Royal Institute of Philosophy

The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics

Author(s): W. F. R. Hardie
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 154 (Oct., 1965), pp. 277-295
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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 THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE
OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XL. No. 154 OCTOBER 1965

THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

W. F. R. HARDIE
I
ARISTOTLE maintains that every man has, or should have, a single
end (TreXo), a target at which he aims. The doctrine is stated in
E.N. I 2. 'If, then, there is some end of the thingswe do which we
desire forits own sake (everythingelse being desired forthe sake of
this), and if we do not choose everythingfor the sake of something
else (forat that rate the process would go on to infinity,so that our
desire would be emptyand vain), clearly this must be the good and
the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great
influenceon life? Shall we not, like archerswho have a mark to aim
at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?'" (1094a 18-24).
Aristotledoes not hereprove,nor need we understandhim as claiming
to prove, that there is only one end which is desired for itself.He
points out correctlythat, if there are objects which are desired but
not desiredforthemselves,theremustbe someobject which is desired
for itself.The passage furthersuggeststhat, if there were one such
object and one only, this fact would be importantand helpful for
the conduct of life.
II
The same doctrineis stated in E.E. A 2. But, whereas in the E.N.
the emphasis is on the concern of political science, statesmanship,
with the human good conceived as a singleend, the E.E. speaks only
of the planning by the individual of his own life. 'Everyone who has
the power to live according to his own choice (wUpox/pea-ts)should
dwell on thesepoints and set up forhimselfsome object forthe good
lifeto aim at, whetherhonour or reputationor wealth or culture,by
referenceto which he will do all that he does, since not to have one's
lifeorganisedin view of some end is a sign of great folly.Now above
all we must firstdefineto ourselveswithouthurryor carelessnessin
'Here, and in quotingotherpassages,I have reproducedtheOxfordtranslation.
I referto theNicomachean Ethicsas E.N. and to theEudemianEthicsas E.E.
A 277
 PHILOSOPHY

which of our possessionsthe good lifeconsists,and what formen are

the conditions of its attainment' (1214b 6-14). Here, then, we are
told that lack of practical wisdom is shown in a man's failure to
plan and organisehis lifeforthe attainmentof a singleend. Aristotle
omits to say, but says elsewhere, that lack of practical wisdom is
shown also in a man's preferencefora bad or inadequate end, say
pleasure or money. We learn in E.N. VI 9 that the man ofpractical
wisdom has a trueconceptionof the end which is best forhim as well
as the capacity to plan effectivelyforits realisation (1 141b 31-33).

III
How far do men in fact plan theirlives, as Aristotlesuggeststhey
should, for the attainmentof a single end? As soon as we ask this
question, we see that thereis a confusionin Aristotle'sconception of
the single end. For the question confusestwo questions: first,how
fardo men plan theirlives; and, secondly,so faras theydo, how far
do they, in their plans, give a central and dominating place to a
single desired object, money or fame or science? To both these
questions the answer that firstsuggestsitselfis that some men do
and some do not. Take the second question first.It is exceptional for
a lifeto be organised to achieve the satisfactionofone rulingpassion.
If asked forexamples we mightthinkof Disraeli's political ambition
or of Henry James' self-dedicationto the art of the novel. But
exceptionalgeniusis not incompatiblewitha wide varietyofinterests.
It seems plain that veryfew men can be said, even roughly,to live
their lives under the domination of a single end. Consider now the
firstquestion. How far do men plan theirlives? Clearly some do so
who have no singledominant aim. It is possible to have a plan based
on priorities,or on equal consideration,as between a number of
objects. It is even possible to plan not to plan, to resolve never to
cross bridges in advance. Hobbes remarked that there is no !finis
ultimus,utmost aim, nor summum bonum,greatestgood, as is spoken
of in the books of the old moral philosophers.... Felicityis a con-
tinual progressofthe desire,fromone object to another,the attaining
of the formerbeing still but the way to the latter' (Leviathanch. xi).
But even such a progressmay be planned, although the plan may
not be wise. Every man has, and knows that he has, a number of
independent desires,i.e. desires which are not dependent on other
desiresin the way in which desirefora means is dependenton desire
foran end. Everyman is capable, fromtimeto time,of tellinghimself
that, ifhe pursuesone particular object too ardently,he may lose or
imperilotherobjects also dear to him. So it may be argued that every
man capable, as all men are, ofreflectionis, even ifonly occasionally
and implicitly,a planner of his own life.
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

IV
We can now distinguishthe two conceptionswhich are confusedor
conflatedin Aristotle'sexposition of the doctrine of the single end.
One of them is the conception of what mightbe called the inclusive
end. A man, reflectingon his various desiresand interests,notes that
some mean more to him than others,that some are more, some less,
difficultand costly to achieve, that the attainmentof one may, in
differentdegrees, promote or hinder the attainmentof others. By
such reflectionhe is moved to plan to achieve at least his most
importantobjectivesas fullyas possible. The followingof such a plan
is roughlywhat is sometimesmeant by the pursuitof happiness. The
desire forhappiness, so understood,is the desire forthe orderlyand
harmonious gratificationof desires. Aristotle sometimes,when he
speaks of the final end, seems to be fumblingfor the idea of an
inclusive end, or comprehensiveplan, in thissense. Thus in E.N. I 2
he speaks of the end of politics as 'embracing' other ends (1094b
6-7). The aim of a science which is 'architectonic' (1094a 26-27; cf.
E.N. VI 8, 1141b 24-26) is a second-orderaim. Again in E.N. I 7
he says that happiness must be 'most desirable of all things,without
being counted as one good thing among others since, if it were so
counted, it would be made more desirable by the addition of even
the least of goods . . .' (1097b 16-20). Such considerationsought to
lead Aristotleto define happiness as a secondary end, the full and
harmonious achievementof primaryends. This is what he ought to
say. It is not what he says. His explicit view, as opposed to his
occasional insight,makes the supreme end not inclusive but domin-
ant, the object of one prime desire,philosophy.This is so even when,
as in E.N. I 7, he has in mind that,primafacie,thereis not only one
finalend: '. . . ifthereare more than one, the mostfinalof these will
be what we are seeking' (1097a 30). Aristotle'smistakeand confusion
are implicit in his formulationin E.E. A 2 of the question in which
of our possessionsdoes the good life consist (1214b 12-13). For to
put the question thusis to rule out the obvious and correctreply; that
the life which is best fora man cannot lie in gaining only oneof his
objects at the costoflosingall the rest.This would be too high a price
to pay even forphilosophy.

V
The ambiguity which we have found in Aristotle'sconception of
the final good shows itselfalso in his attemptto use the notion of a
'function'(epyOP)whichis 'peculiar' to man as a clue to the definition
of happiness. The notion of functioncannot be defendedand should
not be pressed, since a man is not designed for a purpose. The
notion which Aristotlein fact uses is that of the specificnature of
279
 PHILOSOPHY

man, the characteristicswhich primarilydistinguishhim fromother

living things.This notion can be given a wider interpretationwhich
correspondsto the inclusive end or a narrowerinterpretationwhich
corresponds to the dominant end. In E.N. I 7, seeking what is
peculiar to man (1097b 33-4), Aristotle rejects first the life of
nutritionand growth and secondly the life of perception which is
common to 'the horse,the ox and everyanimal' (1098a 2, 3). What
remains is 'an active lifeof the elementthathas a rationalprinciple'
(1098a 3-4). This expressionneed not, as commentatorspoint out, be
understoodas excluding theoreticalactivity.'Action' can be used in
a wide sense, as in the PoliticsVII 3 (1325b 16-23), to include con-
templative thinking. But what the phrase specifies as the proper
functionof man is clearlywider than theoreticalactivityand includes
activities which manifestpractical intelligence and moral virtue.
But the narrowerconception is suggestedby a phrase used later in
the same chapter. 'The good forman turnsout to be the activityof
soul in accordance with virtue,and ifthereare more than one virtue
in accordance with the best and most complete' (1098a 16-18). The
most complete virtue must be theoreticalwisdom, although this is
not made clear in E.N. I.

VI
The doctrinethat only in theoreticalactivityis man really happy
is stated and defended explicitlyin Book X 7 and 8. Theoretical
reason, the divine element in man, more than anythingelse is man
(1 177b 27-28, 1178a 6-7). 'It would be strange,then, if he were to
choose not the life of his selfbut that of somethingelse. And what
we said beforewill apply now; that which is proper to each thingis
by nature best and most pleasant foreach thing' (1178a 3-6). Man
is trulyhuman only when he is more than human, godlike. 'None
of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in con-
templation'(1178b 27-28). This statementmakes obvious the mistake
involved in the conception of the end as dominant rather than
inclusive. It is no doubt true that man is the only theoreticalanimal.
But the capacity of some men fortheoryis verysmall. And theoryis
not the only activityin respectof which man is rational as no other
animal is rational. There is no logic which leads fromthe principle
that happiness is to be found in a way of living which is common
and peculiar to men to the narrow view of the final good as a
dominant end. What is common and peculiar to men is rationality
in a general sense, not theoreticalinsightwhich is a specialised way
of being rational. A man differsfromother animals not primarilyin
being a natural metaphysician,but ratherin being able to plan his
lifeconsciouslyforthe attainmentof an inclusive end.
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

VII
The confusion betweenan endwhichis finalbecauseitis inclusive
and an endwhichis finalbecauseitis supremeor dominantaccounts
formuchthatcriticshave rightly foundunsatisfactory in Aristotle's
account of the thoughtwhich leads to practicaldecisions.It is
connectedwithhis failureto make explicitthe factthatpractical
thinking is notalwaysor onlythefinding ofmeansto ends.Thought
is neededalso forthesettingup ofan inclusiveend. But,as we have
seen,Aristotle failsto makeexplicittheconceptofan inclusiveend.
This inadequacyboth confuseshis statementin E.N. I 1 and 2 of
therelationofpoliticsto subordinateartsand leads to hisgivingan
incompleteaccountofdeliberation.
VIII
I have representedAristotle'sdoctrineas primarilya doctrine
about the individual'spursuitof his own good, his own welfare
But something
(E1P&XiyOvic). shouldbe said at thispointabout the
relationbetweentheend oftheindividualand the'greaterand more
complete'end ofthestate.'Whileit is worthwhileto attaintheend
merelyforone man, it is finerand moregodliketo attainit fora
nationor forcity-states' (E.N. I 2, 1094b7-10).This doesnotmean
it
morethan says: ifit is good thatSmithshouldbe happy,it is even
betterthatBrownand Robinsonshouldbe happytoo.
Ix
What makesit inevitablethatplanningforthe attainment of the
good forman shouldbe politicalis thesimplefactthata man needs
and desiressocial communitywith others.This is made clear in
E.N. I 7 whereAristotlesaysthatthefinalgood mustbe sufficient by
we do notmeanthatwhichis sufficient
itself.'Now by self-sufficient
fora man by himself, forone who livesa solitarylife,but also for
parents,children,wifeand in generalforhis friendsand fellow-
citizens,since man is born for citizenship'(1097b 7-11). That
individualend-seeking is primary,thatthestateexistsforitscitizens,
is statedin Ch. 8 of E.N. VI, one of the bookscommonto both
treatises.'The man who knowsand concernshimselfwithhis own
interestsis thoughtto have practicalwisdom,whilepoliticiansare
thought be busybodies.. . . Yet perhapsone's own good cannot
to
existwithouthouseholdmanagement, norwithouta formofgovern-
ment' (1142a 1-10). The familyand the state,and otherformsof
associationas well,are necessary ofanyman's
forthefullrealisation
for
capacity living well.
X
The statesmanaims,to speakroughly,at the greatesthappiness
ofthegreatest number.He findshisownhappinessin bringing about
281
 PHILOSOPHY

the happiness of others (E.N. X 7, 1177b 14), especially,ifAristotle

is right,the happiness of those capable of theoreticalactivity.Speak-
ing in termsof the end as dominant Aristotle,in E.N. VI 13, sets a
limitto the authorityofpolitical wisdom. 'But again it is not supreme
over philosophic wisdom, i.e. over the superiorpart of us, any more
than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but
provides forits coming into being; it issues orders,then, forits sake
but not to it' (1145a 6-9). This suggestionthatscience and philosophy
are insulated in principle from political interferencecannot be
accepted. The statesmanpromotesscience but also uses it, and may
have to restrictthe resources to be made available for it. If the
secondary and inclusive end is the harmonisationand integrationof
primary ends, no primary end can be sacrosanct. But, even if
Aristotlehad held consistentlythe extravagantview that theoretical
activity is desired only for itselfand is the only end desired for
itself,he would not have been rightto conclude that there could be
no occasion forthe political regulationof theoreticalstudies.For the
unrestrictedpursuitof philosophymighthinder measures needed to
make an environmentin which philosophycould flourish.It might
be necessary to order an astronomerto leave his observatory,or a
philosopherhis school, in order that they should play their parts in
the state. Similarlythe individual who plans his lifeso as to give as
large a place as possible to a single supremelydesired activitymust
be ready to restrain,not only desires which conflictwith his ruling
passion, but the ruling passion itselfwhen it is manifestedin ways
which would frustrateits own object.

XI
In E.N. I 1 and 2 Aristotleexpounds the doctrinethat statesman-
ship has authorityover the arts and scienceswhich fall under it, are
subordinate to it. An art, A, is under another art, B, if there is a
relation of means to end between A and B. If A is a productive art,
like bridle-making,its product may be used by a superior art,
riding. Riding is not a productiveactivity,but it fallsunder general-
ship in so far as generals use cavalry, and generalshipin turn falls
under the art of the statesman,the art which is in the highestdegree
architectonic (1094a 27, cf. VI 8, 1141b 23-25). Thus the man of
practical wisdom, the statesman or legislator, is compared by
Aristotleto a foreman,or clerkof the works,in charge of technicians
and workmenof various kinds, all engaged in building an observa-
tory to enable the man of theoretical wisdom to contemplate the
starryheavens. In the Magna Moralia thefunctionofpractical wisdom
is said to be like that of a steward whose businessit is so to arrange
thingsthat his masterhas leisure forhis high vocation (A 34, 1198b
282
 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

12-17). Perhapstheclosestparallelto thefunction ofthestatesman

as conceivedby Aristotleis the officeof the Bursarin a collegeat
Oxfordor Cambridge.

XII
This accountofstatesmanship as aimingat theexerciseoftheoreti-
cal wisdomby thosecapable of it is an extremeexpressionof the
conceptionof the end as dominantand notinclusive.The account,
as it stands,is a grossover-simplificationofthefacts.Whenhe speaks
of a subordinateart as pursued'forthe sake of' a superordinate or
architectonic art (1094a 15-16),Aristotleshouldmake explicitthe
fact that the subordinateactivity,in addition to servingother
objects,may be pursuedforits own sake. Riding,forexample,has
non-military usesand can be a sourceofenjoyment. Againtwoarts,
or two kindsof activity,may each be subordinate,in Aristotle's
sense,to the other.Ridersuse bridles,and bridle-makers may ride
to theirwork.The engineerusestechniquesinventedby themathe-
matician,but also promotesthe wealthand leisurein whichpure
sciencecan flourish. Aristotledoes not fail to see and mentionthe
factthatan objectmaybe desiredbothindependently foritselfand
dependently foritseffects(E.N. I 6, 1097a30-34).He was awarealso
thattheoretical activityis not the onlykindof activitywhichis in-
dependently desired.Buthe evidently thoughtthatan activitywhich
was neverdesiredexceptforitselfwouldbe intrinsically desirablein a
higherdegreethan an activitywhich,in additionto beingdesired
foritself,was also useful.It is, so to say,beneaththedignityofthe
mostgodlikeactivitiesthattheyshouldbe useful.Aristotle is led in
thisway, and also by otherroutes,to give a narrowand exclusive
account of the final good, to conceive of the supremeend as
dominantand notinclusive.

XIII
Aristotledescribesdeliberation, ofthewiseman,as a
thethinking
processwhichstartsfromtheconceptionofan end and worksback,
in a directionwhichreversestheorderofcausality,to thediscovery
of a means. Men do not, he asserts,deliberateabout ends. 'They
assumethe end and considerhow and by what meansit is to be
attained; and if it seems to be producedby severalmeans they
considerby whichit is mosteasilyand bestproduced,while,ifit is
achievedby one only,theyconsiderhow it will be achievedby this
and by whatmeansthiswill be achieved,tilltheycome to thefirst
cause, whichin the orderof discoveryis last' (E.N. III 3, 1112b
15-20). Such an investigation is comparedto the methodof dis-
coveringby analysisthesolutionofa geometrical problem.Againin
283
 PHILOSOPHY

VI 2 practical wisdom is said to be shown in findingmeans to a good

end. 'For the syllogismswhich deal with acts to be done are things
which involve a starting-point, viz. "since the end, i.e. what is best,
is of such and such a nature" . . .' (1144a 31-33).

XIV
This is Aristotle'sofficialaccount of deliberation. But here again,
as in his account of the relation between political science and sub-
ordinate sciences, a too narrow and rigid doctrineis to some extent
corrected elsewhere, although not explicitly,by the recognitionof
factswhich do not fitinto the prescribedpattern.Joseph, in Essays
in Ancient and ModernPhilosophy, pointed out that the process of
deciding between alternativemeans, by consideringwhich is easiest
and best, involves deliberation which is not comparable to the
geometer'ssearch (pp. 180-181). But he remarksthat Aristotledoes
not 'appear to see' this. What the passage suggestsis that the agent
may have to consider the intrinsicgoodness,or badness, of the pro-
posed means as well as its effectiveness in promotinga good end. A
less incidental admission that thereis more in deliberationthan the
findingof means is involved in Aristotle'saccount of 'mixed actions'
in E.N. III 1. Aristotlerecognisesthat,ifthe means are discreditable,
the end may not be importantenough tojustifythem. 'To endure the
greatestindignitiesforno noble end or fora triflingend is the mark
of an inferiorperson' (111Oa 22-23). 'It is difficultsometimes to
determinewhat should be chosen at what cost, and what should be
endured in returnforwhat gain' (11 lOa 29-30). Alcmaeon's decision
to kill his mother,on his father'sinstruction,ratherthan face death
himselfis given as an example of a patently wrong answer to a
question of this kind. This kind of deliberation is clearly not the
regressiveor analytic discovery of means to a pre-conceived end.
It is rather the determinationof an ideal pattern of behaviour, a
systemof priorities,fromwhich the agent is not prepared to depart.
It is what we described earlier as the settingup of an inclusive end.
It is a kind of practical thinkingwhich Aristotlecannot have had in
his mind when he assertedin E.N. III 3 that 'we deliberatenot about
ends but about means' (1 12b 1 1-12).

XV
I have argued that Aristotle'sdoctrineof the final human good is
vitiated by his representationof it as dominantratherthan inclusive,
and that this mistake underlies his too narrow account of practical
thinkingas the search for means. But to say that the final good is
inclusiveis not to deny that withinit thereare certaindominantends
correspondingto the major interestsof developed human nature.
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

One of these major interestsis the interestin theoreticalsciences. Of

these,according to Aristotle,there are three; theologyor firstphilo-
sophy, mathematics and physics (MetaphysicsE 1, 1026a 18-19, cf.
E.N. VI 8, 1142a 16-18). His account of contemplation in the
Ethics, based on the doctrine of reason as the divine or godlike
elementin man (E.N. X 7, 1177a 13-17;8, 1178a 20-23),exaltsthe
firstand makes only casual mentionof the other two. Elsewhere, in
the De PartibusAnimalium I 5, he admits that physicshas attractions
which compensate forthe relativelylow statusof the objects studied.
'The scanty conceptions to which we can attain of celestial things
give us, fromtheirexcellence, more pleasure than all our knowledge
of the world in which we live; just as a half-glimpseof persons that
we love is more delightfulthan a leisurely view of other things,
whatever their number and dimensions. On the other hand, in
certitude and in completeness our knowledge of terrestrialthings
has the advantage. Moreover theirgreaternearnessand affinity to us
balances somewhat the loftierinterestof the heavenly thingsthat are
the object of the higherphilosophy' (644b 31-645a 4).

XVI
I cannot here discuss the theological doctrineswhich ledAristotle
to place 'the higher philosophy' on the summit of human felicity.
But thereis an aspect of his account of the theoreticlifewhich has an
immediate connection with my main topic. He remarks in E.N.
VII 14 that 'thereis not only an activityof movementbut an activity
of immobility,and pleasure is foundmore in restthan in movement'
(1154b 26-28). This doctrinethat thereis no 'movement'in theoreti-
cal contemplation,and the implicationthat its immobilityis a mark
of its excellence, is determinedprimarilyby Aristotle'sconception
of the divine nature. The latestcommentatorson the E.N., Gauthier
and Jolif, say, with justification,that he here excludes discovery
from the contemplative life. 'On pourrait meme dire que l'ideal,
pour le contemplatifaristotelicien et cet ideal le Dieu d'Aristotele
realise-ce seraitde ne jamais etudier et de ne jamais decouvrir..
(855-856). In E.N. X 7 we are told that 'philosophy is thought to
offerpleasuresmarvellousfortheirpurityand theirenduringness'and
that it is 'reasonable to suppose that those who know will pass their
time more pleasantly than those who enquire' (1177a 25-27). It is
not reasonable at all. It is a startlingparadox. I shall now suggest
that Aristotle'sapparent readiness to accept this paradox, like his
confusion between the dominant and the inclusive end, is to be
explained, at least in part, by his failure to give any explicit or
adequate analysisof the concept of end and means.
285
 PHILOSOPHY

XVII
Aristotlestates in E.N. I that an end may be either an activity
or the product of an activity. 'But a certain differenceis to be
found among ends; some are activities,others are products apart
fromthe activitiesthat produce them.Where there are ends apart
fromthe actions,it is the nature of the productsto be betterthan the
activities' (1094a 3-6). The suggestionhere is that,when an activity
leads to a desired result, as medicine produces health or ship-
building a ship or enquiryknowledge,the end-seekingactivityis not
itselfdesired. As he says (untruly)in the Metaphysics, 'of the actions
which have a limit none is an end'( 0 6, 1048b 18). But an activity
which aims at producing a resultmay be an object eitherof aversion
or of indifferenceor of a positivedesire which may be less or greater
than the desire forits product. It is necessaryto distinguishbetween
'end' in the sense of a resultintended and planned and 'end' in the
sense of a result, or expected result, which, in addition to being
intended and planned, is also desired for itselfwhile the process of
reaching it is not. It is true that travel may be unattractive,but it
may also be more attractivethan arrival. A golferplays to win. But,
if he loses, he does not feelthat his day has been wasted, that he has
laboured in vain, as he would if his only object in playing were to
win a prize or to mortifyhis opponent or just to win. Doing cross-
word puzzles may be a waste of time, but what makes it a waste of
time is not the fact that we rarelyget one out. It would be a greater
waste of time ifwe never failed to finishthem. In short,the fact that
an activityis progressivetowards a planned resultleaves quite open
the question whetherit is the process or the resultwhich is desired,
and, if both, which primarily.If Aristotlehad seen and said this,he
mighthave found it more difficultthan he does to suggestthat the
pleasures of discoveryare not an essential element in science as a
major human interest.Philosophy would be less attractivethan it
is ifonly resultsmattered.God's perfectionrequiresthat his thinking
should be unprogressive.But men,who fallshortofperfectsimplicity,
need, to make them happy, the pleasures of solvingproblems and of
learning somethingnew and of being surprised.For them the best
way of life leads, in the words of Meredith,
'throughwidening chambers of surpriseto where
throbsrapture near an end that aye recedes'.

XVIII
We have seen that Aristotle'sdoctrine of the final human good
needs clarificationin termsof a distinctionbetween an end which is
inclusive, a plan of life,and an end which is dominant as the satis-
faction of theoretical curiositymay be dominant in the life of a
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

philosopher.No manhas onlyone interest. Hence an end whichis to

functionas a target,as a criterion
fordecidingwhattodo and howto
live, mustbe inclusive.But somemen have rulingpassions.Hence
someinclusiveendswill includea dominantend. I shallnow tryto
look morecloselyat theseAristotelian notions,and to suggestsome
estimateoftheirrelevanceand value in moralphilosophy.

XIX
It willbe bestto faceat once and considera naturaland common
criticism ofAristotle;thecriticism thathisvirtuousmanis notmoral
at all buta calculatingegoistwhoseguidingprincipleis notdutybut
prudence,BishopButler's'cool self-love'.Aristotle is in good com-
panyas claimingthatrationality is whatmakesa man ideallygood.
But his consideredview,apartfromincidentalinsights, admits,it is
said, onlytherationality ofprudentself-interest and nottheration-
alityofmoralprinciple.Thus Professor D. J. Allan,in ThePhilosophy
of Aristotle,tellsus thatAristotle'takeslittleor no accountof the
motiveof moral obligation'and that 'self-interest, more or less
enlightened, is assumedto be themotiveofall conductand choice'
(p. 189). Similarlythe late Professor Field, a fairand sympathetic
criticof Aristotle,remarkedthat,whereasmoralityis 'essentially
unselfish', Aristotle'sidea of the finalend or good makesmorality
'ultimately selfish'(Moral Theory, pp. 109, 111).

XX
When a man is describedas selfishwhat is meantprimarilyis
thathe is movedto act, moreoftenand morestronglythan most
men,by desireswhichare selfish.The word'selfish'is also applied
to a dispositionso to plan one's lifeas to givea largerplace thanis
usual or rightto thegratification ofselfishdesires.Butwhatis it fora
desireto be selfish?Professor Broad,in hisessay'Egoismas a theory
of humanmotives'(in EthicsandtheHistory makesan
ofPhilosophy),
importantdistinctionbetweentwo main kindsof 'self-regarding'
desires.Thereare first desireswhichare 'self-confined',whicha man
couldhave evenifhe werealonein theworld,e.g. desiresforcertain
experiences,the desireto preservehis own life,the desireto feel
respectforhimself.Secondlythereare self-regarding desireswhich
nevertheless presupposethata man is not alone in the world,e.g.
desiresto own property, to assertor displayoneself,to inspireaffec-
tion.Broadfurther pointsoutthatdesireswhichare 'other-regarding'
may also be 'self-referential',
e.g. desiresforthe welfareofone'sown
family,friends,school,college,club, nation.
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 PHILOSOPHY

XXI
A man might perhaps be called selfish if his other-regarding
motives were conspicuously and exclusively self-referential, if he
showed no interestin the welfareof anyone with whom he was not
personally connected. But usually 'selfish'refersto the prominence
of self-regardingmotives,and different kindsofselfishnesscorrespond
to different desires.The word,being pejorative,is more
self-regarding
readily applied to the less reputable of the self-regardingdesires.
Thus a man stronglyaddicted to the pursuit of his own pleasures
might be called selfisheven if his other-regardingmotiveswere not
conspicuously weak. A man whose ruling passion was science or
music would not naturally be described as selfishunless to convey
that there was in him a reprehensibleabsence or failure of other-
regardingmotives,as shown, say, by his neglect of his familyor of
his pupils.

XxII
The classificationof desires which I have quoted from Broad
assumes that their nature is correctly represented by what we
ordinarilythinkand say about them. Primafaciesome of our desires
are self-regarding;and, of the other-regardingdesires,some are and
some are not self-referential.But there have been philosopherswho
have questioned or denied the realityof these apparent differences.
One doctrine,psychologicalegoism,assertsin its most extremeform
that the only possible objects of a man's first-orderindependent
desires are experiences, occurrent states of his own consciousness.
Thus my desire to be liked is really a desire to know that I am liked;
and my desire that my childrenshould be happy when I am dead is
really a desire for my presentexpectation that they will be happy.
The obvious criticismof this doctrine is that it is preposterousand
self-defeating:I mustfirstdesire popularityand the happiness of my
childrenifI am to findgratifying my thoughtthat I am popular and
that my children will be happy. To most of us it seems that intro-
supportsthe validity of this dialectic. We can,
spective self-scrutiny
therefore,reject psychological egoism. A fortioriwe can reject
psychologicalhedonismwhich assertsthat the onlyexperienceswhich
can de independentlydesired are pleasures, feelingsof enjoyment.
This furtherdoctrine was stated as follows by the late Professor
Prichard. 'For the enjoymentof somethingwhich we enjoy, e.g. the
enjoyment of seeing a beautiful landscape, is related to the thing
we enjoy, not as a quality but as an effect,being somethingexcited
by the thing we enjoy, so that, if it be said that we desire some
enjoymentfor its own sake, the correct statementmust be that we
desire the experience,e.g. the seeing of some beautifullandscape, for
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

thesakeofthefeelingofenjoyment whichwe thinkit willcause,this

feelingbeing reallywhat we are desiringforits own sake' (Moral
p. 116). Surelymostofus wouldbe inclinedtosaythatwe
Obligation,
can desireforits own sake 'the seeingof some beautifullandscape'
and thatwe do notdetecta distinct'feelingofenjoyment'.

XXIII
Was Aristotlea psychological egoistor a psychological
hedonist?
A crisp answer would have been possibleonly if Aristotlehad
explicitlyformulated thesedoctrinesas I have definedthem.So far
as I can see, he did notdo so evenin hislong,but notalwayslucid,
treatment of friendship in E.N. IX. This beingso, he
and self-love
cannotbe classedas a psychological egoistin respectofhis account
of first-order desires.When Aristotleconfronts thefactofaltruism,
he does not refuseto accept benevolentdesiresat theirface value
(E.N. VIII 2, 1155b31; 3, 1156b9-10; 7, 1159a8-12). Buthe shows
acutenessin detectingself-referentialelementsin benevolence.Thus
he comparesthefeelings ofbenefactorsto beneficiaries
withthoseof
parentsfortheirchildrenand ofartistsfortheircreations.'For that
whichtheyhave treatedwell is theirhandiwork, and thereforethey
love this more than the handiworkdoes its maker' (E.N. IX 7,
1167b31-1168a5).

XXIV
The nearestapproachwhichAristotlemakesto the formulation
of psychologicalhedonismis, perhaps,in the followingpassage in
E.N. II 3. 'There beingthreeobjectsof choiceand threeof avoid-
ance,thenoble,theadvantageous,thepleasant,and theircontraries,
thebase, theinjurious,thepainful,about all ofthesethe good man
tendsto go rightand thebad man to go wrong,and especiallyabout
pleasure;forthisis commonto theanimals,and also it accompanies
all objectsofchoice;foreventhenobleand theadvantageous appear
pleasant'(1104b30-1105a1). But thereare passagesin hisdiscussion
of pleasurein E.N. X whichshow that,even if he had accepted
psychologicalegoism,he would not have accepted psychological
hedonism.'And thereare manythingswe shouldbe keenabouteven
if theybroughtno pleasure,e.g. seeing,remembering, knowing,
possessingthe virtues.If pleasuresnecessarily
do accompanythese,
that makesno odds; we should choose themeven if no pleasure
resulted'(1174a 4-8). This reads like a directrepudiationof the
doctrinein myquotationfromPrichard.In E.N. X 4 he asks,without
answering, thequestionwhetherwe chooseactivity forthesakeofthe
attendantpleasureor viceversa( 175a 18-21).The answerwhichhis
doctrinerequiresis surelythatneitheralternative can be accepted,
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 PHILOSOPHY

since both the activityand the attendantpleasure are desiredfortheir

own sake. But it is open to question whether,when we speak of a
state or activity,such as 'the seeing of some beautiful landscape',
as pleasant, we are referringto a feeling distinctfromthe state or
activityitself.
XXV
The charge against Aristotlethat his moralityis a moralityof self-
interestis directed primarilyagainst his doctrine of the final good,
the doctrinewhich I have interpretedas a conflationof the distinct
notions of the 'inclusive end' and the 'dominant end'. But the critic
may also wish to suggestthat Aristotleoverstatesthe efficacyof self-
regarding desires in the determinationof human conduct. To this
the firstanswer might well be that it is not easy to overstate their
efficacy.The term'self-regarding'applies, as we have seen, to a wide
varietyof motives; and thereis a 'self-referential' factorin the most
potent of the other-regardingmotives. Altruismwhich is pure, not
in any way self-regardingor self-referential, is a rarity. The facts
support the assertionthat man is a selfishanimal. But the criticism
can be met directly.Aristotledoes notignoreother-regarding motives.
Thus, while he points out that the philosopher, unlike those who
exercise practical virtue, does not need other men 'towards whom
and with whom he shall act', he admits that the pleasures of philo-
sophyare enhanced by interestin the workofcolleagues. 'He perhaps
does better if he has fellow-workers,but still he is the most self-
sufficient'(E.N. X 7, 1177a 27-bl). When, in the E.E., Aristotle
speaks of philosophyas the serviceof God, he seems to imply that the
love of wisdom is not directed merely to the lover's own conscious
states (1249b 20). Again, in E.N. IX 8, he can attributeto the 'lover
of self' conduct which is, in the highest degree, altruisticand self-
sacrificing.'For reason always chooses what is best foritself,and the
good man obeys his reason. It is true of the good man too that he
does many acts for the sake of his friendsand his country,and, if
necessary,dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and
honours and in general the goods that are objects of competition,
gaining forhimselfnobility(t) KXA'V) ; since he would prefera short
period of intensepleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment,a twelve-
month of noble life to many years of humdrum existence,and one
great and noble action to many trivialones. Now those who die for
others doubtless attain this result; it is, therefore,a great prize that
they choose for themselves' (1169a 17-26).

XXVI
But it is not enough, if we are to do justice to the criticismthat
Aristotlemakes moralityselfish,to quote thispassage, or the passage
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

in E.N. I 10 whereAristotle speaksoftheshiningbeautyofthevirtue

shownin bearingdisasterswhichimpairhappiness(1lOOb 30-33).
Such passages,it maybe said,showAristotle's moralsensibility
and
moral insight.But the questioncan still be asked whethertheir
commendationof the ultimateself-sacrifice, and of endurancein
suffering, is consistent
withAristotle'sdoctrineof the finalhuman
good. Perhapshe is speakingmoreconsistently withhis own con-
sideredviewswhen,again in E.N. IX 8, he makesthesuggestion (or
is it a joke?) thata man mayshowthefinestself-sacrifice,thetruest
love,bysurrendering to hisfriendtheopportunity
ofvirtuousaction
(1169a 33-4). PerhapsAristotle's commendation ofthesurrender, in
a noblecause,oflifeitselfneedsto be qualified,fromhisown point
ofview,as it was qualifiedby Oscar Wilde:

And yet,and yet

Those Christsthatdie upon thebarricades,
God knowsit I am withthem,in someways.

To thisquestionI now turn.My answermustand can be brief.

XXVII
We have foundtwo main elementsin Aristotle'sdoctrineof the
finalgood forman. Thereis, first, thesuggestion that,as he saysin
E.E. A 2, it is a signof 'greatfolly'not to 'have one's lifeorganised
in view of some end'. Perhapsit would be betterto say thatit is
impossiblenotto liveaccordingto someplan, and thatit is follynot
to tryto maketheplan a goodone. The inevitability ofa plan arises
fromthefactthata man bothhas,and knowsthathe has,a number
of desiresand interestswhich can be adopted as motiveseither
casually and indiscriminately or in accordance with priorities
determinedby the aim of livingthe kind of lifewhichhe thinks
properfor a man like himself.But in an agentnaturallyreflective
theomissionto make such a plan is notcompletely undesigned:the
minimalplan is a plan nottoplan. To thissideofAristotle's doctrine
I have appliedtheterm'inclusiveend', inclusivebecausethereis no
desireor interest whichshouldnotbe regardedas a candidate,how-
everunpromising, fora place in thepatternoflife.Wisdomfindsa
place even forfolly.The secondelementwhichwe have foundin
Aristotle'sdoctrineis hisown answerto thequestionwhatplan will
be followedby a manwhois mostfullya man,as highas a man can
get on thescale frombeastto god. Aristotle's answeris thatsuch a
man willmaketheoretical knowledge, hismostgodlikeattribute, his
main object.At a lowerlevel,as a man amongmen,he willfinda
place forthe happinesswhich comes frombeing a citizen,from
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 PHILOSOPHY

marriageand fromthesocietyofthosewhosharehisinterests. 1 have

called thisthedoctrineofthe dominantend. The questionwhether
Aristotle'sdoctrineof the finalgood can be reconciledwith the
moralityof altruismand self-sacrifice
mustbe askedwithreference
bothto theinclusiveend and to thedominantend.

XXVIII
To say thata man acts,or failsto act,witha viewto an inclusive
end is to saynothingat all aboutthecomparativedegreesofimport-
ance whichhe will ascribeto his variousaims.His devotionto his
own good,in thesenseofhisinclusiveend,need notrequirehimto
prefer self-regarding
desiresto other-regardingdesires,or one kindof
self-regarding desireto another.All desireshave to be considered
impartially as candidatesforplacesin theinclusiveplan. To aim at a
longlifein whichpleasures,so faras possible,are enjoyedand pains
avoidedit is a possibleplan, but not theonlypossibleplan. That a
manseeksan inclusiveend leavesopenthequestionwhetherhe is an
egoistor an altruist,selfishor unselfish
in thepopularsense.'

XXIX
Whilea man seekinghis inclusiveend need not be selfish, he can
be describedas self-centredin at leastthreedifferent ways.Firstand
his desireto followhis inclusiveplan is hisown desire;it is
trivially
self-owned.Secondly,a man can thinkofa plan as beingforhisown
good onlyif he thinksabout himself, thinksof himselfas the one
ownerof manydesires.His second-order desireforhis own good is
self-reflective.
Thirdly, this second-orderdesire, being a desire
about desires,an interestin interests,can be gratifiedonlythrough
of his first-order
the gratification desires.Even the martyrplans to
do what he wantsto do. We can expressthisby sayingthat the
pursuitofthefinalgoodis self-indulging as wellas self-reflective.
But
'self-indulgence' appliedto wayof in whichpleasuresmaybe
as a life
despisedand safety putlastcarriesno pejorativesense.That actionin
pursuitofan inclusiveendis self-centred in thesewaysdoesnotmean
that the agentis self-regarding or self-seekingin any senseincon-
sistentwiththemostheroicor saintlyself-sacrifice.
1I owe thispoint,and lessdirectly muchelse in mydiscussionofthecriticism of
Aristotle's
ethicalsystemas egoistic,to Professor
C. A. Campbell'sBritish
Academy
Lecture(1948), 'Moral Intuitionand thePrincipleofSelf-Realisation'(especially
pp. 17-25). ProfessorCampbell's lecturediscussesthe ethical theoryof T. H.
Green and F. H. Bradley,and I do not know whetherhe would thinkof his
arguments as beingrelevantto theinterpretation ofAristotle.
But I have foundhis
defenceof'self-realisation'
as a moralprinciplehelpfulin myattemptto separate
the strandsofthoughtin Aristotle'sdoctrineofthe finalgood.
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

XXX
To the questionwhetherthe pursuitof the humangood, under-
stoodin termsofAristotle's conceptionofthedominantend,can be
reconciledwith the moralityof altruism,and in particularthe
extremealtruismof the man who giveshis lifeforhis friendsor his
country, a differentanswermustbe given.Here reconciliationis not
possible.In order to see this it is necessaryonly to reflecton
Aristotle'sdefinitionin E.N. I 7 ofthedominantend,whichhe calls
happiness,and to comparethisdefinition withwhat is said about
the self-loveof the man who noblygivesup his own life.'Human
good turnsout to be activityofsoul in accordancewithvirtue,and
if thereare morethanone virtue,in accordancewiththe bestand
most complete.But we must add "in a completelife". For one
swallowdoes notmakea summernordoes one day; and so too one
day or a shorttimedoes notmakea man blessedand happy' (1098a
16-20).How thencan themanwho,to gainnobility
(To KOCXOV) for
himself, giveshislifeforhisfriends or hiscountrybe said to achieve
happiness?Aristotle's answer,as we have seen,is thatsuch a man
prefers'a shortperiod of intensepleasureto a long one of mild
enjoyment, a twelvemonth ofnoblelifeto manyyearsofhumdrum
existence,and one great and noble action to many trivialones'
(1 169a 22-25).But thescalesare beingloaded. For whyshouldit be
supposedthatthemanwhodeclinestolivethefinal,ifcrowded,hour
of gloriouslifewill surviveto gain only 'mild' enjoyments and a
'humdrum'or 'trivial'existence?If suchexistence is,or seems,hum-
drumbecause the 'intensepleasure'ofself-sacrifice has been missed,
then Aristotle'sthoughthere is circularand self-stultifying. The
intensity of the brief it is
encounter, suggested, is such thatby con-
trastthe remainderof life would be humdrum.But, unless the
alternativewould be humdrumin its own right,the encounter
would not be intenseenoughto compensateforthe curtailment of
lifeand happiness.A 'completelife'eitheris, or is not,a necessary
conditionof happiness.Aristotleas a theoristcannotjustifythe
admirationwhich,as a man,he no doubtfeelsforthe'one greatand
noble action'. Confronted with the factshe would have to admit
that the man who, whetherby good fortuneor design,survivesa
revolution or a warmayliveto experience intenseenjoyments and to
performactivitiesin accordancewiththe best and mostcomplete
virtue.He maybecomea professor ofphilosophy or at leasta prime
minister. We mustconclude,therefore, thatProfessor Fieldwasright:
the doctrineof the good forman, as developedby Aristotlein his
account of the dominantend, does make morality'ultimately
selfish'(Moral Theory, pp. 109, 111).

B 293
 PHILOSOPHY

XXXI
Aristotleoffersus in his Ethicsa handbook on how to be happy
though human. To some it may seem that a treatiseon conduct with
an aim so practical and so prudential can do little to clarifythe
concepts with which moral philosophy is mainly concerned, the
concepts of duty and of moral worth. 'He takes littleor no account',
ProfessorAllan tells us, 'of the motive of moral obligation' (The
PhilosophyofAristotle,p. 189). Perhaps not. The topic is too large fora
concluding paragraph. Certainly most men feel moral obligations
which cannot be subsumed under the obligation, if there is one, to
pursue theirown happiness by planning forthe orderlysatisfaction
of theirself-regardingdesires. But 'obligation' and 'duty' are words
with many meanings, meanings variously related to the concept of
moral worth. Perhaps Aristotleis not wrong, as he is not alone, in
connectingthe concept of moral worthwith the fact that man is not
just the plaything of circumstance and his own irrational nature
but also the responsible planner of his own life. This aspect of
Aristotle'steachingis what I have called his doctrineof the 'inclusive
end', and I have argued that there is no necessityforthe doctrine
to be specified and developed as a recommendation of calculated
egoism. Aristotle himself,as we have seen, does not adhere con-
sistentlyto his own exaltation of self-regardingaims. He is, indeed,
always ready to notice factswhich are awkward forhis own theories.
Thus in E.N. I 10 he recognises that the actual achievement of
happiness, virtuous activity,is largely outside a man's control. 'A
multitudeof great eventsiftheyturnout well will make lifehappier
. . .while if they turn out ill they crush and maim happiness; for
they both bringpain with them and hinder many activities' (1 OOb
25-30). He adds that, even when disaster strikes,'nobility shines
through,when a man bears withresignationmany great misfortunes,
not throughinsensibilityto pain but throughnobilityand greatness
of soul' (11OOb 30-33). 'The man who is truly good and wise',
he goes on to say, 'bears all the chances oflifebecominglyand always
makes the best of circumstancesas a good shoemakermakes the best
shoes out of the hides that are given to him' (1 lOOb 35-1lOla 5). The
suggestionof this passage is that a man's worthlies not in his actual
achievement, which may be frustratedby factorsoutside his own
control,but in his strivingtowardsachievement.In an earlierchapter
(5) of E.N. I he speaks of the good as somethingwhich 'we divine to
be proper to a man and not easily taken fromhim' (1095b 25-26).
Aristotle's doctrine of the final good is a doctrine about what is
'proper' to a man, the power to reflecton his own abilitiesand desires
and to conceive and choose for himselfa satisfactoryway of life.
What 'cannot be taken fromhim' is his power to keep on trying
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 THE FINAL GOOD IN ARISTOTLE S ETHICS

to live up to such a conception.Self-respect,

thusinterpreted,
is a
principleof duty.If moralphilosophymustseekonecomprehensive
principleof duty,what otherprinciplehas a strongerclaim to be
regardedas theprincipleofduty?

Christi
Corpus College,
Oxford.

295