Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
ASSOCIATION OF PHIL COCONUT
DESSICATORS v PHIL COCONUT
AUTHORITY
286 SCRA 109
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998
FACTS
- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA
from issuing permits to applicants for the
establishment of new desiccated coconut
processing plants— issuance would violate PCA’s
Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicants
were seeking to operate in congested areas
- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from
ussiung licenses
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993
Resolution No.018-93 providing for the withdrawal
of the PCA from all regulation of coconut product
processing industry; registration would be limited
to the monitoring of their volumes of production
and admin of quality standards
- PCA then issued certificates of registration to
those wishing to operate desiccated coconut
processing plants
ISSUE
WON the PCA can renounce the power to regulate
implicit in the law creating it for that is what the
resolution in question actually is.
HELD
- The power given to the PCA “to formulate and
adopt a general program of dev’t for the coconut
and other palms oil industry” is not a roving
commission to adopt any program deemed
necessary to promote the dev’t of the coconut and
other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in
the context of the regulatory structure.
Reasoning
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30,
1973 to take over the powers and functions of the
Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco
Admin, and the Phil. Coco Research Institute
- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an
independent public corp...charged with carrying
out State’s policy to promote the rapid integrated
dev’t and growth of the coco and other palm oil
industry and to ensure that the coco farmers
become direct participants and beneficiaries
through a regulatory scheme set up by law
- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 gov’t temporarily
prohibited the opening of new coco processing
plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the
existing ones--- because of overproduction in the
industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the
export performance of coco-based products
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87
authorizing establishment and operation of
additional DCN plants because of increased
demand in world market
- The above measures were adopted within the
framework of regulation as established by law “to
promote rapid integrated dev’t and growth of coco
and other palm oil industry and to ensure that the
coco farmers become direct participants and
beneficiaries
- the questioned resolution allows not only
indiscriminate opening of new plants, but the
virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure
- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Code—the role of the
PCA is to “formulate and adopt a general program
of dev’t for the coco and other palm oil industry in
all its aspects”
o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely
monitoring volumes of production and admin.
Of quality standards, PCA in effect abdicates
its role and leaves it almost completely to
market forces how the industry will develop
- Constitution Art.XII
o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands
o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit
monopolies when public interest so requires
o Any change in policy must be made by the
legislative dept of the gov’t. The regulatory
system has been set up by law. It is beyond
the power of an administrative agency to
dismantle it.
Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and
VOID
BLAS OPLE V RUBEN TORRES
G.R. No. 127685
PUNO; JULY 23, 1998
FACTS
- Senator Blas Ople sought to invalidate A.O 308
entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System" on the grounds
that: 1) it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate (bec the establishment of a National ID
system requires a legislative act) 2) the
30
A2010
appropriation of public funds by the president for
the implementation of the AO is an
unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusive right
of congress to appropriate public funds for
expenditure; 3) it impermissibly intrudes on our
citizenry's protected zone of privacy
- Respondents: THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A
JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A
JUDICIAL REVIEW; A.O. NO. 308 WAS ISSUED
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
CONGRESS; THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES; A.O.
NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S
INTEREST IN PRIVACY.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has standing
2. WON petition is ripe for adjudication
3. WON A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative
order but a law and hence, beyond the power of
the President to issue
4. WON A.O No. 308 violates the right to privacy
HELD
1. YES
- As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue
that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the
GSIS, petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
2. YES
- The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at
bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308
as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His
action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
3. YES
- A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties
as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."
-An administrative order is an ordinance issued by
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
the President which relates to specific aspects in
the administrative operation of government. It
must be in harmony with the law and should be for
the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy.
- It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No.
308 merely implements the Administrative Code of
1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System.
Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies - the primacy of
national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc. The said A.O. redefines the
parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry
vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that
separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power
of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals
with a subject that should be covered by law.
-Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that
A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and
creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen
cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people
without the contemplated identification card. No
citizen will refuse to get this identification card for
no one can avoid dealing with government. It is
thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen
will have difficulty exercising his rights and
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and
imposes no duty cannot stand.
-the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits
of administrative legislation and consequently
erodes the plenary power of Congress to make
laws. This is contrary to the established approach
defining the traditional limits of administrative
legislation. As well stated by Fisher: ". . . Many
regulations however, bear directly on the public. It
is here that administrative legislation must be
restricted in its scope and application. Regulations
are not supposed to be a substitute for the general
policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of
a public law. Although administrative regulations
are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source
of power to make laws."
4. YES
-We prescind from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government
to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn.
-A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners
with the facility to conveniently transact business
with basic service and social security providers
and other government instrumentalities and (2)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate,
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable
whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is
not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the
overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger.
- The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Sec 4 which
provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN)
as a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through the
use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer
application designs."
A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics
technology shall be used to identify people who
will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of
options available to the implementors of A.O. No.
308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy
of our people is not groundless.
- The right to privacy is one of the most threatened
rights of man living in a mass society. In the case
at bar, the threat comes from the executive
branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on
the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
services. Given the record-keeping power of the
computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive
the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating
dossier against unsuspecting citizens.
Disposition: the petition is granted and
Administrative Order No. 308 declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.
Separate Opinions:
ROMERO concur
So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as
Administrative Order No. 308 in making inroads
into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big
Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must,
without delay, be "slain upon sight" before our
society turns totalitarian with each of us, a
mindless robot.
31
A2010
VITUG concur
I find it hard to peremptorily assume at this time
that the administrative order will be misused and
to thereby ignore the possible benefits that can be
derived from or the merits of, a nationwide
computerized identification reference system. The
great strides and swift advances in technology
render it inescapable that one day we will, at all
events, have to face up with the reality of seeing
extremely sophisticated methods of personal
identification and any attempt to stop the
inevitable may either be short-lived or even futile.
The imperatives would instead be to now install
specific safeguards and control measures that may
be calculated best to ward-off probable ill effects
of any such device. Here, it may be apropos to
recall the pronouncement of this Court in People
vs. Nazario that -
"As a rule, a statute or [an] act may be said to be
vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men 'of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.' It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure
to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."
Administrative Order No. 308 appears to be so
extensively drawn that could, indeed, allow
unbridled options to become available to its
implementors beyond the reasonable comfort of
the citizens and of residents alike.
The subject covered by the questioned
administrative order can have far-reaching
consequences that can tell on all individuals, their
liberty and privacy, that, to my mind, should make
it indispensable and appropriate to have the
matter specifically addressed by the Congress of
the Philippines, the policy-making body of our
government, to which the task should initially
belong and to which the authority to formulate and
promulgate that policy is constitutionally lodged.
PANGANIBAN concur
I concur only in the result and only on the ground
that an executive issuance is not legally sufficient
to establish an all-encompassing computerized
system of identification in the country. The subject
matter contained in AO 308 is beyond the powers
of the President to regulate without a legislative
enactment.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
I reserve judgment on the issue of whether a
national ID system is an infringement of the
constitutional right to privacy or of the freedom of
thought until after Congress passes, if ever, a law
to this effect. Only then, and upon the filing of a
proper petition, may the provisions of the statute
be scrutinized by the judiciary to determine their
constitutional foundation. Until such time, the
issue is premature; and any decision thereon,
speculative and academic.
KAPUNAN, dissent
There is nothing in the whole breadth and length
of Administrative Order No. 308 that suggests a
taint of constitutional infirmity.
1st ISSUE: was the issuance of A.O No. 308 an
exercise by the President of legislative power
properly belonging to Congress? NO
-The Administrative Code of 1987 has
unequivocally vested the President with quasi-
legislative powers in the form of executive orders,
administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders and circulars and general or
special orders. An administrative order, like the
one under which the new identification system is
embodied, has its peculiar meaning under the
1987 Administrative Code:
SEC. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the
President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operations in pursuance of his
duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
- A.O. No. 308 was promulgated by the President
pursuant to the quasi-legislative powers expressly
granted to him by law and in accordance with his
duty as administrative head. The contention that
the President usurped the legislative prerogatives
of Congress has no firm basis.
-Being the "administrative head," it is
unquestionably the responsibility of the President
to find ways and means to improve the
government bureaucracy, and make it more
professional, efficient and reliable, specially those
government agencies and instrumentalities which
provide basic services and which the citizenry
constantly transact with.
-If we think of the separation of powers as carrying
out the distinction between legislation and
administration with mathematical precision and as
dividing the branches of government into
watertight compartments, we would probably have
to conclude that any exercise of lawmaking
authority by an agency is automatically invalid.
Such a rigorous application of the constitutional
A2010
doctrine is neither desirable nor feasible safeguards (if any) and supply the details on how
this new system is supposed to work. The Court
A mingling of powers among the three branches of should not jump the gun on the Executive.
government is not a novel concept. This blending
of powers has become necessary to properly MENDOZA, dissent
address the complexities brought about by a I cannot find anything in the text of Administrative
rapidly developing society and which the Order No. 308 of the President of the Philippines
traditional branches of government have difficulty that would warrant a declaration that it is violative
coping with. of the right of privacy….
2nd ISSUE: ripeness PHILIPPINE BANK OF
-Basic in constitutional law is the rule that before
COMMUNICATIONS v
the court assumes jurisdiction over and decide
constitutional issues, the ff requisites must first be COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
satisfied: 1) there must be an actual case or REVENUE
controversy involving a conflict of rights 302 SCRA 241
susceptible of judicial determination; 2) the
QUISUMBING; Jan 28, 1999
constitutional question must be raised by a proper
party; 3) the constitutional question must be
Nature:
raised at the earliest opportunity; and
Petition for review
4) the resolution of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the resolution of the case.
Facts:
-In this case, it is evident that the first element is
- Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) filed
missing. Judicial intervention calls for an actual
its quarterly income tax returns for the first and
case or controversy which is defined as "an
second quarters of 1985, reported profits, and paid
existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
the total income tax of P5,016,954.00. The taxes
ripe for determination, not conjectural or
due were settled by applying PBCom's tax credit
anticipatory."
memos and accordingly, the Bureau of Internal
3rd ISSUE: is AO violative of right to privacy
Revenue (BIR) issued Tax Debit Memos.
-There is nothing in A.O. No. 308, as it is worded,
- Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered losses
to suggest that the advanced methods of the
so that when it filed its Annual Income Tax Returns
Biometrics Technology that may pose danger to
for the year-ended Dec 31, 1986, it likewise
the right of privacy will be adopted.
reported a net loss of P14,129,602.00, and thus
-The standards set in A.O. No. 308 for the adoption
declared no tax payable for the year.
of the new system are clear-cut and unequivocably
- But during these two years, PBCom earned rental
spelled out in the "WHEREASES" and body of the
income from leased properties. The lessees
order, namely, the need to provide citizens and
withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding
foreign residents with the facility to conveniently
creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and
transact business with basic service and social
P234,077.69 in 1986.
security providers and other government
- On Aug 7, 1987, petitioner requested the CIR,
instrumentalities; the computerized system is
among others, for a tax credit of P5,016,954.00
intended to properly and efficiently identify
representing the overpayment of taxes in the first
persons seeking basic services or social security
and second quarters of 1985.
and reduce, if not totally eradicate fraudulent
- On July 25, 1988, PBCom filed a claim for refund
transactions and misrepresentation…
of creditable taxes withheld by their lessees from
-Again, the concerns of the majority are premature
property rentals in 1985 for P282,795.50 and in
precisely because there are as yet no guidelines
1986 for P234,077.69.
that will direct the Court and serve as solid basis
- Pending the investigation of the CIR, petitioner
for determining the constitutionality of the new
instituted a Petition for Review on Nov 18, 1988
identification system. The Court cannot and should
before the Court of Tax Appeals.
not anticipate the constitutional issues and rule on
- On May 20, 1993, the CTA denied the request of
the basis of guesswork. The guidelines would,
PBCom for a tax refund or credit of P5,299,749.95,
among others, determine the particular biometrics
on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-
method that would be used and the specific
year reglementary period provided for by law. The
personal data that would be collected, provide the
32
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
petitioner's claim for refund in 1986 amounting to
P234,077.69 was likewise denied on the
assumption that it was automatically credited by
PBCom against its tax payment in the succeeding
year. Petitioner’s MFR was denied.
- PBCom filed a petition for review with the CA,
which affirmed in toto the CTA's resolution.
- Petitioner: its claims for refund and tax credits
are not yet barred by prescription relying on the
applicability of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
7-85 issued on April 1, 1985. The circular states
that overpaid income taxes are not covered by the
two-year prescriptive period under the tax Code
and that taxpayers may claim refund or tax credits
for the excess quarterly income tax with the BIR
within ten years under Art 1144 of the Civil Code.
Citing ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court
of Tax Appeals petitioner claims that rulings or
circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue have no retroactive effect if it
would be prejudicial to taxpayers, as provided by
Sec. 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
- Respondent: the two-year prescriptive period
for filing tax cases in court concerning income tax
payments of Corporations is reckoned from the
date of filing the Final Adjusted Income Tax
Return. CIR also states that since the Final
Adjusted Income Tax Return of the petitioner for
the taxable year 1985 was supposed to be filed on
April 15, 1986, the latter had only until April 15,
1988 to seek relief from the court. When the
petitioner filed the case before the CTA on Nov 18,
1988, the same was filed beyond the time fixed by
law, and such failure is fatal to petitioner's cause
of action.
Issues:
WON CA erred in denying the plea for tax refund or
tax credits on the ground of prescription, despite
petitioner's reliance on RMC No. 7-85, changing
the prescriptive period of two years to ten years
Held:
NO
- Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1977 (now Sec. 229, NIRC of 1997)
provides for the prescriptive period for filing a
court proceeding for the recovery of tax
erroneously or illegally collected. The rule states
that the taxpayer may file a claim for refund or
credit with the CIR, within two years after payment
of tax, before any suit in CTA is commenced. The
two-year prescriptive period provided should be
computed from the time of filing the Adjustment
Return and final payment of the tax for the year.
- When the Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue issued RMC 7-85, changing the
prescriptive period of two years to ten years on
claims of excess quarterly income tax payments,
such circular created a clear inconsistency with the
provision of Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC. In so doing,
the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it
legislated guidelines contrary to the statute
passed by Congress.
- Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered
administrative rulings (in the sense of more
specific and less general interpretations of tax
laws) which are issued from time to time by the
CIR. The interpretation placed upon a statute by
the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it,
is entitled to great respect by the courts.
Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive
and will be ignored if judicially found to be
erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance
administrative issuances that override, instead of
remaining consistent and in harmony with the law
they seek to apply and implement.
- In the case of People vs. Lim, it was held that
rules and regulations issued by administrative
officials to implement a law cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the latter.
- The State cannot be put in estoppel by the
mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. The
nullification of RMC No. 7-85 issued by the Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is an
administrative interpretation which is not in
harmony with Sec. 230 of 1977 NIRC for being
contrary to the express provision of a statute.
Hence, his interpretation could not be given weight
for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute.
- Art. 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial
decisions, applying or interpreting statutes as part
of the legal system of the country. But
administrative decisions do not enjoy that level of
recognition. A memorandum-circular of a bureau
head could not operate to vest a taxpayer with
shield against judicial action. For there are no
vested rights to speak of respecting a wrong
construction of the law by the administrative
officials and such wrong interpretation could not
place the Government in estoppel to correct or
overrule the same.
Disposition Petition is DENIED. The decision of CA
is AFFIRMED.
33
A2010
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENT
MUTUAL FUND
MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT AND
DEVT CORP v PARKWAY REAL
ESTATE DEVT CORP
442 SCRA 572
YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 13,
2004
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- The subject of the controversy is Unit #702 of
Heart Tower Condominium located along Valero
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. Said unit was
originally sold by Segovia Development
Corporation (Segovia) to Masahiko Morishita, who
in turn sold and assigned all his rights thereto in
favor of Parkway Real Estate Development
Corporation (Parkway)
- Sometime in April 1990, Parkway and petitioner
Maxima Realty Management and Development
Corporation (Maxima) entered into an agreement
to buy and sell, on installment basis, Unit #702 in
consideration of the amount of 3 Million Pesos. It
was further agreed that failure to pay any of the
installments on their due dates shall entitle
Parkway to forfeit the amounts paid by way of
liquidated damages.
- Maxima defaulted in the payment of the
installments due but was granted several grace
periods until it has paid a total of P1,180,000.00,
leaving a balance of P1,820,000.00.
- Meanwhile on May 10, 1990, Parkway, with the
consent of Segovia, executed a Deed of
Assignment transferring all its rights in the
condominium unit in favor of Maxima. This Deed
was intended to enable Maxima to obtain title in its
name and use the same as security for
P1,820,000.00 loan with RCBC, which amount will
be used by Maxima to pay its obligation to
Parkway. On the other hand, Segovia and Maxima
agreed to transfer title to the condominium unit
directly in Maxima’s name subject to the condition
that the latter shall pay Segovia the amount of
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
P58,114.00, representing transfer fee, utility
expenses, association dues and miscellaneous
charges.
- RCBC informed Parkway of the approval of
Maxima’s P1.82M loan subject to the submission
of, among others, the Condominium Certificate of
Title transferred in the name of Maxima and the
Certificate of Completion and turn over of unit.
- Maxima, however, failed to pay Segovia the
amount of P58,114.00 for fees and charges. Thus,
Segovia did not transfer the title of the
condominium unit to Maxima. Since Parkway was
not paid the balance of P1.82M, it cancelled its
agreement to buy and sell and Deed of
Assignment in favor of Maxima.
- Maxima filed with the Office of Appeals,
Adjudication and Legal Affairs of the HLURB, a
complaint for specific performance to enforce the
agreement to buy and sell Unit #702.
- HLURB Arbiter sustained the nullification of the
Deed of Assignment and ordered Parkway to
refund to Maxima the amount of P1,180,000.00.
Segovia was further ordered to issue the
condominium certificate of title over Unit #702 in
favor of Parkway upon payment by the latter of the
registration fees.
- Both Maxima and Parkway appealed to the Board
of Commissioners of the HLURB. During the
pendency of the appeal, Maxima offered to pay the
balance of P1.82M, which was accepted by
Parkway. The Board then ordered Maxima to
deliver said amount in the form of manager’s
check to Parkway; and directed Segovia to transfer
title over the property to Maxima. The latter,
however, failed to make good its offer, which
compelled Parkway to file a Manifestation that the
appeal be resolved.
- the Board rendered judgment modifying the
decision of the HLURB Arbiter by forfeiting in favor
of Parkway 50% of the total amount paid by
Maxima and ordering Segovia to pay Parkway the
amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
- Maxima appealed to the Office of the President
which dismissed the appeal for having been filed
out of time.
- Maxima filed a petition for review with the CA.
- CA affirmed the Decision of the Office of the
President.
ISSUE
WON petitioner’s appeal before the Office of the
President was filed within the reglementary period.
HELD
NO.
- In SGMC Realty Corporation v. Office of the
President it was settled that the period within
which to appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the
President is 15 days from receipt of the assailed
decision, pursuant to Section 1521 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer’s Protection Decree) and Section 222 of
Presidential Decree No. 1344.
- We find petitioner’s contention bereft of merit,
because of its reliance on a literal reading of cited
rules without correlating them to current laws as
well as presidential decrees on the matter.
Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure
provides as follows:
Section 27. Appeal to the Office of the President.-
Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the
other party, appeal the decision of the Board of
Commissioners or its division to the Office of the
President within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof pursuant to and in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 18, of the Office of the
President dated February 12, 1987. Decision of the
President shall be final subject only to review by
the Supreme Court on certiorari or on questions of
law.
On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 18,
series of 1987, issued by public respondent reads:
Section 1. Unless otherwise governed by special
laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall
be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order
complained of or appealed from.
As pointed out by public respondent, the
aforecited administrative order allows the
aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of
the President within thirty (30) days from receipt
of the decision complained of. Nonetheless, such
thirty-day period is subject to the qualification that
there are no other statutory periods of appeal
applicable. If there are special laws governing
particular cases which provide for a shorter or
longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail
over the thirty-day period provided for in the
administrative order. This is in line with the
rule in statutory construction that an
administrative rule or regulation, in order to
be valid, must not contradict but conform to
the provisions of the enabling law.
- there are special laws that mandate a shorter
period of fifteen days within which to appeal a
case to public respondent. First, Section 15 of PD
957 provides that the decisions of the National
34
A2010
Housing Authority shall become final and
executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the
date of receipt of the decision. Second, Section 2
of PD 1344 states that decisions of the NHA shall
become final and executory after the lapse of
fifteen days from the date of its receipt. The latter
decree provides that the decisions of NHA are
appealable only to the Office of the President.
Further, we note that the regulatory functions of
NHA relating to housing and land development has
been transferred to Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission, now known as HLURB.
Thus, said presidential issuances providing for a
reglementary period of appeal of fifteen days
apply in this case.
- Accordingly, the period of appeal of thirty days
set forth in Section 27 of HLURB 1994 Rules of
Procedure no longer holds true for being in conflict
with the provisions of aforesaid presidential
decrees. For it is axiomatic that administrative
rules derive their validity from the statute
that they are intended to implement. Any
rule which is not consistent with the statute
itself is null and void.
- In this case, petitioner received a copy of the
decision of HLURB on October 23, 1995.
Considering that the reglementary period to
appeal is fifteen days, petitioner has only until
November 7, 1995, to file its appeal.
Unfortunately, petitioner filed its appeal 28 days
from receipt of the appealed decision, which is
obviously filed out of time.
- In the case at bar, Maxima had until May 4, 1994
to appeal to the Office of the President. The appeal
which was filed on May 10, 1994 was clearly
beyond the reglementary period.
Disposition WHEREFORE the Decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.
2. Publication and affectivity
PEOPLE v QUE PO LAY
94 Phil. 640
MONTEMAYOR; March 29, 1954
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI finding Que
guilty of violating CB Circular No. 20 in connection
with section 34 of RA 265, and sentencing him to
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
FACTS
- The charge was that the appellant who was in
possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S.
dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders
amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same
to the Central Bank through its agents within one
day following the receipt of such foreign exchange
as required by Circular No. 20.
- The appeal is based on the claim that said
circular No. 20 was not published in the Official
Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the
appellant, and that consequently, said circular had
no force and effect. It is contended that
Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both
require said circular to be published in the Official
Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
applicability. The Solicitor General answering this
contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638
and 2930 do not require the publication in the
Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
implementation of a law in order to have force and
effect.
ISSUE
WON the laws were effective despite lack of
publication.
HELD
- NO.
The laws in question do not require the publication
of the circulars, regulations or notices therein
mentioned in order to become binding and
effective. All that said two laws provide is that
laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals, notices and documents
required by law to be of no force and effect. In
other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and
make a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of
the different branches of the Government issuing
same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
- However, section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides that statutes passed
by Congress shall, in the absence of special
provision, take effect at the beginning of the
fifteenth day after the completion of the
publication of the statute in the Official Gazette.
- Article 2 of the new Civil Code also provides that
laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true
that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a
statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance,
it has the force and effect of law according to
settled jurisprudence.
- Circulars and regulations especially like the
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question
which prescribes a penalty for its violation should
be published before becoming effective, this, on
the general principle and theory that before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first
be published and the people officially and
especifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.
- although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was
issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after
appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear
that said Circular, particularly its penal provision,
did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazette or after
November 1951. In other words, appellant could
not be held liable for its violation, for it was not
binding at the time he was found to have failed to
sell the foreign exchange in his possession within
one day following his taking possession thereof.
Disposition decision appealed from is reversed,
appellant acquitted
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS v SSS
17 SCRA 1077
BARRERA, J.: (1966)
FACTS
- The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., a
domestic corporation, since the start of its
operations in 1957, has been employing Japanese
technicians under a pre-arranged contract of
employment, the minimum period of which
employment is 6 months and the maximum is 24
months.
- On October 7, 1958, the Assistant General
Manager of the corporation, on its behalf and as
attorney-in-fact of the Japanese technicians, filed a
claim with the SSS for the refund of the premiums
paid to the System, on the ground of termination
of the members' employment.
- As this claim was denied, they filed a petition
with the Social Security Commission for the return
or refund of the premiums, in the total sum of
35
A2010
P2,520.00, paid by the employer corporation and
the 6 Japanese employees, plus attorney's fees.
- This claim was controverted by the SSS, alleging
that Rule IX of the Rules and Regulations of the
System, as amended, requires membership in the
System for at least 2 years before a separated or
resigned employee may be allowed a return of his
personal contributions. Under the same rule, the
employer is not also entitled to a refund of the
premium- contributions it had paid.
- After hearing, the Commission denied the
petition for the reason that, although under the
original provisions of Section 3 (d) of Rule I of the
Rules and Regulations of the SSS, alien-employees
(who are employed temporarily) and their
employers are entitled to a rebate of a
proportionate amount of their respective
contributions upon the employees' departure from
the Philippines, said rule was amended by
eliminating that portion granting a return of the
premium- contributions. This amendment became
effective on January 14, 1958, or before the
employment of the subject-aliens terminated. The
rights of covered employees who are separated
from employment, under the present Rules, are
covered by Rule IX which allows a return of the
premiums only if they have been members for at
least 2 years.
- The petitioners raise the issue that the amending
rule violates the non-impairment of contracts
clause. They also note that the amending rule was
not published in the Official Gazette until
November 1958. Since they were employed on
October 1958, it follows that they were not yet
covered by the new rule. The Commission on the
other hand noted that its rules are effective upon
approval of the President in January 1958.
ISSUE
WON the Commission erred in applying the
amended rules to the Japanese employees
HELD
NO.
RATIO. Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the
date of publication of laws in the Official
Gazette is material for the purpose of
determining their effectivity, only if the
statutes themselves do not so provide.
[CAVEAT: THIS RATIO IS OBSOLETE, TANADA VS.
TUVERA IS THE CONTROLLING DOCTRINE]
REASONING In the present case, the original
Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically
provide that any amendment thereto subsequently
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on
the date of its approval by the President.
Consequently, the delayed publication of the
amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect
the date of their effectivity, which is January 14,
1958, when they were approved by the President.
It follows that when the Japanese technicians were
separated from employment in October, 1958, the
rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of the
amended Rules and Regulations, which requires
membership for 2 years before such refund of
premiums may be allowed.
Disposition affirmed
TANADA v TUVERA
146 SCRA 446
ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985
Nature
Petition for Mandamus
Facts
- Invoking the people's right to be informed on
matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus
to compel respondent public officials to publish.
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
- Respondents contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the
Civil Code:
"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, x x
x Hong Kong-bound workers:
Issue
WON publication is a condition sine qua non for the
effectivity of laws
A2010
Held ready access to the legislative records - no such
Yes. publicity accompanies the law-making process of
Presidential issuances of general application, the President. Thus, without publication, the
which have not been published, shall have no force people have no means of knowing what
and effect . presidential decrees have actually been
- Considered in the light of other statutes promulgated, much less a definite way of
informing themselves of the specific contents and
applicable to the issue at hand, the
texts of such decrees.
conclusion is easily reached that Article 2
- It is needless to add that the publication of
does not preclude the requirement of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if
general applicability" is a requirement of due
the law itself provides for the date of its
process. It is a rule of law that before a person
effectivity. Sec of CA 638 provides:
may be bound by law, he must first be officially
Section 1. There shall be published in the
and specifically informed of its contents.
Official Gazette [1] all important legislative
Disposition Court ordered respondents to publish
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive
issuances which are of general application, and
and administrative orders and proclamations,
unless so published, they shall have no binding
except such as have no general applicability,
force and effect.
(3) decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as
may be deemed by said courts of sufficient
importance to be so published, [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law, and [5]
such documents or classes of documents as
the President of the Philippines shall
determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF
authorize so to be published. SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. v TORRES
- The word "shall" used therein imposes upon 212 SCRA 298
respondent officials an imperative duty. That
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.; August 6, 1992
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right
of the people to be informed on matters of
Nature
public concern is to be given substance and
Petition for prohibition with temporary restraining
reality.
order
- The clear object of the quoted provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the
Facts:
various laws which are to regulate their actions
- On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
publication, there would be no basis for the
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
suspending the recruitment by private
transgression of a law which he had no notice
employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers
whatsoever not even a constructive one.
going to Hong Kong". The DOLE itself, through the
- Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the
POEA took over the business of deploying such
Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance than at this time when
In view of the need to establish mechanisms
the people have bestowed upon the President a
that will enhance the protection for Filipino
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong, the
While the people are kept abreast by the mass
recruitment of the same by private
media of the debates and deliberations in the
employment agencies is hereby temporarily
Batasan Pambansa - and for the diligent ones,
suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such,
36
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
the DOLE through the facilities of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration shall take over the
processing and deployment of household
workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to
guidelines to be issued for said purpose.
- Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA
issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of
1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government
processing and deployment of Filipino domestic
helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of
Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire
Filipino domestic helpers. On August 1, 1991, the
POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum
Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing
of employment contracts of domestic workers for
Hong Kong.
- On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed
this petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to
prohibit their implementation for the following
reasons:
1. that the respondents acted with grave
abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars
are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. that the requirements of publication and
filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied
with.
Issue
WON the assailed Department Order and circulars
issued by both DOLE and POEA are legally valid
Held
NO.
- Although Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the
Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities and the
questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise
of the police power as delegated to the executive
branch of Government, nevertheless, they are
legally invalid, defective and unenforceable
for lack of power publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative
Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and
Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of
the Administrative Code of 1987 which
provide:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
(15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it
is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. -- The
Department of Labor and other government
agencies charged with the administration
and enforcement of this Code or any of its
parts shall promulgate the necessary
implementing rules and regulations. Such
rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of
their adoption in newspapers of general
circulation.
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file
with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date
of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months shall not thereafter
be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons. (Emphasis supplied,
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-
making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing as above provided unless a
different date is fixed by law, or specified in
the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the
existence of which must be expressed in a
statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to
make emergency rules known to persons
who may be affected by them. (Emphasis
supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987).
- As held in Tañada vs. Tuvera:
. . . Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant
also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties. (p. 448.)
We agree that publication must be in full or
37
A2010
it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the content of the
laws. (p. 448.)
Disposition For lack of proper publication, the
administrative circulars in question may not be
enforced and implemented.
DE JESUS V COA (JAMORALIN)
294 SCRA 152
PURISIMA; August 12, 1998
NATURE
Special civil action of certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioners are employees of the Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1, 1989, RA
6758 (prescribing a revised compensation and
position classification system in the government)
took effect. The said act provides, among others,
for the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation into standardized salary rates.
- to implement the law, the Dept. of Budget and
Management (DBM) issued a circular,
discontinuing without qualification effective Nov.1,
1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted
on top of basic salary. Pursuant to the law and
circular, corporate auditor Jamoralin disallowed on
post audit the payment of honoraria to the
petitioners
- petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the
validity and effectivity of the circular on 2 grounds:
that the circular is inconsistent with the provisions
of RA 6758, the very law it seeks to implement;
and that it is without force and effect because it
was not published in the Official Gazette. COA
upheld the validity of the circular. Hence, this
petition
ISSUE
WON the circular has legal force and effect despite
the absence of publication
HELD
NO
Ratio The Civil Code provides: “Art. 2. Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. xxx”
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
Reasoning In Tanada v Tavera, the court
construed the above provision:
“…all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed…
“Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders xxx. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to
a valid delegation.
“Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.”
- the challenged circular in this case needs to be
published. Following the doctrine, publication in
the OG or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines is required since the circular is in
the nature of an administrative circular the
purpose of which is to enforce or implement an
existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and
enforceable, the circular must go through the
requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
- “the circular, which completely disallows
payment of allowances and other additional
compensation to government officials and
employees, is not a mere interpretative or internal
regulation. It tends to deprive government
workers of their allowances and additional
compensation sorely needed to keep body and
soul together. At the very least, before the said
circular may be permitted to substantially reduce
their income, the people concerned should be
apprised and alerted by the publication of the
circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation – to the end that they be given
amplest opportunity to voice out whatever
opposition they may have, and to ventilate their
stance on the matter. This approach is more in
keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments
of fairness and transparency.
Disposition Petition is granted.
REPUBLIC (NTC) V EXPRESS
TELECOM
G.R. No. 147096, G.R. No. 147210
YNARES-SANTIAGO ; Jan 15, 2002
NATURE
Instant petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- December 29, 1992 > International
Communications Corp (now Bayantel) filed an
application with NTC a Certificate of Public
Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to install,
operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile
Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for
a Provisional Authority (PA)
- January 22, 1993 > NTC issued Memorandum
Circular No. 4-1-93 directing all interested
applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file
their applications before NTC on or before
February 15, 1993, and deferring the acceptance
of any application filed after said date until further
orders
- May 6, 1993 > prior to the issuance of any notice
of hearing by NTC wrt Bayantel's original
application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to admit an amended application.
- May 17, 1993 > notice of hearing issued by NTC
wrt this amended application was published in the
Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application and
notice of hearing were mailed to all affected
parties. Hearings were conducted on the amended
application.
- December 19, 1993 > before Bayantel could
complete the presentation of its evidence, NTC
issued an Order: In view of the recent grant of two
(2) separate Provisional Authorities in favor of
ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the
closing out of all available frequencies for the
service being applied for by herein applicant, and
in order that this case may not remain pending for
an indefinite period of time, AS PRAYED FOR, let
this case be, as it is, hereby ordered ARCHIVED
without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when
the requisite frequency becomes available.
- March 23, 1999 > Memorandum Circular No. 3-3-
99 was issued by NTC re-allocating an additional
five (5) MHz frequencies for CMTS service
- May 17, 1999 > Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion
to Revive Case, citing the availability of new
frequency bands for CMTS operators
- February 1, 2000 > NTC granted Bayantel's
motion to revive the latter's application NTC noted
38
A2010
that the application was ordered archived without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the
requisite frequency shall become available.
- Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom)
filed in NTC an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss)
praying for the dismissal of Bayantel's application
arguing that: Bayantel’s application is outdated
and should no longer be used as basis for the
necessity for the proposed CMTS service and there
is no public need for new CMTS operator as
existing operators - Extelcom, Globe, Smart, Piltel,
and Islacom- more than adequately addressed the
market demand
- March 13, 2000 > Bayantel filed a Consolidated
Reply/Comment, stating that Extelcom cannot
claim that frequencies were not available
inasmuch as the allocation and assignment rest
solely on the discretion of the NTC
- May 3, 2000 > NTC issued an Order granting in
favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate
CMTS service and denying the Motions for
Reconsideration by SMARTCOM and GLOBE
TELECOMS/ISLACOM and the Motion to Dismiss
filed by EXTELCOM for lack of merit. The grant of
the provisional authority was anchored on
ensuring effective competition in the CMTS market
considering the operational merger of (Smart-Piltel
and Globe-Inslacom), new CMTS operators must be
allowed to provide the service, the need to provide
service to some or all of the remaining cities and
municipalities without telephone service and
documents in compliance with the technical
requirements
- In granting Bayantel the provisional authority to
operate a CMTS, NTC applied Rule 15, Section 3 of
its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which
provides:
Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. --- Upon the filing of an
application, complaint or petition or at any stage
thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of
the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief
prayed for, based on the pleading, together with
the affidavits and supporting documents
attached thereto, without prejudice to a final
decision after completion of the hearing which
shall be called within thirty (30) days from grant
of authority asked for. (underscoring ours)
- Extelcom contends that NTC should have applied
the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office
of the National Administrative Register on
February 3, 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the
phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a
provisional authority may be issued only upon
filing of the proper motion before the Commission.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- CA: Extelcom filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking the annulment of the Order
reviving the application of Bayantel and the Order
granting Bayantel a provisional authority to
construct, install, operate and maintain a
nationwide CMTS
- September 13, 2000 > CA granted the writs of
certiorari and prohibition
- MFRs filed by Bayantel and NTC but were denied
for lack of merit
ISSUES
1. WON 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure will
still govern because there was a deficiency in the
publication of the 1993 Revised Rules
2. WON NTC’s rulings can be touched upon by the
courts
HELD
1. YES
- NTC, through the Secretary of the Commission,
issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch
as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been
published in a newspaper of general circulation,
the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.
- The absence of publication, coupled with the
certification by the Commissioner of the NTC
stating that the NTC was still governed by the
1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised
Rules have not taken effect at the time of the
grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The
fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with
the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no
moment. There is nothing in the Administrative
Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the
rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act
that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII,
Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states:
Filing. --- (1) Every agency shall file with the
University of the Philippines Law Center three
(3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it.
Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months
from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of
any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his
equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain or
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be
kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to
public inspection.
- The National Administrative Register is merely a
bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to
the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate
courts, the National Library, other public offices or
agencies as the Congress may select, and to other
persons at a price sufficient to cover publication
and mailing or distribution costs.
- Tañada vs. Tuvera stated, thus: "We hold
therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity is fixed by the legislature. Covered by
this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative power or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. We agree that the publication must be in
full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws."
- Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation is a condition
sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations
can take effect. This is explicit from Executive
Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2 of the Civil
Code, and which states that: Laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
- The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC,
which implements Section 29 of the Public Service
Act (C.A. 146), fall squarely within the scope of
these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case
Tañada v. Tuvera. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation. The only exceptions are
interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
39
A2010
- Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation before it
can take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules
itself mandates that said Rules shall take
effect only after their publication in a
newspaper of general circulation. In the
absence of such publication, therefore, it is
the 1978 Rules that governs.
- In any event, regardless of whether the 1978
Rules or the 1993 Revised Rules should apply, the
records show that the amended application filed
by Bayantel in fact included a motion for the
issuance of a provisional authority. Hence, it
cannot be said that the NTC granted the
provisional authority motu proprio. The Court of
Appeals, therefore, erred when it found that the
NTC issued its Order of May 3, 2000 on its own
initiative.
2. NO
Ratio This Court has consistently held that the
courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of the
government agency entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special and
technical training and knowledge of such agency.
It has also been held that the exercise of
administrative discretion is a policy decision and a
matter that can best be discharged by the
government agency concerned, and not by the
courts. Administrative agencies are given a wide
latitude in the evaluation of evidence and in the
exercise of its adjudicative functions. This latitude
includes the authority to take judicial notice of
facts within its special competence.
Disposition Consolidated petitions are GRANTED
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS v ERC
G.R. No 163935
Callejo, Sr., J; February 2, 2006
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
FACTS
- Meralco filed an application with the ERC to
increase its generation charge from P3.1886 per
kWh to P3.4664 per kWh which was approved by
the latter on June 2, 2004. Petitioners filed the
action
- NASECORE, et al. forthwith filed with this Court
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
the present petition for certiorari seeking to nullify
the said June 2, 2004 ERC Order for lack of
requisite publication of respondent MERALCO’s
amended application, thereby depriving the
petitioners of procedural due process. In addition,
they invoke Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
which provides for publication of the same in a
newspaper of general circulation. Hence they
allege that said failure to comply with the
publication requirement renders the assailed order
null and void.
- Respondent MERALCO, for its part, urges the
Court to uphold the validity of the assailed ERC
Order approving the increase of its generation
charge. In essence, it contends that its amended
application for the increase of its generation
charge is excluded and/or exempted from the
application of the publication requirement, among
others, in Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA.
The applicable rules are the GRAM Implementing
Rules embodied in the ERC Order dated February
24, 2003. These rules govern any petition for the
recovery of fuel and purchased power costs. (The
subject is the additional cost being billed by
Meralco to its customers to recover any increase in
the cost of power it purchases from its electricity
suppliers over a base rate. This is in effect a cost
recovery mechanism since Meralco is just granted
the ability to recover additional costs that its
suppliers charge Meralco due to increase in fuel
cost and such. To arrive at the additional cost to
be charged, a formula was developed and
discussed thoroughly in public hearing held for the
purpose. The same formula was published in two
newspapers of general circulation. Thereafter, this
formula was used in computing the increase in the
charges that Meralco can charge without the need
of going through the publication, public hearing
route as the method of computation has been
clearly established. It became merely
mathematical at that point. However, with the
EPIRA the ERC replaced the ERB and hence new
terminologies and methods had to be established.
The old cost recovery mechanism was replaced by
a new formula which also went through the
process of public hearing. Hence, Meralco opined
that since this new mechanism was essentially the
same as the old one under the ERB, there was no
need for it to go through the process every time
they increase the rates to recover pure costs.)
ISSUE/S
WON ERC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the increase
HELD
Yes.
Contrary to the stance taken by the respondents,
the amended application of respondent MERALCO
for the increase of its generation charge is covered
by Section 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR of the EPIRA. For
clarity, the said provision is quoted anew:
(e) Any application or petition for rate
adjustment or for any relief affecting the
consumers must be verified, and
accompanied with an acknowledgement of
receipt of a copy thereof by the LGU
Legislative Body of the locality where the
applicant or petitioner principally operates
together with the certification of the notice
of publication thereof in a newspaper of
general circulation in the same locality.
The ERC may grant provisionally or
deny the relief prayed for not later than
seventy-five (75) calendar days from the
filing of the application or petition, based on
the same and the supporting documents
attached thereto and such comments or
pleadings the consumers or the LGU
concerned may have filed within thirty (30)
calendar days from receipt of a copy of the
application or petition or from the
publication thereof as the case may be.
Thereafter, the ERC shall conduct a
formal hearing on the application or
petition, giving proper notices to all parties
concerned, with at least one public hearing
in the affected locality, and shall decide the
matter on the merits not later than twelve
(12) months from the issuance of the
aforementioned provisional order.
This Section 4(e) shall not apply to
those applications or petitions already filed
as of 26 December 2001 in compliance with
Section 36 of the Act.
- There is another compelling reason why reliance
by respondent MERALCO and the ERC on the
GRAM Implementing Rules is unavailing. To recall,
they advance the view that the June 2, 2004 ERC
Order is valid, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent MERALCO’s amended application was
not published in a newspaper of general
circulation, because the same was issued in
accordance with the GRAM Implementing Rules
which does not require such publication.
- It does not appear from the records, however,
40
A2010
that the GRAM Implementing Rules, as set forth in
the ERC Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC
Case No. 2003-44, has been published in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation.
- Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Article 2
of the Civil Code, provides that “laws shall take
after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines,
unless it is otherwise provided.”
- The basic requirement of publications of statutes
was explained in Tañada v. Tuvera as follows:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential
decrees and executive orders promulgated
by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature, or at
present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
- A careful review of the procedural steps
undertaken by the ERC leading to its issuance of
the Order dated February 24, 2003 in ERC Case
No. 2003-44, which set forth the GRAM
Implementing Rules, as well as the Order dated
June 2, 2004 in ERC Case No. 2004-112, which
approved the increase of respondent MERALCO’s
generation charge purportedly in accordance with
the GRAM Implementing Rules, shows that there
was no publication of the same in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Disposition Petition is granted.
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
- The appeal is based on the claim that said
circular No. 20 was not published in the Official
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the
appellant, and that consequently, said circular had
BOOK VII no force and effect. It is contended that
CHAPTER 2 Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both
RULES AND REGULATIONS require said circular to be published in the Official
Section 3. Filing. - Gazette, it being an order or notice of general
(1) Every agency shall file with the applicability. The Solicitor General answering this
University of the Philippines Law contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638
Center three (3) certified copies of and 2930 do not require the publication in the
Official Gazette of said circular issued for the
every rule adopted by it. Rules in
implementation of a law in order to have force and
force on the date of effectivity of this effect.
Code which are not filed within three
(3) months from that date shall not ISSUE
thereafter be the basis of any WON the laws were effective despite lack of
sanction against any party or publication.
persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, HELD
- NO.
or his equivalent functionary, shall
The laws in question do not require the publication
carry out the requirements of this of the circulars, regulations or notices therein
section under pain of disciplinary mentioned in order to become binding and
action. effective. All that said two laws provide is that
(3) A permanent register of all rules laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court
shall be kept by the issuing agency and Court of Appeals, notices and documents
and shall be open to public required by law to be of no force and effect. In
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -
inspection. other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and
(1) The
Section 4. University
Effectivity. of- the Philippines
In addition to 3. Penal Regulations make a list of what should be published in the
Law Center requirements
may omit from the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of
other rule-making provided the different branches of the Government issuing
bulletin
by law not or the codification
inconsistent any rule
with this Book,if PEOPLE v QUE PO LAY same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
its publication would be
each rule shall become effective fifteen unduly 94 Phil. 640 - However, section 11 of the Revised
(15)cumbersome,
days from theexpensive or otherwise
date of filing as above MONTEMAYOR; March 29, 1954 Administrative Code provides that statutes passed
inexpedient,
provided unless abut copies date
different of that rule
is fixed by Congress shall, in the absence of special
by law, or specified in the rule in cases on
shall be made available of NATURE provision, take effect at the beginning of the
application
imminent dangertoto public
the agency which
health, safety Appeal from the decision of the CFI finding Que fifteenth day after the completion of the
guilty of violating CB Circular No. 20 in connection publication of the statute in the Official Gazette.
and adopted it, existence
welfare, the and the of bulletin shall
which must - Article 2 of the new Civil Code also provides that
with section 34 of RA 265, and sentencing him to
be contain a noticeinstating
expressed a the general
statement suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
subject matter
accompanying of the
the rule. The omitted rule
agency shall P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of the completion of their publication in the Official
and new copies thereof
take appropriate measures to make may be insolvency, and to pay the costs. Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true
obtained. that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a
(2) Every rule establishing an offense FACTS statute or law but being issued for the
or defining an act which, pursuant to - The charge was that the appellant who was in implementation of the law authorizing its issuance,
law, is punishable as a crime or possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S. it has the force and effect of law according to
subject to a penalty shall in all cases dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders settled jurisprudence.
be published in full text. amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same - Circulars and regulations especially like the
to the Central Bank through its agents within one Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and which prescribes a penalty for its violation should
day following the receipt of such foreign exchange
Codified Rules. - The University of the as required by Circular No. 20. be published before becoming effective, this, on
Philippines Law Center shall furnish one the general principle and theory that before the
(1) free copy each of every issue of the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
bulletin and of the codified rules or
supplements to the Office of the 41
President, Congress, all appellate courts
and the National Library. The bulletin and
the codified rules shall be made available
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first
be published and the people officially and
especifically informed of said contents and its
penalties.
- although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was
issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after
appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear
that said Circular, particularly its penal provision,
did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazette or after
November 1951. In other words, appellant could
not be held liable for its violation, for it was not
binding at the time he was found to have failed to
sell the foreign exchange in his possession within
one day following his taking possession thereof.
Disposition decision appealed from is reversed,
appellant acquitted
PEOPLE v MACEREN
4. Interpretative Rules
HILADO V CIR
100 Phil 288
BAUTISTA ANGELO; October 31,
1956
NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the
CTA
FACTS
- March Emilio Hilado filed his income tax return
for 1951 with the treasurer of Bacolod City claimed
a deductible item of P12,873 from his gross
income pursuant to General Circular V-123 issued
by the CIR. The Secretary of Finance, through the
Collector, issued GC V- 139 which revoked and
declared void Circular V-123; and laid down rules
that the losses of property which occurred in WWII
from fires, storms, shipwrecks or other casualty, or
from robbery, theft or embezzlement are
deductible in the year of the actual loss or
destruction of said property. The deductions he
claimed for were disallowed as deduction from the
gross income of the petitioner for 1951. the
petition for reconsideration and the appeal with
the CTA were denied . This is an appeal from the
said decision
- petitioner claimed as a loss consisting of war
damage claim which has been approved but has
not been paid until the US Congress makes further
appropriation. He claims that the said amount
represents a business asset as defined in the said
act to which he is entitled to deduct as loss in his
1951 returns
HELD
- The court held that assuming that said amount
represents a portion of the 75% of his war damage
claim not paid, the same would not be deductible
as a loss in 1951 because, according to petitioner,
the last installment he received from the War
Damage Commission, together with the notice that
no further payment would be made on his claim,
was in 1950. Said amount would at most be a
proper deduction from his 1950 gross income.
- Secondly, said amount cannot be considered as a
"business asset" which can be deducted as a loss
in contemplation of law because its collection is
not enforceable as a matter of right, but is
dependent merely upon the generosity and
magnanimity of the U. S. government. As of the
end of 1945, there was no law under which
petitioner could claim compensation for the
destruction of his properties during the battle for
the liberation of the Philippines. And under the
Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946, the payments
of claims by the War Damage Commission merely
depended upon its discretion to be exercised in
the manner it may see fit, but the non-payment of
which cannot give rise to any enforceable right,
for, under said Act, "All findings of the Commission
concerning the amount of loss or damage
sustained, the cause of such loss or damage, the
persons to whom compensation pursuant to this
title is payable, and the value of the property lost
or damaged, shall be conclusive and shall not be
reviewable by any court". (section 113).
- Under the authority of section 338 of the National
Internal Revenue Code the Secretary of Finance, in
the exercise of his administrative powers, caused
the issuance of General Circular No. V-123 as an
implementation or interpretative regulation of
section 30 of the same Code, under which the
amount of P12,837.65 was allowed to be deducted
"in the year the last installment was received with
notice that no further payment would be made
until the United States Congress makes further
appropriation therefor", but such circular was
found later to be wrong and was revoked.
42
A2010
- In line with this opinion, the Secretary of Finance,
through the Collector of Internal Revenue, issued
GC No. V-139 which not only revoked and declared
void his previous Circular No. V — 123 but laid
down the rule that losses of property which
occurred during the period of World War II from
fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from
robbery, theft, or embezzlement are deductible for
income tax purposes in the year of actual
destruction of said property.
- "It seems too clear for serious argument that an
administrative officer can not change a law
enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely
an interpretation of the statute when once
determined to have been erroneous becomes
nullity. An erroneous construction of the law by the
Treasury Department or the collector of internal
revenue does not preclude or estop the
government from collecting a tax which is legally
due." (Ben Stocker, et al., 12 B. T. A., 1351.)
"Art. 2254. — No vested or acquired right can arise
from acts or omissions which are against the law
or which infringe upon the rights of others."
(Article 2254, New Civil Code.)
Disposition affirmed
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY,
INC.vs. SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION
114 SCRA 555
BARRERA; Mar 17, 1962
NATURE
Appeal from a resolution of the SSC.
FACTS
- The Social Security Commission issued its
Circular No. 22 informing the employers that all
bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash
value of other media of remuneration of the
following tenor will comprise the Employees
remuneration or earnings, upon which the SSS
contributions will be based.
- Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner
Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,
wrote the Social Security Commission in effect
protesting against the circular. The petitioner’s
arguments are the following:
a. Circular 22 is contradictory to a previous
Circular No. 7 expressly excluding overtime pay
and bonus in the computation of the employers'
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
and employees' respective monthly premium
contributions.
b. The Circular is invalid for lack of authority on
the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President
and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
- Overruling these objections, the Social Security
Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule
or regulation that needed the approval of the
President and publication in the Official Gazette to
be effective, but a mere administrative
interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of
general policy or opinion as to how the law should
be construed.
ISSUE
WON Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation, as
contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission "to
adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval
of the President such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions and
purposes of this Act."
HELD
NO. It is a mere administrative interpretation.
Ratio There is a distinction between an
administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force
and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an
opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely
interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations
when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure
or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute,
and compliance therewith may be enforced by a
penal sanction provided in the law. This is so
because statutes are usually couched in general
terms, after expressing the policy, purposes,
objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by
the legislature. The details and the manner of
carrying out the law are often times left to the
administrative agency entrusted with its
enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that
rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law.
A rule is binding on the courts so long as the
procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed
and its scope is within the statutory authority
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are
not in agreement with the policy stated therein or
its innate wisdom. On the other hand,
administrative interpretation of the law is at best
merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Reasoning Circular No. 22 in question was issued
by the Social Security Commission, in view of the
amendment of the provisions of the Social Security
Law defining the term "compensation" contained
in RA 1161 which was amended by RA 1792. Prior
to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and
overtime pay given in addition to the regular or
base pay were expressly excluded or exempted
from the definition of the term "compensation",
such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the
amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the
Social Security Commission to interpret the effect
of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22
was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned
of the interpretation or understanding of the
Commission, of the law as amended, which it was
its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail
that was not already in the law as amended. It
merely stated and circularized the opinion of the
Commission as to how the law should be
construed.
DISPOSITION
The Resolution appealed from is affirmed.
PERALTA V CSC
212 SCRA 425
Padilla; Aug. 10, 1992
FACTS
-petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II in the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Since he
had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted
from his initial salary the amount corresponding to
his absences inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays.
Petitioner sent a memorandum to Alvis (Chief of
Gen. Administration Service), inquiring as to the
law on said deductions. Alvis replied, citing Ch.
5.49 of the Handbook of Information on the Phil.
Civil Service which states that when an employee
is on leave without pay on a day before or
immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or
Holiday, such Sat., Sun. or holiday shall also be
without pay, unless such non-working days occur
within the period of service actually rendered.
-petitioner sent a letter to the CSC chairman
questioning the cited provision alleging that such
was tantamount to deprivation of property without
43
A2010
due process as it was not supported by law. CSC
promulgated resolution 90-497, ruling that the
deduction was in order, with the rationale that one
who has no leave credits, being absent on either
Monday or Friday, cannot be favorably credited
with intervening days had the same been working
days. Petitioner filed an MFR which the CSC denied
hence this petition.
-during the pendency of this petition, the CSC
promulgated Resolution 91-540 which amended
the questioned policy, resolving to instead adopt
the policy that an employee, regardless of whether
he has leave credits or not, is absent on a day
immediately preceding/succeeding a Sat., Sun. or
holiday shall not be considered absent.
ISSUE
WON CSC’s policy mandating salary deductions is
valid
HELD
-NO. Although from the developments brought by
Resolution 91-540 the issue would appear to have
become moot and academic, the Court has
decided to render a formal ruling for reasons of
public interest.
-When an administrative or executive agency
renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy,
it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the
administrative interpretation of the law is at best
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine
what the law means. Action of an administrative
agency may be disturbed or set aside by the
judicial department if there is an error of law, or
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either
the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
-In promulgating the policy in question, the CSC
interpreted the provision of RA 2625 amending
Sec. 284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative
Code which grants 15 days of vacation leave and
15 days sick leave as referring only to government
employees who have earned leave credits against
which their absences may be charged with pay, as
its letters speak only of leaves of absence with full
pay.
-In statutory construction, the intent or spirit of the
law must prevail over the letter thereof. The intent
in enacting RA 2625 may be gleaned from the
second reading of HB 41 (which became RA 2625)
which stated its purpose as being to exclude from
the computation of the leave, Saturdays, Sundays
and holidays because the employee is entitled not
to go to office during those days and that it would
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
be unfair and unjust to count such days in the
computation of leaves. As such, the construction
by the CSC of RA 2625 is not in accordance with
the legislative intent. The fact remains that
government employees cannot be declared absent
and deprived of their salaries on non-working days.
Furthermore, before RA 2625, Sec. 284 and 285-A
applied to all gov’t employees without distinction
and as such, the effect of the amendment should
apply to all employees as well, whpether or not
they have accumulated leave credits.
Disposition petition is GRANTED
5. Examples of Rule-making in
various agencies
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v MUNOZ
SAND V ABAD SANTOS
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
58 SCRA 33
TEEHANKEE, July 18, 1974
NATURE
Petition for Review and for a declaration of validity
of the disputed rule
FACTS
-Petitioner Board of Examiners for nurses issued
the contested rules and regulation which provided
for periodic inspection of nursing schools and
barring from admission to the nurses’ examination
the graduates of schools that are duly found to be
sub-standard during the period of the deficiency
(Par5, Rule 69, Art VII of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the petitioner board). Respondent
school filed an action for declaratory relief seeking
a declaration that the said provision is void, illegal
and ineffective and without force of law, which the
respondent court granted…
TC: Board of Examiners has the full authority
under Section 9 RA 877 to promulgate rules and
regulations, the board may apply only the same to
new schools or colleges established or opened
after the promulgation of said rules and
regulations and conversely may not be given
retroactive effect and cannot be enforced on
schools and colleges already duly accredit by the
Bureau of Private Schools prior to the
promulgation by the board of the 1967 rules and
regulations. Assailed provision was declared void,
illegal and had no effect against Respondent
School and its graduates.
ISSUES
1. WON the Board of Examiners have the power to
promulgate rules and regulations and to deny
admission to the nurses’ examination and
registration as registered nurses to the graduates
of schools that are found to be sub-standard
2. WON there was arbitrariness or oppression in
the board’s exercise of its powers as to amount to
denial of substantive due process
3. WON the Court erred in holding that the said
provision is void
HELD
1. YES
Reasoning. The Philippine Nursing Act, 2
Republic Act No. 877 as amended by
Republic Act No. 4704 (approved June 18,
1966) expressly empowers in section 9 thereof
the petitioner board "subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines [to] promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act."
-Section 3 of the cited Act specifically empowers
petitioner board to inspect nursing colleges
and schools and vests it with authority "to
issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue
certificates of registration for practice of
nursing. The Board shall study the conditions
affecting nursing education and the practice of the
nursing profession in the Philippines, and shall
exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Act
with a view to the maintenance of an efficient
ethical technical moral and professional standard
in the practice of nursing. The Board shall likewise
study and examine the facilities of hospitals or
universities seeking permission to open new
schools or colleges of nursing or departments of
nursing education so as to see if the essential
requirements therefor including qualified faculty
and adequate budget are properly complied with.
The authorization to open schools or colleges of
nursing shall be based upon the written
recommendation of the Board and the
representative of the Government entity
concerned with the granting of school permits or
authorization." It further provides that "(T)he
Board shall have the power to investigate
violations of this Act . . . Board shall from time to
time look into the conditions affecting the practice
44
A2010
of nursing in the Philippines and whenever
necessary, recommend or adopt such measures as
may be deemed proper for the advancement of
the profession and for the vigorous enforcement of
this Act."
-Section 20 of the Act expressly provides that "'In
order to be admitted to the nurse examination, an
applicant must, at the time of filing his or her
application therefor, establish to the satisfaction of
the Board that' he has all the requisite
qualifications provided for by law." Sections 11 to
15 of the same Act ordain in connection therewith
inter alia that schools and colleges of nursing
should be established for the preparation qualified
applicants for the profession of nursing, and should
be operated as educational institutions (section
11); that adequate budget for the operation of said
schools or colleges and their libraries, classrooms,
teaching equipment and supplies should be
provided (section 12); that clinical and public
health nursing facilities should be established by
said colleges or schools and provisions for required
experience of students be made (section 13); and
that the prescribed qualifications for faculty
members and instructors in nursing be observed
by all colleges, schools or institutes of nursing
(section 14) and the general entrance
requirements of students to said colleges or
schools be followed (section 15).
2. NO
Reasoning. Respondent’s contention that Board’s
Visitorial power was already conferred by law on
the Bureau of Private Education and thus might
result in a situation wherein the Board and the
Bureau would have different and conflicting
findings on the conditions and standards of these
schools manifestly addresses itself to the wisdom
of the provisions of the Act granting similar
visitorial powers to the petitioner board as a
specialized board composed of highly competent
technical persons, viz, "registered nurses of
recognized standing in the Philippines" whom the
Congress deemed could be relied upon to maintain
high standards for nursing education and the
nursing profession. It is well settled that it is
beyond the domain of the courts to inquire into the
wisdom of the Act vesting the petitioner board
with similar powers to that likewise entrusted to
the Bureau of Private Education.
-Respondent’s contention also is pure speculation.
While nursing schools were placed under the
general supervision of the Secretary of Education,
the Congress likewise realized in line with
progressive trends that a specialized agency such
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
as petitioner board of examiners for nurses should
likewise exercise close supervision directly over
nursing schools since "the maintenance of an
efficient ethical, technical, moral and professional
standard in the practice of nursing" has to begin in
the school where the nursing education is given.
3. YES.
Respondent court's view that petitioner board's
power of periodic inspection would apply only to
new nursing schools opened after the
promulgation of the rule and not to existing
schools already accredited by the Bureau of
Private Schools would lead to the absurd result
whereby petitioner board would be utterly helpless
with reference to existing schools (which would
constitute a special class) and powerless to require
them to maintain the minimum standards under
pain of disqualifying their deficient graduates from
the nurses' examination.
Ratio. The cited regulation is one of the many
forms of a proper exercise of police power by the
State which is called upon to see to it and assure
in the interest of public health and welfare that
colleges and schools of nursing are properly
conducted and maintained in accordance with the
standards fixed; that they do not become sub-
standard or fall below the standards; and that only
qualified graduates are allowed to take the State
examination and thereafter license to practice the
noble profession of nursing.
Disposition judgment under review of respondent
court is reversed and set aside, and Article VIII,
Rule 69, section 5 of the Rules and Regulations is
declared valid
AMERICAN TOBACCO V DIRECTOR
OF PATENTS
67 SCRA 287
ANTONIO; October 14, 1975
NATURE
Petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction
FACTS
- Petitioners (American Tobacco, GM, P&G, Warner
Lambert, etc.) challenge the validity of Rule 168 of
the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine
Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended,
authorizing the Director of Patents to designate
any ranking official of said office to hear "inter
partes" proceedings1. It likewise provides that "all
judgments determining the merits of the case shall
be personally and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him."
- Under the Trade-mark Law (RA 166), the Director
of Patents is vested with jurisdiction over the
above-mentioned cases. The Rules of Practice in
Trade-mark Cases were drafted and
promulgated by the Director of Patents and
approved by the then Sec of Agriculture and
Commerce. Subsequently, the Director of Patents,
with the approval of the Sec of Agriculture and
Commerce, amended the Rule as mentioned
above.
- Under Sec 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents
is "empowered to obtain the assistance of
technical, scientific or other qualified officers or
employees of other departments, bureaus, offices,
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including corporations owned, controlled or
operated by the Government, when deemed
necessary in the consideration of any matter
submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement
of the provisions" of said Act. Sec 78 of the same
Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the
approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office."
- Petitioners filed their objections to the authority
of the hearing officers delegated to hear their
cases.
ISSUE
WON the amendment to Rule 168 is valid
HELD
YES
Ratio While the power to decide resides solely in
the administrative agency vested by law, this does
not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of
administrative agency will be made. It is sufficient
that the judgment and discretion finally exercised
are those of the officer authorized by law.
1
The proceedings affected refer to the hearing of
opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name,
interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of
determining the question of priority of adoption and use of
a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and
cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name
pending at the Patent Office.
45
A2010
- Power conferred upon an administrative agency
to which the administration of a statute is
entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as
may be deemed necessary or proper in order to
carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an
adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function, unless by express provisions of
the Act or by implication it has been withheld.
There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165
or 166 negating the existence of such authority, so
far as the designation of hearing examiners is
concerned.
Reasoning This sub-delegation of power has been
justified by "sound principles of organization"
which demand that "those at the top be able to
concentrate their attention upon the larger and
more important questions of policy and practice,
and their time be freed, so far as possible, from
the consideration of the smaller and far less
important matters of detail."
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
RABOR v CSC
THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME
MANNING AGENCIES, INC. v POEA
243 SCRA 666
DAVIDE, JR.; April 21, 1995
NATURE
Petition to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994,
of the Governing Board of the POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 05, series of 1994
FACTS
-Pertinent sections of Memorandum Circular No.
05:
"Section C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
1. In case of death of the seamen during the
term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to
the amount of US$50,000 and an additional
amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of
twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at
the exchange rate prevailing during the time of
payment.
Where the death is caused by warlike activity
while sailing within a declared warzone or war risk
area, the compensation payable shall be doubled.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
The employer shall undertake appropriate warzone
insurance coverage for this purpose."
xxx xxx xxx
III. The maximum rate provided under
Appendix I-A shall likewise be adjusted to
US$50,000 regardless of rank and position of the
seafarer.
IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation
and other benefits herein provided shall apply to
any Filipino seafarer on board any vessel,
provided, that the cause of action occurs after this
Resolution takes effect.
V. This Resolution shall take effect after
sixty (60) days from publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
-Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning
Agencies, Inc., and incorporated association of
licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-
petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which
hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of
their respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge
us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of
the Governing Board of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum
Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the grounds that
“The POEA does not have the power and authority
to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and
workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress
can.”
ISSUE
WON the POEA has the power and authority to fix
and promulgate rates affecting death and
workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen
working in ocean-going vessels
HELD
YES.
Reasoning Well established in our jurisdiction
that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable
power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible,
to anticipate situations that may be met in
carrying the law into effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the
law. This is the principle of subordinate legislation
which was discussed by this Court in People vs.
Rosenthal, (68 Phil. 328 [1939]) and in Pangasinan
Transportation vs. Public Service Commission, (70
Phil 22 [1940]). That the challenged resolution and
memorandum circular, which merely further
amended the previous Memorandum Circular No.
02, strictly conform to the sufficient and valid
standard of "fair and equitable employment
practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer
be disputed
-The POEA mandate referred to as providing the
reasonable standard for the exercise of the POEA's
rule-making authority is found in the statement of
powers and functions of the said office in
paragraph (a), Section 4 of E.O. 797, to wit:
(a) The Administration shall formulate and
undertake in coordination where necessary with
the appropriate entities concerned, a systematic
program for promoting and monitoring the
overseas employment of Filipino workers taking
into consideration domestic manpower
requirements, and to protect their rights to fair
and equitable employment practices. It shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, involving employer-
employee relations arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment, including seamen. This
adjudicatory function shall be undertaken in
appropriate circumstances in consultation with the
Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines.
The governing Board of the Administration, as
hereinunder provided, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the
exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP
AND/OR MAGDIWANG REALTY CORP
v SENDINO
G.R. No. 109703.
KAPUNAN, JR.; July 5, 1994
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
46
A2010
FACTS
-Private respondent Sendino entered into a
reservation agreement with Realty Exchange
Venture, Inc. (REVI) for a lot for P307,800.00 as its
purchase price. She paid P1,000.00 as partial
reservation fee and completed payment of this fee
by paying P4,000.00.
-private respondent paid REVI full downpayment
on the purchase price. However, she was advised
by REVI to change her co-maker, which she
agreed, asking for an extension of one month to do
so.
-For alleged non-compliance with the requirement
of submission of the appropriate documents under
the terms of the original agreement, REVI, through
its Vice-President for Marketing, informed
respondent of the cancellation of the contract
-private respondent filed a complaint for Specific
Performance against REVI with the office of
Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)
-the HLURB, whose authority to hear and decide
the complaint was challenged by REVI in its
answer, rendered its judgment in favor of Sendino
and ordered REVI to continue with the sale of the
house and lot and to pay Sendino damages
-Revi appealed from this decision to the HLURB
OAALA Arbiter, which affirmed the Board's
decision. The decision of the OAALA Arbiter was
appealed to the Office of the President
ISSUE
WON the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
has Quasi-judicial functions, notwithstanding
absence of express grant by Executive Order No.
90 of Dec 17, 1986 which created it.
HELD
YES.
Reasoning As explicitly provided by law,
jurisdiction over actions for specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner or developer, is vested
exclusively in the HSRC, Section 1 of PD 1344, in
no uncertain terms, provides:
'Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to
regulate real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
'A. Unsound real estate business practices;
'B. Claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
'C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.'
"This is reinforced by section 8 of EO 648
(otherwise known as the Charter of the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission) which took
effect on February 7, 1981, thus:
"Section 8. Transfer of Functions. — The
Regulatory functions of the National Housing
Authority pursuant to Presidential Decree Nos.
957, 1216, 1344 and other related laws are hereby
transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission. . . . Among the regulatory functions
are . . . Hear and decide cases of unsound real
estate business practices, claims involving refund
filed against project owners, developers, dealers,
brokers, or salesmen and cases of specific
performance'
"There is no question that a statute may vest
exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative
agency over certain disputes and controversies
falling within the agency's special expertise. The
constitutionality of such grant of exclusive
jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority (now
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) over
cases involving the sale of lots in commercial
subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v.
National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987])
and again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo
Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority
(153 SCRA 399 [1987]) where We restated that the
National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance with the
terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of
judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency."
Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised
its jurisdiction over the case filed by the
petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA,
in ordering petitioners to comply with their
obligations arising from the Reservation
Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or
quasi-judicial powers which an administrative
agency may exercise is defined in the agency's
enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement
in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit,
supra, recognizing the HLURB as the successor
agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it
therefore follows that the transfer of such
functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by
Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby
resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of
adjudicatory powers which included the power to
"(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate
business practices . . . and cases of specific
performance."
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
d. Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987,
BOOK VII
Section 9. Public Participation. -
(1) If not otherwise required by law, an
agency shall, as far as practicable, publish
or circulate notices of proposed rules and
afford interested parties the opportunity
to submit their views prior to the adoption
of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final
order shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a
PANAY AUTOBUS
newspaper CO.
of general v PHILIPPINE
circulation at least
RAILWAY CO
57 Phil 172
VICKERS; FEB 17, 1933
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- R. R. Hancock, vice-president and general
manager of the Philippine Railway Co., filed with
the Public Service Commission in case No. 31724 a
petition requesting the authority of the
Commission to alter the freight rates of the
Philippine Railway Company on the Cebu and
Panay Divisions whenever in their judgment they
find it necessary in order to meet the competition
of road trucks and auto buses. He requested that
the rates at present in effect be considered the
maximum , and that we may fix other lower rates
whenever in our opinion it will be to the advantage
of the Railway Company to do so.
- The petition was set for hearing, and the
operators affected thereby were notified. The Cebu
Autobus Company through its attorneys filed an
opposition to said petition on the following
47
A2010
grounds: 1) That the Cebu Autobus Company holds
a certificate of public convenience to operate an
autobus service for the transportation of
passengers and freight between all the principal
points in the Province of Cebu; 2) That the
establishment of sliding rate is repugnant to the
fundamental principles of Public Utility
Regulations; 3) That the granting of the above
application will promote unnecessary and ruinous
competition between the operators; and 4) That
the granting of sliding rates will promote
discrimination with regard to its enforcement, that
is to say, one shipper of cargoes may be charged
the maximum rates, whereas another shipper is
charged a much lower rate.
- A hearing on the petition in case No. 31724 was
held. At the hearing Attorney Alvear appeared for
the Cebu Autobus Co., and maintained that the
commission could not grant the applicant the
permission which is requested. Upon ascertaining
that the application of the Philippine Railway Co.
related to the Panay Division, Attorney Alvear
reserved the right to file an opposition on behalf of
the Panay Autobus Co., the petitioner and
appellant herein. The only witness presented was
Hancock. He testified that the applicant wished to
reduce its freight rates because of the reduction in
market prices and the competition which the
Philippine Railway had to contend with; that a
flexible tariff would in his opinion increase the
earnings of the Railway Company; the order No. 3
of the Public Service Commission fixing the
maximum rates for steamers has proved very
satisfactory; that it was not the intention of the
Philippine Railway Co. to violate in any way section
16 of Act No. 3108, and that any reduction in
freight rates would be applied to all kinds of cargo
without discrimination; that it was not his intention
to enforce the reduced rates on the Cebu Division;
that the fixing of the rates was to be left entirely to
the discretion of the officials on the Railway
Company, who would apply the rates without
discrimination and notify the commission; that the
present maximum rate from Iloilo to Capiz is P15 a
ton, and he wished to reduce it to P5 or P6.
- Subsequently the Panay Autobus Company filed
its opposition to the applications of the Philippine
Railway Co. in cases Nos. 31724 and 31827 on the
following grounds: 1) the opponent company
operates a bus service in the Island of Panay with
the right and privilege to transport passengers and
freight at schedule of rates fixed by this Honorable
Commission; 2) The petition for flexible rates could
not be granted by this Honorable as it is against
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
the fundamental principles of public utility
regulation; and 3) The granting of a flexible rate
will work ruinous competition with other common
carriers in the field"; and on the same date asked
for a rehearing on the ground that the decision
was contrary to law and the fundamental
principles of public utility regulation. The motion
for a rehearing was denied by the commission.
- The appellant argues that the commission erred
in dictating the decision because 1) it did not find
and declare that rates lower than the maximum
rate are just and reasonable; 2) it delegated to
appellee its powers and duties to fix and
determine what are just and reasonable rates; and
3) the authority granted to appellee is contrary to
the fundamental rules of public utility regulation.
ISSUE
WON the Public Service Commission was
authorized by law to delegate to the Philippine
Railway Co. the power of altering its freight rates
whenever it should find it necessary to do so in
order to meet the competition of road trucks and
autobuses, or to change its freight rates at will, or
to regard its present rates as maximum rates, and
to fix lower rates whenever in the opinion of the
Philippine Railway Co. it would be to its advantage
to do so.
HELD
NO.
- The mere recital of the language of the
application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough
to show that it is untenable. The legislature has
delegated to the Public Service Commission the
power of fixing the rates of public services, but it
has not authorized the Public Service Commission
to delegate that power to common carrier or other
public service. The rates of public services like the
Philippine Railway Co. have been approved or fixed
by the Public Service Commission and any change
in such rates must be authorized or approved by
the Public Service Commission after they have
been shown to be just and reasonable. The public
service may, of course, propose new rates, as the
Philippine Railway Co. did in case No. 31827, but it
cannot lawfully make said new rates effective
without the approval of the Public Service
Commission, and the Public Service Commission
itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce
rates without the prior approval of said rates by
the commission. The commission must approve
new rates when they are submitted to it, if the
evidence shows them to be just and reasonable,
otherwise it must disapprove them. Clearly, the
commission cannot determine in advance whether
or not the new rates of the Philippine Railway Co,
will be just and reasonable, because it does not
know what those rates will be.
- In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in
effect asked for permission to change its freight
rates at will. It may change them every day or
every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do
so in order to meet competition or whenever in its
opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a
procedure would create a most unsatisfactory
state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of
the public service law.
Section 16 of the Public Service Commission
prohibits any public service from exacting any
unjustly discriminatory rate, but if the Philippine
Railway Co. is to alter its rates whenever it may be
necessary to meet the competition of road trucks
and autobuses, or to reduce its rates whenever it
would be to the advantage of the Railway
Company to do so, it cannot prevent its rates from
being discriminatory. It may charge one shipper P5
a ton from Iloilo to Capiz, but immediately
thereafter in order to meet competition it may be
obliged to give another shipper a rate of P4 a ton.
It can scarely be contended that such a rate would
not be discriminatory. Under the order of the
commission, there is no stability of rates. They
may be varied at the will of the railroad officials,
provided that they are not increased. The
commission thereby gives up once of its most
important functions, and leaves it to competition
to fix the rates.
- If the conditions complained of by Hancock exist,
and we do not doubt that they do, it is the duty of
the Public Service Commission to correct them by
enforcing the law and its orders as to those
operators responsible therefor, not by delegating
its powers to the Philippine Railway Co. and
authorizing it to reduce its rates whenever
necessary to meet such unlawful competition.
Dispositve Decision reversed
KMU LABOR CENTER v GARCIA, JR.,
[LTFRB & PROVINCIAL BUS
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES]
239 SCRA 386
KAPUNAN; December 23, 1994
48
A2010
NATURE: Certiorari
FACTS:
- DOTC Sec. Oscar M. Orbos, issued a
memorandum to LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S.
Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to
charge passengers rates within a range of 15%
above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a
period of one (1) year.
- Finding the implementation of the fare range
scheme "not legally feasible," Fernando replied to
Orbos saying that “xxx…the Public Service Act
prescribes (a) the rates to be approved should be
proposed by public service operators; (b) there
should be a publication and notice to concerned or
affected parties in the territory affected; (c) a
public hearing should be held for the fixing of the
rates; hence, implementation of the proposed fare
range scheme without complying with the
requirements of the PSA may not be legally
feasible. xxx”
- Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for
fare rate increase. (An across-the-board increase
of P0.085 per km for all types of provincial buses
with a minimum-maximum fare range of 15% over
and below the proposed basic per km fare rate,
with the said minimum-maximum fare range
applying only to ordinary, first class and premium
class buses and a P0.50 minimum per km fare for
aircon buses, was sought.)
- PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an
across-the-board increase of P0.065 centavos per
km for ordinary buses. The decrease was due to
the drop in the expected price of diesel.
- The application was opposed by the Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautista
alleging that the proposed rates were exorbitant
and unreasonable and that the application
contained no allegation on the rate of return of the
proposed increase in rates.
- the LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare
rate increase.
- Sometime in March, 1994, PBOAP, availing itself
of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing
provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and
minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first
having filed a petition for the purpose and
without the benefit of a public hearing,
announced a fare increase of twenty (20%)
percent of the existing fares. Said increased
fares were to be made effective on March
16, 1994.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- March 16, 1994: KMU filed a petition before the
LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus
fares.
- March 24, 1994: the LTFRB issued one of the
assailed orders dismissing the petition for lack of
merit.
- June 20, 1994: SC issued a TRO enjoining,
prohibiting and preventing respondents from
implementing the bus fare rate increase as well as
the questioned orders and memorandum circulars.
- A moratorium was likewise enforced on the
issuance of franchises for the operation of buses,
jeepneys, and taxicabs.
KMU’s contention:
- First, the authority given by respondent LTFRB to
provincial bus operators to set a fare range
without having to file a petition for the purpose, is
unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
- Second, the establishment of a presumption of
public need in favor of an applicant for a proposed
transport service without having to prove public
necessity, is illegal for being violative of the Public
Service Act and the Rules of Court.
PBOAP, DOTC & LTFRB claim that:
- ALL 3 assert that the petitioner has no legal
standing to sue or has no real interest in the case
at bench and in obtaining the reliefs prayed for.
- They further claim that it is within DOTC and
LTFRB's authority to set a fare range scheme and
establish a presumption of public need in
applications for certificates of public convenience.
ISSUE:
1. WON KMU has locus standi
2. WON the authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range over
and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal
and invalid
Held:
1. Yes.
KMU has the standing to sue. KMU’s members had
suffered and continue to suffer grave and
irreparable injury and damage from the
implementation of the questioned memoranda,
circulars and/or orders.
Reasoning:
- Principle of locus standi of a party litigant: One
who is directly affected by and whose interest is
immediate and substantial in the controversy has
the standing to sue. The rule therefore requires
that a party must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that
can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction
and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial
powers in his behalf.
- KMU members, who avail of the use of buses,
trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected
by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in
passenger fares. They are part of the millions of
commuters who comprise the riding public.
- Even if KMU didn’t have legal standing, SC will
take cognizance because of the transcendental
importance of the issues raised.
2. YES.
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial
bus operators to set a fare range over and above
the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid
as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority. Potestas delegata non
delegari potest.
Ratio: (ON Fixing Rates Wages and Prices)
The power to fix rates cannot be delegated to a
common carrier or other public service. The latter
may propose new rates, but these will not be
effective without the approval of the
administrative agency.
Reasoning:
- A further delegation of such power would
constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the
trust reposed in the delegate mandated to
discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the
provincial bus operators to change and increase
their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic
situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This
would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators who may increase fares every
hour, every day, every month or every year,
whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem
it "necessary" to do so.
- Rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function
of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on
millions of commuters, government must not
relinquish this important function in favor of those
who would benefit and profit from the industry.
Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be
done away with.
-The present administrative procedure, already
mirrors an orderly and satisfactory arrangement
for all parties involved. To do away with such a
procedure and allow just one party, an interested
party at that, to determine what the rate should
be, will undermine the right of the other parties to
due process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely
to determine what a just and reasonable rate is.
Discarding such procedural and constitutional right
49
A2010
is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to
public interest.
- LTFRB is vested with the same under EO No. 202.
Sec. 5(c) of the said EO authorizes LTFRB "to
determine, prescribe, approve and periodically
review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and
other related charges, relative to the operation of
public land transportation services provided by
motorized vehicles."
- Such delegation of legislative power to an
administrative agency is permitted in order to
adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life.
As subjects for governmental regulation multiply,
so does the difficulty of administering the laws.
Hence, specialization even in legislation has
become necessary.
- Given the task of determining sensitive and
delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making
for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory
body is entrusted with the power of subordinate
legislation. With this authority, an administrative
body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement
broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in"
the details which the Legislature may neither have
time or competence to provide.
- However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions
of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and
LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to
a common carrier, a transport operator, or other
public service.
On Public need
- A certificate of public convenience (CPC) is an
authorization granted by the LTFRB for the
operation of land transportation services for public
use as required by law. The issuance of a CPC is
determined by public need. The presumption of
public need for a service shall be deemed in favor
of the applicant, while the burden of proving that
there is no need for the proposed service shall be
the oppositor's. (as per LTFRB’s Memorandum)
- The above-quoted provision is entirely
incompatible and inconsistent with Sec 16(c)(iii) of
the PSA which requires that before a CPC will be
issued, the applicant must prove by proper notice
and hearing that the operation of the public
service proposed will promote public interest in a
proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the
policy guideline states that the presumption of
public need for a public service shall be deemed in
favor of the applicant. In case of conflict between a
statute and an administrative order, the former
must prevail.
- As one of the basic requirements for the grant of
a CPC, public convenience and necessity exists
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
when the proposed facility or service meets a
reasonable want of the public and supply a need
which the existing facilities do not adequately
supply.
- The existence or non-existence of public
convenience and necessity is therefore a question
of fact that must be established by evidence, real
and/or testimonial; empirical data; statistics and
such other means necessary, in a public hearing
conducted for that purpose. The object and
purpose of such procedure, among other things, is
to look out for, and protect, the interests of both
the public and the existing transport operators.
(Hence, the need for a public hearing where the
applicant can establish such facts necessary.)
-The establishment of public need in favor of an
applicant reverses well-settled and
institutionalized judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative procedures. It allows the party who
initiates the proceedings to prove, by mere
application, his affirmative allegations. Moreover,
the offending provisions of the LTFRB
memorandum circular in question would in effect
amend the Rules of Court by adding another
disputable presumption in the enumeration of 37
presumptions under Rule 131, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court. Such usurpation of this Court's
authority cannot be countenanced as only this
Court is mandated by law to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.
Dispositive: Petition is GRANTED
YNCHAUSTI S.S. Co v PHIL RAILWAY
CO.
42 PHIL 624
JOHNS; January 9, 1922
FACTS
- Petitioners are members of shipowners’
association. Because of decrease in volume of
business, it filed with Public Utility Commissioner a
declaration that it would make a 10% increase in
shipping rates. This was allowed.
- On account of low wages, seamen held a strike
and it became necessary to increase wages paid
and the 10% increase became insufficient. The
association filed amended declaration with Public
Utility Commissioner praying for further raise of
10% on freight rates , and that from and after July
20, 1920, it would make a 15% increase.
- The proposed 15% increase was suspended and
hearing was ordered. Commissioner ordered that
a representative of each shipowner should appear
and submit operating account.
- The rate allowed by the Commissioner was based
on original cost of vessel and the 5% depreciation
was allowed upon the original value of the vessel
as opposed to the cost of replacement.
ISSUE
WON the rate allowed by the Commissioner is
proper
HELD
NO.
- There is a legal presumption that the fixed rates
are reasonable.
- The fixing of rates by the government through its
agents involves exercise of reasonable discretion
and unless there’s abuse, courts will not interfere.
- Although fixing of rates is a legislative and
governmental power over which government has
control, it has no power to fix rates that are
unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily.
- Whether a given rate is fair is a judicial question.
Courts have control.
- There are 4 theories of ascertaining what
constitutes a reasonable rate: - original cost
- cost of reproduction
- outstanding capitalization
- present value
- The present market value of the plant or its worth
as a going concern is the ultimate practical basis
for determining the value of the investment upon
which to fix a rate that will produce a fair return.
- Public utility should have fair and reasonable
return upon its property which is used by the
public, and the rate is based upon physical
valuation of the property.
- When a public utility enters public service, it is no
longer a free agent and the control of its property
is subject to reasonable rules and regulations by
the public, and to that extent it is a taking of the
property by the public.
- The purpose of the hearing was to determine
what was a just rate. It should not be based upon
original cost nor should it be based upon
estimated cost. Original cost of vessel should only
be considered for purpose of determining the
50
A2010
present or market value.
- Commissioner should have required proof of the
present or market value. The basing of the rate on
the original cost of the vessel was prejudicial, legal
error.
Disposition Cause reversed and remanded with
instructions.
VIGAN ELECTRIC CO V PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION
10 SCRA 46
CONCEPCION; January 30, 1964
NATURE
Original action for certiorari to annul an order of
respondent Public Service Commission
FACTS
- RA 316 granted Vigan Electric Light Company,
Inc., a franchise to construct, maintain and operate
an electric light, heat and/or power plant for the
purpose of generating and distributing light, heat
and/or power, for sale within the limits of several
municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner secured from respondent a certificate of
public convenience for this purpose.
- Petitioner, with respondent's approval, entered
into a contract for the purchase of electric power
and energy from the NPC, for resale, to its
customers, in accordance with the schedule of
rates.
- About 5 years later, respondent advised
petitioner of a conference for the purpose of
revising its authorized rates. Soon thereafter,
petitioner received a letter of respondent
informing the former of an alleged letter-petition
charging them of selling electric meters in the
black market and accusing them that the meters
installed in Vigan register excessive rates
- An audit and examination of the books and other
records of account" of said petitioner was ordered
by the General Auditing Office "under the
provisions of CA No. 325 and in accordance with
the request of the PSC.”
- Respondent issued a subpoena duces tecum
requiring petitioner to produce, during a
conference, certain books of account and financial
statements specified in said process. Petitioner
moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. The
motion was not acted upon in the conference.
However, it was then decided when the next
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
conference will be. When petitioner's
representatives appeared before respondent they
were advised by the latter that the scheduled
conference had been cancelled, that the petition to
quash the subpoena duces tecum had been
granted, and that respondent had issued an order
for the petitioner to reduce the present meter
rates for its electric service. Said order fixed the
rates and gave regulations on how to bill
customers.
ISSUE
WON said order of the PSC is valid
HELD
NO
Ratio Consistent with the principle of separation
of powers, which underlies our constitutional
system, legislative powers may not be delegated
except to local governments, and only to matters
purely of local concern. However, Congress may
delegate to administrative agencies of the
government the power to supply the details in the
execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by
a which is complete in itself Such law is not
deemed complete unless it lays down a standard
or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at
least, determinable without requiring another
legislation, to guide the administrative body
concerned in the performance of its duty to
implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there
would be no reasonable means to ascertain
whether or not said body has acted within the
scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the
power of legislation would eventually be exercised
by a branch of the Government other than that in
which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation,
not only of the allocation of powers therein made,
but, also, of the principle of separation of powers.
Reasoning
- By way of special defenses, respondent, alleged
that the disputed order had been issued under its
delegated legislative authority, the exercise of
which does not require previous notice and
hearing; and that petitioner had not sought a
reconsideration of said order, and had,
accordingly, failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies.
- Although the rule-making power and even the
power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines may partake of a
legislative character, such is not the nature of the
order complained of. Indeed, the same applies
exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is
predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a
report submitted by the General Auditing Office
that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12%
of its invested capital, which is denied by
petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-
examine the maker of said report, and to introduce
evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or
explain or complement the same, as well as to
refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the
respondent. In other words, in making said finding
of fact, respondent performed a function partaking
of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of
which demands previous notice and hearing.
- Sections 16(c) and 20 (a) of Commonwealth Act
No. 146, explicitly require notice and hearing
before the Commission can fix and determine joint
rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules
thereof, as well as commutation, mileage
kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be
imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any
public service.
- Whether notice and a hearing in proceedings
before a public service commission are necessary
depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional
provisions applicable to such proceedings, which
make notice and hearing, prerequisite to action by
the commission, and upon the nature and object
of such proceedings, that is, whether the
proceedings, are, on the one hand, legislative and
rule-making in character, or are, on the other
hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial,
affecting the rights an property of private or
specific persons. As a general rule, a public utility
must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed
for its services by a public service commission.
Disposition Writ prayed for is granted and the
preliminary injunction issued by this Court hereby
made permanent.
PHILCOMSAT V ALCUAZ
180 SCRA 218
REGALADO; December 18, 1989
NATURE
Petition to annul an order of the Commissioner of
the NTC
FACTS
- RA 5514, granted PHILCOMSAT a franchise to
maintain and operate in the Philippines facilities
for international satellite communications.
Philcomsat was the only one rendering such
51
A2010
services in the Philippines. The satellite services
enable international carriers to serve the public
with indispensable communication services, such
as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams,
high speed data, live TV in full color, and television
standard conversion from European to American or
vice versa.
- Under Section 5 of RA 5514, it was exempt from
the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now NTC. However, pursuant to EO
196 issued in 1987, it was placed under the
jurisdiction of NTC. Implementing EO 196, NTC
required Philcomsat to apply for the requisite
certificate of public convenience and necessity.
- It was granted a provisional authority to continue
operating. This authority was valid for 6 months
and was extended for another 6 months. After it
expired, the NTC order now in controversy had
further extended the provisional authority for
another 6 months but it directed a reduction of
15% on the authorized rates.
- Philcomsat argued that the enabling act (EO 546)
of NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications does not provide the necessary
standards, hence there is an undue delegation of
legislative power. Assuming arguendo that the
rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally
conferred, it violates procedural due process for
having been issued without prior notice and
hearing; and the rate reduction it imposes is
unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus a
violation of substantive due process.
ISSUES
1. WON the rate-fixing power of the NTC is a valid
delegation of legislative power
2. WON the order of the Commissioner of the NTC
violates procedural due process
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio Delegation of legislative power is valid only
when some standard for its exercise is provided
and the manner of its exercise is prescribed.
Reasoning When an administrative agency
establishes a rate, its act must both be non-
confiscatory and must have been established in
the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the
delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In
case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe is that the rate be reasonable and just.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
However, even in the absence of an express
requirement, this standard may be implied.
- NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is
limited by the requirements of public safety, public
interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable
rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the
requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power.
2. YES.
Ratio Notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of administrative action in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions;
but where a public administrative body acts in a
judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are
particular and immediate rather than general and
prospective, the person whose rights or property
may be affected by the action is entitled to notice
and hearing.
Reasoning The order contains all the attributes of
a quasi-judicial adjudication. It pertains exclusively
to Philcomsat and to no other. Further, it is
premised on a finding of fact, although patently
superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of
some of the rates charged - based on an initial
evaluation of petitioner's financial statements -
without affording petitioner the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspects of the
financial statements warranted a corresponding
rate reduction. No rationalization was offered as to
the 15% rate reduction. Philcomsat was not even
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
inspector who issued the report on which NTC
based its order.
- Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act provides:
"Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and
hearing. - The Commission shall have power, upon
proper notice and hearing in accordance with the
roles and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates,
xxx which shall be imposed, observed and followed
thereafter by any public service;"
- There is no reason to assume that the provision
does not apply to NTC, there being no limiting,
excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in
EO 546 and 196.
Disposition Writ prayed for is GRANTED. Order of
is SET ASIDE.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY v AIRSPAIN CORP
e. Licensing Function
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987,
Book VII
Section 17. Licensing Procedure. -
(1) When the grant, renewal, denial
or cancellation of a license is
required to be preceded by notice
and hearing, the provisions
concerning contested cases shall
apply insofar as practicable.
(2) Except in cases of willful violation
of pertinent laws, rules and
regulations or when public security,
health, or safety require otherwise,
no license may be withdrawn,
suspended, revoked or annulled
without notice and hearing.
Section 18. Non-expiration of License. -
Where the licensee has made timely and
GONZALO SY V CENTRAL BANK
70 SCRA 570
MARTIN; April 30, 1976
NATURE
Appeal from CFI decision
FACTS
- Petitioner-appellant is a trading company
engaged in importation of fresh fruits for the last
52
A2010
19 years. In September, 1968 It requested
authority to import from Japan on “no-dollar” basis
$715K worth of fruits. It needed this because of
the coming Christmas season.
- The request was denied “since only the
transactions specifically enumerated in Central
Bank Circular No. 247 are allowed as ‘no-dollar
importation’”
- petitioner-appellant sought reconsideration from
Central Bank.
- Monetary Board of the Central Bank approved the
request for Special Import Permit on No-Dollar
Basis.
- but petitioner-appellant made his first
importation from Japan in February, 1969.
- in October, 1969, petitioner-appellant requested
an amendment of the country of origin of their
importations
- In the response to the request, they told him that
the authority granted by the Monetary Board
earlier for importation was intended only for the
Christmas season of 1968, and did not extend
through 1969.
- in 1970, the Collector of Customs issues warrants
of seizure and detention against $17,568.49 worth
of fruits for having beein imported in violation of a
Central Bank Circular.
- Petitioner-appellant instituted a petition for
mandamus with damages, praying for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus to direct the Central Bank
to release the imported fruits and to provide the
necessary release certificates therefor, and
damages.
ISSUE
WON Special Import Permit granted in 1968 had
already lost its validity when the later questioned
importations were made in 1970.
HELD
YES
Reasoning The series of correspondence
exchanged between petitioner and respondent
reveals that Special Import Permit granted covered
only the Christmas season of 1968. The omission
of an expiry date in the Permit affords no legal
basis for petitioner-appellant to conclude that the
permit is impressed with continuous validity. The
totality of the petitioner’s representations which
led to the issuance of the permit show that the
purpose of the permit was really just for Christmas
1968.
*** the authority of the Central Bank to regulate
“no-dollar” imports, owing to the influence and
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
effect that the same may exert upon the satbility
of our peso, cannot be seriously contested. Such
authority clearly emanates from its broad powers
to maintain our monetary stability and to preserve
the internation value of our currency as well as its
corollary power to issue such rules and regulations
for the effective discharge of its responsibilities
and exercise of powers. 2. Special Statutory Grant
Disposition Judgment of the lower court is
affirmed. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 902-A
Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case: March 11, 1976
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
REORGANIZATION OF THE SECURITIES
B. JUDICIAL FUNCTION
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readilyAND available. UponCOMMISSION
request, the parties
EXCHANGE WITH shall be
given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer,POWER
ADDITIONAL a certified
AND copy thereof
PLACING THE may be
accepted. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, BOOK VII SAID AGENCY UNDER THE
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented CHAPTER 3 him and to submit rebuttal
against evidence. SUPERVISION OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and ADJUDICATION of generally cognizable technical or scientific OFFICE
facts OF THEits
within PRESIDENT
specialized knowledge.
Section 10. Compromise
The parties and Arbitration.
shall be notified and afforded- Toanexpedite administrative
opportunity to contest proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations,
the facts so noticed.
every agency shall, in the- public WHEREAS, in line with the government's policy
Section 13. Subpoena. In anyinterest,
contestedencourage
case, the amicable
agency settlement, comprise
shall have the powerand arbitration.
to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books,
Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. - of encouraging investments, both domestic
papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing
and foreign, andof more
generalactive
relevance.
publicUnless
(1) In any
otherwise contested
provided case
by law, theallagency
partiesmay,
shallinbe entitled
case to notice and
of disobedience, hearing.
invoke the The
aid ofnotice shall be served
the Regional Trial at least
Court withinfive (5) days before the date of the
participation in whose
the jurisdiction
affairs of the contested
private
casehearing and shall
being heard falls.state
The the date,
Court maytime and contumacy
punish place of theorhearing.
refusal as contempt. corporations and enterprises through which
(2) The
Section parties
14. shall- be
Decision. given
Every opportunity
decision renderedto present
by the evidence
agency inand argumentcase
a contested on all issues.
shall be inIf writing
not precluded
and bystate
shall
desirable law, informal
clearly
activities may disposition
and pursuedmay
bedistinctly for be
the themade
facts andof
the any
law contested
on which case by stipulation,
it is based. agreed
The agency settlement
shall or default.
decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission.
promotion of The parties
economic shall be notified
development; and, to of the
(3) The
decision agency shall
personally or bykeep an official
registered mailrecord of itsto
addressed proceedings.
their counsel of record, if any, or to them. promote a wider and more meaningful
Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15)equitable days afterdistribution
the receipt of of
wealth,
a copythere is aby the
thereof
party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if need for an agency of the government to be
proper, has been perfected. One motion for
invested with ample powers to protect such
reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period. investment and the public;
WHEREAS, to achieve these national
objectives, it is necessary to reorganize and
restructure the Securities and Exchange
Commission to make it a more potent,
responsive and effective arm of the
government to help in the implementation of
these programs and to play a more active role
in national-building;
a. Power to Issue Subpoena, WHEREAS, it is necessary and desirable to
Declare Contempt professionalize such agency by investing it
1. General Statutory Provision

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987,

BOOK VII
Section 13. Subpoena. - In any
contested case, the agency shall have
the power to require the attendance of
witnesses or the production of books,
papers, documents and other pertinent
data, upon request of any party before or
during the hearing upon showing of
general relevance. 53 Unless otherwise
provided by law, the agency may, in case
of disobedience, invoke the aid of the
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota

Section 2. That the Commission shall be a collegial body composed of a Chairman and two (2) Associate Commissioners who shall be appointed by the President and the
tenure of the office of each member shall be seven (7) years:SectionProvided,6.however,
In orderThat to the Chairman
effectively and the Members of the Commission first appointed by the President shall
exercise
serve for a period of seven (7) years, five (5) years and three (3) years,
such as fixed the
jurisdiction, in their respective appointments:
Commission shall Provided, further, That upon the expiration of his term, a
5. Failure to file by-laws within the required period;
Member shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed
possess the and qualified:
following powers: and Provided, Finally, that no vacancy shall be filled except for the unexpired portion
6. Failure to file required reports in appropriate forms as determined by the Commission within the prescribed period;
of the term. The Chairman shall receive an annual salary of Fifty a) Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and a monthly allowance of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos and each Member
j) To exercise such other powers as implied, necessary or To issue
incidental preliminary
to the carrying oroutpermanent
the express powers granted to the Commission or to achieve the objectives and
shall receive an annual salary of Forty-Two Thousand Five Hundred (P42,500.00)
injunctions, Pesos and
whether a monthly or
prohibitory commutable allowance of One Thousand Five Hundred (P1,500.00)
purposes of this Decree.
Pesos. mandatory, in all cases in which it has
In the exercise of the foregoing authority and jurisdiction of the Commission, hearings shall be conducted by the Commission or by a Commissioner or by such other
Section 3. The Commission shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision andandcontrol
in over
whichall corporations, partnerships or associations, who are the grantees of primary
bodies, boards, committees and/or any officer as may jurisdiction,
be created or designated by cases the
the Commission for the purpose. The decision, ruling or order of any such
franchise and/or a license or permit issued by the government to operate provisions
pertinent in the Philippines;
of the and inofthe
Rules Courtexercise of its authority, it shall have the power to enlist the aid and
Commissioner, bodies, boards, committees and/or officer may be appealed to the Commission sitting en banc within thirty (30) days after receipt by the appellant of notice
support of any and all enforcement agencies of the government, shall civil or military.
apply;
of such decision, ruling or order. The Commission shall promulgate rules of procedures to govern the proceedings, hearings and appeals of cases falling within its
Section 4. The Commission shall reorganize and restructure the b) present
To punish staff andfor personnel
contempt ofofthethe agency. The proposed staffing pattern of the Commission with the
jurisdiction.
corresponding salary scale, attached as Annex "A" is hereby approved: Commission,Provided,bothThat except
direct anden as to the technical staff and such other positions as the Commission, with the
indirect,
The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision or ruling of the Commission sitting banc to in the Supreme Court by petition for petition for review in accordance with
approval of the President, may declare to be highly technical, policy-determining
accordance with or the primarily
pertinent confidential,
provisionsall positions in the Commission are subject to the Civil Service Law
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
and Rules.
Section 7. The Commission is authorized to recommend of, and President
to the penalties the prescribed
revision,by, the Rulesamendment or adjustment of the charges and fees, which by law, it is
alteration,
Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of of the Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations
Court;
authorized to collect.
registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees,
c) To is it compel
shall havethe original and exclusive
officers anyjurisdiction
of additional to hear and decide cases involving:
Section 8. With the approval of the President, the Commission further authorized to create positions as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the boardcorporation
of directors, or business
association associates,
registered its officers
by it or partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which
and intents of this Decree.
may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of thetostockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.
Section 9. So much amount as may be needed to implement call meetings
the provisions of of
thisstockholders
Decree taken from or the income of the Commission not to exceed twenty-five (25%) per
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,
members between
thereof under and itsamong stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the
supervision;
cent thereof and any unexpended balance in the current appropriation is hereby authorized to be appropriated.
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
d) To members or associates, of respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association
Section 10. When the exigency of the service so requires andpass
with theuponapproval
the validity the
of the President, funds may be set aside from the appropriation provided for the
and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise issuance
or right toand exist as such
use entity; and voting
Commission and/or from the fees collected under existing laws, decrees, rulesof and proxies
regulations to defray expenses to be incurred by the Commission.
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors,trusttrustees, officers or managersstockholders
of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
Section 11. The Commission shall submit an annual report to agreements the Presidentfor of absent
the Philippines not later than January 31 of each year with such recommendations as may
be necessary. or members;
Section 12. All laws, executive orders, decrees, rules and e)regulations
To issue subpoena duces contrary
or parts thereof, tecum and to or inconsistent with the provision of this Decree are hereby repealed,
amended or modified accordingly. summon witnesses to appear in any
This decree shall take effect immediately. proceedings of the Commission and in
Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of March, in the yearappropriate
of Our Lord, cases
nineteen order search
hundred and andseventy-six.
seizure or cause the search and seizure of
all documents, papers, files and records
as well as books of accounts of any entity
or person under investigation as may be
necessary for the proper disposition of the
cases before it;
f) To impose fines and/or penalties for
violation of this Decree or any other laws
being implemented by the Commission,
the pertinent rules and regulations, its
orders, decisions and/or rulings;
g) To authorize the establishment and
operation of stock exchanges, commodity
exchanges and such other similar
organization and to supervise and
regulate the same; including the authority
to determine their number, size and
location, in the light of national or regional
requirements for such activities with the
view to promote, conserve or rationalize
investment;
h) To pass upon, refuse or deny, after
consultation with the Board of
Investments, Department of Industry,
National Economic and Development
Authority or any other appropriate
54
government agency, the application for
registration of any corporation,
partnership or association or any form of
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
EVANGELISTA V JARENCIO
68 SCRA 99
MARTIN; Nov. 27, 1975
NATURE
Original action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction
FACTS
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under
Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
President of the Philippines created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4
of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged the
Agency with the following functions and
responsibilities:
b. To investigate all activities involving or
affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions,
smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness,
subversion, and all other activities which are
prejudicial to the government and the public
interests, and to submit proper recommendations
to the President of the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and
corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to
establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition
of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to
conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior
of any public official or employee and to file and
prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate
agency.
- The President vested in the Agency all the
powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code, including the power to summon witnesses
by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.
- Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency,
issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then
Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to
be and appear as witness at the Office of PARGO...
then and there to declare and testify in a certain
investigation pending therein."
- Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent
Fernando Manalastas filed with CFI Manila an
Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or
injunction with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305
and assailed its legality. Respondent issued the
assailed order which reads:
“IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner
[private respondent] be issued restraining the
respondents [petitioners], their agents,
representatives, attorneys and/or other persons
acting in their behalf from further issuing
subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding
investigations to the petitioner [private
respondent] and from instituting contempt
proceedings against the petitioner [private
respondent] under Section 530 of the Revised
Administrative Code.”
ISSUE
WON the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys
the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of
fact-finding investigations.
HELD
YES.
Ratio Administrative agencies may enforce
subpoenas issued in the course of investigations,
whether or not adjudication is involved, and
whether or not probable cause is shown and even
before the issuance of a complaint.
Reasoning We recognize that in the case before
Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power
from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an
effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony
relevant to the investigation" with the authority
"to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications
as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar
character." Such subpoena power operates in
extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid
out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and
(h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely
exercisable, as respondents would have it, in
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-
paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all
these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or
intertwine with one another with the principal aim
55
A2010
of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the
Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious
activities and anomalies in the civil service. To
hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is
confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the
Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-
paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the
enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what
function should the subpoena power be exercised.
It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant,
that a specific charge or complaint of violation of
law be pending or that the order be made
pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation
be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose
of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to
prove a pending charge, but upon which to make
one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its
obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of
testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose,
and that the proposed witness be claimed to have
information that might shed some helpful light.
Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to
summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant
to issues on litigations it does not follow that an
administrative agency charged with seeing that
the laws are enforced may not have and exercise
powers of original inquiry. The administrative
agency has the power of inquisition which is not
dependent upon a case or controversy in order to
get evidence, but can investigate merely on
suspicion that the law is being violated or even
just because it wants assurance that it is not.
When investigative and accusatory duties are
delegated by statute to an administrative body, it,
too may take steps to inform itself as to whether
there is probable violation of the law. In sum, it
may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1)
within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand
is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is
reasonably relevant.
- There is no doubt that the fact-finding
investigations being conducted by the Agency
upon sworn statements implicating certain public
officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's
sphere of authority and that the information
sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando
Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
possession, is reasonably relevant to the
investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-
incrimination extends in administrative
investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings. In the present case, We
find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not
facing any administrative charge. He is merely
cited as a witness in connection with the fact-
finding investigation of anomalies and
irregularities in the City Government of Manila with
the object of submitting the assembled facts to the
President of the Philippines or to file the
corresponding charges. Since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of
future action, any unnecessary extension of the
privilege would thus be unwise. Anyway, by all
means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may
contest any attempt in the investigation that tends
to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination.
Disposition order is set aside and declared of no
force and effect.
GUEVARRA v COMELEC
G.R. No. L-12596
BAUTISTA ANGELO; JULY 31, 1958
FACTS:
-The COMELEC, on May 4, 1957, after proper
negotiations, awarded to the National Shipyards &
Steel Corporation (NASSCO), the Acme Steel Mfg.
Co., Inc. (ACME), and the Asiatic Steel Mfg. Co.,
Inc. (ASIATIC), the contracts to manufacture and
supply the Commission ballot boxes. On May 8,
1957, both the NASSCO and the ASIATIC signed
with the Commission on Elections the
corresponding contracts thereon. On May 13,
1957, the Commission cancelled the award to the
ACME for failure of the latter to sign the contract
within the designated time and awarded to the
NASSCO and the ASIATIC, one-half each, the
11,000 ballot boxes originally alloted to the ACME.
-ACME filed three petitions, the first to of which
were denied. Due to the seriousness of its
allegations on the third petition, the COMMISSION
ordered an investigation. Pending the
investigation, an article entitled "Ballot Boxes
Contract Hit", which tended to interfere with and
influence the Commission on Elections and its
members in the adjudication of a controversy” was
published in the Sunday Times and signed by
petitioners.
-COMELEC ordered petitioner cause why it should
not be punished for contempt for having published
said article. Petitioner filed motion to quash stating
COMELEC: 1) cannot punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as
neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the
Commission granted a power to so punish the
same, for should Section 5 of Republic Act No. 180,
vesting the Commission with "power to punish
contempts provided for in Rule of the Court under
the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein," be applied to the case at hand;
2) Assuming that the Commission's power to
punish contempt exists, the same cannot be
applied to the instant case, where the Commission
is exercising a purely administrative function for
purchasing ballot boxes; 3) Assuming that the
Commission's power to punish contempt exists,
said power cannot apply to the present case
because the matter of purchasing the ballot boxes
was already a closed case when the article in
question was published.
-COMELEC denied motion to quash. Hence the
present appeal
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to
conduct contempt proceedings against petitioner
HELD:
NO
- Section 2, Article X of the Constitution states that
the COMELEC "shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all
other functions which may be conferred upon it by
law. Section 5 of the Revised Election Code
supplements what other powers may be exercised
by said Commission
-under these two, it would therefore appear that
COMELEC not only has the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections but the power to try, hear and decide
any controversy that may be submitted to it in
connection with the elections.
-The ministerial duties of the said Commissioner
includes the first duty of the Commission to set in
motion all the multifarious preparatory processes
ranging from the purchase of election supplies,
printing of election forms and ballots,
appointments of members of the boards of
inspectors etc.
56
A2010
-it may also be reasonably said that the
requisitioning and preparation of the necessary
ballot boxes to be used in the elections is by the
same token an imperative ministerial duty which
the Commission is bound to perform if the
elections are to be held. Such is the incident which
gave rise to the contempt case
-In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a
ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise
the power to punish for contempt as postulated in
the law, for such power is inherently judicial in
nature
-"The power to punish for contempt is inherent in
all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and
to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice" . “And the exercise of
that power by an administrative body in
furtherance of its administrative function has been
held invalid”
CATURA
TOLENTINO v INCIONG
G.R. No. L-36385
FERNANDO; July 25, 1979
NATURE
Petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction
FACTS
- A verified complaint the then National Labor
Relations Commission was filed, charging
petitioner Arcadio R. Tolentino with violating the
constitution of the Batangas Labor Union by
refusing, as its president, to call for the election of
officers. National Labor Relations Commission
issued an order directing the Batangas Labor
Union to hold its election of officers within twenty
(20) days from receipt thereof.
- Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the
Secretary of Labor, praying at the same time that
the pre-election conference and the election be
suspended in the meanwhile. However, respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, thru its then
Chairman, Amado G. Inciong, informed the herein
petitioner that the elections of officers of the
Batangas Labor Union would proceed as
scheduled.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- The Batangas Labor Union filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance of Batangas a civil case
for prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction,
against the respondent Domingo Cinco and the
National Labor Relations Commission and the
Secretary of Labor, seeking to annul the order to
hold elections.
- On the same date as the filing of the case with
the CFI, petitioner and Judge Delos Angeles were
served with a copy of a subpoena issued by
respondent Amado Inciong requiring them to
appear before him to explain why he should not be
held in contempt for trying to use old society
tactics to prevent a union election duly ordered by
the Commission under Presidential Decree 21.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S
WON Inciong can cite Tolentino and Judge Delos
Angeles for contempt
HELD
NO
- The undeniable concern of respondent Inciong
that the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 21
be attained thus afforded no warrant for exercising
a power not conferred by such decree. He ought to
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
have known that the competence, "to hold any
nature andfor
person in contempt for refusal
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
to comply"
certainly cannotpersonally
extend tobya judge
the judge
of the after
court examination
of
first instance.describing the place ittocannot
Correctly construed, be searched
cover and the persons or things to be seized.
the case likewise of a party to a controversy who
took the necessary steps to avail himself of a
judicial remedy. It must ever be borne in mind by
an administrative official that courts exist precisely
to assure that there be compliance with the law.
That is the very essence of a judicial power. So the
rule of law requires. It is true that courts, like any
other governmental agencies, must observe the
limits of its jurisdiction. In this particular case, it is
admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles,
after hearing the arguments on the propriety of
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for, reserved his resolution in view of the
intricacies of the legal questions raised. 18 The
proper step for an administrative official then is to
seek a dismissal of the case before the court
precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall
within the domain of the powers conferred on it.
Instead, respondent Inciong took the precipitate
step of citing him for contempt. That was an
affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-
settled rules. Neither was there any contumacious
act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial
remedy. It would be a reproach to any legal
system if an individual is denied access to the
courts under these circumstances. The resort of
respondent Inciong to what has been derisively
referred to as epithetical jurisprudence, seeking
shelter in the opprobrious term "old society
tactics," is an implied admission of his actuation
being devoid of support in law. As was so well
stated by Chief Justice Hughes: "It must be
conceded that departmental zeal may not be
permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute."
Disposition the writ of prohibition is granted and
the assailed order citing Judge Delos Angeles as
well as petitioner for contempt declared void and
of no force or effect
b. Warrants of Arrest,
Administrative Searches
1987 CONSTITUTION
Article III
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
1973 CONSTITUTION
Article IV
Section 3. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature
and whatever purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer
as maybe authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and57 the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
A2010
QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION
BOARD
9 SCRA 27
BARRERA; September 30, 1963
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of CFI Manila
FACTS
- On In May 1952, Special Prosecutor Galang
charged Qua Chee Gan et al before the
Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S.
dollars in the total sum of $130K, without the
necessary license from the Central Bank, and of
having clandestinely remitted the same to
Hongkong and other petitioners, with having
attempted to bribe officers of the Philippine and
U.S. Governments. A warrant for the arrest of said
issue
aliens except
was issuedupon probable
by the presidingcause to be
member determined
of the
the witnesses
Deportation he may
Board. Upon their produce, andbond
filing surety particularly
for P10K and cash bond for P10K, Qua Chee Gan et
al were provisionally set at liberty.
- Qua Chee Gan et al filed a joint MTD because the
charges do not constitute legal ground for
deportation of aliens from this country, and that
said Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such
charges. MTC denied. So Qua Chee Gan et al filed
a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition,
which petition was given due course, but made
returnable to the CFI Manila.
- Board’s answer: Deportation Board, as an agent
of the President, has jurisdiction over the charges
filed against petitioners and the authority to order
their arrest; and that, while petitioner Qua Chee
Gan was acquitted of the offense of attempted
bribery of a public official, he was found in the
same decision of the trial court that he did actually
offer money to an officer of the USAF in order that
the latter may abstain from assisting the Central
Bank official in the investigation of the purchase of
$130K from the Clark Air Force Base, wherein Qua
Chee Gan was involved.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
- CFI upheld the validity of the delegation by the
president to the Board of his power to conduct
investigations for determining whether the stay of
an alien in this country would be injurious to the
security, welfare and interest of the State. CFI also
sustained the power of the Board to issue warrant
of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary
release pending investigation of charges against
him, on the theory that the power to arrest and fix
the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is
essential to and complement the power to deport
aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Hence, this appeal. .
ISSUES
1. WON the Board, as agent of the President, has
power to investigate and deport undesirable
aliens.
2. WON, conceding without deciding that the
President can personally order the arrest of the
alien complained of, such power can be delegated
by him to the Deportation Board.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Investigation and deportation of an
undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by
order of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to Sec.69 of the Revised Administrative
Code (Act No. 2711)2, and by the Commissioner of
Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board
of Commissioners, under Sec.337 of C.A. 613.
Reasoning
[1] While it may really be contended that Sec. 69
of Act No. 2711 did not expressly confer on the
President the authority to deport undesirable
aliens, unlike the express grant to the
2
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A
subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall
not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands
or repatriated to his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by
said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground
upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the
person concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than
these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall
also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses."
3
Sec. 37 says to the effect that the Commissioner of
Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and
expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or
grounds therefore.
Commissioner of Immigration under C.A. No. 613,
but merely lays down the procedure to be
observed should there be deportation proceedings,
the fact that such a procedure was provided for
before the President can deport an alien – which
provision was expressly declared exempted from
the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940
– is a clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of the
existence of such power in the Executive. [2] The
charges against Qua CHee Gan et al constitute an
act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of
U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank
regulations an economic sabotage which is a
ground for deportation under the provisions of R.A.
503 amending Sec.37 of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940. The President may therefore order the
deportation of these petitioners if after
investigation they are shown to have committed
the act charged. [3] The Deportation Board, being
an agent of the Executive, may exercise such
power by virtue of delegation.
2. NO
- The exercise of the power to order the arrest of
an individual demands the exercise of discretion
by the one issuing the same, to determine whether
under specific circumstances, the curtailment of
the liberty of such person is warranted. The fact
that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute
relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the
warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to
make the issuance of such warrant dependent
upon conditions the determination of the existence
of which requires the use of discretion by the
person issuing the same.
- In other words, the discretion of whether a
warrant of arrest shall issue or not is PERSONAL to
the one upon whom the authority devolves. And
authorities are to the effect that while ministerial
duties may be delegated, official functions
requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment,
may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant
of power, considering that no express authority
was granted by the law on the matter under
discussion, that would serve the curtailment or
limitation on the fundamental right of a person,
such as his security to life and liberty, must be
viewed with caution, if we are to give meaning to
the guarantee contained in the Constitution4. If this
4
The right of the People to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
58
A2010
is so, then guarantee a delegation of that implied
power, nebulous as it is, must be rejected as
inimical to the liberty of the people. The
guarantees of human rights and freedom can not
be made to rest precariously on such a shaky
foundation.
- Thus, EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it
empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant
of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against
an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the
conditions for the temporary release of said aliens,
is declared illegal.
Disposition Decision appealed is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION insofar as the order of arrest issued
by the respondent Deportation Board is declared
null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such
order of arrest, decreed cancelled.
VIVO v MONTESA (Calacday)
29 SCRA 155
Reyes ; July 29, 1968
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction
FACTS
-The Calacdays, arrived in the Philippines from
Hongkong, Upon their arrival, they sought
admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, a
board of special inquiry found them to be the
legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one Isaac
Calacday, and thus admitted them into this
country. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to
each of them an identification certificate as a
Filipino citizen.
-In February, 1963 Isaac Calacday confessed
before an immigration official that the seven
respondents were not his sons but retracted his
confession in March, 1963, in an investigation in
the Department of Justice, with the explanation
that, in a fit of anger, he disclaimed, under oath,
paternity of the respondents because they refused
to give him money.
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of
Rights, Philippine Constitution).
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
-Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo
issued warrants of arrest against the herein
private respondents, stating in said warrants their
deportability under Section 37(a) (1) and Section
37(a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, for having
entered the Philippines "by means of false and
misleading statements and that they were not
lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being
properly documented for admission". The warrants
directed any immigration officer or officer of the
law to bring the respondents before the
Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any
there be, why they should not be deported.
-Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The
others remained at large.
-Calacday filed before the CFI a petition asking to
restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have
not been arrested; to release Manuel Calacday
who had been arrested; and to prohibit the
deportation of all the petitioners, all upon the
claim that they are Filipino citizens.
ISSUES
1. WON CFI has jurisdiction
2. WON the Commissioner has the power to issue
an arrest warrant
Held
1. NO
- These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of
the Immigration authorities under Sections 29 and
37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613).
That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino
citizenship, where the Commissioner or
Commissioners have reliable evidence to the
contrary; and said officers should be given
opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship
before the courts interfere in the exercise of the
power of judicial review of administrative
decisions.
2. No
- Commissioners of Immigration has no jurisdiction
to issue such solely for purposes of investigation
and before a final order of deportation is issued,
conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III
(Bill of Rights, unreasonable searches and seizures
and requirements for warrant of arrest) of the
Constitution.
It will be noted that the power to determine
probable cause for warrant of arrest is limited by
the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively,
unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal
Constitution of the United States that left
undetermined which public officials could
determine the existence of probable cause. And in
Qua Chee Gan, et al., vs. Deportation Board, L-
20280, promulgated on September 30, 1963, this
Court pointed out that Executive Order No. 69 of
July 29, 1947, issued by President Roxas, in
prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens,
only required the filing of a bond by an alien under
investigation, but did not authorize his arrest.
Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is,
therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other
than the judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the
arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into
effect the power of deportation is valid only when,
as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation,
the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the
investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien
be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the
executive order of President Quirino, that a bond
be required to insure the appearance of the alien
during the investigation, as was authorized in the
executive order of President Roxas."
SANTOS V COMMISSIONER
74 SCRA 96
FERNANDO; November 29, 1976
FACTS
- Petitioner was detained by virtue of a warrant of
arrest on the ground that he is a Chinese citizen
who entered the country illegally.
- He filed a writ of habeas corpus before the lower
court. The lower court granted the petition and
ordered the respondent commissioner to produce
the petitioner and to explain under what
circumstances he was arrested and is being
detained.
- Respondent claims that the petitioner is a
Chinese Citiizen; that there is a pending
deportation proceedings against him; and that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
- The lower court, without passing upon the issue
of citizenship, ordered the release of the petitioner
59
A2010
ISSUE
WON the warrant of arrest against the petitioner
was valid
HELD
NO.
Ratio Under the express terms of our Constitution,
it is therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of
an individual may be ordered by any authority
other than the judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause,
leading to an administrative investigation
Reasoning
- The Constitution does not distinguish between
warrants in a criminal case and administrative
warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one
suspected of having committed a crime is entitled
to a determination of the probable cause against
him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of
arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a
violation, either by an executive or legislative
officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose,
as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the
Constitution which is issuable only on probable
cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of
arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or
to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The
contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest
of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the
power of deportation is valid only when, as already
stated, there is already an order of deportation
Disposition Decision affirmed
HARVEY v DEFENSOR
G.R. No. 82544
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.; June 28.
1988
NATURE
Petition for habeas corpus
FACTS
- Petitioners Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, and
Adriaan Van Elshout were apprehended by agents
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
pedophiles who were apprehended after 3 months
of close surveillance. Only the 3 petitioners have
chosen to face deportation.
- Deportation proceedings were instituted against
petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Sec.
69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioners
filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond
alleging that their health was being seriously
affected by their continuous detention. Upon
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
for their provisional release, respondent ordered
the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who
certified that petitioners were healthy. Petitioners
filed a Petition for Bail which respondent denied
considering the certification that petitioners were
healthy. Respondent ordered petitioners' transfer
to the CID detention cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the
transfer was deferred pending trial due to the
difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID
where trial was on-going.
- Petitioner Andrew Harvey filed
Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally
agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he
be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and
placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he
voluntarily departs the country." The Board of
Special Inquiry allowed provisional release of 5
days only under certain conditions. However, it
appears that on the same date that the aforesaid
Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-
petitioners had already filed the present petition.
- Petitioners question the validity of their detention
on the following grounds:
1) There is no provision in the Philippine
Immigration Act nor under Sec. 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which legally clothes the
Commissioner with any authority to arrest and
detain petitioners pending determination of the
existence of a probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.
2) Respondent violated Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches
and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed
with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure
as required by the said provision.
3) Mere confidential information made to the CID
agents and their suspicion of the activities of
petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with
their association with other suspected pedophiles,
are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and
detention unless they are caught in the act. They
further allege that being a pedophile is not
punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime
to be a pedophile.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners' right against unreasonable
searches and seizures was violated
2. WON petitioners' arrest was valid
3. WON the Commissioner had authority to detain
petitioners
4. WON petitioners should have been granted bail
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The arrest of petitioners was based on
probable cause determined after close surveillance
for 3 months during which period their activities
were monitored. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without
warrant. Those articles were seized as an incident
to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in
evidence
a 2. YES
Ratio Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
records show that formal deportation charges have
been filed against them. Warrants of arrest were
issued against them. A hearing is presently being
conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The
restraint against their persons, therefore, has
become legal. It is a fumdamental rule that a writ
of habeas corpus will not be granted when the
confinement is or has become legal, although such
confinement was illegal at the beginning.
3. YES
Ratio The deportation charges instituted by
respondent Commissioner are in accordance with
Sec. 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act, which
empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to
issue warrants for the arrest of overstaying aliens.
The arrest is a step preliminary to the deportation
of the aliens who had violated the condition of
their stay in this country.
4. NO
Ratio The denial by respondent Commissioner of
petitioners' release on bail was in order because in
deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a
matter of right but a matter of discretion on the
part of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation.
Disposition
The Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas
Corpus is denied
60
A2010
LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA V LIWAG
175 SCRA 318
FERNAN; July 13, 1989
NATURE
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
FACTS
- Lucien Tran Van Nghia (petitioner) is a French
national with temporary address in Sta. Ana.,
Manila. Originally a temporary visitor, his status
was changed to that of an immigrant based on his
representation that he is financially capable and
will invest in the Philippines (which he hasn’t
done).
- Dionisio G. Cabrera, the petitioner’s landlord,
accused petitioner of being an undesirable alien,
and forwarded a complaint to CID Commissioner
Ramon J. Liwag (respondent). Acting on the
complaint, Liwag ordered a team of 7 CID agents
to locate and bring petitioner to the Intelligence
Division for proper “disposition.”
- The agents sought the assistance of the WPD
when the petitioner adamantly refused to be taken
in. In the struggle that ensued, both petitioner and
the lawmen were injured. Finally the petitioner was
subdued and taken to the CID Intelligence Office.
- A warrant of arrest was issued by Liwag,
but there was nothing in the records showing
that the agents served the warrant prior to
his apprehension.
- The French consul requested that the petitioner
be transferred from his cell to the PGH for
treatment of his injuries. This petition for habeas
corpus was filed to avert the threat of petitioner’s
detention.
ISSUE
WON the arrest and detention of petitioner prior to
the deportation proceedings were legal.
HELD
NO
Art. III, Sec. 2
“no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce xxx”
- Particular circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and
propriety of petitioner’s apprehension. The
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
essential requisite of probable cause was
conspicuously absent. HOWEVER, certain events
have supervened to render the petition MOOT and
ACADEMIC, curing the defects of the arrest.
- Firstly, petitioner is no longer in confinement.
Petitioner was released upon posting bail in the
amount of P20K during the pendency of the
administrative proceedings. GENERAL RULE: the
release, whether permanent or temporary, of
a detained person renders the petition for
habeas corpus moot and academic, unless
there are restraints attached to his release
which precludes freedom of action.
- Secondly, records show that formal deportation
proceedings have been initiated against petitioner
before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. The
restraint against petitioner’s person has become
legal, and the writ of habeas corpus has served its
purpose.
DISPOSITION The petition is dismissed.
SALAZAR V ACHACOSO
183 SCRA 145
SARMIENTO; March 14, 1990
FACTS
-Oct 21, 1987: Rosalie Tesoro, in a sworn
statement filed with the POEA charged petitioner
Hortencia Salazar of illegal recruitment (refusal to
release PECC Card, 9months of failure to deploy
her to Japan).
-Nov 3, 1987: Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom
said complaint was assigned, sent to Salazar a
telegram directing the latter to appear before the
POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit.
-On that same day, having ascertained that
Salazar had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso
issued his challenged closure and seizure order.
Invoking the powers vested in him under PD No.
1920 and EO No. 1022, he ordered the closure of
Salazar’s recruitment agency and the seizure of
the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing
illegal recruitment … without prejudice to Salazar’s
criminal prosecution under existing laws.
-Jan 26, 1988: POEA Director on Licensing and
Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office
order designating three lawyers as members of a
team tasked to implement the Closure and Seizure
Order. Doing so, the group assisted by
Mandaluyong policemen and two mediamen
proceeded to Salazar’s residence. There it was
found that Salazar was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio.
-Before entering the place, the team served said
Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora
Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into
the premises. Mrs. Salazar informed the team that
Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil). However, when
required to show credentials, she was unable to
produce any. The team confiscated assorted
costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.
-Jan 28, 1988: Salazar filed with POEA a letter by
her counsel requesting that the personal
properties seized at Salazar’s residence be
immediately returned on the ground that said
seizure was contrary to law and against the will of
the owner thereof. The letter alleged violation of
the due process clause (lack of prior notice or
hearing) and the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. It further
alleged that the entry, the search and the seizure
were done without her consent and were done
with unreasonable force and intimidation, together
with grave abuse of the color of authority, and
constitute robbery and violation of domicile under
Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. Said
letter further stated that unless said personal
properties (allegedly worth around P10k and
already due for shipment to Japan) are returned
within 24hours from receipt of the letter, Salazar’s
camp shall feel free to take all legal action, civil
and criminal, to protect their interests.
-Feb 2, 1988: before POEA could answer the letter,
Salazar filed this petition for prohibition. POEA, on
the other hand, filed a criminal complaint against
her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal.
NOTE: The acts sought to be barred are already
fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late.
But SC chose to consider the petition as one for
certiorari in view of the grave public interest
involved.
ISSUE
WON the POEA (or the Secretary of Labor) may
validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code
HELD
NO.
61
A2010
-Under Article III, Section 2 , of the 1987
Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who
may issue warrants of arrest and search. The
exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and
undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the
purpose of deportation.
-1973 Consti: aside from judges, "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law"
may conduct preliminary investigations and issue
warrants of arrest or search warrants. No such
phrase in 1987 Consti.
-Therefore, mayors and prosecuting bodies may no
longer issue warrants.
-History of Art. 38, par. (c) of the Labor Code:
Under PD1693, the Minister of Labor merely
exercised recommendatory powers. PD1920, with
the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the
campaign against illegal recruitment, gave the
Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers.
PD2018 gave the Labor Minister search and
seizure powers as well. The provisions of PD2018
has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c)
of the Labor Code.
-The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no
longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process.
To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph
(c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no
force and effect.
-Morano v. Vivo is inapplicable. Deportation cases
are exceptional; arrests (of undesirable aliens)
ordered by the President or his duly authorized
representatives, in order to carry out a final
decision of deportation are valid because of the
recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters
involving foreign affairs.
-Moreover, the search and seizure order in
question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it
was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a
general warrant [“seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used
as the means of committing illegal recruitment”]
which is null and void, for a warrant must identify
clearly the things to be seized.
Disposition Petition granted. Art. 38, par (c) of
the Labor Code declared unconstitutional and null
and void. Respondents ordered to return all
materials seized as a result of the implementation
of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
Administrative Law
Dean Carlota
CID V DELA ROSA
197 SCRA 853
BIDIN; May 31, 1991
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
- William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor,
arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with
Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed
Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong and sought admission as
Filipino citizens.
- After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 rendered a decision admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens.
As a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was
issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the
immigration authorities.
- The then Secretary of Justice issued
Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu
proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry.
The same memorandum directed the Board of
Commissioners to review all cases where entry
was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of
William and others.
- The new Board of Commissioner reversed the
decision and ordered the exclusion of, among
others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of
exclusion was issued.
- Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as
well as the others covered by the warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the
Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case
against them was assigned.
- The Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the
then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the
reversal of the decision of the then Board of
Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of
arrest
- Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order
reaffirming the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian
as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of
arrest issued against him
- The acting director of the National Bureau of
Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along
with the other applicants covered by the warrant
of exclusion be charged with violation of Sec. 37
(a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and
(d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
amended, also known as the Immigration Act of
1940
- The Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner
of Immigration for investigation and immediate
action
- Petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued
a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian. The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo and was
released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.
- William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila presided by respondent Judge
dela Rosa
- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case
alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction
over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board
of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge
dela Rosa issued the assailed order denying the
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
WON the arrest of respondent Gatchalian follows
as a matter of consequence based on the warrant
of exclusion issued.
HELD
NO
- Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as
amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act
of 1940, reads: The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after
a determination by the Board of Commissioner of
the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien.
- From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear
that in matters of implementing the Immigration
Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned,
the Commissioner of Immigration may issue
warrants of arrest only after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the
alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid,
62
A2010
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final
order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and
void for being unconstitutional
- As held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board
(supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and
administrative proceedings. And if one suspected
of having committed a crime is entitled to a
determination of the probable cause against him,
by a judge, why should one suspected of a
violation of an administrative nature deserve less
guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged
alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If
the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest is to determine the existence of probable
cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of
constitutionality for only judges can issue the
same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
- A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration,
clearly indicates that the same was issued only for
purposes of investigation of the suspects, William
Gatchalian included.
- Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of
respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6,
1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to
stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest
made no mention that the same was issued
pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant
of exclusion.
- As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their
petition or comment to the counter-petition of
respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with
others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the
Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
- The Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due
course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a
memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner
Victor Nituda recommending 1 the reconsideration
of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued
against applicants.
- Then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an
Order which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting
respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino
citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest
and revalidated their Identification Certificates.
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota
- The above order admitting respondent as a
Filipino citizen is the last official act of the
government on the basis of which respondent
William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights
of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently,
the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of
respondent William Gatchalian.
- There should be no question that Santiago
Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a
Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very
order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed
the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact
that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino.
- Furthermore, petitioners' position is not
enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest
came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged
cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not
be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the
cause of deportation arises."
- Petitioners' alleged cause of action and
deportation against herein respondent arose in
1962. However, the warrant of arrest of
respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo
only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after. It
is clear that petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed and by their inaction could not
now be validly enforced by petitioners against
respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was
already recalled and the Identification certificate of
respondent, among others, was revalidated on
March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner
Nituda.
- The Court, therefore, holds that the period of
effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a
warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the
BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself
provides for a period of prescription. Prescription
of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the
State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a
certain time, while prescription of the penalty is
the loss or forfeiture by the government of the
right to execute the final sentence after the lapse
of a certain time
Disposition Petition Dismissed. William
Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen.

63
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota

64
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota

65
Administrative Law A2010
Dean Carlota

66