Intestate of San Pedro v CA (265 SCRA 733)

FACTS:
The case involves two petitions which were consolidated by the court in its decision.
1. GR 103727
Engracio San Pedro, as heir-judicial administrator of Plaintiff Intestate, filed a complaint for
recovery of real property/ reconveyance with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction
against private defendants Ocampo, Buhain and dela Cruz.
San Pedro alleged that defendants acquired portion of the subject estate by employing fraud,
bad faith and misrepresentation.
RTC of QC dismissed the complaint saying that the defendants are already the registered
owners covered by the Torrens Title - which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish Title of
San Pedro. The Spanish Title also stated that the estate shall be excluded from the coverage of
Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. The court ordered Plaintiff Intestate to pay each defendant the
amount of 5,000 and atty fees.
Motion for Recon was denied. Petitioner filed an appeal, CA dismissed.
2. GR 106496
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito filed a petition for letter of administration over the
intestate to be appointed as administrator and co-administrator. Judge Echeverri appointed San
Pedro as administrator and the court issued letter of administration in his favor upon posting a
bond of 10,000.
Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention and opposition to the petition, claiming
that the Titulo de Propriedad is inadmissible and ineffective proof of ownership in court and it is
invalid.
Republic filed a motion to suspend the proceedings but the Republics opposition to the petition
for letter of administration was dismissed. Republic filed Motion for Recon.
The Judge declared Titulo de Propriedad as null and void and excluded all lands covered from
the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro.
bPetitioner-heirs appealed to CA. CA dismissed.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in settling the issue of ownership of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136?
2. Whether or not the lower court committed error in excluding from the inventory of the estate
all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 on the ground that it is null and void?
RATIO:
1.NO. It is within the jurisdiction of the lower court functioning as probate court. The jurisdiction
of the Probate Court is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what shares are
due them. Their main function is to settle and liquidate the estate of the deceased so as to rule
on whether the inventory of the estate properly included them for distribution of the net assets
estate to lawful heirs.

2.NO. The lower court did not commit any error when it declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
as null and void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the inventory of
the estate.
Under PD 892, the system of registration under Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all
holders of Spanish Titles should cause their lands to be registered under Land Registration Act
within 6 months from date of effectivity or until August 16, 1976.
In both cases, petitioner-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 was brought under the operation of PD 892. There was no certificate of title shown.
Also, Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under PD 892, is inadmissible and ineffective as evidence
of private ownership in special proceedings case. Since the Titulo was not registered under
Land Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered title of defendants Ocampo, Buhain
and dela Cruz. Torrens title of the latter enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity.
Petitioner-heirs failed to present neither the original Titulo nor a genuine copy thereof (only an
alleged illegible copy was presented). Even the secondary evidence presented was also not
admissible.
RULING:
The Titulo de Propriedad is null and void and no rights can be derived therefrom. All lands
covered by said Titulo are excluded from inventory of the estate. The petition for letter of
administration closed and terminated. The heirs are disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership and ordered to vacate.
RA 7691

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots
where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by
the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more
than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in
these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial
Courts."

PD 1529

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally
accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration
of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or
petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the
filing or issuance thereof.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 6-93-A.

TO: METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL

TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

SUBJECT: DELEGATED JURISDICTION OF MTC's AND MCTC's TO HEAR AND DETERMINE

CADASTRAL AND LAND REGISTRATION CASES.

Pursuant to Sec. 34 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R. A. 76791 which took effect 14
April 1995, and the Reslution of the Court En Banc in Adm. Matter No. 93-3-488-0 dated 25 March
1993 [Re: Request of DENR for Metropolitan and Municipal Trial Courts to hear cadastral and land
registration cases under Sec. 34, B. P. Blg. 129], the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts to hear cadastral and land registration cases involving
uncontested lots and contested lots, the value of which does not exceeed One Hundred Thousand
Pesos [P100,000.00] as may be ascertained by affidavit of the claimants or by their agreement or
from the corresponding tax declarations: Provided, That:chanrobles virtual law library

[1] Cadastral or land registration cases filed before the effectivity of this Administrative Circulars but
where hearing has not yet commenced shall be transferred by the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court having jurisdiction over the case to the Executive Judge of the appropriate Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court or Municipal Circuit Trial Court for
the required raffle among the branches of the Courts under his administrative supervision; and
cralaw
[2] Cadastral or land registration cases pending in the Regional Trial Courts where trial had already
been commenced as of the date of the effectivity of this Administrative Circular shall remain with
said courts. However, by agreement of the parties, these cases may be transferred to the
appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal Trial Courts.cralaw

This Administrative Circular shall take effect immediately. However, the Clerk of Court is directed to
cause its publication in a newspaper of general circulation for the information of the public.
G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990

VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO

ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO,
LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of error committed by the Court of
Appeals. 1

It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels
of unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan,
identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while
Abdon passed away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban
had five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with
whom he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo. 2 Pedro,
Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died
on March 8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners.

It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of
donation inter vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of
Jose. 3 Since 1942, Jose had been paying taxes thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof,
5
worked thereon, and claimed them as owner thereof

It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another deed of donation inter
vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose. 6

On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked
as exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away the properties in question in favor of all his
grandchildren including Jose. It seems however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944,
after Escolastica had died.

On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral court 7 an
application for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131 on the strength of
exhibits "J" and "T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of exhibit
"1". Pedro and Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that
each of them were entitled to one-third thereof. 8

The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties according to the law
on intestate succession. 9

Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the
cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.

On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this Court.

The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims
of ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the
lots should have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession since 1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by
acquisitive prescription. 10 They also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly transferred the subject
lands to them.

In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the cadastral court had the
jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of property; that the issue of prescription was never
ventilated below; and that exhibit "J" had been validly rescinded by exhibit "1".

The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three exhibits but rather, over the dates
thereof. Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on September 27, 1941, and not October
27, 1941, and that exhibit "l", the instrument that revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941.
Virginia et al. maintain on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made on October 27, 1941,
twenty-four days after the execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1" came earlier, it was
notarized, and took effect, only on November 3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one of the
donors.

Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that there is no real question of fact to
be resolved in this case. The important question, so we find, is, based on existing facts, legal in
character: Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131?

As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.

The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held that under
Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a
land registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land
registration law. 11 We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law
when acting merely as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to
act not only on applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or
petitions.'" 12 At any rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land registration
courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or have
acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given full
opportunity to present their evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already of
record and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial
issues. 13 By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather,
of mere procedure, which may be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of
ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court commits no
error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their
respective exhibits to defeat one another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case,
registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it.

The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In support of their claims, Virginia, et al. cite four
events: (1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and until his death in 1970, worked thereon;
(2) Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition; (3)
Ever since, Jose had paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to
oust him, Jose, in possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia, et al. now say that barring
the above exhibits, they have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.

We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels
' had come under the category of a co-ownership, following the death of their grandparents, but in
that case, it has been held that in order for prescription to set in, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has
made known to the rest of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the property;
(3) there is clear and convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious. 15

The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots
by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not
amount to adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use
thereof can not by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes
thereon is not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer
title upon a claimant. 16 The fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property
is nothing conclusive because there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to
Pedro, et al. Under these circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia.,
et al., by way of prescription.

We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a
valid donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".

Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J" had been revoked by exhibit "1", exhibit "J"
appears to have been executed in compliance with legal requirements, i.e., as to form and
acceptance. 17 It is true that the cadastral court was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of Jose
in making Abdon sign the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature thereon upon "the
belief that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from one Marciano Santos" 19) but as found by the
Court of Appeals, It is a theory that "must be received with a 'grain of salt', 20 because, for one thing, Jose
is dead, and for another, the petitioners have adduced evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine. We are
bound by the factual finding of the Appellate Court and as we averred, we are disposing of this question
on pure questions of law.

As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just as controlling on this
Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the death of his wife on September 16, 1942
and does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo." 21

We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that a valid
donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23 failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed
in the donation, 24 or by reason of ingratitude. 25 There is simply no proof that Abdon when he executed
exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.

We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the force and
effect" 26 of exhibit "J".

It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights
were transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.

We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties' exhibits, because first, it is an issue
of fact and second, because whatever their true dates, there is no obstacle to the validity of the
claims of Virginia, et al.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to
distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or September) 27, 1941,
exhibit "J", according to the terms and conditions set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated
thereby. No costs.
G.R. No. L-19615 December 24, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF LAND. LEONOR DE LOS

ANGELES, FEDERICO DE LOS ANGELES, ET AL., applicants-appellants,
vs.
ISIDORO O. SANTOS, ANTONIO ASTUDILLO, ET AL., THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, oppositors-appellees.

BENGZON, JP, J.:

Squarely before this Court in this appeal is the important and fundamental question of whether a
land registration court which has validly acquired jurisdiction over a parcel of land for registration of
title thereto could be divested of said jurisdiction by a subsequent administrative act consisting in the
issuance by the Director of Lands of a homestead patent covering the same parcel of land.

The court a quo held in effect that it could be, as it dismissed the application to register title to the
land in its order brought here on appeal.

On November 21, 1959 an application for registration of title to 12 parcels of land in Ampid San
Mateo Rizal was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Leonor de los Angeles and seven co-
applicants. Among other things it alleged that "applicants are owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple
of the aforesaid land."

The required notices were given in which May 27, 1960 was set for the initial hearing. On March 3,
1960 the Director of Lands filed an opposition stating that the land "is a portion of the public domain".
The Province of Rizal also interposed an opposition on May 24, 1960, asserting "the required 3.00
meters strips of public easement" on lots along Ampid River and a creek.

At the initial hearing on May 27, 1960 an order of general default was issued except as against the
Director of Lands, the Province of Rizal and eleven private oppositors who appeared therein. On
July 10, 1960 the aforesaid private oppositors, Julio Hidalgo among them, filed their written
opposition claiming they "are the lawful owners of the parcels of land in question for having acquired
homestead patents over said lots".

On July 25, 1961 a "Report" was filed in court by the Land Registration Commissioner, stating:

1. That the parcel of land described as Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857, applied for in the above-
entitled land registration case, is a portion of that described on plan Psu-148997, previously
patented on June 12, 1961 under Patent No. 95856 in the name of Julio Hidalgo; and

2. That Case No. N-2671, LRC Record No. N-18332, was set for hearing on May 27, 1960
but no decision has as yet been received by this Commissioner.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended to this Honorable Court that Case No. N-

2671, LRC Record No. N-18332, be dismissed with respect to Lot 11 of plan Psu-158857
only, giving due course, however, to the other lots in the application.

Acting thereon, the court required applicants in its order of July 29, 1961, to show cause why their
application should not be dismissed as to Lot 11 (10.6609 hectares). On August 15, 1961 applicants
filed an "opposition to motion to dismiss". But on September 18, 1961 the court issued an order
dismissing the application with respect to Lot 11 "without prejudice on the part of applicants to
pursue the corresponding remedy in any ordinary action". After a motion for reconsideration was
filed and denied, applicants appealed to this Court.

As lone assignment of error it is alleged that "the lower, court grievously erred in dismissing
the application for registration as regards Lot No. 11, over which a homestead patent was
issued by the Director of Lands during the pendency of the registration proceeding".
(Emphasis supplied.)

To start with, it is well settled that the Director of Lands' jurisdiction, administrative supervision and
executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands already of private
ownership. (Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424; Vital vs. Anore 53 O.G. 3739; Republic vs. Heirs of Carle
L-12485, July 31, 1959; Director of Lands vs. De Luna, L-1441, Nov. 23, 1960.) Accordingly, a
homestead patent issued by him over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and
effect against the owner (Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 416; Vital vs. Anore supra).

Now, in the land registration proceedings applicants contended that as of November 21, 1959 the
date they applied for registration they were already "owners pro-indiviso and in fee simple of the
aforesaid land". As a result, if applicants were to successfully prove this averment, and thereby show
their alleged registrable title to the land, it could only result in the finding that when Julio Hidalgo's
homestead patent was issued over Lot 11 on June 12, 1961 said lot was no longer public. The land
registration court, in that event, would have to order a decree of title issued in applicants' favor and
declare the aforesaid homestead patent a nullity which vested no title in the patentee as against the
real owners (Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands, 31 Phil. 273; Zarate vs. Director of Lands, supra;
Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 63 Phil. 654).

Since the existence or non-existence of applicants' registrable title to Lot 11 is decisive of the validity
or nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on said lot the court a quo's jurisdiction in
the land registration proceedings could not have been divested by the homestead patent's issuance.

Proceedings for land registration are in rem whereas proceedings for acquisition of homestead
patent are not (De los Reyes vs. Razon, 38 Phil. 480; Philippine National Bank vs. Ortiz Luis, 53
Phil. 649). A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose of the public or private character
of the land as far as courts upon proceedings in rem are concerned (De los Reyes vs.
Razon, supra). Applicants should thus be given opportunity to prove registrable title to Lot 11.

WHEREFORE, we hereby set aside the orders appealed from and remand the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings, without costs. So ordered.
 II

DUTY IS MINISTERIAL

168 SCRA 503 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Judgment Confirms Title Sec 30 &
32 PD 1529
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of land belonged to one
Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Jose
Gomez et al her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the application, the trial court
issued an order of general default. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision
adjudicating the subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final and executory
hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office (GLRO) to issue
the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned for its setting aside. He
discovered that the 12 parcels of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already
granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted by homestead
patent can no longer be the subject of another registration. The lower court granted Silverios
recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration Act) which provides
that after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order
to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and
certificate of title. That once the judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the
decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE: Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on approving the
adjudication even after it had became final and executory.
HELD: Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the
expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The Supreme
Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry
of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
Baranda vs Gustilo
Facts:
A petition for reconstitution of title was filed with the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo involving a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered by OCT No. 6406 in the name of
Romana Hitalia.
The OCT was cancelled and TCT No. 106098 was issued in the names of petitioners Baranda and
Hitalia.
The Court issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao
refused to honor on the ground that they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517.
The Court found out that TCT No. 257772 was fraudulently acquired by Perez, Gotera and Susana.
Thereafter, the court issued a writ of demolition which was questioned by Perez and others so a
motion for reconsideration was filed.
 Another case was filed by Baranda and Hitalia (GR. NO. 62042) for the execution of judgement in
the resolutions issued by the courts.
In the meantime, the CA dismissed a civil case (GR. NO. 00827) involving the same properties.
(NOTE: This time three cases na ang involve excluding the case at bar.)
The petitioners prayed that an order be released to cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-
106098 and once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and once cancelled to issue
new certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia.
In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated
the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of
titles in the name of petitioners.
However, by reason of a separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens
was annotated in the new certificate of title.
This prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates.
Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD
1529.

Issue: What is the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.

Held:

Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. ... If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."

Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be
taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him
for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds
with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."

The function of ROD is ministerial in nature

The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments
and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing
to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.

In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument presented
to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator
of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance with Section 117 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.

No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register
instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
 FUDOT v CATTLEYA LAND

For resolution is a petition that seeks to nullify the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 28
April 2005 and 11 January 2006, respectively, in C.A.G.R. CV No. 73025 which declared respondent as having
a better right over a parcel of land located in Doljo, Panglao, Bohol.

FACTS: On 1992, Cattleya Land (Respondent) intended to buy the parcels of land owned by Spouses Tecson.
However, only 6 out of 9 lots were annotated since 3 of those are subject to attachment.

On 1995, Fudot (Petitioner) presented for registration before the Register of Deeds the owners copy of the title
of the subject property, together with the deed of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in favor of petitioner
on 19 December 1986. Respondent opposed the petitioners application but the ROD had already registered
the Deed of Sale in favor of Fudot.

Respondent filed its Complaint[ for Quieting Of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership, Cancellation Of Title With
Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. Asuncion filed a complaint-in-intervention,
claiming that she never signed any deed of sale covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner
and that her husband had an amorous relationship with the petitioner.

On 31 October 2001, the trial court rendered its decision (i) quieting the title or ownership of the subject
land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid; (iii)
ordering the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent; (iv) dismissing respondents claim for
damages against the Register of Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncions claim for
damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi) dismissing petitioners counterclaim for lack of the
required preponderance of evidence.

According to the trial court, respondent had recorded in good faith the deed of sale in its favor ahead of
petitioner. Moreover, based on Asuncions convincing and unrebutted testimony, the trial court concluded that
the purported signature of Asuncion in the deed of sale in favor of petitioner was forged, thereby rendering the
sale void.

ISSUE: IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS, AS BY SALE, WHICH LAW SHALL

GOVERN, ARTICLE 1544 OF CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS SYSTEM?

HELD: In the first place, there is no double sale to speak of. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code, which provides the
rule on double sale, applies only to a situation where the same property is validly sold to different vendees. In
this case, there is only one sale to advert to, that between the spouses Tecson and respondent.

The act of registration does not validate petitioners otherwise void contract. Registration is a mere ministerial
act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register
of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or
instrument.While it operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others, it does not add to its
validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one as between the parties, nor amounts to a declaration
by the state that the instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the land. The registration of
petitioners void deed is not an impediment to a declaration by the courts of its invalidity.
Justice Jose Vitug, who explained that the registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer
to registration under P.D. No. 1529, thus:

The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to
registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the
act of registration as the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante v. Rosabal, 1 O.G.
[12] 900, Garcia v. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens System, the
purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the certificate of title,
unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only
exception is where the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the
seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration

II

1. Who may apply

a. REQUISITES FOR FILING OF APPLICATION

1. That the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain

2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation

3. That such possession is under bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier

WHO MAY APPLY

Section 14 of PD1529 enumerates the persons who may apply for registration, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives, to wit:

1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier;

2. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.

3. Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.

4. Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

> Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
> Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the
original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the
pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a
retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

> A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him,
unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

CO-OWNERS SHALL FILE APPLICATION JOINTLY

> Since a co-owner cannot be considered a true owner of a specific portion until division or partition is
effected, he cannot file an application for registration of the whole without joining the co-owners as
applicants

VENDEE A RETRO MAY FILE AN APPLICATION IN HIS NAME

> A sale pacto de recto transfers the legal title to the vendee and the vendee is subrogated to all the
rights and actions of the vendor, subject to the latters right to redemption

> Vendee a retro has therefore a registrable title thereo which may be the subject of initial registration

> The right to redeem the property is only to be noted in the decree and certificate of title that may be
issued

CORPORATION SOLE MAY PURCHASE AND HOLD REAL ESTATE

> Corporation soleorganized and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or
church, for the administration of the temporalities of such religious society or church

> A corporation sole is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property

> Corporation sole is not the owner of the properties he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof
and holds the same in trust for the faithful or members of the society or church for which the corporation
is organized

2. Citizenship Requirement