SPOUSES RODOLFO BEROT AND LILIA BEROT VS. FELIPE C.

SIAPNO,

G.R. No. 188944, July 09, 2014

Facts: On May 23, 2002, Macaria Berot and spouses Rodolfo A. Berot and Lilia P. Berot obtained a
loan from Felipe C. Siapno in the sum of P250,000.00, payable within one year together with interest
thereon at the rate of 2% per annum from that date until fully paid. Macaria and Lilia mortgaged to
appellee a parcel of land as security for the loan. On June 23, 2003, Macaria died. Because of the
mortgagors default and their refusal to pay, appellee filed an action against them for foreclosure of
mortgage and damages on July 15, 2004 in the Regional Trial Court . In answer, appellant and Lilia
alleged that that the lower court has no jurisdiction over Macaria for the reason that no summons
was served on her as she was already dead. With leave of court, plaintiff filed his Amended
Complaint substituting the estate of Macaria Berot in place of Macaria Berot as party defendant. The
Court rendered judgment allowing the foreclosure of the subject mortgage and ordered defendants
mto pay the said amount. Appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeals and contends that the
substitution of the estate of Macaria for her is improper as the estate has no legal personality to be
sued but was denied. Aggrieved by the denial of their motion, they now appealed to the Supreme
Court through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, proffering purely questions of law.

Issue: Whether or not the substitution of the estate of Macaria for her is improper as the estate has
no legal personality to be sued.

Held: Petitioners were correct when they argued that upon Macaria Berots death on 23 June 2003,
her legal personality ceased, and she could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the foreclosure
suit. However, when the plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint substituting the estate of Macaria
Berot in place of Macaria Berot as party defendant, defendants made no objections thereto. Not
even an amended answer was filed by the defendants questioning the substitution of the estate of
Macaria Berot. For these reasons, the defendants are deemed to have waived any objection on the
personality of the estate of Macaria Berot. Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that,
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is one that may
be waived by a party to a case. However, in order to avail of that defense, one must timely raise an
objection before the court. The failure of petitioners to timely object to the trial courts exercise of
jurisdiction over the estate of Macaria Berot amounted to a waiver on their part. Consequently, it
would be too late for them at this point to raise that defense to merit the reversal of the assailed
decision of the trial court. The petition was denied for lack of merit.
 VIVENCIO B. VILLAGARCIA VS. FIFTH SHARIA DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 188832, April 23, 2014

Facts: Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meterparcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,

Maguindanao, from one Ceres Canete on February 15, 1996. TCT No. T-15633, covering the parcel
land, was issued in Roldans name on March 3, 1996. By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng
Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the
same parcel of land. Roldan only found out that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land when he had it
surveyed on October 30, 2006. Roldan then filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of
land with respondent Fifth Shari a District Court due to failure to settle with Vivencio at the
barangay level. Respondent Fifth Shari a District Court ruled in its decision that Roldan, as
registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land. It also ordered for Vivencio to
vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay damages as well as attorneys fees. A notice of
writ of execution was sent to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from the receipt thereof to comply with
the decision. Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction. He argued that Shari a District Courts may only hear civil actions and
proceedings if both parties are Muslims, stating Article 155 Paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines. The respondent Fifth Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of Ronalds action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land. Petition was
denied for lack of merit, hence this petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution issued against Vivencio.

Issues: 1. Whether or not a Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of
the parties is not a Muslim

2. Whether or not proceedings before respondent Sharia District Court were valid since the latter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio

Held: 1. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with existing civil courts over real actions not arising from customary contacts wherein the parties
involved are Muslims. In this case, the allegations in Roldans petition for recovery of possession did
not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. Roldan did not dispute Vivencios claim that he is not a Muslim,
as stated in his petition for relief from judgment. Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no
authority under the law to decide Rolands action because not all of the parties involved in the action
are Muslims.

2. Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him
the possession of his property and to pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property. This
action being in personam, service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for Respondent Fifth
Sharia District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencios person. However, Vivencio not being a
Muslim, the said court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Therefore, all
proceedings, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
B.F. CORPORATION AND HONORIO PINEDA vs. FORM-EZE SYSTEMS, INC

G.R. No. 192948, December 07, 2016

Facts: Petitioner B.F. Corporation (BFC) is a corporation engaged in general engineering and civil
works construction. Respondent Form-Eze Systems Inc. (Form-Eze) is a corporation engaged in
highway and street construction. On 29 August 2006, SM Prime Holdings, Inc. awarded the contract
for general construction of the SM City-Marikina mall to BFC whereby the latter undertook to
supply materials, labor, tools, equipment and supervision for the complete construction of the
Project. In turn, BFC engaged Form-Eze for the lease of formwork system and related equipment
for and needed by the Project. On 30 March 2007, Form-Eze filed a Request for Arbitration before
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). In its Complaint, Form-Eze alleged that
BFC still has an unpaid obligation and that BFC wanted to re-negotiate the equipment leases; and
that it was not complying with the contractual and supplemental agreements in effect. On 7
December 2007, the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal rendered a Final Award in favor of Form-Eze. BFC
filed a Motion for Correction of the Final Award. The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal denied the motion
prompting BFC to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. On 15 January 2010, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals heavily relied on
factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal. BFC filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the present petition.

Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the power and the duty to review the factual
findings made by CIAC.

Held: The case of Asian Construction and Dev't. Corp. v. Sumimoto Corporation summarized the
development of the principle that the final award of CIAC may be still be subject to judicial review,
thus:

To begin, Executive Order No. (EO) 1008, which vests upon the CIAC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved
in construction in the Philippines, plainly states that the arbitral award "shall be final and
inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Court." Later, however, the
Court, in Revised Administrative Circular (RAC) No. 1-95, modified this rule, directing that the
appeals from the arbitral award of the CIAC be first brought to the CA on "questions of fact, law or
mixed questions of fact and law." This amendment was eventually transposed into the present CIAC
Revised Rules which direct that "a petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the
parties within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court." Notably, the current provision is in harmony with the Court's pronouncement
that ''despite statutory provisions making the decisions of certain administrative agencies 'final,' the
Court still takes cognizance of petitions showing want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion,
violation of due process, denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law" and
that, in particular, "voluntary arbitrators, by the nature of their functions, act in a quasi-judicial
capacity, such that their decisions are within the scope of judicial review."