First 5 Cases On Land Titles - SCRA

111111
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-
REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT
OF TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated,
respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE

LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN,
respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay
Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory
relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of
Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches
and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The
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island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped islands three
barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018
declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines,
as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829
dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a
petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands.
They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular
did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a
tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for
declaratory relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of
the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified
as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island;
(2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees;
(3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they
were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether
Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the
lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for
resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title
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No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were
involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The
titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a
fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly
situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws
and in the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by
respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey does not in
itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their
name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The
Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720
and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands in
Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the
forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then
appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us

DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower
court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the
lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present
petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight
and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the
centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and
other landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have
been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial.
444444
They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying

Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the
island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926,
known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for
the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested
right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest
land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of
the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a
positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they
principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No.
3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire
title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN

CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE
TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING
OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED
BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR
PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY
LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND

DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE
FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF

THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
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THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF

THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA
141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE

SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY? 35
(Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R.

No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles
over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not
involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b)
Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their
rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive
acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify
lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great
leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never
been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions.
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.47 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will
be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the
favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49
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Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest
of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the
Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage
Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of
legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth
in said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or
possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is
converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of
uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would
revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on
royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2)
concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4)
titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American
rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public
lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of
1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x
x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as
the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded
title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens
system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which
was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale
or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the
Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known
as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other
countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
777777
possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26,
1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on
December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general
law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26,
1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides
for possession and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles
as evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six
(6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the
Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.78 It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well
as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with
the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there
must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to
those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a
positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
lands occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006.
Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the
888888
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these
old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not
have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands
of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had
no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At
that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases,
or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca
and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice
Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by
an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the
cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is

misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926,
under which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of
the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and
agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in
Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument
that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and
alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already
classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these
lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing
with judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies
to an applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act
No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As
to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine,
continued to be owned by the State.
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In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was
better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber
land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in
effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a
question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within
it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land.
There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of
the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact,
we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show
that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists
some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry
or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified
as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or
the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be
differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that
the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must,
therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a
question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the
land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation
is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of
the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director
of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the
facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify
public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer
had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of
the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court
of the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts
then to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural
lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an
application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys
land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds of Manila,100 which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko
101010101010
cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue.
The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general
classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential
lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104
from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the issue is
whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the
old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.105 As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10)
years under Act No. 926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence,
they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of Appeals.107
Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain.
It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of
the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to
enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of
town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands." In short,
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose
title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and
settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates
the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of
the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of
the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public
domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and
which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay
Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
111111111111
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may
seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As
a premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts
on the island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the
implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do
not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying
lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber
land" as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
for legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status of
Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has
not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued
by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private
claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay
Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and
"areas declared as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island
as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and
areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All
forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes
that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under
CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest
Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it
provides:
121212121212
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of

Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify
Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify
the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to
ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the
areas tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine
environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for
tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four
(64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in
Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island
in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay
Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the
proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120
provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department
head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised

the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to
existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to
do so.122 Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and
628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter
buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right
of way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of
public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest
under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land
without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
131313131313
agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the
Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same
result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains
unclassified land until released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If
the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no
prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the
word "reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest
[referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of
the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed for
forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other
forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no "reclassification of forest
lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification
of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public
domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as
"public forest" under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or
from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
not convert portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered
State property.
141414141414
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of
the absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a
government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed
and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the
law itself.129 Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no
matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that
private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in
developing the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and
investments give them a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by
Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not

automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to
apply for a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally
bound to decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the
law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial
confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued
possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of
Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island
their home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to
apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas
at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended,
this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other
areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not
necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another,
they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to
their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land
151515151515
laws. There is one such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that
bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open
up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd.
That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to
protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and
protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that
should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more
have spoken, and quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation,
conservation, protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification. For,
forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of common
knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on our lands produces a
number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry
up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear.
Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With
erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops,
livestock, houses, and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the
foregoing observations should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(On official leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

RENATO C. CORONA* Associate Justice
161616161616
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

NACHURA** CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
C E R T I FI CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On official leave per Special Order No. 520 dated September 19, 2008.
** No part. Justice Nachura participated in the present case as Solicitor General.

1
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), pp. 37-43. CA-G.R. CV No. 71118, promulgated on
December 9, 2004. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate
Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring.
2
Id. at 47-54; Annex "C." Spl. Civil Case No. 5403. Penned by Judge Niovady M.
Marin, RTC, Kalibo, Branch 5.
3
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 101-114. Annex "F." Classifying Boracay Island
Situated in the Municipality of Malay, Province of Aklan Into Forestland
(Protection Purposes) and Into Agricultural Land (Alienable and Disposable)
Pursuant to Presidential Decreee No. 705 (Revised Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines). Issued on May 22, 2006.
4
As of the year 2000.
5
Manoc-Manoc, Balabag, and Yapak.
6
Under Survey Plan No. NR-06-000001.
7
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 49.
8
Id. at 21-23; Annex "B." Declaring Certain Islands, Coves, and Peninsulas in the
Philippines as Tourist Zones and Marine Reserves Under the Administration and
Control of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
171717171717
9
Id. at 24-27. Rules and Regulations Governing Activities at Boracay Island
Tourist Zone.
10
Records, pp. 13-32; Annexes "A" to "A-18."
11
Issued on May 19, 1975.
12
Records, p. 148.
13
Id.
14
Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2.
15
Records, p. 148.
16
Id. at 177, 178.
17
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 54.
18
Id. at 51.
19
Id.; PTA Circular No. 3-82, Rule VIII, Sec. 1(3) states:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from
the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest reserves.
20
Sec. 87. If all the lands included in the proclamation of the President are not
registered under the Land Registration Act, the Solicitor-General, if requested to
do so by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall proceed in
accordance with the provisions of section fifty-three of this Act.
21
Sec. 53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the opinion of
the President the public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper
Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land
who shall not have voluntarily come in under the provisions of this chapter or of
the Land Registration Act, stating in substance that the title of such holder,
claimant, possessor, or occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of
any such land which has not been brought into court as aforesaid are open to
question; or that it is advisable that the title to such land be settled and
adjudicated, and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof
or the right to occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The judicial
proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with the laws on
adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.
22
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 51.
23
Id. at 211-121.
24
Id. at 42.
25
Id. at 45-46.
26
Supra note 3.
27
Owner of Waling-Waling Beach Resort and Chairman of the Board of Boracay
Foundation, Inc.
28
Owner of Willys Beach Resort.
181818181818
29
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 20; Annex "A."
30
Petitioners in G.R. No. 173775 claim that they are also petitioners in the
declaratory case filed in November 1997 before the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan,
docketed as Sp. Civil Case No. 5403 and now before this Court as G.R. No.
167707.
31
Rollo (G.R No. 173775), pp. 4-5.
32
Id. at 4.
33
Id. at 143.
34
Rollo (G.R. No. 167707), p. 26.
35
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), pp. 280-281.
36
An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil
Government in the Philippine Islands, and for Other Purposes. Issued on July 1,
1902.
37
An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public
Domain. Approved on December 1, 1936.
38
See note 8.
39
See note 3.
40
Constitution (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
41
Constitution (1973), Art. XIV, Sec. 10.
42
Bernas, S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 1995 ed., p. 830.
43
Constitution (1987), Art. XII, Sec. 3.
44
Id.
45
Zarate v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 322;
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 624 (1998).
46
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA
152.
47
Zarate v. Director of Lands, supra; Collado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
107764, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343; Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73246, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339.
48
Republic v. Estonilo, G.R. No. 157306, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 265;
Zarate v. Director of Lands, supra.
49
De los Reyes v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-47331, June 21, 1983, 122 SCRA 652,
citing Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA
381.
50
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
supra.
191919191919
51
Id., citing separate opinion of then Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347
SCRA 128, and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
52
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
53
Effective February 13, 1894.
54
De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government, 13 Phil. 159 (1909).
55
A valid title based upon adverse possession or a valid title based upon
prescription. Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and
Deeds, 1986 ed., p. 39, citing Cruz v. De Leon, 21 Phil. 199 (1912).
56
Ten (10) years, according to Archbishop of Manila v. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593
(1915).
57
Noblejas, A.H. and Noblejas, E.H., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, supra
at 8.
58
Id. at 9; Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 36827,
56622 & 70076, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 121, 137.
59
Id. at 5-11.
60
See note 36.
61
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-32266, February 27, 1989, 170
SCRA 598, 601.
62
note 55, at 347.
63
The provisions relevant to the definition are:
Sec. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the
provisions of this Act and except as herein provided, shall classify
according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall
immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such
rules and regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of law until
they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by
the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning
of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by
Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the
force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single
homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.
Sec. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby

authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe
terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands
in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the
United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the
Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the
acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title;
and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without
compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of
land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and
202020202020
had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on
the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Sec. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby

authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general
legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual
occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and
portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the
United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen
hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more
than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or
association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands,
whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be
conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and
cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years,
during which time the purchaser or grantee can not alienate or encumber
said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to
transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the
distribution of the estates of decedents.
64
10 Phil. 175 (1908).
65
Id. at 182.
66
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47.
67
note 55.
68
Sec. 54, par. 6.
69
Sec. 45(b); Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112172,
November 20, 2000, 345 SCRA 96; Director of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No. 91189,
November 27, 1992, 216 SCRA 78.
70
Collado v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, see separate opinion of Justice Puno
in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 51, and
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
71
Sec. 2.
72
An Act to Amend Subsection (b) of Section Forty-Eight of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One Hundred Forty-One, Otherwise Known as the Public Land Act.
Approved on June 22, 1957.
73
Extending the Period of Filing Applications for Administrative Legislation
(Free Patent) and Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect and Incomplete Titles to
Alienable and Disposable Lands in the Public Domain Under Chapter VII and
Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141, As Amended, For Eleven (11) Years
Commencing January 1, 1977. Approved on January 25, 1977.
74
Republic v. Doldol, G.R. No. 132963, September 10, 1998, 295 SCRA 359.
75
Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of Registration and of the Use
of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land Registration Proceedings (Issued
February 16, 1976).
76
Director of Forest Administration v. Fernandez, supra note 58, citing Director
of Lands v. Rivas, G.R. No. L-61539, February 14, 1986, 141 SCRA 329.
212121212121
77
Lands which were not recorded under the Maura Law and were not yet covered
by Torrens titles.
78
Presidential Decree No. 1529, Preamble; Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra note 47.
79
Pea, N. and Pea, Jr., N., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 ed., p. 9.
80
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48227, August 21, 1991, 201 SCRA 1;
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83609, October 26, 1989, 178
SCRA 708.
81
Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De
Palanca v. Republic, G.R. No. 151312, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 209;
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47, citing Director
of Lands v. Aquino, G.R. No. 31688, December 17, 1990, 192 SCRA 296.
82
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra note 46.
83
Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, July 1, 2003; 405 SCRA 291; Director of
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47, citing Director of Lands v.
Aquino, supra.
84
Republic v. Lao, supra; Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 377, 389-
390 (2002).
85
Republic of the Philippines v. Muoz, G.R. No. 151910, October 15, 2007.
86
Palanca v. Republic, supra; Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
54472-77, September 28, 1989, 178 SCRA 37.
87
Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 585.
88
40 Phil. 10 (1919).
89
Supra note 54.
90
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra at 16.
91
Palanca v. Republic, supra note 81.
92
Id. at 76.
93
Id. at 219-223.
94
Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra note 88, at 16.
95
Id. at 15-16.
96
Act No. 2874, Sec. 8; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155450, August 6,
2008; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127245, January 30, 2001.
96-a
Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-37995, August 31, 1987,
153 SCRA 351, 357.
97
Palanca v. Republic, supra note 81.
222222222222
98
The records do not show the manner in which title was issued to the Heirs of
Ciriaco Tirol.
99
Records, p. 179.
100
79 Phil. 461 (1947).
101
Supra note 64.
102
Supra note 54.
103
Supra note 88.
104
Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
105
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, supra note 100, at 468-469.
106
Act No. 926, Sec. 54, par. 6 states:
SEC. 54. The following described persons or their legal successors in

right, occupying lands in the Philippines, or claiming to own any such land
or interest therein but whose titles to such land have not been perfected
may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor to wit
xxxx
(6) All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have

been in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress
of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next
preceding the taking effect of this act, except when prevented by war, or
force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same,
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.
107
Supra note 47.
107-a
G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128.
108
Collado v. Court of Appeals, id. at 356.
109
Records, p. 101; Annex "A."
110
Id. at 106; Exhibit "1-a."
111
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 5.
112
Constitution (1987), Art. XII, Sec. 3; Constitution (1973), Art. XIV, Sec. 10, as
amended; and Constitution (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 1.
113
Republic v. Naguiat, supra note 87.
114
G.R. No. L-27873, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69.
115
Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, id. at 75.
232323232323
116
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56948, September 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 476, 482-483.
117
Sec. 3 provides:
Establishment of or low-density human settlements in private lands, or

subdivisions, if any, subject to prior approval by the Ministry of Human
Settlements, PTA and local building officials; Provided, that no structures shall be
constructed within 30 meters from the shorelines.
118
Sec. 5 states:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau

of Forest Development.
119
Pars. 3-4.
120
SEC. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce (now the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources), shall from time to time classify lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
And may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of administration and disposition of alienable or

disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources), shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this
Act.
121
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47; Manalo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 64753, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 795.
122
Republic v. Register of Deeds of Quezon, G.R. No. 73974, May 31, 1995, 244
SCRA 537; Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47.
123
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 47, citing
Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, G.R. No. L-36847,
July 20, 1983, 123 SCRA 441; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45202,
September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 742.
124
Supra note 81.
125
Palanca v. Republic, id. at 222-223.
126
Reconsideration of DOJ Opinion No. 169, s. 1993, on the DOJ affirmative
stand on whether the prohibition against the reclassification of forest lands applies
to "unclassified public forest."
127
Rollo (G.R. No. 173775), p. 139.
242424242424
128
Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, G.R. No. 158449, October 22, 2004, 441
SCRA 188; Republic v. Lao, supra note 83.
129
Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b).
130
Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, supra note 69.
131
Commonwealth Act No. 141, Chapter IV.
132
Id., Chapter V.
133
House Bill No. 1109. Declaring Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Within
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan as Agricultural Land Open to Disposition.
134
G.R. No. L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, cited in Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumyung, G.R. Nos. L-31666-68, April 30,
1979, 89 SCRA 532.
135
Director of Forestry v. Muoz, id. at 1214.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
252525252525
G.R. No. 129682 March 21, 2002
NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAAGAS-PAGKATIPUNAN,

petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals nullifying the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon2 which confirmed petitioners
title over the lots subject of the instant petition. Petitioners further seek to annul and set
aside the resolutions3 of the Court of Appeals denying their urgent motion to recall the
judgment entered4 in the land registration case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in November 1960, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, spouses Getulio

Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the Court of First Instance of Gumaca,
Quezon an application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to Lots 1
and 2 of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located in San
Narciso, Quezon.5
On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order of default against the whole
world, except spouses Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo Medenilla who were given ten
(10) days to file their written opposition as regards Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406. Upon
motion of petitioners predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406 was removed from the
coverage of the application. The remaining parcel of land covered by Lot No. 1 has an
area of 3,804.261 square meters.
On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming
petitioners title to the property. On October 23, 1967, OCT No. O-12665 was issued in
the name of petitioners.1wphi1.nt
Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the Republic of the
Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action to declare the
proceedings in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 before the Court of First
Instance of Gumaca, Quezon null and void, and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No.
0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of deeds to
annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public
domain.6
The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land registration case and of
rendition of the decision on June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified as timberland
under LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180;
hence inalienable and not subject to registration. Moreover, petitioners title thereto can
not be confirmed for lack of showing of possession and occupation of the land in the
manner and for the length of time required by Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended. Neither did petitioners have any fee simple title which may be
registered under Act No. 496, as amended. Consequently, the Court of First Instance did
not acquire jurisdiction over the res and any proceedings had therein were null and void.7
On the other hand, petitioners raised the special defenses of indefeasibility of title and res
judicata. They argued that due to the lapse of a considerable length of time, the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in the land registration case has become final and
conclusive against the Republic. Moreover, the action for reversion of the land to the
public domain is barred by prior judgment.8
262626262626
In a decision promulgated on June 27, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court held that
the land in question was forestral land; hence not registrable. There was no evidence on
record to show that the land was actually and officially delimited and classified as
alienable or disposable land of the public domain. Therefore, the Court of First Instance
did not acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for registration and to
decide the same. Consequently, the action to declare null and void the June 15, 1967
decision for lack of jurisdiction did not prescribe. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against

respondents, and as prayed for:
(a) The Decision dated June 15, 1967 in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No.
N-19930 is hereby declared null and void, and accordingly set aside;
(b) Original Certificate of Title No. O-12665, and Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-84439, T-93857 and T-117618 deriving therefrom, as well as any other
derivative titles, are declared null and void;
(c) The respondent Register of Deeds for Quezon Province is ordered to cancel
said titles; and
(d) The parcels of land covered thereby are ordered reverted to the State.
Without pronouncement as to costs."9
On July 16, 1986, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the afore-cited decision10
reiterating that the land in question was agricultural because it was possessed and
cultivated as such long before its classification as timberland by the Bureau of Forestry in
1955. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of said land for agricultural and cattle
raising purposes as far back as the Spanish regime. Following the doctrine in Oracoy v.
Director of Lands,11 private interest had intervened and petitioners acquired vested rights
which can no longer be impaired by the subsequent classification of the land as
timberland by the Director of Forestry.
On August 20, 1986, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.12 On December 12, 1986, the decision of June 27, 1986 attained finality and
judgment was entered in the book of entries of judgments.13
On April 2, 1987, petitioners filed an urgent motion to set aside entry of judgment on the
ground that Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila, petitioners counsel of record, was not furnished a
copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.14 In the absence of such
notice, the decision of the appellate court did not become final and executory.
On October 22, 1987, the Court of Appeals set aside and lifted the entry of judgment in
CA-G. R. SP No. 07115 and directed the clerk of court to furnish petitioners counsel a
copy of the August 20, 1986 resolution.15
For petitioners inaction despite service of the August 20, 1986 resolution, the June 27,
1986 decision became final and executory. On March 2, 1988, entry of judgment was
again made in the land registration case.
On September 4, 1995, Atty. Doronila withdrew his appearance as counsel for

petitioners.16
On April 1, 1996, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. George I. Howard, filed
with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion to recall the entry of judgment,17 which was
denied by the appellate court on December 16, 1996.18
272727272727
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that it raised
arguments already discussed and resolved in the urgent motion to recall entry of
judgment.19
Hence, the instant petition for review.20
Petitioners claim that their title to the land became incontrovertible and indefeasible one
(1) year after issuance of the decree of registration. Hence, the Republics cause of action
was barred by prescription and res judicata, proceedings having been initiated only after
about 18 years from the time the decree of registration was made. Contrary to the
appellate courts findings, the land is agricultural and the inclusion and classification
thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as timberland can not impair the vested rights
acquired by petitioners predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of the land in question since time immemorial and for
more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application for registration in 1960.
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed grave error when it denied their motion to set
aside entry of judgment in the land registration case.
The petition lacks merit.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.21
Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the application for land
registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of
petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the public domain, as per
certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development on April 1, 1985, thus:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Vigo Cantidang, San Narciso,
Quezon, containing an area of 3,804.261 square meters as described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-117618 x x x registered in the name of Spouses Nestor
E. Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Magas is verified to be within the Timberland
Block -B, Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, certified and declared as
such on August 25, 1955 per BFD Map LC-1880. The land is, therefore, within
the administrative jurisdiction and control of the Bureau of Forest Development,
and not subject to disposition under the Public Land Law.
[Sgd.]ARMANDO CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer22
This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the proceedings before the court a quo
on March 10, 1986, when they confirmed that the land has been classified as forming part
of forest land, albeit only on August 25, 1955.23 Since no imperfect title can be confirmed
over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable, the title issued to herein
petitioners is considered void ab initio.24
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.25 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.26
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as
disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
282828282828
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must
be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles
do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain.27 Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of
Government.28 It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.29
It calls for proof.30
The court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Republics
failure to show that the land is more valuable as forest land than for agricultural purposes,
a finding which is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land.
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the dictionary and "forest or
timber land" as a classification of land of the public domain in the Constitution. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification
for legal purposes. The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land
with dense growths of trees and underbrush. However, the cutting down of trees and the
disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the land of the public domain
from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land.31
The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal
nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.32
A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of
that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The
Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.33
As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry:34
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass
or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not
have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, which
took effect on December 1, 1936, expressly provided that only agricultural land of the
public domain are subject to acquisitive prescription, to wit:
Section 48. x x x
(a) x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-six, eighteen
hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this Chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
292929292929
Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land either since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must prove that the land is
alienable public land.35 In the case at bar, petitioners failed to do so.
Petitioners contention that the Republic is now barred from questioning the validity of
the certificate of title issued to them considering that it took the government almost
eighteen (18) years to assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription
does not run against the State.36 The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by
petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial
property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable.37
In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it set aside the June 15,
1967 decision of the court a quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the
public domain. Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land registration court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or judgment rendered therein
is void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners motion to set aside the
judgment rendered on December 12, 1986, in the land registration case.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Kapunan, J., concur.

Puno, J., on official leave.
Footnote
1
Promulgated on June 27, 1986; Justice Tensuan, ponente, Justices Zosa,
Mendoza and Javellana, concurring. Court of Appeals Records, pp. 116-121.
2
In LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Rec. Case No. N-19930.
3
Dated December 16, 1996 and July 2, 1997 in AC-G.R. No. SP-07115, entitled
Republic of the Philippines, et al. v. Getulio Pagkatipunan, et al.
4
Dated March 2, 1988.
5
Docketed as LRC No. 91-G.
6
Docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, Court of Appeals Records, pp. 1-7.
7
Court of Appeals Records, p. 4.
8
Ibid., pp. 33-38.
9
Court of Appeals Records, pp. 116-121, at pp. 120-121.
10
Ibid., pp. 124-155.
11
48 O.G. 3967; CA-G.R. No. 5430-R, June 13, 1962.
303030303030
12
13
Ibid., pp. 158-159.
14
On July 16, 1986, Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila of the Quasha law firm entered his
appearance as lead counsel for petitioners, in collaboration with the previous
counsel, Atty. Milberto B. Zurbano. Atty. Doronila informed the court that
henceforth, all copies of motions, orders, judgments and papers relative to the
land registration case should be addressed to him.
15
16
Ibid., p. 215.
17
Ibid., pp. 218-221.
18
Ibid., pp. 226-228.
19
20
Rollo, pp. 8-34.
21
Menguito v. Republic, 348 SCRA 128, 139 [2000], citing De Ocampo v. Arlos,
343 SCRA 716, 724 [2000].
22
Certification, Court of Appeals Records, p. 69.
23
Court of Appeals Decision of June 27, 1986, citing TSN, March 10, 1986, p.
11.
24
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296, 310 [1998].
25
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339, 346 [1993].
26
Santiago v. De Los Santos, 61 SCRA 146, 152 [1974].
27
Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293, 296 [1999], citing Sunbeam
Convenience Foods, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 443, 448 [1990].
28
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, Note 24, at p. 347.
29
Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 455, 461 [1989].
30
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476, 481 [1987].
31
Ibid., at pp. 482-483.
32
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230, 236 [1998].
33
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 29, at p. 482.
34
126 SCRA 69, 75 [1983].
35
Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA 359, 364 [1998].
36
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 721,734 [1989].
37
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 31, at p. 236.
313131313131

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152570 September 27, 2006

323232323232
SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
x------------------------------------------------x
PEDRO URGELLO, intervenor-appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The instant petition for review assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 18 July 2001 and 18 March 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64097, reversing
and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, Cebu City
in Civil Case No. CEB-17173.
The antecedents follow.
On 18 October 1967, Socorro Orcullo (Orcullo) filed her application for Free Patent for
Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in
Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu. Thereafter, on 14 February 1971, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued Free Patent No. 473408 for Lot No. 1434,
while the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu issued Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-6667 over the said lot.1 Subsequently, the subject lot was sold2 to SAAD
Agro- Industries, Inc. (petitioner) by one of Orcullo's heirs.
Sometime in 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed a
complaint3 for annulment of title and reversion of the lot covered by Free Patent No.
473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 and reversion of Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D to the mass of
the public domain, on the ground that the issuance of the said free patent and title for Lot
No. 1434 was irregular and erroneous, following the discovery that the lot is allegedly
part of the timberland and forest reserve of Sibonga, Cebu. The discovery was made after
Pedro Urgello filed a letter-complaint with the Regional Executive Director of the Forest
Management Sector, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Region
VII, Cebu City, about the alleged illegal cutting of mangrove trees and construction of
dikes within the area covered by Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement.4 On 14 July 1995,
Urgello filed a complaint-in-intervention against the heirs of Orcullo, adopting the
allegations of respondent.5 However, the heirs failed to file their answer to the complaint
and were thus declared in default.6
In its Decision7 dated 15 May 1999, the trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that
respondent failed to show that the subject lot is part of the timberland or forest reserve or
that it has been classified as such before the issuance of the free patent and the original
title. According to the trial court, the issuance of the free patent and title was regular and
in order, and must be accorded full faith. Considering the validity of the free patent and
the OCT, petitioner's purchase of the property was also declared legal and valid. The trial
court also denied the complaint-in-intervention filed by Urgello.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in its Decision8 reversed and set aside the trial court's
judgment. It held that timber or forest lands, to which the subject lot belongs, are not
subject to private ownership, unless these are first classified as agricultural lands. Thus,
absent any declassification of the subject lot from forest to alienable and disposable land
for agricultural purposes,9 the officers erred in approving Orcullo's free patent application
and in issuing the OCT; hence, title to the lot must be cancelled.10 Consequently, the
Court of Appeals invalidated the sale of the lot to petitioner. However, it declared that
Urgello's Fishpond Lease Agreement may continue until its expiration because lease does
not pass title to the lessee; but thereafter, the lease should not be renewed. Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals decreed:
333333333333
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and another one issued declaring Free Patent No. 473408 and the
corresponding OCT [No.] 0-6667 as NULL and VOID ab initio.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of

OCT [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of Cebu City.
The Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered to cancel OCT [No.] 0-
6667 and all other transfer certificates of title that may have been subsequently
issued.
Lot No. 1434, CAD 315[-]D located at Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu, subject
matter of this case, is hereby REVERTED as part of [the] public domain and to be
classified as timberland.11
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and failure to

consider pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals categorically stated that there was a preponderance of evidence showing that the
subject lot is within the timberland area.12
Petitioner now claims that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the DENR officer's
testimony. It claims that the testimony was a mere opinion to the effect that if there was
no classification yet of an area, such area should be considered as a public forest. Such
opinion was premised on the officer's construction of a provision of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code,13 the pertinent portion of
which reads:
Those still to be classified under the present system shall continue to remain as
part of the public forest.14
Petitioner points out that P.D. No. 705 took effect on 19 May 1975, or long after the
issuance of the free patent and title in question. Thus, the provision stating that all public
lands should be considered
as "part of the public forests" until a land classification team has declassified them is
applicable only after the effectivity of P.D. No. 705 and cannot be made retroactive to
cover and prejudice vested rights acquired prior to the effectivity of said law, petitioner
concludes.15 It adds that if the subject lot was encompassed by the term "public forest,"
the same should have been designated as a "Timberland Block," not as Cadastral Lot No.
1434, CAF-315-D, Sibonga Cadastre which was the designation made by the Republic
prior to 1972.16
Petitioner also questions the Court of Appeals' reliance on the land classification map
(L.C. Map) presented by respondent. The trial court had previously declared L.C. Map
No. 2961 as inadmissible, finding that "the plaintiff has not duly proved the authenticity
and contents." According to petitioner, the L.C. Map presented in court is neither a
certified true copy nor one attested to be a true copy by any DENR official having legal
custody of the original thereof, and thus should not have been made the basis of the
cancellation of the free patent and title.17
Petitioner further contends that the projection survey conducted by the DENR to
determine if the subject lot falls within the forest area "is not clear, precise and
conclusive," since the foresters who conducted the survey used a magnetic box compass,
an unreliable and inaccurate instrument, whose results are easily affected by high tension
wires and stones with iron minerals.18
Finally, petitioner claims that respondent failed to overcome the presumption of

regularity of the issuance of the free patent and title in favor of Socorro Orcullo.
343434343434
In sum, petitioner asserts that respondent failed to show that the subject lot is inside the
timberland block, thereby casting doubt on the accuracy of the survey conducted by the
Bureau of Forestry and the opinions of DENR officers. Since respondent is the original
plaintiff in the reversion case, the burden is on it to prove that the subject lot is part of the
timberland block, petitioner adds.
There is merit in the petition.
Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.19 Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.20 In
instances where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is
found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by law to file an action for
reversion,21 which is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.22
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a
question of fraud and misrepresentation committed against the government and it is
aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the public domain. It seeks to cancel the
original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the
transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all
procured through fraud and misrepresentation.23 Thus, the State, as the party alleging the
fraud and misrepresentation that attended the application of the free patent, bears that
burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and
annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate.24
It is but judicious to require the Government, in an action for reversion, to show the
details attending the issuance of title over the alleged inalienable land and explain why
such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property.
In the instant case, the Solicitor General claimed that "Free Patent No. 473408 and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6667 were erroneously and irregularly obtained as the
Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau) did not acquire jurisdiction over the
land subject thereof, nor has it the power and authority to dispose of the same through [a]
free patent grant, hence, said patent and title are null and void ab initio."25 It was
incumbent upon respondent to prove that the free patent and original title were truly
erroneously and irregularly obtained. Unfortunately, respondent failed to do so.
The Court finds that the findings of the trial court rather than those of the appellate court
are more in accord with the law and jurisprudence.
In concluding that the subject parcel of land falls within the timberland or forest reserve,
the Court of Appeals relied on the testimony of Isabelo R. Montejo that as it had
remained unclassified until 1980 and consequently became an unclassified forest zone, it
was incapable of private appropriation. The pertinent portions of Montejo's testimony
read:
Q: And in that particular [R]evised Forestry Code, there is that statement that
unless classified by a land classification team, an area can never be released.
A: Yes sir.
xxx
353535353535
Q: Prior to 1980, there was no classification was [sic] ever of the lands of the
public domain in the town of Sibonga?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words, nobody knew in the whole DNR before and now DENR what
areas were timberland and what areas are not timberland in the town of Sibonga
prior to 1980?
A: Yes, sir, that is why the law states that if there is no classification should be
[sic] considered as the public forest in order to protect the resources.26
Obviously, respondent's counsel and witness were referring to P.D. No. 705 particularly
Section 13 thereof which reads:
CHAPTER II
CLASSIFICATION AND SURVEY
SEC. 13. System of Land Classification.The Department Head shall study,

devise, determine and prescribe the criteria, guidelines and methods for the proper
and accurate classification and survey of all lands of the public domain into
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, settlement, mineral, timber or
forest, and grazing lands, and into such other classes as now or may hereafter be
provided by law, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify through inter-bureau action
the present system of determining which of the unclassified lands of the public
domain are needed for forest purposes and declare them as permanent forest to
form part of the forest reserves. He shall declare those classified and determined
not to be needed for forest purposes as alienable and disposable lands, the
administrative jurisdiction and management of which shall be transferred to the
Bureau of Lands: Provided, That mangrove and other swamps not needed for
shore protection and suitable for fishpond purposes shall be released to, and be
placed under the administrative jurisdiction and management of, the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. Those still to be classified under the Present
system shall continue to remain as part of the public forest. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Reliance on this provision is highly misplaced. P.D. No. 705 was promulgated only on 19
May 1975, or four (4) years after the free patent and title were awarded to Orcullo. Thus,
it finds no application in the instant case. Prior forestry laws, including P.D. No. 389,27
which was revised by P.D. No. 705, does not contain a similar provision. Article 4 of the
Civil Code provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is
provided." The Court does not infer any intention on the part of then President Marcos to
ordain the retroactive application of Sec. 13 of P.D. No. 705. Thus, even assuming for the
nonce that subject parcel was unclassified at the time Orcullo applied for a free patent
thereto, the fact remains that when the free patent and title were issued thereon in 1971,
respondent in essence segregated said parcel from the mass of public domain. Thus, it can
no longer be considered unclassified and forming part of the public forest as provided in
P.D. No. 705.
Respondent's main basis for asserting that the subject lot is part of the timberland or
forest reserve is a purported L.C. Map No. 2961.28 However, at the hearing on 6 June
1997, the trial court denied admission of the map for the purpose of showing that the
subject lot falls within a timberland reserve after respondent had failed to submit either a
certified true copy or an official publication thereof.29 The Court observes that the
document adverted to is a mere photocopy of the purported original, and not the blue
print as insisted by respondent.30 A mere photocopy does not qualify as competent
363636363636
evidence of the existence of the L.C. Map. Under the best evidence rule, the original
document must be produced, except:
1. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
2. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
3. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which

cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
4. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is

recorded in a public office.31
In this case, respondent claims that the presentation of the original L.C. Map is
unnecessary since it is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in the public
office.32 Evidence, indeed, is admissible when the original of a document is in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. However, to prove its contents, there
is a need to present a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.33 In
addition, while the L.C. Map may be considered a public document and prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein,34 the map, to be admissible for any purpose, must be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having
legal custody of the record.35
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same rule holds true when the
Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes to court to litigate
with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges
at every stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as those of its
citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage. This is so because when a sovereignty
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims and rights
are justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable to the claims and rights of the
private parties under similar circumstances.36 Failure to abide by the rules on
admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to
show that the subject lot is part of the forest reserve.
Some officers from the CENRO office in Argao, Cebu testified that they personally saw
the subject lot and that it falls within the timberland or forest reserve. Ultimately,
however, the basis of their declaration is the L.C. Map which respondent failed to present
in accordance with the rules on admissibility. Two foresters in fact testified that the
subject lot was a mangrove area.37 The foresters who conducted the survey may have
been competent and their techniques reliable; nevertheless, the observation that
mangroves grow in the subject lot is not conclusive as to the nature of the land at present
or at the time the free patent and title were issued. Assuming that the area is covered by
mangroves when they surveyed it, there is no proof that it was not planted with trees and
crops at the time Orcullo applied for free patent. Respondent was also unable to establish
that the subject lot has "very deep and muddy soil" or are "mudflats," such that it is
unsuitable for fruit and non-fruit bearing trees.38 Yet these are factual matters which the
Court does not generally delve into. As it is, a mere declaration from the said officers,
without any other supporting evidence, is not sufficient to establish that the area in
question is part of the forest reserve.
Even assuming that the L.C. Map submitted by respondent is admissible in evidence, still
the land in question can hardly be considered part of the timberland or forest reserve.
L.C. Map No. 2961, which purports to be the "correct map of the areas demarcated as
permanent forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705 as amended"39 was made
373737373737
only in 1980. Thus, the delineation of the areas was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was
awarded the free patent over the subject lot.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court, finding that the disputed land was classified
as timberland 25 years after private individuals had commenced their continuous
possession and cultivation thereof in good faith, declared that they have the better right.
The Court held:
It is not disputed that the aforesaid Land Classification Project No. 3, classifying
the 22-hectare area as timberland, was certified by the Director of Lands only on
December 22, 1924, whereas the possession thereof by private respondents and
their predecessor-in-interest commenced as early as 1909. While the
Government has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary
right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good
faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and should not be
prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated. Thus, We
have held that the Government, in the first instance may, by reservation,
decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made.41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, private interests have intervened before classification was made pursuant to
P.D. No. 705. Not only has Orcullo by herself and through her predecessors-in-interest
cultivated and possessed the subject lot since 1930, a free patent was also awarded to her
and a title issued in her name as early as 1971. In fact, it appears that the issuance of the
free patent and certificate of title was regular and in order. Orcullo complied with the
requisites for the acquisition of free patent provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141
(Public Land Act), as certified by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.42
Besides, the records do not show that respondent has considered the lot in question as
forest reserve prior to the issuance of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667. To
declare the land now as forest land on the authority of L.C. Map No. 2961 approved only
in 1980, and opinions based on the said map, would unduly deprive petitioner of their
registered property.
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the present Constitution, but also in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The Court has always recognized and upheld the
Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's property regime. Nevertheless, in
applying this doctrine, we must not lose sight of the fact that in every claim or right by
the Government against one of its citizens, the paramount considerations of fairness and
due process must be observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that the subject lot
is part of timberland or forest reserve it adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted
status of Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and regular issuances,
respondent's insistence on the classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve must be
rejected.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
16 July 2001 and the Resolution dated 18 March 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 15 May 1999 dismissing the complaint
for reversion and the complaint-in-intervention is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.
Footnotes
383838383838
1
Records, pp. 234-236.
2
Id. at 26, Amended Complaint.
3
Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-17173, entitled "Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Director, Lands Management Bureau v. The Heirs of the Late
Socorro Orcullo, SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Cebu,"
raffled to Branch 11, RTC Cebu City, presided by Judge Isaias Dicdican.
4
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 4622, issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, was dated 29 October 1986 and had a period of 25 years. The
lease covers 12,8477 hectares of land located in Sitio Abugon, Barrio Candaguit,
Sibonga, Cebu. It appears that the area covered by the lease is the same area
included in Free Patent No. 473408.
5
Records, pp. 15-17.
6
Id. at 69.
7
Rollo, pp. 90-100.
8
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, concurred in by Associate
Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Perlita J. Tria Tirona.
9
In his testimony, Isabelo R. Montejo, Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) for Argao, Cebu, stated that there was no
classification of the land of the public domain in Sibonga, Cebu prior to 1980, and
thus the subject lot remained an unclassified forest zone and incapable of private
appropriation. TSN, 8 November 1996, pp. 13-15.
10
Rollo, p. 73.
11
Id. at 74. Decision of the Court of Appeals.
12
Resolution dated 18 March 2002, rollo, PP. 86-88.
13
Promulgated on 19 May 1975.
14
Presidential Decree No. 705 (1975), Sec. 13.
15
Rollo, p. 216.
16
Id. at 51-52.
17
Id. at 52.
18
Id. at 53.
19
Sps. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 624, citing Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340.
20
Id.
21
Commonwealth Act No. 141, The Public Land Act, (year of effectivity).
Section 101.All lands for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or
the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines.
393939393939
22
Caro v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. 157536, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 595, 605.
23
Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123586, 12 August 2004, 436 SCRA
213, 223, citing Republic v. Sebastian, 166 SCRA 140, 144 (1998).
24
Id.
25
Records, Amended Complaint, pp. 22-29, 27.
26
TSN, 8 November 1996, pp. 13-15.
27
Otherwise known as the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines, promulgated
on 5 February 1974.
28
Copy of L.C. Map 2961, records, p. 318.
29
Records, p. 160.
30
In its Comment, respondent argues that "It was the blue print of the Land
Classification (L.C.) Map No. 2961 that was presented in court. Rollo, p. 173.
31
32
Rollo, p. 173.
33
34
35
36
National Housing Authority v. Baello, G.R. No. 143230, 20 August 2004, 437
SCRA 86, 106, citing Carr v. United States, 98 U.S. 433 (1878).
37
TSN, 8 November 1996, p. 5; TSN, 8 November 1996, p. 6.
38
According to respondent these plants do not thrive on mangrove swamps, which
are "very deep and muddy soil with additive or are mudflat, " citing TSN, 8
November 1996, pp. 6 and 16; rollo, p. 174..
39
Records, p. 317.
40
No. L-46048, 29 November 1988, 168 SCRA 77.
41
Id. at 83-84, citing Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10,
16 (1919).
42
Records, p. 234.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000

404040404040
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN
DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN,
MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN,
TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO
CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S.
REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY,
VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA
GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE,
BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G.
DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY,
RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G.
SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY,
JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION
MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO
SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING
MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S.
TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by
her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her
father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY
BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE,
INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
414141414141
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement
its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack
of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and

Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor
General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants
ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of
the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier,
et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to
Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to
protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the
Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.),
filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the
NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the
petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed
their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section
3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within
ancestral domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over
the ancestral lands;
424242424242
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter
into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of
natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more
than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found
to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness,
protected areas, forest cover or reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of

"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and

recognition of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to
delineate ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary
of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend
that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive departments
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and
other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
434343434343
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and

Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2,
series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the
States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of
the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion
sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II,
Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be
read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other
hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed
a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await
the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and
57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the
same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion
Footnotes
444444444444
1
Rollo, p. 114.
2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
3
Id. at 23-25.
4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws."
5
Rollo, pp. 25-27.
6
Id. at 27-28.
7
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche
entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's
essay, Judge Richard Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most
'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual,
custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority,
gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is
suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness
of youth. These ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in
a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must
come to terms with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it introduced
radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled
constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources.
The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct
sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by
discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted
by Congress not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous
cultural communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a
grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies
B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

454545454545
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous
peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired
2. The concept of native title
(a) Cario v. Insular Government
(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral

domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate
the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine
enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands
2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the
ancestral domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural
resources, control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of
ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b)

of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Consitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of

the IPRA may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
464646464646
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous

Movement.
DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE

LEGAL SYSTEM.
A. The Laws of the Indies
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3
This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of
jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was
first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies
and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12,
Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish
Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and
possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our
name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which
are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in
order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and
governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those
places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what
may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and
giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts
designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within
which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to
the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those
who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed
of at our will."4
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all
lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish
Government took charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions
to Spaniards, both military and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from
the government either by purchase or by the various modes of land grant from the
Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of
1893.7 The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to
the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an
amendment of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended
by previous orders and decrees.8 This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise
the lands shall revert to the state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the
government of the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory
of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the
Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act.
474747474747
B. Valenton v. Murciano
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v.
Murciano.9
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-
time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the
subject land in 1860. Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased
the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the
plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the
administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse
possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code,
had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the
State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those
special laws which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in
the colonies."10 The question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize
any right of prescription as against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent
was it recognized?"
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition
of land in the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special
law to govern a specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the
Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be
prepared, the authorities of the Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the
Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11
Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias, the court interpreted it as follows:
"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands
belong to the Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the
kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands
not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was
not still the owner of all ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the
adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of the
public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be
fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription
were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the
law that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of
the land possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities."12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his
name, or by the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands
granted by the king, the decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also
ordered that all possessors of agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise,
the land would be restored to the Crown.14
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the
Crown's principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the
Crown's instructions:
"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of
the promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether
or not x x x cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the
titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will
at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their
484848484848
title deeds within the term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will
be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others."15
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully
occupied" by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these
regulations together with contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of
the law, and concluded that plaintiffs' case fared no better under the 1880 decree and
other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a general
doctrine, the Court stated:
"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make
that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed,
and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."16
In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in
force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by
prescription, without any action by the State."17 Valenton had no rights other than those
which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the
owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton
upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish
Government from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title
deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in
Act No. 926."18
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of
portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also
provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for the
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles,
and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;19 and that the government's
title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private
appropriation and settlement,21 and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands.22
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This
new law was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but
limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935
Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially
the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory
provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth
period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.24
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under
Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine
Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands in the Philippines under the
Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land
494949494949
Registration Act of 1898,25 which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the
Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the
Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the
government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named
is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said
certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27
D. The Philippine Constitutions
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and
conservation of the natural resources of the country.28 There was an overwhelming
sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural
resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power
to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.30 The delegates to
the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land
and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain
whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.31
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and

Utilization of Natural Resources," reads as follows:
"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use
may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the
"National Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:
"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use
may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on
"National Economy and Patrimony," to wit:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
505050505050
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x."
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this
concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.
Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights
of Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and
defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to develop lands and natural resources;
- the right to stay in the territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean air and water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
- the right to resolve conflict;32
- the right to ancestral lands which include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same

ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of
transfer, if the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by
vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable
consideration.33
Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to
self-governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to
515151515151
preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual
rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.36
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the
President and is composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each
of the ethnographic areas- Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon;
Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas;
Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central
Mindanao.37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural
Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former
President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.38
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices.
When still unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-
judicial powers.39 The NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a
petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be
punished in accordance with customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years
and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40
A. Indigenous Peoples
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the
1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:
"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of

people or homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others,
who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial,
occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from
the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at
the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of
present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural
and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains
or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains."
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people

or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community
on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually
occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time
immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other
distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural
inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically
differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs
who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all
of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been
525252525252
displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon,
Mindanao, Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands.
They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or

Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte
and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva
Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of
Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III- Aetas.
3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal,

Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of
Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon,
Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan,

Isarog, and Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur;
Itom of Albay, Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines
Sur.
5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat
of Negros Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga

del Sur; the Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon,
Bukidnon, Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin
Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and
Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and
and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the
Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of
the Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and
Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the
Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the
Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and
Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao
del sur and South Cotabato.
10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug,

Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.43
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as
25,000 to 30,000 B.C.
Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by
the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave
rise to common cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic
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reformulation in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in
the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and
socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese porcelain, silk and traders. Indian
influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-colonial society.45
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation
of the soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors
evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where
nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally benign tropical climate
and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences.47 Life was
essentially subsistence but not harsh.48
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They
had languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not
only as media of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their
literary moods.49 They fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not
see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and
religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their
rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal,
and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early
Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the
objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that
was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man
and the object of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the
Malay word "balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The
barangay was basically a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred
families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the
chieftain's duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A
chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions of government. He was the
executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.53
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally
from generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay.
They were preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the
community.54 The written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated
from time to time as the necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the
Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim
Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the
laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership,
crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes
arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by the chieftain as
"judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of different
barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral
barangays acted as arbiters.57
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in

land. The chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social
order was an extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the
community. Each individual, therefore, participated in the community ownership of the
soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay.58 This ancient
communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of
resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership
of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was what
regulated the development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were
likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the
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kind of fishing sharing concept similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized

leaders, such as the chieftains and elders, by virtue of their positions of importance,
enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights, related to either land and
sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the communities from danger and to
provide them with the leadership and means of survival.61
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in

Maguindanao. The Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over
territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga.
Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon.62
The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now
Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.63
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held
in common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of
Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has
no provision for the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies
where most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of
kinship obligations. They were not economies geared to exchange and profit.65 Moreover,
the family basis of barangay membership as well as of leadership and governance worked
to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the
Filipinos living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river
banks. One of the first tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to
collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish
government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The
Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less
fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and
material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them
by the same laws."69
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and
convent would be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct
their houses around the church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same.70 With the
reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian
indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point. The reduccion,
to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of
the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adopt Hispanic culture
and civilization.71
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as
all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands
or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land
grants were made to non-Filipinos.72
The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the
concept of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish
colonial theory and law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of
everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of their ancestral rights to land.74
Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious,
classified the Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them
into three types . First were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came
from the lowland populations. Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and
third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.75
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The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the
Spaniards and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and
infieles were regarded as the lowest classes.76
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were
driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands.
The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were
naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of
the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not
only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process,
separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian community.78 Their own
political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual

feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the
non-Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally
and historically related populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues
and vices of the Filipinos.79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7,

1900, addressed the existence of the infieles:
"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt
the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North
American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under
which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by
civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government
should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices
and introduce civilized customs."80
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization, the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in
accord with humanity and with the national conscience."81
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-
Christian Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a
geographical area, and more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade
of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities."82
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they
passed Act No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the
Department of the Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic
research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a
"special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT was modeled after the bureau
dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological interest in
Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials about them.83
The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The
raging issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more
rapid and complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the
non-Christian Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and
permanent the integration of all said national cultural minorities into the body politic,
creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions." The law
called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream
565656565656
and for this purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI).84 The CNI
was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the American regime. The
post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of assimilation
understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the
Spaniards and Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce
resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of
Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86
Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted
in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With government
initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from
their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the
national government in the name of national development.87
It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:
"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies."88
For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural
minorities" were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were
referred to as "cultural communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized"
culture was given some recognition and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests"
were to be considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State
policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the
Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked
to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and
at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways
beside the larger community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration policy, the
decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.90
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral
Lands Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to
members of the national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their
claims.91 In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created
under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land
problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000
Kalingas and Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam
project of the National Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their
land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur,
the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take
approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-Guthrie plantation in
Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives.93 Timber
concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other projects of
the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their
land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.94
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one
of preservation. Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino
created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and
the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the
President.95
The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of
tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than
the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their
575757575757
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral
lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture
distinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino
mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly
upland areas. They have a system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the
central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and
customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population.97 The kind
of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their
advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs
and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial
administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of
archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and
kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were
governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social
structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was
maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.98
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no

traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots,
ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to
territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if
a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land
reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the
concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present
generation but the future ones as well.99
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except
the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards.100
Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either
be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by
marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by
blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its
meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production.
The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging
for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms,
orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas,
everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and
obligations to the land are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also

sanctions individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed
by a limited system of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual
owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights
of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga
customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is strongly discouraged except
in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs due to sickness,
death in the family, or loss of crops.104 Moreover, and to be alienated should first be
offered to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may
land be sold to a non-member of the ili.105
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The
concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently
colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon
585858585858
indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as

inferior, if not inexistent.106
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.
A. The Legislative History of the IPRA
It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that
the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A.
No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a
consolidation of two Bills- Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a
consolidation of four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural
Communities, Environment and Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance.
It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486
which was a result of six regional consultations and one national consultation with
indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress,
Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of
indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered
from the dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive
migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of
the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed
of their ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the
elite among the migrant population, they became marginalized. And the government has
been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their
ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the
Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our system by
Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant
of lands to migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109
Senator Flavier further declared:
"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for
the land long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had
territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These
territories- the land- include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air,
plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence as
indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political, economic, socio-
cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to this.
Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it;
and depending on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples."110
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a
bill based on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of
parens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian
Doctrine reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional
laws" and jurisprudence passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This
exception was first laid down in the case of Cario v. Insular Government where:
"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the
cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed
595959595959
"native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent
cases."111
Following Cario, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705,
P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized
"native title" or "private right" and the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite
the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not
implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance,
its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early
years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive
resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs."
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their
ancestral land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent
in the supreme power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This
principle mandates that persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which
places them in a position of actual inequality in their relation or transaction with others,
are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators
voting in favor and none against, with no abstention.112
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on
Cultural Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and
defended on the floor by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113
Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:
"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications
that would promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and
ascertain that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the
indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic was established shall be
preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters
seriously and early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations,
the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that they be considered in the
mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as
mandated in the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was
enunciated in Cario v. Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had
vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.115
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding
amendments, was approved on Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE

CONSTITUTION.
A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous
Peoples and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.
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The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are
defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:
"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential
lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally
or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government
and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands,
forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access
to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.116
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual
or traditional group ownership. These lands include but are not limited to residential lots,
rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.117
The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures
embodied in Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel
Alcala.118 DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces
and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and
Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power
conferred by the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).119
The guiding principle in identification and delineation is self-delineation.120 This means
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that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role in determining the boundaries of their domains and
in all the activities pertinent thereto.121
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in
Sections 51 and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of
ancestral lands is in Section 53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and
upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community
concerned.122 The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or
indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to
decide in accordance with customs and traditions.123 With respect to ancestral lands
outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT).124
CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the
Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.125
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired
in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by
torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect
to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:
"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by
ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have
been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."126
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a
claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never
to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since
before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which
also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected.127
Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the
concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.128
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title.
Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over
their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and
domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held
under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands
and are private.
(a) Cario v. Insular Government129
The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cario v.
Insular Government.130 Cario firmly established a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cario, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court
146 hectares of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land
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had been possessed and occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his
grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of cattle and that his father
cultivated some parts of the land. Cario inherited the land in accordance with Igorot
custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document
issued from the Spanish Crown.131 In 1901, Cario obtained a possessory title to the land
under the Spanish Mortgage Law.132 The North American colonial government, however,
ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him to seek a
Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending,
a U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a
military detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and
trespassers, including Cario, off the land.134
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cario's application for absolute ownership to
the land. Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government
appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed
Cario's application. The Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the
Valenton ruling. Cario took the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the
Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cario failed to
comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required
registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cario, on the other, asserted
that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed
part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme
Court held:
"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all
lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations
toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same
zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is
absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain
asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on
one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new
sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide."137
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was
with the new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.
The Cario decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of
"due process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives."138 It was
based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that
"No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws." The court declared:
"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the
United States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American
Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious
that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one,
we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first
object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to
exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter 1369,
section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the
United States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is
reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to
what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the
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Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to
believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person"
did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which
had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants
never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom
and by long association,- of the profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their
own."139
The Court went further:
"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present.
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case
like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant
the benefit of the doubt."140
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as
testimony or memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this
title is presumed to "never have been public land."
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld
in the 1904 decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof
that the Spanish decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed
in Valenton appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any
royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all
"theory and discourse" and it was observed that titles were admitted to exist beyond the
powers of the Crown, viz:
"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such
clear proof that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land.
To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in
error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning
some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to
convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at
will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the the Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it
commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants,
directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true
that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of
all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact
was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain
beyond this recognition in their books." (Emphasis supplied).141
The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as
to convey to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own
would mean loss of such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but
simply to establish it;" it was "not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it."
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It
was frank enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been
deprived of his land under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees
and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be given them. But precisely
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because of the ambiguity and of the strong "due process mandate" of the
Constitution, the court validated this kind of title.142 This title was sufficient, even
without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate.
Justice Holmes explained:
"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a
problem not without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper
on that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a
consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the
applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain."143
Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cario and ordered the registration of the 148
hectares in Baguio Municipality in his name.144
Examining Cario closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it
upheld as "native title." It simply said:
"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his
argument, characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or
military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that
the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the
registration to which formerly the plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and
which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the
technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had
lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government seized his land.
The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the
Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce."145
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire
length of the Cario decision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native
title" may be traced to Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the
University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In
1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native
Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made after Professor Lynch
visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the origin and
development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cario extensively and used the
term "native title" to refer to Cario's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court in said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title"
as defined by Justice Holmes in Cario "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the
American Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that
during the American regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made
in reference to native Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro.150
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial
governor to remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent
reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be
imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to
escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under
the Board Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It
upheld government policy promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only
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successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing civilized customs, improving
their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they roamed.151
Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:
"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United
States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted,
can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated
as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the
United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the
Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians
are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.152
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not
exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian
reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different
parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation
as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on
the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson
can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of
this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when
once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of
the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in
the United States."153
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An
Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use
and occupation of a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress,
by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be established by custom and
prescription.155
Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also
covers the "aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of
possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation
as their ancestral home, in the sense that such lands constitute definable territory
occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation.157 It is a right which exists apart
from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous instances
treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their aboriginal possession
and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their boundaries.158
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land

they have held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the
Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the
nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v.
M'Intosh.159
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the
chiefs of two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this
conveyance, the plaintiffs being private persons. The only conveyance that was
recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the European discoverer.
Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old
world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new
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world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the
court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent
war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all
other Europeans gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the
soil from the natives and establishing settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the
court further stated that:
"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be
regulated by themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could
interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion;
but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they
pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive title to
those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants,
they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised,
as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in
possession of the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title
to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."161
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to
acquire Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to
England, France, Spain or Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or
private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian
claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right,
the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal
as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the discoverer to her
subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land
from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an
absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey
a title paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:
"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of
possession has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the
complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive
power of acquiring that right."162
It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves
the universal recognition of this principle.163
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands
without having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S.
citizens.164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of
Georgia enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to
obtain a license or permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was
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deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain
said license and were thus charged with a violation of the Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the
treaties established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts
of Congress regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between
the United States government and the Indians as:
"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign
potentate for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and
injurious intrusions into their country. That power was naturally termed their protector.
They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of
the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United
States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they
were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power. They assumed the
relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
powerful, not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as
subjects to the laws of a master."166
It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct
territorial boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within
their domains. Thus:
"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade
and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and
manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts,
and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within
which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of
the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the
first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction
which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The
very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." x
x x.167
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States."168
The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as
against all other European governments. Designated as the naked fee,169 this title was to
be consummated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The
discoverer acknowledged the Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land,
the Indians being the original inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted
the exclusive right to acquire the Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest,
or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could
extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while
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the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as occupants, they all
asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves.170
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to
the lands occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the
sovereign- first the discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and
the United States- a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless
recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian right
of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete
ownership.171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply constitutes "permission" from the
whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not specifically recognized as
ownership by Congress.172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based upon aboriginal
possession is not a property right.173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title
rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time.175 It entails
that land owned by Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and
customs, and cannot be sold to another sovereign government nor to any citizen.176 Such
title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual
Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually depends upon
tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being held in communal
ownership.177
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily
used to designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.178
Indian land which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain.179 On the
other hand, an Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and
occupation of a tribe of Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation
ceases to be public land, and until the Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress
can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the nation's power to dispose of, them.181
The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land
claims of indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is
recognized. Second, indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point
of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native
Americans.183 Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title, however,
there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may
be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of
the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the
U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not specifically
recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress.184 The protection of
aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native
Americans' ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles
has remained firmly entrenched.187
Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the
ancestral domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and
any similarities between its application in the Philippines vis--vis American
Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cario doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cario and enshrined in the
IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title
presumes that the land is private and was never public. Cario is the only case that
specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing
Cario did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains
and lands. Cario was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of
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acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a different matter
altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public
agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land
Act are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain,190
ipso jure,191 and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
prescribed statutory period.
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the
rule that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or
grant, belong to the public domain has an exception. This exception would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest
since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property
even before the Spanish conquest.193 Oh Cho, however, was decided under the provisions
of the Public Land Act and Cario was cited to support the applicant's claim of
acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cario had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this
long, continuous, open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years
both for ordinary citizens194 and members of the national cultural minorities195 that
converts the land from public into private and entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate
of title.
(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the
Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further
strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication
is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public
agricultural land simply for registration purposes. To wit:
"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as
amended, or the Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities,
with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the
same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the
members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands
under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration
Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming
purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby
classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the
approval of this Act."196
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their
individually-owned ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not
domains, and such lands must be individually, not communally, owned.
707070707070
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and
occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period
of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the same
ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or
Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the individually-owned
ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public
agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the
requirements of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public
Land Act, deals specifically with lands of the public domain.198 Its provisions apply to
those lands "declared open to disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act, allows
registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains
and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and
Act 496, the IPRA itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land
has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural
land for proper disposition.
The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has
nonetheless a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from
October 29, 1997, the date of approval of the IPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on
National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and
(d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and
ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To
classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes will render the entire
IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs
which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the
ICCs/IPs.201
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the
applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain."202 It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of
ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this
constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept
of ownership under the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a
specified period, and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative
legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of
the same Act on the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:
"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than
twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously
717171717171
occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract

or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled,
under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or
tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and
cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts
of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he
files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or
disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.203
x x x.
"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or

through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide
claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in sub-section (b) hereof."204
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public
agricultural land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at
least thirty years (judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse,
public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper
application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively
after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to
all the rights of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines
ownership in Articles 427, 428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the
Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership,
under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the right
of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned. And the right to enjoy and dispose
of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces,205 the right to
consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy
the thing owned,207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by
any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.208
1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

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Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens
title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally
recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
domain. Thus:
"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the

view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material
bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
sustainable traditional resource rights."
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is
held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view
that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is
private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character
ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by
one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains,
whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held.209 These communal
rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil
Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property
held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned.211 To allow such a right over ancestral
domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very
community itself.212
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property,
much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum
of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance.213
Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the corporation.214 Moreover,
the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.215
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land
but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the
domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs
themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It
belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands
are communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following
limitations: (a) only to the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary
laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period
of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,"216 the IPRA, by
legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has
long existed under customary law.217
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil
Code as a source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that
custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable.219 In other
words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly
proven, can define rights and liabilities.220
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a
specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under
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customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil
law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.221
To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The
CADT is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of
the IPRA, to wit:
"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal
recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over
the territories identified and delineated."
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to
the land, being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since
time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is
fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land- the possession of stewardship through
perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from
man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.222
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine
Enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:
"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of

ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights
include:
a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of

water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them
at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof,

the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within
the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to
benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and
to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as
a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior
informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of

natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in
suitable areas where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;
747474747474
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant
settlers and organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall
have access to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and
air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral
domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved
and intended for common and public welfare and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with

customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof
shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of
Justice whenever necessary."
Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:
"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer
land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to
customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of

land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the
concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is
transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP
shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15)
years from the date of transfer."
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains
which covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of ownership
includes the following rights: (1) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the
right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the
right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the
right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve
conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral
domains, Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights
to members of the same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the
option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a torrens title over the ancestral lands, but not to
domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral
Domains Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and
Control and Supervision in their Development and Exploitation.
The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources
is declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
757575757575
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or, it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the
development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution."223
All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources- are owned by the State.
The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and utilization of these
natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the
same in four (4) modes:
1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing

agreements with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,

petroleum and other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and
responsibility in the exploration, development and utilization of these natural
resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation and development by itself,
or, it may allow participation by the private sector through co-production,224 joint
venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These agreements may be for a period of
25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through Congress, may allow the
small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the large-scale
exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance
agreements with foreign-owned corporations.
767676767676
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint
venture or production-sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228
"Small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor
using simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining
equipment."229
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of
ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is
expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as:
"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It
will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish
in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other
natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership
under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section
7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the
Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters,
and natural resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the
ancestral domains/ lands. These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the
fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to
recover ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right to
recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated
consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands,
waters and natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare
that the right to claim ownership over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself
makes a distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the
right of ownership only over the land within the ancestral domain. It is Sections 7
(b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall
be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over these
resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not
specifically and categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the
constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in general.232 Nevertheless, to avoid any
confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of
777777777777
"natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond
the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is
Allowed Under Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b)
merely grants the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:
"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof,
right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or
used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and
encroachment upon these rights;"
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA
enumerates the following rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of
the natural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and

implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact
upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference

with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the
State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve"
them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation
and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for
the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation
measures." It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring
ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral
domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of
management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the
787878787878
profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time,
however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral
domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources
must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.234
The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to
contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-
scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of
forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who
exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also
expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure
environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very
nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is

Allowed Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority
rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural
resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may
be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a
period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five
(25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the
ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-making process,
has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise
visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under
the same contract."
Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of

natural resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights'
therein." The terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale
utilization. It is utilization not merely for subsistence but for commercial or other
extensive use that require technology other than manual labor.236 The law recognizes the
probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development
and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for a period
of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on
condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and
members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the
natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the
development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority
rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of
priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and this
entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself
chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the

said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the
State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the
provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section
57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake
the development and exploitation of the natural resources by itself, or in the
alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of the
797979797979
land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise
enter into any of said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow
such non-member to participate in its agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State
decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the
agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral

domains, the State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by
itself, directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2)
it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with
them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may
allow such non-member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to
the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it is within its discretion to choose
which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs
the right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within
their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State
supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership
over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give
due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural
resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the
following provision:
"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental

agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any
concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without
prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any
ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation
is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no
certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written
consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a
CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in
accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this
consultation process."
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of

natural resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and
government agencies without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the
agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be
issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and
prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the
consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project
granted by any department or government agency.
808080808080
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any
concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by
the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain.
The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as
to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely
gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the
agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification
applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the
ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57
of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE

INDIGENOUS INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism

stretching back to prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during
the 1960's from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the
limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of
self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights.238 The rise of
the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American
Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for
fundamental rights and freedoms.
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded,239 and during the
1980's, indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine
Cordillera were the first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It
was the Cordillera People's Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the
building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since become one of the best-
organized indigenous bodies in the world.240
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This
came as a result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for
indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment,
together with the national governments' inability to deal with the situation.241 Indigenous
rights came as a result of both human rights and environmental protection, and have
become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda.242
International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies,
programs and specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for
example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in
Latin America.243 The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of
its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of the
Asian Development Bank.244
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and
declares as a State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national
unity and development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with
the international category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.247
ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
many other international instruments on the prevention of discrimination.249 ILO
Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration
of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries"
(ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law made it
818181818181
appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to

removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the
aspirations of these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life
and economic development."250
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and
religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the
Philippine government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly
foreign in origin or derivation.251 Largely unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted
in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The
histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture
and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems.252 It is through the IPRA
that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of
myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The
Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still
continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly
proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task
of continuing democratization,253 it is this Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of
indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land
laws in our national legal system.
With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997.
Footnotes
1
Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School.
2
The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, Summer 2000, No. 3, p. 573.
3
Dominium is distinguished from imperium which is the government authority
possessed by the state expressed in the concept of sovereignty- Lee Hong Hok v.
David, 48 SCRA 372, 377 [1972].
4
Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 543 [1904]; See also Florencio D.R. Ponce,
The Philippine Torrens System, p. 13 [1964].
5
Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; these grants were
better known as repartimientos and encomiendas. Repartimientos were handouts
to the military as fitting reward for their services to the Spanish crown. The
encomiendas were given to Spaniards to administer and develop with the right to
receive and enjoy for themselves the tributes of the natives assigned to them.-
Ponce, supra, p. 12, citing Benitez, History of the Philippines, pp. 125-126.
6
Narciso Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 2 [1994].
7
The Mortgage Law is a misnomer because it is primarily a law on registration of
property and secondarily a mortgage law- Ponce, supra, at 16.
8
Ponce, supra, at 15.
9
3 Phil. 537 [1904].
10
Id. at 540.
828282828282
11
Id. at 548.
12
Id. at 543-544.
13
Id. at 543.
14
Id. at 542-543. These comments by the court are clear expressions of the
concept that Crown holdings embraced both imperium and dominiumMa.
Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface Between National Land
Law and Kalinga Land Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 423 [1983].
15
Id. at 545-546.
16
Id. at 543.
17
Id. at 557.
18
Id. at 553-554; Valenton was applied in Cansino v. Valdez, 6 Phil. 320 [1906];
Tiglao v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 80 [1906]; and Cario v. Insular
Government, 7 Phil. 132 [1906]; all decided by the Philippine Supreme Court.
19
Please see Section 70, Act 926.
20
21
Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 [1909]; also cited in Ponce,
supra, at 32.
22
Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245 [1914]; also cited in
23
Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 250 [1961].
24
25
Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 26 [1982]; Noblejas, supra, at
32.
26
Noblejas, supra, at 32.
27
Ponce, supra, at 123-124; Noblejas, supra, at 33.
28
2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592 [1937].
29
Id. at 600.
30
Id. at 600-601.
31
Ibid.
32
Section 7.
33
Section 8.
34
Sections 13 to 20.
35
Sections 21 to 28.
36
Sections 29 to 37.
838383838383
37
Sections 38 and 40.
38
Sections 74 to 77.
39
Section 69.
40
Section 73.
41
Convention Conerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
June 27, 1989.
42
Guide to R.A. 8371, published by the Coalition for Ips Rights and ancestral
Domains in cooperation with the ILO and Bilance-Asia Department, p. 4 [1999]
hereinafter referred to as Guide to R.A. 8371.
43
Taken from the list of IPs sbmitted by Rep. Andolana to the house of
Representatives during the deliberations on H.B. No. 9125Interpellations of
Aug. 20, 1997, pp. 00086-00095. "lost tribes" such as the Lutangan and Tatang
have not been included.
44
How these people came to the Philippines may be explained by two theories.
One view, generally linked to Professor Otley H. Beyer, suggests the "wave
theory"a series of arrivals in the archipelago bringing in different types and
levels of culture. The Negritos, dark-skinned pygmies, came between 25,000 to
30,000 B.C. Their cultural remains are preserved by the Negrito-type Filipinos
found in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Their relatively inferior culture did not
enable them to overcome the pressures from the second wave of people, the
Indonesians A and B who came in 5,000 and 3,500 B.C. They are represented
today by the Kalinga, Gaddang, Isneg, Mangyan, Tagbanua, Manobo, Mandaya,
Subanon, and Sama. The first group was pushed inland as the second occupied the
coastal and downriver settlements. The last wave involved Malay migrations
between 500 B.C. and 1,500 A.D. they had a more advanced culture based on
metal age technology. They are represented by the Christianized and Islamized
Filipinos who pushed the Indonesian groups inland and occupied much of the
coastal, lowland and downstream areas.
A second view is postulated by Robert Fox, F. Landa Jocana, Alfredo

Evangelista, and Jesus Peralta. Jocano maintains that the Negritos,
Indonesians and Malays stand co-equal as ethnic groups without any one
being dominant, racially or culturally. The geographic distribution of the
ethno-linguistic groups, which shows overlapping of otherwise similar
racial strains in both upland and lowland cultures or coastal and inland
communities, suggests a random and unstructured advent of different
kinds of groups in the archipelagoSamuel K. Tan, A History of the
Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Association, Inc. and the
Philippine National Historical society, Inc., pp. 33-34 [1997]; Teodoro A.
Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 21 [1990].
45
Tan, supra, at 35-36.
46
Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Philippine Centennial
(1898-1998) Edition, vol. 1, p. 13, Aklahi foundation, Inc. [1989]. It was in 800-
1,000 A.D. that the Ifugaos of Northern Luzon built the rice terracesId. at 37.
47
Id. at 5-6.
48
Id. at 13.
49
Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 54 [1990].
848484848484
50
Corpuz, supra, at 5.
51
Id. at 44-45.
52
Agoncillo, supra, at 40.
53
Id. at 40-41.
54
Rafael Iriarte, History of the Judicial System, the Philippine Indigenous Era
Prior to 1565, unpublished work submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-
Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial Commission and the
Supreme Court in 1997, p. 103, citing Perfecto V. Fernandez, Customs Laws in
Pre-Conquest Philippines, UP Law Center, p. 10 [1976].
55
56
Amelia Alonzo, The History of the Judicial System in the Philippines,
Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished work submitted as entry to the
Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial
Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997.
57
58
Renato Constantino, A Past Revisited , p. 38 [1975].
59
Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies
Assn., Inc. and the Phil. National Historical Society, Inc., p. 43 [1997].
60
Id.
61
Id. at 43-44.
62
63
Id. at 48-49.
64
Cacho v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil. 616, 625-627 [1914]; see also Ponce,
The Philippine Torrens System, pp. 11-12 [1964]. In Philippine pre-colonial
history, there was only one recorded transaction on the purchase of land. The
Maragtas Code tells us of the purchase of Panay Island by ten Bornean datus led
by Datu Puti from the Atis under Marikudo in the 13th century. The purchase
price for the island was a gold salakot and a long gold necklace Agoncillo,
supra, at 25.
65
Constantino, supra, at 38.
66
Corpuz, supra, at 39.
67
Resettlement- "bajo el son de la campana" (under the sound of the bell) or
"bajo el toque de la campana" (Under the peal of the bell).
68
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].
69
Id. at 17, citing the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14,
1887.
70
71
Id. at 80.
858585858585
72
Corpuz, supra, at 277-278.
73
Id. at 277.
74
Id., N.B. But see discussion in Cario v. Insular Government, infra, where the
United States Supreme Court found that the Spanish decrees in the Philippines
appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land. Whether in the
implementation of these decrees the natives ancestral rights to land were
actually respected was not discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court; see also
Note 131, infra.
75
76
Id. at 67.
77
Id. at 52-53.
78
Id. at 53.
79
Id. at 55.
80
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].
81
Memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 714 [1919]; also cited in People v. Cayat, supra,
at 17-18.
82
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra, at 693.
83
Charles Macdonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between
Segregation and Integration, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, p. 348, ed. by R.H.
Barnes, A. Gray and B. Kingsburry, pub. by Association for Asian Studies [1995].
The BNCT made a Bontok and subanon ethnography, a history of Sulu genealogy,
and a compilation on unhispanized peoples in northern Luzon.Owen J. Lynch,
Jr., The Philippine Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P.
L. J. 139-140 [1988].
84
R.A. No. 1888 of 1957.
85
See People v. Cayat, supra, at 21; See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 694 [1919]
86
MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 351.
87
The construction of the Ambuklao and Binga dams in the 1950s resulted in the
eviction of hundreds of Ibaloi families Cerilo Rico S. Abelardo, Ancestral
Domain Rights: Issues, Responses, and Recommendations, Ateneo Law Journal,
vol. 38, No. 1, p. 92 [1993].
88
Section 11, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution.
89
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1017 and 1414.
90
The PANAMIN, however, concentrated funds and resources on image-building,
publicity, and impact projects. In Mindanao, the agency resorted to a policy of
forced resettlement on reservations, militarization and intimidation- MacDonald,
Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 349-350.
868686868686
91
No occupancy certificates were issued, however, because the government failed
to release the decrees implementing rules and regulations- Abelardo, supra, at
120-121.
92
Id., Note 177.
93
Id., at 93-94.
94
MacDonald, Indigenous People of the Philippines, supra, at 351.
95
E.O. Nos. 122-A, 122-B and 122-C. The preamble of E.O. No. 122-B states:
"Believing that the new government is committed to formulate more

vigorous policies, plans, programs, and projects for tribal Filipinos,
otherwise known as Indigenous Cultural Communities, taking into
consideration their communal aspirations, customs, traditions, beliefs, and
interests, in order to promote and preserve their rich cultural heritage and
insure their participation in the countrys development for national unity;
xxx"
96
Article II, sec. 22; Article VI, sec. 5, par. 2; Article XII, sec. 5; Article XIII, sec.
6; Article XIV, sec. 17; and Article XVI, sec. 12.
97
MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 345.
98
Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, p. 54 [1997].
99
Cordillera Studies Program, Land Use and Ownership and Public Policy in the
Cordillera, 29-30 [n.d.]; also cited in Dante B. Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain
Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil.
Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 47-48 [1992].
100
Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights, supra, at 98-99, citing Ponciano L.
Bennagen, Indigenous Attitudes Toward Land and Natural Resources of Tribal
Filipinos, 31 National Council of Churches in the Philippines Newsletter, Oct.-
Dec. 1991, at 4-9.
101
Id. at 99, citing June Prill-Brett, Bontok Land Tenure (UP Law library,
mimeographed).
102
Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface of National Land
Law and Kalinga Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 440-441 [1983].
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface, supra, at 420.
107
Senate Bill No. 1728 was co-sponsored by Senator Macapagal-Arroyo and co-
authored by Senators Alvarez, Magsaysay, Revilla, Mercado, Enrile, Honasan,
Tatad, Maceda, Shahani, Osmena and Romulo.
The Eighth Congress, through Senators Rasul, Estrada and Romulo filed a
bill to operationalize the mandate of the 1987 Constitution on indigenous
peoples. The bill was reported out, sponsored an interpellated but never
enacted into law. In the Ninth Congress, the bill filed by Senators Rasul
878787878787
and Macapagal-Arroyo was never sponsored and deliberated upon in the

floor.
108
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Flavier, Legislative History of SBN 1728,
Tenth Congress, Second Regular Session, Senate, Oct. 16, 1996, pp. 15-16.
109
Id. at 12.
110
Id. at 17-18.
111
Id. at 13.
112
Journal of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, Senate, Session No. 5, Aug.
5-6, 1997, pp. 86-87.
113
Co-authors of the bill were Reps. Ermita, Teves, Plaza, Calalay, Recto, Fua,
Luciano, Abad, Cosalan, Aumentado, de la Cruz, Bautista, Singson, Damasing,
Romualdo, Montilla, Germino, VercelesProceedings of Sept. 4, 1997, pp.
00107-00108.
114
Sponsorship speech of Rep. Andolana of House Bill No. 9125, March 20,
1997.
115
Interpellation of Aug. 20, 1997, 6:16 p.m., p. 00061.
116
Section 3 [a], IPRA.
117
Section 3 [b], IPRA.
118
Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 14.
119
Section 44 [e], IPRA.
120
Section 51, IPRA.
121
Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 15.
122
A CADT refers to a title formally recognizing the right of possession and
ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated in
acordance with the IPRARule II [c], Rules & Regulations Implementing the
IPRA, NCIP Admin. Order No. 1.
123
Section 53 [a], IPRA.
124
A CALT refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of the ICCs/IPs over
their ancestral lands- Rule II [d], Implementing Rules, NCIP A.O. No. 1.
125
Section 52 [k], IPRA.
126
Section 3 [1], IPRA.
127
Section 11, IPRA.
128
Ibid.
129
41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594.
130
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Juan Flavier, Leg. History of SBN 1728, Tenth
Congress, Second Regular Session, Oct. 16, 1996, p. 13.
888888888888
131
It was the practice of the Spanish colonial government not to issue titles to
IgorotsOwen J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins
of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249, 288 [1988],
citing the testimony of Benguet Provincial Governnor William F. Pack, Records at
47, Cario.
132
Maura Law or the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894.
133
Later named Camp John Hay.
134
Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 288-289.
135
7 Phil. 132 [1906].
136
In 1901, Cario had entered into a promissory agreement with a U.S. merchant
in Manila. The note obliged Cario to sell the land at issue "as soon as he obtains
from the Government of the United States, or its representatives in the
Philippines, real and definitive title." See Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 290,
citing Governments Exhibit G, Records, at 137-138, Cario.
137
Cario v. Insular Government, supra, at 939.
138
Ibid.
139
Id. at 940.
140
Id. at 941.
141
Id. at 941-942.
142
Aranal-Sereno and Libarios, The Interface Between Kalinga Land Law, supra at
428-This artcile was one of those circulated among the Constitutional
Commissioners in the formulation of Sec. 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
(4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 33).
143
Id. at 944.
144
Certificate of Title No. 2 covering the 148 hectares of Baguio Municipality was
issued not in the name of Cario who died on June 6, 1908, but to his lawyers
John Hausserman and Charles Cohn and his attorney-in-fact Metcalf Clarke.
Hausserman, Cohn and Clarke sold the land to the U.S. Government in a Deed of
Quitclaim-Richel B. Langit, Igorot Descendants Claim Rights to Camp John Hay,
Manila Times, p. 1, Jan. 12, 1998.
145
Id. at 939.
146
57 P.L.J. 268, 293-296 [1982].
147
From 1987 to 1988, Prof. Lynch allowed the P.L.J. to publish parts of his
doctoral dissertation at the Yale Law School entitled "Invisible Peoples: A History
of Philippine Land Law." Please see the Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial
Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62 P.L.J. 279 [1987]; Land Rights, Land Laws and Land
Usurpation: The Spanish Era (1568-1898), 63 P.L.J. 82 [1988]; The Colonial
Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P.L.J. 112; Invisible Peoples
and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws
(1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249.
148
"Native title" is a common law recognition of pre-existing aboriginal land
interests in Autsralia- Maureen Tehan, Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and
898989898989
Property Rights in Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo

Era, 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, No. 3, p. 765 [June 1998].
149
Lynch, Native Titles, supra, Note 164, p. 293.
150
39 Phil. 660 [1919].
151
Id. at 712-713.
152
Id. at 694.
153
Id. at 700.
154
42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.].
155
There are 3 kinds of Indian reservations: (a) those created by treaties prior to
1871; (b) those created by acts of Congress since 1871; and (c) those made by
Executive Orders where the President has set apart public lands for the use of the
Indians in order to keep them within a certain territory- 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29
citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S. 94 Ct. Cl. 150, 170, certiorari granted 62 S.
Ct. 631, 315 U.S. 790, 86 L. Ed. 1194, affirmed 62 S. Ct. 1095, 316 U.S. 317, 86
L. Ed. 1501. It is observed that the first two kinds may include lands
possessed by aboriginal title. The last kind covers Indian reservations proper.
Until 1871, Indian tribes were recognized by the United States as

possessing the attributes of nations to the extent that treaties were made
with them. In that year, however, Congress, by statute, declared its
intention thereafter to make the Indian tribes amenable directly to the
power and authority of the United States by the immediate exercise of its
legislative power over them, instead of by treaty. Since then, Indian affairs
have been regulated by acts if Congress and by contracts with the Indian
tribes practically amounting to treaties- 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 55
[1995 ed].
156
42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].
157
Ibid.; see also U.S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., Ariz., 62 S. Ct. 248, 314 U.S. 339,
86 L. Ed. 260 [1941].
158
Ibid.
159
8 Wheat 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 [1823].
160
Id. at 680.
161
Id. at 689.
162
Id. at 696; see also 41 ALR Fed 425, Annotation: Proof and Extinguishment of
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, Sec. 2[a] [1979].
163
Buttz v. Northern Pac.R. Co., Dak., 7 S. Ct. 100, 119 U.S. 55, 30 L. Ed. 330,
335 [1886].
164
Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293-294; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn.
L.R. 48-49 [1947].
165
6 Pet 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 [1832].
166
Id. at 499.
909090909090
167
Id. at 500.
168
Id. at 501.
169
The title of the government to Indian lands, the naked fee, is a sovereign title,
the government having no landlord from whom it holds the fee- Shoshone Tribe
of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming v. U.S., 85 Ct. Cl. 331,
certiorari granted U.S. v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 58 S. Ct. 609, 303 U.S. 629,
82 L. Ed. 1090, affirmed 58 S. Ct. 794, 304 U.S. 111, 82 L. Ed. 1213, 1218-1219
[1938].
170
Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Dak., at 30 L. Ed. 330, 335; Beecher v.
Wetherby, Wis., 95 U.S. 517, 24 L. Ed. 440, 441 [1877]; see also 42 C.J.S.,
Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].
171
Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal title to Indian Lands, 41
ALR Fed 425, Sec. 2 [b] [1979]- hereinafter cited as Aboriginal Title to Indian
Lands.
172
Ibid.; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 99 L. Ed. 314, 320, 75
S. Ct. 313 [1955], reh den 348 U.S. 965, 99 L. Ed. 753, 75 S. Ct. 521.
173
Ibid.; Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., at 99 L. Ed. 320.
174
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73, 94 S
Ct. 772 [1974]; U.S. v. Alcea Bank of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 91 L. Ed. 29. 67
S. Ct. 167 [1946].
175
For compensation under the Indian Claims Commission Act, the proof of
aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a
long time prior to the loss of the property. (The Indian Claims Commission Act
awards compensation to Indians whose aboriginal titles were extinguished by the
government through military conquest, creation of a reservation, forced
confinement of Indians and removal of Indians from certain portions of the land
an the designation of Indian land into forest preserve, grazing district, etc.) -
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Secs. 2[a], 3[a], pp. 431, 433, 437.
176
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[b], p. 435.
177
41 Am Jr 2d, Indians, Sec. 59 [1995 ed.].
178
An allotment of Indian land contains restrictions on alienation of the land.
These restrictions extend to a devise of the land by will- Missouri, K. & T.R. Co.
v. U.S., 235 U.S. 37, 59 L. Ed. 116,. 35 S. Ct. 6 [1914]; A railroad land grant that
falls within Indian land is null and void- Northern P. R. Co. v. U.S., 227 U.S. 355,
57 L.Ed. 544,33 S. Ct. 368 [1913]; Portions of Indian land necessary for a railroad
right of way were, by the terms of the treaty, declared "public land," implying that
land beyond the right of way was private- Kindred v. Union P.R. Co., 225 U.S.
582, 56 L. Ed. 1216, 32 S. Ct. 780 [1912]; see also 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 58
[1995 ed].
179
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[a], p. 433.
180
42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.]
181
Ibid.
182
North American Indians have made much progress in establishing a relationship
with the national government and developing their own laws. Some have their
919191919191
own government-recognized constitutions. Usually the recognition of Indian

tribes depends on whether the tribe has a reservation. North American tribes have
reached such an advanced stage that the main issues today evolve around complex
jurisdictional and litigation matters. Tribes have acquired the status of sovereign
nations within another nation, possessing the right to change and grow- Jose
Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the
Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, Texas International Law Journal,
vol. 32: 97, 104 [1997].
183
Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293.
184
Dante Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in
Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 43, 40 [Aug.
1992]; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., supra, at 320.
185
Ibid.
186
D. Gatmaytan, supra, citing Churchill, The Earth is Our Mother: Struggles for
American Indian Land and Liberation in the Contemporary United States, The
State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization and Resistance 139 (M. Jaimes
1992); and Indian Law Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property
Rights: A Study in Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination, Rethinking Indian
Law 15 (National Lawyers Guild, Committee on Native American Struggles
1982).
187
Id., Note 28, stating that some earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have
held that Congress is subject to the strictures of the Constitution in dealing with
Indians. When an Indian property is taken for non-Indian use, the U.S.
government is liable for payment of compensation, and an uncompensated taking
may be enjoined. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 217 [1982], citing
Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. 299 U.S. 476 [1937]; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665
[1912]; and Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 [1919].
188
See Discussion, infra, Part IV (c) (2).
189
Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437 [1980].
190
Ibid.
191
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509 [1986];
Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]; Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Lapina, 235 SCRA 567 [1994].
192
75 Phil. 890 [1946].
193
Id. at 892.
194
Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141.
195
Sec. 48 [c], C.A. 141, as amended. This provision was added in 1964 by R.A.
3872.
196
Section 12, IPRA.
197
"Time immemorial" refers "to a period of time when as far back as memory can
go, certain ICCs/Ips are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of
owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of
customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs
and traditions." (Sec. 3 [p], IPRA).
929292929292
198
Section 2, C.A. 141.
199
Section 8, C.A. 141.
200
The classification of ancestral lands 18% in slope or over as alienable in the
IPRA is an exception to Section 15, P.D. 705, the Revised Forestry Code.
201
Charles MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between
Segregation and Integration, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, at pp. 345, 350.
202
Section 5, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.
203
Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 in 1964.
204
Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 on June 18, 1964.
On January 25, 1977, however, Sec. 48 [b] and 48 [c] were further amended by
P.D. 1073 stating that these provisions on cultural minorities apply only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain- Please see Republic v.
CA and Paran, 201 SCRA 1, 10-11 [1991].
205
Jus utendi, jus fruendi.
206
Jus abutendi.
207
Jus disponendi.
208
Jus vindicandi. Please see Tolentino, Civil Code, vol. II, pp. 45-46 [1992]; see
also Tolentino, vol. I, pp. 12-14.
209
Sec. 55, IPRA provides:
"Sec. 55. Communal rights.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the
ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, shall be presumed to be
communally held: provided, That communal rights under this Act shall
not be construed as co-ownership as provided in Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the New Civil Code."
210
Ibid.
211
Article 494, Civil Code.
212
Antonio M. La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, 2 Phil. Nat. Res.
L. J. 23 [Dec. 1989].
213
Section 11, Corporation Code.
214
Sections 60-72, Corporation Code.
215
Section 117, Corporation Code. Please see also La Vina, Arguments for
Communal Title, Part II, supra, at 23.
216
Section 5, par. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.
217
Customary law is recognized by the Local Government Code of 1991 in
solving disputes among members of the indigenous communities, viz:
"Sec. 412 (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural

communities.- The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
939393939393
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the

cultural communities."
218
Law writes custom into contract-Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 16
Phil. 284 [1910].
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy
shall not be countenanced."
"Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of

evidence."
219
Article 78 on marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-
Christian provinces- this is now Art. 33 of the Family Code; Art. 118, now Art. 74
of the Family Code on property relations between spouses; Art. 577 on the
usufructuary of woodland; Art. 657 on easement of right of way for passage of
livestock; Arts. 678, 1315, 1376, 1522, 1564 and 1577. Please see Aquino, Civil
Code, vol. 1, p. 25.
220
Castle Bros. v. Gutierrez Hermanos, 11 Phil. 629 [1908]; In Re: Firm Name of
Ozaeta Romulo, 92 SCRA 1 [1979]; Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736
[1988]; Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 26 for a list of other cases.
221
This situation is analogous to the Muslim code or the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws (P.D. 1083) which took effect on February 4, 1977 despite the effectivity of
the Civil Code and the Family Code. P.D. 1083 governs persons, family relations
and succession among Muslims, the adjudication and settlement of disputes, the
organization of the Sharia courts, etc.
222
Mariflor P. Pagusara, The Kalinga Ili: Cultural-Ecological Reflections on
Indigenous Theora and Praxis of Man-Nature Relationship, Dakami Ya Nan
Dagami, p. 36, Papers and Proceedings of the 1st Cordillera Muti-Sectoral Land
Congress, 11-14 March 1983, Cordillera Consultative Committee [1984].
223
Section 2, Article XII.
224
A "co-production agreement" is defined as one wherein the government
provides input to the mining operation other than the mineral resource- Section 26
(b), R.A. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
225
A "joint venture agreement" is one where a joint-venture company is organized
by the government and the contractor with both parties having equity shares, and
the government entitled to a share in the gross output- Section 26 (c), R.A. 7942.
226
A mineral "production-sharing agreement" is one where the government grants
to the contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a
contract area and shares in the gross output. The contractor provides the
financing, technology, management and personnel necessary for the
implementation of the agreement- Section 26 (a), R.A. 7942.
227
Section 26, R.A. 7942.
228
Section 3 [d], People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) provides:
"Sec. 3 [d] 'Small-scale mining contract' refers to co-production, joint

venture or mineral production sharing agreement between the State and a
949494949494
small-scale mining contractor for the small-scale utilization of a plot of

mineral land."
229
Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.
230
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.
231
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228, 239 [1988], Cruz, J., ponente,
it was declared that if a person is the owner of a piece of agricultural land on
which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the
right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to
which such minerals belong- also cited in H. de Leon, Phil. Constitutional Law,
Principles and Cases, vol. 2, pp. 800-801 [1999].
232
See Ground I, Grounds to Issue Writ of Prohibition, Petition, p. 14.
233
Section 7 (b) is subject to Section 56 of the same law which provides:
"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes.- Property rights within the
ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this
Act, shall be recognized and respected."
The law took effect 15 days upon publication in the O.G. or in any 2
newspapers of general circulation (Sec. 84, IPRA). The IPRA was
published in the Chronicle and Malaya on Nov. 7, 1997.
234
Section 9 of the IPRA also gives the ICCs/IPs the ff. responsibilities over their
ancestral domains:
(a) Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a

balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting the flora and
fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
(b) Restore Denuded Areas.- To actively initiate, undertake and participate

in the reforestation of denuded areas and other development programs and
projects subject to just and reasonable renumeration;
(c) Observe Laws.- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act
and the rules and regulations for its effective implementation."
Section 58 of the same law also mandates that ancestral domains or

portions thereof, which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover,
or reforestation as determined by appropriate agencies with the full
participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained, managed and
developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned shall be given the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with
the full and effective assistance of government agencies.
235
Hector S. de Leon, Textbook on the New Philippine Constitution pp. 473-474
[1987] citing the 1986 UP Law Constitution Project, The National Economy and
Patrimony, p. 11.
236
Under the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, "small-scale mining" refers to
"mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements
and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment"- Section 3
[b], R.A. 7076.
237
See infra., pp. 77-79?.
959595959595
238
Andrew Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia,
ed. By Barnes, Gray and Kingsbury, pub. By Ass'n. for Asian Studies, at 35, 42
[1995].
239
E.g. International Indian Treaty Council, World Council of IPs.
240
Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, supra, at 44, citing the International
Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1988.
241
Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the
Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, 32 Texas International Law
Journal 97, 102 [1997].
242
Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, The American Journal of
International Law, vol. 92: 414, 429 [1998].
243
The World Bank supported the Chico Dam project. Due to the Kalingas'
opposition, the WB pulled out of the project but the conflict between the
Philippine government and the natives endured long after- Marcus Colchester,
Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Sustainable Resource Use in South and Southeast
Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, pp. 59, 71-72.
244
Kingsbury, supra, at 417.
245
Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
246
Interpellation of Senator Flavier on S.B. No. 1728, Deliberation on Second
Reading, November 20, 1996, p. 20.
247
Guide to R.A. 8371, Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains, the
International Labor Organization, and the ILO-Bilance- Asia Dep't, p. 3 [1999].
248
Also referred to as the "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989."
249
See Introduction to ILO Convention No. 169, par. 4.
250
Id., pars. 5 and 6.
251
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Towards a Definition of National Policy on Recognition
of Ethnic Law within the Philippine Legal Order, 55 P.L.J. 383, 385 [1980].
252
Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, Manila Studies Association, Inc.
and the Phil. National Historical Society, Inc., p. 6 [1997].
253
Fernandez, supra, at 385, 391.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and,
when it shows itself in a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus
standi, the propriety of the specific remedy invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of
969696969696
courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so perceived

as good and inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism,
by the Court.
A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Courts adjudication
must have a personal and substantial interest in the dispute;1 indeed, the developing trend
would require a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke
judicial power.2 The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of
the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
warrant his invocation of the Courts jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the
exercise of the Courts remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of
that power can easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point
that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and
consequentiality.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance and paramount interest to the nation,3 the Court must take the
liberal approach that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as
citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them.4 This Court thus did
so in a case5 that involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until and
exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself
from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to
what may be considered to be of overriding concern.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions

of Republic Act No. 8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its
significance to the nation and its people now and in the generations yet to come. Republic
Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
("IPRA"), enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is
apparently intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which
recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of
national unity and development"6 and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national development policies and programs," to protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.7
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral
domains" to embrace "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources" including "ancestral lands,
forest, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise," over which indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and
control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains
covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would
comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-
governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of
the law which states that the "rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected," subsumed under which would
encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use
lands and natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the
right to return to their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right to
regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains
previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance
979797979797
primarily with customary law (par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs
shall be given "priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation
of any natural resources within the ancestral domains." These provisions of IPRA, in
their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the fundamental law and
virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State
authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands, "shall
not be alienated." It ordains that the "exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State."8
These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other
specific mandates in the 1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title
"Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources", were derived largely from the
report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other Natural
Resources.9 According to the Committee report, among the principles upon which these
provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals, forest and other natural resources
constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be
preserved for those under the sovereign authority of the Nation and for their posterity."10
The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention were of the unanimous view that the
"policy on natural resources, being fundamental to the nations survival should not be left
to the changing mood of the lawmaking body."11
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
thus expresses this regalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new,
that all lands and natural resources belong to the state other than those which it
recognizes to be of private ownership. Except for agricultural lands of the public
domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as
all other natural resources, of the country must remain with the state, the
exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control
and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization.12
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cario vs. Insular Government,13
holding that a parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of
private ownership is presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the
application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override the collective will of the people
expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and from them that all
government authority emanates.14 It is not then for a court ruling or any piece of
legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to
the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to
provide "for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement
as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws
shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily
provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide
has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Convention, thus:
"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is
concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be submitted to
989898989898
Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the
codification of these customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now
mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We leave it to Congress to
determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to
whatever may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the
horse."15
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the
customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and
make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due process clause," as I so understand it
in Tanada vs. Tuvera16 would require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before
it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically
enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render
them correspondingly binding and effective as such.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress
to re-examine the law. Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would entail a
balancing of interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of national
interest.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.
Footnotes
1
People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224
SCRA 236, 244.
2
Am Jur 189, p. 591, S. vD., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.
3
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540; Taada vs. Tuvera,
136 SCRA 27, 36, 37.
4
Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11; see
also Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., on the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 Ed., pp. 336-337.
5
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792.
6
Art. 11, Sec. 22.
7
Art. XII, Sec. 5.
8
Sec. 2.
9
II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 594.
10
Ibid., p. 595.
11
Ibid., p. 600.
12
CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 2; Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., vs.
Factoran, Jr., 240 SCRA 100.
13
41 Phil. 935.
14
CONST., Art. II, Sec. 1.
999999999999
15
4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 32.
16
146 SCRA 446.
SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the
race own the land because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a
birthright of every man. The lowly animals claim their place; how much more man? Man
is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to
live human lives. And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an
obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And so land is a grace
that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of Apu
Kabunian to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs
life.
- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen,

"Tribal Filipinos" in Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H.
Davis, the World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony

with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution.1 The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than
may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.2
The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be
construed in view of such presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of
these provisions should take into account the purpose of the law, which is to give life to
the constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous peoples be recognized and
protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and
therefore, their heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned
"Indians" of the United States, with the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New
Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the nations in which these
indigenous peoples live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive
past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community
realized the injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This
sentiment among the family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the most
recent and most comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26,
1994. Among the rights recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories
and even the resources which the indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or
otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied, used or
damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous peoples.
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples
The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In
the sense the term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word
indigenus, which means "native."3 "Indigenous" refers to that which originated or has
100100100100100100
been produced naturally in a particular land, and has not been introduced from the
outside.4 In international law, the definition of what constitutes "indigenous peoples"
attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term "indigenous peoples" has
been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by a
working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo:5
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories,
consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now prevailing in those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sections of society and
are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period
reaching into the present, of one or more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under

a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of
livelihood, life-style, etc.);
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the

habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main,
preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
(f) Other relevant facts.6
In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of
Filipinos who have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture.7
Philippine legal history, however, has not been kind to the indigenous peoples,
characterized them as "uncivilized,"8 "backward people,"9 with "barbarous practices"10
and "a low order of intelligence."11
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now
employs the politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural
communities" as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of people or

homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied,
possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs,
traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous
peoples shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their
descent from the populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the
establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social,
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economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already
plowing our soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who
were the original inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native
culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American
regime,12 these native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their
lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and
Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestral lands,
the lands of their forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our
national culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial
rule and neocolonial domination have created a discernible distinction between the
cultural majority and the group of cultural minorities.13 The extant Philippine national
culture is the culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were replaced by foreign
cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant.14 While the culture of
the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has
retained its essentially native character.
One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around

twelve million Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous
cultural communities,15 accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated
seventy million Filipinos16 in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the
poorest sectors of Philippine society. The incidence of poverty and malnutrition among
them is significantly higher than the national average. The indigenous peoples are also
among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the language of
law and power, they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any,
voice in national politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less
fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people
empowerment and social justice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors
of society, including the indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law
several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous
peoples, to wit:
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development.17
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.18
Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of
property and its increments.19
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Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession, subject to
prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities
to their ancestral lands.20
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall
consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.21
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies
affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall
come from such communities.22
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It

provides, among others, that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and development, protect their
rights over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domains.23 Moreover, IPRA enumerates the civil and political
rights of the indigenous peoples;24 spells out their social and cultural rights;25
acknowledges a general concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title
thereto;26 and creates the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the
President.27
Preliminary Issues
A. The petition presents an actual controversy.
The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order
to decide the case.28
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.29 The
threshold issue, therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of
judicial review in the present case.
An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe
for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural
or anticipatory,30 or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional
problems.31 A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual
controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a
conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the presence of opposing
views or contentions.32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which
remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges
precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-
faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests.33 The controversy must
also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination.34
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law
has been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has
been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to
implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the
adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for
judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face,
constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public
domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into
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motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient

authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional
process.
B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the
constitutional questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he
has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.35 Evidently, the
rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the
citizens, the violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance".36 Yet, in a
sense, all citizens and taxpayers suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the
conduct of government and the allocation of power.37
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing.38 The
proper party requirement is considered as merely procedural,39 and the Court has ample
discretion with regard thereto.40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino vs.
Governor General 41 held:
x x x When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must
show some personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the
real party in interest and his right must clearly appear. Upon the other hand, when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.42
This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at
large, may also be the subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that
a private citizen may enforce a "public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined
therein that:
The right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of
any other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which
he would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or
different from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as
distinguished from a private right. The real party in interest is the public, or the
qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and would
suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to
maintaining a petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be
granted.43
In Taada v. Tuvera,44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be
informed of matters of public concern.
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or
consulted on matters of national concern.
In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law."47 Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:
Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing
less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation-aptly and fittingly stressed by
petitioners-the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
104104104104104104
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.48
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is
not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as
the guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without
distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit
to ensure that any grant of concessions covering the national economy and patrimony
strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity
and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizens suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that
a taxpayer has the right to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the
implementation of an unconstitutional statute,49 and by necessity, he may assail the
validity of a statute appropriating public funds.50 The taxpayer has paid his taxes and
contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the
proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for the purpose
of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds.51
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and
Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing
Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes." In the same
manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing that "the
amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the
current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the
"ONCC") and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC"),"52 which
were merged as organic offices of the NCIP.53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a
taxpayers suit.
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board,

officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings
are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.54 Mandamus, on the other hand, is an extraordinary
writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said entity or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or when said entity or person unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.55
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the
challenged provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR
Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing
public funds for the implementation of the said law and rules. They further ask that the
Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to control and supervise the
activities pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the
questioned provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if
the law is found to be unconstitutional. Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the
Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of the countrys natural resources.
105105105105105105
Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy for
the relief sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court
assumes jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised
therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should
initially pass upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the
hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first
impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate court. This is a
procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although
this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction,56 such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum. The resort to this Courts primary jurisdiction to issue said writs
shall be allowed only where the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify such invocation.57 We
held in People v. Cuaresma58 that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Courts docket x x x.59 (Emphasis supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact
upon the lives not only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos
cannot be denied. The resolution of this case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is
necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to
allow petitioners invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance.
Substantive Issues
Primary Issue
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves
around the constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a),
3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59. These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
106106106106106106
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership60
over ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title.61 The term "ancestral
lands" under the statute refers to lands occupied by individuals, families and clans who
are members of indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands are required to have
been "occupied, possessed and utilized" by them or through their ancestors "since time
immemorial, continuously to the present".62 On the other hand, "ancestral domains" is
defined as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds,
worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by indigenous cultural
communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of
indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral
domains also include inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein.63 Again,
the same are required to have been "held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present".64 Under Section 56,
property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of said law "shall be recognized and respected."
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to
ancestral lands, ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The
fundamental question is, who, between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the
rightful owners of these properties?
It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation,
of the fundamental law.65 The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is
assumed to have acted within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations.
Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a
valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to
effectuate the specific purpose of the law.66
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public
domain and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General advance the following arguments:
107107107107107107
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired
exclusive dominion over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They
contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced
into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in the
archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to
the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the original source of all private
titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is
the source of any asserted right of ownership in land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cario doctrine exists.
However, petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the
public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part,
argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus,
cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral
lands and ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cario doctrine, such native title was
extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the
Constitution to protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2,
Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the
recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands
and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate
of Congress.
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State,
petitioners posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural
resources.
I am not persuaded by these contentions.
Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is
understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been
regarded, almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It has
been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court.67
Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some
grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American
Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish
Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land
must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere.68
In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,69 or those rights which the
King has by virtue of his prerogatives.70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the
sovereign has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad.71
These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King,
and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them
under certain conditions, the King theoretically retained the title.72 By fiction of law, the
King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of
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title, and from him all lands were held.73 The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing
more than a natural fruit of conquest.74
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cario vs. Insular
Government75 the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision76of the pre-war
Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement:
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like
the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. x x x.77 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land,
or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership
since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia.
In Cario, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cario applied for registration in his name of
an ancestral land located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors
had lived on the land, had cultivated it, and had used it as far they could remember. He
also proved that they had all been recognized as owners, the land having been passed on
by inheritance according to native custom. However, neither he nor his ancestors had any
document of title from the Spanish Crown. The government opposed the application for
registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native title to their
ancestral land.
Cario was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the
U.S. Court were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction.78 We applied the Cario
doctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,79 where we stated that "[a]ll
lands that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong
to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the
Spanish conquest."80
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling in Cario was premised on
the fact that the applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription,
having established that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral
land applied for by Cario was transferred from the State, as original owner, to Cario by
virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the basis for decreeing
"by mere legislative fiatthat ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to [indigenous
peoples] without judicial confirmation."81
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cario doctrine applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of
the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cario would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only
to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public
domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership
of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State.
109109109109109109
Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its
possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-
interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of
title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as
memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State
involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to
private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person.
Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed
never to have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor Generals thesis that native
title under Cario applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently,
the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks under the Constitution82 is irrelevant to the application of the
Cario doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of
lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
Legal history supports the Cario doctrine.
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and
occupation thereof in the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it
entered into with Portugal,83 the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were
considered as terra nullius although already populated by other peoples.84 The discovery
and occupation by the European States, who were then considered as the only members
of the international community of civilized nations, of lands in the said continents were
deemed sufficient to create title under international law.85
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did
not mean that it acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial
laws of Spain, the Spanish Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only over
the unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands.86
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the
natives of their property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish
King to do no harm to the natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the
early Spanish colonial period in the Philippines wrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging
opportunity to avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his
written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip
II envisaged a bloodless pacification of the archipelago. This extraordinary document
could have been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian,
Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca. The King instructed
Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their persons
or to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in
friendship and "to explain to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved."
Although the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if attacked, the royal
instructions admonished the commander to commit no aggressive act which might arouse
native hostility.87
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native
land occupancy.88 Thus, the Recopilacin de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred
ownership of lands already held by the natives.89 The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did
not extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June
25, 1880, provided that all those in "unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize
their possession by means of adjustment proceedings,90 and within the period specified.
The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura Law,
declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for
which adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura
Law, it was held in the case of Cario that the royal decree of 1894 should not be
110110110110110110
construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of

registering such title.91
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United
States, contrary to petitioners assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of
Spain, including the latters rights over lands of the public domain.92 Under the Treaty of
Paris of December 10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to
property existing at the time.93 During the American colonial regime, native title to land
was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided that property and
rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be administered for the
benefit of the Filipinos.94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinleys
Instructions, as well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying
the safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable
rule upon every division and branch of the American colonial government in the
Philippines,95 was that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."96 These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902
were in turn expressly protected by the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution.
Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains were firmly established in law.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct act by the
sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the 1935 Constitution."97 He advances the
following arguments:
The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to
restructure the consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the
mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the State has wrested control of
those portions of the natural resources it deems absolutely necessary for social welfare
and existence. It has been held that the State may impair vested rights through a
legitimate exercise of police power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but
determinative of social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the
established social system. x x x
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural

resources that have been found from generation to generation to be critical to the survival
of the Sovereign and its agent, the State.98
Stated simply, the Solicitor Generals argument is that the State, as the source of all titles
to land, had the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands,
including ancestral lands and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that
such a theory would necessarily impair vested rights, he reasons out that even vested
rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not absolute and may
be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor
General, while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any
misunderstanding. It simply declares that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State."99
Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social
welfare and existence," including those which are not part of the public domain, shall
thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for constitutional construction, the
provision should be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or
extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were
extinguished and that the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of
111111111111111111
"wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural resources [which the State] deems
absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence." On the contrary, said Section
restated the fundamental rule against the diminution of existing rights by expressly
providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other natural resources by
the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concessions." The "existing
rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of ownership
by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law
should be given their ordinary or usual meaning,100 and the term "existing rights" cannot
be assigned an unduly restrictive definition.
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution101to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and protection under
IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of the
Congress,102 since such recognition and protection amount to the alienation of lands of the
public domain, which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the
rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense,
the term "right" refers to any legally enforceable claim.103 It is a power, privilege, faculty
or demand inherent in one person and incident upon another.104 When used in relation to
property, "right" includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just and legal claim to
hold, use and enjoy it.105 Said provision in the Constitution cannot, by any reasonable
construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of ownership over such
ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its
constitutional mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically
Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous peoples
over ancestral lands.
The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to
"provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision,
does Congress have the power to decide whether ancestral domains shall be private
property or part of the public domain? Also, does Congress have the power to determine
whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the natural resources found
therein?
It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution
did not intend Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private
property. Rather, they acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private
property, and that customary laws shall merely determine whether such private ownership
is by the entire indigenous cultural community, or by individuals, families, or clans
within the community. The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado and Bennagen
and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is
instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from
either Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase
"CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY
LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domain," because ordinarily it is the law on
ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property rights or relations arising
therefrom. On the other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the
property rights or relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership
and extent of the ancestral domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the
customary laws and our regular civil laws on property.
112112112112112112
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to
Congress to make the necessary exception to the general law on property relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example

of such a customary law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the
ownership and the extent of that ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is
the ownership and the extent of ownership which determine the property rights and
relations arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may
have a different provision or thrust so that we could make the corresponding suggestions
also by way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would
be ownership based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the
thinking expressed in the consultation is that this should be codified and should be
recognized in relation to existing national laws. That is essentially the concept. 106
(Emphasis supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the
following exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms
of the tribal ownership or community ownership or of private ownership within the
ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as

ownership by private individuals, clans and even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State
will set aside the ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the
ancestral domain it could accept more specific ownership in terms of individuals within
the ancestral lands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly
mentioned Cario in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native
title to land, or that they were unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura
regalia.108 The framers of the Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were
presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of
constitutional provisions, and courts should take these doctrines into consideration in
construing the Constitution.109
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as
private property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such
ownership through its various provisions, merely abides by the constitutional mandate
and does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean
"as subject to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which vests in
the State ownership of all lands of the public domain, mineral lands and other natural
resources. Following this interpretation, petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are the property of the State.
113113113113113113
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations
made in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and
nationalization of lands of the public domain and natural resources, and is of paramount
importance to our national economy and patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the
1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that the framers of the Constitution inserted the
phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" mainly to prevent the impairment
of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral
lands and ancestral domains, to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral
lands. How does this affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did
say that in cases where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these
two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts
of Baguio City are considered as ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in
one of the publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered
as ancestral domain in relation to the whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to
certain individuals or certain groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered
as ancestral land?
MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner
that Filipinos can speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms
of the right of a particular person or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110
Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the
framers of the Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of
the indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2
of the same Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution
must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole
Constitution is examined in order to determine the meaning of any provision. That
construction should be used which would give effect to the entire instrument.111
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands
and other natural resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof
which firmly recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth
hereinbefore,112 include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unity and
development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1,
Article XIII, directing the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and
cultural inequities and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of
agrarian reform or stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other natural
114114114114114114
resources, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article XIV, decreeing that
the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and
Section 12, Article XVI, authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to advise
the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the
more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth.113 Equity is given
prominence as the first objective of national economic development.114 The framers of the
Constitution did not, by the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs," intend to establish a hierarchy of
constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or
to create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the
balancing of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davides formulation of the first sentence, he says:

"The State, SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of cultural or
tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social and cultural
well-being." There are at least two concepts here which receive different weights very
often. They are the concepts of national development policies and programs, and the
rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would like to
ask: When the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling
concept? I ask this because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely
transgressed in the interest of national development policies and programs. Hence, I
would like to know which is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national development policies and programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more

paramount. The concept introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is
what we seek to attain. We have to balance the interests taking into account the specific
needs and the specific interests also of these cultural communities in like manner that we
did so in the autonomous regions.115 (Emphasis supplied.)
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the States ownership over the
natural resources within the ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the
public domain and other natural resources,116 as well as the States full control and
supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.117
Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a),118 5,119 and 7120 of
IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that
"[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State."121 They would have the Court declare
as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the
definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership
over these resources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent,
limit and composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines
in determining whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and within the
ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which points
out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any
115115115115115115
right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important
to ensure that no unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral
domains will result during the delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines
ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto
convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous
peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a source of
ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply because it
recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but community property."
The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous
peoples concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In
Civil Law, "ownership" is the "independent and general power of a person over a thing
for purposes recognized by law and within the limits established thereby."122 The civil law
concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from
the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use,
jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that which
is owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the
thing owned.123 In contrast, the indigenous peoples concept of ownership emphasizes the
importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal character of
ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed"124
because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the
individual member.125
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous
peoples is also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on
Section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to
wit:
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where
we transferred the other provision but here itself -
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement.
Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources
because we all agree that that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of
those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by
mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either
rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in their areas, any
logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our
people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat
could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to
consultation and the right to be compensated when there are damages within their
ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are
already considered in subsequent sections which we are now looking for.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the
indigenous people where they are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for
prior consultation of source which is here already. So, anyway it is on the record that you
want to make sure that the secretariat takes note of those two issues and my assurance is
that it is already there and I will make sure that they cross check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.

116116116116116116
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a

Senate version you do not have and if you agree we will adopt that.127 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples
over the natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim
ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous
peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains." Neither does Section 7(b), which
enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found
within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural
resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples rights and welfare in
relation to the natural resources found within their ancestral domains,128 including the
preservation of the ecological balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous
peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-approved activities involving the natural
resources located therein are undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has
not been recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of
Reavies v. Fianza129 in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been
upheld in this jurisdiction.130 They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural
resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to
the 1935 Constitution."131 However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that,
contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native
title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to
claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of

land by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was
acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of the
Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources. The
unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the
underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural
resources from the Spanish regime up to the present.132 Natural resources, especially
minerals, were considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its
battles in wars against other nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over
minerals wherever these may be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the
separability of title over lands and that over minerals which may be found therein. 133
On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its
nationals. As the owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latters cession
from Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to
explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands.
A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the
laws then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting
minerals within his property.134 Although the United States made a distinction between
minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals
was in all cases sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it
necessary to maintain the States ownership over natural resources to insure their
conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country
through economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would
become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security
and independence.135
The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources
in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973136 and 1987 Constitutions.137
117117117117117117
Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains
belong to the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the
NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the
lands and not to the natural resources therein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. -

The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain.
The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Department of Interior and Local Government, and Department of
Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other
government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such
notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed.
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the
administration of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian
Reform, with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification
of these areas as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53
of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands
forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government agencies over
the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by such
certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the
natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as
divesting the State, through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the
natural resources within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established
doctrine that all natural resources are owned by the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not
unconstitutional.
The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve
the natural resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms
and conditions for the exploration of such natural resources.138 The statute also grants
them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains.139 Before the NCIP can issue a
certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the
perfection of any production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the
indigenous peoples concerned must be obtained.140 In return, the indigenous peoples are
given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains
or portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation.141
The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant
role in the utilization of our countrys natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand,
allege that under the Constitution the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources may only be undertaken by the State, either directly or indirectly through co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements.142 To petitioners, no other
method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise submit that by vesting ownership of
ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily gives
them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of the
State.143
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full
control and supervision of the State, which may directly undertake such activities or enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements. This provision,
118118118118118118
however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that any and
all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the foregoing are prohibited. The
Constitution must be regarded as consistent with itself throughout.144 No constitutional
provision is to be separated from all the others, or to be considered alone, all provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the fundamental law.145
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the countrys

natural resources stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself
states in the third paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-
scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens.146 Further, Section 6, Article XIII,
directs the State, in the disposition and utilization of natural resources, to apply the
principles of agrarian reform or stewardship.147 Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII
mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use
of marine and fishing resources.148 Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in
view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony
with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement,149
cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural
resources without the States direct participation.
Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration,
development and utilization of the natural resources under existing laws,150 the State
retains full control over such activities, whether done on small-scale basis151 or otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources
under Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under
existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral
land be declared as a peoples small-scale mining area, the members of the indigenous
peoples living within said area shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale
mining contracts.152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for
mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community
concerned153 and in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community
give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be
paid to them by the parties to the mining to the contract.154
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the
indigenous peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following:
"to manage and conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which
they may sustain as a result of the project, and the right to effective measures by the
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment of these
rights."
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section
7(b) pertains only to the exploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers
only to the search or prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose
of determining the existence and the feasibility of mining them for profit.155 The
exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the entire
process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural resources which under
the Constitution belong to the State.
119119119119119119
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the
utilization of natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does
not mean exclusive rights. What is granted is merely the right of preference or first
consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with
due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character
in the grant of concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by
government entities. Several factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent
and nature of utilization and the consequent impact on the environment and on the
indigenous peoples way of life are important considerations. Moreover, the indigenous
peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in the best position to
undertake the required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a
blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said
natural resources is always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing
laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns
these resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from
undertaking activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing
agreements with private entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located
within the ancestral domains. There is no intention, as between the State and the
indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance the
interests of the State for national development and those of the indigenous peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous
peoples from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority
granted by the proper governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership
rights of the State over the natural resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the
utilization of natural resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7,
Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of
subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of
communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore."
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as
well as the traditional activities of the indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for the
prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples before any search for or utilization of
the natural resources within their ancestral domains is undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities,
IPRA requires that the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The
State must, as a matter of policy and law, consult the indigenous peoples in accordance
with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that national development policies and
programs should involve a systematic consultation to balance local needs as well as
national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution
on this point, the national plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the
region after thorough consultation.156 To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples
the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, and the right not to be removed
therefrom without their free and prior informed consent.157 As to non-members, the prior
informed consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the
indigenous peoples and non-members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State
enters into a co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreement with Filipino
citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar to IPRA. Existing laws and
120120120120120120
regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy,158 the Environmental Impact

System,159 the Local Government Code160 and the Philippine Mining Act of
1995161already require increased consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as
indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous
peoples must be procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance,
renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or to the perfection of any
production-sharing agreement," must be interpreted, not as a grant of the power to control
the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but merely the
imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The clear
intent of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may
be adversely affected by the operation of such entities or licensees.
Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article
III of the Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal
protection of the laws."
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains
under Section 3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion
of private lands in the ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process
clause.162 Petitioners contention is erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are "subject to Section 56," which reads:
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. Property rights within the ancestral domains
already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and
protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of
indigenous peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following
their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples
to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same
communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Such interpretation is
obviously incorrect.
The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals,

whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to
the ethnic origins of the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes
and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-
indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish.163 What IPRA only requires is that these "property rights" already exist and/or
vested upon its effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens
titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes
strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains as safeguards against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land,
whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for
delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to
represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines.164 With regard to ancestral
domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first, petition by an indigenous cultural
community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and census by the
121121121121121121
Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO;
fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of
the final report of the ADO.165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are
within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements:
first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by
the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report
by the ADO.166 Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that the law
affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP167 and the application of customary law,168 violate the due process
clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of
members of indigenous peoples,169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving indigenous peoples,170 including even disputes between a
member of such communities and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in
the delineation of ancestral domains.171 Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the
members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial judges. They merely
contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a party who is not a
member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one
who is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a
suspicion that they do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge."172
In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied
first in disputes involving property, succession and land,173 and that such laws shall
likewise be used in disputes involving indigenous peoples.174 They assert that "[w]hen the
dispute involves a member of an [indigenous cultural community and another who is
not], a resolution of such a dispute based on customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial
of due process. . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not know what
these customary laws are."175
Petitioners concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of
the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be
so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A persons possession
of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic
roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-
indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of justice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its
quasi-judicial powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable
to the Court of Appeals by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of
procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII
of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws
under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use.176 The IPRA
prescribes the application of such customary laws where these present a workable
solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This
interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and
lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary
122122122122122122
disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary
laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall
be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or

relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains,177 where
all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples,178 specifically, of the same
indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-
member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to
different groups, the application of customary law is not required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in
disputes concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are
indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of customary laws is in line with the
constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof through legislation passed by
Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this
jurisdiction. Under the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is
proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence,179 and it is not contrary to law, public
order or public policy.180 Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991 calls for the
recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving
members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the
settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the
inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.181
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon
the Presidents power of control over the Executive Department.
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect the
rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent agency under the
Office of the President. As such, the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the
Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
purposes of policy and program coordination. This relationship shall be carried out
through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the
Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the
President over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
123123123123123123
the President as "lateral but autonomous...for purposes of policy and program

coordination."
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the
Implementing Rules characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of
the President, such characterization does not remove said body from the Presidents
control and supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to
promote and protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples and the
recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto.182 It has been granted
administrative,183 quasi-legislative184 and quasi-judicial powers185 to carry out its mandate.
The diverse nature of the NCIPs functions renders it impossible to place said agency
entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the
reason for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An "independent
agency" is defined as an administrative body independent of the executive branch or one
not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a "subordinate
agency" or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or
revision.186
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all
instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals,187
like those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain
degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of the President" and, as such, is still
subject to the Presidents power of control and supervision granted under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution188 with respect to its performance of administrative
functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the Presidents approval in
obtaining loans to finance its projects;189 (2) it must obtain the Presidents approval for
any negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever
from and from whatever source;190 (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its
operations and achievements to the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating
to the indigenous peoples;191 and (4) it shall exercise such other powers as may be
directed by the President.192 The President is also given the power to appoint the
Commissioners of the NCIP193 as well as to remove them from office for cause motu
proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous community.194
To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5,
6, 7, and 8) affirming the ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral
lands and domains by virtue of native title do not diminish the States ownership
of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and domains are
considered as private land, and never to have been part of the public domain,
following the doctrine laid down in Cario vs. Insular Government;195
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands
and other natural resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57,
58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous peoples over
the natural resources found within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from and
share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same, as well as
priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof.
The State retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the indigenous peoples,
through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization of
natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991196and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.197 Moreover, the rights granted to
124124124124124124
indigenous peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral
domains merely amplify what has been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid
laws;
(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to
their ancestral lands and domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons,
whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples, who may have acquired rights of
ownership lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources within the
ancestral lands and domains;198
(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions
(Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others,
establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the application of customary
law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is
composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of
being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph
2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an

independent agency under the Office of the President does not infringe upon the
Presidents power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP
under the Office of the President, and therefore under the Presidents control and
supervision with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the
decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned,
the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the NLRC and the
SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Footnotes
1
Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino,
89 SCRA 69 (1979); Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. Collector of Internal
Revenue, 90 Phil 674 (1952).
2
In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
3
In Philippine Colonial history, the term indio applied to indigenous throughout
the vast Spanish empire. India was a synonym for all of Asia east of the Indus
River. Even after it became apparent that the explorer Christopher Columbus was
not able to reach territories lying off the east coast of Asia, the Spanish persisted
in referring to all natives within their empire as los Indios. (Owen J. Lynch, Jr.,
THE PHILIPPINE COLONIAL DICHOTOMY: Attraction and
Disenfranchisement, 63 PL J 112 [1988] citing R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE
MANS INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM
COLUMBUS TO THE PRESIDENT 5 [1979].
4
Websters Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 1151.
5
Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A
Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 The American Journal of
International Law 414, 419 (1998) citing Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of the
Problem of Discrimination against indigenous population, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.
2/1986/ 7/ Add. 4, paras. 379-80.
125125125125125125
6
Ibid. This definition is criticized for taking the potentially limited, and
controversial view of indigenous peoples by requiring "historical continuity with
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories."
7
8
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 680 (1919).
9
Hearing before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-
Third Congress, Third Session on HR 18459, pp. 346, 351. Quoted in Rubi at 686.
10
United States President McKinleys Instruction to the Philippine Commission,
April 7, 1900, quoted in Rubi at 680.
11
US v. Tubban, 29 Phil. 434, 436 (1915).
12
See Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples And A Hidden Agenda: The Origins of
Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 PLJ 249 (1988).
13
For an introduction to the chasm that exists between Philippine Law and
Indigenous Custom Law, see Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and
Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey 52 PLJ 268 (1982); and the Philippine
Indigenous Law Collection: An Introduction and Preliminary Bibliography, 58
PLJ 457 (1983), by the same author.
14
See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (1975), pp. 26-41;
Teodoro Agoncillo, A History of the Filipino People, 8th ed., pp. 5, 74-75.
15
Response of Rep. Gregorio A. Andolana to the interpellation of Rep. John
Henry R. Osmea on ouse Bill No. 9125, Journal of August 20 and 21, 1997 of
the House of Representatives, p.20.
16
Philippines Yearbook (1998 ed.), p. 366.
17
Article II of the Constitution, entitled State Principles and Policies.
18
Article XII of the Constitution, entitled National Economy and Patrimony.
19
Article XIII of the Constitution, entitled Social Justice and Human Rights.
20
Ibid.
21
Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education, Science, Technology, Arts,
Culture, and Sports.
22
Article XVI of the Constitution, entitled General Provisions.
23
SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies . - The State shall recognize and
promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples
(ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the
framework of national unity and development;
b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
to ensure their economic, social and cultural well being and shall
recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain;
126126126126126126
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to
preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall
consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of

sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms
without distinction or discrimination;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs
concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural
integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal
footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and
regulations grant to other members of the population; and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression

of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP
participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services
of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs
and desires of these communities.
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary
mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking
into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and
institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to
their ancestral domains.
24
See Sections 13-20, R.A. 8371.
25
26
27
28
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392, 400 (1980), citing People vs. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1937).
29
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492, 513 (1996).
30
Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 104 (1996).
31
Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346, 362 (1913).
32
WEBSTERSS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1976, p. 497.
33
United States v. Freuhauf, 365 US 146 (1961).
34
Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
343, 364 (1989); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993).
35
People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).
36
Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, 342 (1983).
37
US v. Richardson, 418 US 166, 194 S Ct 2940, 41 L Ed 2d 678 (1974).
38
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 135 (1994), citing, among others,
Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); CLU V. Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Osmena v.
127127127127127127
COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991);
Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).
In Kilosbayan v. Morato (250 SCRA 130 [1995]) the Court discoursed on

the rule on standing as follows: taxpayers may sue on the claim of illegal
disbursement of funds, or to assail the constitutionality of a tax measure;
voters may question the validity of election laws; citizens may raise
constitutional questions of transcendental importance which must be
settled early; and, legislators may question the validity of official acts
which infringe their prerogatives.
39
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).
40
Assn. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
175 SCRA 343, 364-365 (1989).
41
16 Phil. 366 (1910), citing HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES.
42
Id., at 371.
43
Id., at 374-375.
44
136 SCRA 27, 37 (1985).
45
177 SCRA 374, 383 (1989).
46
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
47
Id., at 805.
48
Ibid.
49
Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300, 306 (1966).
50
Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479, 487 (1965), citing 11 Am Jur 761.
51
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 (1976); Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).
52
Section 79. Appropriations.- The amount necessary to finance the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current year's
appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act.
53
Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC.The Office for Northern Cultural
Communities (ONCC) and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities
(OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C respectively, are
hereby merged as organic offices of the NCIP and shall continue to function under
a revitalized and strengthened structure to achieve the objectives of the NCIP x x
x.
54
Section 2, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
55
Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
56
Article VIII of the Constitution states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

128128128128128128
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
xxx
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended, provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.-The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,

certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
x x x.
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo

warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and

consuls.
57
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 173-174 (1997).
58
172 SCRA 415 (1989).
59
Id., at 424.
60
Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.The rights of ownership and
possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and
protected. Such rights shall include:
(a) Right of Ownership. The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies
of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places,
traditional
(b) hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at
any time within the domains;
xxx
61
Section 3(l) Native Title refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains
which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private
ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest; x x x
Section 3(p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far

back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied,
possessed in the concept of owners, and utilized a defined territory
devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their
ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.
62
Section 3(b) Ancestral Lands Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land
occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are
members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
129129129129129129
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group

ownership, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots;
63
Section 3(a) Ancestral Domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas
and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by Indigenous peoples, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings entered into by the government and private individuals/corporations, and
which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall
include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively be occupied by
Indigenous peoples but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
64
Ibid.
65
Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, 89
SCRA 69 (1979).
66
In re Guarina, 24 Phil 37 (1913).
67
See Lee Hong Hok vs. David, 48 SCRA 372 (1972).
68
Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 rev. ed., p. 15.
69
1 Bouviers Law Dictionary, 3rd revision, p. 1759.
70
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 1282.
71
76 Corpus Juris Secundum, citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566.
72
Washburn, p. 44; see also Williams, Principles Of The Law On Real Property,
6th ed. (1886), p.2; Bigelow, p. 2.
73
Warvelle, Abstracts and Examination of Title to Real Property (1907), p.18.
74
1 Dictionary of English Law (Jowitt, ed.), p. 797.
75
41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L Ed. 594 (1909).
76
Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 (1906). The Philippine Supreme
Court in this case held that in the Philippines, there is no conclusive presumption
of a grant of title to land from the Government founded merely upon long
possession of the same by the applicant.
77
Cario vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941.
78
Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902.
130130130130130130
79
75 Phil 890 (1946).
80
Id., at 892.
81
Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, p. 861.
82
Section 3, Article XII, Constitution.
83
Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the world was divided between Spain and
Portugal, with the former having exclusive power to claim all lands and territories
west of the Atlantic Ocean demarcation line (Lynch, The Legal Bases of
Philippine Colonial Sovereignty, 62 Phil L J 279, 283 [1987]).
84
See AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 5th ed., 142-143.
85
See Cruz, International Law, 1996 ed., pp. 106-107.
86
Cario v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 939.
This point finds significance in light of the distinction between

sovereignty and dominion. Sovereignty is the right to exercise the
functions of a State to the exclusion of any other State (Case Concerning
the Island of Las Palmas [1928], UNRIAA II 829, 838). It is often referred
to as the power of imperium, which is defined as the government authority
possessed by the State (Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary Vol. 2, p. 419). On the other hand, dominion,
or dominium, is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such
as lands and natural resources.
Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the
theory of jura regalia. The declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State is
likewise founded on dominium (Ibid.). If dominium, not imperium, is the
basis of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in
the 16th century were limited to non-private lands, because it could only
acquire lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the
Filipinos. Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were
unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands.
87
Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipinos
Responses, 1565-1700 (1959), pp. 8-9.
88
Cario vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 943.
89
Book 4, Title 12, Law 9, decreed by Philip II, 1 June 1594. We order that grants
of farms and lands to Spaniards be without injury to the Indians and that those
which have been granted to their loss and injury, be returned to the lawful owners.
Book 4, Title 12, Law 14. We having acquired full sovereignty over the
Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded
away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining
the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they
belong to us, in order that x x x after distributing to the natives what may
be necessary for tillage and pasteurage, confirming them in what they
now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we wish. [Quoted in
Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 542-543 (1904).] (Emphasis supplied.)
131131131131131131
Book 6, Title 1, Law 15, decreed by King Philip II, at Madrid, 7

November 1574. We command that in the Philippine Islands the Indians
not be removed from one to another settlement by force and against their
will.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 23, otherwise known as Ordinance 10 of 1609

decreed by Philip III. It is right that time should be allowed the Indians to
work their own individual lands and those of the community.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 32, decreed by Philip II, 16 April 1580. We command
the Viceroys, Presidents, and Audiencias that they see to it that the Indians
have complete liberty in their dispositions.
Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754. Where such possessors shall not be
able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if they shall show that
ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription; x x x. [Quoted in
Valenton v. Murciano, supra, at 546.] (Emphasis supplied.)
90
Article 6 of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, quoted in Valenton v. Murciano,
supra note 89 at 549.
91
Cario v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 944.
92
Memorandum of Petitioners, par. 3.4, Rollo, pp. 845-846.
93
The Treaty of Paris reads in part:
Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the
Philippine Islands, x x x.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars,
within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present
treaty.
xxx
Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles One, Two, and
Three of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico
and other islands of the West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the
Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts,
structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in
conformity with law, belong to the public domain and as such belong to
the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case

may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect
impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful
possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or
private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other
associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the
aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of
whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
94
The statute reads in part:
Section 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired
in the Philippine Islands under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or
other property as shall be designated by the President of the United States
132132132132132132
for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States,
are hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to
be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof, except as
provided by this Act.
95
McKinleys Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, in Mendoza,
From McKinleys Instructions to the New Constitution: Documents on the
Philippine Constitutional System (1978) p. 71.
96
Id., at 65-75; Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902.
97
Solicitor Generals Memorandum, Rollo, p. 668-669.
98
Id, at 668.
99
Section 1, Article XII, 1935 Constitution reads:
All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
100
Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil 598 (1954).
101
Sec. 5, Article XII. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws

governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains.
102
See Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 863-864.
103
Sibal, Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, p. 893.
104
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 1189.
105
Ibid.
106
107
Id., at 37.
108
Solicitor Generals Memorandum, Rollo, p. 665.
109
Torres v. Tan Chim, 69 Phil 518 (1940); CIR v.Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 (1967).
133133133133133133
110
111
See 1 COOLEY, CONST., LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., pp. 127-129.
112
See pp. 8-9 of this Opinion for the full text of the constitutional provisions
mentioned.
113
Section 1, Article XII provides:
The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of

opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people;
and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for
all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on

sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries
that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State
shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and
trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of
the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private
enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives and similar collective
organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
(Emphasis supplied.)
114
Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, p. 800, citing the
sponsorship speech of Dr. Bernardo Villegas, Chairman of the Committee on
National Economy and Patrimony.
115
116
Petition, Rollo, pp.18-19.
117
Id., at 20.
118
Section 3. Definition of Terms. -For Purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
a) Ancestral Domains. -Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas

generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal
areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary
to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands,
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral
and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
134134134134134134
119
Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership- Indigenous concept of ownership
sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall
serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource
rights.
120
(a) Right of Ownership. The right to claim ownership over lands,

bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred
places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains;
(b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. Subject to Section

56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories
traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization
of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right
to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent
any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights; x x
x (Emphasis supplied.)
121
Section 2, Article XII, Constitution.
122
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. II, p. 42 (1983); see also Articles 427 and 428, Civil Code.
123
Id., at 43.
124
125
Ibid.
126
Should be Section 7. The Transcript of Session Proceedings of the deliberations
of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Cultural Communities
regarding House Bill No. 9125 refers to Section 8 but the Committee was actually
discussing Section 7 on Rights to Ancestral Domains.
127
Transcript of Session Proceedings, Bicameral Conference Committee on
National Cultural Communities, October 9, 1997, XIV-2.
128
Sections 7 (b) and Section 57, R.A. 8371.
129
40 Phil. 1017 (1909), 215 US 16, 54 L Ed 72.
130
Ibid. The facts of the case were discussed in Fianza vs. Reavies, (7 Phil. 610
[1909]) thus: Jose Fianza, et al., members of the Igorot tribe, claimed that he and
135135135135135135
his predecessors had, for more than fifty years prior to 1901, possessed a certain
parcel of mineral land on which were found two gold mines. The same parcel of
land was also claimed by an American, J.F. Reavies, who entered the land in 1901
and proceeded to locate mining claims according to the mining laws of the United
States. The Philippine Supreme Court held that Fianza, et al. were the rightful
owners of the mineral lands pursuant to Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
which in sum states that where a person have held or worked on their mining
claims for a period equivalent to ten years, evidence of such possession and
working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a
patent thereto. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Philippine Supreme Court and held that the indigenous peoples were the
rightful owners of the contested parcel of land, stating that the possession and
working by Fianza, et al. of the mining claim in the Philippine Islands for the time
required under the Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to establish the right
to a patent, need not have been under a claim of title.
131
Memorandum of Intervenors Flavier, et al., Rollo, p. 918.
132
Article I of the Decree of Superior Civil Government of January 29, 1864
provided that "The supreme ownership of mines throughout the kingdom belong
to the crown and the king. They shall not be exploited except by persons who
obtained special grant from this superior government and by those who may
secure it thereafter, subject to this regulation." (FRANCISCO, PHILIPPINE
LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 2nd ed. [1956], p. 14, citing the
unpublished case of Lawrence v. Garduno, G.R. No. 19042.)
Article 2 of the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 (the Spanish Mining Law),
the law in force at the time of the cession of the Philippines to the United
States contained a similar declaration, thus:
The ownership of the substances enumerated in the preceding article

(among them those of inflammable nature) belongs to the state, and they
cannot be disposed of without an authorization issued by the Superior
Civil Governor.
The Spanish Civil Code contained the following analogous provisions

affirming the States ownership over minerals:
Art. 339. Property of public dominium is-
xxx
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general

public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of
the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Art. 350. The proprietor of land is the owner of the surface and of
everything under it and may build, plant or excavate thereon, as he may
see fit, subject to any existing easements and to the provisions of the Laws
on Mines and Waters and to police regulations.
After the Philippines was ceded to Spain, the Americans continued to

adhere to the concept of State-ownership of natural resources. However,
the open and free exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral
deposits and the land where they may be found were allowed under the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Section 21 thereof stated:
136136136136136136
Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine
Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and
open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they
are found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or
of said Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered
and occupied as agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not
patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working of such mineral
deposits is hereby forbidden until the person, association, or corporation
who or which has entered and is occupying such lands shall have paid to
the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make
the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said
deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for
the same as mineral claims.
Other natural resources such as water and forests were similarly regarded
as belonging to the State during both the Spanish and American rule in the
Philippines, viz:
Article 33 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 defined waters of

public ownership as (1) the waters springing continuously or intermittently
from lands of the public domain; (2) the waters of rivers; and (3) the
continuous or intermittent waters of springs and creeks running through
their natural channels.
Article 1 of the same law states:
The following are also part of the national domain open to public use:
1. The coasts or maritime frontiers of the Philippine territory with

their coves, inlets, creeks, roadsteads, bays and ports
2. The coast of the sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the
coasts, to the full width recognized by international law. The state
provides for and regulates the police supervision and the uses of
this zone as well as the right of refuge and immunity therein, in
accordance with law and international treaties.
With respect to forests, there are references made regarding State-

ownership of forest lands in Supreme Court decisions (See Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198-1199 [1968]; Director of Lands
vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5, 11 [1975]; Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 175, 184 [1908]; Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil 572, 584
[1909]).
The States ownership over natural resources was embodied in the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution declared:
All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
137137137137137137
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty -five years,

except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provided:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception
of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in
which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
133
Noblejas, Philippine Law on Natural Resources 1961 Revised Ed., p. 6
134
See Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol.
VI, pp. 494-495.
135
Explanatory Note of the Committee on Nationalization of Lands and Natural
Resources, September 14, 1934, reproduced in Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the
Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. VII, pp. 464-468; see also De Leon
and De Leon, Jr., Philippine Constitutional Law: Principles and Cases, Vol. 2, pp.
801-802.
136
Section 8, Article XIV, see note 139 for the full text of the provision.
137
Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities,
or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations and associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit
of the grant.
138
xxx
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56

hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources
138138138138138138
within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations;
to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right
to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent
any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
139
Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.-The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the
ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and
utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal
and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the
community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow
such operation: Provided, finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers
and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same
contract.
140
Section 59. Certification Precondition - All departments and other
governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing,
renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any
production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall
only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral
Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be
issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent
of Indigenous peoples concerned: Provided, further, That no department,
government agency or government-owned or controlled corporation may issue
new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a
pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have
the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not
satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.
141
Section 58. Environmental Considerations.- Ancestral domains or portions
thereof, which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as
determined by appropriate agencies with the full participation of the Indigenous
peoples concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such
purposes. The Indigenous peoples concerned shall be given the responsibility
to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with the full and
effective assistance of government agencies. Should the Indigenous peoples
decide to transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in
writing. The consent of the Indigenous peoples should be arrived at in accordance
with its customary laws without prejudice to the basic requirements of existing
laws on free and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be
temporary and will ultimately revert to the Indigenous peoples in accordance with
the program for technology transfer; Provided, further, That no Indigenous
peoples shall be displaced or relocated for the purpose enumerated under this
section without the written consent of the specific persons authorized to give
consent.
142
Citing Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
139139139139139139
143
Memorandum of Petitioners, Id., at 840-841.
144
State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St 79, 112 NE 209, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d,
Constitutional Law, 100.
145
Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 US 8, 51 L Ed 345, cited in
16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law, 100.
146
Third paragraph, Section 2, Article XII, Constitution
The Congress may, by law, allow small scale-utilization of natural

resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with
priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays,
and lagoons.
147
Section 6, Article XIII, Constitution
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,

whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and
utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain
under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of the indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own
agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner
provided by law.
148
Section 7, Article XIII, Constitution
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of

local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and
fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to
such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate
financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The
State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share
from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
149
Bower v. Big Horn Canal Assn. (Wyo) 307 P2d 593, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d
Constitutional Law, 100.
150
Republic Act No. 7076 (the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991), Republic Act
No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
151
Section 3(b) of R.A. 7076 defines "small-scale mining" as referring to mining
activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and
methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment.
152
Section 7, R.A. 7076 provides:
Ancestral lands. - No ancestral land may be declared as a peoples small-

scale mining area without the prior consent of the cultural communities
concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as peoles small-
scale mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall
be given priority for the awarding of a peoples small-scale mining
contract.
140140140140140140
153
154
155
Sec. 3(q), Chapter 1, Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of
1995).
156
157
Sections 7(a) and (b), R.A. 8371.
158
Presidential Decree No. 1151 (1971).
159
Presidential Decree No. 1586 (1978) and DENR Administrative Order No. 37
(1996).
160
Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).
161
Republic Act No. 7942.
162
Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-25.
163
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, 596 (1995).
164
Section 53 (f), R.A. 8371.
165
166
167
Sections 40, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62 and 66, R.A. No. 8371.
168
Sections 63 and 65, R.A. No. 8371.
169
Section 40. Composition.- The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the
Office of the President and shall be composed of seven (7) Commissioners
belonging to the ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the Chairperson. The
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a list
of recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7)
Commissioners shall be appointed specifically from each of the following
ethnographic areas, Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II, the rest of Luzon;
Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the
Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and
Central Mindanao: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners
shall be women.
170
Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.- The NCIP, through its regional offices,
shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP.
171
Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts.- In cases of conflicting interest, where
there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey
plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice
to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral
141141141141141141
domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs

regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains,
customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further,
That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain
dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review
to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
172
Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo ,pp. 873-874.
173
Section 3 (f). Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized,
accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;
xxx
Sec. 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of

the ICCs/IPs of the land where the conflict arises shall be applied first
with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or ambiguity in the
application and interpretation of laws shall be resolved in favor of the
ICCs/IPs.
174
Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve
ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
175
Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp.875-876.
176
R.A. 8371 states:
Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes

involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
the dispute.
177
See Secs. 62 and 63, R.A. 8371.
178
Sec. 65, R.A. 8371.
179
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of

evidence.
180
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public
policy shall not be countenanced.180
181
R.A. No. 7160 reads:
Sec. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa.
xxx
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of

indigenous peoples, local systems of settling disputes of indigenous
peoples, local systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus
142142142142142142
or elders shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable provisions

of this Code.
182
Sec. 38, R.A. 8371.
183
Secs. 44 (a), (b), (c),(d), (f), (g), (h), (I), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (p), (q), R.A.
8371.
184
Sec. 44 (o), R.A. 8371.
185
Secs. 44 (e), 51-54, 62, R.A. 8371.
186
1 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, 55.
187
Sec. 62, R.A. 8371.
188
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
189
Sec. 44 (f), R.A. 8371.
190
Sec. 44 (g), R.A, 8371.
191
Sec. 44 (j), R.A. 8371.
192
Sec. 44 (p), R.A. 8371.
193
Sec. 40, R.A. 8371.
194
Sec. 42, R.A. 8371.
195
Supra note 75.
196
R.A. 7076.
197
R.A. 7942.
198
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A.
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not
complain of any injury as a result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a
right to seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon
the plea that the questions raised are of "transcendental importance."
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, 1 extends only to cases and
controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the
protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs.1
In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a property right of petitioners against
the government and other respondents or to demand compensation for injuries suffered
143143143143143143
by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to
be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case
will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring
to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment
cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the
validity of the provisions of the law in question.2
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, 1 of the Constitution
to determine in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive
departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies.
No one reading Art. VIII, 5 can fail to note that, in enumerating the matters placed in the
keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase "all cases. . . ."
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, 1 not really to give the
judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from
invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases
even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,3 in which this
Court, adopting the submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of
its jurisdiction in such cases:
[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to
satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct and that public safety was
endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in
suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.
That is why Art. VII, 18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of the
opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual
cases or controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches
of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court,
as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to
rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to
assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary
to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied
to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in
the area of freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a
party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not
unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute "on its face" rather than "as
applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on freedom of
expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so
far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not
possible.
For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not
only to act without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or
hypothetical questions, its decision will be based on speculation rather than experience.
Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate
144144144144144144
questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into
the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated,
cannot take place in a vacuum.
Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners will be a "galling cop out"4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone
isolationism."5 To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out"
or a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison6 to
hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace
of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie,
because 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the
United States Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the
courts jurisdiction is mainly appellate.
Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial
review, and so that there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country
have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII, 1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can
result either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the
checking and legitimating functions of judicial review so well mentioned in the
decisions7 of this Court.
To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is

not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government
whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to
be valid. The polestar of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the
Angara case when he said that "this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota, presented."8 For
the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals.9 Until,
therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the
presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.
Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor
General,10 reiterated in Tanada v. Tuvera,11 that "when the question is one of public right
and the object of mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws." On
the basis of this statement, he argues that petitioners have standing to bring these
proceedings.12
In Severino v. Governor General,13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel
the Governor General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so.
The ruling was that he did not have such a duty. On the other hand, although mandamus
was issued in Tanada v. Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit,
because the public has a right to know and the failure of respondents to publish all
decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed petitioners in
danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what public right is
there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general
and in common with other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
Footnotes
1
Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).
145145145145145145
2
Muskrat v. United States, 279 U.S. 346, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).
3
42 SCRA 448, 481 (1971) (emphasis on the original).
4
Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion, p. 2.
5
Vitug, J., Separate Opinion, p. 1.
6
1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
7
Occea v. Commission on Elections; Gonzales v. The National Treasurer, 104
SCRA 1 (1981); Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 104 SCRA 59 (1981).
8
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
9
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education,
97 Phil. 806 (1955).
10
16 Phil. 366 (1913).
11
136 SCRA 27 (1985).
12
Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, pp. 21-23.
13
Supra note 10.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted
handling of the procedural or preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners
have shown an actual case or controversy involving at least two constitutional questions
of transcendental importance,1 which deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly
by the highest court of the land.2 Further, I am satisfied that the various aspects of this
controversy have been fully presented and impressively argued by the parties. Moreover,
prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies3 to address the problems raised by
petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral
arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling
copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.
Protection of Indigenous Peoples Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework
With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencias resolution of the two main
substantive issues, which constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that
Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as -
1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public
domain, waters, x x x and other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not be alienated." I
respectfully reject the contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
not public lands and have never been owned by the State." Such sweeping
146146146146146146
statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of

the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people.
As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the entire
Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation's natural wealth.
2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the

"exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources," which the
Constitution expressly requires to "be under the full control and supervision of the
State."
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural
communities right to their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions
of this Constitution."4 I concede that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the beneficial use of public
domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less
in life, Congress in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our
marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution
must be respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to the poor, the
oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy the
blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of
access to the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends
and degrades the repository of the very authority of this Court - the Constitution of the
Philippines.
The Constitution Is a Compact
My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all
other laws must conform.5 It is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying
the principles upon which the State and the government are founded.6 Having the status
of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just
for the majority or for the minority at intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact
made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner.7
Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to
govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is
exempt from its compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous
peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the
state policy enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development."8 Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has provisions
that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority.
More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions
contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's property regime.
Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated
or Ceded
Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the
"conquest" of our country in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly
territory known as the Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain.
The King, as then head of State, had the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all
our lands, waters, minerals and other natural resources. By royal decrees, though, private
ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed; or (2)
ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be obtained
147147147147147147
by prescription.9 Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws meant the
abandonment or waiver of ownership claims.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United
States. The latter assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property
rights of the Spanish Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government
allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens for the "free and open x x x
exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in which they are found."10
To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own, exploit and dispose of
mineral resources and other rights arising from mining patents.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it
crafted and ratified our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the
Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively declared as belonging to the State all lands of
the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural resources.11 Although respecting
mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the further exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who might be entitled to
undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:
"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8
and 9, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, state:
"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources
of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of

the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical,
management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign person or entity for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources.
Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or
other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."
Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

148148148148148148
"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizen,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to
Filipino citizens.
"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino
citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms
and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the
"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution."
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially
impelled by the desire to preserve the nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos
themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers decided
to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with the conservation
of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments in
support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows: "[T]he natural resources,
particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged
not only to the generation then but also to the succeeding generation and consequently
should be conserved for them."12
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all
forces of energy and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the
Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the alienation of these natural resources. Their
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were further restricted only to
Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The present
Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and
expressly states that only agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We
quote below the relevant provision:13
"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x."
149149149149149149
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all
ancestral domains and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that these
properties - including forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein - are
private and have never been part of the public domain, because they have belonged to the
indigenous peoples ancestors since time immemorial.
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the
Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the
1935 Charter, which was subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the States
implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned
have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in
private land, the State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of
its sovereign prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and may not be used by
any private person, including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would
impede the mining operations. Such owner would be entitled to just compensation for the
loss sustained.
In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,15 the Court clarified that while mining claim
holders and patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim, their rights are not absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to
comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a
waiver of the claim.
Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political
history cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The
perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by
conceding the nations resources to their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more
privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen not
to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their
ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of "native title" thereto. It
would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and,
consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the countrys resources.
Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not
grant ownership of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it
recognizes and mandates respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral
lands and domains that had never been lands of the public domain."16 I say, however, that
such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a provision that
exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares that all
lands of the public domain and natural resources "are owned by the State"; and "with the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated."
As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,17 the Court declared as belonging to the public
domain all lands not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under
laws, orders or decrees promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory
information under Act 496 (Mortgage Law).
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of
ICCs/IPs from that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They
maintain that "[t]here are variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a
fair synthesis of these refers to x x x the tribal right to use the land or to territorial
control x x x, a collective right to freely use the particular territory x x x [in] the concept
of trusteeship.'"
In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that
preserves the property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of
150150150150150150
its members, without the attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however,
still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its
enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of
private respondents claims simply makes them repugnant to basic fairness and equality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and
lands to the pre-Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands
and domains was limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-
based. This must be the continuing scope of the indigenous groups ownership claims:
limited to land, excluding the natural resources found within.
In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of
ancestral domains, then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution
is IPRAs Section 5719- without the too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) -
insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting
natural resources within ancestral domains.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past
must fail. Our Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial
masters, but in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has
the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or
create exceptions to them.
Cario v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution
In this connection, I submit that Cario v. Insular Government20 has been modified or
superseded by our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as
referring only to a means by which public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I
must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cario refers to land ownership only, not to
the natural resources underneath or to the aerial and cosmic space above.
Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,21 a Decision handed

down after our three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority
member's registration of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c).22 The reason was that the
property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor
the solicitor generals following statements:
"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of
law involved, as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is
to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions
do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973
Constitution states that with the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated. The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly states that
with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated."
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is
incapable of registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the
defense of indefeasiblity of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not
lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land
is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent covering forest land being
void ab initio."
RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains
The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural
resources found within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very
wordings of the law belies this statement.
151151151151151151
Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging
to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein,
held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously
to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement x x x. It
shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x x
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources x x x." (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs

encompass the natural resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and
protection of their rights of ownership and possession over such domains.
The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law
declares that ancestral domains, including the natural resources found therein, are owned
by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. Not only does it vest ownership,
as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual exclusivity. This means that while
ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos who are not
indigenous can never own any part thereof.
On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands
occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since
time immemorial x x x, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, x x x
including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8 recognizes and protects "the right of ownership
and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands." Such ownership need not be by
virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, more specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public
domain, minerals and natural resources none of which, except agricultural lands, can be
alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural land
must first be reclassified and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
purposes by a positive act of the government.26 Mere possession or utilization thereof,
however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties.27 The
presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration
proceedings have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing
by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory
information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present
competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and
title."28
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are
merely definitions and should not be construed independently of the other provisions of
the law. But, precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or word
group."29 It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person defined.30 Thus, after
defining a term as encompassing several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same
term should be interpreted as excluding one or more of the enumerated items in its
definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be bound by the law. In
other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources
found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means
that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.
152152152152152152
In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral
domains, with no specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory
directly contravenes the Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards
international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the
land.31
No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371
Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more
than 12 hectares of alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More
than that, but not exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In
fact, by their mere definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The
properties under the assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time
immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
[them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators."
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as
they have used up the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back
to one they used to occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use
enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic
ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging ancestral domain or land, several
thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their private property.
Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on
compounded or consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what
their forefathers secured for them when they first set foot on our country."32 They trace
their right to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land way back to their ancient
sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands that have become part of Mindanao.
This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their ancestral lands.33
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various
ICCs/IPs as ancestral domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands.34 Based
on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80
percent of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares
of land in the country.35 This means that four fifths of its natural resources and one third
of the country's land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110
ICCs,36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will
have to share the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional
principle of a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among
Filipinos.
RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural
Resources
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration,
supervision of the State." The State may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter
into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens
or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos.37 Such agreements,
however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and
conditions as may be provided by law.
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of
ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural resources found within their territories are concerned.
153153153153153153
Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the
natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the
utilization thereof.38 And they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-
ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like
period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and
utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.
In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for
the exploration of natural resources,40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State.
Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State's
power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in
contravention of our most fundamental law.
I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale
utilization of natural resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no
objection. These undertakings are certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371
(1) ownership of ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2)
the ICCs/IPs' control of the exploration, development and utilization of such resources I
believe I should no longer tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought
up:
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains
amounts to undue deprivation of private property
2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants
3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies
and other forms of exaction
4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in

the settlements of disputes over their rights and claims
5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of

Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses
6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces
against their will
I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or,
at least, no longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the two
major IPRA propositions are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other hand, I
think that in the case of the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those
whose rights may have been injured by specific provisions of RA 8371.
Epilogue
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:
"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well
being.
"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."
154154154154154154
Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of
ICCs/IPs: (1) the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development
policies and programs.
Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society.
This does not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the
Constitution withholds from the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving them
priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral lands and
domains.41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth
to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live and abide by
our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of
the rule of law.
In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively

mandating "reverse discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so
at the expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced
generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of
turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.
Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to
coddle the few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be
approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the
nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.
Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of
opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from
exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice empowering and
enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the
blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as

UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions
of RA 8371.
Footnotes
1
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130, 140, November 16, 1995; Association of
Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 365, July 14,
1989; Antonio v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil 368 (1949).
2
Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 46, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Comelec, 270
SCRA 106, 123-24, March 19, 1997; Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, 60, May
14, 1991.
3
Tanada v. Angara, ibid.
4
5, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
5
16 CJS 3.
6
16 Am Jur 2d 2.
7
Ibid.
8
22, Art. II of the Constitution.
155155155155155155
9
Abaoag v. Director of Lands, 45 Phil 518 (1923), cited in petitioners'
Memorandum.
10
Soledad M. Cagampang-de Castro, "The Economic Policies on Natural
Resources Under the 1987 Constitution Revisited," Journal of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Vol. XXV, Nos. 3 & 4 (1999), p. 51.
11
In a republican system of government, the concept of jura regalia is stripped of
royal overtones; ownership is vested in the State, instead. (Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ,
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.
1009-1010.)
12
II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 603, quoted in Bernas,
supra, p. 1010.
13
3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
14
160 SCRA 228, 239, April 15, 1988.
15
261 SCRA 528, September 9, 1996.
16
NCIPs Memorandum, p. 24.
17
75 Phil 890, 892, August 31, 1946.
18
Intervenors Memorandum, pp. 33 et seq.
19
"SEC. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. The ICCs/IPs shall
have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of
any natural resources within the ancestral domains. x x x."
20
41 Phil 935, February 23, 1909.
21
172 SCRA 455, 463, April 18, 1989, per Gutierrez Jr., J.
22
"(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at
least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (As
amended by R.A. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18, 1964)."
23
284 SCRA 617, 633, January 22, 1998, per Puno, J.
24
"a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas,
and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or
possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into
by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to
ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators."
156156156156156156
25
"b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the
ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously,
to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice
terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."
26
Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, March 2, 1993; Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296,
December 17, 1990; Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
January 29, 1990.
27
Ibid., Margolles v. Court of Appeals, February 14, 1994; Gordula v. Court of
Appeals, supra.
28
Republic v. Sayo, October 31, 1990, per Narvasa, J. (later CJ). See also
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra.
29
Websters Third New International Dictionary; Petitioners Memorandum, p. 41.
30
Ibid.
31
2, Art. II of the Constitution.
32
Cecilio R. Laurente, "The King's Hand: The Regalian Doctrine as a
Contributing Factor in the Mindanao Conflict," Human Rights Agenda, Vol. 5,
Issue No. 7, July & August 2000, pp. 6-7.
33
Ibid.
34
Solicitor General's Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 651.
35
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
36
Ibid. See also Datu Vic Saway, "Indigenous Peoples and the Uplands: A
Situationer," Proceedings of the 6th Upland NGO Consultative Conference, 23-27
August 1998, p. 30.
37
Or (3) in case of large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, enter through the President into "agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance." (Miners
Association of the Philippines v. Factoran Jr., 240 SCRA 100, January 16, 1995.)
38
7(b), RA 7381.
39
57, ibid.
40
7(b), ibid.
41
As stated earlier, Sec. 57 of IPRA, insofar as it grants them such priority, is
constitutional.
157157157157157157

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
158158158158158158
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Decision1 dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by
Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales,
Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the
said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which
likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje
and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or
encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an

opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto;
that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis
of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land
applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the
whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded
with the hearing of this registration case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case.
The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the
admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the
Government had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein
respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and
decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land
situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP-03-003447 containing an
area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of
15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T.
Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of
Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders
and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act
No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This
adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for
under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which
should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes
final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in
bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner
Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001.
159159159159159159
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998,
affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision "is
not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not
established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect
of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public
Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its
finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her
application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established
that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of
the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to
be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to
have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the Constitution8 classifying
lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and
national parks," do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse
covered by dense growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies the Regalian doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land.11 All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by
the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public
Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e.,
from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of
the government and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by
incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and
disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain
cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a
reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the
legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.)
160160160160160160
The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for
respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive
occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above
assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that,
upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to
be public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning
cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and
alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in
issue. And there lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government
agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and
disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls
for proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and
technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information
respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these
documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a

notorious practice resorted to in land registration cases.20 For this reason, the Court has
made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral
lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands need
an express and positive act from the government.21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in
question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May
29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is
DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
161161161161161161
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I CAT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero (ret.), with Associate
Justices Arturo B. Buena (ret.) and Portia Alio-Hormachuelos, concurring; Rollo,
pp. 22-27.
2
Rollo, pp. 28-38.
3
Ibid., pp. 22-23.
4
Id., pp. 28-38.
5
Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69 (1983); Director of
Forestry vs. Munoz, 126 SCRA 1148 (1983).
6
Ibid.
7
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
8
Art. XII, Sec. 3.
9
See Note # 5, supra.
10
Sec. 2 All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other resources are owned by the State. xxx
11
Seville vs. NDC, 351 SCRA 112 (2001).
12
Bracewell vs. CA, 323 SCRA 193 (2000).
13
Menguito vs. Republic, 348 SCRA 128 (2000).
14
Bilog LAND TITLES and DEEDS, 2005 ed., p. 59, citing Director of Lands vs.
CA, 178 SCRA 708 (1989).
15
Pagkatipunan vs. CA, 379 SCRA 621 (2000).
16
146 SCRA 509 (1986).
162162162162162162
17
95 SCRA 437 (1980).
18
Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57 (1986); Republic vs. CA, 154
SCRA 476 (1987).
19
Republic vs. Lao, 405 SCRA 291 (2003).
20
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701 (1984).
21
Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry; supra; Republic vs. CA 201
SCRA 1 (1991).
22
De Ocampo vs. Arlos, 343 SCRA 716 (2000); Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA
499 [1974). Lacson vs. Del Rosario, 151 SCRA 714 (1987).

First 5 Cases On Land Titles - SCRA

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111111

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE

REYES, R.T., J.:

G.R. No. 167707

RTC and CA Dispositions

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying

G.R. No. 167707

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN

HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF

IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND

IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF

THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF

CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE

In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R.

Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive

to reclassify lands of the public domain

Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised

The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not

One Last Note

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

(On official leave) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

** No part. Justice Nachura participated in the present case as Solicitor General.

Sec. 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby

Sec. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby

SEC. 54. The following described persons or their legal successors in

(6) All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have

Establishment of or low-density human settlements in private lands, or

Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

SEC. 7. For the purposes of administration and disposition of alienable or

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 129682 March 21, 2002

NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAAGAS-PAGKATIPUNAN,

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Sometime in November 1960, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, spouses Getulio

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against

Without pronouncement as to costs."9

On September 4, 1995, Atty. Doronila withdrew his appearance as counsel for

Hence, the instant petition for review.20

The petition lacks merit.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry:34

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

Without pronouncement as to costs.

Davide, Jr., C.J., and Kapunan, J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines