G.R. No.

98028 AGRARIAN LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

205 SCRA 529 2015

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 98028 January 27, 1992

GREGORIO CASTILLO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALBERTO IGNACIO, respondents.

Sumulong Law Offices for petitioner.

Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals decision which reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 8302-M and declared respondent Alberto Ignacio as
agricultural tenant of the petitioner.

On July 18, 1985, a complaint for injunction was filed by private respondent Alberto Ignacio against
petitioner Gregorio Castillo with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan.

It is alleged in the complaint that the respondent is the agricultural tenant of the petitioner in the latter's
parcel of land consisting of 9,920 square meters with fruit-bearing trees situated in Cut-cut, Pulilan,
Bulacan; that sometime in April 1985, the petitioner requested the respondent to allow him to construct
a resthouse in said land, and as a token of goodwill, the respondent agreed, which agreement is
embodied in a "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") between them; that in violation of said agreement, the
petitioner started to cut fruit-bearing trees on the land in question and filled with adobe stones the area
devoted by the private respondent to the planting of vegetables.

The complaint asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
further cutting fruit-bearing trees and from committing further acts of dispossession against the private
respondent. The injunction was granted.

The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the private respondent is not his agricultural tenant;
that respondent Alberto Ignacio is merely a "magsisiga" (smudger) of the landholding in question; that
he did not ask permission from the private respondent to construct a rest house on subject land, since
as owner thereof, he had the right to do so; that he was merely exercising his right of ownership when
he cut certain trees in the subject premises; that when the barangay captain failed to settle the conflict
and the matter was referred to the MAR-BALA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform-Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance) Office in Malolos, Bulacan, Atty. Benjamin Yambao of the MAR (Ministry of Agrarian
Reform) prepared the "Kasunduan" attached to the respondent's complaint, but when he (petitioner)
said that he had some misgivings about some words therein, Atty. Yambao assured him that he need
not worry because the respondent could not be a "kasamang magsasaka" of his mango land because
there is nothing to cultivate or till in said land, but he still corrected the last part of par. 4 of said
"Kasunduan" by making it read "sa kanilang matiwasay na kaugnayan" before signing the same.

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205 SCRA 529 2015

On September 28, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment declaring that no tenancy relationship exists
between the petitioner and the private respondent. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) dismissing the above-entitled case, with costs against the plaintiff;

b) lifting the preliminary injunction issued on September 18, 1985 and declaring the
same legally inefficacious henceforth; and

c) directing the plaintiff no pay unto the defendant the amount of P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees.

From the above decision, the private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the decision of the trial court. The respondent appellate court declared that there exists a
tenancy relationship between Alberto Ignacio and Gregorio Castillo and permanently enjoined the latter
from disturbing the respondent's peaceful possession as tenant of said land.

Hence, the instant petition was filed, with the petitioner assigning the following errors as the issues
raised to us:

The Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) committed clear and patent error in reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court which is fully supported not only by substantial
evidence but by overwhelming evidence.

II

The Court of Appeals committed clear and reversible error and grave abuse of
discretion in declaring that "the relationship between plaintiff-appellant and defendant-
appellee over the mango land in question as one of agricultural tenancy" despite the
patent judicial admission of respondent Ignacio that he is merely a "magsisiga" of the
mango land under litigation.

III

The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in permanently enjoining

petitioner "from disturbing plaintiff-appellant's peaceful possession as tenant of said
land," although private respondent is not in physical possession of the land, respondent
Ignacio being merely and admittedly a "magsisiga" of the mango land in question.

IV

The Court of Appeals committed clear and patent error in not ordering the termination
of any and all relationships between petitioner and private respondent, the latter having
failed to perform the work of "magsisiga" on the subject parcel of land and instead he
obstructs the driveway by scattering rubbish, dry leaves, dirt and other rubbish,
preventing the petitioner from proceeding to the premises of the land by putting up a
barb wire fence which are acts of harrassment, disturbing the peaceful possession of
petitioner and which acts are inimical to the continuation of any kind of relationship
between Gregorio Castillo and Alberto Ignacio.

The issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between
the parties.

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205 SCRA 529 2015

The Agricultural Tenancy Act defines "agricultural tenancy" as

. . . the physical possession by a person of a land devoted to agriculture belonging to

or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the
former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which
the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain, either
in produce or in money, or in both. (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 1199; 50 O.G. 4655-56).

As held in the case of Qua v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 236 [1991]), the essential requisites of
tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land; (3) the purpose is agricultural production; (4) there is consideration which consist of sharing the
harvest; (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land and (6) there is personal cultivation by
him.

From the foregoing definition, the petitioner insists that for a person to claim tenancy relationship, he
must be an occupant or must be in physical possession of the agricultural land. He alleges that, Alberto
Ignacio, being a mere smudger (magsisiga) of the mango land, no tenancy relationship can exist
between them absent the element of physical possession.

In Gagola v. Court of Agrarian Relations (18 SCRA 992 [1966]), the Court held that a tenant has
possession of the land only through personal cultivation. Thus, in the instant case, the key factor in
ascertaining the existence of a landowner-tenant relationship is whether or not there is personal
cultivation of the land by the private respondent.

The trial court noted that:

Let alone or notwithstanding the use of the phrase "kasamang magsasaka" in the
Kasunduan (Exhibit C) relied upon by the plaintiff, there is no dispute that the actual
role ever played by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the land in litigation was that of a mere
"magsisiga" (smudger). Stated differently, plaintiff has never performed on the property
in question any of the acts of cultivation contemplated by the law as essential to the
creation of an agricultural tenancy relationship. In fine, it is the sense of the Court that
absent the important factor of cultivation, no tenancy relationship has ever existed
between the plaintiff and the defendant over the property involved in the instant case.
At most and at best, the contractual relationship between them was purely civil nature
consisting solely of the seasonal engagement of plaintiff's services as "magsisiga" or
"taga-suob."

On this matter, the appellate court disagreed and noted instead that personal cultivation by respondent
Ignacio of petitioner land is clearly spelled out or admitted in the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") in view of
the aforementioned provision therein that nobody except petitioner and the members of his family could
enter said land without said petitioner's written permission.

We agree with the trial court that the element of personal cultivation is absent. The main thrust of the
petitioner's argument is that the respondent Court of Appeals is mandated by law to affirm the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, acting as an Agrarian Court, if the findings of fact in said decision are
supported by substantial evidence and the conclusions stated therein are not clearly against the law
and jurisprudence. On the other hand, the private respondent contends that the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court.

After painstakingly going over the records of the petition, we find no strong and cogent reason which
justifies the appellate court's deviation from the findings and conclusions of the trial court. As pointed
out in Hernandez v.Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in agrarian cases, all that is
required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which went beyond
the minimum evidentiary support demanded by law, that is supported by substantial evidence, are final
and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunal.

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205 SCRA 529 2015

Moreover, and as significantly held in Qua v. Court of Appeals (supra), the fact that the source of
livelihood of the private respondents is not derived from the lots they are allegedly tenanting is indicative
of non-agricultural tenancy relationship.

Under the facts obtaining in the case, respondent Ignacio is a businessman by occupation and this is
his principal source of income. He manufacturers hollow blocks. He also has a piggery and poultry farm
as well as a hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To add to that, the respondent farms
the riceland of one Dr. Luis Santos. It is thus evident that the working hours of the respondent as a
businessman and his other activities do not permit him to undertake the work and obligations of a real
tenant. This is further supported by the undisputed fact that the respondent cannot even personally
perform the work of a smudger because on October 22, 1986, the respondent hired some 20 people
who are not members of his family to cut and burn the grass in the premises of the subject land.

Anent the element of consent, the petitioner contends that the best evidence and imperishable proof of
the relationship of the parties is that shown in the complaint filed by private respondent with the
barangay captain Tomas Mercado that he is a mere "magsisiga" of the mango trees on the subject
parcel of land. On the other hand, the respondent appellate court said that the best proof of the
existence of tenancy relationship is the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") and that under Section 7, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court, 'when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself,' subject only to certain exceptions. Inasmuch
as substantial evidence does not only require the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence (Berenguer,
Jr. v. CA, 164 SCRA 433 [1988] citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]),
we rule that there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that the element of consent
is present. But even assuming arguendo that the element of consent is present, we declared in De los
Reyes v. Espineli (30 SCRA 574 [1969]) that absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be
a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.

With respect to the requisite of sharing the harvests, the respondent appellate court considered the
receipt (Exhibit "E") signed by the petitioner's son Walderado Castillo as its evidence. On this point, the
petitioner has correctly argued that the receipt is inadmissible on the ground that he did not participate
in its execution.

The maxim "res inter alios acta altere nocere non debet," found in Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court
applies, for as stated in Gevero v. Intermediate Appellant Court (189 SCRA 201 [1990]) the right of a
party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.

Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA 247 [1988]), that the fact
of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Well-settled is the rule that all the
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence
of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished from
a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he
is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws. (Qua v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130
SCRA 482 [1984]).

However, with respect to the award of attorney's fees by the trial court, the award of P10,000.00 is
unwarranted since the action appears to have been filed in good faith. There should be no penalty on
the right to litigate. (Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989] citing
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 50 [1985]).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.