#1 Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, 19 June 1967.

CONCEPCION, C.J.

FACTS: Respondents are several judges who issued a total of 42 search warrants to search petitioners,
their residences, and their offices and to seize and take possession of personal property such as books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, etc. Petitioners filed an action alleging that the search warrants
are null and void mainly for not describing with particularity the things to be seized and the illegality of
how its conducted praying that an injunction be issued against respondents and declaring said warrants
void. Respondents meanwhile maintained the validity of the warrants and that any defect was cured by
petitioners consent.

ISSUE: Are the search warrants valid?

RULING: No, two points must be stressed in connection with the constitutional mandate under Sec 2 Art
III: 1) probable cause; and 2) particularity of description. The warrants stated that the persons named
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." No specific offense had been alleged making it impossible for the judges to have
found the existence of probable cause, for it presupposes competent proof that the party against whom
it is sought has performed particular acts or omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

ISSUE: Are the things seized admissible as evidence?

RULING: No, the ruling in Moncado vs People have already been given up the new approach is the
exclusionary rule, due to the realization that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule
is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the
warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements
of the fundamental law.

#2 Katz vs US

389 U.S 347 (1967)

STEWART, J.

Facts:

Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by
telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1084. Evidence of petitioner's end of the
conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to
the outside of the telephone booth from which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, since
there was "no physical entrance into the area occupied by" petitioner.

Issue:

Was the eavesdropping activity of the government constitutive of a search and seizure as
contemplated in the Fourth Amendment?

Held:

Yes. The court ruled that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements. (Silverman v. United States) The Government's
eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which petitioner justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth, and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.

#3 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ANDRE MARTI, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991

BIDIN, J.

FACTS: Andre Marti was to send four packages abroad. Mrs. Reyes attended to him and had him sign the
contract for the shipment. Mrs. Reyes asked if she could inspect the packages to which he refused and
Mrs Reyes did not insist anymore. The packages were places in a box, was sealed, ready for shipment.
Before shipment, Mr. Reyes, as part of their standard procedure, inspected the boxes before sending it
to customs/post. Upon opening, Mr. Reyes discovered a suspicious object to which he reported to the
NBI. He brought the boxes to the NBI wherein he opened the boxes while the NBI agents merely
observed.
ISSUE: What is the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures?

RULING: This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of
one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is his
residence, his papers, and other possessions. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed and not to private individuals.

#7. Washington Distillers Inc., v. Court of Appeals

TOPIC: Scope and Limitation

FACTS: Private respondent requested assistance in prosecuting alleged illegal users, buyers,
sellers or traffickers of its registered bottles. In response to private respondents request, NBI
agents, accompanied by Atty. Jaime de la Cruz, private respondents legal counsel, conducted
surveillance operations at the premises of petitioner Washington Distillers in Sta. Lucia, San
Fernando, Pampanga. They filed an application for a warrant to search the premises of
Washington Distillers and to seize empty and filled 350cc round white flint bottles with blown-in
marks of Ginebra San Miguel and La Tondea, Inc. Executive Judge Rosalio G. de la Rosa
issued a search warrant, pursuant to which agents of the NBI seized from the premises of
petitioners 314,289 pieces of 350cc round white flint bottles, of which 3,708 were filled and
310,581 were empty. The seized bottles were deposited in the warehouse of private respondent
La Tondea Distillers, Inc. in Velasquez, Tondo, Manila on the ground that there was no space for
storage in the court or in the NBI compound. Petitioners filed a motion to quash the search
warrant.

ISSUE: Is the validity of the search warrant be sustained?

RULING: NO. (1) The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as a result
of the failure of the NBI to commence criminal prosecution and the bottles seized from them
should be returned to petitioners in the absence of any civil action for their recovery.
(2) Respondent Judge Descallar, as assisting judge of Branch XXVIII of the RTC of Manila,
had authority to quash the search warrant issued by the regular judge, Hon. De la Rosa.
(3) Although respondent Judge Descallars ruling that the second warrant could not be
enforced in San Fernando, Pampanga is erroneous, his ruling should have been sustained
on the other ground on which it is based, i.e., violation by private respondent La Tondea of
the rule against forum-shopping in obtaining the search warrant.

DISCUSSION: In the case at bar, there has been not even an attempt to prosecute for
violation of R.A. No. 623, pursuant to which the application for search warrant was
ostensibly made. The NBI, which applied for the search warrant in 1993, did not file any
case against petitioners.
Contrary to the requirement of Rule 126, 11 that property seized by virtue of a search warrant
must be deposited in custodia legis, the NBI delivered the bottles to the private respondent La
Tondea. It is claimed that this was done because there was no place for storage either at the
NBI compound or in the premises of the RTC. This is not a good excuse. Some place could
have been found or rented for the purpose, but the delivery of the bottles to private respondent
cannot be made without giving the impression that private respondent has been given
possession of bottles claimed by petitioners to have been lawfully acquired by them.

Indeed in Vlasons Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals through then Justice Narvasa,
that if no criminal case is instituted after the seizure made pursuant to a search warrant,
the property seized should be delivered to its rightful owner, or at least to the person
from whom it had been seized. The property could not be permitted to stay in a perpetual
state of custodia legis.

A search warrant proceeding is not a criminal action, much less a civil action. It is a special
criminal process, the order of issuance of which cannot and does not adjudicate the permanent
status or character of the seized property. It cannot therefore be resorted to, as was done here
by private respondent, as a means of acquiring property or of settling a dispute over the same.
It is settled that a judge may revoke the orders of another judge in a litigation subsequently
assigned to him. In this case, the fact that Judge De la Rosa was the executive judge is not
material, because jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in him qua executive judge. Applications
for search warrant are made to the executive judge only for administrative purposes.Judge
Descallar, as assisting judge, was competent to resolve the motion seeking to quash the search
warrant.
There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. This is exactly what
private respondent did in seeking the issuance of a search warrant from the Manila Regional
Trial Court, after failing to obtain warrants from the Pampanga courts. It is noteworthy that the
ruling of Judge Descallar on this point was not assailed in the certiorari proceeding before the
Court of Appeals. Hence, even though his ruling on the territorial reach of the warrant issued by
Judge De la Rosa was erroneous in light of the subsequent ruling in Malaloan, the Court of
Appeals should have sustained Judge Descallars order quashing the warrant on the ground that
private respondent La Tondea was guilty of forum-shopping.
8. Savage v. Taypin

TOPIC: SCOPE AND LIMITATION

FACTS: Petitioners Savage, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which resulted in the seizure
of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners located in Biasong,
Talisay, Cebu.

The complaint was lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza, president and general
manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO), alleging that Savages products are
the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. Savage contends however, that there was no existence of
offense leading to the issuance of a search warrant and eventual seizure of its products.

ISSUE: Can a search warrant be issued?

RULING: NO. There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving
design patents in the controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear
whether the crime exists at all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of
Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code. In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the
statute against the State and liberally in favor of the accused, for penal statutes cannot be
enlarged or extended by intendment, implication or any equitable consideration.
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search
warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on
its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in
petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant
is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in
accordance with established jurisprudence.

9. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

TOPIC: SCOPE AND LIMITATION

FACTS: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
[Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of
the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized. A petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was
filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and to
enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using
the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v.
Burgos).

ISSUE: Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the
basis of the issuance of search warrants.

HELD: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. In mandating that no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of
a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos is in possession
or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the
offense of subversion punishable under PD 885, as amended is a mere conclusion of law and
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity
the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
will not suffice.
10. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
Facts: The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los
Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI
placed a listening device to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioners end of
the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The
petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the
evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations
conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a
person?

Ruling: Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that
the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects
persons and not places from unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his
self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited
ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be
seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not
be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Governments activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioners telephone
conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search
warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Dissent: Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that
eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they
drafted the United States Constitution (Constitution). Had they wished to prohibit this activity
under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that
would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue
that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and
seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.
Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for
what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone
booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the open public
would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be
reasonable.

Discussion: The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to

individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J.
Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that
expectation must be reasonable.

11. People v. Aruta G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling
Rosa will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team.
The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio,
when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of her bag,
the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked cash katutak.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality
of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just
come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road
an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by
the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere
to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.

But the trial court convicted the accused in violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: Whether there was a need of search warrant?

Ruling: Yes.
In People v. Ramos, this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno. This exclusionary rule was
later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation
which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must
perforce be strictly construed and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or
allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a
right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.

In the instant case, the accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing
the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was
committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag,
there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

Also, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second,
Arutas identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Aruta
was searched while about to cross a street.

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one
without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General.

Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence illegal and
inadmissible subsequently in evidence.

12. Manalili v. CA G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of CAs decision in affirming TCs
decision on convicting Manalili of illegal possession of prohibited drug violating RA 6425.
Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along the front
of Kalookan Cemetery based on the information that drug addicts were roaming around in the
area, saw a man who appeared to be high on drugs and introduced themselves as policemen. Said
man avoided them and tried to resist, when they asked what the man was holding in his hand, the
man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found what he suspected to be
crushed marijuana leaves. The man was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out to be
Manalili. The substance found on Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry Section
and was confirmed as mj.
Manalilis version of the story was that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3
policemen stopped the tricycle and informed them of the suspected possession of marijuana, the
policemen bodily searched both Manalili and the driver and upon finding nothing illegal on their
persons, let the driver go but brought Manalili along to the police station. Manalili while on the
way to the station saw a neighbor whom he signaled to follow them and when he was again
searched in the station, he was asked to strip his pants where they found nothing illegal. Said
neighbor then asked the policemen to let Manalili go seeing as they had not found anything
illegal but Manalili was put on a cell who was brought to a fiscal later that day and was told not
to say anything despite his saying that the policemen had not found marijuana on his person.
Said tricycle driver and neighbor testified on court as to how the 2 searches yielded nothing
illegal on Manalilis person.

Issue: Whether it was a valid warrantless arrest?

Ruling: Yes.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and
subject to challenge. Sectio n 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in

evidence as a fruit of the poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs
search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure. In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that [i]n these cases, the search and
seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term
eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of
suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place
to be searched.

Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search
without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals ,the Court held that there are many instances
where a search and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one
of which is stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao
stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside
petitioners bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions
for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said
that to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant
might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it
was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine
his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply
shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance
that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery,
which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From his
experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high.