstanding and that
Gunigundo was not negligent in handling their case.
Gunigundo explained that he filed a MR instead of an appeal from the dismissal order
as there was vacillation among the eight plaintiffs as to whether they would appeal;
that there were no available funds to defray the expenses of an appeal since not all of
the plaintiffs were inclined to appeal; that some of the plaintiffs wanted to hire another
lawyer; that when the period was about to expire, the plaintiffs changed their mind
and decided to continue with the respondent's services and that the eldest plaintiff
died and plaintiffs' desire to appeal was communicated to the respondent only after
the funeral.
ISSUE
WoN respondent is negligent in his duty towards his clients
RULING
Yes. His filing of motions for extension on the last day and sending them by
registered mail and his omission to verify whether his second motion for extension
was granted are indicative of lack of competence, diligence and fidelity in the dispatch
of his clients' business. If his clients were wavering on whether to appeal the order of
dismissal, he could have in the meantime, but within the thirty-day period, filed his
motion for reconsideration.
The period of filing pleadings and submitting the record on appeal (not notice of
appeal and appeal bond) may be extended but the thirty-day period for appealing
may not be extended for the purpose of filing the motion for new trial or
reconsideration. On the other hand, the thirty-day period may be extended for the
purpose of filing the record on appeal because, where the record is voluminous or the
appellant has other pressing matters to attend to, it may not be practicable to submit
the record on appeal within the reglementary period.
In this case, had the respondent been more conscientious or experienced, he could
have easily avoided the loss of his client's right to appeal by filing the motion for
reconsideration within the thirty-day period. He could have even withdrawn from the
case with his clients' consent and required them to get another lawyer to perfect their
appeal.
However, the fact that the complaints and their six co-plaintiffs lost the right to appeal
would not necessarily mean that they were damaged. The lower court's order of
dismissal has in its favor the presumption of validity or correctness. An examination of
the TCs order discloses that the TC painstakingly studied the motion to dismiss and
carefully rationalized its order. It found that the action was filed more than forty years
after the disputed land was registered in the name of defendants' predecessor-in-
interest.
Where a judgment became final through the fault of the lawyer who did not appeal
therefrom, that fact alone is not a sufficient ground for the losing party to recover
damages from his lawyer since the action for damages rests "on the unsubstantiated
and arbitrary supposition of the injustice of the decision which became final through
the fault and negligence" of the lawyer.
In view of the foregoing and considering complainants' affidavit of desistance in this
case, drastic disciplinary action against the respondent is not warranted. But he is
admonished to exercise care and circumspection in attending to the affairs of his
clients. A repetition of the same irregularity will be treated with more severity.
SPOUSES TEODORO and NANETTE PERENA, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
TERESITA PHILIPPINE NICOLAS and L. ZARATE, NATIONAL RAILWAYS, and
the COURT OF APPEALS Respondents.
29 August 2012 || Bersamin, J.
The operator of a school bus service is a common carrier in the eyes of the law. He is
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of his business. He is
presumed to be negligent when death occurs to a passenger. His liability may include
indemnity for loss of earning capacity even if the deceased passenger may only be an
unemployed high school student at the time of the accident.
FACTS:
Spouses Zarate contracted Spouses Perea, who were engaged in the business of
transporting students from their residences in Paraaque City to Don Bosco in Makati
City and back, to transport their son Aaron to and from his school. On 22 August
1996, as on previous school days, the KIA Ceres Van driven by Clemente Alfaro
picked up Aaron around 6AM, who then took his place on the left side of the van near
the rear door. The vans air-conditioning unit was turned on at that time and the
stereo was playing loudly. Considering that the students were due in school by
7:15AM, and that they were already running late because of the heavy vehicular
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traffic on the South Superhighway, Alfaro took an alternate route at about 6:45AM by
traversing the narrow path underneath the Magallanes Interchange that was then
commonly used by Makati-bound vehicles as a short cut into Makati. At the time, the
narrow path was marked by piles of construction materials and parked passenger
jeepneys, and the railroad crossing in the narrow path had no railroad warning signs,
or watchmen, or other responsible persons manning the crossing. In fact, the bamboo
barandilla was up, leaving the railroad crossing open to traversing motorists.
PNR Commuter No. 302 was nearing the railroad crossing when Alfaro drove the van
eastward across the railroad tracks, closely tailing a large passenger bus. His view of
the oncoming train was blocked because he overtook the passenger bus on its left
side. When the train was about 50 meters away from the passenger bus and the van,
Alano applied the ordinary brakes of the train. He applied the emergency brakes only
when he saw that a collision was imminent. The passenger bus successfully crossed
the railroad tracks, but the van driven by Alfaro did not. The train hit the rear end of
the van, and the impact threw nine of the 12 students in the rear, including Aaron, out
of the van. Aaron landed in the path of the train, which dragged his body and severed
his head, instantaneously killing him. Alano fled the scene on board the train, and did
not wait for the police investigator to arrive.
The Zarates claim against the Pereas was upon breach of the contract of
carriage for the safe transport of their son; while that against PNR was based on
quasi-delict under Article 2176.
In their defense, Sps. Perea adduced evidence to show that they had exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Alfaro, by
making sure that Alfaro had been issued a drivers license and had not been involved
in any vehicular accident prior to the collision; that their own son had taken the van
daily; and that Teodoro Perea had sometimes accompanied Alfaro in the vans trips
transporting the students to school. For its part, PNR tended to show that the
proximate cause of the collision had been the reckless crossing of the van whose
driver had not first stopped, looked and listened; and that the narrow path traversed
by the van had not been intended to be a railroad crossing for motorists.
TC: Sps. Perea jointly and severally liable with PNR to the Sps. Zarate for the death
of their 15-year old son, Aaron. Their cooperative gross negligence caused the
collision that led to the death of Aaron. Awarded damages for the death, actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
Award for loss of earning capacity valued at P2,109,071.00
CA: affirmed with modification the TC ruling. Limited the moral damages to
P2,500,000; and deleted the attorneys fees for lack of factual & legal bases. The
award for the loss of earning capacity was upheld.
ISSUE: W/N Sps. Pereas and PNR were jointly and severally liable for damages
HELD: YES, the SC concurs with the finding of the CA. The defense of ordinary
diligence does not apply is inappropriate in an action for breach of contract of
carriage. It upheld that the Sps. Perea operated as a common carrier, and that
their standard of care was extraordinary diligence. The true test for a common
carrier is not the quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the number
and character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the undertaking
is a part of the activity engaged in by the carrier that he has held out to the
general public as his business or occupation. The question must be determined
by the character of the business actually carried on by the carrier.
Applying these considerations to the case before us, there is no question that the
Pereas as the operators of a school bus service were: (a) engaged in transporting
passengers generally as a business, not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking
to carry passengers over established roads by the method by which the business was
conducted; and (c) transporting students for a fee. Despite catering to a limited
clientle, the Pereas operated as a common carrier because they held themselves
out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school
living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee.
Given the nature of the business and for reasons of public policy, the common carrier
is bound "to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case." Article 1755 of the Civil Code specifies that the common carrier should
"carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances." To successfully fend off liability in an action upon the death or injury
to a passenger, the common carrier must prove his or its observance of that
extraordinary diligence; otherwise, the legal presumption that he or it was at fault or
acted negligently would stand. No device, whether by stipulation, posting of notices,
statements on tickets, or otherwise, may dispense with or lessen the responsibility of
the common carrier as defined under Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
The Pereas also were not able to overturn the presumption of negligence by credible
evidence. Sps. Perea, acting as a common carrier, were already presumed to
be negligent at the time of the accident because death had occurred to their
passenger. The presumption of negligence, being a presumption of law, laid the
burden of evidence on their shoulders to establish that they had not been negligent.
The Pereas were liable for the death of Aaron despite the fact that their driver might
have acted beyond the scope of his authority or even in violation of the orders of the
common carrier. The records showed their drivers actual negligence. There was a
showing, to begin with, that their driver traversed the railroad tracks at a point at
which the PNR did not permit motorists going into the Makati area to cross the
railroad tracks. Although that point had been used by motorists as a shortcut into the
Makati area, that fact alone did not excuse their driver into taking that route. On the
other hand, with his familiarity with that shortcut, their driver was fully aware of the
risks to his passengers but he still disregarded the risks. Compounding his lack of
care was that loud music was playing inside the air-conditioned van at the time of the
accident. The loudness most probably reduced his ability to hear the warning horns of
the oncoming train to allow him to correctly appreciate the lurking dangers on the
railroad tracks. Also, he sought to overtake a passenger bus on the left side as both
vehicles traversed the railroad tracks. In so doing, he lost his view of the train that
was then coming from the opposite side of the passenger bus, leading him to
miscalculate his chances of beating the bus in their race, and of getting clear of the
train. As a result, the bus avoided a collision with the train but the van got slammed at
its rear, causing the fatality. Lastly, he did not slow down or go to a full stop before
traversing the railroad tracks despite knowing that his slackening of speed and going
to a full stop were in observance of the right of way at railroad tracks as defined by
Page | 11
the traffic laws and regulations. He thereby violated a specific traffic regulation on
right of way, by virtue of which he was immediately presumed to be negligent.
The test of negligence, as aptly stated in the leading case of Picart v. Smith: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. x x x Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant
his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Pursuant to the Picart v. Smith test of negligence, the Pereas driver was entirely
negligent when he traversed the railroad tracks at a point not allowed for a
motorists crossing despite being fully aware of the grave harm to be thereby
caused to his passengers; and when he disregarded the foresight of harm to
his passengers by overtaking the bus on the left side as to leave himself blind
to the approach of the oncoming train that he knew was on the opposite side of
the bus.
Although the basis of the right to relief of the Zarates (i.e., breach of contract of
carriage) against the Pereas was distinct from the basis of the Zarates right to relief
against the PNR (i.e., quasi-delict under Article 2176, Civil Code), they nonetheless
could be held jointly and severally liable by virtue of their respective negligence
combining to cause the death of Aaron. As to the PNR, the RTC rightly found the
PNR also guilty of negligence despite the school van of the Pereas traversing the
railroad tracks at a point not dedicated by the PNR as a railroad crossing for
pedestrians and motorists, because the PNR did not ensure the safety of others
through the placing of crossbars, signal lights, warning signs, and other permanent
safety barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians from crossing there. The RTC
observed that the fact that a crossing guard had been assigned to man that point from
7 a.m. to 5 p.m. was a good indicium that the PNR was aware of the risks to others as
well as the need to control the vehicular and other traffic there. Verily, the Pereas
and the PNR were joint tortfeasors.
(Note: Meron ring discussion on whether it was proper for the court to award
damages based on loss of earning capacity notwithstanding the fact that Aaron was
just a highschool student. The SC upheld the award and computed it based on the
expectation of minimum wage earnings. Accordingly, we emphatically hold in favor of
the indemnification for Aarons loss of earning capacity despite him having been
unemployed, because compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of time or
earnings but for loss of the deceaseds power or ability to earn money.)
EQUITABLE BANKING CORP. vs SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS
Special Steel Products Inc. (SSPI) is a private domestic corporation selling steel
products, with International Copra Export Corporation (Interco) as its regular
customer. SSPI sold welding electrodes to the latter as evidenced by 3 sales
invoices. In payment thereof, Interco issued 3 crossed checks payable to the order of
SSPI, each with the notation account payee only and drawn against Equitable
Banking Corp.
The son-in-law of Intercos majority stockholder and also Intercos employee, Jose
Isidro alias Jolly Uy, somehow came into possession of these 3 checks and
presented each to Equitable on the day of its issuance, claiming he had good title
thereto. He demanded the deposit of the checks in his personal accounts in
Equitable.
Equitable acceded to Uys demands, assuming that he was acting pursuant to
Intercos orders (as son-in-law of its majority stockholder) and relying on his status as
a valued client. The checks were deposited in his account and he was able to
withdraw their proceeds.
SSPI then reminded Interco of its unpaid welding electrodes. Interco replied that it
had already issued the 3 checks, but SSPI denied receipt of these. Uys scheme was
discovered and Interco then paid the value of the 3 checks to SSPI, but without the
interest on these, on the ground that it was not responsible for the delay.
This is a complaint for damages with application for a writ of preliminary attachment
against Uy and Equitable Bank, filed by SSPIs president Augusto Pardo.
ISSUE: Whether SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable for quasi-delict
HELD: YES. SSPI has a cause of action for quasi-delict against Equitable.
The banking business is impressed with public interest, with public trust and confidence
reposed in it. The highest degree of diligence is thus expected of banks, which Equitable
did not observe under the existing factual circumstances. It is an accepted banking practice
that crossed checks are intended for deposit in the named payees account ONLY and no
other.
The fact that a person, other than the named payee of the crossed check, was presenting it for
deposit should have put the bank on guard. It should have verified if the payee (SSPI)
authorized the holder (Uy) to present the same in its behalf, or indorsed it to him, or verified with
Interco the truth of Uys representation. Considering however, that the named payee does not
have an account with Equitable (hence, the latter has no specimen signature of SSPI by which
to judge the genuineness of its indorsement to Uy), the bank knowingly assumed the risk of
relying solely on Uys word that he had a good title to the three checks, on the ground that he is
the son-in-law of Intercos majority stockholder. Such misplaced reliance on empty words
is tantamount to gross negligence, which is the absence of or failure to exercise even slight
care or diligence, or the entire absence of care, evincing a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
Presumption of Negligence
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented
the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.
Page | 12

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are
applicable. (n)
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation. (n)
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant
if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or
substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof
is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n)
MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs ELENA FERNANDEZ, et al..
Facts:
The Realistic Institute, owned by Mercedes M. Teague, was a vocational school for
hair and beauty culture situated on the 2nd floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey,
semi-concrete edifice located in Quiapo. The said 2nd floor was unpartitioned, had a
total area of about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about
1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-
escape ladders and the presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
On October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about 10
meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute.
Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire!
Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant
instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to
calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. They told the students
not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes.
The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the
few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the
stairs, thereby causing stampede therein.
Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four
students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of defendants, were found dead and
several others injured on account of the stampede.
The cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic
fractures of the ribs with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of
both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Teague
as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. CFI dismissed the case in favor of
Teague, CA reversed, finding such negligence was the proximate cause of the death
of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that
Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied
with:
Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions, exits and stairways. ... All buildings and separate
sections of buildings or buildings otherwise known as accessorias having less than
three stories, having one or more persons domiciled therein either temporarily or
permanently, and all public or quasi-public buildings having less than three stories,
such as hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human detention,
assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the like, shall be provided with
at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter and twenty
centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the
perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be
provided when required by the chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be
placed as far apart as possible.
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted in the fact that the
second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead
of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the
building had a second stairway under construction.
Issue:
WoN failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause
of the death of Lourdes Fernandez.
Held:
Yes. In argument, the petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death
of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring
place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6)
injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote
cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of
independent causes which produced the injury complained of. A statement of the
doctrine relied upon is found in Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause
did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and
the injury a distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent
causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The
weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which
formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-compliance
with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the
violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety
designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants
of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was
bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway
available. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding
in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused
the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was
Page | 13
precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind,
for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the
building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence: "The general principle is that
the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury
by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner
in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended
to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the
injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate
to say that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was
precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two
stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the
respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
PEDRO DE GUZMAN v CA (1988)
Feliciano, J
December 22, 1988
Relevant Law:
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.
Art 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration
of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; meriee
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Art. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove
that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.
Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omission of his or
its employees;
(6) That the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who
do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or
diminished;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of goods on account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship,
airplane or other equipment used in the contract of carriage.
FACTS:
- Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer was engaged in buying up used bottles and
scrap metal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap
metal, respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale.
- On his return trip to Pangasinan, he would load his vehicles with cargo which
various merchants wanted delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan
(charged freight rates lower than commercial ones)
- November 1970: Pedro de Guzman, a merchant and authorized dealer of
General Milk Company, contracted with respondent for the hauling of the 750
cartons of Liberty filled milk from Makati to Urdaneta
- Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner because the 600
boxes never reached him since the truck was hijacked somewhere in Tarlac, by
armed men who took the truck, its driver, his helper, and the cargo
- The owner of the merchandise then commenced an action against PR in the CFI
demanding payment for the value of the lost merchandise plus damages.
Contention of petitioner:
- PR being a common carrier failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required
by him by law and should be liable for the value of undelivered goods
- They should have hired a security guard to ride with the truck
Answer of respondent:
- denied that it was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held
responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss having been due to force
majeure
TC: PR is a common carrier and liable
CA: reversed, saying that PR has been engaging in the transporting of goods as a
casual occupation, and not common carrier, also, no certificate of public
convenience
ISSUE/HELD:
1. WON PR Cendana is a common carrier YES
2. WON he should be liable for the value of the merchandise NO
RATIO:
1. Art. 1732 does not make a distinction between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity (sideline
o Neither does it make a distinction between a carrier offering its services
to the general public and those from a narrow segment of the general
population
o PR is properly characterized as a common carrier eventhough he
merely back-hauled goods for other merchants from Manila to
Pangasinan, although it was done on a periodic or occasional rather
than regular or scheduled manner
Page | 14
 o Certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for incurring liability
under the CC. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a
common carrier because he has not secured a permit would be
offensive to the sound policy.
2. Common carriers by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy
are held to a very high degree of care and diligence in the carriage of goods as
well as of passengers. However, they are not held responsible for acts of
robbers, thieves who acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.
o Applying Art. 1734 and 1735, the specific cause, hijacking, is not one
mentioned in Art 1734, hence, it is presumed that the common carrier
was negligent
o Art. 1745 (6), a common carrier is held responsible and will not be
allowed to divest or diminish such responsibility even for acts of
strangers like thieves or robbers except when such thieves or robbers in
fact acted with grave or irresistible threat
o In this case, armed men held up the second truck owned by PR, an
information for robbery in band was filed, and they even kidnapped the
driver and the helper, detaining them for several days
o In these circumstances, it could be said that it is quite beyond the
control of the common carrier and properly regarded as fortuitous event
o It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made
absolute insurer against all risks of travel and of transport goods, and
are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are
inevitable, provided that they have complied the rigorous standard of
extraordinary diligence
MALLARI V CA
At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger jeepney driven by petitioner
Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the
delivery van of respondent BULLETIN Publishing Corp. along the National Highway in
Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera
which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van
of respondent BULLETIN coming from the opposite direction. The sketch of the
accident showed that the collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while
negotiating a CURVE in the highway. The points of collision were the left rear portion
of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN. The
impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to
its passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity
of his injuries.
The widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City against Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also
against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance
Company. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of
Israel Reyes was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger
jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.
TC: Proximate cause = BULLETINs drivers negligence
CA: Reversed. Proximate cause = sole negligence of Mallari
Issue:
W/N the accident was caused by Mallari Jrs negligence alone? YES.
W/N Mallari Sr. the owner can be held liable? YES.
Held:
MALLARI JR. DRIVER NEGLIGENCE
Based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities which were not disputed
by petitioners (even corroborated by his own testimony), Mallari Jrs act of overtaking
was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 (Land Transportation
and Traffic Code)
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. - (a) The driver of
a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a
highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such
overtaking or passing to be made in safety. (nag-overtake siya kahit
alanganin)
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction when approaching the
crest of a grade, NOR UPON A CURVE in the highway, where the
drivers view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of
five hundred feet ahead except on a highway having two or more
lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a
vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle(nag-overtake siya
sa kurbada)
Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the
opposite direction and failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still
dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and
overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway.
Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap
he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed
to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
MALLARI SR.OWNER LIABLE
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art.
1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is
Page | 15
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it
is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts
of the formers employees.
This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees.
Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr. assumed
the express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and any
injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier.
Res ipsa loquitur
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C. AFRICA, and the HEIRS
OF DOMINGA ONG, vs. CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the
corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was
being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of
the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to and
burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects
inside them. Petitioners sued Caltex for damages on the ground that the destruction
of their properties was caused by the negligence on the part of the Respondents.
Based on the investigation report by the police, at about 4:00 P.M. March 18, 1948,
while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck an unknown man
lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of the said
underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes, fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of
Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with the
underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the flames scattered due
to the hose from which the gasoline was spouting.
The Fire Department reported on the other hand that based on the photograph
submitted to them by the petitioners, they observed that there was an installation of a
Coca-Cola and cigarette stand. It appears that the cigarette racks were installed in
between the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks.
RTC and the CA dismissed the case. Basing their decisions on the fact that
petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in
the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. The reports
discussed above were mere hearsay. The police report was reproduced information
given a certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline station and what
the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject. In addition, the Fire
Department report was based on the testimony of Detective Capacillo, unfortunately,
he was not examined and did not take the witness stand.
They also did not apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine on the grounds that it has not yet
been applied in the Philippines and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption, it
did not find practical use for its application in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine would apply as to presume negligence
on the part of the respondents?
2) Is Caltex also liable or should the liability must be borne by the independent
contractor Boquiren alone?
HELD:
1) Yes. The SC sustained the inadmissibility except for the report made by a certain
policeman regarding the location of the Gasoline station. With respect to the other
evidence, the sources of the facts were not even identified. The statements of the
witnesses of the petitioners could not give any reason as to the origin of the fire, they
are not based on personal knowledge, thus, it cannot be admitted.
The Court held that contrary to the ruling of the CA, the doctrine had already been
applied by the Court of Appeals in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and
Development Co. where the respondents electric transmission wire suddenly parted
and electrocuted the plaintiff with 4,440 volts. It was observed in the said case that it
transpired in a day with clear weather and without any wind blowing. It was held
that "where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is
under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the
injury arose from defendant's want of care. The burden of evidence is shifted to
him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. This rule is known by
the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself).
Although decisions of the Court of Appeals do not lay down doctrines binding on the
Supreme Court, but we do not consider this a reason for not applying the particular
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a highly combustible
material, in the storage and sale of which extreme care must be taken. On the other
hand, fire is not considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably from
some act of man.
In the present case, the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and
employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to
and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known
how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano regarding the location of the Gas
station, it was observed that the station was within a very busy business district.
Lighting of cigarettes cannot be excluded in this case because of the large number of
people who pass by the area. The concrete walls on the sout and west adjoining the
Page | 16
neighborhood are also only 2- meters only and cannot avoid the flames from
leaping over it in case of fire.
Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this gasoline service station is
also used by its operator as a garage and repair shop for his fleet of taxicabs
numbering ten or more, adding another risk to the possible outbreak of fire at this
already small but crowded gasoline station.
Further, the statement of Leando Flores, the driver of the gasoline tank wagon, before
the police officer must also be taken into account: "Before loading the underground
tank there were no people, but while the loading was going on, there were people
who went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about a meter from the
hole leading to the underground tank." He added that when the tank was almost filled
he went to the tank truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to the
"manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."
Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire
but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses because of its
failure to ensure that its concrete walls would be effective in the spread of the fire.
2)
Yes. The Court applied the control test and found that Boquerin was a mere
employee of Caltex. Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the
equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at the service station in
question was owned and operated by Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any
contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at the time of
the fire. There must have been one in existence at that time. Instead, what was
presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case,
since it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-year period it was
intended to operate.
Boquiren can hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under his agreement
with Caltex, Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal sum of P1.00 for the use
of the premises and all the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex Products.
Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other
words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee
without the consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be from
January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex
upon two days prior written notice. Caltex could at any time cancel and terminate the
agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the
business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex. Termination of the contract
was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren. These provisions of
the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was
such that the latter was virtually an employee of the former.
G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988
PEDRO T. LAYUGAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO
ISIDRO, and TRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION (SARMIENTO, J.)
FACTS:
PLAINTIFF: Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo
Isidro, alleging that on May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya,
the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck (Plate
No. SU-730) which was parked along the right side of the National Highway;
that defendant's truck bearing Plate No. PW-583, driven recklessly by Daniel
Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and
hospitalized at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center and the Our
Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent P10,000.00 and will incur more
expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; that because of said injuries
he would be deprived of a lifetime income in the sum of P70,000.00; and that
he agreed to pay his lawyer the sum of Pl0,000.00.
DEFENDANT: Defendant admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the
accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered that the plaintiff was
merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the
driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked,
occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right
after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the
driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the
driver of the parked car should be liable for damages sustained by the
truck of the herein defendant in the amount of more than P20,000.00; that
plaintiff being a mere bystander and hitchhiker must suffer all the damages
he incurred. By way of counterclaim defendant alleged that due to plaintiffs
baseless complaint he was constrained to engage the services of counsel for
P5,000.00 and P200.00 per court appearance; that he suffered sleepless nights,
humiliation, wounded feelings which may be estimated at P30.000.00.
May 29, 1981 - a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against
his insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party
plaintiff, without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party
defendant is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and
subrogation by virtue of their contract under Insurance Policy No. 11723
which covers the insurer's liability for damages arising from death, bodily
injuries and damage to property.
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT: Even assuming that the subject matter of the
complaint is covered by a valid and existing insurance policy, its liability shall in
no case exceed the limit defined under the terms and conditions stated therein;
that the complaint is premature as no claim has been submitted to the third party
defendant as prescribed under the Insurance Code; that the accident in question
was approximately caused by the carelessness and gross negligence of the
plaintiff-, that by reason of the third-party complaint, third-party defendant was
constrained to engage the services of counsel for a fee of P3,000.00.
PLAINTIFF Pedro Layugan declared that he is a married man with one (1) child.
He was employed as security guard in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, with a salary
of Php600/month. When he is off-duty, he worked as a truck helper and
while working as such, he sustained injuries as a result of the bumping of
the cargo truck they were repairing at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya by
the driver of the defendant. He used to earn Php200 to Php300 monthly, at the
rate of Php100 per trip. Due to said injuries, his left leg was amputated so he
had to use crutches to walk. Prior to the incident, he supported his family
sufficiently, but after getting injured, his family is now being supported by
his parents and brother.
Page | 17
 DEFENDANT/third-party plaintiff GODOFREDO ISIDRO testified that his truck
involved in this vehicular accident is insured with the Travellers Multi Indemnity
Corporation covering own damage and third-party liability, under vehicle policy
No. 11723 dated May 30, 1978; that after he filed the insurance claim the
insurance company paid him the sum of P18,000.00 for the damages
sustained by this truck but not the third party liability.
DEFENDANT driver DANIEL SERRANO declared that he gave a statement
before the municipal police of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya on May 16, 1979; that
he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he checked the
truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped
the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan, plaintiff, while the same was at a
stop position. From the evidence presented, it has been established clearly that
the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel
Serrano. The collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned
the plaintiff to the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his
left forearm and left foot. The left leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later
on amputated when gangrene had set in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for
work depriving him of his income.
RTC: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff; ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
actual and compensatory damages, attorneys fees, moral damages, costs of this
suit. Further, on the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant is ordered to
indemnify the defendant/third party plaintiff.
IAC: reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint, the
third-party complaint, and the counter- claims of both appellants. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
WON IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR with
proper basis (IAC found petitioner negligent under Res ipsa loquitur or the thing
speaks for itself). NOPE.
Who is negligent if the doctrine is inapplicable? Isidro solidary liability with
driver
RATIO:
Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a
parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be
on the highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a
threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as well as
the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme
care so that the motorist negotiating the road would be properly forewarned of
the peril of a parked vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care
and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for, as previously
claimed, his (Isidro's) truck had a right to be on the road, while the immobile
cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be there. Likewise, Isidro proffers
that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the
driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided an early warning device, like that
required by law, or, by some other adequate means that would properly forewarn
vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the
time, place, and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof
of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the
parked cargo truck as well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the
flat tire of the said truck. SC: untenable. The evidence on record discloses
that three or four meters from the rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene
lamp was placed. Moreover, there is the admission of respondent Isidro's driver,
Daniel Serrano. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half
the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into
account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three
or four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this warning which we rule
as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private
respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct
consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm
and left foot. His left leg was later amputated from below the knee when
gangrene had set in. It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the
absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear
and convincing evidence. It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon
the invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to
escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the respondent court
committed reversible error.
IAC: In the case at bar the burden of proving that care and diligence was
(sic) observed is shifted evidently to the plaintiff, for, as adverted to, the
motorists have the right to be on the road, while the immobile truck has no
business, so to speak, to be there. It is thus for the plaintiff to show to the
satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he himself did employ early
warning device such as that required by law or by some other adequate means
or device that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the
parked vehicle posed considering the time, place and other peculiar
circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at
bar, will evoke the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as
plaintiff who was fixing the flat tire of said truck.
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR: "Where the thing which causes injury is
shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Or
as Black's Law Dictionary puts it: Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing
injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which
ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere
fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not
have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under
management and control of alleged wrongdoer. Under doctrine of "res ipsa
loquitur" the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence
where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an
agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and management of
defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. In this
jurisdiction we have applied this doctrine in quite a number of cases, notably in
Africa et al. vs. Caltex, Inc., et al., 35 and the latest is in the case of F.F. Cruz and
Co., Inc. vs. CA. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is
Page | 18
 peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive
law 38 but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The
rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not
intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable
negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates
what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the
presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is
overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to
the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or
where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the
facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally,
once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the
plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely
elucidated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made,
whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180,
paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or
both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently,
may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the
incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has
already been adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his
responsibilities as a driver and that the truck owner used to instruct him to be
careful in driving. SC does not agree. In the first place, it is clear that the
driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not
check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have
discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could
have repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. The private
respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a
thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the
light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed
to prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of
his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his
driver to the petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good
father of a family was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is
not an iota of evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same
quantum of diligence in the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would
be directly in charge in maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's)
truck. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article
2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
[EXTRA: re facts of the case]
Who was negligent? Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. In Picart vs. Smith, we held: The test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
General Rule: In the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals that its findings
of fact are entitled to great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this
Court but there are exceptions1. Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 obtain in the
instant case to warrant a deviation from the general rule. From its finding that
the parked truck was loaded with ten (10) big round logs 13 the Court of Appeals
inferred that because of its weight the truck could not have been driven to the
shoulder of the road and concluded that the same was parked on a portion of the
road 14 at the time of the accident. Consequently, the respondent court inferred
that the mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked
truck. 15 The inference or conclusion is manifestly erroneous. In a large measure,
it is grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture. How the respondent court
could have reversed the finding of the trial court that a warning device was
installed 16 escapes us because it is evident from the record that really such a
device, in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp, was installed by the driver of the
parked truck three to four meters from the rear of his parked truck. 17 We see this
negative finding of the respondent appellate court as a misreading of the facts
and the evidence on record and directly contravening the positive finding of the
trial court that an early warning device was in proper place when the accident
happened and that the driver of the private respondent was the one negligent.
On the other hand, the respondent court, in refusing to give its "imprimatur to the
trial court's finding and conclusion that Daniel Serrano (private respondent
Isidro's driver) was negligent in driving the truck that bumped the parked truck",
did not cite specific evidence to support its conclusion. In cavalier fashion, it
simply and nebulously adverted to unspecified "scanty evidence on record."
1
1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2)
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case if the findings are contrary to the admission of both the appellant and the appellee; 6) the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; 7) the said findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 8) the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and 9) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted on record.
Page | 19

Ramos vs Delos Santos Medical Center
G.R. No. 124354
December 29, 1999
Davide, C.J.
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos was until the afternoon of June 17, 1985, a 47-year old
robust woman. She would sometimes complain about pain because of a
stone in her gall bladder but she was very normal aside from that.
Since the pains were becoming persistent, she sought medical advice and
was found to be fit for surgery. She and her husband Rogelio met for the first
time Dr. Orlino Hozaka on June 10, 1985. They agreed that their date at the
operating table at the DLSMC, would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M. Dr.
Hosaka decided that she should undergo a cholecystectomy operation
after examining the documents (findings from the Capitol Medical Center,
FEU Hospital and DLSMC) presented to him. Rogelio E. Ramos, however,
asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn,
assured Rogelio that he will do so.
A day before the operation, Erlinda was already admitted into DLSMC. At
7:30 AM on the day of the operation, hospital staff prepared her for the
operation and they then proceeded to the operating room. Upon her request,
her sister-in-law, Herminida Cruz was in the room with her. Herminida was
the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. Also in the
room was Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez who was to administer anesthesia.
At 9:30 AM, Dr. Gutierrez made a phone call to Dr. Hosaka who was not yet
at the hospital. Erlinda was already getting impatient and even requested for
another doctor to attend to her instead. Herminida relayed this to Rogelio,
who tried his best to look for another doctor who would entertain his
concern.
Finally, at 12:01 nn, he came to know that Dr. Hozaka had already arrived so
he proceeded to wait outside the operating room. Dr. Hozaka arrived and at
about 12:15 nn, Erlinda was prepared for the operation.
She then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter
heard Dr. Gutierrez say, ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. She thereafter noticed bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as
Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for
someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon
arrived at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to
intubate the patient. The patients nailbed became bluish and the patient
was placed in a trendelenburg position - a position where the head of the
patient is placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that
there is a decrease of blood supply to the patients brain. Dr. Calderon was
later able to intubate her. At almost 3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the
patient taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
About two days thereafter, Dr. Hosaka informed Rogelio that something
went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what was told to him, Rogelio
reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened,
had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked for a good anesthesiologist. The doctors
explained to the hospital that the patient had bronchospasm.
Erlinda Ramos stayed at the ICU for a month. About four months thereafter
or on November 15, 1985, the patient was released from the hospital. Since
that fateful afternoon of June 17, 1985, she has been in a comatose
condition due to the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes.
She needs constant medical attention and all these medical concerns have
amounted to numerous bills.
RTC: Defendants were guilty of, at the very least, negligence in the
performance of their duty to Erlinda.
CA: Reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint against the
defendants
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case - Yes
HELD:
Res ipsa loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself. The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for
the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption
of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. It is simply a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify
an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by
the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior
logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or
common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence
of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction
with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such
proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident,
enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an
inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the
defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to
the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily
shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someones negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in
malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act
or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general
rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such
Page | 20
 matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to
matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the
court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper
proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony,
where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine
the proper standard of care. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that
the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or
omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the
custody and management of the defendant without need to produce
expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to
res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain
redress for injury suffered by him.
It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no
application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the
merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The real question,
therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any
extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine
performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such operations, which, if
unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man
as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence.
Erlinda had entered the operating room neurologically sound.
However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the
performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to
her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the
operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated.
Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury
which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder
operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not happen in the
absence of negligence of someone in the administration of
anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Furthermore, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner
Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because
she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her
unconscious.
Dra. Gutierrezs liability
With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the care of
Erlinda during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient.
Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well
testify upon matters on which she is capable of observing such as,
the statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external
appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any
one. This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
where the testimony of expert witnesses is not required. It is the
accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary for the proof of
negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary
person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill
or want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony
unnecessary.
The pre-operative evaluation of a patient prior to the administration of
anesthesia is universally observed to lessen the possibility of
anesthetic accidents. It is usually done about a day before the
operation. In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted
that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation
itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations
with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until
the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of
the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise
not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face
during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra.
Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour
before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of
exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility.
The alleged diagnosis of bronchospasm was not supported by
evidence and the expert witnesses presented were not very
knowledgeable on the matter. Faulty intubation is undeniably the
proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to
Erlindas brain damage and, ultimately, her comatosed condition. As
the issue was whether the intubation was properly performed by an
anesthesiologist, we rejected the opinion of the pulmonologist on the
ground that he was not: (1) an anesthesiologist who could enlighten
the court about anesthesia practice, procedure, and their
complications; nor (2) an allergologist who could properly advance
expert opinion on allergic mediated processes; nor (3) a
pharmacologist who could explain the pharmacologic and toxic
effects of the drug allegedly responsible for the bronchospasms.
(taken from Reyes vs Sisters of Mercy)
Had appropriate diligence and reasonable care been used in the
pre-operative evaluation, respondent physician could have been
much more prepared to meet the contingency brought about by
the perceived anatomic variations in the patients neck and oral
area, defects which would have been easily overcome by a prior
knowledge of those variations together with a change in
technique.
Dr. Hosakas liability
As the so-called captain of the ship, it is the surgeons responsibility
to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper
manner. He did not double check on the procedure of the
anesthesiologist nor did he allot ample time to question the
anesthesiologist before the operation (since he was late).
DLSMCs liability
The four-fold test, especially the control factor, determines whether
there is an employer- employee relationship between a hospital and
its consultant physicians. DLSMC did exercise control over Dra.
Gutierrez and Dr. Hosaka and are held solidarily liable for not taking
the proper precautions and not exercising the proper supervision
Page | 21
 during the operation.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed
from are hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily
against private respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual
damages computed as of the date of promulgation of this decision plus a
monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos
expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages, 3)
P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as exemplary
damages and attorneys fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
DM Consunji v. CA
G.R. No. 137873 | April 20, 2001 | J. Kapunan
FACTS
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and
filed a report stating that: x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical
Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by
the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A.
Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as
carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by
2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four
corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which
was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx
causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of
the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the
victim to death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was
then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the
removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points
of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.
Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the RTC a complaint for damages against the
deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other
defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
RTC ruled in favor of Maria Juego.
CA affirmed RTC decision in toto.
ISSUES
1) WON police report was admissible evidence of the alleged negligence of
petitioner
2) WON res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove negligence on the part of
petitioner
3) WON private respondent who had previously availed of the death benefits
provided under the Labor Code, is precluded from claiming from the
deceaseds employer damages under the Civil Code
HELD
1) YES.
Hearsay rule: A witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others
either because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.
Exception: Entry in official records (in this case)
The police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of PO3 Villanueva. The portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which
were of his personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a
result of the elevator crash.
2) YES.
Ps ARGUMENT: PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall of the platform
was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block mere opinion, therefore
inadmissible
SC: Petitioners contention loses relevance in the face of the application of RES IPSA
LOQUITUR.
EFFECT
The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of
the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was
negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
CONCEPT
Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained
of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence
resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient
evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendants want of care.
THEORETICAL BASIS
The necessary evidence is not available. The defendant in charge of the
instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge,
and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the
proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
REQUISITES
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 a) The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement
while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent
b) The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence
The construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that
likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant
c) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured
No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased
husband
All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises.
Ps DEFENSE: The presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since
it proved that it exercised DUE CARE to avoid the accident which befell respondents
husband.
Evidence presented: Sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed
before the police investigator, that the company enacted rules and regulations for the
safety and security of its workers, and that the leadman and the bodegero inspect the
chain block before allowing its use.
SC: Defendants negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The
presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or
innocence, may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove
its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the
defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the
application of the doctrine has been established.
As to evidence: It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as
proof of its due care but, in arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence
on the part of petitioners employees, also assails the same statement for being
hearsay. Fabro's sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify
thereon.
3) NO.
GR: An injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil
action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses
of action simultaneously.
EXC: A claimant who has already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act
may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
IN THIS CASE
Private respondents case came under the exception because private respondent was
unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages
after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors
Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners personnel.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to
allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus,
erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue.
What negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the fact
that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor
issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability.
There is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits
from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days
after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on
November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to
her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights.
The application of Article 3 of the Civil Code is limited to mandatory and prohibitory
laws. This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a person's ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the
laws. The rule allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory
nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT/OMISSION AND INJURY
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause being the defendants lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded. (n)
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 MERALCO vs. Remoquillo
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and
as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON,
CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT
OF APPEALS
GR No. L-8328 | May 18, 1956 | J. Montemayor
Facts:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Pealoza, his
stepbrother, to repair a media agua (canopy of a roof) said to be in a leaking
condition. The media agua was just below the window of the third story. Standing on
said media agua, Magno received from his son thru that window a galvanized iron
sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the
iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of MERALCO strung parallel to the
edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.
So his widow and children filed an action to recover damages.
Factual findings:
- The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire
stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It
was installed before Pealozas house was constructed. (Another incident
happened before this instant case, although not as tragic, but because of it
MERALCO moved one end of the wire farther from the house.)
- The distance from the wire to the edge of the media agua was only 2
feet when City of Manila regulations require a distance of 3 feet from
the building.
- As the house was built after the wire was put in its place, the city authorities
gave the house owner a permit to construct a media agua only 39 inches
wide so as to keep the prescribed minimum of 3 feet distance from the
electric wire, but he built one 65 inches wide (which is 17 3/8 inches more
than permitted). But even so, he was still given a final permit of occupancy of
the house by city authorities.
- No insulation for the high-tension wire is available in the market yet, thus its
exposure.
TC: in favor of Magnos family; MERALCO is liable
CA: affirmed the TC, only modifying, by reduction, the attys fees
The CA held that it was MERALCO who is liable as the owner, although the
construction of the media agua was illegal for being more than what was permitted,
was still given a final permit of occupancy; and notwithstanding the fact that the wire
was installed long before the house was constructed, mere compliance with the
regulations does not satisfy the requirement of due diligence nor avoid the need for
adopting such other precautionary measures as may be warranted. It, however,
refrained from stating or suggesting what other precautionary measures could and
should have been adopted.
Issue: WON MERALCO should be held liable for Magnos death NO
Held:
MERALCO is not liable as the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence and contributed to by the close proximity of the media agua to the
wire which cannot be imputed to MERALCO but rather to the violation of the
first permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction. MERALCO had no part in any of these.
Principal and proximate cause: reckless and negligent act of turning around with the
iron sheet without any precaution
Contributory cause: violation of the original permit and the subsequent approval of the
city inspector
Remote cause: the electric wire
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the
proximate cause. (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.)
There was a distance of 7 feet and 2 inches from the side of the house.
Considering the media agua, there would have been a distance of 3 feet and 11 3/8
inches had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city.
However, the house owner disregarded this and to add to this, the city approved it
despite the violation. These serious violations of a city ordinance and permit
cannot be attributed to MERALCO, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
regulation. It cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal
construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and
after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or
installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for
the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its
ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or disapprove all
illegal constructions.
The CA cited the case of Astudillo vs. MERALCO (the electrocution in Intramuros
case) but the circumstances in that case and instant case are different and thus,
Astudillo cannot be used as basis.
Astudillo Remoquillo
The wires were placed on top of the The wires were placed high over the
walls of Intramuros, a public place, and street where there was no possible
said wires were placed where anyone danger to pedestrians, only to those
can easily reach them. standing on the media agua, which is
not a public place. Plus, the wire cannot
be reached with the hand alone (too far
for that).
The victim was a young student who was Magno was not a boy but a father and
in no position to realize the danger. supposedly a tinsmith.
CA decision is REVERSED.
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 December 23, 1914
JUAN BERNARDO, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M. B. LEGASPI, Defendant-Appellee.

Facts:
Petitioner and defendant were going in opposite directions, and collided on turning a
street corner. Petitioner filed an action to recover damages sustained by plaintiffs
automobile by reason of defendants negligence in causing a collision between their
automobiles. Defendant filed a cross-complaint, praying for damages against the
plaintiff on the same grounds.

Issue:
Whether or not either party can collect from the other when both are found to be
negligent NO

Held:
The trial court found upon the evidence that both parties were negligent in handling
their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the
part of both as to prevent either from recovering. Where the plaintiff in a negligence
action, by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the
accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally
true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their negligent acts, contributed to the
determining cause of the accident, neither can recover

(The case is only 3 paragraphs long. If only all cases were like this.)

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