DUCO v.
COMELEC COMELEC en banc due to the matter thereby resolved being the
[G.R. No. 183366; August 19, 2009]
Facts:
On Oct. 2007, simultaneous barangay and SK elections were
held all over the country.
In Brgy Ibabao, Loay, Bohol, Duco was proclaimed as
elected Punong Barangay.
Avelino, his opponent, initiated an election protest in the
MCTC seeking a recount of the ballots in four precincts.
o He alleged that the election results were spurious,
fraudulent and did not indicate the true will of the
electorate.
MCTC ruled in favor of Avelino.
Duco filed a notice of appeal and subsequently a motion for
reconsideration.
o COMELEC dismissed for failure to pay necessary
motion fees and for failure to specify that evidence is
insufficient to justify assailed COMELEC Order.
Issue:
WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Ducos appeal and in
denying his Motion for Reconsideration
Held:
Yes and no. The court noted that the assailed resolution by
COMELEC denying the Motion for Reconsideration was issued by
the 1st Division when instead it should have been made by the
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The action of the 1st Division
was contrary to Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the Constitution which provides
that provided that motions for reconsiderations of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc. Moreover, the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides that upon the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall
notify the Presiding Commissioner, who shall thereafter certify the
case to the Commission en banc. The Clerk of Court shall then
calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the
commission en banc within 10 days from the certification thereof.
There is no showing that the clerk of court of the 1st Division notified
the Presiding Commissioner; or that the Presiding Commissioner
certified the case to the COMELEC en banc; or that the Clerk of
Court of COMELEC en banc calendared the motion within 10 days
from its certification.
Overlooking the said constitutional violation, the court provides that
there is no need to remand the motion for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc for its proper resolution. Considering the urgent
need for resolution of election cases, the court has decided that the
petition for certiorari lacks merit.
Firstly, Duco filed his appeal on time but paid the deficiency of his
appeal fees beyond the 5-day reglementary period. This payment did
not cure the defect because the date of payment of appeal fee is
deemed the actual date of the filing of notice of appeal. This means
the decision of the MCTC was already final and immutable, since his
appeal is considered filed beyond the reglementary period. The court
1
will not bar any claim of good faith, excusable negligence or mistake
in any failure to pay the full amount of filing fees in election cases.
Thus, the plea for a liberal application of technical rules of procedure
is undeserving of any sympathy. Such payment is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement. An
appeal is not a right but a mere statutory privilege that must be
exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions set by law.
Lastly, petitioners claim that MCTC was not furnished a copy of
said Resolution lacks substance. The resolution was not unknown to
the MCTC and to his counsel, because it has already been issued in
2002. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petitioner
was not able to discharge the burden of proving that there was not
merely a reversible error but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC for his
issuance of such order.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE
EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES OF
THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
A. M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009
Facts:
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is a foundation working for
indigent and underprivileged people.
Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi, administrator of the Good Shepherd
Foundation, Inc., wrote a letter addressed to the Chief
Justice.
o He asks the Court to apply to it the exemption from
paying legal fees granted to indigent applicants.
Issue:
WON a foundation working for the indigent and underprivileged
people can be granted the same exemption from payment of legal
fees granted to indigent litigants. NO
Held:
The basis of the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free
access clause embodied in Art. 3, Sec. 11 of the Constitution which
is implemented under Rule 3, Sec. 21 and Rule 141, Sec. 19 of the
Rules of Court. The clear intent and precise language of said
provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party
litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. Good Shepherd
Foundation has a separate juridical personality from its members. It
being a juridical person, it is not covered by the scope of the free
2
access clause and the provisions of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
poverty is a condition that can only be experienced by a natural
person. Other reasons for denying the expansion of the language of
the law is that such allowance could be prone to abuse by
corporations and that scrutiny of the necessary documents if a
corporation were to comply would be time consuming for the courts.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
GUZMAN v. COMELEC
[GR No. 182380, August 28, 2009]
Facts
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Tugegarao City authorized City Mayor Ting to acquire two
parcels of land for use as a public cemetery
As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued and released a
Treasury Warrant
Guzman then filed a complaint in the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against
both Ting and Garcia for violations of the Omnibus Election
Code, for having undertaken construction of a public
cemetery and disbursement of public funds withing 45 days
prior to the May 9, 2004 elections due to the election ban
having commenced on March 26, 2004, ending on May 9,
2004
The Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan
recommended dismissal of the complaint, which the
COMELEC en banc adopted
It argued that acquisition of the two parcels of land
was not considered within the term public works,
hence this present case
This is a petition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65
assailing the resolution of the COMELEC of the dismissing
the criminal complaints against Mayor Randolph Ting and
City Treasurer Salvacion Garcia, both of Tugegarao City
3
 The two were charged with allegedly violating prohibitions
against: 1) disbursing public funds and undertaking public
works; and 2) issuing treasury warrant in payment
Guzman alleges that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in exonerating Ting and
Garcia, based on its finding that the acquisition of
the land for use as a public cemetery and the
issuance of treasury warrants
Issues
1. WON the acquisition of lots during the election ban was
covered by the term public works as to be in violation of
Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code
2. WON the issuance of Treasury Warrants during the period of
the election ban was in violation of Section 261 (w) of the
Omnibus Election Code
Held
1. NO. To be liable for violation of Section 261 (v) of the
Omnibus Election Code, four essential elements must
concur: 1) A public official releases, disburses or expends
any public funds; 2) The release, disbursement or
expenditure of such funds must be within forty-five days
before regular elections; 3) The release, disbursement or
expenditure of funds is for any and all kinds of public works,
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
and; 4) The release, disbursement or expenditure of the
public funds should not cover any exceptions of Section 261
(v) of the OEC. The Local Government Code of 1991
defines public works to be the fixed infrastructures and
facilities owned and operated by the government for public
use and enjoyment. Likewise the Administrative Code in
defining the Declaration of Poliy of the DPWH states that
the said department has the responsibility in: The planning
design, construction and maintenance of infrastructure
facilities, especially national highways, flood control and
water resources development systems and other public works
in accordance with national development objectives Thus
only fixed infrastructures for the use of the public are
regarded as public works. This construction conforms to the
rule of ejusdem generis. The Omnibus Election Code
construes public works as any building or structure on land
or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the
Government for public use and paid for by public funds.
Public works are clearly works, whether of construction or
adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state,
or municipal authorities, designed to subserve some purpose
or public necessity, use or convenience, such as public
buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc:; or, in other words,
all fixed works construed for public use
2. THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CHARGE TING AND
GARCIA. The OSG posits that there are two methods of
violation of Section 261 (w) of the OEC: a). By any person
who, within 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days
4
 before a special election, undertakes the construction of any
public works except those exempted by law or b) by any
person who issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any
device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other
things of value chargeable against public funds within 45
days preceding a regular election and 30 days before a
special election. The court concurred with the OSGs
position. There was a probable cause to believe that Section
261 (w), subparagraph (b) of the OEC was violated by Ting
and garcia when they issued a treasury warrant during the
election ban period. The COMELEC en banc gravely abused
its discretion in dismissing the election case for lack of
merit.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
SUHURI v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 181869; October 2, 2009]
Facts:
Ismunlatip Suhuri ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of
Patikul, Sulu during the 2007 national and local elections.
He was opposed by Kabir Hayudini and a third candidate,
Datu Jun Tarsum.
During the canvassing, Suhuri orally objected to the
inclusion of the election returns from 25 precincts.
o He asserted that the 25 election returns were (1)
obviously fabricated (2) tampered with or falsified
(3) prepared under duress and (4) characterized by
statistical improbability.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) ruled against
Suhuri by rejecting his objections to the 25 election returns.
Suhuri filed his notice of appeal.
MBC proclaimed Hayudini as the duly elected Mayor.
Suhuri filed a petition-appeal with the COMELEC. This was
assigned to the Second Division.
Suhuri filed an election protest ad cautelam in the RTC in
Patikul, Sulu to contest the results of the elections.
RTC held the election protest in abeyance given the pending
pre-proclamation controversy.
Suhuri brought a petition to declare a failure of election with
urgent motion to suspend and/or annul the canvass the
election returns.
COMELEC en banc denied the petition to declare a failure
of election for insufficiency of evidence.
5
 COMELEC Second Division gave due course to Suhuris
petition-appeal.
COMELEC Second Division excluded the 25 questioned
electoral returns and voided the proclamation of Hayudini as
the duly elected Mayor.
Hayudini moved for the reconsideration of the COMELEC
Second Division resolution.
Due to the fact that the required majority vote necessary to
reverse the COMELEC Second Division resolution was not
reached, COMELEC en banc conducted a re-hearing.
COMELEC en banc granted the motion for reconsideration.
Thus the proclamation of Hayudini was declared valid.
is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns
and to investigate election irregularities. In a special civil action for
certiorari, the petitioner carries the burden of proving not merely
reversible error but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction non the part of the public respondent for its
issuance of the impugned order. In this case, Suhuri did not
discharge his burden as petitioner. The COMELEC cannot look
behind or beyond the 25 contested election returns in a pre-
proclamation controversy. Thus Court affirmed COMELEC en banc
resolution, and confirmed the proclamation of Hayudini as the duly
elected Mayor of the Municipality of Patikul, Sulu in the 2007 local
elections.

Issue:
WON there were proper grounds for a pre-proclamation controversy?

Held:
NO. Not every question bearing on or arising from the elections may
constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation controversy. Sec. 243 of
the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the scope of a pre-
proclamation controversy; the enumeration is restrictive and
exclusive. As a result, the petition for a pre-proclamation controversy
must fail in the absence of any clear showing or proof that the
election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects;
or appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under
duress; or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any
candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election.
To be noted too is that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the
COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 6

Mayor Tolentino vs. COMELEC
[G.R. Nos. 187958, 187961, and 187962; April 7, 2010]
Facts:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Tolentino and De Castro were
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor,
respectively.
Ricardo et.al contested the election results in 116 ballot
boxes by filing 3 separate election protests against the
proclaimed winning candidates for Mayor, VM and
Members of the Sanggunian Panlungsod.
After finding the protests sufficient in form and substance,
the COMELEC Division required the City Treasurer of
Tagaytay to inventory the protested ballot boxes and turn
them over to the Election Officer for delivery and
submission to the COMELECs Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department (ECAD) in Manila.
The delivery and submission took place only in Dec. 17,
2008 due to the actions of Tolentino and Castro in
suspending the transmittal.
Further delay occurred because 44 of the 116 contested
ballot boxes became involved in the election protest of Koko
Pimentel against Sen. Migz Zubiri pending in the SET.
These were set aside due to apparent sealing defects or
irregularities.
On Jan. 6, 2009, upon receipt of the 72 ballot boxes, the
Division ordered the constitution of the 4 Revision
Committees.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Tolentino and De Castro moved for the reconsideration of
the order. -GRANTED
The Division suspended the revision proceedings until all the
contested ballots were already in the custody of the
COMELEC. But lifted the suspension when the SET agreed
to conduct the revision proceedings in the SET premises.
De Castro filed a verified omnibus motion requesting the
Division to formulate the mechanics, guidelines and
procedure for the simultaneous revision of the ballots for the
3 distinct positions protested, and to defer the revision
proceedings until after all pending incidents had been
resolved. DENIED
De Castro assailed the denial.
Meanwhile, Tolentino filed a supplement to his petition
asserting that the revision proceedings conducted within the
SET premises involved only 28 ballot boxes because the
Revision Committee suspended the revision of the set-aside
16 ballot boxes.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the revision, thereby depriving Tolentino and De Castro
of due process? NO.
Held:
NO. The SC held that the order of revision and the
revision of ballots synchronized with that of the SET
were proper.
7
 In the case of Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the
procedural due process was simplified into four basic
rights, as follows:
1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive,
of the institution of the proceedings that may
affect a persons legal right;
2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear
and defend his rights and to introduce witnesses
and relevant evidence in his favor;
3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give
him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent
jurisdiction; and
4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal
supported by substantial evidence presented at
the hearing or at least ascertained in the records
or disclosed to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentinos
complaint was unwarranted.
o He was not denied procedural due process.
o The Division had required him to provide the names
of his revisors whose tasks included the raising of
objections, the claiming votes for him, or the
contesting of the votes in favor of his opponent. He
has neither alleged being deprived of this
opportunity, nor indicated any situation in which his
revisors were denied access to the revision
proceedings. He could not also insist that the
COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
arguments; besides, he could still raise them in his
memorandum should he chose to. During the
revision stage, he should raise all objections, present
his evidence and witnesses, and file his
memorandum before the case would be submitted
for resolution.
Thus, the Division did not commit any abuse of discretion,
least of all grave, in its issuance of the assailed orders. Its
actuations relative to the conduct of the revision proceedings
in the three election protests were far from capricious or
whimsical.
o The Division issued ground rules with sufficient
notice to the parties, who were thereby adequately
shielded from partiality or unfairness during the
process of revision. The Division should instead be
commended for carrying out its mandate to expedite
the disposition of the present election controversies.
In an election protest, the electoral tribunal has an imperative
duty to promptly ascertain by all means within its command
the candidates the electorate have chosen. It bears stressing
that in the exercise of the plenitude of its powers to protect
the integrity of the elections, the COMELEC should not and
must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving
election disputes.
The nature of election protests cases often makes the
COMELEC face varied situations calling for the exercise of
its general authority to adopt means necessary to effect its
powers and jurisdiction. The COMELEC, in its performance
of its duties, must be given a considerable latitude in
8
 adopting means and methods that would insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The
choice of the means by the COMELEC should not be
interfered with, unless the means were clearly illegal or the
choice constituted grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, a liberal construction of its rules should be conceded
to the COMELEC
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
CIBAC v. COMELEC
GR No. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
Facts:
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) is a duly-
organized party-list.
CIBAC submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its
representatives will be chosen.
o The nominees are Villanueva (CIBACs president),
Lokin, Jr., Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and Galang.
o This list was also published in newspapers of general
circulation.
Prior to the election, CIBAC, through Villanueva, filed a
certificate of nomination, substitution, and amendment of the
list of nominees.
o The new list consist of Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales,
and Borje.
Following the close of polls, Villanueva sent a letter to
COMELEC Chairman Abalos transmitting a signed petition
of CIBAC members confirming the withdrawal of Lokin,
Tugna, and Galang.
CIBAC filed with COMELEC en banc a motion seeking the
proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee as it is entitled
to a second seat based on preliminary computations.
o This motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-
Gonzales.
COMELEC, as National Board of Canvassers, issued a
resolution proclaiming CIBAC as one of the winning party-
list.
9
 o Another resolution was issued by COMELEC
proclaiming CIBAC to an additional seat.
Ricardo de los Santos, the secretary of CIBAC, requested the
secretary general of the House of Representatives to have
Lokin be sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia.
o De los Santos replied that he could not do so because
he was notified by the COMELEC regarding the
issue in CIBACs list of nominees.
COMELEC en banc issued a resolution declaring that
CIBACs list of nominees is composed of Villanueva, Cruz-
Gonzales, and Borje and the withdrawal of Lokin, Tugno,
and Galang.
o COMELEC ruled that such change was done by
Villanueva within his power as CIBACs president.
o As a result, Cruz-Gonzales became the official
second nominee of CIBAC.
Hence, Lokin seeks through certiorari and mandamus to
compel COMELEC to declare him as the official second
nominee of CIBAC.
o He assails Resolution No. 7804 (promulgating the
IRR for RA 7941) and COMELECs resolution
allowing the amended list of nominees as
unconstitutional because it expands the scope of RA
7941 (Party-list System Act).
o COMELEC counters that the proper remedy should
be an election protest with the HRET and not a
petition with the Court.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction. YES
(2) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 or the
IRR is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List System Act.
YES
Held:
(1) YES. The court has jurisdiction over the issue of Lokin
because it is neither an election protest or a proper subject for quo
warranto. Hence, a petition for certiorari and mandamus is the
proper remedy. Lokins case is not an issue wherein one nominee of
a party-list seeks to unseat a nominee of another party-list nor is it an
issue imputing ineligibility or disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the
Republic of the Philippines. Lokins case is one in which he seeks to
be seated as the proper second nominee of CIBAC.
An election protest proposes to oust the winning
candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the
defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to
determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the
office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in
the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to
questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of
the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to
unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to
10
 install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate For an IRR to be valid, the following requisites must be
the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest present:
where the parties strive for supremacy because the o Its promulgation must be authorized by the
petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may Legislature;
be unseated. o It must be within the scope of the authority
The proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under given by the Legislature;
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which seeks to review the o It must be promulgated in accordance with
judgments or resolutions of COMELEC. the prescribed procedure; and
o It must be reasonable.
(2) YES. RA 7941 provides that no change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the
same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in
cases where the (1) nominee dies, (2) withdraws in writing
his nomination, or (3) becomes incapacitated. On the other
hand, the IRR includes as a fourth exception the instance
when the nominee withdraws his acceptance to the
nomination.
The Court noted that adding the fourth ground is against
the object of RA 7941. It will promote arbitrariness on
the part of the party-list and will not give the electorate
a chance of making an intelligent and informed choice.
Since such provision or additional exception in the IRR
is void, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of
CIBAC after it has submitted an original list to
COMELEC. Hence, the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales
was annulled and set-aside and the Court ordered
COMELEC to have Lokin be proclaimed as one of the
representatives for CIBAC.

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 11

GOMEZ-CASTILLO v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 187231; June 22, 2010]
Facts:
Minerva Gomez-Castillo and Strike Revilla ran for
Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite during the May 14, 2007
local elections.
After the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla
as the elected Municipal Mayor, Castillo filed an Election
Protest Ad Cautelam in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite.
o The election protest was raffled to Branch 19.
Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest, alleging
that it was filed in the wrong Branch of the RTC.
o Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 54-2007
designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite
and Branch 88 of the RTC in Cavite City to hear, try
and decide election contests involving municipal
officials in Cavite.
Branch 19 dismissed Castillos election protest for being
violative of SCAO No. 54-2007.
Castillo presented a notice of appeal.
RTC ordered that the complete records of the protest be
forwarded to the Election Contests Adjudication Department
(ECAD) of the COMELEC.
COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal for being
brought beyond the five-day reglementary period prescribed
in Sec. 3 of Rule 22 of COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
o Although Castillo received the November 21, 2008
order of RTC on December 15, 2008, she filed the
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
notice of appeal on December 23, 2008, a day too
late to appeal.
Castillo moved for reconsideration of dismissal of appeal.
COMELEC denied the motion because Castillo did not pay
the motion fees required under Sec. 7 (f), Rule 40 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Castillo brought the present recourse, contending that the
COMELECs orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issues:
1) Does Sec. 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate
the RTC Branch that has jurisdiction over an election
contest, or does it merely designate the proper venue for
filing?
2) WON Castillos tardy appeal should be dismissed?
Held:
1) It merely designates the proper venue for filing. Jurisdiction
over election contests involving municipal offices has been
vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-
4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases
may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by
which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction.
Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was
designated to ensure a just and orderly administration of
justice and is permissive. Castillos filing her protest in the
RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong choice of
12
 venue. The dismissal of the protest by Branch 19 constituted
plain error, considering that her wrong choice did not affect
the jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch 19 should have
done under the circumstances was to transfer the protest to
Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite, which was the proper
venue.
2) YES. Although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008
order of the RTC on December 15, 2008, she filed her notice
of appeal only on December 23, 2008 or eight days after her
receipt of the decision. Her appeal was properly dismissed
for being too late under the aforequoted rule of COMELEC.
The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not
mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for they are
essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the
stability of our judicial system.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
DE CASTRO v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
[GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010]
Facts
The controversy in the case arose from the then-forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17,
2010 or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
The JBC passed a resolution stating that it will open
applications or recommendations and deliberate on the list of
candidates for Chief Justice, however, as to the time to
submit the list, the JBC said that it welcomes and will
consider all views on the matter taking into consideration
the seemingly incongruent provisions banning midnight
appointments in Article VII and the imperative duty of the
president to fill out a vacancy in the Supreme Court within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof
The OSG submitted its comment stating that the incumbent
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno
upon his retirement by May 17, 2010
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the
Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the
13
 Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from
its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution
It argues that the framers of the Constitution neither
mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight
appointments or its effects on such period, vice versa
Had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to
the Supreme Court, they could have expressly stated
so in the Constitution
The Valenzuela case involved the appointment of
RTC judges, the situation now refers to the
appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the
prohibition does not apply
At any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there
might be the imperative need for an appointment
during the period of the ban
Issue
WON the ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution applies to appointments in the Supreme Court
as well?
Held
NO. The deliberations of the Constitutional COmmission reveal that
the framers evoted time to meticulously drafting, styling and
arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the
organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers. It was the
intention of the framers that the awesome powers of the government
were allocated among the three great departments. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article
VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as
being equally applicable to the appointment of members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4(1).
Moreover, the usage of in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall
an imperative, operating to impose a duty may be enforced should
not be disregarded. Thereby Section 4(1) imposes on the President
the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The failure of the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to
the Constitution.
14
SPS. YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 156664; April 6, 2011]
Facts:
Sps. Yusay owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 sq.
meters between 2 streets in Mandaluyong City.
o Half of their land was used as their residence, while
the rest was rented out to nine other families.
o Allegedly, the land was their only property and only
source of income.
On Oct. 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Mandaluyong City adopted a Resolution authorizing the
Mayor to take necessary steps for the expropriation of the
land of Sps. Yusay
o This was said to be for the purpose of developing it
for low cost housing for the less privileged but
deserving city inhabitants.
Despite such resolution being only the initial step, Sps.
Yusay became alarmed and filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the RTC
o They prayed for the annulment of the Resolution for
being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and
without force and effect.
RTC ruled in favor of the City saying that certiorari did not
lie against a legislative act of the City Government.
On Motion for Reconsideration, RTC set aside its decision
and declared the resolution null and void.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
o The passage of said Resolution would already pave
the way for the City to deprive Sps. Yusay and their
heirs of their only property without due process
CA reversed RTCs second decision claiming presumption
of regularity and validity of laws.
Issue:
WON the validity of a resolution may be assailed even before its
implementation?
Held:
No. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the
Sanggunian Panglungsod which was not part of the Judiciary settling
an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable
rights when it adopted the Resolution but a legislative and policy
making body declaring its sentiment or opinion. Moreover, the LGC
required the City to pass an ordinance and not adopt a resolution.
Such resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation proceeding.
Prohibition also does not lie against expropriation considering that
only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod to expropriate the property was issued. As of then, it
was premature for Sps. Yusay to mount any judicial challenge.
Before the City, as the expropriating authority, files a verified
complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until
then, Sps. Yusay, as the owners, could not also be dperived of heir
property under the power of eminent dominion.
15
NAPOCOR v. Heirs of Sangkay
[G.R. No. 165828; August 24, 2011]
Facts:
Pursuant to its legal mandate under RA 6395, NPC
undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project
in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao.
o The project included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the
water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric
plants.
The Heirs of Sangkay sued NPC in the RTC for recovery
damages and property, with the alternative prayer for
payment of just compensation.
o They alleged that (1) the underground tunnel had
been constructed without their knowledge and
consent (2) the presence of the tunnel deprived them
of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and
residential value of their land, and (3) their land had
become an unsafe place for habitation.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Sangkay had no right of
compensation, and assuming that they were entitled to
compensation, their cause of action already prescribed.
o NPC argued that the Heirs of Sangkay had no right
to compensation under Sec. 3 (f) of RA 6395, under
which a mere legal easement of their land was
established. And should they be entitled to
compensation, their cause of action already
prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
in 1979. By reason of the tunnel being an apparent
and continuous easement, any action arising from
such easement prescribed in five years.
RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Sangkay. NPC had
concealed the construction of the tunnel in 1979 and had
since continuously denied its existence.
o Prayer for removal or dismantling of tunnel was
denied. However RTC ordered payment just
compensation.
o RTC fixed the just compensation at P500/square
meter based on the testimony of Dionisio Banawan,
OIC-City Assessor of Iligan City. RTC based its
fixing of just compensation on the prevailing market
value at the time of the filing of the complaint,
instead of reckoning from the time of taking.
NPC appealed to the CA.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Issue:
WON the Heirs of Sangkay are entitled to just compensation?
Held:
YES. Firstly, the five-year prescriptive period under Sec. 3 (i) of RA
6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not
extend to an action to recover just compensation. An action to
recover just compensation, also known as inverse condemnation, has
the objective to recover the value of the property taken by the
governmental defendant. Just compensation is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
16
On the other hand, action for damages seeks to vindicate a legal
wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary. Secondly, NPC is liable to pay
not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for the
land. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to
be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful
manner, lessening or destroying its value. NPC then should pay just
compensation for the entire land. Lastly, the valuation of
P500/square meter is binding given that NPC did not assail the
valuation in the lower courts. As for the reckoning value, Court held
that value should be determined at the time of the filing of the
complaint in order to prevent NCC from unjustly profiting from its
deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the Heirs of
Sangkay.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY v.
PULIDO
[GR No. 188995, August 24, 2011]
Facts
This case involved expropriation of three parcels of land in
Rosario Cavite, by the petitioner, Export Processing Zone
Authority, of land belonging to Salud Jimenez (who would
later be represented by the Estate of Salud Jimenez).
Export Processing Zone Authority filed expropriation cases
in May 15, 1981
Originally, three parcels of land were subject of
expropriation, Lots 1408, 1409-B-2 and 1406.
o Lot 1406 was later subdivided into Lots 1406 A and
B during the pendency of the case For this case, Lot
1406 B is of importance
The RTC sustained the right of EPZA to expropriate the land
except Lot 1406-A 1991, which led EPZA to file an appeal
to the Court of Appeals.
EPZA and the Estate of Salud Jimenez later entered into a
compromise agreement where the parties agreed that:
o EPZA would withdraw its appeal over the release of
1406 A from expropriation while the Estate would
waive its claim for damages because of the
possession by EPZA over the parcel of land since
1981
o The Estate would transfer Lot 1406-B in exchange
for Lot 434, as just compensation
17
 The CA remanded the case to the RTC and the RTC
approved the compromise agreement in August of 1993
The EPZA was not able to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the
Estate because the registered owner was Progressive Realty
Inc., not EPZA
The Estate filed a motion to partially annul the compromise
agreement which was granted. The EPZA appealed from this
decision by the RTC and the RTC which the CA granted.
o The CA remanded the case to the RTC to determine
just compensation for Lot 1406 B
o The RTC determined that the just compensation
should be the value of Lot 1406 B in 1993 when the
compromise agreement was entered into, not 1981,
when the actual taking occurred
o EPZA appealed from this decision, hence this
present case
had in fact settled between themselves the question of what
is just compensation and that had intended that the Estate
would be compensated on the basis of the prevailing values
at the time of the agreement. What the compromise
agreement only set out to do is to determine the mode of
compensation which is by land swap. Since such is not
possible the value of the Lot 1406 B or Lot 434 in 1993
should be the basis for the determination of just
compensation
2. YES. The EPZA should have known the inefficacy of land
swapping as a mode of just compensation. In view of the
long delay in the payment of just compensation to the Estate,
an interest rate of 12% is imposed from the approval of the
compromise agreement until full payment.

Issues
1. WON just compensation should be determined from the
value or assessment rate prevailing in 1981 (date of taking)
or 1993 (date of the compromise agreement) or 1997 (the
date when the compromise agreement was set aside)
2. WON the Estate is entitled to legal interest

Held
1. Just compensation should be determined from the value or
assessment rate prevailing in 1993. When the parties signed
the compromise agreement and the same was approved, they

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 18

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SUNTAY
[GR. No. 188376; December 14, 2011]
Facts:
Federico Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro.
In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform expropriated
948.1911 hectares of Suntays land pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27.
o Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the
expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total
valuation of P4,251,141.
Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for
determination of just compensation in the Office of the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV,
DARAB.
On January 24, 2001, after summary administrative
proceeding, RARAD Mias rendered a decision fixing the
total just compensation for the expropriated portion at
P157,541,951.30.
On October 11, 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated its
decision in Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903) holding
that it is the Regional Trial Courts sitting as Special Agrarian
Courts which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination of just compensation.
o Adjudicators are merely empowered to make a
preliminary determination of the compensation,
subject to the ultimate power of the courts.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Suntay alleged that the RARAD Decision had already
attained finality in DARAB v. Lubrica because the Land
Bank failed to file the petition within the reglementary
period, notwithstanding its recourse to the special agrarian
court.
Issue:
WON a final and executory decision may be reversed, modified, or
set aside by the Supreme Court en banc
Held:
NO. Such insinuation runs afoul of the well settled doctrine of
immutability of judgments. Although Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of
the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the discretion to sit either
en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven Members, the
divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts. Nor is a
hierarchy of courts thereby established within the Supreme Court,
which remains a unit notwithstanding that it also works in divisions.
The actions taken and the decisions rendered by any of the divisions
are those of the Court itself, considering that the divisions are not
considered separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and
the same court. Lastly, the only thing that the Constitution allows the
banc to do in this regard is to reverse a doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the Court en banc or in division.
19
LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 176951; February 15, 2011]
Facts:
Congress filed 57 bills for the conversion of 57
municipalities into component cities.
o Only 33 were enacted into law. 24 remained as
pending bills, with 16 municipalities already
converted into component cities through the
Cityhood Laws
A Senate Bill was introduced to amend LGC
o The amendment sought to increase the income
requirement to qualify for conversion into a city
from P20M average annual income to P100M
locally generated income
The said amendment was signed into law as RA 9009
After he effectivity of RA 9009, the Congress soght to
exempt from the income requirement in the law the 24
municipalities
o However, Senate did not approve the Resolution
exempting them
During a Senate session, Sen. Pimentel asserted passing the
Resolution, suggesting that the House of Representatives file
individual bills.
o Heeding the advice, 16 municipalities filed
individual cityhood bills, which all had a provision
exempting the municipality from the P100M
requirement
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Both Houses of Congress approved the individual cityhood
bills.
Petitions were then filed seeking to declare the cityhood laws
unconstitutional for violation of Art. X of the Constitution,
as well as violation of the equal protection clause.
o The conversion of the municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment.
On Nov. 2008, the court held that the exemption clauses in
the pending bills were unconstitutional because they were
not written in the LGC.
Issue:
WON the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional and violative of the
equal protection clause
Held:
No.
The phrase in the Constitution in accordance with the criteria
established in the LGC was put to lay stress that it is Congress alone
and no other which can impose the criteria. Since the GC is a
creation of Congress, Congress also has the power to alter or modify
as it did when it enacted RA 9009. This power of amendment of laws
was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. The
exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the
express articulation of that intent to exempt respondent
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009, which amended the
LGC. Therefore, since the Cityhood Laws explicitly amended the 16
20
municipalities from RA 9009, such Cityhood Laws are also
amendments to the LGC itself.
As to the equal protection clause, the favorable treatment accorded to
the 16 municipalities rests on substantial distinction. It must be noted
that the 16 municipalities were going through the process of
becoming a city when RA 9009 was passed. It would be unfair if
they were suddenly restricted by the sudden increase in the revenue
requirement. The classification was also germane to the purpose of
law because it was meant to reduce inequality brought by the
amendment, which was non-retroactive since it was a mere
declaration of prior qualification with the non-retroactive effect of
RA 9009.
The constitutional protection extends to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, however, are entitled to
protection only insofar as their property is concerned. League of
cities cannot invoke equal protection clause because no deprivation
of property results by virtue of the enactment of the Cityhood Laws.
It is also presumptuous on the part of the League of Cities member-
cities to stake a claim on the IRA as the IRA is yet to be allocated.
For final consideration, the existence of cities consequent to the
approval of the creating, but challenged cityhood laws in the
plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. Thus,
the Cityhood Laws are constitutional.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID
AND ELISEA RAMOS
[GR No. 159402, February 23, 2011]
Facts:
Spouses Ramos discovered that a portion of their lot was
being used as a runway of the Loakan Airport being operated
by Air Transportation Office (ATO).
Spouses Ramos agreed to convey the affected portion by
deed of sale to ATO in consideration of P 778,150.
ATO failed to pay despite demands. Thus, the Spouses filed
a collection case against ATO.
ATOs invoked the following defenses:
o Proclamation No. 1358 by Pres. Marcos reserving
certain parcels of land, including the Spouses, for
use by Loakan Airport
o Since the deed of sale was entered by ATO in the
performance of its governmental function, it cannot
be sued without the consent of the State.
RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses which was affirmed by
the CA.
Issue:
WON ATO can be sued without the States consent (or can it claim
State immunity).
Held:
21
YES. ATO is an agency of the government NOT performing a purely
governmental or sovereign function, but was involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that
was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from
suit.
Furthermore, the doctrine of State immunity cannot be used as a
shield to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the
taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceeding being first resorted to.
Lastly, RA 9497 or the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008 which
abolished ATO and to be replaced by CAAP. Section 23 of said Act
provides that one of the powers of CAAP is to sue and be sued.
Hence, the obligations of ATO it incurred through the deed of sale
can now be enforced against CAAP which can be sued.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
CAGAS v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 194139; January 29, 2012]
Facts:
Douglas Cagas and Claude Bautista contested the position of
Governor of Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010
automated national and local elections.
o Cagas was proclaimed the winner with 163,440
votes, with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes.
Bautista filed an electoral protest alleging fraud, anomalies,
irregularities, vote buying and violation of election laws,
rules and resolutions.
o The protest was raffled to COMELEC First
Division.
Cagas averred that Bautista did not make the requisite cash
deposit on time, and that Bautista did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order
denying the special affirmative defenses of Cagas.
Cagas moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did
not discuss whether the protest specified the alleged
irregularities in the conduct of the elections.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requires all
decisions to clearly and distinctly express the facts
and the law on which they were based, and further
requires a detailed specified of the acts or omissions
complained of.
o Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the
COMELEC en banc.
22
 Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en resolution issued by a COMELEC Division. A decision, order or
banc. resolution of a COMELEC Division must be reviewed by the
COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final
denying Cagas motion for reconsideration for failing to en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
show that the first order was contrary to law. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
o The allegations in Bautistas petition have
substantially complied with the requirements of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant
the opening of the ballot boxes in order to resolve
not only the issues raised in the protest but also those
set forth in Cagas answer.
o The prayer to elevate the motion for reconsideration
to the COMELEC en banc is denied considering that
the COMELEC First Division order is merely
interlocutory and it does not dispose of the instant
case with finality.
Cagas commenced this special civil action for certiorari
directly in this Court.

Issue:
WON Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari?

Held:
NO. Sec. 7, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution, although it confers on
the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the
COMELEC en banc. It does not extend to an interlocutory order
issued by a COMELEC Division. Otherwise stated, the Court has no

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 23

PEOPLE v. BAKUNAWA
[GR No. 180418, August 28, 2013]
Facts
The Republic appeals from the decision of the
Sandiganbayan dismissing the action for reconveyance
brought against Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuela Bakunawa,
Jr. Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady
Imelda R. Marcos for allegedly having acquired and
accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other
property in unlawful concert with one another and in
flagrant breach of trust and of their fiduciary obligations as
public officers
The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa
had served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the
Marcos administration; that it was during that period of her
incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her
husband Manuel Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and
other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to her
salaries and their other lawful income and that Luz
Bakunawa by herself and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. marcos and Imelda R. marcos,
taking undue advantage of her position, influence and
connection with the latter Defendant spouses, for their
benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent
disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged
in devices, schemes and startagems
In their defense, the Bakunawas alleged that Luz Bakunawa
was never Social Secretary of Imelda Marcos, but only an
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
employee in the office of the Social Secretary; that the
properties acquired while Luz Bakunawa was employed in
the government were purchased with honestly earned money
and their acquisition was well within their legitimate income
Issue
WON the defendant Luz Bakunawa, considering her position in
Malacanang during the incumbency of President Marcos occupied a
confidential position and was able to obtain contracts, run businesses
and acquire real properties using her officer and the influence of
either or both of the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos so as to
give propriety to the filing of cases by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government under EOs 1, 2, 14 and 14-a
Held
NO. In Republic v. Migrino, the Court held that it does not suffice
that the respondent is or was a government official or employee
during the administration of Former President Marcos.. There must
be prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated
wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife.
The Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the
Social Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of the First Lady
Marcos; and mentions several other circumstances that indicated her
close relationship with the Marcoses, such as her assumption of
office in the early part of the Marcos administration, the
24
accommodations extended to her during her various travels, and the
fact that her close relationship was common knowledge among the
Masbatenos, and the negotiated contracts with Bakunawas entered
into during the Marcos administration. The Court holds that the
Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of Republic was
able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee
in Malacanang Palace during the marcos admnistration, and did not
establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
FUNA v. AGRA
[GR. No. 191644; February 19, 2013]
Facts:
On January 12, 2010, Alberto C. Agra was the Government
Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as
the Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General
Devanadera.
On March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as
the Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera
who had tendered her resignation in order to run for
Congress.
Agra alleged that he then relinquished his position as the
Government Corporate Counsel, and that pending the
appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his
duties as the
Acting Solicitor General.
On April 7, 2010, Funa, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a
concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agras concurrent
appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
During the pendency of the suit, President Benigno S.
Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the
Solicitor General.
Issue/s:
1. WON the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of
Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting
25
 Solicitor General, violates the constitutional prohibition
against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the
Cabinet and their deputies and assistants
2. WON the Agra was designated as Secretary of Justice in
an ex officio capacity.
3. Assuming that his designation as Secretary of Justice is
void, WON his actions are without effect.
Held:
1. YES. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was
unconstitutional and void because the Constitution has not otherwise
so provided. It was of no moment that Agras designation was in an
acting or temporary capacity. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to
apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of
Section 13 of Article VII is to prevent the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and
assistants.
According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two
exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those
provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet;
and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials specified in Section 13,
Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
officials offices. In Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary,
the Supreme Court held that the phrase the Members of the Cabinet,
and their
deputies or assistants found in Section 13 referred only to the heads
of the various executive departments, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries, and did not extend to other public officials
given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
2. NO. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not
in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly
authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding
of one office being the consequence of holding the other. An ex
officio means from office; by virtue of office. It refers to an
authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position.
Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by
the primary functions nor included by the powers of the DOJ, and
vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent
unit of the latter, as, in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees
that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested with a
cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. Considering that the
nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper,
from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both,
an incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the
26
declaration of Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice,
concurrently with his designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to
be void for being in violation of the express provisions of the
Constitution.
3. NO. All official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of
Justice were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the
officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. A de facto
officer is one who derives his appointment from one having
colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office,
and whose appointment is valid on its face. Consequently, the acts of
the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de
jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested
therein are concerned.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Nazareth vs. COA
[GR. No. 188635; January 29, 2013]
Facts:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to provide a program for
human resources development in science and technology in
maintaining the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower
that would sustain the drive for total science and technology
mastery.
Sec. 7 grants additional allowances and benefits (Magna
Carta benefits) such as honorarium, share in royalties,
hazard allowance, subsistence allowance, laundry allowance,
housing and quarter allowance, longevity pay and medical
examination.
The funds of the Magna Carta benefits are to be
appropriated by the GAA of the year following the
enactment of the law.
The DOST Regional Offices released the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing
in CY 1998 despite the absence of specific appropriation for
the purpose in GAA.
Subsequently, COA State Auditor Vargas issued several
Notice of Disallowances (ND) disapproving the payment of
the benefits following a post-audit.
This prompted DOST Sec. Uriarte Jr. to request the OP for
the authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the
benefits. -GRANTED
Exec. Sec. Zamora, acting by authority of the Pres, approved
the request through a Memorandum.
27
 Nazareth as the DOST RD in Region IX, lodged an appeal
with COA RD Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance
of the benefits for the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001
amounting to P4,363,997.47, citing the Memorandum issued
by Exec. Sec. Zamora and Sec. 58 of GAA in 1998. She
argued that the Memorandum ratified the payment of the
benefits out of the savings for CY 1998 and CY 1999 and
allowed the use of the savings for CY 2000, but also
operated as a continuing endorsement of the use of savings
to cover the benefits in succeeding calendar years.
DENIED.
Director Inok of COA Legal and Adjudication Office denied
the appeal but set-aside the NDs covering the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 2000 in view of the authorization under the
Memorandum.
Nazareth filed a petition for review with COA Head Office,
insisting that the payments had been allowed under RA
8349.
COA rendered a decision lifting the NDs covering the
Magna Carta benefits for CY 1998 and CY 1999 for the
same reason for lifting NDs for CY 2000. However, it
maintained the disallowance of the benefits for CY 2001
because they were not covered by the authorization granted
by the Memorandum.
Issue:
WON the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
provision of RA 8439 and in ruling that the Memorandum did not
cover the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY2001?
Held:
No. The Memorandum is not a blanket authority from the
OP to pay the benefits out of the DOSTs savings. Although
it was silent as to the period, it was clear that it only
encompassed CY 1998, 1999, and CY 2000.
o The limitation of its applicability to those calendar
years was based on the tenor of the request of
Secretary Uriarte, Jr. to the effect that the DOST had
previously used its savings to pay the Magna Carta
benefits in CY 1998 and CY 1999; that the 2000
GAA did not provide for the use of savings; and that
the DOST personnel were looking forward to the
Presidents favorable consideration. The
Memorandum could only be read as an authority
covering the limited period until and inclusive of CY
2000. The text of the Memorandum was also bereft
of any indication that the authorization was to be
indefinitely extended to any calendar year beyond
CY 2000.
The COA correctly ruled on the matter. Art. VI Sec. 29 (1)
provides that, No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. This
requires that the GAA be purposeful, deliberate and precise
in its provisions and stipulations. In line with this, the
requirement in RA 8439 that the amounts needed to fund the
Magna Carta benefits were to be appropriated by the GAA
28
 only meant that such funding must be purposefully,
deliberately and precisely included in the GAA.
The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not
materialize if not initially proposed by the officials of the
DOST for submission and consideration by the Congress.
RA 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the benefits
because the GAA did not mirror every provision of law that
referred to it as the source of funding. DOST itself
acknowledged the need for appropriation.
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs,
the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount
contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress
will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for
the proponent agency.
o The only exception is found in Section 25 (5),
Article VI of the Constitution, by which the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions are authorized to transfer
appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for
their respective offices from the savings in other
items of their respective appropriations. The plain
language of the constitutional restriction leaves no
room for the Nazareths posture.
Lastly, Nazareth ignored the provisions in the 2000 GAA on
the use of savings
o Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an
item, project, activity or purpose with an
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
appropriation which upon implementation or
subsequent evaluation of needed resources is
determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore,
shall a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose
or object of expenditure be funded by augmentation
from savings or by the use of appropriations
authorized otherwise in this Act.
Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer
of appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the
payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a
specific item or provision in the GAA and without due
authority from the President to utilize the DOSTs savings in
other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439,
the Constitution, and the re-enacted GAA for 2001.
The COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the
exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to
examine and audit expenditures of public funds, particularly
those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by
law.
29
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS v. SPS. RIGOR-SORIANO
[G.R. No. 178312; January 30, 2013]
Facts:
Sps Rigor-Soriano and other respondents are children of the
owners of two parcels of land in Nueva Ecija covered by a
Transfer Certificate of Title.
The properties became subject to Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) and were valued at P10,000/hectare by Land Bank
and DAR.
Sps. Rigor-Soriano filed an action for just compensation
contending that the valuation was too low compared to other
existing valuations of agricultural lands.
o They claim that the properties were irrigated lands
o They asked that a final valuation of the properties be
pegged at P1,800,000.
Land Bank claimed that under PD27 and EP228 the
Government, through the DAR had taken the properties in
1972 and had since then redistributed the properties to
farmer-beneficiaries.
o Thus, in all cases under PD27 and EO 228, its
participation was only to pay the landowners
accepting the valuations fixed by the DAR.
Issue:
WON the respondents may ask for a revaluation for just
compensation?
Held:
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
No. It appears that the parties entered into a Joint Manifestation and
Motion stating the approval by Land Bank of the revaluation of the
properties which was communicated to Sps. Rigor Soriano for their
unconditional acceptance. There is no question that the agreement
was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into
for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. A
compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an end to a
pending litigation; or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a
litigation. It is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial
compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its
execution, is not executory until it is being approved by the court and
reduced to a judgment.
A review of the terms of the Agreement indicates that it is a judicial
compromise because the parties intended it to terminate their
pending litigation by fully settling their dispute. With the
respondents thereby expressly signifying their unconditional or
absolute acceptance and full receipt of the foregoing amounts as just
compensation, the ultimate objective of the action to determine just
compensation for the landowners was achieved. Therefore, the court
approves the agreement being in compliance with the requirements
of the law.
30
MANALANG-DEMIGILLO v TIDCORP
[G.R. No. 168613 ; March 5, 2013]
Facts:
Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo) was
appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent
status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services
Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.
In 2002, TIDCORP President Joel C. Valdes sought an
opinion from the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) relative to TIDCORPs authority to
undertake a reorganization under the law.
o Assailing that Sec 7 and Sec 8 provides that it must
be the Board of directors who should reorganize.
Government Corporate Counsel released an Opinion which
sided with TIDCORP
TIDCORP then passed a resolution (Resolution 1365) to
approve the following
o a so-called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring
Plan to implement a new organizational structure
and staffing pattern,
o a position classification system,
o a new set of qualification standards.
During the implementation of the Organizational
Refinement/Restructuring Plan, the LCSD was abolished.
o Petitioner Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as
a Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the
Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector
(RCMSS). On the same date, President Valdes
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
issued her appointment as head of RCMSS, such
appointment being in nature a reappointment under
the reorganization plan.
o This was later approved by the president
Demigillo challenged before the Board of Directors the
validity of Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to the
RCMSS.
o She averred that she had been thereby illegally
removed from her position of Senior Vice President
in the LCSD to which she had been previously
assigned during the 1st reorganization.
o She insisted that the Board of Directors had not been
authorized to undertake the reorganization and
corporate restructuring.
Pending determination of her challenge by the Board of
Directors, Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), raising the same issues.
The TIDCORP board dismissed Demigillos appeal for its
lack of merit, thereby rendering the question about the
propriety of Demigillos appeal moot and academic
In the meanwhile, by letter, President Valdes informed
Demigillo of her poor performance rating for the period from
January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002,
Demigillo formally communicated to Atty. Florencio P.
Gabriel Jr., Executive Vice President of the Operations
Group, appealing the "poor rating" given her by President
Valdes.
o Atty. Gabriel informed Demigillo that he could not
act on her appeal because of her "failure to state
31
 facts and arguments constituting the grounds for the the functions of Demigillos office were in
appeal and submit any evidence to support the fact transferred to the Operations Group.
same." o that the dropping from the rolls of Demigillo did not
Demigillo received a memorandum from President Valdes comply with the mandatory requirement
stating that her performance rating for the period from
Issue:
January 1, 2003 to June 2003 "needs improvement,"
WON the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego
attaching the pertinent Performance Evaluation Report Form
of the President who had the continuing authority to
that she was instructed to return "within 24 hours from
reorganize TIDCORP NO
receipt."
The Board of Directors rendered Decision No. 03-003 which
HELD:
unanimously dropped Demigillo from the rolls.
The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially
CSC decision held the following:
postulates that the heads of the various executive
o that the 2002 Organizational Refinements or
departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the
Restructuring Plan of TIDCORP had been valid for
actions taken by such heads in the performance of their
being authorized by Republic Act. No. 6656
official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the
o that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8498 granted a
President himself should disapprove such acts.
continuing power to TIDCORPs Board of Directors
o This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our
to prescribe the agencys organizational structure,
presidential form of government, all executive
staffing pattern and compensation packages
organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief
o that such grant continued until declared invalid by a
Executive;
court of competent jurisdiction or revoked by
that the heads of the Executive Departments
Congress.
are assistants and agents of the Chief
o However, TIDCORPs implementation of its
Executive; and
reorganization did not comply with Section 6 of
that the multiple executive functions of the
Republic Act No. 6656
President as the Chief Executive are
that although there was no diminution in
performed through the Executive
Demigillos rank, salary and status, there
Departments.
was nonetheless a demotion in her functions
The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical
and authority
necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 32

 to personally perform the multifarious functions of the
executive office.
But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be
extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves
the appointees of the President to the Cabinet.
o Under the circumstances, when the members of the
Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002
reorganization, they were acting as the responsible
members of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1080, as amended by Republic Act No. 8494, not as
the alter egos of the President.
Nonetheless, the court upholds the 2002 reorganization and
declare it valid for being done in accordance with the
exclusive and final authority expressly granted under
Republic Act No. 8494
The court also reiterate that the ruling of the CSC that deals
with specific cases coming within its area of technical
knowledge and expertise
that the reorganization was not arbitrary and whimsical. It
had been formulated following lengthy consultations and
close coordination with the affected offices within
TIDCORP in order for them to come up with various
functional statements relating to the new organizational
setup
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
ARAULLO V. AQUINO III
[G.R. No. 209287; February 3, 2015]
Facts:
In a privilege speech, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada revealed that he
and his fellow senators received 50 million-peso incentive
because of their vote to impeach Chief Justice Corona.
Sec. Abad responded to the speech saying that it is part of
the Spending Acceleration Program.
1. The Spending Acceleration Program is also known
as the Disbursement Acceleration Program [DAP].
2. Sec. Abad also said that the money was given in
response to several funding requests from the
senators.
The money used for the DAP are taken from:
1. Unreleased appropriations under personnel services;
2. Unprogrammed [sic] funds;
3. Carry-over appropriations unreleased from the
previous year; and
4. Budget for slow-moving items or projects that had
been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects.
The Department of Budget and Management [DBM]
released a claim on its website saying that the money used
for the DAP are savings from:
1. Pooling of unreleased appropriations, and
2. Withdrawal of unobligated allotments.
The legal bases of DBM in implementing DAP vis--vis the
use of savings are as follows:
33
 1. Article VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, which
granted the President the power to augment an item
for his office in the general appropriations law,
2. Administrative Code of 1987s Book VI, Chapter 5,
Sections 38 (suspension of expenditure
appropriations) and 49 (Authority to use savings for
certain purpose),
3. 2011-2013 General Appropriations Acts (GAAs)
which provides for (a) use of savings, (b) meanings
of savings and augmentation, and (c) priority in the
use of savings.
With regard to unprogrammed [sic] funds, the legal bases of
DBM are the 2011-2013 GAAs.
Araullo, et al., filed a petition to the Supreme Court assailing
the Constitutionality of National Budget Circular [NBC] No.
541, which was issued to implement the DAP.
Issues:
1. WON the certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
remedies to assail the Constitutionality and validity of the
DAP, NBC no. 541, and other issuances implementing the
DAP?
a. WON controversy is ripe for judicial determination;
and
b. WON the petitioners have locus standi?
2. WON the DAP violates Article VI, Sec. 29 of the
Constitution, which provides, [n]o money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law?
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
3. WON the DAP, NBC Bo. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Article
VI, Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution insofar as:
a. They treat the unreleased appropriations and
unobligated allotments withdrawn from government
agencies as savings as the term used in Sec. 25 (5),
in relation to 2011-2013 GAAs,
b. They authorize the disbursement of funds for
projects or programs not provided in the GAAs for
the Executive Departments, and
c. They augment discretionary lump sum
appropriations in the GAAs?
4. WON the DAP violates (1) the equal protection clause
[EPC], (2) the system of checks and balances, and (3)the
principle of public accountability enshrined in the
Constitution that it authorizes the release of funds upon the
request of legislators?
5. WON factual and legal justification exists to issue a TRO to
restrain the implementation of DAP and other executive
issuances implementing DAP?
Held/Ratio:
1. Yes, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper
remedies to assail the Constitutionality of DAP. Since
certiorari and prohibition are large in scope and the issues
involved the limitations of the Executives spending power,
the said remedies are proper.
a. The case is not moot and academic even if the
President has terminated the DAP. The fact that huge
34
 public funds have been allocated, disbursed, or
utilized by reason or on account of the challenged
executive acts gave rise to an actual controversy that
is ripe for adjudication. Even if assuming that the
DAP has mooted the case, this case still falls under
the exception to the requirement of ripeness:
i. There is a grave violation of the
Constitution,
ii. The case involved a situation of exceptional
character and was of paramount public
interest,
iii. When the constitutional issue raised required
the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the Bench, the Bar, and the public, and
iv. When the case was capable of repetition yet
evading review.
b. The petitioners have legal standing to assail the
Constitutionality of the DAP. Considering that the
issue involves the expenditure of public funds and
the present case is of transcendental importance, the
petitioners do have a legal standing to raise the
issues before the Court.
2. No, there is no violation of the provision since DAP is not an
appropriation measure but a program of prioritizing
spending. Congresss duty vis--vis treasury is to allocate
funds in the treasury in a particular fund.
3. Yes. The term savings does not include unreleased
appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under
the DAP because savings refers to portions or balances of
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
any programmed appropriation in the GAA free from any
obligation or encumbrance, which are:
a. Still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity
or purpose for which the appropriation is authorize,
b. From appropriations balances arising from unpaid
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absences without pay, and
c. From appropriations balances realized form the
implementation of measures resulting in improved
systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies
to meet and deliver the required or planned targets,
programs, and services approved in the GAAs at a
lesser cost.
Mere declaration of the DBM will not ripen the status of the
funds under the DAP to the categories considered as savings.
It is necessary that these funds must be released first and not
merely withheld.
On the other hand, the term augment means to enlarge or
increase the allotment for an item in the GAA wherein the
current appropriation for the said item is deficient.
The Constitution also limits the augmentation within the
office of the President; hence, savings of the Executive
branch must be augmented only to an item under the
executive. In the present case, the savings of the Executive
were augmented to the members of Congress. Therefore, the
Constitutional provision was violated.
4. The Court did not pass upon a judgment over the alleged
violation of the EPC because the contentions of Luna and
35
 COURAGE are speculative. As regards to the violation of
separation of powers and the public accountability, the Court
has already addressed the issue in the discussion of other
issues.
5. No, the doctrine of operative fact applies. A legislative or
executive act is presumed to be constitutional such that when
it is declared void for being unconstitutional does not give
rise to any right or obligation. The Court recognized that the
result of the DAP and its related issuances could not be
ignored and be undone. The Court also declared that the
doctrine of operative fact is not confined to statutes and rules
and regulations. The doctrine can be invoked only in
situations where the nullification of the effects of what used
to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice.
Other concepts discussed:
Budget cycle:
o Budget preparation- it is commenced by the
issuance of DBM of budget calls, i.e., one for
government offices including SUCs and another for
GOCCs and GFIs. The government agencies will
then submit their respective budget proposals to the
DBM. DBM will consolidate these proposals to the
National Expenditure Program [NEP] and a Budget
of Expenditures and Sources of Financing [BESF].
o Budget legislation or budget authorization- the
Congress will receive the Presidents budget, which
includes the NEP and BESF. With this, Congress
will come up with a General Appropriations Bill
[GAB]. The President will then approve of the GAB
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
and make it into GAA [See PHIL. CONST. art. VI,
27 (2)].
o Budget execution- the Budget Execution Phase is
primarily the function of the DBM, which is tasked
to perform the following procedures, namely: (1) to
issue the programs and guidelines for the release of
funds; (2) to prepare an Allotment and Cash Release
Program; (3) to release allotments; and (4) to issue
disbursement authorities.
o Accountability- it ensures that the government
funds have been effectively and efficiently utilized
to achieve the States socio-economic goals. It also
allows the DBM to assess the performance of
agencies during the fiscal year for the purpose of
implementing reforms and establishing new policies.
An agencys accountability may be examined and
evaluated through (1) performance targets and
outcomes; (2) budget accountability reports; (3)
review of agency performance; and (4) audit
conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA).
Public Expenditures:
o Categories:
Capital Expenditures are the expenses
whose usefulness lasts for more than one
year, and which add to the assets of the
Government, including investments in the
capital of government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
36
 Current Operating Expenditures are the
purchases of goods and services in current
consumption the benefit of which does not
extend beyond the fiscal year.
o Functions:
Economic development expenditures
Social services or social development
expenditures
General government or general public
services expenditures
National defense expenditures
Public debt
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NAPOCOR) v.
HEIRS OF SATURNINO BORBON
[GR No. 165354, January 12, 2015]
Facts:
In 1993, NAPOCOR entered into the property owned by the
Heirs of Borbon in order to construct and maintain
transmission lines.
In 1995, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation in
the RTC seeking the acquisition of easement of right of way
over a portion of the same property.
o It allege that it had negotiated with the Heirs but
failed to reach any agreement and that it is willing to
deposit an amount of P 9,790 representing the
assessed value of the property.
The Heirs answered that there was no prior negotiation.
NAPOCOR entered their property without consent and in the
process destroyed some fruit trees without payment.
o They also allege that the presence of the high tension
wires rendered the remaining unaffected portion
inutile for any future use and capabilities.
o They tendered no objection to the expropriation by
NAPOCOR as long as it is for the entire property
and not only for the affected portion.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs and ordered NAPOCOR
to pay the Heirs just compensation for the whole property.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Hence, NAPOCOR appealed to the SC.
37
 o During the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed
a manifestation stating that there is no longer any
public purpose since the transmission lines will be
retired already.
o NAPOCOR wants the expropriation proceedings to
be discontinued.
(2) NO. In view of the discontinuance of the expropriation
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be
discontinued. YES
(2) Whether or not just compensation should be paid by
NAPOCOR. NO
Held:
(1) YES. Since public use is the fundamental basis for the action
of expropriation, NAPOCORs motion to discontinue the
proceedings is warranted.
The very moment that it appears at any stage of the
proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public
use, the action must necessarily fail and should be
dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be
maintained at all except when the expropriation is
for some public use. That must be true even during
the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of
the proceedings.
Although there is no Board Resolution showing that
NAPOCOR decided as a corporate body to retire the
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
transmission lines, the Court considered the
Memorandum and the Certificate of
Inspection/Accomplishment attached to
NAPOCORs motion attesting to the retirement of
the transmission lines as sufficient to establish that
the public purpose has ceased to exist.
proceedings, there is no need to pay just compensation since
the property will be returned to the Heirs. However,
NAPOCOR is liable to compensate the Heirs for the
disturbance they caused given that NAPOCOR entered the
property without the Heirs consent, destroying fruit trees,
and the effect of the transmission lines or hogh tension wires
with respect to the whole property.
The Court ordered that the payment will be reckoned
when the property was taken (1993) and not when
the expropriation complaint was filed (1995).
Furthermore, the compensation should be based on
what the Heirs actually lost as a result of
dispossession of their property and its use including
the value of the fruit trees and crops destroyed.
Considering that the dismissal of the expropriation
proceeding occurred during the appeal, the action is
now treated as an action for damages. Hence, the
case will be remanded back to the RTC to give both
parties the opportunity to re-establish the factual and
legal issues.
38
LIMKAICHONG v. LBP
[GR. No. 158464; August 2, 2016]
Facts:
Federico Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro.
In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform expropriated
948.1911 hectares of Suntays land pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27.
o Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the
expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total
valuation of P4,251,141.
Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for
determination of just compensation in the Office of the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region IV,
DARAB.
On January 24, 2001, after summary administrative
proceeding, RARAD Mias rendered a decision fixing the
total just compensation for the expropriated portion at
P157,541,951.30.
On October 11, 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated its
decision in Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903) holding
that it is the Regional Trial Courts sitting as Special Agrarian
Courts which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination of just compensation.
o Adjudicators are merely empowered to make a
preliminary determination of the compensation,
subject to the ultimate power of the courts.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Suntay alleged that the RARAD Decision had already
attained finality in DARAB v. Lubrica because the Land
Bank failed to file the petition within the reglementary
period, notwithstanding its recourse to the special agrarian
court.
Issue:
WON a final and executory decision may be reversed, modified, or
set aside by the Supreme Court en banc
Held:
NO. Such insinuation runs afoul of the well settled doctrine of
immutability of judgments. Although Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of
the Constitution gives the Supreme Court the discretion to sit either
en banc or in divisions of three, five, or seven Members, the
divisions are not considered separate and distinct courts. Nor is a
hierarchy of courts thereby established within the Supreme Court,
which remains a unit notwithstanding that it also works in divisions.
The actions taken and the decisions rendered by any of the divisions
are those of the Court itself, considering that the divisions are not
considered separate and distinct courts but as divisions of one and
the same court. Lastly, the only thing that the Constitution allows the
banc to do in this regard is to reverse a doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the Court en banc or in division.
39
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines
[G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016]
FACTS:
The Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan with plunder
as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 the
following: (1) GMA, (2) Aguas, (3) former PCSO General
Manager and Vice Chairman Rosario C. Uriarte, (4) former
PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio O.
Valencia, (5) former members of the PCSO Board of
Directors, and (6) two former officials of the Commission on
Audit (COA).
The Sandiganbayan eventually acquired jurisdiction over
most of the accused, including petitioners. All filed petitions
for bail, which the Sandiganbayan granted except those of
the petitioners. Their motions for reconsideration were
denied. GMA assailed the denial of her petition for bail
before the Supreme Court. However, this remains
unresolved.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately
filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.
The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the
case against the accused within its jurisdiction, except for
petitioners and Valencia. It held that there was sufficient
evidence showing that they had conspired to commit
plunder.
Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017
Petitioners filed this case before the Supreme Court
on certiorari before the Supreme Court to assail the denial of
their demurrers to evidence, on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the
denial of the demurrers to evidence NO.
Held:
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail
such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that the order denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable
by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. It is not an insuperable
obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not
terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring
accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they
may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among the
errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in
which the writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because
to do so x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not
wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either
prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our superintending
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control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case as the ends of justice may
require. So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one
side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional
duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and
wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory
character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of
certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Bersamin Political Law Case Digests 2017 41