The Energy Security Complex

Energy Security and the Regional Security Complex

Theory

DRAFT, PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE

Mikko Palonkorpi
Researcher
Aleksanteri Institute / University of Helsinki
mikko.palonkorpi@helsinki.fi

Abstract

The article evaluates theoretical aspects of energy security. The paper is based on the theoretical concept of Regional
Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and there is an attempt to apply the RSCT to the energy security issues and ascertaining
whether energy security should be considered as a sixth security sector together with already established military, political,
economic, societal and environmental security sectors or should energy security be counted as a sub or super sector to these
five other sectors instead. The paper introduces both the RSCT and securitization as theoretical concepts and also proceeds
to applying these concepts to energy issues.

The Concept of Energy Security

Energy security as a concept is widely used in the media and in academic research, but its definitions are vague and often
limited only to the economic aspects of the phenomena. For instance the energy security defined as an attempt by energy
customers to protect themselves from interruptions, that could endanger supply of energy as an result of an accident,
terrorism, insufficient investment in energy infrastructure or insufficient organization of the energy markets1. Energy
security definitions often emphasize the need to secure sufficient supply and reasonable price for energy:

“[…] conventional definition of energy security – that of securing adequate energy supplies to sustain economic
performance and growth - and extends this quantitatively oriented definition, again in a fairly conventional albeit less
usually discussed direction, to include prices, that is - that of securing adequate energy supplies at reasonable and
2
stable prices in order to sustain economic performance and growth.”

3
“[…] energy insecurity as a susceptibility to prolonged supply disruptions and price spikes.”

However, these definitions do not take into account the political aspects of energy security, which has been on top of the
European energy agenda after the 2005-2006 gas price dispute between Ukraine and Russia. The gas conflict interrupted

1
Milov 2005, p. 60.
2
Eng et al. 2003, p. 4.
3
Bartis et al. 2005.

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 The Energy Security Complex

Russian natural gas deliveries to several EU countries and highlighted effects of growing dependency of Europe on energy
imports4, and in particular on Russian energy resources. 5 The subsequent energy discourse in Europe has pointed out the
danger of over dependency on one main energy supplier (Russia) for European energy security and possibility that energy
could be used as a political weapon.6 This suggests that the concept of energy security is broader than the definitions limited
to the economic dimensions of energy supply and energy price and that energy issues can involve dependency relationships,
which include political aspects that can be argued as (energy) security threats.

Since the energy producers have comparable over dependency threat perceptions on only few energy customers or energy
markets (such as the Russian dependency on European energy market)7, regional energy security cannot be approached only
from the point of view of energy importing countries.8 Therefore, energy security analysis should be able to capture and
combine both economic and political aspects of energy security as well as the perspectives of both energy producers and
customers.

This papers approach to the energy security is the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) introduced by Barry Buzan in
“People, States & Fear”9. The key concept of the theory, securitization, was advanced by Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de
Wilde in “Security: A New Framework for Analysis“10. The paper will first put forward some basic definitions of the
Regional Security Complex Theory and then attempts to show how RSCT and securitization could be applied to energy
security issues.

The Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

Buzan and Wæver have defined regional security complexes as follows:

“The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones,
security interdependence is normally into regionally based clusters: security complexes. […] Process of
securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such
complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and outside of it.”11

In other words, the regional security complexes can be seen as a group of security dilemmas concentrated into certain
geographical area, where essential threat perceptions by states (or other actors) are so interlinked and create such strong

4
For example natural gas import dependency of EU15 is expected to rise from 46% in 2003 to staggering 87% in 2025. Eurogas 2004.
5
The growing dependency on Russian natural gas is not confined to Western Europe. According to the US Energy Secretary Samuel
Bodman in few years time United States might import 10-20% of its natural gas from Russia, Smith 2006.
6
See Larsson 2006 or Stern 2006. Probably the best known case when the oil weapon has been used was the Great Oil Crisis in the 1970’s,
when the OPEC countries applied it against the West. According to Heinberg those instances when oil demand has outreached
dramatically oil supply have resulted from politically motivated delivery disruptions, such as the 70’s oil crisis and not because there
hasn’t been enough crude oil available, Heinberg 2005, p. 92.
7
See Monaghan 2005, pp. 3-5. For example since Russia has insufficient oil export capacity in its warm water ports, it is forced to seek
more diversified energy customer base in order to avoid over dependency on few current customers. Hogarth 2005.
8
The energy producers and consumers view energy security from very different starting points. For example the major energy exporting
states possess 65% of the gas and 75% of the oil reserves in the world, whereas the major energy importing states possess only 10% of the
global energy reserves. Yenikeyff, 2006, p. 1.
9
Buzan 1991.
10
Buzan et al. 1998.
11
Buzan & Wæver 2003, p.4.

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 The Energy Security Complex

security interdependence, that security of a one state cannot be easily separated from security of another. Two components
with different dynamics define security complexes. Distribution of power between the states in specific geographical area
and historical amity and enmity patterns of these states.12

The Energy Security Complex13

Energy security complexes on the other hand could be defined as follows. The regional energy security complexes are
formed by energy related interaction between two or more states in a limited geographical area, which includes an energy
dependency relationship between the states involved and perception of this dependency as a threat (securitization). The
energy interaction includes transactions such as production (export), purchasing (import) and transit of energy. Analogous to
RSCT definitions by Buzan & Wæver, also the threats arising from energy dependencies are usually more intense between
states (or regions) in close geographical proximity. On the other hand, thousands of kilometres long oil and gas export
pipelines can link states, located geographically far apart, into a same chain of energy (inter)dependency. In other instances,
this direct geographical link either does not exist and or is less obvious. A good example is the US and Western European
energy dependency on Persian Gulf hydrocarbon resources, in particular crude oil, which can be - at least logistically - more
easily substituted by energy imports from alternative sources. In energy security complexes regional distribution of energy
resources and regional energy dependencies could be regarded as parallel to the distribution of military power in political-
military based security complexes. This highlights an important question: are the regions and actors the same in the energy
security complexes and in the more traditional political-military security complexes? In order to outline an energy security
complex one needs to evaluate the relative strength of energy dependencies by measuring such factors as energy trade
balance, level of (domestic) energy resources and possibilities for energy diversification.14 In the Eurasian context this idea
can be roughly conceptualized by thinking the relative (%) energy dependency of different CIS-states on Russian gas, oil and
electricity imports measured against their ability to diversify energy imports from alternative sources or increase their own
domestic energy production.

However, these percentages or relative dependency figures are aggregate measures of overall energy (supply) dependency
from specific exporting country; therefore these shares have to be balanced against energy mix of the individual states. For
example, at first sight Finland’s 100% dependency on natural gas imports from Russia would indicate strong dependency
pattern resembling circumstances in Georgia and in Armenia. However, the decisive difference is that natural gas constitutes
only around 11% of Finland’s primary energy consumption.15 Therefore, there is room for analytical choice, whether one
chooses to construct regional energy security complexes based upon aggregate energy dependencies or whether it makes
more sense to construct these along major energy sources (i.e. natural gas, oil, coal, electricity, renewables, hydro power or

12
Buzan 1991, pp. 189-194.
13
In their writings on the Regional Security Complex Theory Buzan and Wæver do not consider energy as a separate sector of security,
but instead it is incorporated into the economic security sector, Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 97-99, 116. It should also be underlined that the
energy security complex is an abstract analytical concept and as such it should not be confused with such concepts as the fuel and energy
complex (FEC) which in Russian context is used to describe energy sector of the Russian economy.
14
The energy price is also very effective instrument for political pressure. If the energy price is subsidized by another state, the elites of
the both receiving and supplying country know that the subsidized energy prices can be withdrawn at any point of time. Subsidized energy
prices in turn contribute to the internal stability and dependent state is expected to take supplying country’s interests into consideration in
order to secure subsidized prices – and internal stability - in the future. On the other hand, revenues from energy exports are no less
important for producer countries internal stability. Increased earnings from energy exports which account for more than half of Russia’s
total exports have enabled Russia to payback its loans in advance and in past six years to have a surplus budget, which in turn has reduced
the pressure to raise taxes, ERT 2006, p. 10. Should these revenues suddenly disappear, the Russian Federation would face considerable
stability challenges.
15
Kara et al. 2004, pp. 64, 68-69.

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 The Energy Security Complex

nuclear power). Analyst has to make the assessment, whether or not this is well-grounded or justified. What speaks heavily
against dividing energy security complexes according to the energy sources is the fact that in the policy making process the
energy security of any given state is treated as an aggregate whole. However, a powerful counter argument for analyzing the
security implications of the different energy sources separately is the difference in their transportation capabilities and the
structure of their markets. For example, the crude oil can be easily transported by large tankers from the other side of the
world and thereby the oil market is truly global, where as the natural gas trade rests upon far less mobile gas pipelines and
that is one of the reasons why there is no such thing as the global gas markets or a global gas price. Although it is technically
possible to transport liquefied natural gas (LNG) over long distances by ships, for the most part the gas producers and
customers alike are still lacking the expensive LNG-infrastructure to create a truly global market for natural gas.

Since the 1960’s and 70’s the dependency and interdependency concepts have been widely used in the Marxist oriented
research on global inequality structures, north-south and centre-periphery conflicts. More over, in the mainstream IR theory
interdependency has been associated with liberalist emphasis on markets (dependency) versus realist or neo-realist emphasis
on political (dependency). According to Sullivan for example, the mainstream liberal arguments have advocated separation
between economic and political issues, i.e. that economic activities occur in non-politicized space, where as realist regard
economics subordinate to politics, because for them nations are the main actors and the power is the main objective. 16 The
difference is illuminated by Benjamin Cohen, who by building upon Richard Rosecrance’s distinctions has argued that in the
two extremes liberalism sees states mainly as trading states seeking absolute gains and not interested what are the gains of
other states, where as realism sees states mainly as territorial states, seeking gains relative to other states, i.e. gaining (better)
position among the states.17

Table 1 below illustrate relative dependency shares of selected European states on Russian natural gas imports.18 As perhaps
expected, the gas dependency is strongest in the countries either bordering Russia or in the Russia’s immediate proximity,
where as the states located further away in the West are on average less dependent. Without drawing too far reaching
conclusions from one example, it nevertheless appears that the strength of the gas dependency changes in rough geographical
clusters or “dependency regions” that in this case and with certain exceptions follows the East-West axis. Setting a specific
percentage as a “dependency threshold” that would define borders between different energy security complexes, is some
what arbitrary. For example an argument could be made that if more than half (50%) of the natural gas supply comes from
one country (i.e. Russia) that could indicate at least favorable conditions for dependent state belonging to a same energy
security complex with the source of that dependency (Russia). Naturally these energy dependency percentages have to be
weighted against the entire energy mix of the dependent country and before energy dependencies can form energy security
complexes these energy dependencies have to be articulated as security threats (securitization). In many cases there are some
annual fluctuations in the precise dependency percentages, but often the long term dependency trends are enduring enough to
enable the security complex analysis. Based upon these annual energy dependency fluctuations it could be argued that the
structures of the energy security complexes are dynamic, perhaps even more dynamic than the structures of the military-
political security complexes. A separate question is how much these energy dependency levels have to change before it

16
Sullivan 2002, p. 172-174.
17
Cohen 1990, p. 274; see also Rosecrance 1986, pp. 8, 17, 30, 62.
18
Despite significant energy dependency, the overall EU-Russia trade pattern is complementary, Russia being the main supplier of energy
to the Union, where as the EU being the main supplier of many industrial products to Russia. ERT 2006, p. 5. A comprehensive analysis of
all trade patterns between actors often provides a more symbiotic, interdependent and balanced picture of the trade relations than a one
dimensional and detached emphasis on energy dependency, which is only a part of the whole trade structure.

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 The Energy Security Complex

affects the threat perceptions of the dependent state? Presented above is only the energy consumer side of the energy
security equation that needs to be balanced against securitization of the market dependency levels by the energy producers.

Table 1
Russia’s share of total natural gas imports of selected European/CIS countries in 2004

Weak dependency Medium dependency (Central) Medium dependency Strong dependency

(West) 40-60% (Central) (East)
20-40% 60-80% 80-100%
Italy 35% Belarus* 52% Austria 77% Estonia 100%
France 30% Ukraine* 50% Romania 70% Finland 100%
Germany 41% Czech Republic 69% Moldova 100%
Poland 69% Serbia 100%
Turkey 65% Bulgaria 100%
Latvia 94%
Lithuania 94%
Azerbaijan 89%
* Gas imports from Central Asia Hungary 85%
via Russia are not included. Greece 80%
Slovakia 80%
Source: figures from Heinrich 2006, p. 5.

Equally important factors that define the energy security complexes are the historical amity and enmity patterns that have an
influence on how the energy dependency is perceived. Each energy dependency case can be perceived in varying degree
either as a mutually beneficial interdependency (positive dependency) or as an unequal and threatening dependency (negative
dependency). In other words, the amity and enmity patterns can be seen as factors that partially explain why certain energy
dependencies are politicized and/or securitized when others are not. Based on the different dependency perception
alternatives, the nature of the energy dependency can be placed into an economic-political-security continuum. 19For example
state with cordial bilateral relations to another state might not consider 30% energy dependency from neighbouring state as a
serious security threat, where as two states with antagonistic relations might perceive even 10% dependency as a serious
threat to national security. Although, in reality the economic and political aspects of energy security are often merged
together, that doesn’t reduce the impact of analytical separation of these aspects, which forms the foundation for the study of
energy security complexes. Without analytical separation of these different aspects, energy security would be interpreted as
either completely market driven quest for equilibrium between energy supply and demand or a completely state driven
geopolitical competition for energy resources, transit routes and so forth.

This distinction is well illustrated in the report “Energised Foreign Policy – Security of Energy Supply as a New Key
Objective” by the Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP) in which two scenarios are constructed based upon
global geopolitical developments that effect energy markets (see figure 1 below). In these scenarios sections D and C would

19
However, it can be disputed whether or not the amity and enmity patterns are the most appropriate concepts for the analysis of the
energy dependency perceptions by the energy policy actors, because the realm of energy security is dominated by rather hard value issues.
But since the energy security complex model is based on the original RSCT, it is logical to use the already established terminology.

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 The Energy Security Complex

include China, Russia, India and majority of the producing states which have preferred the state centric global energy (trade)
system. On the contrary the sections A and B would include the US, Japan and the EU which have opted for global energy
market mechanism instead. In the first scenario movement of energy trade towards dominance of states and national oil
companies in the global energy sector favors the state centric system and therefore even actors advocating market driven
system are forced to adopt more bilateral practices to secure the energy supply. As a result the role of the governments is
increased at expense of the (international) energy companies as the main actors in energy policy. In the opposite scenario the
global energy sector is dominated by international energy market mechanisms and it favors the (international) energy
companies as the key actors. Functioning energy markets ensure the balance between energy demand and supply. Since most
of the producer countries and the important future consuming countries (China and India) prefer the state centric system, the
future global energy sector is likely to gravitate towards the first scenario.20

Figure 1

Source: Energised Foreign Policy – Security of Energy Supply as a New Key Objective, 2005, p. 22.

An example of positive energy interdependency the president of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso described
in March 2006 the nature of EU’s energy relations with Russia as interdependency. “[…] if we need a flow of energy from
Russia, namely gas, I believe that it is also in interests of Russia to have a stable market and a stable relationship with such
an important customer as the European Union”.21

20
General Energy Council 2005, Energised Foreign Policy – Security of Energy Supply as a New Key Objective, pp. 22-23.
21
Dempsay 2006, p. 1, 10.

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 The Energy Security Complex

In Georgia the tone has been very different. Unlike Western Europe Georgia has been repeatedly target of natural gas supply
cuts or disruptions, which according to President Saakashvili, have been politically motivated. “[…] Manipulation of energy
prices and supplies is a critical tool of those in Russia who believe that hydrocarbons are the best means of political
influence … [R]ussia’s arbitrary cut-off sent a clear message to the European Union: There can be no energy security when
an undependable neighbour is willing and able to use its energy resources as a weapon in political influence”. 22 The
Georgia’s 100% dependency on Russian natural gas could be considered as a revealing example of negative energy
dependency.

However it is important to emphasize that interdependence as such is not inheritably a positive phenomenon. Climate change
is an illuminating example since it is mostly caused by consumption in the developed North, but the most serious
consequences of the climate change will be felt in the underdeveloped South.23 Similar negative interdependency analogy
could be pointed out between the single crop economies or “monoculture” producers (for example bananas) in the
developing world and the markets in the developed world. Monoculture comparison is also relevant to many “one
commodity” energy producing countries, but unlike devastating effects of ruined crops (and/or sharp global price
fluctuation) to the entire economy of single crop producing countries, the energy producing states are better shielded from
the annual fluctuation risks, because ever increasing global energy demand has kept at least oil and gas prices relatively high.
Moreover, count out the Hurricane Katrine type direct hit, the natural phenomena are usually less of a threat to the energy
production.

As a conclusion it is argued that energy dependency is politicized or securitized more easily if it is linked to other
controversies or conflicts (enmity) between states and these enmity perceptions can be regarded as factors which turn
dependency into a negative energy dependency. Therefore, the energy security complexes are likely to follow the already
existing lines of security interdependence in the region. On the other hand, positive energy interdependency is likely to
develop according to the rules of the energy market where the main threats are secure supply and stable price of energy as
quoted above. As Howard Chase has pointed out, in itself lack of self-sufficiency in energy is not a problem, because energy
trade is the mechanism that should balance that out.24 But on the other hand the concentration of the future oil and gas
reserves/production in the hands of smaller number of states with uncertain prospects for political stability emphasises
enmity or negative perception aspect.25 By this criteria energy security complex could be defined as a geographical area
where negative energy dependencies are concentrated and for positive energy interdependencies a more appropriate term
would be an energy security community.26

22
Saakashvili 2006, p. A19.
23
Shanahan and Carlsson-Kanyama 2005, p. 300.
24
Chase 2006, http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/energy/Events/chase.htm
25
Energised foreign policy, p. 9.
26
This definition raises an important question whether or not the energy security complex is always the underlying phenomena, upon (or
rather against) which the energy security community is built/formed? Logic here assumes that both are based on (inter)dependency, but
perceived as either negative or positive. However, since the energy dependencies do not develop in the isolation from the more general
framework of patterns of regional enmities or amities, it could be that energy security complex does not have to precede the energy
security community if the states in the region have already established security community. The Western Europe and the utilization of the
North Sea hydrocarbons from the 1970’s onwards is a good example.

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 The Energy Security Complex

The Energy Security Communities

The concept of security community was introduced by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950’s. At that time, security communities
were defined as products of profound integration that created sense of community among the states which led to the
expectations that conflicts within that community would be resolved in a non-violent manner. States within the security
communities share core values and security cooperation between them reinforces the mutual understanding of these shared
values. According to Deutsch security communities are either amalgamated or pluralistic. In the former case two sovereign
units are formally integrated into united whole and in latter case sovereignty of states involved stays intact.27

In the energy sector, one of the most ambitious initiatives in this direction has been the Polish proposal in March 2006 for
establishing the European Energy Security Treaty (EEST) that would have been open to the current member states of both
NATO and the EU. Similar to the NATO’s article 5, the EEST would have obligated the signatories to assist other treaty
members if their energy security had been threatened, thereby creating an energy security pact or a sort of an energy NATO.
Key practical feature of the proposed treaty was to set ceiling limits on particular (geographical) sources of energy. Proposal
didn’t meet much success, because it excluded Russia and because majority of the EU countries valued the Russia’s energy
exports over the Polish proposal.28 After all, proposal appeared as an unsuccessful attempt to utilise Norway’s hydrocarbon
resources for advancing the energy security of the NATO-EU Europe as a whole.

Security “Features” of the Different Energy Resources

Energy resource wise, the natural gas appears as the most likely candidate for being used for political purposes. Unlike the
crude oil, the natural gas doesn’t have a global market or a global price, both of which are regionalising factors. However,
the recent initiative by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Russian President Vladimir Putin to establish a natural gas
cartel similar to the OPEC in the oil sector could challenge the isolation of these local markets in the future. If the initiative
becomes materialized, the coordinated actions of the major gas producers and possible gas price regulation could link
fragmented local gas markets to something approaching embryonic world gas market.29 Until then, the natural gas prices are
negotiated locally and quite often the NG prices are not made public and this lack of transparency provides for more
opportunities to securitization. Moreover, the transportation of the natural gas is for large degree still pipeline dependent and
therefore possibilities for rapid adjustment in importing and exporting patterns of the natural gas are much more inflexible
than in crude oil, which can be transported by large tankers from several different producers around the globe. Naturally, the
oil import diversification options available for the landlocked states are limited as well.

Developments in the shipment techniques of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) can also challenge the dominance of the
pipelines as the main export system for the natural gas. Improved LNG systems would increase competition and reduce the
price in the European gas market, since new suppliers such as Oman would be able to enter the market.30 In the beginning of

27
Adler and Barnett 1998, pp. 3-7.
28
Dempsay 2006, p.1, 10.
29
See e.g. “Russia still pondering gas OPEC idea – Putin”, RIA Novosti, 12.2.2007 http://en.rian.ru/world/20070212/60604209.html
30
Rosner 2006, http://www.iags.org/n0119061.htm

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 The Energy Security Complex

1990’s LNG’s share of the global gas trade was just mere 4%, but by 2020 this share is expected to rise to 14%-17%. As a
result increasingly global LNG market will emerge, with more closely linked natural gas prices between different regions. 31

However, critics denounce these estimates as over optimistic. First of all, LNG as a substance is much more difficult and
expensive to transport than crude oil, since extra transport distances add notably to the overall transport costs. Secondly,
construction of the LNG delivery and liquefaction infrastructure is also expensive and volatility of the gas market is an
additional risk factor for the potential long term investor. As a result, short distance regional LNG markets are more likely to
emergence than an oil-like integrated global market for LNG.32 If this holds true, the LNG may not offer a solution to the
regionalizing security qualities of the pipelined natural gas. Furthermore, LNG facilities and large LNG vessels have been
securitized as attractive targets for the terrorists, which has for its part delayed introduction of the LNG technology in many
countries33.

The renewable energy sources (solar energy, wind power and hydroelectric power) on the other hand are the least likely
energy sources to be used for political pressure purposes. The renewables are usually domestically produced energy sources,
which by definition possess less capacity to create dependency patterns that could be utilized politically by outside actors. In
military terms, renewable energy sources could be regarded as “defensive”, since they substitute the reliance on
hydrocarbons and thereby mitigate possible accompanied political dependencies. Again, at least in theory and in very
particular circumstances the natural gas could be labeled as potentially “offensive” energy resource. If the natural gas
pipelines could be regarded as political pressure instruments then they would contain following features: longer the gas
pipeline and more countries connected to it (i.e. more international borders pipeline has to cross), longer the “range” of the
political effects, but less the “accuracy”, because it is technically difficult if not impossible to target the gas cut offs to just
one out of several countries connected to the pipeline. Same logic functions also the other way around: Shorter the pipeline
and less countries connected to it, better the “accuracy”, but shorter the “range” and geographically more limited political
effects.

Structure of the Security Complex

Structure of the security complex can change as a result of changes in the regional balance of power or as a result of change
in historical amity and enmity patterns. Four structural options available for security complex are:

1) Status quo, where changes in distribution of power or amity/enmity patterns have not transformed the essential structure
of the security complex;
2) Internal transformation, where structure of the security complex changes within the existing boundaries of the complex as
a result of changes in those two factors;
3) External transformation, where outer boundary of the security complex is changed, because new states move into the
complex or states move away from the complex. This usually implies redefining more than one security complex;
4) Overlay, which in military security means overwhelming military presence by more powerful state in the area of weaker
state(s) that suppress functioning of normal security dynamics of the region.34

31
Cook 2000, pp. 20-22.
32
Roberts 2004, p. 249.
33
Roberts 2004, p. 250.
34
Buzan 1991, pp. 215-220.

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 The Energy Security Complex

Structure of the Energy Security Complex

Structure of the energy security complex may change as a result of relative changes in the energy dependency (%) or as a
result of shifts in the perceptions of the energy dependency to energy interdependency or vice versa. Building a new power
plant by one state for example could decrease its energy dependency, but this might not be enough to alter the existing
regional energy dependency patterns and therefore the structural status quo of the energy security complex. Internal
transformation would occur when regional energy projects are significant enough to change the dependency patterns within
the region. External transformation can occur as a result of major strategic energy infrastructure undertakings, such as new
oil and gas pipelines, that bring substantial amount of additional energy resources to the complex from outside, change the
energy dependency patterns and link new states to the complex. By extension, this might sift the boundaries of more than
one energy security complex. Overlay in the energy security complex could be viewed as a (almost) total dependency on a
one energy supplier (or a customer) in the region. Overlay could also occur if one state has a monopoly position in energy
transportation. The near 100% control of Russian gas monopoly Gazprom over the Central Asian gas exports to world
markets is the prime example. Rough hypothesis on energy security complex structure polarity could be the following: more
the structure of the complex is tilted towards unipolarity more the degree of dependency within the complex, where as more
the structure is towards multipolarity the more degree of interdependency within the complex.

This formulation is simplification that is open to criticism on grounds that interdependency is equaled with less conflict
prone in state to state relations. For example Waltz has argued that: “[…] mutuality of dependence, which is a feature of
multipolar systems, compels each state to observe others with suspicion” and as Mearsheimer has argued: “[…] if
interdependence is high, there are many occasions in which the states can come into conflict”.35 But on the other hand states
equal more diversification in energy issues to more energy security and therefore in this respect energy security seems to
differ from the neorealist understanding of security.

The Energy Super Powers

Russia has claimed (and at times denied and disputed) its ambitions to become an energy superpower. From IR theory
perspective this claim proposes number of questions that need to be answered. If Russia is to be considered an energy super
power, then:

1. What are the other energy super powers (if any)?

2. What is the polarity structure between energy super powers?

In global perspective it looks like that in the future hydrocarbons production is increasingly concentrated in three main
regions Russia, Middle East and West Africa, where as the main demand regions are United States, the EU and China &
India.36 These three regions in both sides of supply/demand axis are prospective candidates for supply and demand energy
super powers in the global level. Based upon this analysis, the structure of that global energy super power system seems to

35
Quoted in Linklater 1995, p. 247.
36
Chase 2006, http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/energy/Events/chase.htm.

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 The Energy Security Complex

be tri-polar, if supply and demand are considered as separate sides. Following from this it could be argued that Eurasia is one
(perhaps even the only one with close geographical connectivity) of the energy security super complexes, which is centred
around Russian Federation on supply side the EU/Europe on the demand side. This energy security super complex comprises
the whole CIS area, the Baltic States & Finland, Eastern and Central Europe all the way to Germany, Austria and Italy. The
exact boundaries of this super complexes are fluid in the West (and South) due to new energy infrastructure projects, such as
the NEGP, aimed at transporting more Russian hydrocarbons to the Western Europe. Structure and boundaries of this
complex has changed significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Map of major oil trade movements

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006.

Map of major natural gas trade movements

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2006.

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 The Energy Security Complex

Securitization

Regarding securitization, issues are presented as existential threats to the referent object. Securitizing actors37 can attempt to
securitize issues which do not present "objective" existential threat. Issue is successfully securitized only when priority and
urgency of the threat can be argued in such way, that the securitizing actors are able to by pass normal political procedures
when countering the threat. Therefore security arguments are always hypothetical and future oriented. Security arguments
include two options: what happens if certain security action is not taken (i.e. threat materializes) or what happens if certain
security action is taken (i.e. how the selected security policy is expected to work). Therefore, from the securitization
perspective the regional security complexes can be defined as interlinked clusters of successful securitization cases that are
confined into a specific geographical area.38

Securitization of Energy Issues

One of the problems in applying securitization approach to the energy security is the blending of state and energy company
interests in the energy field.39 Identifying the securitizing actors and referent objects of the threats is somewhat problematic
in energy security. In other words, what exactly is threatened by energy security threats and who are the relevant securitizing
actors in energy security? The nature of the existential threat in energy security is captured nicely by Paul Roberts, who
argues that:

“A failure of energy security means that the momentum of industrialization and modernity grinds to a halt,
and survival itself becomes far less certain”.40

In energy security the referent object is highly dependent on who is speaking, i.e. who is trying to raise energy issues to the
security agenda and what mandate they possess to speak. One solution is to approach the energy security referent object
problem from the point of view of the securitizing actors: is an energy issue argued mainly as economic, political or security
issue or as different combinations of the three? The securitization theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is difficult
if not impossible to define parameters of “normal politics” to which securitization process is to be compared (i.e. moving
beyond rules that govern normal political bargaining). On the first sight in the energy security this distinction appears to be
much more clear cut, since we could take market based energy transactions as a yardstick for the normality and consider any
movement away from that as abnormal i.e. likely towards securitization. However, reality is more multidimensional, since
there is large degree of political (state) intervention into energy markets that is considered to be a “normal state of affairs”
and not an example of securitization.

As mentioned above, if the energy issues are argued mainly as economic issues, then securitization is expected to focus on
sufficient supply (and demand) and reasonable price of energy. Great proportion these arguments are almost purely

37
Often securitizing actors are governments, political decision-makers etc. For example states have clear mechanisms who can speak on
behalf of a state, but for other actors these rules are less clear. Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 40-41.
38
See Buzan et al. 1998, pp. 21-45; Buzan & Wæver 2003, p. 71-73.
39
Russian state controlled energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft provide an illustrative example. Chairman of Gazprom, Dmitry Medvedev,
is also the first Deputy Prime Minister, whereas Rosneft’s CEO Igor Sechin is the chief of Kremlin administration. Smith 2006,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060403_russian_energy.pdf.
40
Roberts 2004, p. 238.

12
 The Energy Security Complex

economic without any direct security linkages.41 But for example emergency stockpiling of energy products by National
Emergency Supply Agency in Finland and similar arrangements in other countries are good examples of interface between
economic and security aspects of the energy issues. 42

If energy questions are mainly argued as a political questions, then securitization is focused on different political aspects of
energy dependency where referent object is likely to be the state sovereignty. In extreme cases when energy issues are so
highly politicized, that they are almost solely argued as security issues, where dangerously high energy dependency is seen
as a serious challenge to the state sovereignty.

For example, there were serious warnings from Gazproms top leaders in May 2006 that in the future there would not be
enough natural gas for everyone Russia is currently supplying it. According to Gazprom’s vice CEO Aleksandr Rjazamov
especially those states which are not paying the market price are in greatest danger of being left without Russian gas
supplies. This was followed by warnings of Gazproms CEO Aleksei Miller that if they try to complicate Gazproms effort in
the European markets the end result would not be pleasant for Europeans and that the Gazprom is looking for new markets in
the US and China.43 Even after these statements the Russia-EU energy relations have stayed largely de-securitized, although
there have been calls from outside actors to securitize them. For example the main economist of the IEA, Fatih Birol, has
interpreted the spring 2006 statements by Aleksei Miller as warning signals to Europe and he advised the EU to change its
energy policy to avoid over dependency on Russian, especially on natural gas.44

Role of the State Controlled Energy Companies

Very basic and in many ways incomplete hypothesis about categories of actors could the following. If the economic aspects
dominate the securitization, then the main actors are likely to be (international) energy companies, but if the political aspects
dominate the securitization, then main actors are likely to be states. What complicates the matters further in this very rough
division is the significant role played by hybrid actors, such as the state owned or state controlled energy companies (or
national oil companies NOCS). As Howard Chase has pointed out, the five largest private international oil companies
produce currently approximately 14% of world’s oil and gas, but own only 4% of the reserves of these commodities. In
comparison the state controlled companies produce 60% of world’s oil and gas and own up to 90% of these reserves 45.
Measured by market value Exxon Mobil is the most valued company in the world, but thirteen state owned energy
companies possess larger energy reserves than Exxon Mobil. Furthermore as much as 77% of the global oil and gas reserves
are located in states, in which state companies and/or their associates control production. Since the state owned companies
are in general operated less transparently than the international energy majors and in particular they are secretive of the size
of their oil and gas assets, this could increase the security aspects of energy. 46 In the future it is also to be expected that oil

41
There are two wide scenarios for the operation of the global energy economy. First scenario, the global economy integrates and
globalises according to the rules of free trade. This implies that it is the market mechanism that funnels energy from the producer to the
customer and the role of the governments in this process is relatively minor and largely confined to the facilitation of the operation of the
energy markets. Second scenario, the governments play prime role and their actions are guided by utility perceptions. International energy
flows are highly politisized and goverments manipulate or control the energy trade, viite?
42
See the Finnish National Emergency Supply Agency website: http://www.nesa.fi/
43
Niinivaara 2006, p. B3.
44
Tuohinen 2006, p. B3.
45
Chase 2006, http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/energy/Events/chase.htm.
46
The Economist 2006, p. 58-60.

13
 The Energy Security Complex

and gas production will be concentrated on diminishing number of states and regions.47 That is likely to have an impact on
the dependency structures on the system level if increasing energy consumption/demand depends on smaller number of
states, which will lead to the development of core energy security complexes (with strong dependency links) and rim energy
security complexes (with weak dependency links) with each having a supply and demand poles.

Role of Information and Time48 in the Energy Security – The Peak Oil Theories

Various studies on future energy demand estimate that in 2030 global energy demand is still dominated by hydrocarbons.49
The role of accurate information (on energy reserves, production and consumption) is crucial for the energy security of any
given actor. According to Vladimir Milov world oil security is founded on “confidence about the availability of oil
resources, and transparency of information” and on “international access to oil resources”. Accurate assessment is
aggravated by the classified status of the resource data in some countries (like oil in Russia) and the heterogeneous resource
evaluation standards.50 Accurate energy information is especially crucial to the security implications of the “peak oil” and
“peak gas” predictions. Since global oil and gas resources are definite it will be soon rather than later that we are faced with
the inevitable exhaustion of the oil and gas resources and subsequently diminishing production. Increased scarcity will
intensify competition between actors for the remaining oil and gas resources. Therefore the closer we are moving to the
“final end” of the oil and gas production, the more pronounced will be the role of the reliable information, i.e. can we trust
the data on existing oil and gas resources or the estimates on energy production and consumption. If the oil and gas resource
scarcity at the end of the global oil and gas production era is combined with the scarcity of reliable information, this offers
more possibilities for securitization of the energy issues, whereas reliable and transparent information decreases possibilities
for securitization.

Even though the exact timing of the global oil peak is subject to fierce academic debate, there is much more consensus for
the idea that with ever increasing consumption the finite hydrocarbon reserves will be exhausted sooner rather than later. For
example it has been estimated that 90% of the world’s conventional oil has already been discovered. At the same time oil
demand is expected to increase to 40 billion barrels per year or 60% from current levels by 2020.51

Since late 1940’s the peak oil theory has been strongly advocated by Marion King Hubert who was able to predict US oil
production peak in the early 1970’s by studying petroleum and gas reserve statistics. Although his predictions, that global oil
peak would occur between 1990’s and 2000, were proved to be wrong, he foresaw the severe social and economic impacts
that would follow from the passing of the peak oil production and as a result Hubert advised societies to move away from the
debt-interest based monetary systems to the matter-energy balance based systems. One of his key arguments was, that
monetary systems encourage exponential growth, which has no “natural” growth limits, whereas the world’s matter-energy

47
Energised Foreign Policy, p. 9.
48
The time dimension in the energy security has some unique characteristics. Rapid changes in the international operational environment
(crises, natural disasters, accidents etc.) and difficult predictability of these changes generate situations that can have almost an immediate
impact on energy prices and/or supply. However, preparation for such changes by planning and building new energy infrastructure takes
several years, even decades.
49
For example IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2006 projects the share of the fossil fuels to be 81% of the global energy demand in 2030.
World Energy Outlook 2006, pp. 65-66.
50
Milov 2005, p. 65-66.
51
Heinberg 2005, p. 93.

14
 The Energy Security Complex

resources are limited and thus cannot outlast exponential growth indefinitely. Remedy he offered among other things was a
steady-state economy to replace current growth ethos. 52

Although Hubert’s argumentation has a clear existential threat undertone, which is clearly illustrated by a quote: “you can
only use oil once”, his ideas challenges the logic of the energy securitization presented above. Hubert regard unlimited
economic growth as an existential threat vis-à-vis definite energy resources, where as the energy securitization modelling
takes energy relations based upon economic transactions as a yardstick for normality. Hubert suggests more government
involvement in the guidance of the economy in general and energy trade in particular, where as in energy securitization
model that is regarded as an indication of possible securitization. One can consider implications of Hubert’s approach for
example to the Western complaints about insufficiently operating market mechanism and the role of the state in Russia’s
energy sector.

The First Law of Petropolitics

Based upon his observations and comparisons of the selected key world events and the price of oil, Thomas L. Friedman has
detected a negative correlation between the global oil price and the level of freedoms in the oil producing states with weakly
developed institutions. This phenomena Friedman calls the first law of petropolitics which is defined as following:

“[…] higher the average global crude oil price rises, the more free speech, free press, free and fair
elections, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and independent political parties are eroded” (within
the petrolist states).

According to Friedman increase in oil windfall enables oil producing regimes to resist external and domestic pressures for
more political freedoms, because state finances are less dependent on other foreign capital inflows or domestic tax collection
and in addition increased oil revenues allows these regimes to finance larger (repressive) security structures.53 Friedman
argues that if the price level of oil is (semi)permanently raised to 40-60 dollars per barrel (or above) then the petrolist states
have a very little incentive for reform and to consolidate weak democratic institutions, but rather continue on current anti-
democratic path and as a consequence attempts to spread democracy to these states from outside are futile unless the global
oil prices cannot be reduced at a same time.54

Therefore, if the first law of petropolitics holds true it seems highly unlikely that the petrolist states would take
democratizing steps before the end of the oil (or gas) production in these states is within reasonable sight (i.e. the post peak
production).55 Derived from the logic of the first law of petropolitics the oil producers with weak democratic institutions are
unlikely to be able to build security communities based upon shared values even less likely to form a zone of peace between
mature democracies as formulated by the democratic peace theory. 56 As a consequence this logic challenges the assumption
that energy security definitions based upon the energy prices are inherently less prone to securitization than the energy

52
Heinberg 2005, pp. 95, 97-100.
53
Friedman 2006, pp. 29, 31-32.
54
See Friedman 2006, pp. 33, 36.
55
For example the reserves-to-production ratio in Saudi-Arabia is 77 years, in Iran 94 years, in Azerbaijan 48 years and even in Russia 18
years and these are merely the figures for proven oil reserves, not the entire discoverable oil resources of these states, International Energy
Agency 2006, p. 89.
56
The main argument of the democratic peace is that democracies do not fight wars with other democracies, see e.g. Brown, Lynn-Jones &
Miller (eds.) 1996.

15
 The Energy Security Complex

dependency-interdependency structures. Furthermore, since the high oil (and gas) prices are also one of the key contributing
factors for incentives of consuming states to diversify away from oil and gas imports and towards domestically produced
nuclear power, biofuels etc. 57 this emphasises the fact that economic and political aspects of energy security can be only
analytically separated.

Levels of Analysis Problem in the Energy Security

The fact that the regionalist approach features a distinct level of analysis located between global and state level is what gives
RSCT its analytical power.58 The level of analysis problem is also apparent in energy security. The energy security can be
analysed at least from state, regional and global level perspectives. At each level the security dynamics are different. In the
state level focus is on bilateral energy relations between two states, where as in the regional level, the focus is on
dependencies or interdependencies within the region and at the global level the focus is on global concerns of supply and
demand (such as the peak oil) or global level dependencies. As indicated above different types of energy sources are
securitized in different levels. Globally traded crude oil could be securitized on all levels, unlike natural gas which is more
seldom securitized on global level. However, threats and referent objects in energy security do not have to be at a same level,
but they have to be in the same energy security complex.

Ideas which have been outlined above could be illustrated as a picture below:

Regional energy security complex

SECURITIZATION Energy security policy

threat (negative dependency)

perception/enmity
Dependency X% (high)

perception/amity interdependency (positive dependency)

Dependency X% (low)

DE-SECURITIZATION Energy policy

Regional energy market

57
See e.g. International Energy Agency 2006, pp. 313-314.
58
Buzan & Wæver 2003, p. 27.

16
 The Energy Security Complex

Heterogeneous or homogeneous energy security complex?

According to Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde the sectors of security in the Regional Security Complex Theory are military,
political, economic, societal and environmental security. Security complexes can be analytically divided into homogeneous
and heterogeneous complexes. Homogeneous security complexes are formed by interaction of similar actors within one of
the security sectors. Where as in heterogeneous security complexes different kind of actors interact across several sectors of
security.59 If energy security is approached from the homogenous security complex point of view, then energy security could
be a sixth security sector in addition to the already established five sectors, which in turn is a prerequisite for arguments of
distinctive energy security complexes. If energy security is approached from the heterogeneous security complex point of
view, then energy security is a security sector “above” other sectors, which in interaction with other security sectors forms
the security complex. Since energy security has both political and economic dimensions it is difficult to confine energy
security issues to any of the existing sectors of security, because often energy security threats have spill over effects to the
other sectors and in many cases other way around. 60 Therefore as mentioned above, energy is more likely to be a super
sector or cross-sectoral or inter-sectoral, because energy is a necessary precondition for other sectors.

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