EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991

Facts:

That at about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision occurred between
a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP 717, and a Mazda passenger bus with
Motor No. Y2231 and Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza,
Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the truck sideswiped the
left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the drivers seat to the
last rear seat. Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown out and
died as a result of the injuries they sustained.

The trial court held that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or
combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to the death of
the passengers. It could not be determined from the evidence that it was only the
negligent act of one of them which was the proximate cause of the collision. In view of
this, the liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. The Court of
Appeals ruled on the contrary, it held that the bus driver had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision and his reckless negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand
tractor was the proximate cause of the collision.

Issue:

Whether or not the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bar.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the principle of last clear chance applies in a
suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners
on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. Furthermore, as
between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors
as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by
reason of his discovery of the latters peril, and it cannot be invoked as between
defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot
defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
have avoided the injury.The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed
an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the
defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the
colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against
both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred
in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.

By: RONIL G. ARBIS JD-2

 THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989

Facts:

That a typhoon hit the province of Ilocos Norte bringing heavy rains and flood.
When the typhoon abated and flood water began to recede, Nana Belen went to her
grocery store together with 2 assistants following her to check on her merchadise. After
a few meters away Nana Belen screamed "AY!" then sank into the flood water. The 2
girls following her noticed an electric wire dangling, Nana Belen was electrocuted.

Issue:

Whether or not Ilocos Norte Electric Company is to be held liable.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no
harm is done to the general public" considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and
deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence
and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be (Astudillo vs. Manila
Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now
absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a
fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have
resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission".

By: RONIL G. ARBIS JD-2

 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER

G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991

Facts: That on or about October 10, 1986, accused Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and
Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room in Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the
accused told them to take a bath. When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was
told to remove her clothes by the accused and to join him in bed. At that time, Jessie
was already asleep but Rosario touched him to call his attention. When he looked, he
saw the accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was trying
to penetrate but it would not fit. The following morning the accused left after paying
the children. Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted something in her vagina.
Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object
was already removed from her body and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie claimed
that on the evening of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of
pain in her vagina and when he asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet
removed. Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital with bloodied skirt,
unconscious and foul smelling. After 6 days, Rosario got serious and was pronounced
dead subsequent to her operation with a portion of a sexual vibrator extracted from her
vagina. A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter. The Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo rendered a decision declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing
the rationale of Art 4 of the Revised Penal He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused. The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of the
lower court and acquitted Ritter.

Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
from civil liability

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III,
Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable may still be
civilly liable. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA
559). Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.
Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession. Though
the SC is acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, it emphasizes
that it is not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional
presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case
for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As
earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left
inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. The
Court cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the
facts found in the records of this case. The appellant certainly committed acts contrary
to morals, good customs, public order or public policy (Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier
mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The
Court cannot overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the
Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. Thus, considering the
circumstances of the case, the Court awarded damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot
in the amount of P30,000.00. The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The
appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot.

By: RONIL G. ARBIS JD-2