Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
ARTICLE 4 sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her
10. Garcia v. People (2009)
Facts:
One night, Amado Garcia was having a drinking spree with
his friends, when Manuel Chy, who lived nearby, requested the
group to quiet down as the noise from the videoke machine
was blaring. It was only after Manuels second request when
the group obliged. But apparently, Amado was mad AF and
bore a grudge against Manuel. Three days later, Amado
confronted Manuel and suddenly punched him in the face.
Amado kept on assaulting him. Manuel managed to escape
with the help of Amados companion, Foz. Manuel ran towards
his house and phoned his wife Josefina, to call the police.
When the police reached Manuels home, there was no answer.
Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found
Manuel lying unconscious. He died of myocardial infarction.
Amado was charged with homicide and was convicted
thereof by the RTC as affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Amado is liable for the death of
Manuel.
Held: Yes. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended. The essential requisites for the
application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is
felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the
unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the
actors wrongful acts. In this case, petitioner was committing a
felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a bottle.
Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart
ailment does not alter petitioners liability for his death. Where
death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened
condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does
not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is
responsible for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is
different from the one he intended. Thus, the circumstance
that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of
the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability. Since he
deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition
simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of
the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, we must appreciate as
mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the
physical injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have
resulted naturally and logically, in the actual death of the
victim, if the latters heart was in good condition.
11. People v. Ulep (1988)
Facts:
Macario Ulep was charged with parricide for the killing of
his wife, Asuncion. The spouses had a fight, and Ulep elbowed
Asuncion in the chest at around 5:30 pm. She vomited and
then went to bed. At around 9 pm, Asuncion died of a heart
attack. Autopsy showed that Asuncion suffered several
fractures in the ribs. Ulep claimed that a year before, while his
wife went to have their palay milled, their bullcart loaded with
breast, thus, according to Ulep, the gradual weakening of the
heart due to a long standing illness of the body system caused
the cardiac arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion. To
bolster his bullsh*t, he pointed out the fact that there were no
contusions on the chest of the victim, indicating that the elbow
blows could not have fractured the ribs.
Issue: Whether or not Ulep is guilty of parricide.
Held: Yes. Even if the victim is suffering from an internal
ailment, liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow
delivered by the accused (a) is the efficient cause of death;
or (b) accelerated his death; or (c) is the proximate cause of
death; then there is criminal liability. Apropos to all these is
that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended." Again, We elucidated that: even
though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any
external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the
spleen and peritonitis and cause death, and even though the
victim may have been previously affected by some internal
malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death,
he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death
as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted.
12. Belbis, Jr. v. People (2012)
Facts:
Petitioners Rodolfo Belbis and Alberto Crucales were
charged with homicide for the killing of Jose Bahillo who was a
Barangay Tanod of Barangay, Naga, Twi, Albay. On Dec. 9
1997 at around 10 pm, petitioners were loitering outside a
store when Jose told them to go home. Petitioners claimed
that Jose went after them, and thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo.
The nightstick turned out to be a bolo sheathed on a scabbard.
Rodolfo managed to take the bolo from Jose and stabbed the
latter. When Jose went home, he told his live-in partner,
Veronica what happened, that he was held by Alberto and
stabbed by Rodolfo. Jose was taken to a hospital and his
wounds were treated. He was supposed to return to the
hospital but did not do so due to financial restraints. On Jan. 1,
1998, Veronica brought Jose back to the hospital as he was
complaining of urinary retention and pains in his lumbar
regions. He was diagnosed by Dr. Corral as having advanced
Pyelonephritis, his kidney was inflamed and with pus formation
and scarring. On January 8, Jose died.
The RTC convicted petitioners of homicide but applied the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTCs ruling but took away the mitigating
circumstance.
Petitioners contended that the stab wounds were not the
proximate cause of the Joses death.
Issue: Whether or not the stab wounds were the proximate
cause of Joses death.
Held: Yes. What really needs to be proven in a case when the
victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. Proximate
cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred." The autopsy report indicated that the
cause of the victim's death is multiple organ failure. According
to Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, the doctor who conducted the autopsy,
the kidneys suffered the most serious damage. Although he
admitted that autopsy alone cannot show the real culprit, he
stated that by having a long standing infection caused by an
open wound, it can be surmised that multiple organ failure was
secondary to a long standing infection secondary to stab
wound which the victim allegedly sustained. What is important
is that the other doctors who attended to the wounds
sustained by the victim, specially those on the left and right
lumbar area, opined that they affected the kidneys and that
the wounds were deep enough to have caused trauma on both
kidneys.
The Court also did not give much weight to the testimony
of the doctor for the defense as he merely examined Joses
cadaver as compared to the doctors who treated Jose when he
was still alive.
13. Urbano v. IAC (1988)
Facts:
At around 8 am of Oct. 23, 1980, Filomeno Urbano went
to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan
and was surprised that the place where he stored his palay
was flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed. Marcelo Javier, who was nearby,
admitted that it was his fault. Urbano got angry and hacked
Javier with a bolo in his hand and leg. Urbano stopped upon
the plea of his daughter. Urbano and Javier eventually had an
amicable settlement before the barangay. But on Nov. 14,
1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital as he had lockjaw and
was having convulsions. The doctor found that Javiers
condition was caused by tetanus toxin.
Charged with homicide, Urbano argued that the proximate
cause of the death of Javier was his own negligence as Javier
got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to
his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The lower courts convicted Urbano, ruling that Javiers death
was the natural and logical consequences of Urbanos unlawful
act.
Issue: Whether or not Urbanos guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: No. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the
direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted
upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the
victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time
Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Doubts are
present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the
remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take
necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause (Manila
Electric Co. v. Remoquillo).
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go
scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records
show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However,
the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out
by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and
Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while
Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This
settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express
provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3).
14. People v. Villacorta (2011)
Facts:
On January 22, 2002, Danilo Cruz went to a sari-sari store
to buy bread. Out of nowhere, Orlito Villacorta appeared and
thereafter stabbed the left part of the body of Cruz with a
sharpened bamboo stick. After that, Villacorta fled. Cruz was
helped by bystanders and he was brought to a nearby hospital
where he was treated as out-patient. He was discharged on
the same day but on February 14, 2002, or 21 days after the
stabbing incident, he returned to the same hospital where he
was treated for severe tetanus. The next day on February 15,
2002, Cruz died. The medical report states that Cruz died of
tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals convicted
Villacorta for murder.
Issue: Whether or not Villacorta is guilty for murder.
Held: No. In this case, the proximate cause of the death is not
the stabbing done by Villacorta upon Cruz. There was an
efficient intervening cause which appeared between the time
of the stabbing and the time of the death of Cruz. In
explaining this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the
fact that severe tetanus (the kind of tetanus which causes
immediate death) has an incubation period of 14 days or less.
In this case, the stabbing made by Vilalcorta could not have
caused the tetanus infection as 22 days already lapsed from
the time of the stabbing until the date of death of Cruz.
Something else caused the tetanus other than the stabbing
in short, Cruz acquired the tetanus 14 days or less before
February 15, 2003 and not on the date of stabbing.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victims
death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time [Cruz] was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
Villacorta is however guilty of slight physical injuries based
on the facts. Neither is he guilty of attempted nor frustrated
murder, his intent to kill was not proven by the prosecution.
15. People v. Acuram (2000)
Facts:
At around 7 pm, Rolando Manabat along with others were
waiting for a ride home. They flagged down an approaching
jeepney, which, however, swerved dangerously towards them.
Rolando shouted at the jeep, and one passenger shouted back.
Immediately thereafter, two gunshots came from the front side
of the jeepney and hit Rolando on the right knee. Rolando was
brought to the hospital at round 11 pm. He underwent surgery
at around 5 am but he died at 11 am on the same day. The
doctor said that he died of massive loss of blood due to
gunshot wound.
The passenger who shot Rolando happened to be a police
officer named Orlando Acuram. He was seated at the front,
right side of the jeepney. Charged with murder, Acurams
defense, among others, was that the delay in giving proper
medical attendance to the victim constitutes an efficient
intervening cause which exempts him from criminal
responsibility. The trial court convicted him of murder.
Issue: Whether or not the delay in giving proper medical
attendance constitutes an efficient intervening cause.
Held: No. Appellant never introduced proof to support his
allegation that the attending doctors in this case were
negligent in treating the victim. On the contrary, Dr. Ismael
Naypa, Jr., testified that the attending doctor at the Cagayan
de Oro Medical Center tried his best in treating the victim by
applying bandage on the injured leg to prevent hemorrhage.
He added that the victim was immediately given blood
transfusion at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital when
the doctor found out that the victim had a very low blood
pressure. Thereafter, the victim's blood pressure stabilized.
Then, the doctor operated the victim as the main blood vessel
of the victim's right leg was cut, thereby causing massive loss
of blood. The surgery was finished in three hours.
Unfortunately, the victim died hours later. We cannot hold the
attending doctors liable for the death of the victim. The
perceived delay in giving medical treatment to the victim does
not break at all the causal connection between the wrongful
act of the appellant and the injuries sustained by the victim. It
does not constitute efficient intervening cause. The proximate
cause of the death of the deceased is the shooting by the
appellant. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is
responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act such as
death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact
that the injured did not receive proper medical attendance
would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility. The rule is
founded on the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a
convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of
his wrongful act. If the rule were otherwise, many criminals
could avoid just accounting for their acts by merely
establishing a doubt as to the immediate cause of death.
16. People v. Talampas (2011)
Facts:
Ernesto Matic (a tricycle driver who sidelines in a band)
along with Eduardo Matic and Jose Sevillo were infront of
Joses house, repairing a tricycle. Suddenly, Virgilio Talampas y
Matic who was riding a bicycle alighted. He brought out a short
gun and fired at but missed Eduardo who took refuge behind
Ernesto. Talampas again fired 3 more times, one shot hitting
Ernesto at the right portion of his back and the other hitting
Eduardo on his nape. Thereafter, Tampas ran away, and the
victims were brought to the hospital. Eduardo managed to
survived, but Ernesto died. According to the doctor, the shot to
Ernesto was fatal as it involved the major organs such as the
lungs, liver and the spinal column which caused Ernestos
death.
Charged with homicide, Talampas interposed self-defense
and accident. According to him, Eduardo tried to hit him with a
monkey wrench, so they grappled for it. Meanwhile, Talampas
noticed that Eduardo had a gun, so he tried to grabbed it, and
in doing so, the gun accidentally fired. Moreover, he pointed
out that his enemy had been Eduardo and not Ernesto.
The RTC and the CA convicted Talampas of homicide.
Issue: Whether or not it matters that Eduardo, and not
Ernesto, was Talampass target.
Held: No. The fact that the target of Talampas assault was
Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of
Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas felonious deadly assault against
Eduardo. Talampas poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or
mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him
from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability.
Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what
is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
17. People v. Flora (2000)
Facts:
During a dance party to celebrate the birthday of Jeng-
jeng Malubago, Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a suitor of Jeng-
jeng, attended the party with his brother, Edwin. At around
1:30 am, Hermo fired his revolver twice: The first shot grazed
the right shoulder of Flor Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma,
below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte. As a
result of the incident, Ireneo and Emerita died, while Flor
suffered injuries. It so happened that days before the incident,
Hemo had a violent altercation with a certain Oscar Villanueva,
and it was Oscars uncle, Ireno, who pacified them.
Hermo and Edwin were charged with double murder and
attempted murder. The RTC convicted them as charged.
Issue: Whether or not Hermo and Edwin are guilty of double
murder and attempted murder, considering that their target
was only Ireneo.
Held: Yes. In the present case, when Hermogenes Flora first
fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and
Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for Emeritas death and
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
Flors injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the
basis of aberratio ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act be
different from that which he intended.
However, Edwin was acquitted of the murder of Ermita
and Flor, because evidence shows only conspiracy to kill
Ireneo and no one else.
18. People v. Violin (1997)
Facts:
There was a party in Brg. San Jose, Catbalogan, Samar. In
attendance were the victims Dioscoro Jr. and Darmo Astorga
and the accusedAntonio Violin, Remegio Yazar, Cessar
Allego and Eutiquio Cerriguene. Later that evening, Dioscoro
wanted to go home but was not able to due to lack of
transportation, so he and Darmo just stayed at Allegos house.
At around 4 am, Dioscoro and Darmo were roused from their
sleep by Allego who invited them for food and liquor. They
were gathered in the kitchen. After a few rounds, Allego asked
Violin to buy more beer. Violin left followed by Cherriguene
and Yazar. Meanwhile, Dioscoro asked to use the comfort
room but was told by Allego to urinate outside. Darmo, who
was left alone in the kitchen, heard gunshots. He tried to go
outside but was met by a bloodied Dioscoro who told him to
hide. Darmo crawled and hid himself under a table measuring
about 3 feet wide, 7 feet long and 2 fee and 4-1/2 inches tall.
While in hiding, Darmo witness the killing of his brother. A
stray bullet also grazed the right side of Darmos head.
The killing was apparently politically motivated. Dioscoro
and Darmo were the sons of the Daram city mayor, with
Dioscoro, Jr. being groomed to replace his father. The accused
were fanatics and avid followers of the mayors political rival,
Miguel Figueroa.
The accused were charged with murder and frustrated
murder. Allego has remained at large. Also charged with the
same crimes were Miguel Figueroa and Catalino Figueroa, the
one who contracted the hitmen. The RTC convicted them as
charged.
Issue: Whether or not the charge of frustrated murder for the
injuries sustained by Darmo proper.
Held: No. The crime of slight physical injuries, not frustrated
murder, was committed against Darmo Astorga. Antonio Violin
fired at Dioscoro Astorga Jr. and not at Darmo. There is not
the slightest indication that at that time Violin knew that
Darmo was hiding under a table. Darmo himself admitted that
he was injured by a stray bullet which grazed the right parietal
region of his head. The wound was diagnosed as superficial
and required treatment only for three (3) days.
19. People v. Adriano (2015)
Facts:
A speeding blue Toyota Corolla overtook a maroon Honda
CRV. When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the
passenger on the front seat of the Corolla hot the CRV and
caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road
embankment. Four armed men ten suddenly alighted the
Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who was
later identified as Danilo Cabiedes. A stray bullet also hit a
bystander, Ofelia Bulanan. Danilo died on the spot, while Ofelia
was brought to the hospital but eventually also died. The
Corolla was registered under the name of Antonio Rivera who
was actually engaged in the car rental business. That particular
Toyota Corolla was leased to Rolly Adriano.
Adriano, and four others who remained at large, were
charged with murder.
The RTC convicted Adriano. the CA affirmed the ruling of
the RTC that Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga at the time of the incident does not convince
because it was not impossible for Adriano to be physically
present at the crime scene, in Barangay Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in less than an hour.
Issue: Whether or not Adriano is also liable for the death of
Ofelia, who hit by a stray bullet.
Ruling: Yes. Criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act be different
from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional
felony is responsible for all the consequences which may
naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the
doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal
causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of
the evil caused.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio
ictus? Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate,
we shall adhere to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in
People v. Flora, where the Court ruled that treachery may be
appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora, the accused was
convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the killing of
two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the
victim killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, qualified both
killings to murder. The material facts in Flora are similar in the
case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora doctrine.
20. People v. Sales (2011)
Facts:
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior,
then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to
attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia
without the permission of their parents. They did not return
home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria),
looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby
Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar
and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother
prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home a
furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped
them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought
his kids outside their house. With Noemars and Juniors hands
and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating
them with a thick piece of wood.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back
to the house, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria
then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned
with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a
hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious
Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them
to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
quack doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar
is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Appellant was charged with parricide and slight physical
injuries.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since
no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar
died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never
complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant
recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a
year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a
weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered
from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers from epileptic seizures,
Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain
consciousness after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur
whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The trial court charged the accused guilty of parricide and
slight physical injuries. Accused argued that he merely
intended to discipline Noemar and not kill him.
Issue: Whether or not accused is guilty of parricide.
Ruling: Yes. In order that a person may be criminally liable
for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it
is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that
the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.20
Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar
and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony.
As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child,
he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his
son, Noemar, is thus clear. Appellants claim that it was
Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no
merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since
it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr. Salvador Betito, a
Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a
death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-
pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that his
death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth
emphasizing that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also,
even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to
his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was
even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that
Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death
while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy.
Interestingly, Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by
evidence.
All the elements of the crime of parricide is present in this
case. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of accused.
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to
prove the first element, that is, a person was killed. There is
likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element
that the appellant killed the deceased. It is sufficiently
established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. As
to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the
deceased is his child.
As to the charge of Physical injuries, the victim himself,
Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar,
were beaten by their father, herein appellant, while they were
tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have been hit on his right
eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician
thereafter. Maria corroborated her sons testimony.
21. Intod v. CA (1992)
Facts:
Sulpicio Intod and four others met with Aniceto
Dumalagan who instructed them to kill Bernardina
Palangpangan with whom Dumalagan had a land dispute. The
five men went to the house of Bernardina. They identified
Bernardinas bed room and opened fired. It so happened that
no one was at the room at that time, and no one was hurt.
Convicted by the RTC of attempted murder, Intod argued
that he is liable only for an impossible crime under Art. 4(2) of
the RPC.
Issue: Whether or not Intod is guilty of attempted murder.
Held: No. In the United States, where the offense sought to
be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the
offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted
of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the
elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that
the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the
offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor
cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt
not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in
American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime.
Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime
charge that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction,
impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of
accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but
an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent
impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal
Code makes no distinction between factual or physical
impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime. To uphold the contention of respondent that
the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the
actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which
makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case
all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the
actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated
felonies.
22. Jacinto v. People (2009)
Facts:
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
A certain Baby Aquino handed petitioner Gemma Jacinto a
BDO check postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of P10,000.
The check was payment for Babys purchases from Mega Foam
Intl., Inc. Gemma was then a collector for Mega Foam. The
check was, however, deposited in the Land Bank account of
Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Captle; the latter
is the sister of Gemma and used to be a Mega Foam employee.
The check, however, bounced.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca received a call from a
customer who asked if she could issue checks payable to the
account of Mega Foam instead of to CASH, because
apparently the customer was instructed by Jac to make the
checks payable to CASH. Thereafter, Rowena again received a
call, this time from a Landbank employee who was looking for
Generoso concerning the bounced check. Because Generoso
and Jac had no landline, Rowena called Anita Valencia, a
neighbor of Generoso and Jac and also a former Mega Foam
employee. Valencia told Rowena that the check came from
Baby, and instructed Rowena to replace the check with cash.
Valencia also told Rowena of a plan to take the cash and divide
it equally into four: for herself, Rowena, Gemma and Jac.
Rowena wisely reported the matter to Mega Foams
owner, who, in turn, coordinated with Baby and filed a
complaint with the NBI which planed an entrapment operation.
Ten pieces of P1,000 bills were marked and dusted with
fluorescent powder and were given to Rowena, who was
tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencias
plan.
And so, Rowena met with Gemma, Jac and Valencia.
Rowena was given the BDO check and was instructed to
request Baby to replace it with cash. Rowena pretended to get
cash from Baby and brought the pre-marked P10,000 to
Gemma and Valencia. Jac was not with them, because for her,
shopping is life. While they were dividing the money, Gemma
and Valencia were arrested.
Gemma, Valencia and Jac were charged with Qualified
Theft. The RTC convicted them as charged, but the CA
reduced Valencias penalty to 4 months arresto mayor and
acquitted Jac.
Issue: Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of
theft.
Held: No. The personal property subject of the theft must
have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain
from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309,
where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen. In this
case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging
to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as
it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on
whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Applying the principle laid down in Intod v. CA, the
Supreme Court held that Petitioner's evil intent cannot be
denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant
for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to
petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out
to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace
the value of said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the
P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought was the cash
replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. Under
the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
there is only one operative act of execution by the actor
involved in theft the taking of personal property of another.
The circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as
supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer
necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was hatched only after the check
had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of
theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving
the cash replacement should not be considered as a
continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was
caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating
evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
23. People v. Tan (1993)
Facts:
Enrico Paulo Agra, an eight-year old child, was walking
with a classmate when he was approached by Pablito who
requested his assistance in getting his fathers signature on a
medical certificate. But instead of going to the hospital, the
man flagged a minibus and forced Enrico inside. When they
alighted, Pablito talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an
envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boys father. They
took a tricycle, and the driver noticed that Enrico was crying
frantically, so he immediately reported the matter to two
barangay tanods. The tanods chased Pablito, who left Enrico
behind. Enrico was able to get home safely. Meanwhile, his
father noticed that the handwriting of the letter looked
familiar, and tests by NBI revealed that it was written by Dr.
Samson Tan, a resident physician in the hospital owned by
Enrique.
Pablito and Tan were charged with kidnapping with
serious illegal detention. The RTC convicted them as charged.
Tan argued that the crime alleged is not kidnapping with
serious illegal detention as no detention in an enclosure was
involved. If at all, it should be denominated and punished only
as grave coercion.
Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that
the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime which
he says is not punishable. His reason is that the second
paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an
act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment
or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or
property but against liberty, he argues that it is not covered by
the said provision.
Issue: Whether or not Pablito and Tan are lowlife kidnappers.
Held: Yes. Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; of if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death
where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or
any other person; even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.
Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not
only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining
him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. In the case
at bar, it is noted that although the victim was not confined in
an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian
restrained him from going home and dragged him first into the
minibus that took them to the municipal building in Gumaca,
thence to the market and then into the tricycle bound for San
Vicente. The detention was committed by Domasian, who was
a private individual, and Enrico was a minor at that time. The
crime clearly comes under Par. 4 of the above-quoted article.
As to the issue on impossible crime, Tan conveniently
forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly
applies to him, thus: By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. Even before the ransom note was
received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention
had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an
impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability
of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or
ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the
rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had
already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of
his liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had
the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the last
paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have
been possible under the new Constitution.
The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover.
According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before the
incident happened and requested a loan of at least
P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and
Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even
raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help. The refusal
obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1
million for his release.
ARTICLE 6
24. People v. Lamahang (1935)
Facts:
Aurelio Lamahang was caught by the police opening with
an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. He was able
to break one board and in unfastening another from the wall
before the police showed up.
Lamahang was charged and convicted by the CFI of
attempted robbery.
Issue: Whether or not Lamahang is guilty of attempted
robbery.
Held: No. The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal
Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the
execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator,
leading directly to its realization and consummation. It is
necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried
to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in
order that the simple act of entering by means of force or
violence another person's dwelling may be considered an
attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the
offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose
of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In
the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which
such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From
the fact established and stated in the decision, that the
accused on the day in question was making an opening by
means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only
be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention
was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its
owner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering
the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates,
or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record
to justify a concrete finding.
Therefore, Lamahang is guilty only of attempted trespass
to dwelling.
25. Baleros v. People (2006)
Facts:
UST Med student Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou) was
sleeping in her dorm when she was awakened by the smell of
chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. Somebody
was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She was
able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed
causing the man to let go. Malou called for help, but the man
was able to escape. Later on, the man was identified by the
dorms security guard to be Renato Baleros (Chito), a rejected
suitor of Malou.
Chito was charged with attempted rape and was convicted
by the RTC and the CA. Chitos alibi was that he was at a
fraternity party in Greenhills.
Issue: Whether or not Chito is guilty of attempted rape.
Ruling: No. Overt or external act has been defined as some
physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles
nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically
and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case,
it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing
a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would
induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an
intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized
that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt
on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part.
For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is
anybodys guess. s. The CA maintained that if the petitioner
had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the
complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated
the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim
had been rendered unconscious. At bottom then, the appellate
court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under
the rule on evidence in criminal cases. For, mere speculations
and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to
establish the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of
execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
Chito was instead convicted by the Supreme Court of light
coercion.
26. People v. Lizada (2003)
Facts:
Rose Orillosa separated with her husband. She took her
childrenAnalia, Jepsy and Rosselwith her. To make both
ends meet, Rose worked as a waitress in Manila. Rose met
Fredie Lizada, and they decided to live together as husband
and wife. However, from the years 1996 to 1998, Lizada
sexually abused and even raped Roses daughter, Analia.
These acts were kept from Rose as Lizada threatened to kill
Analia. But on Nov. 9, 1998, Rossel caught Lizada on top of
Analia. Eventually, Analia broke down and told her mother
everything.
Lizada was charged with four counts of qualified rape
under four separate informations. The RTC convicted him as
charged.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in convicting
Lizada of for counts of qualified rape.
Held: No (hes still a rapist tho). With respect to the three
charges of rape, the Court held that only simple rape was
committed, since the qualifying circumstance of Analias age,
which was 13 years, was not alleged in the Information.
With respect to the other charge of rape (the one
committed on Nov. 9, 1998), the Court held that Lizada is
guilty of only attempted rape: In light of the evidence of the
prosecution, there was no introduction of the penis of accused-
appellant into the aperture or within the pudendum of the
vagina of private complainant. Hence, accused-appellant is not
criminally liable for consummated rape.[36] The issue that now
comes to fore is whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of
consummated acts of lasciviousness defined in Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code or attempted rape under Article 335 of
the said Code, as amended in relation to the last paragraph of
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. In light of the evidence on
record, we believe that accused-appellant is guilty of
attempted rape and not of acts of lasciviousness.
Acts constitutive of an attempt to commit a felony should
be distinguished from preparatory acts which consist of
devising means or measures necessary for accomplishment of
a desired object or end. One perpetrating preparatory acts is
not guilty of an attempt to commit a felony. However, if the
preparatory acts constitute a consummated felony under the
law, the malefactor is guilty of such consummated offense.
It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous
desistance of a malefactor exempts him from criminal liability
for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the
crime committed by him before his desistance. In light of the
facts established by the prosecution, we believe that accused-
appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of private
complainant. The overt acts of accused-appellant proven by
the prosecution were not mere preparatory acts. By the series
of his overt acts, accused-appellant had commenced the
execution of rape which, if not for his spontaneous desistance,
will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused-appellant
desisted from performing all the acts of execution however his
desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so
only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel.
Hence, accused-appellant is guilty only of attempted rape.
27. Abella v. People (2013)
Facts:
Petitioner Fe Abella was fighting with Alejandro Tayrus
and Dioniso Ybanes. Abellas brother, Benigno, pacified Abella
and convinced him to go home. Benigno went to Alejandros
house to apologize, when suddenly Abella arrived bringing with
him two scythes, one in each hand. Benigno tried to block
Abella but was hacked in the neck. He fell to the ground, while
Abella ran after Alejandro. Benigno survived after being
treated in the hospital.
Abella was charged with frustrated homicide, and the RTC
and CA convicted him as charged. He argued that there was
no intent to kill, because after the single hacking blow was
delivered to Benigno, he ran after Alejandro.
Issue: Whether or not Abella is guilty of frustrated homicide.
Held: Yes. the use of a scythe against Benignos neck was
determinative of the petitioners homicidal intent when the
hacking blow was delivered. It does not require imagination to
figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use
of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave
him dead. While no complications actually developed from the
gaping wounds in Benignos neck and left hand, it perplexes
logic to conclude that the injuries he sustained were potentially
not fatal considering the period of his confinement in the
hospital. A mere grazing injury would have necessitated a
lesser degree of medical attention. This Court likewise finds
wanting in merit the petitioners claim that an intent to kill is
negated by the fact that he pursued Alejandro instead and
refrained from further hacking Benigno. What could have been
a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no more
desistance to speak of. Benigno did not die from the hacking
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
incident by reason of a timely medical intervention provided to
him, which is a cause independent of the petitioners will.
28. People v. Labiaga (2013)
Facts:
Gregorio Conde and his two daughters, Judy and
Glenelyn, were at their home. Gregorio went outside and was
shot by Regie Labiaga. When the two girls rushed to Gregorios
aid, Judy was shot in the abdomen. Gregorio and Judy was
rushed to the hospital. Gregorio, who suffered merely small
wounds in his forearm and shoulder, recovered, but Judy did
not make it.
Regie and two others (Balatong Barcenas and Cristy
Demapanag) who were with him were charged with murder
and frustrated murder. Regie claimed self-defense. According
to him, Gregorio pulled out a shotgun and tried to shoot him,
but the shotgun jammed. He claimed that he tried to wrest the
shotgun, and during the struggle, the shotfun fired.
The RTC convicted Regie as charged but acquitted Cristy
due to lack of evidence, while Barcenas remained at large. The
CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the charge of frustrated murder for the
wounds inflicted to Gregoio proper.
Held: No. Regie should be convicted of attempted murder. We
distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in
this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony
as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony,
the offender merely commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all
the acts of execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the
other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for
the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident
other than the offenders own spontaneous
desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing
that the wound would have been fatal were it not for timely
medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court
that the wound sustained would have caused the victims
death without timely medical attention, the accused should be
convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder. In
the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained
by Gregorio Conde was mortal.
29. Valenzuela v. People (2007)
Facts:
At SM North Edsa, a security guard saw petitioner Aristotel
Valenzuela haling a push cart with cases of Tide detergent.
Aristotel unloaded these cases in a parking space where Jovy
Calderon was waiting. Aristotel haled a taxi and loaded the
cartons inside. Meanwhile, the security guard approached the
two and asked for a receipt of the merchandise, and they
reacted by fleeing on foot. They were eventually apprehended.
Aristotel and Jovy were charged with theft. The RTC
convicted both of them as charged. In his appeal with the CA,
Aristotel argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated
theft, citing old cases People v. Dio and People v. Flores, both
of which were decided by the CA. In Dio and Flores, it was
held that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the
property stolen is a constitutive element of the crime of theft.
The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling.
Issue: Whether or not there is such a crime as frustrated
theft.
Held: No. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4)
that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
In this case, the moment petitioner obtained physical
possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the
pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed
without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons
nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent
of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would
have afforded him.
30. Canceran v. People (2015)
Facts:
On or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc (a security guard)
saw Jovito Caneeran approach one of the counters in
Ororama; that Caneeran was pushing a cart which contained
two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1,423.00; that
Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been
checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the packer, they
found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic
Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty
Cream worth P28,627.20; that Caneeran hurriedly left and a
chase ensued; that upon reaching the Don Mariano gate,
Caneeran stumbled as he attempted to ride a jeepney; that
after being questioned, he tried to settle with the guards and
even offered his personal effects to pay for the items he tried
to take; that Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal
belongings were deposited in the office of Arcenio.
Canceran was charged with Frustrated Theft. However,
the RTC convicted him of Consummated Theft, which was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not Canceran can be convicted of
Consummated Theft.
Held: No. Canceran was charged with Frustrated Theft, which
was held in Valenzual v. People (2007) to be non-existent. An
accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with
which he was charged in the complaint or information and on
which he was tried. Hence, he can be held liable only for
Attempted Theft, which is necessarily included in
Consummated Theft and lower than Frustrated Theft if there is
such a crime.
31. People v. Quinanola (1999)
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
Facts:
Catalina Carciller (15 years old), along with her cousin
Rufo and another male companion Richard, went to attend a
dance at around 10 pm in Cebu. As they were on their way
home, the accused Agapito Quinanola and Eduardo Escuadro,
who were both armed with guns, held them up and announced
that they were NPA members. Eduardo watched over Rufo and
Richard who were able to run away. Meanwhile, Agapito took
Catalina at a secluded place and had carnal knowledge with
her. Eduardo joined them and did the same to Catalina.
Thereafter, Catalina went home and told her mother what
happened.
A report by the medico-legal officer of the NBI who
examined Catalina concluded that there was no extragenital
injuries and her hymenal orifice was so small that an erect
average-size penis would not have completely penetrated it,
causing laceration.
Agapito and Eduardo were charged with rape, but the RTC
convicted them of frustrated rape, citing the doctrine laid down
People v. Erinia (1927) which was actually abandoned in a
later case, People v. Orita.
Issue: Whether or not there is a crime of frustrated rape.
Held: No. In the context it is used in the Revised Penal Code,
"carnal knowledge" unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual
intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen
be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed consummated even
when the man's penis merely enters the labia or lips of the
female organ or, as once so said in a case, by the "mere
touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act.
32. People v. Orande (2003)
Facts:
The accused in this case was Arnulfo Orande, a pedicab
driver, who was the common law husband of Girle Castro.
Girlie, who worked as a fish vendor, had three children, one of
which was Jessica. Girlie had two more children by Orande.
Between the 1994 and 1996, Orande had raped Jessica for
four times whenever Girlie was away. Jessica was only 9 years
old when she was first raped, 11 on the second, and 12 on the
third and fourth.
It was Jessicas teacher, Mrs. Adoracion Mojica, who
noticed unusual treatment of Jessica by the appellant. When
confronted by Mrs. Mojica, Jessica told her what Orande has
been doing to her. This eventually led to the filing of four
Informations of rape against Orande.
The RTC convicted Orande of simple rape for the first
three rapes but convicted him only of frustrated rape for the
last rape, because Orandes penis only slightly penetrated her
vagina.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction for frustrated rape was
proper.
Held: No. Thus, it was error for the trial court to convict
appellant of frustrated rape. Besides, after a careful review of
the records, we find that the rape was in fact consummated.
Jessica initially testified that, although appellant did not
succeed in inserting his penis in her vagina, she felt his sex
organ touch hers and she saw and felt semen come out of his
penis and smear her vagina. In response to the
clarificatoryquestions asked by the prosecutor, Jessica testified
that the appellant was able to slightly penetrate her because
she felt pain and her vagina bled. It has been held that, to be
convicted of rape, there must be convincing and sufficient
proof that the penis indeed touched the labia or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface
thereof. Nevertheless, we have also ruled in cases where
penetration is not established that the rape is deemed
consummated if the victim felt pain, or the medico-legal
examination finds discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina,
or the labia minora is already gaping with redness, or the
hymenal tags are no longer visible. In the present case, the
victim testified that she felt pain and her vagina bled,
indisputable indications of slight penetration or, at the very
least, that the penis indeed touched the labia and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant
should be found guilty of (consummated) rape and not merely
frustrated or attempted rape.
33. People v. Pareja (2012)
Facts:
At around 3:30 a.m. of June 16, 2003, AAA was sleeping
beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her
sisters room, when the appellant hugged her and kissed her
nape and neck. AAA cried, but the appellant covered her and
BBB with a blanket. The appellant removed AAAs clothes,
short pants, and underwear; he then took off his short pants
and briefs. The appellant went on top of AAA, and held her
hands. AAA resisted, but the appellant parted her legs using
his own legs, and then tried to insert his penis into her
vagina.8 The appellant stopped when AAAs cry got louder;
AAA kicked the appellants upper thigh as the latter was about
to stand up. The appellant put his clothes back on, and
threatened to kill AAA if she disclosed the incident to anyone.
Immediately after, the appellant left the room. AAA covered
herself with a blanket and cried.
AAA narrated to her sister what had happened, and
eventually they went to the Women and Childrens Desk of the
Mandaluyong City Police Station to report the incident.
Pareja was charged with rape and was convicted by the
RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC decision, explaining that a slight
penetration of the labia by the male organ is sufficient to
constitute rape, and that a slight penetration took place when
the appellants penis touched AAAs vagina as he was trying to
insert it.
In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Pareja argued
that the prosecution failed to prove even the slightest
penetration.
Issue: Whether or not Pareja is guilty of consummated rape.
Held: No, he is guilty merely of attempted rape. Based on
AAAs testimony, it appeared that the appellants penis did not
penetrate, but merely touched (i.e., naidikit), AAAs private
part. In fact, the victim confirmed on cross-examination that
the appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis into her
vagina. Significantly, AAAs Sinumpaang Salaysay also
disclosed that the appellant was holding the victims hand
when he was trying to insert his penis in her vagina. This
 Criminal Law Review (2nd Assignment)
circumstance coupled with the victims declaration that she
was resisting the appellants attempt to insert his penis into
her vagina makes penile penetration highly difficult, if not
improbable. Significantly, nothing in the records supports the
CAs conclusion that the appellants penis penetrated, however
slightly, the victims female organ.
Simply put, rape is consummated by the slightest penile
penetration of the labia majora or pudendum of the female
organ. Without any showing of such penetration, there can be
no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape
[or] acts of lasciviousness.
34. Cruz v. People (2014)
Facts:
Norberto and Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of
plastic and glass wares in different localities around the
country. They employed AAA, 15 years old, and BBB to help
them sell their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then
celebrating its fiesta. When they reached Bangar in the
evening, they set up camp. Belinda went back to Manila to get
more goods. At around 1 AM, Norberto stripped off the clothes
of AAA who was awakened from her sleep. Norberto touched
her private parts, and later on he did the same to BBB. The
two girls reported the incident to the police.
Norberto was charged with (1) attempted rape for the
acts he committed against AAA and (2) acts of lasciviousness
for the acts he committed against BBB. The RTC convicted
Norberto for both crimes. The CA affirmed the conviction for
attempted rape but acquitted Norberto of acts of
lasciviousness for lack of evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Norberto was guilty of attempted rape.
Held: No, he was guilty merely of acts of lasciviousness.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense
which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the
beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the
Penal Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed
constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to
establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and
natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed
which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the
offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to
prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape,
but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of
having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted
stage requires the commencement of the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only
means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can
be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended
crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the
female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond
the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his
overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held
liable for attempted rape without such overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the
State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt
acts, should his criminal intent be carried to its complete
termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters,
would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v.
Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime
of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement
of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis
into the vagina, before the interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and
was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing
her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony
would be highly unwarranted.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that
would have produced attempted rape did not include equivocal
preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts
directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the
latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with
rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the
preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to
commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his
putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of
AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and
his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to
buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct
connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not
punishable under the Revised Penal Code for as long as they
remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by
their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what
the perpetrators intent really was.
Norberto was guilty, however, of acts of lasciviousness,
the elements of which are: (a) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex;
and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed
either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years
of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful,
indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that
has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a
wanton manner.