8. ZOOMZAT, INC., vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE Hence, the officer involved should be authorized to issue permitrs and
PHILIPPINES, ROMULO S. RODRIGUEZ, JR., et.al.
Facts:
Gingoog City passed resolution No 261 which resolved to express
willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and
operate a cable TV system. Zoomzat applied then for a mayors permit
but was not acted upon by the mayors office. Subsequently the City
passed an ordinance (Ordinance No. 19) which granted a franchise to
GingoogSpacelink Cable TV to operate for a period of 10 years/ Hence
Zoomzat filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman to
against respondents (Members of the SangunianPanlungsod of
Gingoog City) fpr violation of RA 3019. The case went to the
Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan asked the Special Prosecutor to
restudy the case, where the latter recommended its dismissal. The
Sandiganbayan then issued a resolution ordering the withdrawal of the
petition. This was assailed in the instant petition.
Zoomzat disagrees with the finding of the prosecutor that it is the NTC
(National Telecommunications Commission) that has the power to
allow or disallow the operation of cable television and not the LGU. It
contends that under the LGC, the LGU can grant permits licenses and
franchises by virtue of their regulatory or revenue raising powers.
Zoomzat also contends that the grant of exclusive franchise to
Spacelink for a period of ten (10) years subject to automatic renewal,
contravenes Section 2 of Executive Order No. 205, which provides that
a certificate of authority to operate a CATV by the Commission shall be
on a non-exclusive basis and for a period not to exceed 15 years.
Issues:
1. Who has the power to authorize the operation of cable television in
the City of Gingoog City? The LGU or NTC?
2. Was the LGU in violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019
Ruling:
1. THE NTC
EO 205, expressly provides that the LGU does not have the authority
to issue licenses and permits pertaining to the operation of Cable TV,
only the NTC has.
Hence, the City of Gingoog was not authorized or charged with the
grant of licenses.Our pronouncement in BatangasCATV, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals is pertinent:
Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons,
associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a
Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install,
operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area
Plainly, the SangguniangPanlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the
bounds of its authority when it usurped the powers of the NTC with
the enactment of Ordinance No. 19.
2.
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concession
1
other concessions. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did
not confer any right nor vest any privilege to Spacelink. As such,
petitioner could not claim to have been prejudiced or suffered injury
thereby. There is no violation of said law because the LGU was not
authorized to give permits.
In addition, petitioner could not impute manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents
when they enacted Ordinance No. 19. A perfunctory reading of
Resolution No. 261 shows that the SangguniangPanlungsod did not
grant a franchise to it but merely expressed its willingness to allow the
petitioner to install and operate a cable television.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED
9. RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
LUIS T. SANTOS G.R. No. 93252, August 5, 1991
Facts:
Ten administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ganzon, mayor
of Iloilo, by various city officials for various charges of abuse of
authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral
conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention. The Department of Local Government of Iloilo,
acting through the Secretary of Local Government, ordered for
Ganzons three successive 60-day preventive suspension. Ganzon filed
a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from
implementing the said orders. His primary argument is that the
Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority
to suspend and remove local officials, since under the 1987
Constitution, he merely exercises supervisory powers to support and
strengthen local autonomy.
Issue:
Can the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego,
suspend and/or remove local officials?
Ruling:
Yes.The president, as granted by Constitution, is granted the power of
supervision over local government officials. Supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.
Difference between Power of Control and Power of
Supervision
The two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which
differ one from the other in meaning and extent. "In administration
law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter."
It cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so
requires.
Caveat (from transcript in previous years)
Bretch: But note that this was the ruling before where the president
still has the power to remove local officials under the previous LGC.
However, under Sec. 60 of the present LGC, the president can no
longer remove local officials. Such power is already lodged to the
regular courts.
10. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 79956
 primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs
Facts: and services in the covered areas.

The constitutionality of EO 220 which created the Cordillera Issue 3:

Administrative Region is assailed on the primary ground that it pre-
empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the
creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the
approval of the act through a plebiscite.
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President Aquino in the
exercise of her legislative powers, created CAR to accelerate economic
and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of
the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to
coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services
in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government
units as well as with the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the
region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national
and local government projects in the region. The CAR and the
Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the
autonomous regional government is established and organized.
Issue 1:
W/N EO No. 220 pre-empted the enactment of an organic act by the
Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Ruling:
No. E.O No. 220 did not pre-empt the enactment by Congress of an
organic act.
Whether the creation of CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee
of local autonomy for the provinces which compose the CAR.
No. As mentioned earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating
agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a
group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying
local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested
with political autonomy.
11. PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE, July 19, 2000
Facts:
President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 which was a cash
management measure adopted by the government to match
expenditures with available resources which were presumably depleted
at the time due to economic difficulties brought about by peso
depreciation. Petitioners filed instant petition to (1) nullify Sec. 1 of AO
372 which directs the LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25% and
(2) enjoin respondents from implementing Sec. 4 of such AO which
withholds 10% of the internal revenue allotments (modified to 5% by
AO 43) pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.
Petitioners contend that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect
exercising the power of control over LGUs, not merely general
supervision which was granted to it by the Constitution.

1. E.O. No. 220 simply provides for the consolidation and Issue:
coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and
agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the WON Sections 1 and 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of the Presidents
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of power of general supervision over local governments
autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic
act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares
the ground for autonomy. Ruling:

2. The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in While the wordings of Section 1 have a commanding tone, the Court
the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and accepts that it is merely advisory and does not constitute a mandatory
legislature and special courts with personal, family and property or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. In this regard,
law jurisdiction. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 Section 1 is deemed valid. Section 4, on the other hand, is invalid since
did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a it encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with
the main objective of coordinating the planning and Jurisprudential precepts
implementation of programs and services.
Supervision v. Control
3. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing
local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous Section 4 of Constitution vests in the President the power of general
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for supervision over LGUs. Such power excludes the power of control.
an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, Control and Supervision are different in meaning and extent.
the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic
groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a Control Supervision
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras. Means the power of an officer to Overseeing or the power or
alter or modify or nullify or set authority of an officer to see that
Issue 2: aside what a subordinate officer subordinate officers perform
has done in the performance of their duties. If the latter fail or
W/N EO 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial his duties and to substitute the neglect to fulfil them, the former
and political subdivision. judgment of the former for that of may take such action or step as
the latter. prescribed by law to make them
Ruling: perform their duties.
Includes restraining authority over Mere oversight over an inferior
E.O. No. 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or inferior body body
merge existing ones into a larger subdivision. CAR is not a public Officers lay down the rules in the It does not cover laying down of
corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a performance or accomplishment of rules. Officer merely sees to it
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and an act. If these rules are not that the rules are followed; they
municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally followed, they may, in their do not have the discretion to
granted to public corporations. As stated earlier, the CAR was created discretion, order the act undone or modify or replace them.
redone by their subordinates or

2
even decide to do it themselves. fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. It is understood,
however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their
Under the present system of government, executive power is vested in officials who do not follow such advice.
the President. Members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are
merely alter egos; as such, they are subject to the power of control of
President. On the other hand, heads of political subdivisions are
elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the Section 4 is not valid exercise
electorate, therefore, they are subject to the Presidents supervision
only, not control. Basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue, as mandated by the
Extent of Local Autonomy Constitution. LGC provides that the release shall be made directly to
LGUs and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
Hand in hand with constitutional restraint on Presidents power over imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. Term
local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy. Local shall is a word of command that must be given compulsory meaning.
autonomy signified a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. Section 4 orders the withholding of 10% of IRA pending the
Decentralization means the devolution of national administration, not assessment by Development Budget Coordinating Committee. This is
power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the equivalent to a holdback which means something held back or
central government as the law may provide. withheld, often temporarily. Temporary nature of retention does not
matter. Any retention is prohibited.
Decentralization of Decentralization of power
administration 12. PIMENTEL, et. al, v Executive Sec. OCHOA and
The central government This involves an abdication of (DSWD) Sec. JULIANO-SOLIMAN, July 17, 2012
delegates administrative powers political power in the favor of
to political subdivisions in order to LGUs declared to be autonomous. Assailed in a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is the
broaden the base of government The autonomous government is constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 10147 or the General
power and in the process to make free to chart its own destiny and Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2011 which provides a P21 Billion budget
local governments more shape its future with minimum allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by
responsive and accountable and intervention from central the DSWD. Petitioners sought to enjoin respondents from
ensure their fullest development authorities. implementing said program on the ground that it amounts to a
as self-reliant communities and recentralization of government functions that have already been
make them more effective This power amounts to self- devolved from the national government to the LGUs.
partners in the pursuit of national immolation since the autonomous
government and social progress. government becomes Ruling: The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention
accountable not to the central program formulated by the national government itself but
It relieves the central government authorities but to its constituency. implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve
of the burden of managing local the common national goal development and social progress can by no
affairs and enables it to means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
concentrate on national concerns.
Facts:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over LGUs. Only Petitioners challenged before the Court the disbursement of public
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political funds and the implementation of the CCTP (Conditional Cash Transfer
subdivisions, the purpose of which is to make governance more Program) which are alleged to have encroached into the local
directly responsive and effective at the local levels. autonomy of the LGUs. They admit that the wisdom of adopting the
CCTP as a poverty reduction strategy for the Philippines is with the
Fiscal autonomy legislature. They take exception, however, to the manner by which it is
being implemented, that is primarily through a national agency like
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to DSWD instead of the LGUS to which the responsibility and functions of
create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care services have
in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as been devolved pursuant to Sec. 17 of RA 7160, also known as the
the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own Local Government Code of 1991, in relation to Sec. 25, Art. II&Sec. 3,
priorities. It does not however rule out any manner of national Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners assert that giving the
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the
local programs are consistent with national goals. The President, being manner by which services are to be delivered or conditionaities are to
the head of economic and planning agency of the government, may be complied with, instead of allocating the P21 Billion CCTP budget
interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that: directly to the LGUs that would have enhanced the delivery of basic
1. There is unmanaged public sector deficit of the national services, results in the recentralization of basic government
government. functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the
2. There are consultations with presiding officers of the Senate and avowed policy of decentralization.
House of Reps and the presidents of the various local league.
3. Corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of DOF, DILG,
and DBM
4. Adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of
the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the 3rd fiscal
year preceding the current one (Sec. 284, LGC) Issue:

Section 1 is valid exercise of power of general supervision Whether or not the local autonomy of LGUs enshrined in Art. II, Sec.
25 & Art. X, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of
The Court agrees that the requirements are not satisfied: (1) no the LGC of 1991 had been violated.
showing of unmanageable public sector deficit, and (2) no
consultations with league of local governments. However, the Court Ruling:
accepts the assurance of solicitor general that Section 1 is merely
advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for

3
The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the
autonomy of local governments and even devotes a full article on the
subject of local governance which includes the following pertinent
provisions:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
x xx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development
councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen
the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
social growth and development of the units in the region.
(Underscoring supplied)
In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful
autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities and
effective partners in the attainment of national goals, Section 17 of the
Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions
pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. (a) Local government
units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon
them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code.
Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the
basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x
xx.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of
the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public
works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered
under this Section, except in those cases where the local government
unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such
projects, facilities, programs and services. (Underscoring supplied)
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In Pimentel v. Aguirre, the Court defined the extent of the local
government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national
government in the pursuit of common national goals, referring to such
key concepts as integration and coordination. Thus:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national
government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
4
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The
purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable
the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national
goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress.
Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local
government unit as to preclude any and all involvement by the
national government in programs implemented in the local level would
be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme, which
would amount to a decentralization of power explicated in Limbona v.
Mangelin as beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy xxx. A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter
of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is,
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and
implementation of national development programs especially where it
is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
13. LIMBONA v. MANGELIN
Facts:
Petitioner Sultan AlimbusarLimbona was appointed as a member of the
SangguniangPampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII,
representing Lanao del Sur.On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or BatasangPampook of
Central Mindanao. Subsequently, Congressman DatuGuimidMatalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region
XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a
telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to
wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as
"our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress takes
precedence over any pending business in batasangpampook. Acting
secretary sent a telegram to members of the assembly informing them
of the cancelled assembly on that certain day.
However, despite the prior notice, the assembly still met and a
meeting took place. After declaring the presence of a quorum, the
Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On
Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in
attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat
of the Speaker vacant.
Petitioner prays for the injunction of the said action done by the
assembly. He also prays that the assembly be considered invalid.
Pending further proceedings, this Court, received a resolution filed by
the SangguniangPampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA
FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS
REGION XII," on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner
"had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing
his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of
Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the
record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by
Abdula was ever made . . ." and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in
paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the
Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"
that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much
amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the
salaries and emoluments of some Assembly.
Issues:
1. Whether or not they Limbonawas afforded due process?
2. Whether the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as
they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government
given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
Ruling:
I.
We hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the
first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an
investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his
defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given
the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the
records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents)
that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not
set foot at the SangguniangPampook." "To be sure, the private
respondents aver that "The Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture,
wanted him to come to Cotabato City," but that was "so that their
differences could be threshed out and settled." Certainly, that avowed
wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory
it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing
contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in
administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party
need only be given the opportunity to be heard, it does not appear
herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he
had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues.
It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to
rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled
amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
II.
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions
IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618. Among other things, the
Decree established "internal autonomy" in the two regions "within the
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities
specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all
internal administrative matters for the respective regions," except to
"act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of
the National Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and
quasi-banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or
utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.
5
In relation to the central government, it provides that "The President
shall have the power of general supervision and control over the
Autonomous Regions.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress." At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that
local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control
over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that
event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim
Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to
decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question
foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local
government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present
Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in
this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy
in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the
decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision
of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government). 32 If the SangguniangPampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are,
debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way
that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the
very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central
government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions."
33 In the second place, the SangguniangPampook, their legislative
arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the SangguniangPampook. The
SangguniangPampook shall exercise local legislative powers over
regional affairs within the framework of national development plans,
policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous
Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the
Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in
this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established
by the Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and
other social services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages
and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including
the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous
Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to
assure that enactment and acts of the SangguniangPampook and the
LupongTagapagpaganapngPook are in compliance with this Decree,
national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
The SangguniangPampook shall maintain liaison with
BatasangPambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the
validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review
the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
14. MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION
Facts:
In 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand their casino operations into
Cagayan de Oro and leased a portion of a building owned by Pryce
Properties. The city along with other civic groups wanted to stop
PAGCOR from operating a casino in Cagayan de Oro (herein, CDO),
calling such an affront to the welfare of the city.
Therefore, the SangguniangPanlungsod (herein, SP) of CDO enacted
Ordinance 3353 which would prohibit and cancel business permits of
establishments allowing or using its premises (or a portion of it) for
casino operations. Furthermore, the SP enacted another Ordinance
(Ordinance 3375-93) which outright prohibits the operation of Casinos
as a measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and
general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social
and moral welfare of the community.
Pryce Properties (owner of the portion of the lot to be leased to
PAGCOR) assailed both mentioned ordinances before the CA which
succeeded. The CA subsequently declared the ordinances invalid.
However, the Mayor brought the case to the SC to have the ordinances
declared to be valid.
The Mayors argument for the validity of the assailed ordinances
prohibiting operating casinos in CDO are as follows:
1. CDO is empowered to enact ordinances and vested with police
power under the General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of the
LGC) and pursuant to such Clause, a Local Government Units
Powers, Duties, Functions (Section 458 of the LGC) include the
power to enact ordinances to prevent, suppress, and impose
appropriate penalties for..gambling and other prohibited games
of chance.
2. Under these provisions, the SP has the power to prohibit casinos
and all other games of chances in the city. Even if PD 1869
(PAGCORs charter) permits operating casinos, it is subordinate to
whatever ordinances enacted by the LGU pursuant to the LGC
3. The Mayor also argues that this is consistent with the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
4. Using Statutory Construction, the fact that the LGC expressly
authorized the local government units to prevent and suppress
gambling and other prohibited games of chance, it meant all forms
of gambling. Ubilex non distinguit, necnosdistingueredebemosor
where the law does not distinguish, one does not distinguish. It
further argued that if the law would have expressly excluded
gambling authorized by special law, it would have done so. Instead
of stating gambling and other prohibited games of chance it
should have stated gambling and other prohibited games of
chance EXCEPT those authorized by special law
5. The Mayor also argues that the LGC has already modified PD 1869
since the LGC was a later enactment than PD 1869. Basing on this
argument, the LGC has modified pro tanto or modified PD 1869
only to the extent regarding operation of casinos in LGUs. The
mayor argues that with the enactment of the LGC, PAGCOR which
used to have the power to operate casinos anywhere in the
country, can now only do so without objection from the local
government unit where it will be operating since the LGC has
modified PD 1869.
6. Lastly, the mayor argues that gambling is intrinsically harmful
the
Issue:
Can a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare clause
and Section 458 of the LGC, enact an ordinance to prohibit the
operation of Casinos within its territorial jurisdiction despite the fact
that PAGCORs charter (PD 1869) empowers it to operate casinos
nationwide?
Ruling:
No, a local government cannot enact an ordinance in contravention of
a statute.
An ordinance is valid provided it follows the following substantive
requirements:
1. It must not contravene the constitution or any statute
2. It must not be unfair or oppressive
3. It must not be partial or discriminatory
4. It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. It must be general and consistent with public policy
6. It must not be unreasonable
Under Sec. 458, LGUs are empowered to prohibit gambling and other
prohibited games of chance. The SC explained that what the LGU is
allowed to prohibit are games of chance that are prohibited. Logically,
an LGU is not allowed to prohibit, by ordinance or otherwise, games of
chance that are no prohibited by law.
6
Furthermore, the ordinances enacted by the SP of CDO are invalid
since it contravenes a statute (PD 1869). The argument of the Mayor
that the LGC modified pro tanto PD 1869 so that PAGCOR can now
only operate casinos if the LGUs do not object to it, is flawed.
As pointed out by the SC, the Mayors argument was merely playing
with words when they averred that the LGC modified pro tanto PD
1869. What the Mayor was actually saying in that argument was that
the LGC has already repealed PD 1869 since the Code, using the
Mayors argument, has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and
regulate casinos. Basically, the SC explained that using the Mayors
argument that Section 458 mandates the prohibition of all kinds of
gambling (illegal or legal) by the LGUs, then PAGCOR can no longer
operate casinos anywhere at all. Therefore, there is a clash between
the LGC and PD 1869 IF we were to use the argument of the Mayor.
However, there is no proof of express repeal of PD 1869 by the LGC
since the repealing clause (sec. 534) listed down the laws and
provisions expressly repealed by the LGC and PD 1869 is not included.
Furthermore, there is also no implied repeal in this case given the
principle that implied repeal is frowned upon by our legal system and
the Court must exert all effort to harmonize all laws before accepting
an implied repeal. In the case at bar, there is no indication at all of an
implied repeal of PD 1869. In fact, PD 1869 and the LGC can be
harmonized: under the LGC, local government units shall suppress all
kinds of gambling EXCEPT those allowed by statutes like PD 1869.
15. LINA V. PANO, GR No. 129093, Aug. 30, 2001
Facts:
Calvento was appointed as agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install a terminal for the operation of
lotto. He was also tasked to apply for the necessary mayors permit to
operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro.
Unfortunately, no permit was issued for Calvento on the ground that
KapasiyahanBlg. 508 Taon 1995, a local ordinance of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Laguna, prohibited gambling (i.e.
operation of lotto).
Calvento filed an action for Declaratory Relief with prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
The trial court ruled the issue in favour of Calvento and thus enjoining
the Province of Laguna from implementing the prohibition on
gambling.
Issue:
1. WON KapasiyahanBlg. 508, Taon 1995 of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan of Laguna is valid
2. WON the consequent denial to issue a mayors permit due to the
prohibition of the said ordinance is valid
Ruling:
Both are invalid.
KapasiyahanBlg. 508, Taon 1995 merely states the disfavor of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan to gambling. In itself is not self-executing as
it is merely a policy statement on the part of the Sanggunian. Thus, it
cannot be held as a valid ground to justify any act of prohibition on the
proliferation of gambling and all its forms in Laguna, including the lotto
system subject of the inquiry.
If we were to look at the policy statement in itself, the existence of
such is valid as the Sanggunian is allowed by law to raise and forward
their sentiments through resolutions or other legislative measure. This
is a manifestation of the local autonomy of the local government units;
they are free to air out their views. However, this does not give the
local government units the power to enact ordinances that will
7
contravene the laws created by Congress. Hence, the prohibition of the
Sanggunian of the operation of the lotto system based on the ground
of a mere policy statement is an error on their part. It went beyond
the scope of its authority.
Also, ordinances should not contravene the Constitution as well as
national legislations. This is grounded on the idea that local
governments are mere agents of the national government, thus, their
local councils only exercise delegated legislative powers from
Congress. The delegate cannot be superior than the principal and as
such, is prohibited to exercise powers higher than those of the
principals. The spring cannot be higher than its source.
The question if gambling should be prohibited is one that is lodged in
the Congress. Applying in the case at bar, since Congress allowed
PCSO to operate lotteries in Laguna, the SanggunianPanlalawigan of
the latter therefore does not have the authority to nullify the said
operation.
16. SAN JUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSSION
GR No. 92299, April 19, 1991
Facts:
This case involved a vacancy in the position of Provincial Budget
Officer of Rizal (PBO). The governor of Rizal, a certain San Juan
nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly
assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department
of Budget and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and
recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO because
she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently
approved by the DBM through the issuance of a circular. Petitioner
protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil
Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His
arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right
and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of
PBO and that the appointee should come only from his
nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive
Order No. 112.
Issue:
Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not
expressly nominated by the provincial governor.
Ruling:
NO. Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to
recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws
for the position of PBO. Consequently, if the recommendations
made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards,
the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected
to reject the same. However, if the appointee is not qualified, DBM
does not have the right to appoint their own choice.
Petitioners arguments are on point. Petitioner states that the phrase
of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief executive
concerned" must be given mandatory application in
consonance with the state policy of local autonomy as
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X,
Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public
respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing
vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification
requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget
Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional
policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in
Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the
scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local
governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by law."
The President controls the executive departments. He has no
such power over local governments. He has only supervision
and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by
statute.
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The
DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees
nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list
of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal
requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
17. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through
Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction
to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or
activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals
and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.
Issue:
Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development
Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?
Ruling:
Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above,
specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface
water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region,
including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish
enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority
to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan
may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or
other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the
municipal waters.
SPECIAL LAW vs GENERAL LAW
We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake
Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority
over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the
Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part
of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.
The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law.
8
It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that
"a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is
not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions
and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest,
although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the
cases embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute,
the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as
an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied
repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given
to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed,
amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority,
which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and
sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative
intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission.
"Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a
national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced
growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to
the inter-generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this
part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this
need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to
govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources."
POWER OF LGU TO ISSUE FISHING PRIVILEGES
The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that
Section 149 of the New Local Government Code empowering local
governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book
II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On
The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government
Units."
On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the
purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the
Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for
lake quality control and management.
It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers including the power of taxation.
Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid
exercise of police power should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3
of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees
collected.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion
of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such
powers as are by its charter vested on it.
Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will
render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power
would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if
not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the Local
Government Code of 1991 had never intended to do.
18. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO
G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004
Facts:
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION. The Oversight Committee
(referred to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48) constituted
under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code of 1991) has been authorized to issue the implementing rules
and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of
said fund to the LGUs.
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations (GAA) of 1999, the program was renamed as the
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF). Under
said appropriations law, the amount of P96,780,000,000 was allotted
as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. Internal
Revenue Allotment of Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following
proviso:
... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS
(P5,000,000,000) shall be earmarked for the Local Government Service
Equalization Fund for the funding requirements of projects and
activities arising from the full and efficient implementation of devolved
functions and services of local government units pursuant to R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be released to the local
government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations,
including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations
and distribution of said fund among local government units subject to
the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on
Devolution as constituted pursuant to Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b)
of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released
directly by the Department of Budget and Management to the Local
Government Units concerned.
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the
amount of P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in
the internal revenue taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000
contained a proviso earmarking five billion pesos of the IRA for the
LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title
XXXVII A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as that
contained in the GAA of 1999.
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations
law for 2001, the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with
the IRA of the LGUs therein and the proviso earmarking five billion
pesos thereof for the LGSEF.
The Oversight Committee passed OCD Resolutions providing for the
allocation schemes covering the said five billion pesos and the
implementing rules and regulations therefor. The release of the LGSEF
to the LGUs only upon their compliance with the implementing rules
and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed
by the Oversight Committee.
Issue:
WON the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs and the OCD
resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos
of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and
imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the Constitution and
the Local Government Code of 1991.
Ruling:
The assailed provisos in the General Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are declared
9
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the constitutional precept on local
autonomy.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined
by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions,
underscores the automatic release of the LGUs just share in this wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government
units shall have the power and authority to establish an organization
that shall be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation
of their development plans, program objectives and priorities; to
create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and
which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes
which shall be automatically and directly released to them without
need of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local
government unit shall be released, without need of any further action,
directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the
case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of
each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback
that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share
of local government units under existing laws.
Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr. v.
Aguirre,viz:
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. As a rule, the
term SHALL is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning. The provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and
release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is
part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To
subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing
rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time,
as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a
flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the
just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The
LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals in this wise:
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization. The Constitution, as we
observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments and as put
by political adherents, to liberate the local governments from the
imperialism of Manila. Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central
administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a
regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical
step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to
regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely,
albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of
national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments more responsive
and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves
the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units
declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government
is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency.
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. The
fairly recent case of Pimentel v. Aguirre is particularly instructive. The
Court declared therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of
the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities:
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to
their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of
their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and
imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local
needs and resources or not ..
Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally
mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the
IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion
pesos LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by
the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372,
the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
19. TANO vs. SOCRATES
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the constitutionality of:
(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng
Puerto Princesa City entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE
SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF";
(2) Office Order No. 23, which then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero
issued to implement said city ordinance, requiring any person engaged
or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or
profession or having in his possession any of the articles for which a
permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors permit and
authorizing and directing to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto
Princesa; and
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan, entitled: "A
10
RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE
CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS
The petitioners contended that:
1. the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under
which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other
words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine
whether or not to issue permit.
3. As Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether
prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and
shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any
distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful
fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-
fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are
concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their
vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary,
and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion.
Public respondents defended the validity of the ordinance arguing that:
1. It is a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under
the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]),
2. Its specific power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment
under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and
Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC.
3. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of
Palawan had the right and responsibility to insure that the
remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory
remain healthy for the future generation.
4. The Ordinance covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded
other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral
reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to
protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged
to regenerate.
5. There was no violation of due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were
conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which,
undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable
means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed
between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of
selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no
intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium
cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied
equally to all those belonging to one class.
Issue:
Are the Ordinances contrary to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution?
Ruling:
No, the Ordinances are not contrary to Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7, Article XIII of the Constitution as having been
transgressed by the Ordinances.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as
a subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan is described as a private association
composed of Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia
Lim, as merchants; while the rest of the petitioners claim to be
fishermen, without any qualification, however, as to their status.

Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the
terms subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in
their general and ordinary sense.
A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose
margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by
existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the
cost of gathering the fish.
A subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the
irreducible minimum for his livelihood.
Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer
or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence farming or
fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of
agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate
family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding
that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of
communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection,
development, and conservation. The ordinances in question are meant
precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that
their enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the
present generation, but also for the generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to
the use of marine resources is not at all absolute, since it is limited by
the Regalian Doctrine.
Decentralization
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as
expressly mandated by the Constitution. Devolution refers to the act
by which the National Government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes
enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws
within the municipal waters.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution
enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted to local government
units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under
Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi),
which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity
of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal
objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of five years, and
(2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City of Puerto
Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved
power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No.
1015, which allows the establishment of closed seasons. The
devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the
Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department
of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to
cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment.
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92
of the City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in
11
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one
hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is painfully
obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the
Ordinances may not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor
Amado L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing
therein violative of any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order
refers to the implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not
the Mayors Permit.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
20. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
DENR AND SECRETARY
GR. No. 175368, April 11, 2013
Petitioner: League of Provinces - a duly organized league of local
governments incorporated under the Local Government Code; it is
composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of
Bulacan
Respondent: DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes
Other parties:
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon)
applicant for a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA);
filed before Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Regional Office No. III
(MGB-RO); application was denied twice
Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) applicants for Quarry
Permit; filed before the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) applicant for
Exploration Permit; filed before the PENRO of Bulacan
Facts:
Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29,
1998,MGB-ROdenied GoldenFalcons application for FTAA on for failure
to secure the required area clearances from the Forest Management
Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO.Golden Falcon
appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central
Office (MGB-CO).
On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO,
MCCS filed with the PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry
permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA
application.MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcons appeal on July 16,
2004.
AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration
permit covering the same subject area on September 13, 2004.
Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC
and the persons applying for quarry permits the contention was the
date the area of Golden Falcons application became open to other
permit applications from other parties
On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog,
DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the denial of GoldenFalcons
application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after
Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application.Hence, the
area of Golden Falcons application became open to permit applications
only on that date.
Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal
opinion on the issue, stating that the subject area became open for
new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998
(MGB-ROs order of denial), as MGB-COs order of denial on July 16,
2004 was a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-ROs April 29 order; hence,
the reckoning period should be April 29.
Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RODirector Cabantogendorsed the
applications for quarry permit, now apparently converted to
applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of Bulacan.
PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said
applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining
permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary.
The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and
cancelled the governors issuance of small-scale mining permits. It
agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was open to
mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO
denial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit filed on February 10,
2004 were null as these were filed when the area was still closed to
mining location. On the other hand,AMTC filed its application when the
area was already open to other mining applicants, hence, its
application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also issued
in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of
the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was
never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.
The petitioner League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this
petition saying that that this is not an action of one province alone, but
the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a
favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all provinces
and all local governments.
Issues:
1. Whether DENRs act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits
amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps
the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary
substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code
and Section 24 of the Small-Scale Mining Act, which confer upon
DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and
Exec Depts) has the power of supervision only, not control over
acts of LGUs
Ruling:
[The Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition
because it is tasked under Section 504 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level; adopt
measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its
officials and employees; and exercise such other powers and perform
such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the
welfare of the provinces.]
DENR Secs act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of
review under the RA 7076 and its IRR; Assailed statutes did not
overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are not
unconstitutional.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the
provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The
LocalGovernment Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's Small
ScaleMining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. Supervision
isthe power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform
their function in accordance with law.
The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2
of the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of the LGUs
or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve
devolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following
national policies or standardsand those provided by the Local
Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of
powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials
are placed by the Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.
12
It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the States
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development and utilization of the countrys natural resources,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC.Hence,
the enforcement of the small-scale mining law by the provincial
government is subject to the supervision, control and review of the
DENR.The LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law.
RA 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining program was established
to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of the law
makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary, its powers and functions
subject to review by the same.
Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications
should be filed with the PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the
provincial governor, for applications outside the mineral reservations.
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of
RA 7076 likewise provides that the DENR Secretary shall exercise
direct supervision and control over the Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Boards
(PMRB) powers and functions shall be subject to review by the DENR
Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the Revised IRR of
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-
Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City
Mayor through their respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas
outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in
coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve
applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry xxx and
gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.
Petitioners contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not
confer upon DENR and DENR Secretary the power to reverse,
abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial
Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are
without merit because the DENR Secretary was granted the power of
review in the PMRBs resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076
and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify
and cancel the Governors issuance of permits emanated from its
power of review under RA 7076 ad its IRR. Its power to review and
decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits
by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves
the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the
contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and
on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their
respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076
and its IRR to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or
litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial power of the
DENR can neither be equated with substitution of judgment of the
Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor control
over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of
the rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in
its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified,
it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. In this case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17b(3)(iii) of the LGC and
Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of
the said provisions of the law.
Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
21. JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA
Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Its constitutionality is
assailed on ground that RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of
Local Government Units. It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the
ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs under Section 17
of the Local Government Code and the ARMM.
Issue:
Does the RH Law amount to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments?
Ruling:
No. While Section 17 of LGC of 1991 endeavors the LGUs to take on
the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved
upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for
basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph
(c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases
involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the
implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which
funding has been provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it.
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it
pertains to the establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of
skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the
funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to national priority
programs which the local government is called upon to implement like
the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely
encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording
of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
22. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS vs. COA
One Liner: In order to be able to deliver more effective and efficient
services, the law allows local government units the power to
reorganize. In doing so, they should be given leeway to entice their
employees to avail of severance benefits that the local government can
afford. However, local government units may not provide such when it
amounts to a supplementary retirement benefit scheme.
Facts:
Then mayor of General Santos City, issued EO no. 40, series of 2008,
creating management teams pursuant to its organization development
program. Then, the city enacted ordinance no. 08, series of 2009,
which was an ordinance establishing the GenSan Scheme on Early
Retirement for Valued Employees Security (GenSan SERVES). It
provides:
13
Section 5.GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of
GSIS and Pag-Ibig Benefits Any personnel qualified and
approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be
entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or Pag-Ibig
is granting to a retiring government employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early
retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate
of 1 and months of the employees latest basic salary for
every year of service in the City Government.
Section 6.GenSan SERVES Post-Retirement Incentives
Upon availment of early retirement, a qualified employee
shall enjoy the following in addition to the above incentives:
a. Cash gift of 50,000.00 for the sickly employees;
b. Lifetime free medical consultation at General Santos
City Hospital;
c. Annual aid in the maximum of 5,000.00 if admitted to
hospital;
d. 14 karat gold ring as token.
Respondent Commission on Audit declared that Ordinance no. 08,
series of 2009, partakes the nature of a supplementary retirement
benefit plan proscribed by Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 186 as amended.
Issue:
Whether COA acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
COA committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared the entire
ordinance as contrary to the GSIS Act because Section 6 of the said
ordinance is valid.
The constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner
citys issuance of EO no. 40, series of 2008, creating change
management teams as an initial step for its organization development
masterplan, , and consequently, ordinance no. 08, series of 2009.
Section 5, paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that
any provision on a power of a local government unit shall
be liberally interpreted in its favour, and in case of doubt,
any question thereon shall be resolved in favour of
devolution of power x xx.
Unfortunately, these allegations of good faith are not enough to
declare the program created by the petitioner city as a reorganization
that justifies the creation of a retirement benefit plan.
Section 28 paragraph b of Commonwealth Act no. 186 (GSIS
Act) Hereafter no insurance or retirement plan for officers
or employees shall be created by any employer. All
supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore in
force in any government office, agency or instrumentality or
corporation owned and controlled by the government, are
hereby declared inoperative or abolished: Provided, That the
rights of those who are already eligible to retire thereunder
shall not be affected.
Hence, Section 5 of Ordinance no. 08, series of 2009, refers to an
early retirement incentive, the amount of which is pegged on the
beneficiarys years of service in the city government. Consequently,
this provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit.
On the other hand, Section 6 of the ordinance on post-retirement
incentives provides for benefits that are not computed based on years
of service. They are lump sum amounts and healthcare benefits. It
provides for a form of severance pay to those who availed of GenSan
SERVES, which was executed in good faith. The benefits provided in
Section 6 serve its purpose of inducing petitioner citys employees,
who are unproductive due to health reasons, to retire early.
Furthermore, the benefits under GenSan SERVE were only given to a
select few the sickly and unproductive due to health reasons.
Certainly, this negates the position that the benefits provide for
supplementary retirement benefits that augment existing retirement
laws. The Court, however, perceives otherwise.

The proscription under section 28 paragraph (b) of CA no. 186 does A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an
not apply to section 6 of the ordinance. Thus, the cash gift for the existing provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs
sickly employees, lifetime free medical consultation in petitioner citys to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to
hospital, and other similar benefits under section 6 of the ordinance is utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at
valid. best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been
complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular
was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial
23. VILLAFUERTE, JR. VS ROBREDO
portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually
utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more
Facts:
properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination
Contrary to the petitioners posturing, however, the enumeration was
and audit on the manner the local government units (LGUs) utilized
not meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of
their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-
their funds. It was meant to enlighten LGUs as to the nature of the
1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a
development fund by delineating it from other types of expenses. It
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
was incorporated in the assailed circular in order to guide them in the
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to
proper disposition of the IRA and avert further misuse of the fund by
expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other
citing current practices which seemed to be incompatible with the
Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A.
purpose of the fund. Even then, LGUs remain at liberty to map out
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
their respective development plans solely on the basis of their own
(LGC). Thus, on December 14, 1995, the DILG issued MC No. 95-216,
judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction
enumerating the policies and guidelines on the utilization of the
that 20% thereof be expended for development projects. They may
development fund component of the IRA. It likewise carried a
even spend their IRAs for some of the enumerated items should they
reminder to LGUs of the strict mandate to ensure that public funds,
partake of indirect costs of undertaking development projects. In such
like the 20% development fund, "shall bespent judiciously and only for
case, however, the concerned LGU must ascertain that applicable rules
the very purpose or purposes for which such funds are intended."
and regulations on budgetary allocation have been observed lest it be
inviting an administrative probe.
On September 20, 2005, then DILG Secretary Angelo T. Reyes and
Department of Budget and Management Secretary Romulo L. Neri
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
issued Joint MC No. 1, series of 2005, pertaining to the guidelines on
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
the appropriation and utilization of the 20% of the IRA for
development projects, which aims to enhance accountability of the
24. LUCENA DEMAALA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
LGUs in undertaking development projects. The said memorandum
circular underscored that the 20% of the IRA intended for
Facts:
development projects should be utilized for social development,
economic development and environmental management.
Pursuant to an ordinance enacted by the SangguniangPanlalawigan of
Palawan, which provides for an additional levy on real property tax for
On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG
the special education fund at the rate of 0.5%, the Municipality of
Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83, entitled "Full Disclosure
Narra collected from owners of real properties an annual tax at the
of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings," which
rate of 0.5% as special education fund.
aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and
accountability of LGUs.
However, an Audit Observation by the COA questioned the levy of the
special education fund at the rate of only 0.5% rather than 1%, as
On December 2, 2010, the respondent issued MC No. 2010-138,
provided in Section 235 of RA 7160. The Regional Cluster Director of
reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for
COA then held Demaala, mayor of Narra Municipality, and the
desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential to
municipal treasurer liable for the deficiency. Demaala filed an MR,
the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality oflife for all.
which was denied. Upon appeal, COA still hedDemaala, the municipal
It also listed the enumeration of expenses for which the fund must not
treasurer, and the special education fund payors, jointly & severally
be utilized. Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be dealt with in
liable.
accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
Issue:
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur,
joined by the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant
Can a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, a city, or a
petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the
province may have an additional levy on real property for the special
respondent for being unconstitutional and having been issued with
education fund at the rate of less than 1%?
grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
Issue:
Yes.
Does the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local
and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC?
Setting the rate of the additional levy for the special education fund at
less than 1% is within the taxing power of local government units. It
Ruling:
is consistent with the guiding constitutional principle of local
autonomy.
No. The assailed memorandum circulars do not transgress the local
and fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs.
The basis for the taxing power of local government units are provided
under Article X, Section 5 and Article II, Section 25 of the 1987
It is the petitioners contention that the respondent went beyond the
Constitution. The taxing power granted by constitutional fiat to local
confines of his supervisory powers, as alter ego of the President, when
government units exists in the wider context to ensure the autonomy
he issued MC No. 2010-138. They argue that the mandatory nature of
of local governments.
the circular, with the threat of imposition of sanctions for non-
compliance, evinces a clear desire to exercise control over LGUs.
14
Also, this power must be read in relation to their power to effect their
basic autonomy. Consistent with the 1987 Constitutions declared
preference, the taxing powers of local government units must be
resolved in favor of their local fiscal autonomy.
In City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes, the Court ruled that:
The power to tax is primarily vested in Congress.
However, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised
by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by
virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant
to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X
of the Constitution.
The important legal effect of Section 5 is that
henceforth, in interpreting statutory provision on
municipal fiscal powers, doubts will have to be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
Hence, the limits on the level of additional levy for the special
education fund under Section 235 of the Local Government Code
should be read as granting fiscal flexibility to local government units.
Section 235s permissive language is unqualified. Moreover, there is
no limiting qualifier to the articulated rate of 1% which unequivocally
indicates that any and all special education fund collections must be at
such rate. At most, there is a seeming ambiguity in Section 235.
Consistent with what has earlier been discussed however, any such
ambiguity must be read in favor of local fiscal autonomy.
25. BENJAMIN P. ABELLA vs COMELEC and ADELINA Y.
LARRAZABAL | G.R. No. 100710
ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL vs COMELEC and SILVESTRE DE LA
CRUZ
Facts:
Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene)
filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal
from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as
Kananga, Leyte. The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was
that respondent Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter
of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed, but a resident and registered voter
of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte, but
independent of the province pursuant to Section 12, Article X of the
Constitution, thereby disqualifying her for the position of governor of
Leyte. Eventually, COMELEC found that petitioner Larrazabal was
neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered voter thereat.
With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as
governor of the province of Leyte.
Issues:
1. Does Larrazabal meet the residence requirement to run for
Governor of the Province of Leyte?
2. Does the prohibition against the 'city's registered voters' electing
the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the
registered voters to be elected as provincial officials?
Ruling:
1. NO
Sec. 42.Qualification. (1) An elective local official must
be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years
of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such
in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he
proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least one
year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,
and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other
local language or dialect.
AdelinaLarrazabal lacks the required residence on the evidence of
record to the effect that despite protestations to the contrary made by
the her, she has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to
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the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly
change her residence one year before the election by registering at
Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to ran for the position of governor of the
province of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a
resident of Ormoc City.
Mere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue
studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. The
determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends
upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and
utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left
his residence or origin must show and prove preponderantly such
abandonment or loss.
In this case, there is no evidence to prove that Larrazabal temporarily
left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in to pursue any calling,
profession or business. What is clear is that she established her
residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a
resident therein. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte
through the years does not signify an intention to continue her
residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places
where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and
relatives therein although for intents and purposes we have already
transferred our residence to other places.
Also, the evidence shows that AdelinaLarrazabals supposed
cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer of registration in
Kananga, Leyte, is not supported by the records. She was not in the
list of voters. The certification of the Election Registrar of Kananga
states that Mrs.AdelinaLarrazabal was not a registered voter in any of
the precincts in Kananga.
2. YES
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law,
and component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall
be independent of the province. The voters of
component cities within a province, whose charters
contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of
their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of
Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the
Provincial Board of the members of the Provincial
Board of the Province of Leyte The qualified voters
of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial governor and the
members of the provincial board of the Province of
Leyte.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the
Constitution one comes up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc
City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanized city but is,
nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to
which it is geographically attached because its charter prohibits its
voters from voting for the provincial elective officials.
Larazzabal alternatively argues that if the prohibition to run was
indeed intended, the provision should have been phrased "Shall not be
qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial governor." A comma
should have been used after the word qualified and after the word
"vote" to clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of the
provincial governor" is modified separately and distinctly by the words
"not qualified" and the words "not entitled to vote.
The SC ruled that the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be
qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the
COMELEC in relation to the demonstrative phrase "in the election of
the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte."

26. MMDA vsBEL-AIR VILLAGE

Facts:

MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic

services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air is a non-stock, non-profit corporation
whose members are homeowners of Bel-Air Village in Makati City. Bel-
Air is the registered owner of the Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air
Village. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received
a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-
Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of Neptune
Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons and to
regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA
law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. The respondent, to stop the
opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent
claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court
decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of
the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune
Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can
practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue:

Is MMDA mandated to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant

to its regulatory and police powers?

Ruling:

No.

The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise
police power. Police poweris primarily lodged in the National
Legislature. However, police power may be delegated togovernment
units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political
government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
because it cannot be delegated to them.

It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act No. 7924

does not empower the MMDAto enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police
power.It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.

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