G.R. No.
198780 October 16, 2013 entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite
(RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios
(A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity
4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention
of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the
existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did
not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of
respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that
she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter
into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties
went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he
never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that
their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never
intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and
wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that
is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT. 8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and
for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as
they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished
from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her
stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from
the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its
petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In
the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose
or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. 11 A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend
to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified
with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which
now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus,
shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is
used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal
validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The
early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In
1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay
in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a
divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage
to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage,
there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go
through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which
may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not
a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation
will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as
such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as
soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married
at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
19
Lines, which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry
to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because
the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration case of
Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally
denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to
achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage
was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying
the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent
to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the
marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into
the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They
never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband
and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack
of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real
in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal
in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create
the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a
genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering
that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was,
thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal
tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify
a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall
be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure
their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children
or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages entered into for
other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status,
and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31are equally valid. Love,
though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize
marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same
Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving
moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud
as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose
of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured
or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing
her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO* ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August
25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L.
Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the
assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend
of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a
certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage
and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not
have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed
husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as
she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She
believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency,
whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated
in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel
all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that
of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on
the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioners counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean
national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the
Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Order based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN
THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB
INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or
corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in
fact, the latters personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the
wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null
and void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised
or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value of the
evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry, to wit:
 SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register,
may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births;
(b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought
may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction
for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy
of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or
adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of
Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true
facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However,
a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule
108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. 22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her
signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported
husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there
was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married
to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of
the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-
respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature
appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a
categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers
and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition,
no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v.
Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office 24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for
the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children,
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
 corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot
dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show
the existence of marriage.1wphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The
testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of
the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP.
Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
 G.R. No. 184343
March 2, 2009
PP vs Jesus Domingo
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April
2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision[2] dated 13 November 2006 of
Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000
and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No.
1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, and frustrated
homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.
On 7 March 2003, six Informations[3] were filed before the RTC charging appellant with the
following offenses:
Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000 for Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver and with intent to kill one Marvin G.
Indon, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the
kitchen knife and screw driver said Marvin G. Indon, hitting him on his body thereby
inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000 for Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver and with intent to kill one Melissa G.
Indon, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the
kitchen knife and screw driver said Melissa G. Indon, hitting her on different parts of her
body thereby inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with kitchen knife and screw driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery attack, assault and hit with the
said screw driver one Michelle G. Indon, a minor of 9 years old, hitting her on her back and
buttocks, thereby inflicting on her serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have
caused the death of the said Michelle G. Indon, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, this is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Michelle G. Indon.
Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault,
stab and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw driver one Ronaldo Galvez, hitting him
on different part of his body, thereby inflicting on him serious physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused the death of Ronaldo Galvez, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ronaldo Galvez.
Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a kitchen knife and screw driver, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, stab
and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw driver one Raquel Gatpandan Indon, hitting
her on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting on her serious physical injuries
which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Raquel Gatpandan Indon, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his
will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Raquel Gatpandan
Indon.
Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000 for Attempted Murder
That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a kettle and with intent to kill one Jeffer G. Indon, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, commence
the commission of murder directly by overt acts, that is by attacking, assaulting, and hitting
the said Jeffer G. Indon, a 2 year old boy, with the kettle, hitting the latter on his head,
thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries and if the accused was not able to accomplish
his purpose, that is to kill the said Jeffer G. Indon, it was not because of his voluntary
desistance but due to the timely intervention of third persons.
On 7 September 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned and he
entered separate pleas of Not Guilty to the crimes charged. Thereafter, pre-trial
conference was held, and trial ensued accordingly.[4]
Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of complainants Raquel Indon,
Jeffer Indon, and Michelle Indon; Dr. Jacinto Caluag; Police Officer (PO) 3 Asher Villegas
and PO2 Rogelio Santos.
Complainant Raquel Indon testified that between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. of 29 March
2000, she and her minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside
their house in Caingin, San Rafael, Bulacan, when she was awakened by the sound of
appellant kicking their door open. Raquel narrated that she immediately recognized the
accused, since the kitchen light illuminated his face. Armed with a screwdriver and a
kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed her, using
the six-inch screwdriver, and hit her right arm three times. She screamed and was heard
by her sister-in-law, whose house was contiguous to theirs. When her sister-in-law asked
her for the identity of the assailant, she immediately identified herein appellant as Doser,
a name by which he is known in the community. Appellant was angered by her reply and
said, Anong Doser? and thereafter pulled a kitchen knife from his right side and stabbed
her on the stomach. When she tried to escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin rushed
towards her. She then grabbed him and ran towards the gate. However, before reaching
the gate, she fell down and appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then proceeded
to stab Marvin, hitting the latter twice on the arm and twice on his left chest. Marvin died
on 3 April 2000 as a result of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back
to the house, towards Raquels two daughters Michelle and Melissa. When Raquel pleaded
that the appellant spare her daughters lives, he retorted: Ngayon pa, nagawa ko
na. Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted on her; while
Michelle, who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained serious physical
injuries. The appellant also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with
the screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house of Raquels sister-in-
law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but the appellant followed her. Their neighbor,
Ronaldo Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to subdue the appellant. Raquel,
thereafter, lost consciousness. She also relayed that she was later informed that a struggle
ensued between appellant and Galvez. Appellant inflicted wounds on Galvezs upper left
chest and arms, after which Galvez was able to hit appellant with a piece of wood, which
rendered the latter unconscious. Raquel, Melissa, Marvin, Jeffer, Galvez and the appellant
were taken to the hospital.[5]
Raquel also testified that she spent P15,000.00 for the casket of Melissa Indon, P27,000.00
for the burial expenses of Melissa Indon and Marvin Indon, and approximately P30,000.00
for the food served during their wake. She also stated that because of her stab wounds,
she spent P90,000.00 for hospitalization expenses and medicines. However, the receipts
were lost except those issued
[6]
by Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital.
Jeffer Indon, who was five years old at the time he testified, stated that the scar on his
forehead was the result of the stab wound inflicted by Doser. However, on cross-
examination, he admitted that he did not know who stabbed him.[7]
Michelle Indon identified the appellant as the man who stabbed her mother, her brother
Marvin and her sister Melissa. She testified that the appellant stabbed her in the back
once. Thereafter, she hid under the papag. She related that she did not go to the hospital
anymore, because a certain Nanang Ella had already seen to her stab wound.[8]
Dr. Jacinto Caluag stated under oath that he treated Raquel Indon for multiple stab
wounds. He testified that he also assisted in the operation on Raquel to repair her liver and
gallbladder, which were damaged. He also disclosed that Raquel would have gone into
shock and died had she not been given medical attention.[9]
Police officers Asher Villegas and Rogelio Santos testified that they proceeded to the scene
of the crime after the neighbors of the complainant reported the incident. When they
arrived at the crime scene, appellant was already tied up. They took pictures of the victims,
while the kitchen knife and the screwdriver allegedly used by the appellant were turned
over to Police Officer Villegas. The complainants and the appellant were then brought to
the hospital. They recorded the incident in the Police Blotter and prepared the statements
of the witnesses. After the accused was treated for injuries, he was brought to the police
station and detained. When asked why he committed the crime, accused denied
knowledge of what happened.[10]
In an Order dated 10 July 2003, the trial court ordered that Ronaldo Galvezs testimony
during his direct examination be stricken off the records due to his absences on the days
he was scheduled to be cross-examined.[11]
The documentary evidence offered by the prosecution included the following: (1) the
sketches of Raquel Indons house, to prove that the light from the kitchen allowed her to
identify the appellant, marked as Exhibits A to A-6; (2) the Death Certificate of Marvin
Indon marked as Exhibit D; (3) the Medico-Legal Certificates of Raquel Indon, Marvin
Indon, Jeffer Indon, and Ronaldo Galvez marked as Exhibits E, F, H, and L, respectively; (4)
the Birth Certificates of Marvin Indon and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits B and N; (5)
pictures of Melissa Indons lifeless body marked as Exhibits G and O; (6) Sworn Statements
of Ronaldo Galvez and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits K and M; (7) Statement of
Account of the Medical Expenses incurred by Raquel Indon, issued by Sagrada Familia
Hospital in the amount of P38,500.00, marked as Exhibit I; and (8) Statement of Account
of the Medical Expenses incurred by Raquel Indon, issued by the Bulacan Provincial
Hospital, in the amount of P7,843.00, marked as Exhibit J.[12]
In his defense, appellant testified that prior to the incident, he was in good terms with the
Indon family and that he had no record of mental illness. However on 20 March 2000, he
went to East Avenue Medical Center for a medical check-up, and he was advised to have
an operation. He suffered from sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and
nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. He averred that when he regained
his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and he was already
detained. He only came to know of the incidents from his sister and his children who visited
him. On cross-examination he admitted that when he regained his memory, he did not
even ask the police officers why he was incarcerated.[13]
Dr. Regienald Afroilan, a witness for the defense, also testified that appellant was first
brought to the National Center for Mental Health (Center) in August 2004 for a psychiatric
evaluation, psychological examination and final testing to determine if he could stand
trial. Dr. Afroilan stated that based on his evaluation, appellant suffered from
Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the presence of delusions and or
hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low frustration
tolerance. He could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the
symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he
suffered from the illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. On cross-
examination, he clarified that the evaluation finding that appellant suffered from
Schizophrenia covered the period when the appellant submitted himself to
examination.[14]
In a Decision dated 13 November 2006, the RTC decreed that the appellant was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-00 and No. 1497-M-
00, frustrated homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1499-M-00 and No. 1500-M-00, and
attempted homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-00 and No. 1501-M-00. The RTC gave
credence to the principal eyewitness, Raquel Indon, whose testimony was corroborated by
Michelle Indon, regarding appellants attack on 29 March 2000. The trial court found the
appellants defense of insanity unmeritorious, since what was presented was proof of
appellants mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at the time
the crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had the
presence of mind to respond to Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by
saying, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. It also noted that based on the psychiatrists findings,
the appellant was competent to stand trial. However, the trial court declared that there
were no qualifying circumstances to support the charges of Murder, Frustrated Murder or
Attempted Murder.[15] The dispositive part of the Decision dated 13 November 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of:
a) In Crim. Case No. 1496-M-00, Homicide, for the death of Marvin G. Indon, minor and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision
mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75,000.00.
b) In Crim. Case No. 1497-M-00, Homicide, for the death of Melissa Indon, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor as
minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the amount of P75,000.00.
c) In Crim. Case No. 1498-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years
of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the private complainant in the
amount of P10,000.00.
d) In Crim. Case No. 1499-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the private complainant
Ronaldo Galvez in the amount of P30,000.00.
e) In Crim. Case No. 1500-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the private complainant
Raquel Gatpandan Indon in the amount of P30,000.00. Likewise, accused is further
directed to pay to the private complainant herein the sum of P90,000.00 to cover
hospitalization and medical expenses; P42,000.00 to cover the casket and burial expenses
for Melissa and Marvin, and P30,000.00 for food expenses, all by way of actual damages.
f) In Crim. Case No. 1501-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years
of prision correccional as maximum, and to indemnify the private complainant in the
amount of P10,000.00.[16]
The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
30511, wherein he faulted the RTC for not taking note of the inconsistencies in Raquel
Indons testimony and for not giving due weight to his defense of insanity. [17] In a Decision
dated 30 April 2008, the appellate court adjudged that Raquel Indons testimony was
credible, and that the inconsistency pointed out by appellantwhether or not Raquel was
standing up or lying down when appellant stabbed her legsreferred to minor
details. Moreover, insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental disorder
refers to appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the
commission of the crime. This was not the case when appellant was first medically
examined more than four years after the commission of the crimes. Appellants response
to Raquel Indons pleas also proved that his faculties of reasoning were unimpaired at the
time of the attack against Raquels children.[18]
The Court of Appeals nevertheless modified the RTCs Decision dated 13 November 2006
and declared that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, which was alleged in the six
Informations along with evident pre-meditation, was adequately proven by the
prosecution. Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon, Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer Indon
were merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not even given the slightest
provocation when appellant attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the killing of
Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, both minors who could not be expected to defend
themselves against an adult, was considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction
for murder.The penalties imposed were adjusted accordingly. Appellants conviction for
frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution
failed to prove appellants treachery or evident premeditation in his assault against Rolando
Galvez, who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the appellant.[19]
The Court of Appeals also modified the trial courts award of damages. It reduced the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 awarded by the trial court, occasioned by the deaths of Marvin
Indon and Melissa Indon, to P50,000.00 and awarded the heirs of each murder victim
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. The awards for funeral expenses
of P42,000.00 and food expenses of P30,000.00 were deleted by the appellate court for
lack of sufficient evidence to support the same. The appellate court awarded Raquel Indon
civil indemnity of P30,000.00 and moral damages of P25,000.00, but reduced the actual
damages of P90,000.00 awarded by the RTC to P46,343.00, in accordance with the
Statement of Accounts from Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital. It
affirmed the trial courts award for moral damages of P10,000.00 in favor of Michelle Indon
and P10,000.00 in favor of Jeffer Indon. Moral damages of P25,000.00 were also awarded
by the appellate court in favor of Ronaldo Galvez. [20]
In the Decision dated 30 April 2008, the fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 13, 2006 of the trial court is
modified as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, accused-appellant Jesus Domingo is convicted of the
crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marvin Indon the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial courts award of funeral and food
expenses of P42,000.00 and P30,000.00 respectively, are hereby deleted.
2) In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, accused-appellant Jesus Domingo is convicted of the
crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Melissa Indon the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay Michelle Indon P10,000.00 as moral
damages.
4) In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of frustrated homicide and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years
of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayoras maximum and to
pay Ronaldo Galvez P25,000.00 as moral damages.
5) In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of frustrated murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay Raquel
Indon the amount of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P46, 343.00 as actual damages
and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
6) In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay Jefferson (sic) Indon P10,000.00 as
moral damages.[21]
Hence, the present petition where the appellant reiterates the assignment of errors that
were raised before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
and
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED THE CRIMES CHARGED, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT EXEMPTING HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN VIEW
OF HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME.[22]
This Court affirms the judgment of conviction.
The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution, Raquel Indon, is assailed by
appellant for not being credible due to an inconsistency in her testimony and a lack of
conformity with the experience of ordinary men.
Appellant refers to Raquels testimony during cross-examination wherein she narrated that
after the appellant entered her bedroom, she screamed. Her sister-in-law, who lived next
door, responded by asking Raquel who her assailant was, and the latter identified the
appellant. Appellant claims that the conversation between Raquel and her sister-in-law
was contrary to the ordinary course of things, and that the initial reaction of people in such
a situation would be to ask for help from other people in order to save those who are in
danger. Secondly, Raquel also testified during cross-examination that the appellant
stabbed the front of her legs when she fell down. It is also argued that the appellant could
not have stabbed the front of her legs, since she would be lying on front of her legs when
she fell down.
This Court finds no merit in these arguments. To begin with, there was nothing out of the
ordinary as regards Raquels testimony on these two matters. First, there was nothing
unusual about the sister-in-laws query as to who was attacking Raquel. Considering that
the exchange merely consisted of this question and the reply to it, it would not even be
accurate to refer to it as a conversation. Secondly, it was not impossible for the appellant
to stab the front of Raquels legs, had her legs been positioned sideways when she fell. But
more importantly, these are peripheral details that do not affect the substantial aspects of
the incident. Raquel clearly and positively testified that she was carrying her son Marvin
when she rushed to the gate and fell down, and the appellant stabbed her legs and
thereafter proceeded to stab Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. Her testimony
was supported by the Medico-Legal Reports marked as Exhibits E and F. Any
inconsistencies in such peripheral details would not exculpate the appellant.
Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the
commission of the alleged crimes, and therefore should be exempted from criminal liability
in accordance with Article 12, Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code.[23] However, this claim
is not supported by evidence.
Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was insane at the
time he committed the crime. He testified that nine days before he committed the crime,
he suffered from lack of appetite, sleeplessness, and anxiety. In addition, he allegedly
heard voices ordering him to kill bad people. He claims that he does not remember
anything that happened on 29 March 2000, when the crimes were committed, and that he
was already detained when he became conscious of his surroundings.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes
that all acts are voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done
unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance
of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she was insane
immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed. [24]
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the
act; i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if
the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and
perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. An
insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of his
or her acts.[25]
Even assuming that appellants testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack of appetite,
nervousness and his hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive of an abnormal mental
condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power
to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular
conception of the word crazy is used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of
ordinary. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the
commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally insane and will not
grant him or her absolution.[26]
Raquel Indons narration of the events presents evidence that is more revealing of
appellants mental state at the time the crime was committed. Appellants reply to her pleas
that her daughters lives be spared, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na, was a positive sign that he
was aware of what he was doing, and that his reasoning faculties were unimpaired.
The trial court found the testimony of Raquel Indon more credible than that of the accused,
and its findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial
courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon this Court. This Court does not generally disturb the findings
of fact of the trial court because it is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well
as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying on the stand. Unless there is a
clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances that might alter the result
of the case, the findings of fact made by the trial court will be respected and even accorded
finality by this Court.[27]
It is also remarkable that appellants testimony is not supported by his familys or intimate
friends accounts of his purported insanity. Appellant testified that he had been suffering
from symptoms of insanity nine days before the incident. Insanity may be shown by the
surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the
allegedly deranged persons general conduct and appearance, his conduct consistent with
his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well as his improvident
bargains.[28] It is difficult to believe that appellants behavior, conduct and appearance,
which would denote mental disturbance, escaped the notice of his family and friends.
Appellant draws attention to the results of the medical examination conducted by Dr.
Regienald Afroilan in 2004, showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. It should be
noted however that the examination was taken four years after the crimes were
committed, and that Dr. Afroilan admitted that his findings did not include the mental state
of petitioner four years before. The alleged insanity of an accused should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed, not at any time
thereafter. Medical findings of mental disorder, referring to a period after the time the
crime was committed, will not exempt him from criminal liability. [29]
Appellant emphasizes the fact that he was a friend of the Indon family and would not have
committed such atrocities against them, unless he was totally deprived of
reason. In People v. Madarang,[30] this Court ruled that the fact that the accused had no
quarrel with his victim prior to the killing does not prove the unstable mental condition of
the accused. Jurisprudence is replete with cases in which lives have been terminated for
the flimsiest reasons.
This Court will now discuss the imposition of penalties and modify those imposed by the
Court of Appeals. Appellant is guilty of Murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No.
1497-M-2000. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its
medium period, or reclusion perpetua.[31] Thus, for the murder of Marvin Indon and
Melissa Indon, the penalty imposed on appellant is two sentences of reclusion perpetua.

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[32]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime.[33] Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award
of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is in order.[34] Thus, P50,000.00 is
awarded to the heirs of Marvin Indon and P50,000.00 to the heirs of Melissa Indon.
The heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are not entitled to actual damages, because
said damages were not adequately proved. The party seeking actual damages must
produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an
award therefor.[35] The funeral expenses, to which Raquel Indon referred in her testimony,
were not supported by receipts. Nevertheless, the award of P25,000.00 in temperate
damages for homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial or funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court.[36] Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. [37] Thus, the heirs of Marvin
Indon and Melissa Indon are entitled to temperate damages of P25,000.00 for each death.
In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need
of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. [38] The award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages is in order for the death for Marvin Indon, and likewise for that of Melissa
Indon.
Exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should also be awarded, since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was firmly established.[39] Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon were
both minors when they were killed by the appellant. The killing by an adult of a minor child
is treacherous.[40] Moreover, the victims in this case were asleep when appellant barged
into their house and attacked their family. The attack was clearly unprovoked, and they
were defenseless against him.
In Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, appellant is guilty of the
Attempted Murder of Michelle Indon and Jeffer Indon. The penalty for Attempted Murder
is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.Thus, the penalty imposed on
the appellant is two sentences of six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten years
of prision mayor medium, as maximum, for the attempted murder of Michelle Indon and
Jeffer Indon. In addition to the moral damages of P10,000.00 for each victim, which the
Court of Appeals imposed, appellant is also ordered to pay civil indemnity
of P20,000.00[41] and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.[42]
In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, appellant is convicted of the crime of frustrated
homicide of Ronaldo Galvez. The penalty for frustrated homicide, there being no other
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the same, is five years of prision
correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. Moral
damages in the amount of P25,000.00, awarded by the Court of Appeals, are affirmed.
Appellant is guilty of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000. The penalty for
Frustrated Murder is reclusion temporal, which must be imposed in its medium period,
considering that there were neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that were
proven in this case. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum
penalty. This Court affirms the award by the Court of Appeals of (1) Civil Indemnity in the
amount of P30,000.00;[43] (2) actual damages of P46,343.00 for medical expenses, which
are supported by receipts marked as Exhibits I and J; and (3) moral damages
of P25,000.00. Appellant is also ordered to pay exemplary damages of P25,000.00 based
on the finding that the assault against Raquel Indon was attended by treachery. [44] The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift
and unexpected manner of execution, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape.[45] At the time Raquel was attacked, she was in her home,
unarmed and sleeping with her children. She was undoubtedly unprepared and
defenseless to resist appellants attack on her and her young children.
All the sums of money awarded to the victims and their heirs will accrue a 6% interest from
the time of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30
April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511 is MODIFIED in accordance with the hereinabove
discussion on penalties and award of damages, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, this Court additionally awards P25,000.00 as
temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Marvin Indon.
2. In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, this Court additionally awards P25,000.00 as
temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Melissa Indon.
3. In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, the Court additionally awards civil indemnity
of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to Michelle Indon.
4. In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, the appellant is sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum.
5. In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, this Court additionally awards exemplary damages
of P25,000.00 to Raquel Indon.
6. In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, this Court additionally awards civil indemnity
of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to Jeffer Indon.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 216021, March 02, 2016
SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties differ from
one who is totally deprived thereof and is unable to exercise sufficient restraint on
his. Thus, it is but reasonable that the actions made by the latter be measured
under a lesser stringent standard than that imposed on those who have complete
dominion over their mind, body and spirit.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July 10,
2014 Decision1 and the December 15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed the May 30, 2013 Judgment3 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13283,
finding accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the
crime of murder for killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo), the accusatory portion of which
reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused SOLOMON VERDADEROarmed with a Rambo knife, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon him
stab wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.
Contrary to law.5 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the
pre-trial, he invoked the defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse trial.
Thereafter, trial ensued.6
Evidence of the Prosecution
The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:
On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata
(Maynard) and his father Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with
Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to report that Verdadero had stolen the fan
belt of their irrigation pump.7
After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their
way home on a tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy
some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded towards a store near the drugstore while
Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store, Maynard saw Verdadero
stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.8
Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of
a Rambo knife. He again struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder.
Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He
defended himself using a small stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in the chest.9
Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding
police officers arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a
clinic but were advised to bring him to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC).
Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the CVMC. Based on the Post-Mortem
Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds.10
Evidence of the Defense
The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but revolved
around Verdadero's alleged insanity, to wit:
Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as
he claimed to hear strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in 2001,
Miriam Verdadero (Miriam), Verdadero's sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC after he became violent and started throwing stones at a
tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero was confined for two (2) months and was
diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.
On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications
to address his mental illness. Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as
he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then, in 2009, he was again confined for the
fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.
On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the stabbing
incident. There, she saw Verdadero removing the IV tubes connected to his body
and, thereafter, locked himself inside the comfort room. Eventually, Verdadero was
given sedatives and was transferred to an isolation room after Miriam informed the
nurses of the incident.11
On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after Dr.
Leonor Andres-Juliana (Dr. Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed that he was having
difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that Verdadero suffered a relapse, as
evidenced by his violent behaviour.
Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr.
Pagaddu) conducted a mental examination on Verdadero. She confirmed that as
early as 1999, he was already brought to CVMC and that he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu agreed with Dr. Andres-Juliana that
Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing incident.12
The RTC Ruling
On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the
crime of homicide. The dispositive portion of which reads:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SOLOMON
VERDADERO y Galera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences him:
1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12) years
of prision mayor [as maximum] as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; and,
2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:
a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,
3. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.13 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution
failed to establish the presence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the
killing to murder. The trial court, however, opined that Verdadero failed to establish
insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial court posited that Verdadero was
unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the time he
stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous
with the commission of the crime.
Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The
appellate court agreed that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a
history of schizophrenic attacks, but was unable to prove that he was not lucid at
the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal portion of the decision
states:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Judgment,
dated May 30, 2013, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City,
Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.14
ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution, dated December 15, 2014.
Hence, this present petition, raising the following
ISSUE
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE
TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims
that Maynard even admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they
were at the police station before the stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that
Verdadero was having hallucinations after the stabbing incident as testified to by Dr.
Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a relapse
at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.
In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that the
present petition presented a question of fact, which could not be addressed in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, it asserted that
the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the evidence presented failed to
completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.
In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),16 Verdadero indicated that he would no
longer file a reply as his petition for review already contained an exhaustive
discussion of the issues.
The Court's Ruling
The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of insanity.
Before delving into the merits of the case, a discussion of the procedural issue is in
order.
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45;
Exceptions
The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition for review
as it principally revolves around the issue of his insanity a question of fact which
should no longer be addressed in a petition for review. The Court disagrees.
Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court as it is limited to reviewing only questions of law. The rule,
however, admits of exceptions wherein the Court expands the coverage of a petition
for review to include a resolution of questions of fact. In Laborte v. Pagsanjan
Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,17 the Court reiterated the following
exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, to
wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the time of the
stabbing incident. Obviously, it is a question of fact, which, ordinarily is not
entertained by the Court in a petition for review. As will be discussed below, the
Court, nevertheless, finds that the circumstances in the case at bench warrant the
application of the exception rather than the rule.
Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed
To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that
he had suffered a relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an
imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter had
acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly
proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are voluntary.18
In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was
brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed
with depression in 2001; (3) he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003;
(4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a relapse; (5)
he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in 1999
until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on
March 20, 2009.
Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only
thing left to be ascertained is whether he should be absolved from responsibility in
killing Romeo because of his mental state.
Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering from a mental disorder, however,
does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.20
In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding insanity as an
exempting circumstance, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is
a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is
deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete
absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time
immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with
which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he must be adjudged guilty for the said
offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability
under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was
completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and
(2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.
In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime
because such defense is in the nature of a confession or avoidance.23 As such, he is
duty bound to establish with certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely
diminished, of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime. Failing which,
Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly admitting to have stabbed
Romeo to death.
Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state
of the accused. In People v. Opuran24 the Court explained how one's insanity may
be established, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of
proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of
which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties
which is manifested in language and conduct. xxx
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational
basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that evidence of the
mental condition of the accused during a reasonable period before and after the
commission of the offense is material, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is
permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition during a reasonable period
before and after. Direct testimony is not required nor are specific acts of
disagreement essential to establish insanity as a defense. A person's mind can only
be plumbed or fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and
emotions may be evaluated to determine whether his external acts conform to those
of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial
evidence would suffice.
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court
finds that Verdadero sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the
stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different from that of the CA as the latter
concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not clearly proven.
It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the
exact moment the crime was committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding
that he was insane. His insanity may still be shown by circumstances immediately
before and after the incident. Further, the expert opinion of the psychiatrist Dr.
Pagaddu may also be taken into account.
Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the
time of the stabbing incident. During her testimony, she stated as follows:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
On direct examination
Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred which involved
your diagnosis as a life long chronic disease?
Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.
Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx
Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has relapse of
schizophrenia could distinguish his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of the
commission of the crime that the impulse control and judgment of an individual was
affected sir.
Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of schizophrenia
could not distinguish any act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.
Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse upon
admission on March 19, 2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and there must
be a remission if the symptom is abated, your Honor.
the medications taken. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the
testimony of an expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he
stabbed Romeo.
Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the observations made
by Maynard, a witness for the prosecution. In his testimony, Maynard gave his
opinion on Verdadero's behavior and appearance when they met at the police
station, to wit:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

On cross examination
xxx
Atty. Tagurama
Atty. Tagaruma Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to say that
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged you are familiar with Solomon Verdadero even before March 12, 2009?
violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 which is the date A: Yes, sir.
of the incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it possible that the violent
behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr. Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?
Juliana in diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon admission on A: We are neighbors, sir.
March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir. Q: You are immediate neighbors?
A: Yes, sir
Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet
Taguinod and the conclusion made by you, is it also your conclusion that Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a (sic)
Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on March 12, 2009 due to violent time?
behavior? A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?
On cross examination A: Yes, sir.

Prosecutor Aquino xxx

Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would somewhat be
continued even when medications is administered to him?
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that the
patient may have relapse (sic) even with medication, sir.
Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in this case
could that have a long effect on his mental condition?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not absolutely
eradicate the symptom.
Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view of the
medication undertaken as of January 19, 2009?
A: It's haphazard, sir.
xxx
Court
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26
Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant behavior
did you observe from him?
A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.
Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his relapse or
what you called not in his proper mind occurred often?
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.
Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once a week?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon
Verdadero appears not in his proper mind?
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.
Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx

[Emphases Supplied] Court

Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for the passed
Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a
(sic) years before this incident was he also violent like what happened on March 12,
relapse of his schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. In contrast, she
2009?
was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might have been in a lucid interval because of

Witness
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen fan belt do
I get you right that Solomon Verdadero was with you at the police station?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?
A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.
xxx
Q: Can you describe his appearance?
A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.
xxx
Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation or how
he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).
Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.27 cralawred
[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time.
He had observed that there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound
mind as he would sometimes become violent. On the day of the stabbing incident,
Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound mind noting that he had
reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately transferred
to the psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from
harming himself and others.28
These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking
wine, poor sleep and violent behavior were among the symptoms of a
relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for his previous
diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited
symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus,
Dr. Pagaddu reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a
relapse of his illness on that fateful day.
Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse of
schizophrenia. Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is
immaterial. It, however, may be appreciated and given weight if there is also proof
of abnormal behavior before or simultaneous to the crime.30
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost
care and circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking
to escape punishment through a general plea of insanity.31 The circumstances in the
case at bench, however, do not indicate that the defense of insanity was merely
used as a convenient tool to evade culpability.
The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised the
defense of insanity and remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the offense. He no longer offered any
denial or alibi and, instead, consistently harped on his mental incapacity. Unlike in
previous cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was raised only
when the initial defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was
not a mere afterthought.
In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free
him from the responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC
expressly states that "[w]hen an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of
incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his mental
condition may be addressed so that he may again function as a member of society.
He shall remain confined therein until his attending physicians give a favorable
recommendation for his release.
Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration
In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal
responsibility. He is, nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for
the latter's death. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal
and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from the criminal liability.33
The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to conform to
recent jurisprudence.34 The P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral
damages awarded by the RTC must each be increased to P75,000.00. In addition,
an interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum should be imposed on all
damages awarded computed from the finality of the decision until the same have
been fully paid.
cha nrob leslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant
Solomon Verdadero yGalera of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is ordered
confined at the National Center for Mental Health for treatment and shall be released
only upon order of the Regional Trial Court acting on a recommendation from his
attending physicians from the institution.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as stipulated actual
damages, plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of finality of this decision until the same shall have been fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
ibra ry
G.R. No. 126396 June 29, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIXBERTO LAO-AS, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision1 dated May 29, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 2303-M-91, convicting Felixberto Lao-as for murder,
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the victim's
heirs indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 with 6% interest from the time of filing the
information with the trial court.2
The information against appellant dated November 19, 1991 alleged:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 1988, in the municipality of Marilao, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, with intent to kill one Leonardo Bastuten, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and treachery, attack, assault, stab with a bladed instrument and use personal violence on
the said Leonardo Bastuten, hitting the latter on his body, thereby causing him stab
wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law. 3
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General and which we
find supported by the records, are as follows:
On December 24, 1998, the victim Leonardo Bastuten invited appellant, Armando Ramirez,
Demetrio Candelisas4 and a certain Lanchiola to his house in Tabing Ilog, Marilao, Bulacan
to celebrate Christmas. Bastuten and the four persons he invited are from Bacolod City
(tsn, Nov. 16, 1994, pp. 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13).
The drinking inside the compound of the Bastuten started at about 4:00 in the afternoon
of December 24, 1988 and ended at 5:00 in the morning of Christmas day. The group
consumed about 4 to 5 big bottles of Tanduay ESQ.
Bastuten himself did not join the drinking. (tsn, Nov. 16, 1994, pp. 12-14). At about 10:00
in the evening of December 24, 1988, he went to sleep, while his guests continued drinking.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, Bastuten woke up and went outside his house.
Bastuten talked with Armando Ramirez and told him that he still wanted to sleep (tsn, Nov.
16, 1994, pp. 14, 15).
At about 5:30 in the morning, Bastuten went again downstairs but this time he did not talk
with Ramirez. Bastuten did not do anything. Appellant who was then drunk and without
saying a word, got a knife from his left sock and stabbed Bastuten. Appellant was about to
stab Bastuten for the second time but Ramirez, who was only two feet away was able to
parry the thrust. The left thumb of Ramirez was wounded. Ramirez was not aware of any
reason why appellant stabbed the victim. After stabbing the victim, appellant ran away
(tsn, Nov. 16, 1994, pp. 5-11, 15-18).
Demetrio Candalisas, a friend of the victim, was in the victim's house taking a rest. He heard
the victim shout and say "pare, nasaksak ako." He asked the victim who stabbed him and
the victim told him that it was appellant. He brought the victim to the hospital. At the
hospital, the victim told him to inform his (the victim's) parents (tsn, March 21, 1995, pp.
5-10).5
Bastuten's wife, Concepcion, failed to talk with her husband, who soon could no longer
speak. He succumbed to septicemia and reversible shocks due to the stab wounds on
December 27, 1988.
Upon arraignment of the charge against him, appellant pleaded not guilty. 6 In the course
of trial, the following witnesses were presented by the prosecution: (1) Concepcion
Bastuten,7 the wife of the victim; (2) Armando Ramirez, an alleged eyewitness to the
stabbing incident; and (3) Demetrio Candilosas, who brought the victim to the hospital and
allegedly heard him declare that he had been stabbed by appellant. 8
For its part, the defense presented the following witnesses: (1) Appellant, who testified on
his behalf, and (2) Bienvenido Porlaje, who testified that he saw the victim and appellant
having a fight, with the former holding a knife.9
On May 29, 1996, the trial court convicted appellant of the crime of murder, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as
penalized under Art. 247, Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua;
2) accused is ordered to pay the following amount to the heirs of Leonardo Bastuten:
(a) P50,000.00 for the life of the victim Leonardo Bastuten with 6% interest on all amount
due from the filing of the information on November 29, 1991 until said amounts have been
fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 10
In his appeal, appellant now claims that the trial court erred
1. IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
2. IN NOT GIVING CREDIT TO THE ESTABLISHED FACT THAT THERE IS NO EYEWITNESS TO
THE KILLING AND THAT THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL INTENT ESTABLISHED AGAINST THE
APPELLANT.11
In his brief, appellant contends that no one witnessed the stabbing of the victim. Hence,
he argues that his culpability was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. At the same time,
appellant also asserts that there was a fight between him and the victim, wherein he
defended himself but did not stab the victim.12
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that: (1) appellant was identified by
a prosecution witness as the assailant; (2) the victim's utterance to Demetrio Candilosas
that he was stabbed by appellant is admissible as part of the res gestae, if not a dying
declaration; (3) the flight of appellant after the incident is indicative of his guilt; (4) there
was no improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses when they testified
against appellant; and (5) appellant in effect admitted stabbing and wounding the victim.
At issue is whether or not the witnesses' testimonies were credible and sufficient to
establish the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
To begin with, we had to peruse closely the records of the case. Appellant's claim that no
one witnessed the stabbing incident is belied by the records. Prosecution witness Armando
Ramirez testified under oath that it was appellant who inflicted the fatal wound with
a balisong which had been concealed in appellant's left sock. 13 This witness categorically
stated that he was about two feet from the victim and appellant. 14 After the stabbing, the
witness saw appellant run away.15 Worthy of note, no one directly contradicted the
testimony of Ramirez.
Ramirez was an unbiased witness, without any improper motive to falsely testify for or
against anyone. Both appellant and Ramirez testified that they were friends.16 Given the
circumstances, Ramirez' testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 17
Furthermore, prosecution witness Demetrio Candilosas testified on trial that as the victim
staggered into his house, he declared that he had been stabbed. When asked who had
stabbed him, the victim identified appellant as the culprit. 18 While the direct examination
of Candilosas was not subjected to cross-examination, it is nonetheless admissible in
evidence as counsel for appellant waived cross-examination of this witness. 19
While Candilosas himself did not see the actual stabbing, the victim's revelation to him of
the name of appellant as the assailant could be considered as a dying declaration.
Such ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest order because at the threshold of
death, all thoughts of fabricating lies are stilled. 20 The utterance of a victim made
immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered the incident speaking
through the victim.21 It is entitled to the highest credence.
Even if arguendo said declaration is not admitted as a dying declaration, it is still admissible
as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after a startling occurrence and under
the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity
to contrive22 his statement beforehand.
Appellant claims self-defense but at the same time denies involvement in the fatal
stabbing. His illogical stance that he did not stab the victim does not faze his vigorous
assertion that he was merely defending his own life and limb. He adds that the prosecution
has failed to establish any ill motive nor intent to commit a crime. However, he also insists
that he only tried to grab from the victim the knife that eventually killed him. 23
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the posture of the accused is a mlange of
defenses: accident, self-defense and unawareness that a mortal wound had been inflicted
upon the victim, each of which are mutually exclusive. Accident presupposes lack of
intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by
necessity.24 As to his defense of "accident," according to the prosecution, a person who
accidentally injures another does not perceive any aggression that must be repelled by
force. A person who says he stabbed another person accidentally or in self-defense cannot
at the same time pretend he did not know he had stabbed the other. 25
Appellant's claim of lack of motive, however, does not preclude his conviction. It is judicial
knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all.26 Besides, proof
of motive in a criminal case becomes relevant and essential only when the identity of an
assailant is in question.27 This, in our view, is not so in the present case, since Armando
Ramirez positively identified appellant as the malefactor.
The testimony of defense witness, Bienvenido Porlaje, does not fortify appellant's
allegation of innocence. Porlaje testified that on the night of December 25, 1988, he joined
a drinking session with one Badong, Armando (Ramirez), "Bulldog", Danny, Leonardo
(Bastuten) and the appellant. He heard a commotion inside the victim's house and went
inside to investigate, only to find appellant and the victim fighting. Appellant was holding
a knife. Thereafter, he saw him run away from the house. According to Porlaje, appellant
went inside the house of the victim to awaken the latter so as to continue their drinking
spree.28
On cross-examination, however, Porlaje retracted his earlier statement that he was part of
the drinking group, claiming instead that he was just a neighbor of the victim. When asked
who among the group present went inside the house of the victim, he first answered that
he did not know any of them. When pressed for an answer, he finally said that Ramirez
went inside the house.29 These contradictions, inconsistencies and incongruities in
Porlaje's testimony merely undermine appellant's defense.
The trial court found that the stabbing of the victim was attended by treachery. Appellant
stabbed the victim just as the latter descended from his house. According to witness
Ramirez, there was no previous altercation between the victim and appellant. Appellant
had concealed the balisong in one of his socks prior to the stabbing.30 The victim could not
have anticipated that appellant would attack him. He had just awakened after sleeping late
on Christmas eve. Clearly, the attack on the victim was carried out with alevosia. There is
treachery or alevosia when the attack on an unarmed victim who has not given the
slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected, and without warning. 31Even in a case where
the victim was stabbed in the front part of his body, we have ruled that such frontal attack
is treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected, and the victim is unarmed.32
In the present case, however, we find that dwelling is not a generic aggravating
circumstance. Ramirez witnessed the stabbing incident outside the victim's house, while
Demetrio Candilosas testified that the victim staggered into his own house after he had
been stabbed.33 Hence, the crime did not occur inside the victim's dwelling. In addition,
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was not alleged in the
information.34
As to the appropriate penalty, the attendance of treachery has qualified appellant's
offense to murder, and without aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua has been properly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, dated
May 29, 1996, in Criminal Case No. 2303-M-91 is AFFIRMED. Appellant Felixberto Lao-as is
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the MURDER of Leonardo Bastuten.
Appellant is sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and ordered to pay the heirs of Leonardo
Bastuten the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity with 6% interest from the filing of
the information on November 29, 1991 until fully paid. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182239 March 16, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail
over the victims positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 1 For
it to prosper, the court must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part
of the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become
final and executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended
sentence on the ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years,
shall still be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this
Court the reversal of the judgment of his conviction.4
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed
as Criminal Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 oclock in the evening more
or less, at barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim
being only five years old.7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 8 During pre-trial,9 the defense
admitted the existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing
that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and
(3) medical certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by
the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their
respective versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may
be summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFFs house is along the road.
That of appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road,
appellant has to pass by FFFs house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be
"every minute [and] every hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were close
friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to the incident. 13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time
playing at the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house
on his way to the road. She and appellant used to be friends until the incident.14
At about past 6 oclock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old
daughter CCC to the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When
CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television
at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita]. 15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
Rum.16 At the store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap.17 He was wearing sleeveless
shirt and a pair of short pants.18 All of them left the store at the same time.19 Julito
proceeded to the house of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the hand of
AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area or place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when
he held her hand while on the road near the store. 22 They walked towards the rice field
near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos]. 23 There he made
her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the
chest.24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he mounted her, and, while her legs were
pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. 26 She
felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos. 28 She, in
turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs. 30 She was without
slippers.31 He found her face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing
from the back of her head.33 He checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion
that was already turning black.34 She had no underwear on and he saw white substance
and mud on her vagina.35 AAA told him that appellant brought her from the store36 to the
grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos;37 that he threw away her pair of
slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast; 38 and that he proceeded
thereafter to the Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos. 40 He asked the appellant
what he did to AAA.41Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that
AAA followed him.42 FFF went home to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back
to appellant, asked again,44 and boxed him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television
at the house of Rita.46AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied
her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant
raped her.49 Julito left and found appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads,
did you really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?" but the latter ignored his
question.51Appellants aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen were coming to
which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow
(sic) and my knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt. 53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident
blottered.54 FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health
center.55 Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical
certificate56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 oclock and 9 oclock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination
at the provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical
Officer III of the provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate
dated 29 January 2003,58 the pertinent portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there
is no bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To
corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness
stand to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the commission of the
crime.60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick
up AAA on the road.61 In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia], sister-in-law of appellants
aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was revealed. 63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at
the back of FFFs house.64He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in
order to access the road or to fetch water. 65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally
worked for FFF,66 and whenever he was asked to buy something from the store, AAA
always approached him.67
At about 8 oclock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to
attend a birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and
his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session,
appellants uncle sent him to the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about
20 meters from the house, he was able to return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of
the time because he had a watch .68
Appellants aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house
attending the birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening
to buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five
(5) minutes later. She also observed that appellants white shorts and white sleeveless shirt
were clean.69
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen
having a drink with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve
herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos.72 From
where she was, she saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry
AAA.73 AAAs face was covered and she was wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she
thought it was just a game.75 Meanwhile, appellant was still in the kitchen when she
returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-
shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following behind.79 Luzvilla
followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the
appellant did to her.81 The child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and
testified that appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left
shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again
boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellants uncle Alejandro,
a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary Organization (CVO) member
admonished FFF.83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 oclock in the evening, she was watching the
television along with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was
wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He
paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA
and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon Antonias advice, Julito released
her and went out of the house.84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 oclock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger
at him, brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at
around 8 oclock in the evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he
molested his daughter.85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
committed upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay
[AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that
appellant was apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years
old when the crime was committed on 28 January 2003. 88 The trial court appreciated the
evidence and reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is
amended in order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The
penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition
in view of the ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty
imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is
ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs. 91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellants Notice of
Appeal.92 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs.93 Both parties manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their
positions in their respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement. 94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
IN CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the
test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the
three well-entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.97
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient
to convict the accused.98More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal
findings of the examining physician.99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victims positive identification of the
perpetrator of the crime,100except when it is established that it was physically impossible
for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the
crime.101
I II
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age
even in the absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. 102
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts
culminating in the insertion of appellants organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and
the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved such fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else
did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.103
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-
phrased in order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said
it all she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all
that is essential to show that rape was committed. 104 Significantly, youth and immaturity
are normally badges of truth and honesty.105
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo 106 revealed that the
hymenal lacerations at 5 oclock and 9 oclock positions could have been caused by the
penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus could have been "the result of
the repeated battering of the object;" and that such object could have been an erect male
organ.107
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration
conclusively established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the
commission of the crime are now in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant
was elsewhere when the crime was committed.109
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her
assailant, especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a
good look at him during the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her
life. Moreover, appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near the store to
the situs criminus111 that it would be impossible for the child not to recognize the man who
held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of
AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom
she called "kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and
who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing
and persuasive. The defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else one Julito
Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was
accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her. 112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial
court of the credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that
it has "the opportunity to observe the witnesses manner of testifying, their furtive glances,
calmness, sighs and the scant or full realization of their oath," 113 unless it is shown that
material facts and circumstances have been "ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted."114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to
someone else is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainants positive
identification of accused and other corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted
that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this
incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latters testimony that he confronted accused
after hearing of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding
his denial and alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his
testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their respective testimonies that even
destroyed the credibility of the appellants very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy
Tanduay; that he gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long
before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On
cross-examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after
the rape incident because he was then at work. 116 He arrived from work only after FFF
came to their house for the second time and boxed appellant. 117 It was actually the fish
vendor, not her husband, who asked appellant to buy Tanduay. 118 Further, the drinking
session started only after the appellants errand to the store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is
contrary to Glorias statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvillas testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia
Perocho. Antonia recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvillas claim
that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the
prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria,
were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless shirt, Luzvillas recollection differ
in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a short-
sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvillas story that she saw AAA walking towards Ritas house three (3)
minutes after she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that
AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial courts
appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her
father that Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to
cry among strangers who were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court
believe. When the child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla
Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought there by her mother Brenda so that
Lita Lingkay could take a look at her just as Julito Apiki said.120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same
having been offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its
witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked
to each other."121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his
whereabouts, still, the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission
of the crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs
criminis and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present at the
scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the
commission of the crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an
hour even by foot.125 Inasmuch as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to
rape the victim, this Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness attesting that
the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather bamboo trees and returned several
hours after. She could have merely presumed that the accused slept all throughout. 126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the
appellant that he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were
likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellants part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellants
sister-in-law and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellants physical presence in the
fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the
appellants house where the rape occurred, was a stones throw away from the
fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their sight the entire afternoon of
December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an eye on
the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very much
occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr.
Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused
his entire attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the
appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought
her inside his house and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never
left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left
their sight, save from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human
experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where the crime was committed is
just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring
AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down the farmland and
consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could
have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to
his uncles house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even
bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime. 130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have
been at the time and place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission
of the crime three (3) years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v.
Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said
Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by
the lower court is still under review. 133 (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen
(18) years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with
discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall
be observed.134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.135 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. 136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the
crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and
dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx,
to weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellants mental
capacity to fully understand the consequences of his unlawful action. 139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering
that she was only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law
prescribing the death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years
old141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against
the imposition of the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; 142 and (2)
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of
reducing the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code.143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of
penalties provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. 145 Consequently, in its
appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered
the penalty one degree from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, in its
medium period, as maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to
be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of
the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime
has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her
family.150 The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of
75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper.151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
which effectively lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by
the Court of Appeals in the amount of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity and 75,000.00 as
moral damages. And, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary
damages should be increased from 25,000.00 to 30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the
Period of Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the
law notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment
of conviction is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court
of Appeals held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended,154 the aforestated provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision
in Sarcia,156 overturning the ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the
child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D.
and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not
apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec.
38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that rape is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on
when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who victim P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its
apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
found guilty of a heinous crime.157 SO ORDERED.
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations158 on Senate Bill No. 1402
(Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new
position of this Court to cover heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. The pertinent portion
of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or
may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the
child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiagos] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a
judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still
be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still
be the childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in
Conflict with the Law,which reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence
can no longer apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section
40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately,
appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the
welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the
age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she
was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a
normal life and become a productive member of the community. The age of the child in
conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still
of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in
accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of
origin to effect appellants confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified

G.R. No. 186128
PP vs SUSAN LATOSA y CHICO
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated April 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 which affirmed the April 12, 2006 Decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 159, convicting appellant Susan Latosa y Chico of
parricide.
Appellant was charged with parricide in an information [3] which reads,
That, on or about the 5th of February 2002, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then the legitimate wife of one Felixberto Latosa y Jaudalso, armed with and using
an unlicensed gun, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot her husband, Felixberto Latosa y Jaudalso, hitting him on the head,
thereby causing the latter to sustain gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on June 25, 2002, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecutions evidence established the following version:
On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant and her husband Major
Felixberto Latosa, Sr. (Felixberto) together with two (2) of their children, Sassymae Latosa
(Sassymae) and Michael Latosa (Michael), were at their house in Fort Bonifacio. Felixberto,
Sr. was then asleep[4] when Sassymae saw appellant take Felixberto Sr.s gun from the
cabinet and leave. She asked her mother where she was going and if she could come along,
but appellant refused.[5]
Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice cream at the
commissary. Appellant gave her money and asked her to leave.[6] After Sassymae left,
appellant instructed Michael to follow his sister, but he refused as he was hungry.
Appellant insisted and further told Michael not to make any noise as his father was
sleeping. Nevertheless, appellant went back inside the house and turned up the volume of
the television and the radio to full.[7] Shortly after that, she came out again and gave
Michael some money to buy food at the grocery.
Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and returned to the barracks located at
the back of their house. Michael thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who told him
that he saw appellant running away from their house. Michael did not pay any attention
to his friends comment, and simply continued eating his ice candy. Moments later, a
certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something had happened in their house. Michael
replied in the negative then entered their house. At that point, he saw his father lying on
the bed with a hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what happened. Sgt.
Ramos told him that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall
office.[8] Then, Sassymae arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a
gun near his left hand.[9]
Felixberto Latosa, Jr., one (1) of the legitimate sons of appellant and the victim, also
testified that sometime in December 2001, their father told him and his siblings over dinner
about a threat to their lives by a certain Efren Sta. Inez.[10]
Appellant, testifying on her own behalf, on the other hand claimed that when Felixberto,
Sr. woke up, he asked her to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed.
As she was handing the pistol to him it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still
lying down. Shocked, she ran quickly to Felixberto, Sr.s office and asked for help. [11] She
also claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. asked her for his gun, she was on her way out of the
house to follow her children who left for the market on an errand she had earlier given
Sassymae. She claimed that she wanted to drive for them because it was hot. She ran after
them but after a few minutes, when she realized that she did not have with her the keys
to their jeep, she went back to their house. Felixberto, Sr. then asked again for his gun, and
it was then that it fired as she was handing it to him.[12]
Appellant further described herself as a good mother and a good provider for their six (6)
children whom she raised by herself while Felixberto, Sr. was in Mindanao. She claimed
that they testified against her because they were manipulated by her brother-in-law,
Francisco Latosa.[13] She denied that Sassymae saw her holding a gun when she asked her
to buy ice cream, alleging that Michael and Sassymae saw her holding the gun only when
she placed it inside the cabinet before they proceeded to the hospital. [14]
Appellant also denied her childrens testimony[15] that she was having an affair with a
certain Col. Efren Sta. Inez (Sta. Inez), a policeman. She claimed that she first met Sta. Inez
when her youngest brother was killed on June 6, 2001 by unidentified men. Sta. Inez was
the one (1) who assisted her. She was alone at that time since her husband informed her
that he could not leave his post in Mindanao for he had to rush some papers. She allegedly
only saw Sta. Inez twice but admitted that Sta. Inez went to the precinct when he learned
of the shooting incident.[16] She also denied that she was terminated from her job at the
Philippine Public Safety College due to immorality for having said affair. She claimed that
she was terminated because she had incurred numerous absences from her work as she
grieved the death of her youngest brother and had lost interest in her work after his
death.[17]
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing her husband Felixberto,
Sr. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SUSAN LATOSA Y CHICO
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 in rel. to Sec. 1[,] 3rd par. PD 1866 as amended by RA
8294 and Sec. 5, RA 8294 and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to further indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity[,] P50,000 as moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The RTC held that the claim of accidental shooting was inconsistent with the evidence
considering the location of the gunshot wound, which was at the left temple of Felixberto,
Sr., and the fact that the gun was found near Felixberto, Sr.s left hand despite his being
right-handed. The trial court found that appellant planned the killing by asking her two (2)
children to leave the house and, after the shooting, placing the gun near the victims left
hand to suggest that the death was suicide. But appellant overlooked the fact that
Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed. The trial court noted that despite the grueling cross-
examination of the defense counsel, the Latosa children never wavered in their
testimonies about what they knew regarding the circumstances surrounding the shooting
incident. Their testimonies bore the hallmarks of truth as they were consistent on material
points. The RTC found it inconceivable that the children would testify against their own
mother or concoct a story of parricide unless they were impelled by their passion to
condemn an injustice done to their father.[19]
The RTC, in finding appellant guilty, considered the following circumstantial evidence
established by the prosecution: (1) shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two
(2) children to do errands for her which were not usually asked of them; (2) at the time of
the shooting, only the appellant and Felixberto, Sr. were in the house; (3) appellant was
seen running away from the house immediately after the shooting; (4) when Michael went
inside their house, he found his father with a hole in the head and a gun in his left hand;
(5) the medico-legal report showed that the cause of death was intracranial hemorrhage
due to the gunshot wound on the head with the point of entry at the left temporal region;
(6) the Firearms Identification Report concluded that appellant fired two (2) shots; (7)
Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and the gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassymae
testified that she heard Sta. Inez tell appellant bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay
Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok; (9) appellants children testified that they were
informed by Felixberto, Sr. regarding the threat of appellants paramour, Sta. Inez, to the
whole family; and (10) Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum showing that appellant
was terminated from her teaching job by reason of immorality.[20]
On appeal, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA held that since appellant
admitted having killed her husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of
proving the presence of the exempting circumstance of accident to relieve herself of
criminal responsibility. She must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the
appellant has admitted the killing.[21]
The CA, however, found appellants version of accidental shooting not credible. Citing the
case of People v. Reyes,[22] the CA held that appellants claim of accidental shooting was
negated by the following facts: (1) a revolver is not prone to accidental firing as pressure
on the trigger is necessary to make the gun fire, cocked or uncocked; and (2) when handing
a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle is never pointed to that person. In this case,
appellant held the gun in one (1) hand and extended it towards her husband who was still
lying in bed. Assuming that appellant was not aware of the basic firearm safety rule that
the firearms muzzle is never pointed to a person, she failed to explain why the gun would
accidentally fire, when it should not have fired unless there was pressure on the trigger.
The location of Felixberto, Sr.s wound also showed that the shooting was not
accidental. Appellant did not dispute that Felixberto, Sr. was lying down during the
shooting and that after the incident, the gun was found near his left hand. The CA found
that it was contrary to human nature that a newly awakened military man would suddenly
ask his wife, who was busy doing other things, to bring his firearm, and patiently wait for
her to come back to their house, when the gun was just inside an adjacent cabinet only
two (2) meters away from his bed.[23]
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. 122621-H finding
SUSAN LATOSA y CHICO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering her to pay the heirs of Felixberto Latosa the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Undaunted, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on May 12, 2008.[25]
Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was
insufficient to prove that she intentionally killed her husband. She insists that the gun fired
accidentally while she was giving it to Felixberto, Sr. Since she had no experience in
handling firearms, she was not able to foresee that it would fire accidentally and hit her
husband. After her husband was hit, she immediately rushed to his office and asked for
assistance.[26]
The only issue the Court has to resolve in this case is whether the exempting circumstance
of accident was established by appellant.
The basis of appellants defense of accidental shooting is Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
from criminal liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.
Thus, it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the
following essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident, to wit:
1. She was performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. She caused the injury to her husband by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.[27]
To prove the circumstance she must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved
after the accused has admitted the killing.[28]
However, by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her husbands
head and pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. As
correctly found by the CA, which we quote in full:
Appellants version that she accidentally shot her husband is not credible. Appellants
manner of carrying the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of due care in the performance
of an act. The location of the wound sustained by the victim shows that the shooting was
not merely accidental. The victim was lying down and the fact that the gun was found near
his left hand was not directly disputed by her. We find it contrary to human nature that a
newly awakened military man would suddenly ask his wife for his firearm, and even
patiently wait for her return to the house, when the said firearm was just inside the cabinet
which, according to appellant, was just about two meters away from his bed.
xxxx
In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her
husband who was still lying in bed. Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned
how to fire a gun and was merely handing the firearm over to the deceased, the muzzle is
never pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety rule which appellant is deemed to have credence. It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and
already known since she admitted, during trial, that she sometimes handed over the gun their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique
to her husband. Assuming further that she was not aware of this basic rule, it needed opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
explaining why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless there was attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating
pressure on the trigger.[29] the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
There is no merit in appellants contention that the prosecution failed to prove by testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be
circumstantial evidence her motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which
the essential element of the offense on which her conviction rests. Evidence to prove witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed
intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the case.[32] We find none in this case.
victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the One last note. On the matter of damages, the CA awarded exemplary damages in the
accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is amount of P25,000.00. We increase the award to P30,000.00 in light of prevailing
presumed.[30] jurisprudence[33] fixing the award of exemplary damages to said amount.
In the instant case, the following circumstantial evidence considered by the RTC and WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008 Decision
affirmed by the CA satisfactorily established appellants intent to kill her husband and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby AFFIRMED with
sustained her conviction for the crime, to wit: MODIFICATION. The amount of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.
The prosecution established the following circumstantial evidence: With costs against the accused-appellant.
(1) Susan Latosa, the accused, asked her twins to do errands for her. She first asked SO ORDERED.
Sassymae to go to Commissary to buy ice cream, thereafter, she asked Michael to follow
his sister at the Commissary which according to the prosecution witnesses was not the
usual thing the accused would do;
(2) Thereafter, it was only the accused and the victim who were left alone in the house;
(3) After the witness Michael, son of the accused and the victim left and proceeded at the
barracks located at the back of their house, Susan Latosa was seen running away from the
house by Michaels friend named Macmac;
(4) Immediately thereafter, Michael Latosa went inside the room of their barracks and saw
his father with sort of a hole in the head, blood on the nose and had a gun in his left hand
(TSN, May 5, 2003, pp. 7-8, 12-13);
(5) The cause of death of the victim Felixberto Latosa was intracranial hemorrhage due to
gunshot wound of the head (per Medico-legal Report No. M-052-2002, Exh. P);
(6) Susan Latosas paraffin test yielded positive result for the presence of gunpowder nitrate
in her right hand;
xxx
(8) The point of entry of the gunshot wound found on the victim was located at the left
temporal region as evidenced by Medico Legal Report No. M-052-2002 (Exhibit P);
(9) The victim was a right-handed and the gun was found on the latters left hand;
(10) Sassymae Latosa [testified] that she heard Col. Sta. Inez [tell] her mother, bakit mo
inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok. (TSN, May 19, 2002,
p. 13); and
(11) The children testified that they were informed by the victim regarding the threat of
Sta. Inez to the whole family who alleged[ly] has an amorous relationship with their
mother. Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum that accused was terminated from
her teaching job by reason of immorality.[31]
Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the
findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA that appellants version is undeserving of
G.R. No. 91115 December 29, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PACALSO MAT-AN Y KUTBING/KATUBING, accused-appellant.
NOCON, J.:
This an appeal from a decision 1 dated March 7, 1989 of Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 5 in Criminal Case No. 4230 wherein accused-appellant Pacalso Mat-an y Kutbing
or Kutubing was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE in an
information filed on January 19, 1987 which reads:
The undersigned accuses PACALSO MAT-AN y KUTBING or KATUBING of the crime of the
PARRICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of December, 1986, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court , the above named accused, with intent to
kill, did them and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike his
mother, Martha Mat-an, with a branch of pine tree, hitting the latter on the head, thereby
inflicting upon the victim neurogenic shock secondary to contrecoup injuries of the brain,
subdural hemorrhage and basal skull fracture all due to application of physical violence of
the head, which injuries directly caused the death of said Martha K. Mat-an.2
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the offense charged after
due trial, the court a quo rendered a judgment against him, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused PACALSO MAT-AN y "KATUBING"
or "KUTBING" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as charged, and
hereby sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Martha Katubing y Mat-an in the amounts of: P30,000.00 for the latter's death and
P30,869.75 as consequential damages, representing the burial expenses; and to pay the
costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with his preventive
imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.3
It appears on record that at around 6 p.m. of December 24, 1986, David Mat-an, youngest
brother of the accused-appellant, was walking towards a nearby store with his four (4)
friends when he met accused-appellant, Pacalso Mat-an.
Accused-appellant told David that he was going to talk to their sister, Brenda, and upon
noticing that the former was holding a long piece of wood, drunk and only in his briefs, the
latter decided to follow accused-appellant who is known to make trouble whenever he is
drunk and had, in fact, killed their brother, Witty, in 1968.
When accused-appellant reached the compound of the house of his sister, the former
confronted the latter about the spilled water at his residence and told her to pay for one-
half (1/2) of his water bill to which his sister readily agreed. Inspite of his, accused-
appellant hit his sister's right jaw and left arm with the pine tree branch he was holding
causing the latter to fall down on the ground.
David, who followed accused-appellant and witnessed the incident tried to pacify the latter
and told him to go home but accused-appellant, instead, hit his mother on the head with
another piece of wood after arguing with her about an indebtedness involving money.
To prevent the accused-appellant from inflicting further harm on their mother, David got
an axe and hit the chest of the accused-appellant with it and the latter fled.
Thereafter, David called his friends to help him bring his mother to Baguio Medical Center
where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.
On the following day or on December 25, 1986, accused-appellant was arrested and a pine
tree branch (Exhibit "A") used by the accused-appellant in hitting his mother was recovered
from the scene of the crime.
An autopsy conducted on the body of the victim by Dr. Emmanuel N. Fernandez, the
medico-legal officer of the Baguio Health Department on the evening of December 25,
1986 reveal the following per his report, to wit:
AUTOPSY FINDINGS:
1. Body of a female; medium built; height of 4' 7" and weight of about 90 lbs.
2. Rigor mortis beginning to disappear; postmortem lividity fully developed on the neck,
back and buttocks; cornea cloudy; pupils dilated; pinkish conjunctive.
3. Presence of the following external injuries;
a) Contusion-hematoma on the left malar region of the face.
b) Contusion-hematoma on the right forearm, lateral aspect.
c) Contusion on the medial aspect of the left knee.
4. INTERNAL FINDINGS:
a) Presence of a subdural hemorrhage located over the left cocipital lobe and the left
cerebellar hemisphere.
b) Presence of a basal skull fracture on the left middle cranial vault.
c) The rest o the internal organs are within normal limits.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Neurogenic shock secondary to contrecoup injuries of the brain, subdural hemorrhage and
basal skull fracture due to application of physical violence on the head. 4
On the other hand, accused-appellant testified that at around 6 p.m. of December 24,
1986, he went to the house of his sister to advice the latter not to connect her water hose
to his water hose as the connection was causing water to spill since his water hose does
not have a gate valve.
After informing his sister of said situation, his sister got mad and started cursing him
causing accused-appellant to get mad that he slapped his sister causing the latter to fall
down on the ground unconscious. Striken by a guilt complex, accused-appellant was about
to help his sister when his brother David suddenly lunged at him and hit his left clavicle
with an axe causing him to fall on the ground. As he was struggling to get up from the
ground, he saw David about to hit him again with the axe and, in order to save himself
from further injury, he picked up a piece of wood and swang the same towards David but
instead hit his mother Martha who was about to embrace David to prevent the latter from
hitting accused-appellant. Thereafter, accused-appellant ran away and proceeded to the
Dr. Efrain Montemayor Medical Center for the treatment of his wound.
Accused-appellant further denied that he was drunk when he went to his sister's house,
although he admitted to have previously drunk a bottle of beer before proceeding to her
house.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
It is well settled that appellate courts will generally not disturb the conclusions and findings
of fact of the trial court considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of if he never intended to hit his mother since his act of hitting his mother was not done in
testifying during the trial, unless the court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance the performance of a lawful act as required by the aforementioned Article.
and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 5 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED
The conflicting testimonies of the accused-appellant and the prosecution witnesses with but with MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of the victim
regards to the chain of events that occurred on that fateful day were properly assessed by be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our present jurisprudence.
the trial court in its decision which states that: SO ORDERED.
The Court finds more credible the version of the prosecution that Pacalso deliberately
struck his mother Martha with a piece of wood after picking up a quarrel with her over an
indebtedness which he was insisting to be still subsisting but which Martha claimed to have
already been paid. From all appearances, when Pacalso went to confront Brenda, with
whom Martha was living, about Brenda's use of his water supply, he was ready for trouble.
He went there only in his briefs and was holding a piece of wood. He even imbibed of liquor
to embolden himself. In fact, he admitted to slapping Brenda although the latter asserted
that he hit her with a piece of wood. His violent temper even towards his next of kin is
amply shown by his having already killed his own brother, Witty, an attribution which he
did not bother to deny.
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, it is more probable that David hit Pacalso with the axe only after the
latter had struck Martha with a piece of wood in order to prevent Pacalso from inflicting
further harm on Martha. This explains why Pacalso has not seen it right to complain against
David up to the present time.6
Furthermore, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were rendered in a direct,
simple and consistent manner and there is no showing of any improper motive on their
part to testify falsely against the accused-appellant. Besides, the injury sustained by the
accused-appellant makes his claim of self-defense highly improbable since the wound
inflicted upon him was such as to immobilize the latter's usage of his arms immediately
after he was hit by his brother David. Thus, defense witness Dr. Samuel Lachica, resident
physician of Dr. Efrain Montemayor Medical Center who treated accused-appellant's
wound, testified that:
Q. Now, what would happen to the person if hit by an axe?
A. Due to this fracture and this wound, the first problem of the patient would be, of course,
the limitation of range of motion over the left shoulder due to pain and there will be
massive bleeding. Not only will it cause massive bleeding but it would also affect the neuro-
vascular structures in which the patient cannot move the extremities, not even a little
range of motion. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that accused-appellant killed his mother when he hit the latter with a
piece of wood. His contention that her death was accidental and without any criminal
intent as he was only defending himself from the unlawful attack of his brother is
unavailing since it was accused-appellant himself who started the unlawful agrression
when he slapped his sister which led to the untimely death of their mother.
For the exempting circumstance of accident to be properly appreciated in accused-
appellant's favor, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused person was
performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and
(3) that there was no fault or intent of causing the injury (Paragraph 4, Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar, accused-appellant is liable for his unlawful act even
G.R. No. L-64 October 28, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIGUEL M. MORENO
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant Miguel M. Moreno from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga, which found him guilty of the crime charged with the
aggravating circumstances of premeditation and cruelty and without any mitigating
circumstance, and sentenced the defendant to death and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased.
The appellant was at the outbreak of the war a prisoner serving sentence in the San Ramon
Penal Colony Farm, situated in the City of Zamboanga. During the Japanese occupation, he
befriended and gained the confidence of the Japanese naval authorities, was released from
prison, and appointed Captain of a semi-military organization known as Kaigun Jeutay,
composed of Filipinos and sponsored by the Japanese navy. On October 23, 1944, the
defendant was appointed by the Japanese naval authorities as section commander of the
San Ramon Penal Colony with plenary powers of supervision and control over said colony
and its environs.
On November 23, 1944, a group of defendant's soldiers went to the house of Paciano de
los Santos, and took with them two single young daughters of said Paciano, and on the
next day, when the deceased wet to San Ramon Penal Colony, he was confined in a cell by
order of the defendant.
On the night of December 1, 1944, defendant gathered all the prison officials and
employees of San Ramon Penal Colony in a meeting in the house of P.D. Dellosa then
Assistant Superintendent of the institution, and in that gathering the accused arrogantly
announced that he was not afraid to cut the head of anybody, ordered all those present to
witness the execution of Paciano de los Santos the following day, and instructed Gregorio
Magalit, a prisoner employee of said institution to prepare the grave for said Paciano and
issue a formal memorandum to that effect. A photostatic copy of which was presented as
Exhibit D during the trial.
And in the morning of December 2, 1944, Paciano de los Santos was taken to a place known
as Fishery Division of the colony with both hands tied at the back, and there the defendant
ordered the victim Paciano to kneel down with the head bent forward by the side of the
grave already prepared for him by order of the accused, and in that position the accused
with a Japanese sabre held in the handle by his both hands, hacked the head of Paciano de
los Santos, and immediately kicked the prostrate body of the victim into the grave.
The facts above stated were established beyond a per-adventure of doubt by the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, and are substantially admitted by the
defendant in his testimony during the trial. When the defendant was asked whether he
killed Paciano de los Santos in the form and manner described by the witness for the
prosecution, he answered the following: "When I arrived at the place the deceased Paciano
de los Santos was already in the place where I was to execute him, and was taken there by
four Japanese and several guards of San Ramon, and on the way they have instructed me
how should I kill him, I did kill him in the form and manner testified to by the witnesses for
the prosecution." (Pp. 49, 50, t.s.n.)
The attorney de oficio appointed by this court for the defendant contends, in the four
assignments of error assigned in his brief, that the court below erred (1) in trying the
defendant in the same day on which he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and not
granting him two days to prepare for trial as provided by law; (2) in trying and convicting
the accused without a preliminary investigation by the municipal judge or Fiscal of
Zamboanga City;(3) in not compelling, by process of subpoena, the attendance of
witnesses in behalf of the defendant, and finding, despite this failure, that the latter's
testimony was not corroborated by any witness; and (4) in finding the accused guilty of
murder with two aggravating circumstances and imposing upon him the penalty of death.
(1) As to the first assigned error of the court below, it is true that, according to section 7,
Rule 114, the defendant after arraignment is entitled to at least two days to prepare for
trial, except when the case is on appeal from the justice of the peace. But this court in
several cases, among them, the case of People vs. Cruz (54 Phil., 24, 28), has already
construed said section and held that the said right may be waived either expressly, or
impliedly by not asking for time to prepare for trial. In the present case, the defendant has
waived his right to have at least two days to prepare for trial, by submitting himself and
not objecting to the trial ordered by the court on the same day in which he was arraigned.
The decision of this court in the case of People vs. Valte (43 Phil., 907), quoted by the
attorney for the accused, does not support his contention, for in the said case the
defendant did not waive but exercised his right by demanding that he be granted two days
to prepare for trial.
Besides, taking into consideration the fact that the defendant admitted having killed the
victim in the form and manner testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, and the
only defense he alleged is that he was ordered to do so by Japanese naval authorities; that
the defendant had in fact been given time to prepare for his defense, because before the
trial had begun, the said attorney, after a conference with the defendant, asked the court
to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to Nicanor Punsala and Timoteo Almonte,
employees in San Ramon Penal Colony, and to Gregorio Magalit, a detainee in the stockade
of Zamboanga, and the subpoenas were issued and served on the same date, August 6,
upon them; and that after three of the witnesses for the prosecution had testified, the trial
was adjourned and continued on August 7 and 8; it may be concluded that had there been
any error such an error is not a reversible one, for it did not impair the substantial rights of
the defendant.
(2) With respect to the second assignment of error, the record shows that the defendant
has waived his right to a preliminary investigation in a communication called a motion of
July 30, 1945, filed with the court, in which the said defendant states that "he respectfully
waives his right to a preliminary investigation and request that this case be remanded to
the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga for final decision."
Section 1 and 7, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court use the words "preliminary investigation,"
but a cursory reading thereof would clearly show that the investigation mentioned therein
is not the preliminary investigation proper in which the defendant has the right to present
his evidence. That is the reason why said investigation made for the purpose of issuing the
warrant of arrest of a defendant if it appears that his arrest is justified, is defined by section
1 as "a previous inquiry or examination made before the arrest of the defendant." Whether
or not the warrant of arrest issued without a probable cause, has nothing to do with the
right of the defendant to a preliminary investigation, and cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal from a judgment in which the defendant is found guilty of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced to death.
The preliminary investigation proper to which the defendant is entitled as apart of the due
process of law in those cases in which the statute provides for it, is that established by
section 11, of same Rule 108, and consist in the right of the defendant, after his arrest, to
"be informed of the complaint or information filed against him . . . of the substance of the
testimony and evidence presented against him," and to be allowed "to testify or to present
witnesses or evidence in his favor." And the defendant has waived expressly his right to
that preliminary investigation, as above stated.
(3) In his third assignment of error, the attorney for the defendant states that "the lower
court erred in not compelling by process of subpoena the attendance of witnesses in behalf
of the appellant as provided by the Philippine Constitution, and finding, despite this failure,
that the testimony of the appellant was corroborated by any witnesses."
This assignment of error is clearly without foundation; because the same attorney admits
in his brief that, the would be witnesses for the defense Nicanor Punsalan, Timoteo
Almonte and Gregorio Magalit were, upon petition of his attorney in the court below,
served on August 6 with subpoena and subpoena duces tecum issued by the court, That
"Nicanor Punsalan and Timoteo Almonte were not examined or presented as witnesses in
behalf of the appellant," does not support the contention of dependant's attorney that
they have not been compelled by subpoena to appear in court as witnesses. The
presumption is that they had appeared in compliance with the subpoena, there being
nothing in the record to show the contrary, and that if they had not been presented as
such by the attorney for the defendant, it was because their testimonies were not
favorable to the latter; as evidenced by the testimony of said Magalit, the other witness
subpoenaed for the defense, who was used by the prosecution as a rebuttal witness and
testified against the accused.
(4) The fourth or last assignment of error, is also without merit. Because the defendant,
testifying in his own behalf, admitted having killed Paciano de los Santos on the date and
in the form and manner testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, and the only
defense that he executed or killed the deceased in obedience to an order given him by
Japanese officers of the navy, by whom he was informed that the deceased was one of
those who were encountered by the Japanese in a mountain and wounded a Japanese
soldier, is not supported by any evidence in the record. And because assuming that there
was such an order, it would not justify the crime committed by defendant and exempt him
from criminal liability.
That there was no such order, oral or written, is clearly shown by the defendant's own
incredible, contradictory and unsupported testimony relating to his having been ordered
by the Japanese naval officer to kill the deceased, which reads as follows:
P. declarando aqui los testigos de la acusacion todos dijeron de que ejecucion de aquel
Paciano de los Santos era por orden de Vd, es cierto eso? - R,
senor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
P. Tambien declararon aqui de que Vd. habia ordenado a n tal Magalit, su assistant para
que notificara al jefe y a los empleado de la Colonia de San Ramon para que estuviera
presente en el dia y hora de ejecucion de Paciano de los Santos, es cierto esto? -R. Eso
era el diciembre 1.0.
P. Si? - R. Cuando el Capitan Susuki y el Commander Tanigawa se fueron a mi oficina me
ordeno para que ejectura a Paciano de los Santos.
P. Y cual era objecto de Vd. al notificar a los oficiales y empleados de la Colonia Penal de
San Ramon para el que estuviera presente al tiempo de la ejecucion de Paciano de los
Santos? - R. Para que durante la manana cuando me estaban dando ordenes de que yo
ejecute esa orden de matar a Paciano de los Santos que ellos esten presentes, porque yo
estuve discutiendo con el Capitan Susuki, yo les dije que no podia hacerlo.
P. Por que? - R. Por ellos insistian, y yo les dije que realmente no podia hacerlo, pero
entonces ellos me dijeron, Tienes que obedecer porque esa ordende Major Susuki tienes
que cumplir, de lo contrario tines que venir con nosotros.
P. Que mas? - R. Asi pues era la orden de Major Sasaki.
P. Que mas? - R. Y como yo no podia esquivarme de la orden que ellos me daban, yo les
pedi si voy a hacer la ejecucion ellos tienen que presenciar tambien para que ellos vean
que yo lo hago contra mi propia voluntad. Entonces, el Capitan Susuki me dijo que ellos
no podian estar presentes porque tenian que volver acquel mismo dia a Zamboanga. (Pp.
48, 49, t.s.n.).
JUZGADO: P. Aquel suspuesto orden que recibio Vd. de los oficiales del navy para la
ejecucion de Paciano de los Santos dada a Vd. por escrito o verbalmente? - R. Una carta
del Commander Tanigawa llevada alli a mi oficina y la orden fue firmada por el Major
Sasaki.
P. Aquella carta estaba dirigida a Vd? - R. Si, senor. virtual law library
P. Y tiene Vd. en sur poder esa carta? - R. Tenia todo eso en el record alli en San Ramon
pero no se ahora no se puede encontrar.
FISCAL ATILANO. Q. you had office in San Ramon, as you say? - A. Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. You had also a record clerk who kept all your papers? - A. Yes,
sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Q. And this particular order you said that was given to you by Major Sasaki was also
delivered to your record clerk Mr. Magalit? - A. Si, senor, yo le he dado para que ponga al
file de cartas recibidas. (Pp. 58, 59, t.s.n.).
The above-quoted appellant's testimony is unsupported. And it is not only unsupported,
but contradicted by the witness for the prosecution whose testimony about the order of
the appellant to witness the beheading of the victim we have already stated above, and by
Gregorio Magalit who testified that he had not received or seen the alleged written order
of Major Sasaki.
It is also incredible and contradictory as a cursory reading of the above would show. The
appellant testified that he ordered them to witness the execution of Paciano de los Santos,
so that "during the morning when they will give me orders to execute the mandate to kill
Paciano de los Santos, they be present" (emphasis supplied); but in the same breath he
added: "as I could not refuse to comply with their order, I asked that if I had to execute it,
they should also be present so that they would see that I do against my will. The Captain
Susuki told me that they could not be present because they had to return that same day to
Zamboanga." (P. 49, t.s.n.) Upon being pressed to explain how could the mere act of his
beheading Paciano de los Santos inform those present that he (the defendant) had acted
against the order of the Japanese authorities, he tried to give an explanation that does not
explain by saying that, on the night previous to the execution, he informed the officers and
employees of San Ramon Penal Colony, gathered by his order in the house of Mr. Dellosa,
"that he had been ordered by Major Sasaki to kill Paciano de los Santos, and asked their
opinion about it." This explanation does not explain, because, aside from being
contradicted by the witnesses for the prosecution (p. 68, t.s.n.), if it were true that he had
already informed them about it, why did he still require them to be present at the
execution of Paciano de los Santos, specially when, according to his own testimony, the
Japanese officers who gave him the order could not be present because they had to return
the same day to Zamboanga?
But assuming that such an order was really given by Major Sasaki, it could not exempt the
defendant from criminal liability, either under subsection 6, article 11, or subsections 5 and
6, article 12, of the Revised Penal Code.
Not under subsection 6 of article 11, because, in killing the deceased, the defendant has
not acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. The
alleged order was not for lawful purpose, because the deceased was to be killed without
any previous trial or hearing, and Commander Sasaki has no authority to give or issue such
an order. This court, in the case of United States vs. Garcia (5 Phil., 58), held that it is not a
defense to a charge of homicide that it was committed under an illegal order of an officer
of the United States Army.
And not under subsections 5 and 6, article 12, of the same Revised Penal Code, which
exempt from criminal liability any person "who acts under the compulsion of an irresistable
force," or "who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury." Because it is plain that there was no compulsion of an irresistible force that
compelled the defendant to kill the victim against his will; nor was there any threat of such
a serious character and imminence as to create in the mind of the defendant an
uncontrollable fear that an equal or greater evil or injury would be inflicted upon him if he
did not comply with the alleged order to kill the deceased. The only part of the defendant's
testimony relating to a sort of a threat is the following: "As they insisted and I informed
them that I could not do it, then Captain Susuki told me: You have to comply with the order,
he had to come along with them, is not such a threat as contemplated by said provision of
the Revised Penal Code; especially, taking into consideration that the defendant himself
declared that the captain told him "that they could not be present (at the execution of the
deceased) because they had to return that same day to Zamboanga." (P. 49, t.s.n.)
At the oral argument, the appellant's attorney invited the attention of this court to a
letter received by him from the defendant Moreno, where it is stated, among other things,
that his attorney de oficio in the court below, Atty. Timoteo de los Santos, was a relative
(kamaganak) of he deceased Pacianode los Santos, and this court ordered that said letter
be attached to the record. Later on, the Solicitor General presented to this court the
affidavits of Timoteo de los Santos and Maximo de los Santos, attorney in the lower court
and brother respectively, of the deceased Paciano de los Santos, in which the affiants
declare that the victim was not related at all to said Timoteo de los Santos.
Although the attorney for the appellant in this court did not impugn in his brief the manner
of conducting the defense by the attorney de oficio for the defendant in the court below,
in his memorandum of authorities submitted after the oral argument he states that the
letter above referred to corraborates in part the statement of Attorney De los Santos
appearing in the stenographic transcript when he said, among other things, "Por encima
de micircunstancia personal y de mi opinion personal entre el acusado, me veo ahora
obligado a aceptar el nombramiento y defender al acusado." In view of the fact that the
appellant is charged with a capital offense and the penalty imposed upon him by the court
below is death, we suggested, during and after the hearing of the case on appeal, that the
appellant's attorney file a formal motion for a new trial accompanied by evidence or
affidavit of merits of witnesses who could support the appellant's defense of having acted
in obedience to a lawful order, so as to have some legal ground to grant a new trial and
thus give the appellant additional opportunity to substantiate his defense.
We can not find a legal way of remanding this case to the lower court for a new trial. In the
first place, because from the fact that about eight months having already elapsed since the
oral argument or hearing of this case, and no formal motion for a new trial has been filed
as suggested, it may be inferred that the appellant has no other evidence to support his
defense; and because after examining carefully the conduct of the proceedings in the trial
court by the attorney de oficio for defendant, we have come to the conclusion that, though
said attorney was somewhat reluctant at first to act as attorney de oficio for the defendant,
he accepted the appointment although his personal opinion is against the defendant, and
performed faithfully his duties as such. Atty. Timoteo de los Santos did not cross-examine
the rebuttal witness Magalit, whose testimony was limited to deny having received or seen
any order by Major Sasaki commanding the appellant to execute Paciano de los Santos, for
it would have been useless to cross-examine him on that point. He did not cross-examine
the witness Carmona because he merely denied the testimony of the defendant that,
during the meeting in the house of Dellosa, he told the officials and employees of the San
Roman Penal Colony gathered there that he did not like to execute Paciano de los Santos.
And he did not cross-examine the other witnesses, Faustino Triplett, Rosa Orquijo and
Pedro Herrera, who testified that in the arrest of civilians by the defendant the latter was
not being accompanied by a Japanese, for whether or not he was accompanied by a
Japanese was not material to the present case.
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the judgment of the lower court that finds the
defendant guilty of the crime of murder with the aggravating circumstances of
premeditation and cruelty and sentences him to death, is in conformity with the facts and
law, and should therefore be affirmed with costs against the appellant. But in view of the
fact that one of the Justices dissents from this decision, the appellant should, according to
section 133 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, as amended by Executive Order No. 86 of the
President of the Philippines dated January 7, 1946, suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of death. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice concurred in this decision