Doxa and Epistm as Modes of Acquaintance in Republic V

Jan Szaif (University of California at Davis)

The interpretation of Platos distinction between epistm and doxa is notoriously

difficult. One of the reasons for this is that Plato has different uses for these two terms
and often uses them in ways that are far removed from the meaning we moderns tend to
connect with the concepts of knowledge and belief.
The usual contemporary distinction between knowledge and (mere) true belief
relates to the quality of the justification or evidence the true belief in question is based
upon. This kind of perspective does occur in Plato. One of the targets of philosophical
dialectic is to provide a foundation for our judgments about concrete actions, situations
or rules that require the application of some general action-guiding concept like, for
instance, just. The ability to know if a certain course of action, in a given situation,
would be just presupposes, according to Plato, a clear and reliable grasp of what justice
is an understanding of justice which is true to its objective essence. Thus the grasp of
such an essence (or eidos, Form) is viewed by Plato as a necessary prerequisite for a
justified belief concerning the justice or injustice of a particular action, and he is ready
to apply knowledge-words like eidenai or gnnai to judgments about particular actions
in that perspective (e. g. Rep. 520C).
But there are also contexts where he restricts knowability to the Forms as pure
intellectual objects and classifies the whole realm of perceptible bodies together with
their movements, changes and transient properties as things that are mere doxasta (i. e.
merely objects of doxa, incapable of becoming objects of genuine knowledge/epistm).
One important example for this can be found in Republic V, 476E ff., a passage that I
will examine in this paper. Apparently it uses the argument from opposites (which
could also be called an argument from context-relativity) in a very questionable way
by arguing from the co-presence of opposites in the case of natural and social
instantiations of a Form to the conclusion that such instantiations dont even allow for
an unqualifiedly true judgment and thus cannot be objects of knowledge. Another
striking example is the passage in Timaeus, 37B, which asserts that the world-soul
achieves nous (insight) and epistm with respect to the intellectual realm (to
logistikon), but with respect to the perceptible realm (to aisthton) only doxa and pistis
(the latter being a type of non-epistemic cognition with a higher degree of truth-
approximation and reliability). Yet in the Timaeus-passage, truth and stability/reliability
(to bebaion) are attributed to the doxai of the world-soul, as one would expect since the
world-soul has direct cognitive access to everything that happens within its body, i.e.

1
the physical cosmos. So here it cannot be the lack of truth, and not even that of
reliability, which separates doxa from epistm.
So there seems to be an outright inconsistency in Platos ideas about knowing. On
the one hand, he denies that there can be knowledge about particulars in the sensible
world, on the other he affirms that the person who has grasped the essence of a certain
property can also know with respect to a particular whether or not it exhibits this
property. But this impression of a contradiction may subside if it turns out that he is
using different, yet compatible concepts of knowledge that go along with different
concepts of doxa. Such a solution seems certainly possible with regard to the Timaeus-
passage. It has been a recurring theme in Plato scholarship during the last three decades
that Platos concept of epistm, in many contexts, is a concept of understanding.1
Understanding can be taken as conceptual understanding or as scientific or theoretical
understanding (explanation), but for Plato these are two sides of the same coin, because
he conceives theoretical knowledge as the result of dialectic, and hence as the result of a
systematic effort of working toward adequate concepts that are true to the underlying
essences or Forms. He contends that the only fully rational cosmos which can become
totally transparent or fully understood is the realm of pure intellectual objects. The
physical world does not allow for perfect understanding, because there is only partial
and imperfect rationality in its structures and movements.2 Accordingly, the object-
range of perfect theoretical understanding is the world of pure intellectual entities, and
the core of this understanding is ones conceptual understanding which has been
perfected through the elucidation of the Forms and their interrelations.
So if one uses the words epistm and doxa as names for cognitive states that
differ according to the level of insight or understanding they can provide, then Platos
restriction of epistm to the realm of Forms is a consequence of his views on the
insufficient rationality and cognitive accessibility of physical cosmos. This view is
compatible with the claim that a person who has achieved adequate understanding of a
certain concept or property and has a clear, non-deceptive perception of a particular
situation or object, can recognize that this situation or object exhibits a certain property
and can know this to be the casein a different sense of knowing which does not imply
full rational transparency of the object in all its properties and relations but only a well-
founded judgment that answers to some specific question regarding the object.

1
Cf. J. M. E. Moravcsik, Understanding and Knowledge in Platos Philosophy, Neue
Hefte fr Philosophie 15/16 (1979), 53-69; Julia Annas, An Introduction to Platos
Republic, Oxford 1981; Myles Burnyeat, Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge, in E.
Berti (ed.), Aristotle on Science. The Posterior Analytics, Padua 1981, 97-139.
2
Cf. Rep. 527D-530C, Tim. 47E ff.

2
 The phenomenon of the co-presence of opposites does not pose a real challenge to
the possibility of true and well-founded judgments about concrete instances. Plato
himself in Rep. IV, 436B-437A, shows how to handle this. In this passage he elaborates
the point that an object cannot exhibit opposite properties or movements except in
different respects. The apparent co-presence of opposite determinations should not
disturb us (436E), since it can always be dissolved by way of an analysis which either
points to a difference in respect or reveals that the opposing properties or movements
have two different bearers. In a section of the introductory conversation of the
Parmenides (129A-E), it is also emphasized that in the case of particular objects the co-
presence of opposites does not pose any real philosophical problem since it is always
possible to differentiate between the respects in which the opposites occur together. The
text, moreover, points out that there is no problem with a lack of truth when one or the
other of the opposites is ascribed to the object in question. In both cases we have a true
statement (129D2).
In the light of this, the argument in Rep. V, 476E ff., proves to be very puzzling. It
seems to commit the very mistake of inferring from the co-presence of opposites the
impossibility of an unequivocally true ascription of, say, beauty with respect to a
particular instance of beauty. The consequence would be, it seems, that even people
with an adequate conceptual understanding of beauty or largeness would not be able to
apply these concepts to particular instances so as to produce true judgments. Thus they
would also not be able to know if this or that particular instance is something beautiful
or something large (given that truth is a necessary condition of knowledge). This result
seems incompatible with, for instance, a well-known passage in the context of the simile
of the Cave (Rep. 520C) where the text clearly states that someone who has gained
philosophical insight and returns to the cave (i.e. is willing to confront again the social
and natural reality), will be able to recognize the exemplifications of the Forms in the
cave and will know what participates in what. What is more, this result would run
afoul, it seems, of the whole tendency of the Socratic quest for a reliable foundation of
our practical judgments through the conceptual clarification of Forms. The practical side
of dialectic remains a major concern of Plato in the Republic and beyond. It is only
supplemented, not pushed aside, by the contemplative ideal of knowledge that seeks
fulfillment in a complete rational penetration of reality achievable only with respect to
the noetic cosmos of the Forms.3 Whereas the Timaeus passage is compatible with the

3
Cf. Jan Szaif, Platons Begriff der Wahrheit, 2nd ed., Freiburg/Mnchen 1998, 163-168,
307-315. 1998, on the influence of practical and contemplative ends on Platos
conception of knowledge.

3
possibility of true and well-founded judgments about concrete objects and situations, the
Rep. V passage seems to go too far and to contravene the applicability of philosophical
knowledge for practical purposes.
There is another serious difficulty posed by the argument in Rep. V. It
distinguishes epistm and doxa as two different powers (dunameis) of the soul. That
seems to contradict the affirmation later in Rep. VII (518A-519B) that the rational
faculty (the eye of the soul) is one and that it can achieve only doxa-type competence
as long as it remains focused on the physical and social world, but will produce
epistm once it has been turned around and refocused toward the realm of
intellectual objects through the efforts of dialectic.
In my subsequent remarks I will provide an analysis of the argument in Rep. V,
476E-480A, and comment on the meaning of doxa and epistm in this context and their
function as powers. My main contention will be that doxa and epistm should be
construed here as different qualities of (conceptualized) acquaintance whose
achievement or cognitive value is a function of the ontological quality of their objects.

First some remarks about the context of the argument that I am going to analyze: In
473CD, Socrates has come out with his contention that philosophers should be the
political rulers. Socrates (whose persona serves as a personification of the ideal
philosophical inquirer in the dialogue) wants to base the justification of this contention
on an explanation of the true nature of philosophers (474B). He starts with an analysis
of the meaning of the word philosopher as lover of wisdom/learning, emphasizing
that concepts of the form lover of F imply that the person is inclined to love and
appreciate all types or instances of that which is F. Thus only someone who loves all
kinds of learning can count as a lover of wisdom/learning. Glaucon objects (475D1-E1)
that this would enlarge the scope of philosophy so as to include the interests of people
who want to watch each new theatrical show (philotheamones) or are fond of
insignificant crafts and knacks (technudria). Socrates replies that the philosophersthe
true ones (475E3)are indeed lovers of shows/sights, but of a specific kind of sight,
namely the sight of truth (ts altheias philotheamones, E4). (With respect to this turn
of phrase one should bear in mind that the Greek word for truthaltheiacan be used
to name reality from the point of view that it can become an object or content of
knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge of some truth. I will come back to this
point later.)
With this answer, Socrates has hinted that the curiosity which is exhibited by the
lovers of theatrical shows and unphilosophical crafts does not concern the truth and
thus cannot count as genuine love of wisdom or learning since wisdom and learning

4
relate to truth. His ensuing discussion focuses on the lovers of sights and sounds who
are clearly enough identified as the lovers of the dramatic performances (475D5-8)
people who believe that those products of poetry are the best source for an
understanding of beauty, justice and virtue. So in the background we perceive the
recurrent Platonic theme that not poetry (or the arts in general) but only philosophy can
truly educate.4 His argumentation exploits the conceptual link between love of
knowledge and love of truth (cf. 485B-D). If, as he tries to show, the exploits of the
lovers of sights and sounds, and of other people similar to them, dont lead to
acquaintance with the truth, their kind of learning cannot belong to the scope of a
genuine love for truth and learning.
Theatrical shows provide (amongst other things) examples of beauty (think of the
musical and lyrical parts of the Greek drama). The lovers of sights and sounds will
appreciate that each such performance gives them some new examples of beauty and
thus enriches their experience of beauty. They think that this will increase and deepen
their understanding of beauty. Yet Socrates points out that they are incapable of
seeing and appreciating the nature of the beautiful itself (476B). They acknowledge
the existence of the many instances of beauty yet are unable to grasp beauty itself.
Being unaware of the reality of the Form behind these instances, they mistake mere
images for the real thing. With this state of mind, says Socrates, they are similar to
dreamers who take dream-images for real things. They are in a state of mere doxa
(opining) and subject to a fundamental error regarding the nature of reality. This is very
different with philosophically educated people. They realize that a term like beauty
denotes a Form and that the instantiations of beauty in the world of becoming are only
images of this. The latter will be able to discern the Form of beauty and the things that
participate in it, and they will not confuse the Form and its participants. Thus they will
know (gignskein) (476CD).Note that the knowledge attributed to the knowing
person includes the ability to discern the participants. So the possibility of some sort of
knowledge with regard to objects in the sensible realm is affirmed here, yet as a
corollary of the knowledge of the Form.
Let us call the argument in 475E-476D, which I have just summarized, the Doxa-
as-Dreaming-Analogy (DDA). It characterizes the doxastic state of mind as a state of
deception and the objects a person in this state is acquainted with as being deceptive or
untrue insofar as they (like dream images) conceal their nature as mere copies. The

4
Cf. Myles Burnyeat, Culture and Society in Platos Republic, in: The Tanner Lectures
on Human Values, vol. 20, ed. by G. B. Peterson, Salt Lake City 1999, 215-324. About
the vocabulary of thea, theria etc. see also A. W. Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in
Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context, Cambridge 2004.

5
only way to overcome this deception is philosophy and its practice of dialectic, since
only dialectic can make us aware of the reality of the Forms. (The word dialectic
serves Plato, roughly, as the name for whatever may be the appropriate argumentative
method or methods of investigating our concepts and the underlying objective Forms.)

DDA presupposes the truth of the theory of Forms. Now, since the lovers of sights and
sounds dont recognize the truth of this assumption, they wont have to follow this
argumentation. From their point of view it is not a mistake to consider the many
instances of beauty as the only reality the term beautiful stands for. The subsequent
argument (467E7-480A13)5 is addressed to a hypothetical representative of those
lovers of sights and sounds, and it is intended as a gentle (476E1) refutation of their
conviction that the kind of reality they acknowledge could be the basis of genuine
knowledge, a refutation that does not rely on the acceptance of the theory of Forms.6
Yet it would be wrong to reduce the function of this argument to its dialectical
role as a refutation of the lovers of sights and sounds. The core of this argument is a
scheme of correlations between three cognitive states or powers (dunameis) and three
ontological categories. I will call this scheme CS and the argument based on it CSA. It
is important to note that CS lays important groundwork for a whole sequence of
arguments and similes that will follow in books VI and VII. Therefore it is also no mere

5
There is a tremendous amount of literature on this text. I wont be able to discuss the
conflicting views here in any detail. Important contributions include: R. E. Allen, The
Argument from Opposites in Republic V, in Review of Metaphysics 15 (1961), 325-
335; Julia Annas, loc. cit., 190-241; Myles Burnyeat, Plato On Why Mathematics is
Good for the Soul, in T. Smiley (ed.) Mathematics and Necessity (Proc. Brit. Acad. 103)
Oxford 2000, 1-81; Nicholas Denyer: Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient
Greek Philosophy, London 1991, 46-67; Gail Fine, Knowledge and Belief in Republic
V-VII, in S. Everson (ed.): Epistemology, Cambridge 1990, 85-115; Francisco Gonzales,
Propositional as Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and Belief in
Republic V, Phronesis 41 (1996), 245-275; J.C.B. Gosling, doxa and dunamis in
Platos Republic, Phronesis 13 (1968), 119-130; Andreas Graeser, Platons
Auffassung von Wissen und Meinung in Politiea V, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 98
(1991), 365-388; B. E. Hestir, A Conception of Truth in Republic V, History of
Philosophy Quaterly 17 (2000), 311-332; Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and its Objects
in Plato, in J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.): Patterns in Platos Thought, Dordrecht 1973, 1-
30; Charles Kahn, Some Philosophical Uses of to be in Plato, Phronesis 26 (1981),
105-134; Yvon Lafrance, La thorie platonicienne de la doxa, Montreal/Paris 1981;
John Palmer, Platos Reception of Parmenides, Oxford 1999, 31-87; Peter Stemmer:
Das Kinderrtsel vom Eunuchen und der Fledermaus, Philosophisches Jahrbuch 92
(1985), 79-97; Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies, 2nd ed., Princeton 1981, 43-57, 58-75.
6
This was emphasized by Gosling loc. cit., 120 f., and is also a basic premise of Fines
interpretation (loc. cit., 87).

6
accident that Socrates brings in the Forms at a certain point of his argumentation
although, at first sight, this might seem inconsistent with his professed aim of refuting
the lovers of sights and sounds without presupposing the theory of Forms. The
refutational part of his argument, directed against the lovers of sights and sounds, can
indeed stand without reliance on the theory of Forms. But Socrates argumentation is at
the same time also addressed to Glaucon and Adeimantos, his two philosophically
educated and sympathetic interlocutors. For them Socrates connects the scheme CS with
the theory of Forms as a starting-point for his subsequent more complex explanations
concerning the relation of ontological categories and epistemic modes.
We can break down CSA as follows:
Section (a), 467E7-477B9, begins the exposition of CS. The ontological
categories he distinguishes are (1) that which (perfectly/unqualifiedly) is, (2) that which
is-and-is-not, and (3) that which is not at all (or in no way). (The corresponding
cognitive powers are knowledge (gnsis/epistm), doxa, and ignorance (agnsia)
this last one rather being a specific form of absence of cognitive power. The ontological
categories of things that perfectly are and of things that are-and-are-not will later (in
section [d]) be equated with the Forms and their natural or social instantiations
respectively.
The basic idea of this scheme (which obviously harks back to the three ways
distinguished by the Presocratic Parmenides7) can be represented in this table:

CS
Type of cognitive dunamis Object (relatum) of the cognitive dunamis
1) knowledge (gnsis/epistm) what (perfectly/unqualifiedly) is [ a Form]
2) doxa what is and is not [ a mere exemplification
not the Form itself]
3) ignorance (agnsia) what in no way is [ nothing]

Section (b), 477B10-478A5, explains the concept of a power (dunamis) and tries
to validate the claim that epistm and doxa, qua cognitive powers, must relate to
different ranges of objects and result in different cognitive achievements.
On this basis section (c), 478A6-E6, sets out why we have to identify the objects-
range of doxa, as a fallible cognitive state intermediate between knowledge and
ignorance, with the things that are-and-are-not.
Section (d), 478E7-479E9, explains what sorts of objects belong into the category
of the things that are-and-are-not. The answer is that the things the lovers of sights and

7
Cf. John Palmer, loc. cit., on Platos use of Parmenides in CSA.

7
sounds recognize as the only reality, viz. the many instances of the Forms, are things
which are-and-are-not. In the course of this explanation the talk of being versus being-
and-not-being, which had remained very vague up to this point, acquires a more
concrete meaning. Thanks to this, it also becomes clearer why the mix of being and not-
being is supposed to thwart epistemic cognition.
The final section (e), 479E10-480A13, carries the argument to the conclusion that
people like the lovers of sights and sounds should be called philodoxoi (lovers of
doxa) instead of philosophoi.

A number of questions need to be raised with respect to CS.

1) How can the nature of the correlations between the cognitive dunameis
and their types of objects be spelled out in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions? For instance, the ontological characteristic of unrestricted being
seems to function as a necessary condition for somethings being an object
of epistm. Is that so also in the case of complete non-being and agnsia?
2) What is the sense of dunamis here?
3) What is the sense of to be here, and do the ontological categories
define non-overlapping sets of objects?
4) In which sense is doxa said to be fallible and epistm infallible?
If we answer all these questions, then we can hope to reach a well-founded conclusion
regarding the nature of the epistm and doxa as represented in this argument.
I will first tackle the third question regarding the concept of being (and I will have
to be rather doctrinal because there is no room here for discussing Platos concept of
being in detail).

Ad 3: It is helpful to distinguish between an absolute and a copulative use of is or

being (esti, einai/on). Being is attributed absolutely in a statement of the form A
is. It is used for a copulative function in sentences of the form A is B (where B can
be replaced either by a general or a singular term). If the second term is a general term,
we also speak of predicative being. If it is a singular term, the statement expresses an
identity relation. The is (esti) which is predicated absolutely could mean either
existence or veridical being the case, according to the established usages in Ancient
Greek.
It is, however, essential to note that often Plato understands being, attributed
absolutely, as equivalent to being something such that the word something functions
like a variable for general terms. In this case, the absolute use of to be indicates
predicative being. Predicative being is closely connected with veridical being, because if

8
some x is F, it is also the case that x is F. Thus a veridical instance of being, i.e. the on
in the sense of a state of affairs which obtains and can be known, can unfold into an
instance of predicative being (x being F).8
CSA is an example for the absolute use of to be and not to be for the
indication of predicative being and not-being with a veridical connotation. Take the
example of an instance of beauty. Section (d) tells us that this is an example of
something which IS and IS NOT, because it is and is not beautifulor because it is
both true and false to say of it that it is beautiful. (We might think of Helen being
compared to some other, more beautiful entity, or viewed form some unfavorable
perspective). Accordingly, something which is beautiful and in no way is not beautiful,
would be an example of a thing which unqualifiedly IS (i.e. without a mix with not-
being). For Plato, this ontological description singles out the Form of the beautiful the
Beautiful-itself. Of course this means that this talk of unrestricted being presupposes
the possibility of the self-predication of Forms.9 The is in such a statement oscillates
in a problematic way between predication and identity. But either way it is copulative,
not existential.
Also in the case of the negative limit concept of that which in no way is
(=nothing) (477A3-4, 7, cf. 478B12-C4) we have to think of the copulative use: This
pseudo-object is nothing or in no way, because there is no way to characterize it
predicatively.
Hence, when Plato speaks of things that are and things that are-and-are-not, the
predicative or (more generally) copulative sense of being is to be understood. Yet this
cannot be the whole story. The Forms, which are the example of things that ARE, can
also be characterized in a negative way. For instance: The Beautiful itself is not ugly.
Or: The Beautiful itself is not perishable. Platos examples and comments (478E-
479D) suggest that a Forms undiluted mode of being consists in the fact that the Form
is what it is unequivocally, since it perfectly excludes any contrary quality. The many
instantiations of this Form, on the other hand, dont perfectly exclude contrary qualities.
In some way or other they exemplify not just Fness, but also the opposite of Fness, and

8
On the terminology of being in Ancient Greek and in Plato in particular cf. Charles
Kahn, On the Theory of the Verb To Be, in M. K. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology,
New York 1973, 1-20; idem, A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of
Being, Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004), 381-405; idem, Some Philosophical Uses of to
be in Plato, Phronesis 26 (1981), 105-134; Lesley Brown, The Verb To Be in Greek
Philosophy: Some Remarks, in S. Everson (ed.), Language, Cambridge 1994; Szaif,
Platons Begriff der Wahrheit ... [loc. cit.], passim.
9
Cf. John Malcolm, Plato on the Self-Predication of the Forms, Oxford 1991, for a
comprehensive survey and analysis of the positions on self-predication in Plato.

9
that is why their mode of being is indistinct and, as it were, ambiguous (cf. 479B11-
C5). To put it in a slightly more formal way: For any predicative content F or Fness:
Only F-itself is unequivocally F (i.e. without any aspect of being not-F), all other
objects that are F are also not F. In 479C3-5, the argument reaches an even more radical
analysis of the situation: Because the contrary characteristics cancel out each other and
yet obtain somehow, it is not possible to firmly conceive the thing in question as F or
not F or both or neither. Although it is not nothing at all, it eludes any firm cognitive
hold. (Note that we are talking here about instances, say, of beauty as instances of
beauty. The question is not if Helen, as Helen, does allow for any sort of firm cognitive
acquaintance, but if this instance of beauty, conceptualized as an instance of beauty, can
be firmly represented as such.)
Thus the ontological status of perfect/unrestricted being (to pantels on) is based
on the fact that such a thing is perfectly determined since the descriptive (or eidetic)
content thanks to which it is determined is not qualified or cancelled out by the co-
presence of a contrary eidetic content. Accordingly we can also say that unrestricted
being here stands for perfect determinateness.
Do these ontological categories define exclusive sets of objects? An object might
be perfectly determined in one respect and not so in another. CSA exploits the
phenomenon that in the case of properties that constitute pairs of opposites the
ascriptions are often context-sensitive or perspectival. Nothing is large or small
absolutely, but only from a certain perspective, viz. depending on what counts as small
or large in the given context. Yet ascriptions of descriptive contents like being human or
being a finger are not perspectival in this way (523CD). Also they cant come in pairs
of opposites (enantia, polar contraries) for the simple reason that such individuative
terms dont have opposites. Therefore Platos argument in Rep. V cant apply to such
characteristics. Hence, as far as that goes, his argument is open for the possibility that
the same object in perfectly determined and hence a knowable in one respect, yet in
another respect a mere doxaston. 10 To be sure, other passages in his middle-period
works articulate the thought that sensible objects in general and in all respects dont
qualify as objects of epistm (probably as a consequence of Platos views concerning
the unity and imperishability of an object of epistm).11 So, in the end, the two classes

10
Cf. Annas, loc. cit., 193-211.
11
Already the brief back reference in 485AB to the result of CSA has shifted to the
antithesis between things that always are and things that are subject to coming-into-
being and passing-away, which does affect the status of individuative properties.For a
comprehensive discussion of Platonic arguments for the existence of Forms cf. Gail
Fine, On Ideas. Aristotles Criticism of Platos Theory of Forms, Oxford 1993.

10
of objects are meant to be exclusive, but that doesnt yet follow from the distinction
between perspectival and non-perspectival being.

Ad 1: Regarding the correlations in CS we have to differentiate between terms for

cognitive states like knowledge (epistm) and terms for dispositional attributes like
knowable (gnston) which contain a modal component. At the outset of his argument
Plato introduces the correlations (1) and (3): With respect to (1), he claims that if
somebody knows something, this must be something which IS (or unqualifiedly IS). He
also states that that which unqualifiedly IS is unqualifiedly knowable. This statement is
not free of ambiguity since can mean that being implies knowability (i.e. is a sufficient
condition of knowability), but may also be taken to mean that being is logically
equivalent to knowability (i.e. is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of
knowability). Later it becomes clear that the argument presupposes that unqualified
being is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition for knowability, for
Socrates claims that knowledge is set over that which is and has the function to know
of that-which-is which way it is (477B10 f, 478A6). Given that unqualified being is a
necessary condition for knowability, it follows that all instances of knowledge are, each
of them, of some unqualified being or other.
Thus we get the following two contentions, of which the first is meant to imply
the second:
i) For all objects x: If and only if x IS (unqualifiedly), is it possible that there be
some epistemic cognition y which is of x.
ii) For all cognitive states y: if y is an epistemic cognition, then there is some
object x, such that y is of x and x IS (unqualifiedly).

The first is a claim regarding the knowability of the objects in the first ontological
category. The second is a claim about the kind of object the cognitive state of epistm
requires. Undiluted being is a necessary and sufficient condition of knowability and a
necessary condition for becoming an object of somebodys actual epistm:
What about correlation (3)? Plato claims that that which IS NOT (anything at all)
is completely unknowable (panti agnston). Yet total lack of being is not only
sufficient for a total lack of knowability, it is also a necessary condition for it, since only
that which in no way is (something or other) will be completely inaccessible to any kind
of cognition. Of something which IS, there can be knowledge, but of something which
IS NOT anything at all, there must be ignorance. Plato hints at this asymmetry by
adding an ex ananks in the case of agnsias being set over non-being (477A9,
478C3) which he doesnt do in the other cases.
Thus we obtain the following claims:

11
 iii) For all objects x: if and only x is not (anything at all), is it necessary that there
be ignorance (i.e. no cognition at all) of x.
iv) For all cognitive states y: if there is some object x, such that y is of x and x IS
NOT (anything at all), then y is a state of ignorance.

Let us turn to correlation (2). Here we are not dealing with a total absence of
cognition, but with a different type of cognition and a different kind of cognitive
accessibility of an object. The same way as epistm correlates with that which IS, doxa
is said to correlate with that which IS AND IS NOT. Both are characterized as different
cognitive powers which require a different type of object according to the ontological
distinction between undiluted being and being mixed with not-being. Thus we can
attribute to Plato the following two claims which match the claims (i) and (ii) regarding
epistm: (The second claim, which is about the object of doxa, is meant to be implied
in the first claim about the cognitive accessibility of objects of that mixed kind.)
v) For all objects x: If and only if x is and is not, is it possible that there be some
doxastic cognition y which is of x.
vi) For all cognitive states y: if y is a doxastic cognition, then there is some object
x, such that y is of x and x is and is not.

The suggestion that epistm and doxa are two different cognitive powers with
different ranges of referential objects seems very strange to modern readers who are
used to the evidential or justificatory distinction between knowledge and mere true
belief. Yet it also seems incompatible with remarks in other contexts in the Republic
and elsewhere which affirm the possibility of (some sort of) knowledge with respect to
concrete instantiations and of opinion with respect to Forms. I can refer back to my
introductory remarks. Even the immediately preceding passage which contains DDA
turned out to imply the possibility of knowledge with respect to concrete instantiations.
There is no way out of this conundrum if we construe the objects of the
cognitive states distinguished here as the referential objects of propositional cognition,
i.e. as that about which something is known or believed. May be a closer examination of
the way in which Plato conceives epistm and doxa as powers will provide us with an
alternative.

Ad 2: Platos argument in section (b) about powers is built upon an assumption (A)
about the general identity criterion for types of power formulated in 477D2-5. It can
be rephrased in this way:

A: (1) powers (dunameis) are the same in kind if and only if they relate to the
same objects and achieve the same things; (2) Powers (dunameis) differ in

12
 kind if and only if they relate to different kinds of objects and achieve
different things.

The and printed in italics in second first leg of (A) is the puzzling feature in this
assumption, but it is also crucial for the argument because the intended conclusion can
be obtained only if this and is kept and not replaced by an or. For the text will argue
from the premise that doxa has a different kind of achievement (and hence is a different
kind of dunamis) to the conclusion that its objects must also be different from those of
epistm. This inference would not be possible if we had an or instead of an and in
the second leg of (A). This means that Plato does not acknowledge the possibility of two
dunameis achieving different things with regard to the same kind of object. But why
should that possibility be excluded? This certainly looks question-begging and thus
represents a very questionable move in this argument. Yet we may try to add some extra
explanation to the argument that would justify the exclusion of the possibility that
powers can achieve different things with respect to the same relata.
Assumption (A) can make sense only if the object range is conceived of as
intrinsically connected with the kind of function or achievement of the power in
question. Later metaphysical terminology developed the concept of a formal object: A
formal object is the type object of a faculty, ability or power that matches its defining
function, activity or effect. If we speak of the ability to slap and the ability to caress,
their formal objects would be that which is capable of being slapped or that which is
capable of being caressed. Of course the same person can be slapped and caressed. The
material objects, hence, can be the same. But there is still the difference of the formal
objects as defined by the kind of power or ability.
Can we suppose that something like this is going on here? The only illustrative
examples he mentions are sight and hearing (477C3). Unfortunately, he does not give us
any further indications as to how he wants us to use these examples. The easiest way of
specifying their formal objects would be to call them the visible and the audible. A more
sophisticated answer would identify the visible with, say, colors and shapes, the audible
with sounds. Now there is an additional complication. The examples Socrates gives in
section (d) of CSA suggest that we are invited to consider the objects of doxa and
epistm as not only formally, but also materially distinct: as two non-overlapping sets
of objects, viz. Forms on one side and transient or mixed instances on the other. If we
link the faculties of sight and hearing to colors and shapes or sounds respectively, we
would also obtain non-overlapping sets of objects. But this is rather an exception. It is
obviously not true in general that abilities or faculties define non-overlapping sets of
objects, and we dont have to burden the argument here with such an extravagant
assumption. The premise that he needs in section (c) does not imply a stronger claim

13
than that the object-ranges of doxa and epistm are formally distinct. That they are also
materially distinct and even exclusive sets of objects, this is a consequence of the
ontological chorismos between the Forms and their physical and social instantiations, a
thesis which is not argued for in this passage.
Now, if we want to get clear about as what kind of power doxa and epistm are
conceived here, we have to understand how their formal objects are characterized. There
are basically two possibilities. If we construe doxa and epistm as tpyes of
propositional cognition, then their formal objects (the opinable and the knowable)
would have to be identified as propositional contents or as propositionally structured
states of affairs. This would allow for a fairly straightforward answer to the question
how these two types relate to two formally distinct object-ranges: Since knowledge
implies truth, whereas opinion does not, knowledge is of true propositional contents (or
existing states of affairs) while opinion is of true or false propositional contents.
Unfortunately this solution, supported by Gail Fine and others12, does not square with
the way the objects of knowledge and opinion are described in section (d)not as
propositional contents (like that Helen is beautiful) but as Forms and as physical or
social instantiations of a Form (like beautiful things).13
The alternative is to read this distinction as one between types of object-cognition
or acquaintance. The usage which relates the nominal constructions doxa tinos and
epistm tinos (knowledge of something) or the verbal constructions doxazein ti
and gnonai/eidenai ti (knowing something) to objects instead of propositional
contents is well established for Plato, the Theaetetus in particular providing ample

12
Cf. Gosling, loc. cit., Fine, Knowledge and Belief ...(loc. cit.).
13
Defenders of the view that the objects which epistm and doxa are set over, are
propositions refer to 479D4, where the text specifies the objects of doxa as ta tn
polln polla nomima kalou te peri kai tn alln: the many nomima of the multitude
with respect to what is beautiful et cetera. Fine, for instance, translates nomima as
beliefs (loc. cit., 92). Yet nomimon can also denote that which is an object of belief
or acknowledgement. In the present context, the word nomimon harks back to what
was said about the lovers of sights and sounds in the preceding passage DDA: that
they acknowledge (nomizei) many beautiful things, but not the beautiful itself
(476C2-3). So the nomima are the things acknowledged by them. In this case, then, the
peri after nomima does not mean about so as to point to an object of reference of
a belief (that which the belief is about), but more vaguely indicates the respect: In
respect of beauty, they acknowledge nothing else than the many instances beauty which
are and are not beautiful.

14
evidence for that.14 But does that also tally with the way he describes the achievement
of epistm and doxa in CSA?
The claim that we are dealing here with types of object-cognition is easier to
establish with respect to the concept of epistm. The type of object that corresponds to
epistm (or gnnai) is said to exhibit unrestricted, unqualified being-F, and the reason
indicated for this is that such a mode of being allows for a firm and stable cognitive
grasp (pagis nosai, 479C4). Since his examples for perfect beings are Forms (the
Beautiful itself etc.), we can infer that he has in mind the kind of acquaintance with a
Form that reveals the essence that can be ascribed to the Formif his distinction is
indeed about modes of acquaintance. This kind of acquaintance would be the
achievement of a progress in conceptual understanding as aimed at by philosophical
dialectic.
Yet one can object that the achievement of epistm is paraphrased as to on
gnnai hs echei (478A6). Isnt this stating that the knowledge in question knows
with respect to that-which-is, how it is, and wouldnt this knowing how it is (or what
it is like) be an instance of propositional knowledge? Now, this Greek phrase is actually
somewhat ambiguous between an objectual and a propositional construal: It can
certainly be construed in the way just cited. But since to on (that which is) functions
here also as the object of gnnai, the more adequate translation seems to be knowing
that-which-is as it is.15 Yet this point is not really decisive. However we construe this
phrase, there is no incoherence in describing the epistemic acquaintance with a Form F-
itself such that it implies that one knows what this Form is like. Some formulation like
that could even be used with respect to some strictly non-propositional knowledge-by-
acquaintance as conceived by Russell. If somebody is acquainted with the color red,
they can certainly be said to know what red is like, although the content of this
knowledge is not expressible in a proposition. Moreover, Platonic theory of object-
cognition with respect to Forms should not be construed in this Russellian manner
anyway. To begin with, even if not all forms are definable according to Plato, some at
least are. And in their case it is possible to reproduce the content of ones acquaintance

14
For the possibility of a non-propositional construction doxazein cf. Szaif, Platons
Begriff der Wahrheit ...(loc. cit.), 357 f. A general grammatical analysis for the verbs of
knowing is provided by John Lyons, Structural Semantics. An Analysis of Part of the
Vocabulary of Plato, Oxford 1963.
15
This is the way Cornford and G.M.A Grube (revised by C.D.C. Reeve) translate it.
The ambiguity is not removed by the parallel formulation in 477B10-11. Although the
word-order is slightly different, the syntactical structure is the same.

15
in a definitional formula (with some qualifications thoughI will come back to this
point at the end of my paper).
So it is possible to construe epistm as a mode of acquaintance or object-
cognition. If, in the light of this, it is granted that we are dealing here with a
classification of modes of object-cognition or acquaintance, it follows that we have to
construe doxa as acquaintance with natural or social instantiations of Forms, since doxa
is described as being of such instantiations.
The formal object of doxa is characterized by its mode of equivocal being which
cannot be determined as being either F or not-F or both or neither (479C3-5), so that the
acquaintance with such an object can provide only an unstable appearance (phainesthai,
479A7, B2, 4), not a firm and stable intellectual grasp (nosai). What then is the
characteristic achievement (the ho apergazetai) of doxa with respect to this type of
object?
Plato says no more than that doxas activity is doxazein (478A8) and that it takes
place with respect to what is-and-is-not. This does not give us any additional
information since the meaning of the verb doxazein depends on how we are supposed to
understand the achievement of doxa. The clue we are looking for may lie in the
connection between doxa and changing appearance highlighted in section (d). An object
of doxa appears, say, beautiful and is, hence, conceived of as beautiful. But while the
grasp of some perfect being like the beautiful itself as beautiful/beauty is stable, the
conceptual representation of a doxastic instance is unstable as this object can also
appear ugly (e. g. if we change the context and compare it to something much more
beautiful, or if we see it from a different aspect). Both types of cognitive grasp represent
their object as being F, but only when the object is unqualifiedly F, is this representation
fully warranted, while in the mixed ontological case the object eludes this representation
as being F since it manifests itself both as F and as not-F.
Thus we can say that, according to CSA, the cognitive achievement of the activity
of doxazein is a certain kind of conceptualized representation of an object which is not
unequivocally F, as being F. It is a mode of representation of being which falls short of
its object and is unstable because its object lacks genuine being. Its representational
truth is equivocal and transient the same way as the instantiated being which it
represents is equivocal and transient.If this is the achievement of doxa, it does not
seem much of an achievement at all, rather a lack of a cognitive achievement. But this
is of course the point Plato wants to drive home. This cognitive mode has no real value.
To be sure, it is better than total agnsia, which is the cognitive state in which nothing
is presented to the mindjust a total lack of cognition, a black screen, as it were,
complete darkness. There is more light in doxa than in agnsia (cf. 478C13-14). But it

16
is only, as it were, a flickering light, a mix of light and darkness, presenting a certain
mode of being to the mind and then canceling it out it again.
I think that this interpretational strategy of construing epistm and doxa as two
kinds of acquaintance with things that are or appear F, is the only way to provide a
reading which stands in agreement with the text and does not lead into the absurd
consequence that it is impossible to form an opinion about a Form or that one cannot
know anything about concrete objects. When philosophers (as conceived in the
Republic) assess presumed participants of F-itself in the physical and social world,
they will not simply represent them as being or not being F. They will distinguish
between the underived being-F or the Form and the derived being-F that is based on
participation in F-itself, and they will specify the relevant respects in which the case in
question qualifies as an exemplification of (derived) being-F . In other words: They
wont base their judgment on the simple and deceptive appearance of the thing as being
F. Theirs will be a differentiated judgment whose main cognitive basis is acquaintance
with the Form itself.
At this point I want to add some more general remarks as to why Plato bothers to
distinguish epistm and doxa as two levels of acquaintance with being-F. As Julia
Annas has rightly pointed out, the argument in Rep. V presupposes a certain
understanding of knowledge and tries to develop a concept of doxa as its counterpart.16
Now, if epistm is conceived as perfected conceptual understanding, rooted in the
adequate and firm cognitive grasp of the essence or Form denoted by the concept-word
in question, then we ought to expect that doxa stands for some deficient mode of
conceptual understanding.
So what is the point of doxa as a deficient mode of conceptual understanding for
an epistemological theory focused on the idea of the possibility of firm and objective
conceptual understanding? Lets take up again the point about context-relativity and
imagine a little example of our own. If lover of beautiful sights stands in front of a
painting of Helen and exclaims: She is beautiful!, an uncompromising Platonist in
their company would of course retort that this is nothing compared to the beauty of a
geometrical construction. Another, more amiable philosopher might come to the aide of
the lover of sights and submit: Well, with respect to her looks and as a human being, it
is certainly fair to say that she is extraordinarily beautiful. If the lover of sights buys
that, they are already on the way to becoming aware of the distinction between Forms
and mixed instances. This more sophisticated judgment is immune against the argument
from context-relativity because it specifies the relevant context or respect and thus

16
Cf. Annas, loc. cit., 193.

17
qualifies the attribution of the property in the appropriate way. It does more than just
articulate a mode of appearance. It has analyzed the appearance by situating it in its
context. This kind of realization of context-dependence is the first step toward
understanding why the universal content denoted by the concept-word cannot be
identical with any of these derived instances or their sum.
Yet people who havent yet opened themselves to the impact of Socratic dialectic,
will rely for their understanding of concepts like beauty, justice, or largeness, on their
acquaintance with what they see as uncontroversial or outstanding examples. When
Socrates asks someone to explain what justice is, or what beauty is, they will first cite
such examples (types or tokens), because it is examples of that kind which their
understanding of the concepts in question is based upon. In the case of value-concepts,
poetic productions play a significant role for the Greeks in providing such socially
accepted examples. (This refers us back to the lovers and sights and sounds.) Yet like
the orators and politicians, the poets as well lack insight into the real nature of the
values in question and thus cannot provide any reliable guidance. When Socrates
scrutinizes such examples presumed to be clear instances of something which is F, it
turns out that their appearance of being-F is not clear at all because a change of context
will turn the appearance into its contrary. He will try to make his interlocutors realize
that they lack genuine understanding of the property or value in question as long as they
rely solely on their acquaintance with socially accepted examples. Yet he will grant that
their deficient understanding is more than total ignorance (agnsia). They are in an
intermediate state which is not knowledge but at least provides some starting-points in
the quest for real understanding.
So from the point of view of a theory of conceptual progress, one needs to discuss
this mode of acquaintance because it is the basis of our insufficient conceptual
understanding before the onset of philosophical investigation. It is easy to show how,
from this point of view, CSA fits into the context of the central books of the Republic,
which are inspired by an ethical and pedagogical idea according to which the
objectivation of our leading concepts is of paramount significance for the realization of
human happiness. Genuine conceptual understanding requires that one become aware of
the existence of Forms and of the derivative character of determinations in the physical
and social world. This is the theme of DDA. Genuine conceptual understanding would
have to have the character of a firm and stable acquaintance with a descriptive content
and should not be subject to changes according to context and perspective. Yet the
instantiations in the physical and social world cannot provide this because their mode of
being is context-relative and unstable. This is the theme of CSA. Only the person who is
acquainted with the Form itself and has a clear representation of it in his soul will be

18
competent to judge upon and produce things that instantiate the Form in the physical
and social world. This is the theme of the passage that immediately follows upon CSA
(484A-D). It provides the epistemological justification for the contention that the
philosophers alone are entitled to rule over a human commonwealth. These three aspects
of the description of the doxastic state of mind and its objects (i.e. the concealment of
the underlying reality of the Forms, the instability of appearance, the insufficiency as
models or standards for judgment and production) together provide the basis for the
subsequent epistemological and pedagogical discussions in books VI and VII about how
we can advance toward a genuinely true conceptual representation of reality and value.

Ad 4) As to the remaining question in which sense epistm is infallible and doxa

fallible I can now confine myself to some brief comments. In a way, the answer can be
very simple: Since the doxastic representation is not true without qualification, it cannot
be called infallible. The epistemic acquaintance, on the other hand, provides a firm and
stable representation which is true of its object without any restriction and cannot turn
into something false. Yet the remark in 477E that doxa is apt to fail while epistm isnt,
is likely to have a wider scope. It seems to characterize the doxastic state of mind in
general, i.e. the cognitive condition that we are in as long as we have not gained an
objective foundation for our concepts and rely on examples instead. The lack of
adequate and reliable concepts is a the source of mistaken judgements. People whose
understanding of justice is based solely on their acquaintance with supposedly clear
instances of justice and who try to extrapolate from these to new situations with the help
of similarities and analogies, may be lucky enough to hit upon a right answer here and
there. But they may quite as well go wrong, not having grasped the essence of justice.
To be sure, also someone with perfected conceptual understanding can go wrong if their
information about the details of the situation is insufficient. But the cause of their error
does not lie in their knowledge of the Form. In that sense, genuine conceptual
knowledge is infallible.
In my introductory remarks I mentioned the problem that CSA distinguishes
epistm and doxa as two different powers (dunameis) of the soul, while later on, in
Rep. VII, 518A-519B, he stresses that the rational dunamis of the soul (the eye of the
soul) is just one and that it is not implanted into our soul by philosophical or scientific
education, but has been active all along if with respect to the inappropriate kind of
objects. The word dunamis is used in many different ways by Plato. In the passage in
Rep. VII dunamis means a faculty, indeed the rational faculty of the soul. Yet in the
text in Rep. V that sets out CSA, it is crucial not to interpret dunamis as faculty. His
examples of sight and hearing are misleading in that respect because they are faculties.

19
In the Rep. VII passage, Socrates grants that the rational faculty, when it applies itself to
the objects and processes of the social or natural world, can achieve a high degree of
shrewdness and sharpness of mind with respect to these, even though it has not been
enlightened by philosophy. This is a kind of competence which is based on experience
and socially transmitted ideas, but without real understanding regarding the basic ethical
concepts that should lead ones pursuit of private and public happiness. There are
several striking passages in books VI and VII that situate this sort competence at the
level of doxa.17 So, from the point of view of Rep. VII, 518A-519B, the one rational
faculty can and does produce doxa-type cognition. Furthermore, there is a clear thematic
sequence that links CSA with this passage in Rep. VII. The Sun follows up on the
description of epistm and doxa as different cognitive states and powers, describing
them as different achievements of the intellectual faculty (represented as an analogon to
the visual faculty) that correlate with the ontological quality of the object of
acquaintance such that only an object which exhibits truth and being allows for
epistm. The imagery of the Sun is then integrated into the much more complex
imagery of the Cave, and the passage in Rep. VII which emphasizes the unity of the
rational faculty, belongs to Socrates comments about the meaning of the Cave.
So all this, taken together, makes it quite clear that also doxa, as described in
CSA, is a product of the rational core of the soul when it is in a deficient condition. The
rational faculty of the soul, which is metaphorically named as eye of the soul, can
produce cognitive states with different levels of cognitive power or force. Only
epistemic cognition is able to present an object to the mind that allows for a firm and
unequivocal grasp. Doxa does not achieve that.

I want to conclude with some general remarks on the concepts of truth and knowledge18
(as acquaintance with Forms) and about the problem of the assertibility of knowledge in
order to shed some more light on the background of CSA. When Socrates started his
reasoning as to why the kind of learning which is provided by theatrical performances
or minor crafts, should not count as genuine interest in knowledge, he hinted at the

17
Cf. Rep. 488C-E, 493A-C, 516E-517A, 517D.
18
On the relation between Platos concept of truth and his epistemology cf. Szaif,
Platons Begriff ...(loc. cit.), 72-324 (see also idem, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in der
klassischen Antike, in M. Enders, idem (eds.), Der philosophische Wahrheitsbegriff in
seiner Geschichte, Berlin/ New York 2006, 1-32.). Two recent interesting attempts at
elucidating the role of altheia in the simile of the Sun (which is pivotal for our
understanding the role of this concept in the Republic) are Franco Ferrari, La causalit
del bene nella Repubblica di Platone, Elenchos, 22 (2001), 5-37; B. E. Hestir, Plato
and the Split Personality of Ontological Altheia, Apeiron 37 (2004), 109-150.

20
connection between the concepts of knowledge and truth, calling the philosophers
lovers of the sight of the truth (475E), and he implied that the kind of experience such
performances and crafts can provide is irrelevant for the achievement of knowledge
because it can grant no acquaintance with the truth. At the same time, his remark also
points forward to one of the central thematic lines that can be followed books VI and
VII: The idea that the orientation toward truth and genuine being is the defining
characteristic of a philosophical pre-disposition and a philosophical life,19 and that the
main goal of the whole curriculum of mathematical and philosophical subjects for the
future philosopher-rulers, the crucial end of their cognitive ascent, is to let the students
become acquainted with the truth.20 The concept of truth at play here is to a large
extent determined by the basic epistemological and metaphysical idea of Platos, viz.
the idea that real knowledge and understanding must be based on an objective
clarification of our concepts and that this can be achieved only by becoming acquainted
with the underlying objective essences or Forms. Plato has adjusted his talk of truth to
the purposes of his epistemology and ontology of Forms.
A very important factor, in this connection, for Platos understanding of the term
truth is his tendency to see truth as the relatum of knowledge (epistm). As he points
out in his discussion of the theory of Forms in the Parmenides, knowledge is supposed
to be of the truth (ts altheias, Parm. 134A). In this turn of phrase, altheia is
understood as reality which can become known. Since Plato conceives epistm
primarily as conceptual clarification on the basis of a specific type of object-cognition,
viz. cognition of the Forms, the corresponding concept of altheia as knowable reality is
not conceived as the counterpart of assertoric truth (which would be something like
facts or existing states of affairs). Rather he uses the phrase the truth (or
interchangeably that which is true, ta alth) to name the whole realm of Forms. 21
The Parmenides-passage is an example for that because it treats altheia as the generic
object of generic epistm, but the different Forms as the objects of the different kinds
of epistm (e. g. knowledge of justice, which is knowledge of the Form the Just). In a
similar manner, though only implicitly, the first of the two arguments in Rep. V (DDA)

19
Cf. Rep. 485A-487A, 489E-490D, Rep. 535 DE, (see also Legg. 730C ff.). On this
topic, cf. Jan Szaif, Die Aletheia in Platons Tugendlehre, in M. van Ackeren (ed.),
Platon Verstehen. Perspektiven der Forschung, Darmstadt 2004, 183-209.
20
E. g. Rep. 525C5-6, 526B2-3, 527B9, E2-3.
21
Cf. Phd. 84A8, Symp. 212A5, Rep. 519B4, Phdr. 247D4, 248C3-4, 249D5. This
usage is also incorporated into the three central similes of the Republic (cf. Rep. 508D4-
6, 510A9, 511E, 515C2, D6-7).

21
identifies the truth with the Forms by identifying the ability to see or contemplate the
truth with the ability see the Forms.
Yet in the context of Platos theory of Forms, truth does not only function as the
notion for knowable reality. When Plato identifies the Forms with the the truth (h
altheia) or that which is true (ta alth), which he does frequently in the books VI
and VII, we are also supposed to understand that only the Forms are what they are in a
not-derivative way, while the being of the instances we are first familiar with, is only
derivative, only a copy of that which is the only true F, the essence itself. Also the idea
of the Forms pure and undiluted being-what-it-is, not faulted by the admixture of
contrary properties, is supposed be an aspect of the truth of the Forms. (The linguistic
basis for these connotations of the word true is the attributive use of true).22
These very specific aspects of ontological truth restrict the application of this term
to objects and, moreover, to a specific ontological category of objects, the Forms. This
concept of truth is adjusted to the purposes of his metaphysical epistemology of
acquaintance with Forms. (It needs to be mentioned that beside this theoretically loaded
concept of truth there is also a much more down-to-earth usage of true in the Republic
and elsewhere , which has the meaning of assertoric trutha concept that he cant
renounce if he wants to uphold the applicability of the knowledge of Forms to concrete
objects in the sensible word. Yet this meaning does not yet get Platos full philosophical
attention in the Republic.) Now, if the truth that can become the content of the epistemic
representation is a set of intellectual objects, not of propositions, does this mean that the
truth which can become known is not assertible at all?
For Plato, knowledge is first and foremost knowledge-what23, i. e. the grasp of
essences. That is why the passage in the Parmenides breaks down truth (altheia), as the
generic object of knowledge, into Forms. In CSA, Plato speaks of knowing that-what-
is as it is. Yet in the case of a Form knowing the thing as it is is knowing what it is. It is
the kind of knowledge Platos Socrates aims at when he discusses questions like What
is beauty?. Now, the grasp of such an essence is typically described by Plato as a kind
of acquaintance (witness the pervasive use of visual metaphors in passages that describe
the cognitive ascent to the Forms). On the other hand, it is also a methodological

22
The association between the term true (in its attributive meaning) and the idea of
the Form as an original (the thing itself) of which certain other things are mere
copies, is particularly prominent in 510A, 520C, Symp. 212A (see also Rep. 484CD,
533A, Crat. 439AB, Soph. 240A). Phd. 67AB explicitly asserts the conceptual
connection between truth and purity (to eilikrines). Cf. the use of eilikrins in Rep. V,
479D5.
23
Cf. Annas, loc. cit., 192.

22
principle of dialectical enquiry that it should try to provide a definition of the Form in
question, a definition that can be asserted and defended in an argumentative exchange.
So this type of acquaintance cannot be totally disconnected from assertibility. Yet how
it connects with assertibility, seems to be a rather complex issue in Plato.
A Form, in Plato, is a reified essence such that the content of which the Form is
supposed to be the one and only pure instantiation can be ascribed to the Form itself (the
so-called self-predication of the Form). Therefore the content which is that as which
the Form becomes known, can also be asserted of the Form. This is the minimum of
assertibility which is fulfilled even by simple, unanalyzable Forms. Yet such an
assertion in which the unanalyzable content is predicated of itself, would have no more
information value regarding the content of this Form than a tautology. Thus this
propositional formulation would certainly be secondary to the pre-propositional
acquaintance with the Form and not be able to express the truth which has become
known, in an informative way. In the case of analyzable Forms, the question what it is
can be answered with an informative definitional statement. Yet even here it seems that
this propositional articulation is somehow secondary to the familiarity with the Form
which cannot be established simply by learning a definitional formula. Otherwise
philosophical instruction would be easy and could consist in memorizing definitional
formulae. This is definitely not Platos position. The ways in which dialectic can
establish knowledge of and acquaintance with Forms, are not the topic of this paper
though.
I want to end by summarizing what I see as three defining characteristics of
Platos concept of epistm that are in the background of the arguments in Rep. V. First,
knowledge is conceived primarily as a type of object-cognition or acquaintance, with
Forms as objects. Secondly, this object-cognition is primarily a kind of knowledge-what
and as such the foundation for a perfected conceptual understanding which is adequate
in virtue of being true to the Forms. Thirdly, this kind of object-cognition connects (in
ways that need further investigation) with the ability to assert and rationally defend
statements about the Form in question (and ultimately about the whole network of
Forms24). In contrast to this, doxa is understood as a developmental stage of conceptual
understanding in which a person has nothing but derivative instantiations to rely upon

24
This is a point that I have not touched upon at all in this paper. It is the reason why in
Plato knowledge as conceptual understanding based on acquaintance with the Forms
connects with knowledge as systematic understanding. this becomes more transparent in
Platos later dialogues. (Yet see Jan Szaif, Platon ber Wahrheit und Kohrenz,
Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (2000), 119-148, on the role of the
systematicity of dialectical knowledge in the Republic)

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instantiations of F-itself whose being-F is context-depended and transient. These
derivative instantiations will turn out not to provide a reliable basis if someone in this
condition is confronted with the question what it is to be an F. Not being acquainted
with that which is trueviz. the original itself behind the transient images, the one
pure and faultless instance of being-Fclinging instead to examples in the natural or
social world which are accepted by the multitude without a sufficient rational
foundation, they will not stand up to the dialectical test.

24