August 25, 1987.
On September 9, 1987, the last
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO
RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA
CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL,
SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to
declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the
case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De
Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first
resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry
of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the
petition outright for not being verified as required by
Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However,
even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive
grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall
of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On
the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial
Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII,
presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered
judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross
negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals
in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a
copy of which was received by petitioners on
day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal,
petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion
for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this
was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461,
that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing
a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In
its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142
SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and
clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that
no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts,
and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a
motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of
the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-
53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the
rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the
prospective application of said rule, and explained
the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month
grace period from the promulgation
on May 30, 1986 of the Court's
Resolution in the clarificatory
Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,
1986, within which the rule barring
extensions of time to file motions for
new trial or reconsideration is, as
yet, not strictly enforceable.
 Since petitioners herein filed their
motion for extension on February 27,
1986, it is still within the grace
period, which expired on June 30,
1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
chance," which has been applied to vehicular
accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and
Bidin, JJ., concur.

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for

extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace
period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer
within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration
of the grace period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25,
1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the
ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for
their failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in

the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to
the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of
the time the subject decision of the Court of
Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners'
view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified,
consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R.
s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals

committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable
under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total
or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners

argument that private respondents had the "last Republic of the Philippines
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they SUPREME COURT
heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop Manila
and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should
be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No.
34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati,
Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by
the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake
up respondent and instead left the house after
giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of
his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting
his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to
one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn
statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he
alleges that respondent caused his arrest on
January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument
with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant
was not married to De Castro and that the filing of
the administrative action was related to
complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which
was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's
arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed
by De Castro against complainant. According to
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the
police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to
Ongkiko, although he admits having five children
with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko
went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva
Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was
not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license.
Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago,
leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De
Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith
and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized
without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second
marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40
of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in
1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place
in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This
is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Article
40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that
as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the
service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke

good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit
with a woman, who beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962

and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At
the time he went through the two marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer.
Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any
law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent
was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his
first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married
for the second time. His failure to secure a
marriage license on these two occasions betrays
his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the

standard of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed

prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with
De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the

conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality
of morality. A public figure is also judged by his
private life. A judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in
the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too
self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 Republic of the Philippines
[1994]). Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ.
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA.
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated:
CARLOS II,
Respondents. December 16,
2008
x-------------------------------------
-------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to
sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized
during the effectivity of the Family Code, except
cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The
nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be
declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review
on certiorari the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed and set aside the summary
judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage,
status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the
instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia
died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly described
as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA
ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.
6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of
Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07
centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B),
being a portion of Lot 159, situated in
the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa,
Province of Rizal, x x x containing an
area of Thirteen Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (13,441) square
meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the
subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,
approved as a non-subd. project),
being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC]
Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Boun
ded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE,
point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S,
points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the
W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan,
containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130)
SQ. METERS, more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd.
plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion
of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C.
Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE,
along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines
2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on
the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B
of the subd. plan x x x containing an
area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-
SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50,
Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela
36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por
el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto
marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la
Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas,
continiendo un extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51,
Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela
37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por
el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto
Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la
Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles
Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas,
continiendo una extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed
to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance
taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn
over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land
were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No.
139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds
of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of
petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He
was survived by respondents Felicidad and their
son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos
death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name
of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo
II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered
by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, In August 1995, petitioner commenced an
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila. action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity
respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money
case, the parties submitted and caused the approval and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
of a partial compromise agreement. Under the 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
compromise, the parties acknowledged their
respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the
portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land. respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the
absence of the required marriage license. He
On September 17, 1994, the parties likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
the remaining land of the first parcel between them. respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of
v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters of the second the contracts he entered into with respondent
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of Felicidad with respect to the subject real
plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
portion was later divided between petitioner and certificates of title issued in the name of
respondents. respondents. He argued that the properties covered
by such certificates of title, including the sums
The division was incorporated in a received by respondents as proceeds, should be
supplemental compromise agreement executed reconveyed to him.
on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No.
94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as
compromise agreement, which was approved and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
accordingly. attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two
more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, On October 16, 1995, respondents
the parties equally divided between them the third submitted their answer. They denied the material
and fourth parcels of land. averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents
contended that the dearth of details regarding the
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In
Felicidads marriage to Teofilo. Respondents her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that
declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.[5]
the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
Subsequently, the Office of the City
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, its report and manifestation, discounting the
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case possibility of collusion between the parties.
before the trial court. They also asked that their RTC and CA Dispositions
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees, be granted. On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered
judgment, disposing as follows:
But before the parties could even proceed to
WHEREFORE, premises
pre-trial, respondents moved for summary considered, defendants
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of (respondents) Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiffs
the justice of the peace who solemnized the (petitioners) Counter-Motion for
marriage. Respondents also submitted the Summary Judgment is hereby
granted and summary judgment is
Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
as follows:
the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and
respondent Felicidad were designated as parents. 1. Declaring the marriage
between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May
14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage
motion for summary judgment on the ground of Certificate submitted in this case, null
and void ab initio for lack of the
irregularity of the contract evidencing the
requisite marriage license;
marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his
2. Declaring that the
own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II,
presented a certification from the Local Civil is not the natural, illegitimate, or
legally adopted child of the late
Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there Teofilo E. Carlos;
is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II. 3. Ordering defendant
Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00
together with the interest thereon at
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter- the legal rate from date of filing of the
motion for summary judgment the testimony of instant complaint until fully paid;

respondent Felicidad in another 4. Declaring plaintiff as the

case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion
89-2384, entitled Carlos v. adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 11975, covered by TCT No.
 139061 of the Register of Deeds of
Makati City, and ordering said
Register of Deeds to cancel said title
and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract,
Annex K of complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null
and void, and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Makati City to
cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name
of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue
another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract,
Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null
and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation
of TCT No. 210877 in the names of
defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation
of TCT No. 210878 in the name of
defendant Sandoval and defendant
Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for
hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral
damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, appearance fees, and
litigation expenses on June 7,
1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the
CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia,
that the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad
and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child
of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary
judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the
case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the
herein appealed summary judgment
by the court a quo contrary to law and
public policy as ensconced in the
aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it
was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial
court, did not justify the grant thereof
in favor of appellee. Not being an
action to recover upon a claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on
summary judgment apply (sic) to an
action to annul a marriage. The mere
fact that no genuine issue was
presented and the desire to expedite
the disposition of the case cannot
justify a misinterpretation of the
rule. The first paragraph of Article 88
and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition
of decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. Yet, the
affidavits annexed to the petition for
summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of
appellees argument that the
foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent
collusion of spouses in the matter of
dissolution of marriages and that the
death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13,
1992 had effectively dissolved the
marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellees own brother
and appellant Felicidad Sandoval
lived together as husband and wife
for thirty years and that the
annulment of their marriage is the
very means by which the latter is
sought to be deprived of her
participation in the estate left by the
former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the
case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a
quo resolved the issues in the case,
the rule is to the effect that the
material facts alleged in the
complaint for annulment of marriage
should always be proved. Section 1,
Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
Section
1. Judgment on the
pleadings. Where an
answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise
admits the material
allegations of the
adverse party's
pleading, the court
may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment
on such pleading.
But in actions for
annulment of
marriage or for legal
separation, the
material facts alleged
in the complaint shall
always be proved.
(Underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to
sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage
license is among the formal
requisites of marriage, the absence
of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)
in relation to Article 58 of the Civil
Code the failure to reflect the serial
number of the marriage license on
the marriage contract evidencing the
marriage between Teofilo Carlos and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval,
although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside
from the dearth of evidence to the
contrary, appellant Felicidad
Sandovals affirmation of the
existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by
Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the
Peace who officiated the impugned
marriage, to wit:
That as far as I
could remember,
there was a marriage
license issued at
Silang, Cavite on May
14, 1962 as basis of
the said marriage
contract executed by
Teofilo Carlos and
Felicidad Sandoval,
but the number of said
marriage license was
inadvertently not
placed in the marriage
contract for the reason
that it was the Office
Clerk who filled up the
blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn,
may have overlooked
the same.
Rather than the inferences
merely drawn by the trial court, We
are of the considered view that the
veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a
trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the
marriage contract the primary
evidence of marriage is not proof that
a marriage did not take place, neither
should appellants non-presentation thoroughly resolve the issues
of the subject marriage license be pertaining to the filiation of appellant
taken as proof that the same was not Teofilo Carlos II.[8]
procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it
must be emphasized, rests upon the On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for
plaintiff and any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the reconsideration and for the inhibition of
marriage. the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-
Considering that the burden Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
of proof also rests on the party who
disputes the legitimacy of a particular
party, the same may be said of the Issues
trial courts rejection of the
relationship between appellant
Teofilo Carlos II and his putative In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner
father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad hoists the following issues:
Sandovals statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellants
1. That, in reversing and
prior claims regarding the legitimacy
setting aside the Summary Judgment
of appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the
under the Decision, Annex A hereof,
averment in the answer that he is the
and in denying petitioners Motion for
illegitimate son of appellees brother,
reconsideration under the
to Our mind, did not altogether
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with
foreclose the possibility of the said
respect to the nullity of the impugned
appellants illegitimate filiation, his
marriage, petitioner respectfully
right to prove the same or, for that
submits that the Court of Appeals
matter, his entitlement to inheritance
committed a grave reversible error in
rights as such.
applying Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code, despite the fact that the
Without trial on the merits
circumstances of this case are
having been conducted in the case,
different from that contemplated and
We find appellees bare allegation
intended by law, or has otherwise
that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
decided a question of substance not
merely purchased from an indigent
theretofore decided by the Supreme
couple by appellant Felicidad
Court, or has decided it in a manner
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient
probably not in accord with law or
to support what could well be a
with the applicable decisions of this
minors total forfeiture of the rights
Honorable Court;
arising from his
putative filiation. Inconsistent though
2. That in setting aside and
it may be to her previous statements,
reversing the Summary Judgment
appellant Felicidad Sandovals
and, in lieu thereof, entering another
declaration regarding the illegitimate
remanding the case to the court of
filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
origin for further proceedings,
credible when considered in the light
petitioner most respectfully submits
of the fact that, during the last eight
that the Court of Appeals committed
years of his life, Teofilo Carlos
a serious reversible error in applying
allowed said appellant the use of his
Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1,
name and the shelter of his
Rule 34) of the Rules of Court
household. The least that the trial
providing for judgment on the
court could have done in the
pleadings, instead of Rule 35
premises was to conduct a trial
governing Summary Judgments;
on the merits in order to be able to
 3. That in reversing and
setting aside the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of
origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions,
made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the
facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a
marriage may be declared void ab initio through a
judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment
and without the benefit of a trial. But there are other
procedural issues, including the capacity of one who
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of
marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary
judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1,
Rule 19[10] of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the
adverse partys pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always
be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35
of the Rules of Court governing summary judgment,
instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its
finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the
trial court, the CA likewise considered the provisions
on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to
sustain the applicability of the rules
on summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record
shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings
or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in
cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known
as Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in
cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 2003[12] is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The
presiding judge shall personally
conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed
except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for
declaration of absolute nullity or
 annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the (b) x x x If there is no collusion, the
pleadings, summary judgment, or court shall require the public
confession of judgment shall be prosecutor to intervene for the State
allowed. (Underscoring supplied) during the trial on the merits to
prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement
Truly, only the active participation of the public
in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In that case, We
prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage
the interest of the State is represented and protected
from the application of summary judgments.
in proceedings for declaration of nullity of marriages
by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
Prescinding from the evidence.[16]
foregoing discussion, save for
annulment of marriage or declaration II. A petition for declaration of absolute
of its nullity or for legal separation,
summary judgment is applicable to all nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
kinds of actions.[14] (Underscoring husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of
supplied) marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the
court has divested the State of its lawful right and Civil Code.
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the
State is not terminated by the declaration of the Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
the parties. The State should have been given the Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute
opportunity to present controverting evidence before nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
the judgment was rendered.[15] outside of the marriage. The Rule made it
exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that
the court should order the prosecuting attorney to SEC. 2. Petition for
appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no
suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if (a) Who may file. A petition
there is no suppression of evidence, the public for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be by the husband or the
presented or laid down before the court is not wife. (Underscoring supplied)
fabricated.
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity declaration of absolute nullity of void
of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
prosecutor, viz.: enlightening, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to Only an aggrieved or injured

appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x spouse may file a
 petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do
not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor,
and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its
dissolution.[17] (Underscoring
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband
and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones
who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the
engineers of their marital life. They
simultaneously the directors and actors of their
matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can
and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends
only to marriages entered into during the effectivity
of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of
the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule
never intended to deprive the compulsory or
intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the
law. They can still protect their successional right,
for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or
intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule
does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage
involved is within the coverage of the Family
are
Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became
effective on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its
application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs
of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines, and is prospective in
its application.[22] (Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage
case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14,
1962. Which law would govern depends upon when
the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of its celebration.[24] But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any
person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of
a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as
a license for any person to institute a nullity of
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.[25] Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the
real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v.
Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil
Code which is the law in force at the
time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is
no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who
can demonstrate proper interest can
file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest and must be based
on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file
the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father to
their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality
to file the petition to declare the nullity
of marriage cannot be ascertained
because of the absence of the
divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. Hence, a remand of the
case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether
respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not
allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio but
reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00
to P50,000.00 and exemplary
damages from P200,000.00
to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the
trial court must dismiss the instant
petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality
to file the same.[29] (Underscoring
supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to
determine whether or not petitioner is a real-
party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity
of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when
Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their
son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs
ART. 1003. If there are no
are called to succeed by operation of law.[30] descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights succeed to the entire estate of the
and obligations to the extent of the value of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Underscoring
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory supplied)
heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Indeed, only the presence of descendants,
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child,
ascendants or illegitimate children excludes
respectively.
collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of
the decedent. The presence of legitimate,
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are
illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the
compulsory heirs, to wit:
deceasedprecludes succession by collateral
[32]
relatives. Conversely, if there are no
(1) Legitimate children and
descendants, with respect to descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
their legitimate parents and surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
ascendants;
succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.[33]
(2) In default of the foregoing,
legitimate parents and If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally
ascendants, with respect to their
proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
legitimate children and
descendants; adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of
(3) The widow or widower;
his deceased brother
(4) Acknowledged natural children, with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering
and natural children by legal that collateral relatives, like a brother and sister,
fiction; acquire successional right over the estate if the
(5) Other illegitimate children referred decedent dies without issue and without ascendants
to in Article 287 of the Civil in the direct line.
Code.[31]
The records reveal that Teofilo was
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as predeceased by his parents. He had no other
compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally
such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a found and proven to be not a
compulsory heir, he legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo,
still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles petitioner succeeds to the other half of the
1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide: estate of his brother, the first half being allotted
to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New
ART. 1001. Should brothers
and sisters or their children survive Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-
with the widow or widower, the latter interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity
shall be entitled to one-half of the of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be
half.
void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire
estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal
personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of
marriage case is contingent upon the final
declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate,
adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate,
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the
nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground
that he has no successional right to be protected,
hence, does not have proper interest. For although
the marriage in controversy may be found to be void
from the beginning, still, petitioner would not
inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,[34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes
the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the
case for trial on the merits to determine the validity
or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But
the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of
action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is
a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son
of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the
question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is
proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the
disposition of the trial court as to the other
causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as
issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case
concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This
notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter
hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review
matters not specifically raised or assigned as error
by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just resolution of the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits
having been conducted in the case, petitioners bare
allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted
from an indigent couple is insufficient to support a
total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative
filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its
pronouncement that the declaration of respondent
Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the
appellate court, such declaration of respondent
Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We
remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article
167 of the Family Code to protect the status of
legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be
considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an
adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the
legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that is
proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The
language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by
the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of
petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of
money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that
the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision
is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional

Trial Court in regard to the action on
the status and filiation of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II and the validity
or nullity of marriage between
respondent Felicidad Sandoval and
the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the

legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of the late Teofilo
Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS th
e action for nullity of marriage for lack
of cause of action;
THIRD DIVISION
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8
of the fallo of its decision ANITA CHENG, G.R
Petitioner,
is VACATED AND SET ASIDE. Pre

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to YNA

Cha
conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give - versus - CHI
this case priority in its calendar. VEL
NAC
PER
No costs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and Pro
SO ORDERED. TESSIE SY,
Respondents. July

x------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court of the Order dated January
2, 2006[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452
entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and
Tessie Sy.
The antecedents are as follows
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases
before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against
respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy
(Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy
and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William
Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce
(PBC) Check Nos. 171762 and 71860
for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both
of which were dishonored upon presentment for
having been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on
January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2)
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP
Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch
7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of
the prosecution to prove the elements of the
crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-
969952 contained no declaration as to the civil
liability of Tessie Sy.[3] On the other hand, the Order
in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 contained a
statement, Hence, if there is any liability of the
accused, the same is purely civil, not criminal in
nature.[4]
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on
demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order[5] dated
February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of
petitioner to identify the accused respondents in
open court. The Order also did not make any
pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused
respondents.
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against
respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
complaint[6] for collection of a sum of money with
damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the
same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the
two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and
BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order[7] dated January 2, 2006, the
RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action
to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages
was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22
cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[8] which
the court denied in its Order[9] dated June 5,
2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal
issue
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and
Guidelines in the filing and
prosecution of criminal cases under
BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the
present case where the nature of the
order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the
respondents was [based] on the
failure of the prosecution to identify
both the accused (respondents
herein)?[10]
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg.
22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated
on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be
given only prospective application. She further
contends that that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action
correspondent to the criminal action is deemed
instituted with the latter
(1) additional evidence as to the
identities of the accused is
necessary for the resolution
of the civil aspect of the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be
just as efficacious as or even
more expedient than a timely
remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings
on the civil aspect of the case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any
pronouncement as to the civil
liability of the accused
amounting to a reservation of
the right to have the civil
 liability litigated in a separate
action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that
the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not
exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an
obligation ex-contractu and
not ex-delicto pursuant to
Article 31[11] of the Civil Code;
and
(6) the claim for civil liability for
damages may be had under
Article 29[12] of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not
assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22
proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP
Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express
reservation to litigate separately, or has not
instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the
amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted
with the criminal cases.[13]
This rule applies especially with the advent
of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the
estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to
recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and
remained pending before the respective trial
courts. This is consonant with our ruling
in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada[14] that the possible
single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a
bouncing check can be the subject of both civil
actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and
the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22,
simultaneously available to the complaining party,
without traversing the prohibition against forum
shopping.[15] Prior to the judgment in either the
estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the
complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected
either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in
the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the
other.[16]
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime
beyond reasonable doubtwhere in Criminal Case
No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as
regards the civil liability of the accused and in
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court
declared that the liability of the accused was only
civil in natureproduced the legal effect of a
reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate
separately the civil action impliedly instituted with the
estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code.[17]
However, although this civil action could have been
litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the
estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner
was deemed to have also elected that such civil
action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22
cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure
to establish the identity of the accused, the question
that arises is whether such dismissal would have the
same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put
differently, may petitioners action to recover
respondents civil liability be also allowed to prosper
separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were
dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure states
Section 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions.
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be
allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and
civil actions, the offended party shall
pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which
shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the
complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages,
the offended party shall pay the filing
fees based on the amounts alleged
therein. If the amounts are not so
alleged but any of these damages [is]
subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment.
 Where the civil action has been filed
separately and trial thereof has not
yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying
the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2
of this Rule governing consolidation
of the civil and criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in
1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply
even to cases already pending at the time of their
promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights does not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. It is
axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected,
nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for
this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.[18]
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the
criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes
the corresponding civil action to recover the amount
of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is
intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then,
the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before
the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of
petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In
view of this special rule governing actions for
violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is
not applicable.[19]
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure
before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for the
speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice
and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain
this objective.[20]
However, in applying the procedure
discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be
left without a remedy to recover from respondents
the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This
could prejudice even the petitioners Notice of Claim
involving the same amount filed in Special
Proceedings No. 98-88390 (Petition for Voluntary
Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and
Tessie Sy), which case was reportedly archived for
failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable
length of time.[21] Expectedly, respondents would
raise the same defense that petitioner had already
elected to litigate the civil action to recover the
amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22
cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention
that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor
during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner
indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to
protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to
have her establish the identities of the accused
during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil
action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg.
22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22
cases, petitioners recourse pursuant to the
prevailing rules of procedure would have been to
appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned
to respondents corresponding to the bounced
checks.Hence, the said civil action may proceed
requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the
part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the
reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver
altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability
of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake
of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are
constrained to digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes,
negligence and omission of their counsel.[22] But this
rule admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels
mistake is so great and serious that the client is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where
the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in
the clients deprivation of liberty or property without
due process of law.[23] Tested against these
guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls within the
exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels
to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent
enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the Bar.[24] Further,
lawyers in the government service are expected to
be more conscientious in the performance of their
duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They
are not only members of the Bar but are also public
servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.[25] Apparently, the public prosecutor
neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the
proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he
failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted
with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining
remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover
the money she loaned to respondents, upon the
dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this
failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to
prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay
their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial
courts observation when it dismissed the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there
was any liability on the part of respondents, it was
civil in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the
inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount
would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of
respondents, as they may now conveniently evade
payment of their obligation merely on account of a
technicality applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person
is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived
at the expense of or with damages to another. This
doctrine simply means that a person shall not be
allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at
anothers expense. One condition for invoking this
principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved
party has no other recourse based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other
provision of law.[26]
Court litigations are primarily designed to
search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and
application of the rules which will give the parties the
fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to
ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and
vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities.[27] For reasons of
substantial justice and equity, as the complement of
the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their
rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to
the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent
to do so,[28] we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil
Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v.
Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby
ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189649 April 20, 2015
ADORACION CARO LINO (spouse and in
substitution of the deceased JEREMIAS A.
CAROLINO),Petitioner,
vs.
GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, as Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP);
BRIG GEN. FERNANDO ZABAT, as Chief of the
AFP Finance Center; COMMO. REYNALDO
BASILIO, as Chief of the AFP-GHQ Management
and Fiscal Office; and COMMO. EMILIO
MARAYAG, Pension and Gratuity Officer,
Pension and Gratuity Management Center, AFP
Finance Center, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45
seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated May 25, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103502 and the
Resolution2 dated September 10, 2009 denying
reconsideration thereof.
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino,
petitioner's husband, Retired3 from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) with the rank of
Colonel under General Order No. 1208 dated
November 29, 1976, pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No.
340,4 as amended. He started receiving his monthly
retirement pay in the amount of P18,315.00 in
December 1976 until the same was withheld by
respondents in March 2005. On June 3, 2005,
Jeremias wrote a letter5 addressed to the AFP
Chief of Staff asking for the reasons of the
withholding of his retirement pay. In a letter
reply,6 Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension
and Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance Center,
informed Jeremias that his loss of Filipino
citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the
alpha list of the AFP Pensioners Payroll effective
March 5, 2005; and that he could avail of re-
entitlement to his retirement benefits and the
restoration of his name in the AFP Pensioners'
Master list Payroll by complying with the
requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the
Dual Citizenship Act.
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias'
pension was done pursuant to Disposition
Form7 dated October 29, 2004,which was approved
by the Chief of Staff and made effective in January
2005. In the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge
Advocate General opined that under the provisions
of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340, retired
military personnel are disqualified from receiving
pension benefits once incapable to render military
service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to
a foreign country. It was also mentioned that
termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of
the AFP could be done pursuant to the provisions
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 16388which
provides that the name of a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the
retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon such loss. It being in consonance with the
policy consideration that all retirement laws
inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are
repealed and modified accordingly.
On August 24, 2006, Jeremias filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a
Petition for Mandamus9against Gen. Generoso
Senga, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brig. Gen.
Fernando Zabat, as Chief of the AFP Finance
Center, Comm. Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the
AFP- GHQ Management and Fiscal Office, and
Comm. Emilio Marayag, Pension and Gratuity
Management Officer, Pension and Gratuity
Management Center, AFP Finance Center, seeking
reinstatement of his name in the list of the AFP
retired officers, resumption of payment of his
retirement benefits under RA No. 340, and the
reimbursement of all his retirement pay and
benefits which accrued from March 5, 2005 up to
the time his name is reinstated and, thereafter, with
claim for damages and attorney's fees. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-06-58686, and
raffled off to Branch 220.
On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its
Decision10 granting the petition for mandamus, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., as
Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brigadier General
Fernando Zabat, as the Commanding Officer of the
AFP Finance Center, Commodore Reynaldo
Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-GHQ Management and
Fiscal Office, and Captain Theresa M. Nicdao, as
Pension and Gratuity Officer of the Pension and
Gratuity Management Center, or any of their
respective successors and those taking instructions
from them as agents or subordinates, to:
a. immediately reinstate the name of
petitioner in the list of retired AFP Officers,
and to resume payment of his retirement
benefits under RA 340; and
b. release to [petitioner] all retirement
benefits due him under RA 340 which
accrued to him from March 2005
continuously up to the time his name is
reinstated in the list of AFP retired officers.11
The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the
applicability of RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638 upon
Jeremias' retirement benefits. It found that he
retired as a commissioned officer of the AFP in
1976; thus, RA No. 340 is the law applicable in
determining his entitlement to his retirement
benefits and not PD No. 1638 which was issued
only in 1979. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides
that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless
the contrary is provided." PD No. 1638 does not
provide for such retroactive application. Also, it
could not have been the intendment of PD No.
1638 to deprive its loyal soldiers of a monthly
pension during their old age especially where, as
here, the right had been vested to them through
time. RA No. 340 does not provide that the loss of
Filipino citizenship would terminate one's retirement
benefits; and that PD No. 1638 does not reduce
whatever benefits that any person has already
been receiving under existing law.
Respondents sought reconsideration,12 but the
RTC denied the same in an Order13 dated May 25,
2007, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED,
considering that the questioned decision has not
yet attained its finality. The Motion for Execution in
the meantime is hereby DENIED.14
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the
CA. After the submission of the parties' respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for decision.
Jeremias died on September 30, 200715 and was
substituted by his wife, herein petitioner. On May
25, 2009, the CA granted respondents' appeal. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeal is GRANTED. The appealed decision is
REVOKED and SET ASIDE.16
In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that
Jeremias retired in 1976 under the provisions of RA
No. 340, as amended, which does not contain any
provision anent cessation or loss of retirement
benefits upon acquiring another citizenship, PD No.
1638, which was signed in 1979, effectively
repealed RA No. 340, as amended. Section 27 of
PD No. 1638, which provides that the name of a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement
benefits terminated upon such loss, was correctly
made applicable to Jeremias' retirement benefits.
Logic dictates that since Jeremias had already
renounced his allegiance to the Philippines, he
cannot now be compelled by the State to render
active service and to render compulsory military
service when the need arises. The CA found that
for the writ of mandamus to lie, it is essential that
Jeremias should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of
respondents to perform the act required which
petitioner failed to show; thus, mandamus will not
lie.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
in a Resolution dated September 10, 2009.
Hence, this petition raising the following:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND
RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED THE 26 FEBRUARY 2007 DECISION
OF THE QC RTC BECAUSE:
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot
be used against petitioner as her husband's
retirement and pension were granted to him by the
AFP under RA 340 which was not superseded by
PD 1638, a later statute.
Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of
mandamus to compel the reinstatement of his
pension and benefits from the AFP under RA 340
as PD 1638 was not applicable to him. Petitioner
contends that her husband's retirement from the
active service in 1976 was pursuant to the
provisions of RA No. No. 340 as PD No. 1638 was
not yet in existence then, and there was nothing in
RA No. 340 that disqualifies a retired military
personnel from receiving retirement benefits after
acquiring foreign citizenship. The concept of
retirement benefits is such that one is entitled to
them for services already rendered and not for
those to be made at a future time. Retirement
benefits due petitioner's husband under RA No.
340, is an acquired right which cannot be taken
away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638 does not
expressly provide for its retroactive application.
Respondents, being officers of the AFP tasked to
implement the provisions of RA No. 340 have
neglected their function thereunder by delisting
petitioner's husband as a retiree, thus, mandamus
is proper.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that
PD No. 1638 applies to all military personnel in the
service of the AFP whether active or retired; hence,
it applies retroactively to petitioner's husband. Even
when a retiree is no longer in the active service, his
being a Filipino still makes him a part of the Citizen
Armed Forces; that whether a military personnel
retires under the provisions of RA No. 340 or under
PD No. 1638, he is still in the service of the military
and/or the State only that he is retired, thus, they
should not be treated differently upon the loss of
Filipino citizenship. He argues when there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the two laws of
different vintages, i.e., RA No. 340 and PD No.
1638, the latter enactment prevails.
The Solicitor General argues that mandamus will
not issue to enforce a right to compel compliance
with a duty which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. In this case, petitioner's
husband does not have a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to continuously receive retirement
benefits after becoming an American citizen.
Likewise, the AFP does not have a clear and
imperative duty to grant the said benefits
considering that Section 27 of PD No. 1638
provides that the name of a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the
retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon such loss.
Petitioner filed her reply thereto.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioner's husband retired in1976 under RA No.
340. He was already receiving his monthly
retirement benefit in the amount of P18,315.00
since December 1976 until it was terminated in
March 2005. Section 5, RA No. 340 provides:
Sec. 5. Officers and enlisted men placed in the
retired list shall be subject to the rules and articles
of war and to trial by court-martial for any breach
thereof. At any time said officers and enlisted men
may be called to active service by the President.
Refusal on the part of any officer or enlisted man to
perform such services shall terminate his right to
further participation in the benefits of this Act
provided he resides in the Philippines and is
physically fit for service. Such fitness for service
shall be determined by applicable regulations.
The afore-quoted provision clearly shows how a
retiree's retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e.,
when the retiree refuses to perform active service
when called to do so provided that (1) the retiree
resides in the Philippines and (2) is physically fit for
service. There is no other requirement found in the
law which would be the reason for the termination
of a retiree's retirement benefits. Petitioner's
husband was never called to perform active service
and refused to do so, however, his retirement
benefit was terminated. The reason for such
termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship
based on Section 27 of PD No. 1638, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under
Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the
retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list
and his retirement benefits terminated upon such
loss.
We find that the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638
to the retirement benefits of petitioner's husband.
Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under
Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws
shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future
only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to
some legal provisions;17 that all statutes are to be
construed as having only prospective operation,
unless the purpose and intention of the legislature
to give them a retrospective effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used; and that every case of doubt must
be resolved against retrospective effect.18 These
principles also apply to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision
regarding its retroactive application, nor the same
may be implied from its language. In fact, Section
36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree
shall take effect upon its approval. As held in
Parreo v. COA,19 there is no question that PD No.
1638, as amended, applies prospectively. Since PD
No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system of
retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the
service at the time of its approval.20 Conversely, PD
No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired
before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that
after an act is amended, the original act continues
to be in force with regard to all rights that had
accrued prior to such amendment.21
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically
provides for the retirees to whom the law shall be
applied, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under
Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the
retired list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the retired list
and his retirement benefits terminated upon such
loss. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under
those above-enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638
as he retired under RA No. 340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to
retirement benefits or pension vests in an
employee, he must have met the stated conditions
of eligibility with respect to the nature of
employment, age, and length of
service.22Undeniably, petitioner's husband had
complied with the conditions of eligibility to
retirement benefits as he was then receiving his
retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was
terminated. Where the employee retires and meets
the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested
right to the benefits that is protected by the due
process clause.23 It is only upon retirement that
military personnel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits.24 Retirees enjoy a protected
property interest whenever they acquire a right to
immediate payment under pre-existing law.25
In Ayog v. Cusi,26 we expounded the nature of a
vested right, thus:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has
become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S.
1173).1wphi1 It is "the privilege to enjoy property
legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the
rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12
C.J.S. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or
interest in property which has become fixed and
established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20,
cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of
vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by
the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or
by a change in the constitution of the State, except
in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16
C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term
"vested right" expresses the concept of present
fixed interest, which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right
which an enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot
deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal,
192 Atl. 2nd 587). 27
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the
payment of his retirement benefits which must be
respected and cannot be affected by the
subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which
provides that loss of Filipino citizenship terminates
retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a
demand, but also an exemption from new
obligations after the right has vested.28
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No.1638
recognize such vested right, to wit:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be
construed in any manner to reduce whatever
retirement and separation pay or gratuity or other
monetary benefits which any person is heretofore
receiving or is entitled to receive under the
provisions of existing law.
xxxx
Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect
to the provisions of this Decree and to preserve the
rights granted to retired or separated military
personnel, all laws, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has
no intention to reduce or to revoke whatever
retirement benefits being enjoyed by a retiree at the
time of its passage. Hence, Section 35 provides for
an exception to what the decree repealed or
modified, i.e., except those necessary to preserve
the rights granted to retired or separated military
personnel.
We also find that the CA erred in finding that
mandamus will not lie.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down
under what circumstances petition for mandamus
may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to
be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by
reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when
petitioners legal right to the performance of a
particular act which is sought to be compelled is
clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right
which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable
as a matter of law.29 A doctrine well-embedded in
our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only
when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the
performance of the act sought to be compelled and
the respondent has an imperative duty to perform
the same.30 The remedy of mandamus lies to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty.31 A
purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.32 If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.33

The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's

husband with the RTC was for the payment of his
Republic of the Philippines
terminated retirement benefits, which has become
SUPREME COURT
vested, and being a ministerial duty on the part of
Manila
the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is
the proper remedy to compel such payment.
FIRST DIVISION
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006
administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for vs.
review.34 However, the principle of exhaustion of THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh
administrative remedies need not be adhered to Division) and BARBERSHIP MANAGEMENT
when the question is purely legal.35 This is because LIMITED and NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING
issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the AGENTS, INC. Respondents.
administrative officer.36 Appeal to the administrative
officer would only be an exercise in futility.37 Here,
the question raised is purely legal, i.e., what law
should be applied in the payment of retirement DECISION
benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus, there was no
need to exhaust all administrative remedies before YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
a judicial relief can be sought.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
Decision dated May 25, 2009 and the Resolution CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 dated March 30, 2001 which
dated September 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 2 of the National Labor
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 31,
Decision dated February 26, 2007 of the Regional 1998 dismissing petitioners complaint for payment
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, is of disability and other benefits for lack of merit and
AFFIRMED. the Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals denying petitioners motion for
SO ORDERED. reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning
Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto
G. Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel
registered and owned by its principal and co-
respondent, Barbership Management Limited.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at
the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while
petitioner was assisting in the loading operations,
the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner
experienced dizziness and he subsequently
collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that
he had a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage
from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. 5 Petitioner
underwent a brain operation and he was confined at
the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A.
On July 19, 1990, he underwent a second brain
operation.
Owing to petitioners physical and mental condition,
he was repatriated to the Philippines. On August 21,
1990, he was examined at the American Hospital in
Intramuros, Manila where the examining physician,
Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go
back to sea duty and has been observed for 120
days, he is being declared permanently, totally
disabled." 6
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the
respondents convinced him to settle his claim
amicably by accepting the amount of
US$13,200. 7 Petitioner accepted the offer as
evidenced by his signature in the Receipt and
Release dated February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria
Famanila and one Richard Famanila, acted as
witnesses in the signing of the release.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with
the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC OCW Case
No. 6-838-97-L praying for an award of disability
benefits, share in the insurance proceeds, moral
damages and attorneys fees. On September 29,
1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire A.
Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. Petitioner appealed the decision with
the NLRC. On March 31, 1998, the NLRC
promulgated its decision 10 finding the appeal to be
without merit and ordered its dismissal. When the
motion for reconsideration 11 was denied by the
NLRC in its resolution dated June 29,
1998, 12 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
this Court. On December 2, 1998, we resolved to
refer the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National
Labor Relations Commission. 13
On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals
promulgated the assailed decision which dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
petition for review raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING
THE VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE
SINCE PETITIONERS CONSENT THERETO WAS
VITIATED THEREBY MAKING THE SAME VOID
AND UNENFORCEABLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD
APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIM OF THE
PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED
FOR UNDER THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND NOT THE 10-YEAR PERIOD
PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.
Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and
Release voluntarily or freely because he was
permanently disabled and in financial constraints.
These factors allegedly vitiated his consent which
makes the Receipt and Release void and
unenforceable.
The petition lacks merit.
It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme
Courts judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is confined only to errors of law. It does not
extend to questions of fact. More so in labor cases
where the doctrine applies with greater force. 14 The
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already
determined the factual issues, and these were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they are
accorded not only great respect but also finality and
are deemed binding upon this Court so long as they
are supported by substantial evidence. 15 We
reviewed the records of the case and we find no
reason to deviate from the findings of the labor
arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and
unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise to
a voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code, the
vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud. 16 If consent is given
through any of the aforementioned vices of consent,
the contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is
binding unless annulled by a proper action in
court. 18
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total
disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and
Release thereby rendering it void and
unenforceable. However, disability is not among the
factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, save for
petitioners self-serving allegations, there is no proof
on record that his consent was vitiated on account of
his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated
consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release
must be upheld. We agree with the findings of the
Court of Appeals that:
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to
show that petitioners consent was vitiated when he
signed the agreement. Granting that petitioner has
not fully recovered his health at the time he signed
the subject document, the same cannot still lead to
the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept the
agreement, for his wife and another relative
witnessed his signing.
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release
which was attached by petitioner in his appeal does
not show on its face any violation of law or public
policy. In fact, petitioner did not present any proof to
show that the consideration for the same is not
reasonable and acceptable. Absent any evidence to
support the same, the Court cannot, on its own
accord, decide against the unreasonableness of the
consideration. 19
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes
frowned upon and are considered as ineffective in
barring recovery for the full measure of the workers
right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom
does not amount to estoppel. 20 The reason is plain.
Employer and employee, obviously do not stand on
the same footing. 21However, not all waivers and
quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the
agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on
the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of change of mind. It is only where there is
clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
But where it is shown that the person making the
waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding
undertaking, 22 as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched
in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as
to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit
that legally pertains to them. 23 We have reviewed
the terms and conditions contained in the Receipt
and Release and we find the same to be clear and
unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by
petitioners wife, Gloria T. Famanila and one Richard
T. Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in
part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of
THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
DOLLARS (US$13,200.00) or its equivalent in
Philippine currency THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS
(365,904.00), the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged to my full and complete satisfaction x
x x I, ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, x x x hereby remise,
release and forever discharge said vessel "HANSA
RIGA", her Owners, operators, managers,
charterers, agents, underwriters, P and I Club,
master, officers, and crew and all parties at interest
therein or thereon, whether named or not named,
including but not limited to BARBER SHIP
MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD INTERNATIONAL
MANNING AGENTS, INC. and
ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and all
claims, demands, debts, dues, liens, actions or
causes of action, at law or in equity, in common law
or in admiralty, statutory or contractual, arising from
and under the laws of the United States of America,
Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the
Philippines and/or any other foreign country now
held, owned or possessed by me or by any person
or persons, arising from or related to or concerning
whether directly or indirectly, proximately or
remotely, without being limited to but including the
said illness suffered by me on board the vessel
"HANSA RIGA" on or about 21st June 1990 at
Portland, Oregon and disability compensation in
connection therewith.
This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended
to release all liabilities of any character and/or claims
or damages and/or losses and/or any other liabilities
whatsoever, whether contractual or statutory, at
common law or in equity, tortious or in admiralty,
now or henceforth in any way related to or occurring
as a consequence of the illness suffered by me as
Messman of the vessel "HANSA RIGA", including
but not limited to all damages and/or losses
consisting of loss of support, loss of earning
capacity, loss of all benefits of whatsoever nature
and extent incurred, physical pain and suffering
and/or all damages and/or indemnities claimable in
law, tort, contract, common law, equity and/or
admiralty by me or by any person or persons
pursuant to the laws of the United States of America,
Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the
Philippines and of all other countries whatsoever.
I hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully
understand this instrument which was read to me in
the local dialect and I agree that this is a FULL AND
FINAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all parties
and things referred to herein, and I further agree that
this release may be pleaded as an absolute and final
bar to any suit or suits or legal proceedings that may
hereafter be prosecuted by me or by any one
claiming by, through, or under me, against any of the
persons or things
referred to or related herein, for any matter or thing
referred to or related herein. 24
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere
consent and from that moment the parties are bound
not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. 25 Further, dire necessity
is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt
and Release since it has not been shown that
petitioner was forced to sign it. 26
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive
period for the money claims against the respondents
is the three year period pursuant to Article 291 of the
Labor Code which provides that:
ART. 291. Money Claims. All money claims arising
from employer-employee relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
(3) years from the time the cause of action accrued;
otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxxx
Since petitioners demand for an award of disability
benefits is a money claim arising from his
employment, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies.
From the time petitioner was declared permanently
and totally disabled on August 21, 1990 which gave
rise to his entitlement to disability benefits up to the
time that he filed the complaint on June 11, 1997,
more than three years have elapsed thereby
effectively barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30,
2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 which affirmed the
Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dismissing petitioners complaint for
disability and other benefits for lack of merit, and
the Resolution dated October 5, 2001 denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO
MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES
WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, represented by
their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the
January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the
Orders dated July 21, 20002 and July 17, 20033 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138
in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004
Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors
Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes
(Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate
of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei,
who died intestate in Makati City on October 29,
1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00
consisting of real and personal properties. His
known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy
and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents
prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima
Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in the
meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the
decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of
the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition
was a Certification Against Forum
Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate
can be settled without securing letters of
administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court. He further argued that private
respondents should have established their status
as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima
Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against
forum shopping should have been signed by private
respondents and not their counsel. They contended
that Remedios should have executed the
certification on behalf of her minor daughters as
mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the
Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs
alleged that private respondents' claim had been
paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished
by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and
Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all
liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to
Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver
of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted
guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no
renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal
application of the rules, the trial court also rejected
petitioner's objections on the certification against
forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the
Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated
January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for
lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed
Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17,
2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED.
Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to
resolve the controversy over the illegitimate
filiation of the private respondents (sic)
minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille
Oanes Wei who are claiming successional
rights in the intestate estate of the deceased
Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
disregarded existing rules on certification against
forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of
Claim executed by Remedios released and
discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima
Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private
respondents do not have the legal personality to
institute the petition for letters of administration as
they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime
of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the
Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's
certification can be considered substantial
compliance with the rules on certification of non-
forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new
issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of
the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private
respondents' petition should be dismissed for
failure to comply with the rules on certification of
non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and
Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents
from claiming their successional rights; and 3)
whether private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides
that the certification of non-forum shopping should
be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be
cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal
application of the rules is proper where the higher
interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v.
Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition
may have been flawed where the certificate of non-
forum shopping was signed only by counsel and
not by the party, this procedural lapse may be
overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice.12 So it is in the present controversy where
the merits13 of the case and the absence of an
intention to violate the rules with impunity should be
considered as compelling reasons to temper the
strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of
Claim, the same does not bar private respondents
from claiming successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be
attributed to a person when its terms do not
explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a
right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of
hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full
settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever
nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the
document did not specifically mention private
respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima
Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly
waived the hereditary rights of private respondents,
such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article
1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free
disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or
incapacitated persons may be accepted
by their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance
left to their wards only by judicial
authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the
poor shall belong to the persons designated
by the testator to determine the
beneficiaries and distribute the property, or
in their default, to those mentioned in Article
1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate
the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to
an alienation of property16 which must pass the
court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the
ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is
void and will not bar private respondents from
asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is
the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no
basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of
a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot
be established by a consent given under a mistake
or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not
have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistently denied that
private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus
be inconsistent to rule that they waived their
hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do
not have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation
of waiver on the part of private respondents must
fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the
same would be premature considering that private
respondents have yet to present evidence. Before
the Family Code took effect, the governing law on
actions for recognition of illegitimate children was
Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of
natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except
in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the
mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either
or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced
within four years from the finding of the
document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the
Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the
Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of the
Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children
is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence,
the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy
may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or
in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child
shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same
period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an
illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or
an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, the action for recognition may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime.
However, if the action is based upon open and
continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
rules or special laws, it may only be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue
of prescription depends on the type of evidence to
be adduced by private respondents in proving their
filiation. However, it would be impossible to
determine the same in this case as there has been
no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a
trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by
the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial.
While the original action filed by private
respondents was a petition for letters of
administration, the trial court is not precluded from
receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation.
Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate, including the
determination of the status of each heir.20 That the
two causes of action, one to compel recognition
and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As
held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the
position of the present plaintiff can in any
event maintain a complex action to compel
recognition as a natural child and at the
same time to obtain ulterior relief in the
character of heir, is one which in the opinion
of this court must be answered in the
affirmative, provided always that the
conditions justifying the joinder of the two
distinct causes of action are present in the
particular case. In other words, there is no
absolute necessity requiring that the action
to compel acknowledgment should have
been instituted and prosecuted to a
successful conclusion prior to the action in
which that same plaintiff seeks additional
relief in the character of heir. Certainly,
there is nothing so peculiar to the action to
compel acknowledgment as to require that a
rule should be here applied different from
that generally applicable in other cases. x x
x G.R. No. 174689
The conclusion above stated, though not
heretofore explicitly formulated by this court,
is undoubtedly to some extent supported by
our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment,
but who has not been in fact acknowledged,
may maintain partition proceedings for the
division of the inheritance against his
coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5;
Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the
same person may intervene in proceedings
for the distribution of the estate of his
deceased natural father, or mother
(Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde
vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations
has it been thought necessary for the
plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is
that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might
take by inheritance are before the court; and
the declaration of heirship is appropriate to
such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the
denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its
Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the
records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES
SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the
likeness of God; He created them male and
female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed
planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North
Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the
voices said. She pecked the reed once, then
twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked
and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong)
and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The
Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a
woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs
and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May
a person successfully petition for a change of name
and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect
the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in
the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962.
His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that
is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female" and that he had always identified himself
with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a
mans body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he
(petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was
in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male"
to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was
published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for
three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were
sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional
requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also
presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a
decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to
evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely
for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not
petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that
granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-assignment],
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and
acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune
to be trapped in a mans body is not his own
doing and should not be in any way taken
against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm,
injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition
would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and
the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show
any cause or ground to deny the present
petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG]
has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING the petition and ordering the
Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of
[p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first
name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and
petitioners gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of
Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked
legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus,
the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition,
set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered
the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his
name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under
Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the
ground for his petition for change of name and sex.
As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to
evade any law or judgment or any infraction
thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely
for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex.
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the
physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by
individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not
a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled
by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048
(Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA
9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or
Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It
vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court,
until and unless an administrative petition for change
of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It
likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy
and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which
change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First
Name or Nickname. The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first
name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter ones
legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioners first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name,
he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name.20 In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that
he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it
prayed for the change of petitioners first name was
not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally
done. It was an improper remedy because the
proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth
certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit
since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court
of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in
so far as the change of his first name was
concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth
Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412
of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this
provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA
9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule
108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or
typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used
in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error"
refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that
is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place
of birth or the like, which is visible to
the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected
or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality,
age, status or sex of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code
and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the
Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in
the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery
of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated
under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth.25 However, no
reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of
the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were
all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in
the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate
children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial
decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events
and judicial decrees produce legal consequences
that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the
legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age,
nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his
personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive
term status include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality,
capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as
birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and
family relations. It is a part of a persons legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article
413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the
registration of civil status shall be governed
by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register
Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of
births. The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in
default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be
sufficient for the registration of a birth in the
civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and
shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician or midwife in attendance at the
birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above
mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship
and religion of parents or, in case the father
is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant
was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a
historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is
determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no
law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of
his or her birth, if not attended by error,30is
immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to
be given their common and ordinary meaning in the
absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words
"sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry
(and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage,
there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish
a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between
male and female."33 Female is "the sex that
produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex
that has organs to produce spermatozoa for
fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are
presumed to have been used in that sense unless
the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the
statutory language of the Civil Register Law was
enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged,
it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then
is something alterable through surgery or something
that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have
succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis
for his petition for the correction or change of the
entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to
First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of
Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was
in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is
wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious
and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found
that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner
will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment
of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioners petition were to
be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates
that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty
of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to
make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this
case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file
petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they
may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall
be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a
person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to
write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law
on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of
government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also
entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the
commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed
an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed
solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of

her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM,Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the
Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the
criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v.
Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent

Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On
January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the
time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July

19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by
the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time,
their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came
home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a
promise to provide monthly support to their son in
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
(which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and
her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the
Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing
thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife
established a business known as Paree Catering,
located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the
parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her
counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances,
petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal
to support his minor child with
petitioner. Respondent submitted his counter-
13
affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted
her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an information for the
crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-
Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the
present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still
continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of
financial support legally due him, resulting in
economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the
RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was
arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of
Permanent Protection Order to which respondent
filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was
arraigned. Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu
19
having resolved the application of the protection
order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged; and (2) prescription of the crime
charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the
herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground
that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the
respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondents
obligation to support their child under Article
19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which
"equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children
regardless of the obligors nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order25 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling.
Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are
basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court
hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our
national law (The Family Code) in regard to a
parents duty and obligation to givesupport to his
child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively
established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner
who fails to give support tohis child,
notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give
such support, it is the considered opinion of the
court that no prima faciecase exists against the
accused herein, hence, the case should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be
held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his
minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are
taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the
Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development
Corporation,28 which lays down the instances
when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on
appeal directly to the Supreme Court without
violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any
of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or
involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed
the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the
three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC,
to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of
error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a
petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and
law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the
CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law. The third mode of appealis
elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions
of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not
call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood
of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution
involve questions of law the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether
or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do
so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant
petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who
allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation
to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the
factual milieu of the present case, therefore,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which
will eventually serve as a guidepost for future
cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant
petition and remanding the same to the CA would
only waste the time, effort and resources of the
courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations
of efficiency and economy in the administration of
justice should prevail over the observance of the
hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We
find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioners contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the
legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code,
which provides the parents obligation to support
his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding
the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation
to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is
not excused from complying with his obligation to
support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that
there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are
entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is
not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that
petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent,
who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the
New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine
laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of
the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to
family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter
that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences
of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in
position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the
principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to
which they belong even when staying in a foreign
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the
respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present
case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded
the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son,
he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and
prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree), because
Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already
enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondents failure to prove the
national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the
Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land
as well as its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in view of the nationality principle
on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce
Covenant presented by respondent does not
completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioners
allegation that under the second page of the
aforesaid covenant, respondents obligation to
support his child is specifically stated,46which was
not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that
notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation
to support their children or that such obligation is
not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of
America, NT and SA v. American Realty
Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the
English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said
foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract
is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons,
their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the
instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single
cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is pertinent
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available
as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when
its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give
justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation
to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner
herself, respondent is no longer liable to support
his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in
San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife,
the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further,
she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject
to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find
that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing
or failing to give support topetitioners son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and
Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman
or her child to engage in conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to desist from or desist
from conduct which the woman or her child has
the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited
to, the following acts committed with the purpose
or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's
or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman
or her children of financial support legally due her
or her family, or deliberately providing the
woman's children insufficient financial support; x x
xx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor childrenof access to the
woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or
denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and
children.
In addition, considering that respondent is
currently living in the Philippines, we find strength
in petitioners claim that the Territoriality Principle
in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable
that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in
refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of
Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondents
argument that granting, but not admitting, that
there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A.
No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A.
No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. Acts falling
under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g)
to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under
Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53which started in 1995 but is
still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not
prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether
respondent has provided support to petitioners
child calls for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby
remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court
of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same
court to conduct further proceedings based on the
merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in
his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner

which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be
followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter
against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay
down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to
be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda

Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together
for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20,
1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual

recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such

connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was
failure of their marriage and that they had been living
apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal

separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show
that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding
and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of
that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after
the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with
yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr.,
after the corresponding investigation, recommended
the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review,
the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two
complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were
eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of
the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the
sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the
Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the
cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of
Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave
due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of
Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned
and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further
proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal
cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence,
Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand,
respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April
6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and
for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the
petition for review then pending before the Secretary
of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the
respondent judge in an order dated September 8,
1987. The same order also directed the arraignment
of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and
William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such
refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her
counsel were fined and the former was ordered
detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a
plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the
main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to
try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8,
1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23,
1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted
on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the
dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for
shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the
crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon
a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in
it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn
written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate
since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and
concubinage by the parents, grandparents or
guardian of the offended party. The so-called
exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of
the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and
vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with
the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not
include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In
other words, only the offended spouse, and no other,
is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time
of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar
and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss
in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the
prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply.
Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and
fundamentally commenced by the State, through the
People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in
the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot
be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution
for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse
assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a
matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal
of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would
be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at
the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the
status and capacity of the complainant to commence
the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action.
It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action
would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement
thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior
to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to
but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the
case. We would thereby have the anomalous
spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time
when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local
precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as
to when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in
law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the present
case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary
in the commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and
existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes
in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders where
the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall
have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been
properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution
of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that
 'No prosecution for adultery can be
commenced except on the complaint
of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of
defendant when the offense is said to
have been committed, he had ceased
to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his
status was not such as to entitle him
to make the complaint. We have
repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as
well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion
that the unoffending spouse must be
such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule
should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the
matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the
accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates
the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and
by this is meant that he is still married to the accused
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.,
et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and
her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in
a trial court here alleging that her business concern
was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff
be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously
demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any
of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law,
private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal
assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale,
private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could
not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no
legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once
a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither
would there be a danger of introducing spurious
heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the
reasons for the particular formulation of our law on
adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no
spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of
the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs.
Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal
Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared void",
the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers
intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a
married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have
her marriage contract declared null and void, until
and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be
logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can
still be filed after the declaration of nullity because
such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint
for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity
would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover,
what was consequently contemplated and within the
purview of the decision in said case is the situation
where the criminal action for adultery was
filed before the termination of the marriage by a
judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same
rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the
termination of the marriage was effected, as in this
case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et
al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of
said case reveals that the offended spouse therein
had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for
adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue
determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying
petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in
Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction.
The temporary restraining order issued in this case
on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-
RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A.
RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage
between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan
City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of
the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of
Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian
government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7]In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still
in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on
May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed
that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far
back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the
couples wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was
able to secure a divorce decree from a family court
in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the
Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.[15] The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of
both parties.[16] After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved
on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of
any defect in an essential element of the marriage;
that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce
decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the
divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage
to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a
naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a
substantial requisite voiding the petitioners
marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of
Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of
the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this
case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to
remarry, without first securing a recognition of the
judgment granting the divorce decree before our
courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes
of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two,
there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
 Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and
Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of
the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng
Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree,
like any other foreign judgment, may be given
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She
adds that respondent miserably failed to establish
these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the
law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex
loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
requirements of the place where the marriage was
performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal
principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for
absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant
it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil
Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and
a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows
the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce,
as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.[28] Therefore, before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree
can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13
and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required,
each of the contracting parties shall file separately
a sworn application for such license with the proper
local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties
has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties
has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the
death certificate of the deceased spouse or the
judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity
of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute
nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of
the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not
affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the
Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a
written official act of an Australian family
court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before
a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the
other hand, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and
Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court.[35] However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and
52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove
Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because
she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges
may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies
with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised
by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent
Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.[44] The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to
Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the
insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence,
she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce
decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry
under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its
strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The
two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while
the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar
which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an
interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the
court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted
on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage
only after proof of good behavior.[47]
 On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree
contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the
divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the
divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on
Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the
simple reason that no proof has been presented on
the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal
capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a
marriage license. According to her, its absence is
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to
remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to
contract marriage is determined by the national law
of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in
Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the
alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no
evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to
marry petitioner. A review of the records before this
Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner:
(a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January
12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c)
Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick
A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson
(Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro
Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D.
Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 --
Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate
of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d)
Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in
the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and
Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot
conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree
ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity
to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his
legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to
declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that
under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there
being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the
Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly
procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the
case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondents
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground
of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN,* respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both
Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. They were not however blessed with
children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their
agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July
1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three
(3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix
Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married
for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On
31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for
issuance of letters of administration concerning the
estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also
referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the
surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis,
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the
latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves,
Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino
Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina
and the Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and
the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the
sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the
immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled
hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as
well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed
to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the
trial court required the submission of the records of
birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs
would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required
documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v.
Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and
decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the
divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that
their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that
there was no showing that marriage existed between
private respondent and Arturo, much less was it
shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with
her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a
brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987[4] only
petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate
heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of
the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the
two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the
Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that
the recognition of the children by the deceased as
his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made
in their respective records of birth.Thus on 15
February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted
declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the
exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the
other half.[7] Private respondent was not declared an
heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned
records of birth that she and Arturo were married on
22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since
it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina
and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the
circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules
of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground
alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27
November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of
the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there
is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the
Padlan children or as to their respective shares in
the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second,
the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one
of law which can be resolved in the present petition
based on established facts and admissions of the
parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision
relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists
either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs
that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of
Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to their respective
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to
who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The
trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed
to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate
declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply
issued an order requiring the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs
would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's
motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to
inherit from the decedent considering that she had
secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted
procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that
Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of
a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in
issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties
either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her
favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v.
Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside
and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was
relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed
to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship.[15] The trial court did not grant private
respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both
petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were facts and circumstances. There must also be
married in the Philippines."[16] It maintained that their identical causes of action, subject matter and
divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, issue.[22] The present petition deals with declaration
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance
citizenship pertained solely to the time of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain
of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied properties belonging to the estate of
with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to existence of forum shopping.
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their
divorce was decreed. The trial court must have WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering
proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the remand of the case to the court of origin for
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo. T. Padlan as intestate heirs isAFFIRMED. The order
of the appellate court modifying its previous decision
Respondent again raised in her appeal the by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate
issue on petitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not merit to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She Arturo's brotherRuperto Padlan, is likewise
even furnishes the Court with the transcript of AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the the reception of evidence by the trial court should be
hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the
certain transfer certificate title as well as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
The motion to declare petitioner and her
before another trial court. When asked whether she
was an American citizen petitioner answered that counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the SO ORDERED.
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file
a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about
her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual
issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial
court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did
not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court
for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be
determined by the trial court should be limited only
to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She
and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the
prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under
Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she
is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for
petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be
dismissed for forum shopping,[21] the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
involve the same transactions and same essential
 Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes
Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The
marriage produced four children.

Several years later, the couple encountered marital

problems that they decided to separate from each
other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided
to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a
Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge
of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws.6

Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private

respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the
Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual
consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June
23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of
Republic of the Philippines properties between Tristan and Lily.
SUPREME COURT
Manila On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar
O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
FIRST DIVISION States7 and both lived as husband and wife until
October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.8
G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the
divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican
ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
vs.
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A.
Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was
CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-
deemed void under Philippine law. When she
CATINDIG, Respondents.
confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her
that he would legalize their union after he obtains an
DECISION annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further
promised the petitioner that he would adopt their son
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his
estate as that of each of his children with Lily.9
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25, 2003 On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
74456 which set aside and declared as null and void Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as
the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the Regional Trial Case No. Q-01-44847.
Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, granting
petitioners motion for leave to file intervention and Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to
admitting the Complaint-in-Intervention3 in Civil File Intervention10 claiming that she has a legal
Case No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 interest in the matter in litigation because she knows
Resolution4 denying the motion for reconsideration. certain information which might aid the trial court at
a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily case, which the trial court granted on September 30,
Gomez Catindig5 twice on May 16, 1968. The first 2002. Petitioners complaint-in-intervention was also
marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the order
dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The
Court of Appeals granted the petition and declared
as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of
the trial court granting the motion for leave to file
intervention and admitting the complaint-in-
intervention.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
contends that the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the
annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. However, if the error subject of the recourse
is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
granted by a court with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as
alleged in this case, the proper remedy is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.11 This
is based on the premise that in issuing the assailed
decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate
if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the
lower court.12
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to
establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed
decision and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of
discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion
is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.13 The word "capricious,"
usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary,"
conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.
Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari,
a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion is imperative.14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before
a person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. A person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is
so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with
leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.15
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal
interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the original parties may be delayed
or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may
be protected in a separate proceeding or not.16
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene,
must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will
either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment.17 Such interest must be actual,
direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant.18
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and
companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
requisite legal interest required of a would-be
intervenor under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the law,
petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence
her claim of legal interest has no basis.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14,
1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from
the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the
Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by
Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights
and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether
he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a
petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from
spouse and eventually becomes successful in
getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines
will not recognize such absolute divorce.20

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968,

their marriage was governed by the provisions of the
Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30, 1950.
In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,

sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled
to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither
is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country.
(Emphasis added)

Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan

even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks
merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal
interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.

Since petitioners motion for leave to file intervention

was bereft of the indispensable requirement of legal
interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order
granting the same and admitting the complaint-in-
intervention was attended with grave abuse of
discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
correctly set aside and declared as null and void the
said order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The

assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and
Resolution dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
 children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married

Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6

Republic of the Philippines On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent

SUPREME COURT Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
Manila before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with
THIRD DIVISION
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the
time of their marriage up to his death on December
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 18, 1992.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of
vs. their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she
filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before
x ---------------------------------------------------- x the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 146 thereof.

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD
SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review
assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which
reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in
SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit
on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the
decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street,
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that
the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as
legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage,
and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership
assets be liquidated and that letters of administration
be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis,
one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos
place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to
file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same
grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994,
the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss,
respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner
Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their
motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of
Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos
from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent,
possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion
for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge
Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from
the Order denying their motion for reconsideration
arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul
T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the
parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers
on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void
ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was
not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled
that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate
children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for
the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in
its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12,
1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule
73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided
in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters
of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had
legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by
virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As
a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo
was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage
with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of
paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and
the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of
E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view sweeping statement
of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the
Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our
state against divorce in any form whatsoever."
Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All
that the courts should do is to give force and effect
to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on
December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x
x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws".
For this reason, the marriage between the deceased
and petitioner should not be denominated as "a
bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via
the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo
later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the
said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and
Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid
because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that
pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile"
which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one intends to return. They claim that
a person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage
to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was
performed during the subsistence of the latters
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph
2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because
it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was
properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial
Court of the province "in which he resides at the time
of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence as contradistinguished
from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing
the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it ones domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
"residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval
and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in
one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to
the time of his death. Respondent submitted in
evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also
presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine
Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country
Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990
sent by the deceaseds children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa"
while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial
Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a
resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed
on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was
still a municipality and the branches of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal
personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or
before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through
a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that
the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be
protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse
had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court
of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from
the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation
of husband and wife, and to free them both from the
bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision
of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not
be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said
case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper
party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino
wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court
stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in
1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the
development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long
been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the
Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise,
Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if
the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the
historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on
August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy,
a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in
resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the
enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where one
is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil
Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned.
However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law
by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of
the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them
so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in
a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and
must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a
law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in
every case brought to it for decision. Justice is
always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law
be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the
laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo
allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate
and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial
court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated
to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the
subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as
regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that
letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section
2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x
x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation,
the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or
their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides
that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary
that the property be acquired through their joint
labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the
portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of
both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations
of couples living together as husband and wife but
are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or
the acquisition of property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The
Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money,
property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the
partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponents defense. x x x81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents

legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners
motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-
Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12,
Republic of the Philippines 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they
SUPREME COURT begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L.
Manila Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna,
FIRST DIVISION Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY.
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014 LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart
from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, separation of property, to which end, they entered
vs. into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY
GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby
ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents. they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
DECISION
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a
BERSAMIN, J.: divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual
under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in
Hence, any settlement of property between the Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same
parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the together as husband and wife until 1987.
husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new
The Case law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner.
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan
Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY.
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora Development
decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati Condominium Project(condominium unit) at
City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52
pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on
unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired installment basis for 36months starting on April 15,
during the second marriage. 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law
office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of
Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was
Antecedents
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was
issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA bearing the following names:
as follows:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan
Offices at that time when he was living with his first (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero- Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently,
Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of
Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium
unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a
new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7,
1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON,
married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and
the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common
under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that
the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium
unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter
established and headed another law firm with Atty.
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm
lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12,
1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken
over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the
first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to
his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who
established his own law firm named Renato G. De la
Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of
ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch
138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said
properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the
extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her
share in the said properties plus her share in the
net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to
her in the latters last will and testament; and thatthe
heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna
excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject
properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be
declared the owner of the portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an
accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit
pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted;
that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad
administer the subject properties;and that the heirs
of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand
costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision
after trial upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing
thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit located at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
(517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to
have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna
through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under
any other concept over the condominium
unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry
of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be
changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married
to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the
books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as
soon as appropriate arrangements have
been madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following
errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY
OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO
HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT
IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT
THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED
AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION
OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED
BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF
THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF
THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION
OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS
BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND
LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY
FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following
errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY.
LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF
PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER
CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS
LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF
PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM
HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its
assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of
ATTY. LUNA until the latters death on July 12, 1997.
The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY.
LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate
his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign
divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in
our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity,
Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the
condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM
PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100)
(sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged
to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(first marriage), having been acquired from
the sole funds and sole industry of Juan
 Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has
no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry
in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with
respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan
Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to
be the owner of the books Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for
review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and
Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable;
hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
not recognizing the Dominican Republic
courts approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce
sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among
the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit;
and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the
Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether
the second marriage entered into by the late Atty.
Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any
rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of
the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule. The Civil
Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the
effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase
by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage
on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both
of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the
only two types of defective marital unions under our
laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages.
As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the
first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule,
however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of
his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to
the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a
special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and
family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce
in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for
the sanctity of the marital union especially among
Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of
a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the
death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on
marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree
dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in
this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement)
that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into
and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership was enforceable against
Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error
in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because
the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
time of their marriage, did not specify the property
regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the
time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil
Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation
of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same
are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this
Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal
partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of
gains the husband and wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income
from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership,
the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until
terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains
terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property
under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna
and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of
the Agreement by a competent court was still
required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil
Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration
in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed when
the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to
a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has
been declared absent, or when legal separation has
been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any
petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any
such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect
the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of
partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the
CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal
partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no
question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for
their execution of the Agreement were identical to
the grounds raised in the action for divorce.21 With
the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable
under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine
public policy and public law, the approval of the
Agreement was not also legally valid and
enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being
bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the
second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas
subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12,
1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground
that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the
death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before
the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the
bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on
co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the
Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together
as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by eitheror both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership
carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it
became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of
her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership,
without sufficient and competent evidence, would
warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained
in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v.
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a
bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the
petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous
and adulterousunion is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the fact that the controverted property was
titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous
relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership
absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the
partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of
the opponents defense. This applies with more vigor
where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was
allowed to present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The
plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief
prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome
measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove
the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can
be granted only after the court isconvinced that the
facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently
proved her actual contributions in the purchase of
the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at
least P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions
of P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna
had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco
Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such
aggregate contributions of P306,572.00
corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty.
Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit
amounting to P362,264.00 of the units purchase
price of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further
asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of
her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had
even sent her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the
financial capacity to make the contributions and
purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the
properties on his own due to the meagerness of the
income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on
the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked
the petitioners assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and
conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance
of evidence that her own independent funds were
used to buy the law office condominium and the law
books subject matter in contentionin this case
proof that was required for Article 144 of the New
Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to
apply as to cases where properties were acquired
by a man and a woman living together as husband
and wife but not married, or under a marriage which
was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil
Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But
this was not readily applicable to many situations
and thus it created a void at first because it applied
only if the parties were not in any way incapacitated
or were without impediment to marry each other (for
it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful
wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the
Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the
property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions
and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution
was required. The same rule and presumption was
to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of
credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership
accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the
party who acted in bad faith was not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article
147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both
parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the
exception while conjugal partnership of gains was
the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable
social institution and divorce decrees are not
recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs.
Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in
the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she made an actual contribution to purchase the said
property. She failed to establish that the four (4)
checks that she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the
Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00
payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months
before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7"
was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978
in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff,
thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The
third check which was for P49,236.00 payable to
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment
of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit
"M", for P4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980.
None of the foregoing prove that the amounts
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the
acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash
contribution of P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated.
Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDADs claim of
co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit and the trial court correctly found
that the same was acquired through the sole industry
of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the
condominium unit was in the name of Atty. Luna,
together with his partners in the law firm. The name
of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the
spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the
use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and
Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his
partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to
show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof.
Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being
evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast,
given the subsistence of the first marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty.
Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal
funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained
to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time
of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to
the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT

No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof
that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium
unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration
does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer.

So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of
books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that
she had anything to contribute and that she actually
purchased or paid for the law office amortization and
for the law books. It is more logical to presume that
it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space
and the law books from his earnings from his
practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or Republic of the Philippines
ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm SUPREME COURT
that he headed.30 Manila

The Court upholds the foregoing findings and SECOND DIVISION

conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
 DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, $550,000.00
vs. (unpaid debt
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent. $285,000.00)

DECISION Furniture and furnishings $3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
PEREZ, J.:
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
Before the Court is a petition for review assailingBank
the of America Checking Account $8,000
1
9 May 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the Bank8 of America Cash Deposit
December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, $56,228.00
The factual antecedents are as follow: annuities

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras
(Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California,
United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then
begot two children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and
JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia
worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following
properties in the Philippines and in the USA:
LIPPINES
OPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
se and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. P1,693,125.00
ted at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
ila (Sampaloc property)
cultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. P400,000.00
ocated at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
arcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares P490,000.00
ted at Maria Aurora, Aurora
arcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. P175,000.00
ted at Sabang Baler, Aurora
as. coconut plantation in San Joaquin P750,000.00
a Aurora, Aurora
A and judgment was duly entered on 29 June
OPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
se and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street,
y City, California
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by Davids
parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a
bank and mortgaged the property. When said
property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid
a total of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and
returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia,
sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora
province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence
of Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that
David shall return and pay to Leticia P750,000.00,
which is equivalent to half of the amount of the
redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3)
that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and
interest in the conjugal and real properties situated
in the Philippines.5 David was able to
collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
property, leaving an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.
3
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair,
Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The
California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005
2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the
couples properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003
Joint Affidavit and Davids failure to comply with his
obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the
power to administer all conjugal properties in the
Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and
desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3)
the declaration that all conjugal properties be
forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half
of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the
sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
ofP50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the
dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June
2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of
San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA
properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorneys fees of both parties
be charged against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as
follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A.
Noveras committed acts of abandonment
and marital infidelity which can result intothe
forfeiture of the parties properties in favor of
the petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction
over the properties in California, U.S.A. and
the same can be included in the judicial
separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x
executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras
and respondent David A. Noveras will
amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latters
property rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras
isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of
the P2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their
property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of
the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the
property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including
interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties
should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorneys feesand
litigation expenses of the parties were
chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the
parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment
as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the
parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community
of property ofthe parties in the Philippines
are hereby ordered to be awarded to
respondent David A. Noveras only, with the
properties in the United States of America
remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the
Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, United States of America, dissolving
the marriage of the parties as of June 24,
2005. The titles presently covering said
properties shall be cancelled and new titles
be issued in the name of the party to whom
said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to
respondent David A. Noveras in the
preceding paragraph are hereby given to
Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with
petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and
said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in
the income from these properties shall be
remitted to them annually by the respondent
within the first half of January of each year,
starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United
States of America awarded to petitioner
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in
paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and
Jena, her two minor children with respondent
David A. Noveras as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be
annotated on the titles/documents covering
the said properties. Their share in the income
from these properties, if any, shall be
remitted to them annually by the petitioner
within the first half of January of each year,
starting January 2008;
 5. For the support of their two (2) minor
children, Jerome and Jena, respondent
David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00
as monthly allowance in addition to their
income from their presumptive legitimes,
while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take
care of their food, clothing, education and
other needs while they are in her custody in
the USA. The monthly allowance due from
the respondent shall be increased in the
future as the needs of the children require
and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on
the purchase price of the Sampaloc property,
the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to
pay P5,000.00 to respondent David A.
Noveras and P405,000.00 to the two
children. The share of the respondent may
be paid to him directly but the share of the
two children shall be deposited with a local
bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe
taken out in their names, withdrawal from
which shall only be made by them or by their
representative duly authorized with a Special
Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit
shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30)
days after receipt of a copy of this Decision,
with the passbook of the joint account to be
submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court
of this Court within the same period. Said
passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of
Court only by the children or their attorney-
in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorneys
fees incurred by the parties shall be
shouldered by them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are
US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to
their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of
the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by
the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties
marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial
court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one
for liquidation of the absolute community of property
regime with the determination of the legitimes,
support and custody of the children, instead of an
action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court
first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute
any marriage settlement before the solemnization of
their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family
Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance
with the doctrine of processual presumption,
Philippine law should apply because the court
cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the
parties did not submit any proof of their national law.
The trial court held that as the instant petition does
not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant
of judicial separation of properties, the absolute
community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of
Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court
observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment
and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not
entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the
properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the
childrens presumptive legitimes. The trial court held
that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver
or renunciation made by David of his property rights
in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial
courts Decision by directing the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses.
Moreover with respect to the common childrens
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered
both spouses to each pay their children the amount
of P520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the
assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of
Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil
Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as
follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community
of property of the parties in the Philippines
are hereby divided equally between
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A.
Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph
2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome
and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes
which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said
 properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by
petitioner annually within the first half of
January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and
petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each
ordered to pay the amount ofP520,000.00 to
their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes from the sale of the
Sampaloc property inclusive of the
receivables therefrom, which shall be
deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora,
under a joint account in the latters names.
The payment/deposit shall be made within a
period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa
copy of this Decision and the corresponding
passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe
Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period,
withdrawable only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall
read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby
ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana
(sic) the amount of P1,040,000.00
representing her share in the proceeds from
the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry
of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon
City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics
Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA,
Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome
Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of
Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties
to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before
the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to
share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to
unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that
the latter was already granted all US properties by
the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David
and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a
decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded
all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect
to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a
petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the
divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we
stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for
Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may
be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2)
a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof. Such official publication or copy
must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer
has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be
issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy
or consular officials stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. The attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may
be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent
California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of
Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on
certification where we held that "[petitioner therein]
was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured
the divorce and that divorce is recognized and
allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however,
it appears that there is no seal from the office where
the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual
presumption17 as the lower courts did with respect to
the property regime of the parties, the recognition of
divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between
Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The
trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage
settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed
provided that the modification isjudicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles
66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for
judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and
6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has
been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe
spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the
court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has
abandoned the latter or failed to comply with
his or her obligations to the family as
provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage settlements
has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the
spouses have been separated in fact for at
least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and
(3), the presentation of the final judgment against the
guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the
grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of property.
(Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was
no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article
135 of the Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the
Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when he/she has left the
conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if
the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give
any information as to his or her whereabouts within
the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the
respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even
went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going
back to the USA to visit her and their children until
the relations between them worsened. The last visit
of said respondent was in October 2004 when he
and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of
a petition for dissolution of marriage with the
California court. Such turn for the worse of their
relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also
be considered as valid causes for the respondent to
stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant
a judicial separation of property was not tackled in
the trial courts decision because, the trial court
erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the
absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence
that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not
been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had
been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his
own business. Second, Leticia heard from her
friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita
Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita
Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the
hospital where David was once confined, testified
that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife
of David in the Consent for Operation form.20 Third
and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and
it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had
actually separated for at least one year, the petition
for judicial separation of absolute community of
property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute
community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th
paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal
separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or
declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property
during the marriage under Articles 134 to
138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation
follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute
community regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine
courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing
separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of
each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute
community shall be paid out of its assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties
in accordance with the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive
properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the
absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements, or unless
there has been a voluntary waiver of such
share provided in this Code. For purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and
63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the
common children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the
parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse
with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below
the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such
majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said
children. At the risk of being repetitious, we
will not remand the case to the trial court.
Instead, we shall adopt the modifications
made by the Court of Appeals on the trial
courts Decision with respect to liquidation.
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of them the amount of P520,000.00 as their
the Civil Code clearly states that real property as well presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
only be limited to the Philippine properties. Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of
Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in SO ORDERED.
the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines,
as well as the payment of their childrens JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court Associate Justice
explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share

in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1wphi1 While both claimed to have
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their
contributions came from, the same is presumed to
have come from the community property. Thus,
Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the
redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds

from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given
full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be
charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount
of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor Republic of the Philippines
cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at SUPREME COURT
least the Statement of Contributions and Manila
Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on SECOND DIVISION
Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014
as the same had not benefited the family. In sum,
Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,
of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in vs.
the respective amounts of P1,040,000.00. SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.
xxxx DECISION
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil BRION, J.:
Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary
estate of the father and of the mother." The children
Before us is the Petition for Review on
arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank
spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, (Orion) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents assailing the decision2 dated August 23, 2012 and
covering the same, as well as to their respective the resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.
Sampaloc property including the receivables from
Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. The Factual Antecedents
Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay
In the first week of August 2003, respondent
Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national,
met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire
about a condominium unit and a parking slot at
Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly
owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean
national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa
(SRRV) holder.
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit
No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) No. 18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42
[covered by CCT No. 9118]5 were for sale
for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured
Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking
slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the
parties agreed to reduce the price
to P2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki
issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI)
Check No. 833496 for One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On
August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another
check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time
for P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining
balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 26, 20039 covering Unit No. 536 and
Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took
possession of the condominium unit and parking
lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior
of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations
with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties,
which were then allegedly in possession of
Alexander Perez (Perez, Orions Loans Officer)
for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands,
Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later
on learned that Kang had left the country,
prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the
properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of
Deeds.
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118
representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained
under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through
Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez,
certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase
price of Unit. No. 53610 and Parking Slot No.
42.11 CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the
condominium unit had no existing encumbrance,
except for anannotation under Entry No. 73321/C-
10186 which provided that any conveyance or
encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject
to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority
(PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry
No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for
a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry
No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation
of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the
properties remained in possession of Perez.
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim 12 dated September 8,
2003, withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong
City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in
CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the
delivery of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited
the need to consult Orions legal counsel as its
reason.
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter
from Orions counsel dated October 9, 2003,
stating that Kang obtained another loan in the
amount of P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to
pay, he executed a Dacion en Pagodated
February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering Unit
No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the
Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No.
42 (covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was
annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the
parking lots title.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Kang
and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the
following admissions and stipulations:
1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was
the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and
Parking Slot No. 42;
2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion
supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry
No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2,
1999, was subsequently cancelled by
Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June
16, 2000;
 3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas
never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and
9118;
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate
capital gains tax and the documentary
stamp tax for the alleged Dacion en Pago
on October 15, 2003;
5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by
CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to
Orion; and
6. That when Suzuki bought the properties,
he went to Orion to obtain possession of
the titles.
The RTC Ruling
In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City
ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to
deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the
properties prevailed over Orions. The RTC further
noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the
status of the properties but he did not find any
existing encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion
claims to have purchased the property by way of
a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki only learned about it
two (2) months after he bought the properties
because Orion never bothered to register or
annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos. 18186
and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly
and severally pay Suzuki moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, appearance
fees, expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit. Orion
timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted
Orions appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as
it upheld Suzukis right over the properties. The
CA further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186
pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an
SRRV only serves as a warning to an SRRV
holder about the implications of a conveyance of
a property investment. It deviated from the RTC
ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision
but the CA denied the motion in its January 25,
2013 resolution. Orion then filed a petition for
review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orions petition is based on the following
grounds/arguments:15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in
favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under
Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal
property should be made with the consent
of both spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he
failed to check the owners duplicate
copies of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under
Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits
any conveyance or encumbrance of the
property investment, defeats the alleged
claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for
exercising due diligence.
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on
spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal.
Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital
coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the
operation of the presumption of conjugal
ownership.17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he
is a purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to
the protection of the law.
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review
generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-
evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the
uniform factual conclusions of the trial court and
the appellate court.18 In the present case, while the
courts below both arrived at the same conclusion,
there appears tobe an incongruence in their
factual findings and the legal principle they applied
to the attendant factual circumstances. Thus, we
are compelled to examine certain factual issues in
the exercise of our sound discretion to correct any
mistaken inference that may have been made.19
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real
property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on
the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold
this position, however, because the issue of
spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the
CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing
court.20 To consider these belated arguments
would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice,
and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss
the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an
end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the
denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable
property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located.21 The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property
its immobility. Immovables are part of the country
and so closely connected to it that all rights over
them have their natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand
disposition ofreal property are determined by what
is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone
prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from
one person to another, or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost.23 This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent,
alienation and transfer of immovable property and
the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.24
This principle even governs the capacity of the
person making a deed relating to immovable
property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus,
an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to
land if the person making it is incapacitated by the
lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his
domicile and by the law of the place where the
instrument is actually made, his capacity is
undoubted.25
On the other hand, property relations between
spouses are governed principally by the national
law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a
question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved
as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign
law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or
the law of the forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country
inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by
the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having
a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and
disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the
conjugal natureof the property shall be governed
by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a
fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to
prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a
"Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law.
This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for
there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required
under Section 24 of Rule 132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approachor processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign
law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not
proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the
same as Philippine Law.31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam
Kang married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Kang.32 In other
words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Kang is the owner of the properties as they
are registered in his name alone, and that he is
married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we
have held that registration of the property in the
name of only one spouse does not negate the
possibility of it being conjugal or community
property.33 In those cases, however, there was
proof that the properties, though registered in the
name of only one spouse, were indeed either
conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly,
we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed
lack of spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence
to prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the
Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been
sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership
shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil
Code presupposes the existence of two or more
duly executed contracts of sale. In the present
case, the Deed of Sale dated August 26,
200335 between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by
Orion36 and was properly identified by Suzukis
witness Ms. Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated
August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract
of sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to
deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates
himself to pay a price certain to the seller.38 The
execution of the notarized deed of saleand the
actual transfer of possession amounted to delivery
that produced the legal effect of transferring
ownership to Suzuki.39
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority
in right under the principle of prius tempore, potior
jure (i.e.,first in time, stronger in right), it failedto
prove the existence and due execution of the
Dacion en Pagoin its favor.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas
Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove
the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction
in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion
likewise offered in evidence the supposed
promissory note dated September 4, 2002 as
Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the
additional P800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however,
denied the admission of Exhibits "5" and
"12,"among others, in its order dated August 19,
2008 "since the same [were] not identified in court
by any witness."40
Despite the exclusion of its most critical
documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a
tender ofexcluded evidence, as provided under
Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For
this reason alone, we are prevented from
seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its
submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present
petition.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its
submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present
petition, the copious inconsistencies and
contradictions in the testimonial and documentary
evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion
that the Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First,
there appears to be no due and demandable
obligation when the Dacion en Pago was
executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion.
Orions witness Perez tried to impress upon the
RTC that Kang was in default in
his P1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct
examination, he stated:
ATTY. CRUZAT:
Q: Okay, so this loan of P1.8 million, what
happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: Well it became past due, there has been
delayed interest payment by Mr.
Kangand...
Q: So what did you do after there were
defaults[?]
A: We have to secure the money or the
investment of the bank through loans and
we have executed a dacion en
pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no
money. So we just execute[d] the dacion
en pago rather than going through the
Foreclosure proceedings.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell the court when was this
executed?
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41
A reading of the supposed promissory note,
however, shows that there was nodefault to speak
of when the supposed Dacion en Pagowas
executed.
Based on the promissory note, Kangs loan
obligation wouldmature only on August 27, 2003.
Neither can Orion claim that Kang had been in
default in his installment payments because the
wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he
principal of this loanand its interest and other
charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance
hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There
was thus no due and demandable loan obligation
when the alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.
Second, Perez, the supposed person who
prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only
have a vague idea of the transaction he
supposedly prepared. During his cross-
examination, he testified:
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: And were you the one who prepared this
[dacion en pago] Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
xxxx
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already
inclusive of all the penalties, interest and
surcharge due from Mr. Yung Sam Kang?
A: Its just the principal, sir.
Q: So you did not state the interest [and]
penalties?
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not
include interest, sir. We may actually
includethat but....
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas
Clause, Mr. Witness?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the
said loan to the second party and as of
February 10, 2003, the outstanding
obligation which is due and demandable
principal and interest and other charges
included amounts to P1,800,000.00 pesos,
sir.
xxxx
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t
now includes interest and other charges,
based on this document?
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43
Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that
the P1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a
 real estate mortgage. However, no
document was ever presented to prove this
real estate mortgage aside from it being
mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other
document like a supplement to that Credit
Line Agreement referring to this 1.8 million
peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which
says that there was a subsequent
collateralization or security given by Mr.
Yung [Sam]
Kang for the loan?
xxxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44
Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned
only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin
demanded the delivery of the titles sometime in
August 2003,and after Suzuki caused the
annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim.
Records show that it was only on October 9, 2003,
when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin
Mapile & Associates first spoke of the Dacion en
Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en
Pago on October 1, 2003, when he personally
received a letter demanding the delivery of the
titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter
and opted to first consult with his lawyer.46
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained
material inconsistencies in its recital of facts
surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago.
In particular, it mentioned that "on [September 4,
2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang]
applied and was granted a new Credit Line Facility
by [Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P1,800,000.00)." Perez, however, testified that
there was "no cash movement" in the
original P1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony, he
said:
COURT:
xxxx
Q: Would you remember what was the
subject matter of that real estate mortgage
for that first P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: Its a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any
payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of
this P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
Q: No payments?
A: None sir.
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no
payment, either by way of payment to the
principal, by way ofpayment of interest,
there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam
Kang of this loan?
A: Literally, there was no actual cash
movement, sir.
Q: There was no actual cash?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank
Orion Savings Bank still extended
an P800,000.00 additional right?
A: Yes, sir.47
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the
supposed execution of theDacion en Pago on
February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession
of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the
records shows that Orion even bothered to take
possession of the property even six (6) months
after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion
en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer
possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki,
who then made immediate improvements thereon.
If Orion really purchased the condominium unit on
February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true owner,
why did it not assert its ownership immediately
after the alleged sale took place? Why did it have
to assert its ownership only after Suzuki
demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps
have remained unanswered and unfilled.
In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent
index of simulation is the complete absence of
anattempt on the part of the vendee to assert his
rights of ownership over the property in question.
After the sale, the vendee should have entered the
land and occupied the premises. The absence of
any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right
of dominion over the property allegedly soldto it is
a clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding the
execution of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained
in possession of the disputed condominium unit
from the time of the execution of the Dacion en
Pagountil the propertys subsequent transfer to
Suzuki unmistakably strengthens the fictitious
nature of the Dacion en Pago.
These circumstances, aside from the glaring
inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of
Orions witness, indubitably prove the spurious
nature of the Dacion en Pago.
The fact that the Dacion en Pago
is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that
gave rise to their execution and are to be
considered as containing all the terms of the
agreement.49 While a notarized document enjoys
this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized
is not a guarantee of the validity of its
contents."50 The presumption of regularity of
notarized documents is not absolute and may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.51
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply
because the regularity in the execution of the
Dacion en Pago and the loan documents was
challenged in the proceedings below where their
prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly
questionable circumstances surrounding their
execution.52
Effect of the PRA restriction on
the validity of Suzukis title to the
property
Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No.
18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In
particular, Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a
purchaser in good faith in view of the express PRA
restriction contained in CCT No. 18186.53
We reject this suggested approachoutright
because, to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot
affect the conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this
particular point, we concur withthe following
findings of the CA:
x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to
the owner who holds a Special Resident Retirees
Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he
disposes his property which serves as his
investment in order to qualify for such status.
Section 14 of the Implementing Investment
Guidelines under Rule VIII-A of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Executive Order No.
1037, Creating the Philippine Retirement Park
System Providing Funds Therefor and For Other
Purpose ( otherwise known as the Philippine
Retirement Authority) states:
Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw
his investment from the Philippines, or transfer the
same to another domestic enterprise, orsell,
convey or transfer his condominium unit or units
to another person, natural or juridical without the
prior approval of the Authority, the Special
Resident Retirees Visa issued to him, and/or
unmarried minor child or children[,] may be
cancelled or revoked by the Philippine
Government, through the appropriate government
department or agency, upon recommendation of
the Authority.54
Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to
successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the
basis of the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the
PRA restriction when it transacted with Kang.
Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating
Kangs request to cancel the mortgage annotation
despite the lack of payment to circumvent the PRA
restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from
impugning the validity of the conveyance in favor
of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction that
Orion itself ignored and "attempted" to circumvent.
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the
authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no
reason for the application of the rules on double
sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient
evidence to establish the validity of conveyance in CALLEJO, SR., J.:
his favor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY

the petition for lack of merit. Costs against Before the Court is the petition for review
petitioner Orion Savings Bank. on certiorari filed by Far East Bank and Trust
SO ORDERED. Company (now Bank of the Philippines Islands)

ARTURO D. BRION seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated August

Associate Justice
30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
WE CONCUR:
CV No. 36627 which ordered it, together with its

branch accountant, Roger Villadelgado, to pay

respondent Themistocles Pacilan, Jr.[2] the total sum

of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

The assailed decision affirmed with modification that

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros

Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, in Civil Case

No. 4908. Likewise sought to be reversed and set

aside is the Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of

the appellate court, denying petitioner banks motion

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST G.R. No. for reconsideration.
157314
COMPANY, NOW BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Present: The case stemmed from the following undisputed
Petitioner,
PUNO, J., Chairman, facts:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
- versus - TINGA, and Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with
C
HICO- petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980.
NAZA
RIO, J His account was denominated as Current Account
J.
Promulgated: No. 53208 (0052-00407-4). The respondent had
THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR.,
Respondent. July 29, 2005 since then issued several postdated checks to
x-------------------------------------
-------------x different payees drawn against the said account.

Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued

DECISION Check No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and
the same was presented for payment to petitioner of P428.57. As a consequence of the overdraft,

bank on April 4, 1988. Check No. 2434886 was dishonored.

Upon its presentment on the said date, On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to

Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his

bank. The next day, or on April 5, 1988, the account was unjustified. When he did not receive a

respondent deposited to his current account the reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with

amount of P800.00. The said amount was accepted the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch

by petitioner bank; hence, increasing the balance of 54, a complaint for damages against petitioner bank

the respondents deposit to P1,051.43. and Villadelgado. The case was docketed as Civil

Case No. 4908. The respondent, as complainant

Subsequently, when the respondent verified
therein, alleged that the closure of his current
with petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check No.
account by petitioner bank was unjustified because
2434866, he discovered that his current account
on the first banking hour of April 5, 1988, he already
was closed on the ground that it was improperly
deposited an amount sufficient to fund his checks.
handled. The records of petitioner bank disclosed
The respondent pointed out that Check No.
that between the period of March 30,
2434886, in particular, was delivered to petitioner
1988 and April 5, 1988, the respondent issued four
bank at the close of banking hours on April 4, 1988
checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416 for P6,000.00;
and, following normal banking procedure, it
Check No. 2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880
(petitioner bank) had until the last clearing hour of
for P680.00 and; Check No. 2434886 for P680.00,
the following day, or on April 5, 1988, to honor the
or a total amount of P7,410.00. At the time, however,
check or return it, if not funded. In disregard of this
the respondents current account with petitioner bank
banking procedure and practice, however, petitioner
only had a deposit of P6,981.43. Thus, the total
bank hastily closed the respondents current account
amount of the checks presented for payment on April
and dishonored his Check No. 2434886.
4, 1988 exceeded the balance of the respondents

deposit in his account. For this reason, petitioner The respondent further alleged that prior to the

bank, through its branch accountant, Villadelgado, closure of his current account, he had issued several

closed the respondents current account effective the other postdated checks. The petitioner banks act of

evening of April 4, 1988 as it then had an overdraft closing his current account allegedly preempted the
deposits that he intended to make to fund those which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any

checks. Further, the petitioner banks act exposed reason.[3]

him to criminal prosecution for violation of Batas

They showed that the respondent had improperly
Pambansa Blg. 22.
and irregularly handled his current account. For

According to the respondent, the indecent haste that example, in 1986, the respondents account was

attended the closure of his account was patently overdrawn 156 times, in 1987, 117 times and in

malicious and intended to embarrass him. He 1988, 26 times. In all these instances, the account

claimed that he is a Cashier of Prudential Bank and was overdrawn due to the issuance of checks

Trust Company, whose branch office is located just against insufficient funds. The respondent had also

across that of petitioner bank, and a prominent and signed several checks with a different signature from

respected leader both in the civic and banking the specimen on file for dubious reasons.

communities. The alleged malicious acts of

When the respondent made the deposit on April 5,
petitioner bank besmirched the respondents
1988, it was obviously to cover for issuances made
reputation and caused him social humiliation,
the previous day against an insufficiently funded
wounded feelings, insurmountable worries and
account. When his Check No. 2434886 was
sleepless nights entitling him to an award of
presented for payment on April 4, 1988, he had
damages.
already incurred an overdraft; hence, petitioner bank

In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado rightfully dishonored the same for insufficiency of

maintained that the respondents current account funds.

was subject to petitioner banks Rules and

After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered
Regulations Governing the Establishment and
judgment in favor of the respondent as it ordered the
Operation of Regular Demand
petitioner bank and Villadelgado, jointly and
Deposits which provide that the Bank reserves the
severally, to pay the respondent the amounts
right to close an account if the depositor frequently
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00
draws checks against insufficient funds and/or
as exemplary damages and costs of suit. In so
uncollected deposits and that the Bank reserves the
ruling, the court a quo also cited petitioner banks
right at any time to return checks of the depositor
rules and regulations which state that a charge

of P10.00 shall be levied against the depositor for

any check that is taken up as a returned item due to his credit standing in the business community. The

insufficiency of funds on the date of receipt from the court a quo further ratiocinated that even

clearing office even if said check is honored and/or granting arguendo that petitioner bank had the right

covered by sufficient deposit the following banking to close the respondents account, the manner which

day. The same rules and regulations also provide attended the closure constituted an abuse of the

that a check returned for insufficiency of funds for said right. Citing Article 19 of the Civil Code of the

any reason of similar import may be subsequently Philippines which states that [e]very person must, in

recleared for one more time only, subject to the the exercise of his rights and in the performance of

same charges. his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,

and observe honesty and good faith and Article 20

According to the court a quo, following these rules
thereof which states that [e]very person who,
and regulations, the respondent, as depositor, had
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
the right to put up sufficient funds for a check that
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
was taken as a returned item for insufficient funds
same, the court a quo adjudged petitioner bank of
the day following the receipt of said check from the
acting in bad faith. It held that, under the foregoing
clearing office. In fact, the said check could still be
circumstances, the respondent is entitled to an
recleared for one more time. In previous instances,
award of moral and exemplary damages.
petitioner bank notified the respondent when he

incurred an overdraft and he would then deposit The decretal portion of the court a quos decision

sufficient funds the following day to cover the reads:

overdraft. Petitioner bank thus acted unjustifiably WHEREFORE, PREMISES

CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
when it immediately closed the respondents account rendered:
on April 4, 1988 and deprived him of the opportunity 1. Ordering the defendants
[petitioner bank and
to reclear his check or deposit sufficient funds Villadelgado], jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff [the
therefor the following day.
respondent] the sum
of P100,000.00 as moral
As a result of the closure of his current account, damages;

several of the respondents checks were 2. Ordering the defendants,

jointly and severally, to pay
subsequently dishonored and because of this, the plaintiff the sum
of P50,000.00 as exemplary
respondent was humiliated, embarrassed and lost damages plus costs and
expenses of the suit; and
 3. Dismissing [the] Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the
defendants counterclaim for
lack of merit. CA declared that even as it may be conceded that

SO ORDERED.[4] petitioner bank had reserved the right to close an

account for repeated overdrafts by the respondent,

On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated the exercise of that right must never be despotic or

August 30, 2002, affirming with modification the arbitrary. That petitioner bank chose to close the

decision of the court a quo. account outright and return the check, even after

accepting a deposit sufficient to cover the said

The appellate court substantially affirmed the factual
check, is contrary to its duty to handle the
findings of the court a quo as it held that petitioner
respondents account with utmost fidelity. The
bank unjustifiably closed the respondents account
exercise of the right is not absolute and good faith,
notwithstanding that its own rules and regulations
at least, is required. The manner by which petitioner

bank closed the account of the respondent runs

allow that a check returned for insufficiency of funds
afoul of Article 19 of the Civil Code which enjoins
or any reason of similar import, may be subsequently
every person, in the exercise of his rights, to give
recleared for one more time, subject to standard
every one his due, and observe honesty and good
charges. Like the court a quo, the appellate court
faith.
observed that in several instances in previous years,

petitioner bank would inform the respondent when

he incurred an overdraft and allowed him to make a

The CA concluded that petitioner banks
timely deposit to fund the checks that were initially
precipitate and imprudent closure of the
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. However, on
respondents account had caused him, a respected
April 4, 1988, petitioner bank immediately closed the
officer of several civic and banking associations,
respondents account without even notifying him that
serious anxiety and humiliation. It had, likewise,
he had incurred an overdraft. Even when they had
tainted his credit standing. Consequently, the award
already closed his account on April 4, 1988,
of damages is warranted. The CA, however,
petitioner bank still accepted the deposit that the
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the
respondent made on April 5, 1988, supposedly to
court a quo as it found the same to be excessive:
cover his checks.
We, however, find excessive
the amount of damages awarded by
the RTC. In our view the reduced
 amount of P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as and/or uncollected deposits. The same rules and
exemplary damages are in order.
Awards for damages are not meant to regulations also provide that the depositor is not
enrich the plaintiff-appellee [the
respondent] at the expense of entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this
defendants-appellants [the
petitioners], but to obviate the moral deposit and the bank reserves the right at any time
suffering he has undergone. The
to return checks of the depositor which are drawn
award is aimed at the restoration,
within limits possible, of the status against insufficient funds or for any reason.
quo ante, and should be
proportionate to the suffering
inflicted.[5] It cites the numerous instances that the respondent

had overdrawn his account and those instances

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
subject to the MODIFICATION that
the award of moral damages is
reduced to P75,000.00 and the
award of exemplary damages
reduced to P25,000.00.
where he deliberately signed checks using a
signature different from the specimen on file. Based
on these facts, petitioner bank was constrained to
close the respondents account for improper and
irregular handling and returned his Check No.
2434886 which was presented to the bank for

SO ORDERED.[6] payment on April 4, 1988.

Petitioner bank further posits that there is no law or

Petitioner bank sought the reconsideration of the
rule which gives the respondent a legal right to make
said decision but in the assailed Resolution dated
good his check or to deposit the corresponding
January 17, 2003, the appellate court denied its
amount to cover said check within 24 hours after the
motion. Hence, the recourse to this Court.
same is dishonored or returned by the bank for

Petitioner bank maintains that, in closing the account having been drawn against insufficient funds. It

of the respondent in the evening of April 4, 1988, it vigorously denies having violated Article 19 of the

acted in good faith and in accordance with the rules Civil Code as it insists that it acted in good faith and

and regulations governing the operation of a in accordance with the pertinent banking rules and

regulations.

regular demand deposit which reserves to the bank

The petition is impressed with merit.
the right to close an account if the depositor

frequently draws checks against insufficient funds

 A perusal of the respective decisions of the unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad

court a quo and the appellate court show that the motive.[12]

award of damages in the respondents favor was

Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to
anchored mainly on Article 19 of the Civil Code
close the account of the respondent based on the
which, quoted anew below, reads:
Art. 19. Every person must, in following provisions of its Rules and Regulations
the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with Governing the Establishment and Operation of
justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Regular Demand Deposits:

10) The Bank reserves the right

to close an account if the
The elements of abuse of rights are the depositor frequently draws
checks against insufficient
following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; funds and/or uncollected
deposits.
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the

sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[7] Malice 12)

However, it is clearly
or bad faith is at the core of the said provision.[8] The understood that the depositor is
not entitled, as a matter of right,
law always presumes good faith and any person who
to overdraw on this deposit and
seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of the bank reserves the right at
any time to return checks of the
another has the burden of proving that the latter depositor which are drawn
against insufficient funds or for
acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.[9] Good faith any other reason.

refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by

the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the The facts, as found by the court a quo and

intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable the appellate court, do not establish that, in the

and unscrupulous advantage of another.[10] Bad faith exercise of this right, petitioner bank committed an

does not simply connote bad judgment or simple abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third

negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in the

obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach present case. The evidence presented by petitioner

of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill- bank negates the existence of bad faith or malice on

will that partakes of the nature of fraud.[11] Malice its part in closing the respondents account on April

connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response 4, 1988 because on the said date the same was

to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and already overdrawn. The respondent issued four

checks, all due on April 4, 1988, amounting

to P7,410.00 when the balance of his current accordance with the express rules and regulations

account deposit was only P6,981.43. Thus, he governing the current accounts of its depositors.

incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in Upon the opening of his account, the respondent

the dishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further, had agreed to be bound by these terms and

petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current conditions.

account of the respondent was overdrawn 156 times

Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the
due to his issuance of checks against insufficient
deposit made by the respondent the day following
funds.[13] In 1987, the said account was overdrawn
the closure of his account constitutes bad faith or
117 times for the same
malice on the part of petitioner bank. The same

could be characterized as simple negligence by its

reason.[14] Again, in 1988, 26 times.[15] There were
personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of
also several instances when the respondent issued
bad faith.
checks deliberately using a signature different from
The respondent had thus failed to discharge
his specimen signature on file with petitioner
his burden of proving bad faith on the part of
bank.[16] All these circumstances taken together
petitioner bank or that it was motivated by ill-will or
justified the petitioner banks closure of the
spite in closing his account on April 4, 1988 and in
respondents account on April 4, 1988 for improper
inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, 1988.
handling.

Further, it has not been shown that these

It is observed that nowhere under its rules
acts were done by petitioner bank with the sole
and regulations is petitioner bank required to notify
intention of prejudicing and injuring the respondent.
the respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of
It is conceded that the respondent may have
the closure of the account for frequently drawing
suffered damages as a result of the closure of his
checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad
current account. However, there is a material
faith could be imputed on petitioner bank for so
distinction between damages and injury. The Court
acting since the records bear out that the respondent
had the occasion to explain the distinction between
had indeed been improperly and irregularly handling
damages and injury in this wise:
his account not just a few times but hundreds of
Injury is the illegal invasion of
times. Under the circumstances, petitioner bank a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt
or harm which results from the injury;
could not be faulted for exercising its right in and damages are the recompense or
 compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm The Decision dated August 30, 2002 and Resolution
was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. In such cases, the dated January 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 are REVERSED AND SET
no remedy for damages resulting
ASIDE.
from an act which does not amount to
a legal injury or wrong. These
situations are often called damnum SO ORDERED.
absque injuria.

In other words, in order that a plaintiff

may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which
the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff
and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the
premise that the individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be a breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be
awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the
injury.[17]

Whatever damages the respondent may have

suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his

other insufficiently funded checks, would have to be

borne by him alone. It was the respondents repeated

improper

and irregular handling of his account which

constrained petitioner bank to close the same in

accordance with the rules and regulations governing

its depositors current accounts. The respondents

case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria.


ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS
UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum
cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure
others and to give everyone his due. These
supreme norms of justice are the underlying
principles of law and order in society. We reaffirm
them in this petition for review on certiorari
assailing the July 26, 2000 decision1 and October
18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was
approached by Juan Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero
and Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil
aspect of a criminal case for robbery3 filed by
Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a
red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of
its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for
the original certificate of registration but the three
accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile,
the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside
respondents business establishment, Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and
accessible to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle
had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-
owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment,
the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner
corporation.4
When Gabutero could no longer pay the
installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and
continued the payments. In September 1982,
however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining
installments and told petitioner corporations
collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had
allegedly been "taken by respondents men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner
Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,5 went to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the
motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt.
Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and
asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the
clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back
and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for
respondent in his residence while petitioner
Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take
photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find
respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-
AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings
instruction and over the clerks objection, took the
motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a
criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law6 against respondent in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete
City.7 Respondent moved for dismissal because the
complaint did not charge an offense as he had
neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The
Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint8 and denied petitioner Uypitchings
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against
petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, Branch 37.9 He sought to hold the
petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful
taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a
defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief)
and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and
malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and
embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a
decision10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was
motivated with malice and ill will when he called
respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an
abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law. Petitioners acts were found to be contrary to
Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the
trial court held petitioners liable to respondent
for P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary
damages and P50,000 attorneys fees plus costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA
affirmed the trial courts decision with modification,
reducing the award of moral and exemplary
damages to P300,000 and P100,000,
respectively.13 Petitioners sought reconsideration
but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
In their petition and memorandum, petitioners
submit that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved
here is whether the filing of a complaint for qualified
theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the
Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award
of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorneys
fees and costs in favor of respondent.
Petitioners suggestion is misleading. They were
held liable for damages not only for instituting a
groundless complaint against respondent but also
for making a slanderous remark and for taking the
motorcycle from respondents establishment in an
abusive manner.
Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC
and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the
public imputation of a crime to respondent14 but
also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were
deemed to have accepted the correctness of such
findings. This alone was sufficient to hold
petitioners liable for damages to respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners concern, we
also find that the trial and appellate courts correctly
ruled that the filing of the complaint was tainted with
malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in fact
described their action as a "precipitate
act."15 Petitioners were bent on portraying
respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote
with approval the following findings of the RTC, as
adopted by the CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the
complaint before the City Prosecutors
Office] because Atty. Ernesto Ramas
Uypitching knew or ought to have known as
he is a lawyer, that there was no probable
cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for
qualified theft and fencing activity against
[respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no
personal knowledge that [respondent] stole
the motorcycle in question. He was merely
told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill
collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,]
Wilfredo Verao[,] that Juan Dabalan will
[no longer] pay the remaining installment(s)
for the motorcycle because the motorcycle
was taken by the men of [respondent]. It
must be noted that the term used by
Wilfredo Verao in informing Atty. Ernesto
Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan
Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment
was []taken[], not []unlawfully taken[] or
stolen. Yet, despite the double hearsay,
Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only
executed the [complaint-affidavit] wherein
he named [respondent] as the suspect of
the stolen motorcycle but also charged
[respondent] of qualified theft and fencing
activity before the City [Prosecutors] Office
of Dumaguete. The absence of probable
cause necessarily signifies the presence of
malice. What is deplorable in all these is
that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the
motorcycle, did not accuse [respondent] or
the latters men of stealing the motorcycle[,]
much less bother[ed] to file a case for
qualified theft before the authorities. That
Atty. Uypitchings act in charging
[respondent] with qualified theft and fencing
activity is tainted with malice is also shown
by his answer to the question of Cupid
Gonzaga16[during one of their
conversations] - "why should you still file a
complaint? You have already recovered the
motorcycle"[:] "Aron motagam ang
kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson to
the thief of motorcycle.")17
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad
faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of
the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court,
are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling
reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the
CA.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as
Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable
for petitioner corporations exercise of its right as
seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle
preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They
are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or
protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is,
however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery
of possession of mortgaged property: if a
mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a
mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he
must bring a civil action either to recover such
possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
obtain judicial foreclosure.18
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil
action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching
descended on respondents establishment with his
policemen and ordered the seizure of the
motorcycle without a search warrant or court order.
Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the
motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a
slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its
co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the
lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to
the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners acts
violated the law as well as public morals, and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in
Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give every one his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of
right," prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise he opens himself to liability.19 It seeks to
preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal
right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
solely to prejudice or injure another.20 The exercise
of a right must be in accordance with the purpose
for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability for
damages to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle
was taken at petitioners instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement,
petitioners exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and
injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint
could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated
design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule
respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively
harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.
Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage
to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that
petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer
and an officer of the court, for his improper
behavior.
SO ORDERED.

CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R.
DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z.
NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI,
RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B.
SALA, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
Decision1 dated January 31, 2003 and Resolution
dated October 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71506.
The facts are:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a
domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and
non-stock private membership club, having its
principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City.
Petitioners herein are members of its Board of
Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a
special company proprietary member of CCCI,
designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its
Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for
the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-
proprietary member. The designation was
thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of
Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application
for proprietary membership. The application was
indorsed by CCCIs two (2) proprietary members,
namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around
the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then
president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a
share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however,
purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for
only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6,
1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership
Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May
30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on
respondents application for proprietary
membership was deferred. In another Board
meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents
application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on
August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from
Julius Z. Neri, CCCIs corporate secretary,
informing him that the Board disapproved his
application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of
respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration.
As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7,
1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still,
CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997,
respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring
whether any member of the Board objected to his
application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against
petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 67190.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated
February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff the amount
of P2,340,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages.
 2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff the amount
of P5,000,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff the amount
of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff the amount
of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of
attorneys fees and P80,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
5. Costs of suit.
Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in
its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the
trial courts Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed Decision dated February 14, 2001
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71,
Pasig City in Civil Case No. 67190 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the
amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages;
2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay,
jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the
mount of P500,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of the suit.
The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration and motion for leave to set the
motion for oral arguments. In its Resolution4 dated
October 2, 2003, the appellate court denied the
motions for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether in
disapproving respondents application for
proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are
liable to respondent for damages, and if so,
whether their liability is joint and several.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to
respondent despite the lack of evidence that they
acted in bad faith in disapproving the latters
application; and in disregarding their defense
of damnum absque injuria.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition
lacks merit, hence, should be denied.
CCCIs Articles of Incorporation provide in part:
SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock
corporation and membership therein as well
as the right of participation in its assets shall
be limited to qualified persons who are duly
accredited owners of Proprietary Ownership
Certificates issued by the corporation in
accordance with its By-Laws.
Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCIs Amended
By-Laws provides:
SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE
ELECTED The procedure for the
admission of new members of the Club shall
be as follows:
(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by
another voting proprietary member, shall
submit to the Secretary a written proposal
for the admission of a candidate to the
"Eligible-for-Membership List";
(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the
Secretary for a period of thirty (30) days on
the Club bulletin board during which time
any member may interpose objections to
the admission of the applicant by
communicating the same to the Board of
Directors;
 (c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty
(30) days, if no objections have been filed or
if there are, the Board considers the
objections unmeritorious, the candidate
shall be qualified for inclusion in the
"Eligible-for-Membership List";
(d) Once included in the "Eligible-for-
Membership List" and after the candidate
shall have acquired in his name a valid POC
duly recorded in the books of the
corporation as his own, he shall become a
Proprietary Member, upon a non-refundable
admission fee of P1,000.00, provided that
admission fees will only be collected once
from any person.
On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to
read as follows:
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty
(30) days, the Board may, by unanimous
vote of all directors present at a regular or
special meeting, approve the inclusion of
the candidate in the "Eligible-for-
Membership List".
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a
secret balloting known as the "black ball system" of
voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the
ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to the
admission of an applicant, while a black ball means
disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended,
cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is
required. When respondents application for
proprietary membership was voted upon during the
Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of
unanimity, his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its
Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or
disapprove an application for proprietary
membership. But such right should not be
exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,5 we expounded
Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus:
This article, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with
justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms
of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does
not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper. (Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondents application for proprietary
membership, we find that petitioners violated the
rules governing human relations, the basic
principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of
social order. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud
and evident bad faith in disapproving respondents
applications. This is contrary to morals, good
custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are
liable for damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation
to Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section
3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special
or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted to
CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the
required number of votes needed for admission of
an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not
printed on the application form due to economic
reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and
unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being
extremely significant, was introduced way back in
1978 or almost twenty (20) years before
respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom
why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country
club, like the CCCI, whose members are all
affluent, did not have enough money to cause the
printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in
the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a
unanimous vote of the Board members was
required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration
and an inquiry whether there was an objection to
his application, petitioners apparently ignored him.
Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of
treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel
Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of
CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners
with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they
should have informed him why his application was
disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must
nonetheless be in accordance with the proper
norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily,
unjustly or excessively and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.6 It bears
reiterating that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals held that petitioners disapproval of
respondents application is characterized by bad
faith.
As to petitioners reliance on the principle
of damnum absque injuria or damage without
injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced.
In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,7 we held that this principle
does not apply when there is an abuse of a
persons right, as in this case.
As to the appellate courts award to respondent of
moral damages, we find the same in order. Under
Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral damages
may be recovered, among others, in acts and
actions referred to in Article 21. We believe
respondents testimony that he suffered mental
anguish, social humiliation and wounded feelings
as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application.
However, the amount of P2,000,000.00 is
excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in
determining what would be a fair and reasonable
amount of moral damages, the same should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral
damages are not intended to impose a penalty to
the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the
expense of the defendant.8 Taking into
consideration the attending circumstances here, we
hold that an award to respondent of P50,000.00,
instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is
reasonable.
Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article
2229 allows it by way of example or correction for
the public good. Nonetheless, since exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions,9 we reduce the amount
from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, Article 2208 of the same Code provides,
among others, that attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation may be recovered in cases when
exemplary damages are awarded and where the
court deems it just and equitable that attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered, as in this case. In any event, however,
such award must be reasonable, just and equitable.
Thus, we reduce the amount of attorneys fees
(P500,000.00) and litigation expenses (P50,000.00)
to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Lastly, petitioners argument that they could not be
held jointly and severally liable for damages
because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of
respondents application lacks merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or
officers. Directors or trustees who willfully
and knowingly vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or who are
guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation or
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest
in conflict with their duty as such directors,
or trustees shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages resulting
therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other
persons. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506
are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that
(a) the award of moral damages is reduced
from P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the award of
exemplary damages is reduced
from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c) the
award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is
reduced from P500,000.00 and P50,000.00
to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. G.R.
No. 165443
Petitioner,
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Seeking the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated 1 June 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62331 and the
reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November
2000 of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in SEC Case No. 04-98-5954, petitioner
Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. (Calatagan) filed this Rule
45 petition against respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr.
(Clemente).
The key facts are undisputed.
Clemente applied to purchase one share of
stock of Calatagan, indicating in his application for
membership his mailing address at Phimco
Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC, complete
residential address, office and residence telephone
numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with
which he was connected, Calatagan issued to him
Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May
1990 after paying P120,000.00 for the share.[2]
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its
members to meet expenses for general operations,
as well as costs for upkeep and improvement of the
grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly
dues is incorporated in Calatagans Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at
the back of each certificate of stock.[3] As reproduced
in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock No. A-
01295, the provision reads:
5. The owners of shares of
stock shall be subject to the payment
of monthly dues in an amount as may
be prescribed in the by-laws or by the
Board of Directors which shall in no
case be less that [sic] P50.00 to meet
the expenses for the general
operations of the club, and the
maintenance and improvement of its
premises and facilities, in addition to
such fees as may be charged for the
actual use of the facilities x x x
When Clemente became a member the
monthly charge stood at P400.00. He
paid P3,000.00 for his monthly dues on 21 March
1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share

Then he ceased paying the dues. At that point, his would be included among the delinquent shares to

balance amounted to P400.00.[4] be sold at public auction on 15 January 1993. Again,

this letter was sent to Clementes mailing address

Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the that had already been closed.[6]

initial step to collect Clementes back accounts by

sending a demand letter dated 21 September On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale

1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22 was posted on the Clubs bulletin board, as well as

October 1992. Both letters were sent to Clementes on the clubs premises. The auction sale took place

mailing address as indicated in his membership as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and Clementes

application but were sent back to sender with the share sold for P64,000.[7]According to the Certificate

postal note that the address had been closed.[5] of Sale issued by Calatagan after the sale,

Clementes share was purchased by a Nestor A.

Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for Virata.[8] At the time of the sale, Clementes accrued

having failed to pay his monthly dues for more than monthly dues amounted to P5,200.00.[9] A notice of

sixty (60) days, specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 foreclosure of Clementes share was published in the

October 1992. Calatagan also included Clementes 26 May 1993 issue of the Business World.[10]

name in the list of delinquent members posted on

the clubs bulletin board. On 1 December 1992, Clemente learned of the sale of his share

Calatagans board of directors adopted a resolution only in November of 1997.[11] He filed a claim with

authorizing the foreclosure of shares of delinquent the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

members, including Clementes; and the public seeking the restoration of his shareholding in

auction of these shares. Calatagan with damages.

On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a

On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third decision dismissing Clementes complaint. Citing

and final letter to Clemente, this time signed by its Section 69 of the Corporation Code which provides

Corporate Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, that the sale of shares at an auction sale can only be

Jr. The letter contains a warning that unless questioned within six (6) months from the date of
sale, the SEC concluded that Clementes claim, filed dues in non-stock corporations, the appellate court

four (4) years after the sale, had already prescribed. employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as the

The SEC further held that Calatagan had complied proper rule of prescription. The provision sets the

with all the requirements for a valid sale of the prescription period of actions to recover movables at

subject share, Clemente having failed to inform eight (8) years.

Calatagan that the address he had earlier supplied

was no longer his address. Clemente, the SEC The Court of Appeals also pointed out that

ruled, had acted in bad faith in assuming as he since that Calatagans first two demand letters had

claimed that his non-payment of monthly dues would been returned to itas sender with the notation about

merely render his share inactive. the closure of the mailing address, it very well knew

that its third and final demand letter also sent to the

Clemente filed a petition for review with the same mailing address would not be received by

Court of Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of Clemente. It noted the by-law requirement that

Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the

The appellate court restored Clementes one share sale at auction of a members share of stock for

with a directive to Calatagan to issue in his a new indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall notify

share, and awarded to Clemente a total the owner thereof and advise the Membership

of P400,000.00 in damages, less the unpaid monthly Committee of such fact. Finally, the Court of Appeals

dues of P5,200.00. ratiocinated that a person who is in danger of the

imminent loss of his property has the right to be

In rejecting the SECs finding that the action notified and be given the chance to prevent the

had prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SECs loss.[12]

own ruling in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valley

Golf Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of the Hence, the present appeal.

Corporation Code specifically refers to unpaid

subscriptions to capital stock, and not to any other Calatagan maintains that the action of

debt of stockholders. With the insinuation that Clemente had prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of

Section 69 does not apply to unpaid membership the Corporation Code, and that the requisite notices
under both the law and the by-laws had been along with all other obligations of the shareholders

rendered to Clemente. to the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares

and in the event of delinquency such shares may be

Section 69 of the Code provides that an ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner

action to recover delinquent stock sold must be provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other

commenced by the filing of a complaint within six (6) obligations of the shareholders.[13] With its illative but

months from the date of sale. As correctly pointed incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes that

out by the Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part of the prescriptive period under Section 69 should also

Title VIII of the Code entitled Stocks and apply to the sale of Clementes share as the lien that

Stockholders and refers specifically to unpaid Calatagan perceives to be a restriction is stated in

subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of which is the articles of incorporation and not only in the by-

governed by the immediately preceding Section 68. laws.

The Court of Appeals debunked both We remain unconvinced.

Calatagans and the SECs reliance on Section 69 by

citing another SEC ruling in the case of Caram v. There are fundamental differences that defy

Valley Golf. In connection with Section 69, equivalence or even analogy between the sale of

Calatagan raises a peripheral point made in the delinquent stock under Section 68 and the sale that

SECs Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of

take-off Section 6 of the Corporation Code which delinquent stock is the non-payment of the

refers to such rights, privileges or restrictions as may subscription price for the share of stock itself. The

be stated in the articles of incorporation, pointed out stockholder or subscriber has yet to fully pay for the

that the Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does value of the share or shares subscribed. In this case,

not impose any lien, liability or restriction on the Golf Clemente had already fully paid for the share in

Share [of Caram], but only its (Valley Golfs) By-Laws Calatagan and no longer had any outstanding

does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its own Articles obligation to deprive him of full title to his share.

of Incorporation does provide that the monthly dues Perhaps the analogy could have been made if

assessed on owners of shares of the corporation, Clemente had not yet fully paid for his share and the
non-stock corporation, pursuant to an article or by- of no help to its cause. Calatagans Articles of

law provision designed to address that situation, Incorporation states that the dues, together with all

decided to sell such share as a consequence. But other obligations of members to the club, shall

that is not the case here, and there is no purpose for constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to

us to apply Section 69 to the case at bar. any lien in favor of the national or local government,

and in the event of delinquency such shares may be

Calatagan argues in the alternative that ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner

Clementes suit is barred by Article 1146 of the Civil provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or other

Code which establishes four (4) years as the obligations of the stockholders.[14] In turn, there are

prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to several provisions in the By-laws that govern the

the rights of the plaintiff on the hypothesis that the payment of dues, the lapse into delinquency of the

suit is purely for damages. As a second alternative member, and the constitution and execution on the

still, Calatagan posits that Clementes action is lien. We quote these provisions:

governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which

sets five (5) years as the period of prescription for all ARTICLE XII MEMBERS ACCOUNT

other actions whose prescriptive periods are not

SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members,
fixed in the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither Posting of Delinquent Members The
Treasurer shall bill al members
article is applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Code monthly. As soon as possible after the
end of every month, a statement
which provides that an action to recover movables showing the account of bill of a
member for said month will be
shall prescribe in eight (8) years. Calatagans action prepared and sent to him. If the bill of
any member remains unpaid by the
is for the recovery of a share of stock, plus damages. 20th of the month following that in
which the bill was incurred, the
Treasurer shall notify him that if his bill
is not paid in full by the end of the
succeeding month his name will be
posted as delinquent the following day
at the Clubhouse bulletin board. While
posted, a member, the immediate
Calatagans advertence to the fact that the members of his family, and his guests,
may not avail of the facilities of the
constitution of a lien on the members share by virtue Club.

of the explicit provisions in its Articles of (b) Members on the delinquent list
for more than 60 days shall be
Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but ultimately reported to the Board and their shares
or the shares of the juridical entities
they represent shall thereafter be
ordered sold by the Board at auction
to satisfy the claims of the Club as
provided for in Section 32 hereon. A
member may pay his overdue account
at any time before the auction sale.
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of
Share at Auction- The club shall have
a first lien on every share of stock to
secure debts of the members to the
Club. This lien shall be annotated on
the certificates of stock and may be
enforced by the Club in the following
manner:
(a) Within ten (10) days after the
Board has ordered the sale at auction
of a members share of stock for
indebtedness under Section 31(b)
hereof, the Secretary shall notify the
owner thereof, and shall advise the
Membership Committee of such fact.
(b) The Membership Committee
shall then notify all applicants on the
Waiting List and all registered
stockholders of the availability of a
share of stock for sale at auction at a
specified date, time and place, and
shall post a notice to that effect in the
Club bulletin board for at least ten (10)
days prior to the auction sale.
(c) On the date and hour fixed,
the Membership Committee shall
proceed with the auction by viva voce
bidding and award the sale of the
share of stock to the highest bidder.
(d) The purchase price shall be
paid by the winning bidder to the Club
within twenty-four (24) hours after the
bidding.The winning bidder or the
representative in the case of a juridical
entity shall become a
Regular Member upon payment of the
purchase price and issuance of a new
stock certificate in his name or in the
name of the juridical entity he
represents. The proceeds of the sale
shall be paid by the Club to the selling
stockholder after deducting his
obligations to the Club.
(e) If no bids be received or if the
winning bidder fails to pay the amount
of this bid within twenty-four (24)
hours after the bidding, the auction
procedures may be repeated from
time to time at the discretion of the
Membership Committee until the
share of stock be sold.
(f) If the proceeds from the sale
of the share of stock are not sufficient
to pay in full the indebtedness of the
member, the member shall continue to
be obligated to the Club for the unpaid
balance. If the member whose share
of stock is sold fails or refuse to
surrender the stock certificate for
cancellation, cancellation shall be
effected in the books of the Club
based on a record of the
proceedings. Such cancellation shall
render the unsurrendered stock
certificate null and void and notice to
this effect shall be duly published.
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to
install a clear and comprehensive procedure to
govern the payment of monthly dues, the declaration
of a member as delinquent, and the constitution of a
lien on the shares and its eventual public sale to
answer for the members debts. Under Section 91 of
the Corporation Code, membership in a non-stock
corporation shall be terminated in the manner and
for the causes provided in the articles of
incorporation or the by-laws. The By-law provisions
are elaborate in explaining the manner and the
causes for the termination of membership in
Calatagan, through the execution on the lien of the

share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws, as
written, affords due protection to the member by
assuring that
the member should be notified by the Secretary of t
he looming execution sale that would terminate
membership in the club. In addition, the By-Laws
guarantees that after the execution sale, the
proceeds of the sale would be returned to the former
member after deducting the outstanding obligations.
If followed to the letter, the termination of
membership under this procedure outlined in the By-
Laws would accord with substantial justice.
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the
by-law provisions when it sold Clementes share?
The appellate courts finding on this point warrants
our approving citation, thus:
In accordance with this
provision, Calatagan sent the third
and final demand letter to Clemente
on December 7, 1992. The letter
states that if the amount of
delinquency is not paid, the share will
be included among the delinquent
shares to be sold at public
auction. This letter was signed by Atty.
Benjamin Tanedo, Jr.,
Calatagan Golfs Corporate
Secretary. It was again sent to
Clementes mailing address Phimco
Industries Inc., P.O. Box 240,
MCC Makati. As expected, it was
returned because the post office box
had been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the
Corporate Secretary is tasked to give
or cause to be given, all notices
required by law or by these By-Laws.
.. and keep a record of the addresses
of all stockholders. As quoted above,
Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further
provides that within ten (10) days after
the Board has ordered the sale at
auction of a members share of stock
for indebtedness under Section 31 (b)
hereof, the Secretary shall notify the
owner thereof and shall advise the
Membership Committee of such
fact., The records do not disclose
what report the Corporate Secretary
transmitted to the Membership
Committee to comply with Section
32(a). Obviously, the reason for this
mandatory requirement is to give the
Membership Committee the
opportunity to find out, before the
share is sold, if proper notice has
been made to the shareholder
member.
We presume that the
Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is
knowledgeable on the law and on the
standards of good faith and fairness
that the law requires. As custodian of
corporate records, he should also
have known that the first two letters
sent to Clemente were returned
because the P.O. Box had been
closed. Thus, we are surprised given
his knowledge of the law and of
corporate records that he would send
the third and final letter Clementes last
chance before his share is sold and
his membership lost to the same P.O.
Box that had been closed.
Calatagan argues that it
exercised due diligence before the
foreclosure sale and sent several
notices to Clementes specified
mailing address. We do not agree; we
cannot label as due diligence
Calatagans act of sending
the December 7, 1992letter to
Clementes mailing address knowing
 fully well that the P.O. Box had
been closed. Due diligence or good
faith imposes upon the Corporate
Secretary the chief repository of all It is noteworthy that Clemente in his
corporate records the obligation to
check Clementes other address membership application had provided his residential
which, under the By-Laws, have to be
kept on file and are in fact on file. One address along with his residence and office
obvious purpose of giving the
Corporate Secretary the duty to keep telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of
the addresses of members on file is
specifically for matters of this kind, Calatagans By-Laws requires that the final notice
when the member cannot be reached
through his or her mailing prior to the sale be made solely through the
address. Significantly, the Corporate
Secretary does not have to do the members mailing address. Clemente cites our
actual verification of other addressees
on record; a mere clerk can do the aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial
very simple task of checking the files
as in fact clerks actually undertake Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals[15] that [a]
these tasks. In fact, one telephone call
to Clementes phone numbers on file simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x
would have alerted him of his
impending loss. x could have prevented this present controversy.

That memorable observation is quite apt in this case.

Ultimately, the petition must fail because

Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe

and letter of its own by-laws. The by-law provisions its own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss

was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the of Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf course

delinquent member of the impending sale, and not and avail of its amenities, but also in significant

just to provide an intricate faade that would facilitate pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only

Calatagans sale of the share. But then, the bad faith blame that could be thrown Clementes way was his

on Calatagans part is palpable. As found by the failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O.

Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would cost

Clementes postal box to which it sent its previous Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he

letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in deserve answerability for failing to notify the club of

sending that final letter to the same postal box. What the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he

for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it had known did that Calatagan was in possession of his home

very well that the letter would never actually reach address as well as residence and office telephone

Clemente. numbers, he had every reason to assume that the

club would not be at a loss should it need to contact in its place in the name of the purchases at the

him. In addition, according to Clemente, he was not auction who was not impleaded in this case.

even aware of the closure of the postal box, the However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that

maintenance of which was not his responsibility but Calatagan to issue to Clemente a new certificate of

his employer Phimcos. stock. That sufficiently redresses the actual

damages sustained by Clemente. After all, the

The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan certificate of stock is simply the evidence of the

brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the share.

Civil Code,[16]under the Chapter on Human

Relations. These provisions, which the Court of The Court of Appeals also awarded

Appeals did apply, enunciate a general obligation Clemente P200,000.00 as moral

under law for every person to act fairly and in good damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,

faith towards one another. A non-stock corporation and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees. We agree that

like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in the award of such damages is warranted.

its treatment of its members. The obligation of a

corporation to treat every person honestly and in The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for

good faith extends even to its shareholders or violation of Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows

members, even if the latter find themselves recovery of damages from any private individual who

contractually bound to perform certain obligations to directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in

the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a any manner impedes or impairs the right against

charter of dehumanization. deprivation of property without due process of laws.

We turn to the matter of damages. The The plain letter of the provision squarely entitles

award of actual damages is of course warranted Clemente to damages from Calatagan. Even without

since Clemente has sustained pecuniary injury by Article 32 itself, Calatagan will still be bound to pay

reason of Calatagans wrongful violation of its own moral and exemplary damages to Clemente. The

By-Laws. It would not be feasible to deliver latter was able to duly prove that he had sustained

Clementes original Certificate of Stock because it mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded

had already been cancelled and a new one issued feelings by reason of Calatagans acts, thereby
entitling him to moral damages under Article 2217 of

the Civil Code. Moreover, it is evident that

Calatagans bad faith as exhibited in the

course of its corporate actions warrants correction

for the public good, thereby justifying exemplary

damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals

is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES

JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE,
 CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND that she was delinquent for three (3) months
GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., Respondents. corresponding to the months of December 1998,
January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa
DECISION argued that the due date of her payment was
March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000,
PERALTA, J.: pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was
at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water
line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).

On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the

Before the Court is a petition for review
delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p.
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
12). On the same date, through her lawyer, Ma.
seeking to reverse and set aside the
Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
who authorized the cutting of the water line
(CA), dated August 28, 2003 and December 17,
(Records, p. 160).
2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The
CA Decision affirmed with modification the
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general
August 15, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.,
Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24,
answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and
while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's
reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce
Motion for Reconsideration.
Ardiente that the water line was cut off (Records,
p. 161).
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa
cralavvonl inelawl ibra ry

Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint

[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her
for damages [against petitioner, COWD and its
husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water
three (153) square meters and covered by
line was only restored and reconnected when the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
[trial] court issued a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a
(Records, p. 237).4
Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. B, pp. 470-
473, Records) selling, transferring and conveying
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as
in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
follows:
all their rights and interests in the housing unit at
cralavvonl inelawl ibra ry

Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The

xxxx
Memorandum of Agreement carries a
stipulation:
In the exercise of their rights and performance of
cralavvonlinelawli bra ry

their duties, defendants did not act with justice,

4. That the water and power bill of the subject
gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and
property shall be for the account of the Second
good faith. Before disconnecting the water
Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1,
supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar
1994. (Records, p. 47)
Gonzales did not even send a disconnection
notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr.
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of
Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial
the payment of the mortgage loan secured by
Department of defendant COWD. There was one
Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage
though, but only three (3) days after the actual
(Records, Exh. A, pp. 468-469)
disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date
for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water
did not act with justice. Neither did they observe
connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was
honesty.
never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October
31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999,
They should not have been swayed by the
without notice, the water connection of Ma.
prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have
Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of
investigated first as to the present ownership of
the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to
the house. For doing the act because Ardiente
complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa
told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce
Ardiente should have requested before the
cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay.
While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did
not have the patience of seeing them. She knew
that it was plaintiffs who had been using the
water four (4) years ago and not hers. She
should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's
Decision reads, thus: c ralavvon linelawl ib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente,
COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally
plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District
and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed.
The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of
the water supply of plaintiffs was because they
were influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente.
They were negligent too for which they should be
liable.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal
with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its
assailed Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed
decision is AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the awarded damages is
reduced to P100,000.00 each for moral and
exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is
lowered to P25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she
has a legal duty to honor the possession and use
of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant
to their Memorandum of Agreement and that
when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection,
she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and
[injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide.8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they
failed to give a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite
payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent
spouses Pastorfide].9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their
cra lavvonli nelawli bra ry
cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
cralavvo nli nelawlib rary
NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS
TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19
respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these
were denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review
on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical
grounds and on the finding that the CA did not
commit any reversible error in its assailed
Decision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24,
2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied with
finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated
June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the
instant petition with the following Assignment of
Errors:cralavvo nline lawlib rary
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH
IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF)
HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND
SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V.
ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER
DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D.
GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO
SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL
DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT
PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY
SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF
RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN
IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND
FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN
THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR
THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH
LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY
THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE
OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE
OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE
EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY
AND GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN AWARD
OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER
ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and
Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants
before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA,
were impleaded as respondents in the instant
petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-
parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner
cannot, in the instant petition for review
on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez,
adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the
part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and
Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to do
so, considering that, in the first place, there is no
showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim against
COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set
up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a
cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before
the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing
so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and
Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court was already denied with finality
on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed
CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD
and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and
Gonzalez are already precluded from participating
in the present petition. They cannot resurrect
their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as
respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the
same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with
the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court
likewise noticed that the main issues raised by
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the
resolution of factual issues is the function of
lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and considered binding
by the Supreme Court subject only to certain
exceptions, none of which is present in this
instant petition.13This is especially true when the
findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA
as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand
would readily show that the instant petition lacks
merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held
liable for the disconnection of respondent
spouses' water supply, because she had no
participation in the actual disconnection.
However, she admitted in the present petition
that it was she who requested COWD to
disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply.
This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in
their cross-claim against petitioner. While it was
COWD which actually discontinued respondent
spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it
was through the instance of petitioner that the
Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was
disconnected in the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask
and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause
the transfer of the former's account with COWD
to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the
remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water
supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm
another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach.16 In the present case,
intention to harm was evident on the part of
petitioner when she requested for the
disconnection of respondent spouses water
supply without warning or informing the latter of
such request. Petitioner claims that her request
for disconnection was based on the advise of
COWD personnel and that her intention was just
to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with
their agreement that petitioner's account with
COWD be transferred in respondent spouses'
name. If such was petitioner's only intention,
then she should have advised respondent
spouses before or immediately after submitting
her request for disconnection, telling them that
her request was simply to force them to comply
with their obligation under their Memorandum of
Agreement. But she did not. What made matters
worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
disconnection also without prior notice and even
failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides water
supply despite payment of their arrears. There
was clearly an abuse of right on the part of
petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty
of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v.
The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is
instructive, to wit:
cralavvonli nelawlib ra ry
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must
be observed in the exercise of ones rights as well
as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act
with justice; give everyone his due; and observe
honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper. The Court said: cralavvo nline lawlib rary
One of the more notable innovations of the New
Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers
of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the
old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience" and which
were also meant to serve as "guides for human
conduct [that] should run as golden threads
through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway
and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among
these principles is that pronounced in Article
19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also
in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice;
to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though
by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order,
it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the
latter for the same. It speaks of the general
sanctions of all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for its own sanction. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the
provision does not provide a remedy for its
violation, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances
of each case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated
the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent
spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with
her failure to warn or at least notify respondent
spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD
and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior
notice of the impending disconnection and their
subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent
spouses' water supply despite the latter's
settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both
the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and
Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral
damages based on the provisions of Article
2219,19 in connection with Articles 2020 and
2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides
that exemplary damages may be imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good.
Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another,
but to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees
with the CA in sustaining the award of exemplary
damages, although it reduced the amount
granted, considering that respondent spouses
were deprived of their water supply for more
than nine (9) months, and such deprivation
would have continued were it not for the relief
granted by the RTC.

With respect to the award of attorney's fees,

Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among
others, that such fees may be recovered when
exemplary damages are awarded, when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest, and where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just
and demandable claim.

WHEREFORE, instant petition for review

on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August
28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
FLORENCIO A.
SALADAGA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B.
ASTORGA, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 4728
FLORENCIO A.
SALADAGA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B.
ASTORGA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Membership in the legal profession is a high
personal privilege burdened with
conditions,1 including continuing fidelity to the law
and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers,
as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the
preservation of society, and a consequent
obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest
standards of ethical conduct.2 Failure to live by the
standards of the legal profession and to discharge
the burden of the privilege conferred on one as a
member of the bar warrant the suspension or
revocation of that privilege.
The Factual Antecedents
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and
respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" on
December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with
rightof repurchase) to complainant a parcel of
coconut land located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay,
Leyte covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under the said deed,
respondent represented that he has "the perfect
right to dispose as owner in fee simple" the subject
property and that the said property is "free from all
liens and encumbrances."3The deed also provided
that respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years
within which to repurchase the property, and if not
repurchased within the said period, "the parties
shall renew [the] instrument/agreement."4
Respondent failed to exercise his right of
repurchase within the period provided in the deed,
and no renewal of the contract was made even
after complainant sent respondent a final demand
dated May 10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the
property. Complainant remained in peaceful
possession of the property until December 1989
when he received letters from the Rural Bank of
Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the
property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI,
that the bank had subsequently foreclosed on the
property, and that complainant should therefore
vacate the property.5
Complainant was alarmed and made
aninvestigation. He learned the following:
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by
TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine
National Bank (PNB) as early as November
17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;
(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT
No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and
his wife on January 4, 1982 pursuant to a
deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between
PNB and respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject
property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI
foreclosed on the property, and
subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635
on March 27, 1991.6 Complainant was
subsequently dispossessed of the property
by RBAI.7
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal
complaint for estafa against respondent with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte,
docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial
Prosecutor of Leyte approved the
Resolution8 dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-144
finding that "[t]he facts of [the] case are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x
has been committed and that respondent herein is
probably guilty thereof."9Accordingly, an
Information10 dated January 8,1996 was filed
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay,
Leyte, formally charging respondent with the crime
of estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of
the Revised Penal Code,11 committed as follows:
On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself
as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same
to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing
fully well that the possessor and owner at that time
was private complainant Florencio Saladaga by
virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused
executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd
December, 1981, without first
redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate
complainant knowing of accused[s] unlawful act
only on or about the last week of February, 1991
when the rural bank dispossessed him of the
property, the mortgage having been foreclosed,
private complainant thereby suffered damages and
was prejudiced by accused[s] unlawful transaction
and misrepresentation.
The aforementioned estafa case against
respondent was docketed as Criminal Case No.
3112-A.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant
administrative cases against respondent by filing
before this Court an Affidavit-Complaint12 dated
January 28, 1997 and Supplemental
Complaint13 dated February 27, 1997, which were
docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728,
respectively. In both complaints, complainant
sought the disbarment of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.14
In his Consolidated Answer15 dated August 16,
2003 filed before the IBP, respondent denied that
his agreement with complainant was a pacto de
retrosale. He claimed that it was an equitable
mortgage and that, if only complainant rendered an
accounting of his benefits from the produce of the
land, the total amount would have
exceeded P15,000.00.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors
In a Report and Recommendation16 dated April 29,
2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline found that
respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with
complainant and executed the "Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed that the
agreement was one of equitable mortgage.
Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when
he represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the
property was covered by TCT No. T-662, even
giving complainant the owners copy of the said
certificate of title, when the said TCT had already
been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT No.
T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank
(PNB). Respondent made matters even worse,
when he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the
issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his and his
wifes name on January 4,1982 without informing
complainant. This was compounded by
respondents subsequent mortgage of the property
to RBAI, which led to the acquisition of the property
by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of
complainant. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be (1) suspended
from the practice of law for one year, with warning
that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt
with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the
sum of P15,000.00, the amount he received as
consideration for the pacto de retrosale, with
interest at the legal rate.
Considering respondents "commission of unlawful
acts, especially crimes involving moral turpitude,
actsof dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and
deceit," the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioners Report
and Recommendation with modification as follows:
respondent is(1) suspended from the practice of
law for two years, with warning that a similar
misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more
severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum
of P15,000.00 received in consideration of the
pacto de retrosale, with legal interest.17
The Courts Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for two years, but it refrains
from ordering respondent to return the P15,000.00
consideration, plus interest.
Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2,
1981 in favor of complainant. However, respondent
insists that the deed is not one of sale with pacto de
retro, but one of equitable mortgage. Thus,
respondent argues that he still had the legal right to
mortgage the subject property to other persons.
Respondent additionally asserts that complainant
should render an accounting of the produce the
latter had collected from the said property, which
would already exceed the P15,000.00
consideration stated in the deed.
There is no merit in respondents defense.
Regardless of whether the written contract between
respondent and complainant is actually one of sale
with pacto de retroor of equitable mortgage,
respondents actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present
administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for
the highest standards of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from
lawyers, for which respondent should be held
administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal
profession, he took an oath where he undertook to
"obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct
[him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion."18He gravely violated his
oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found,
and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that
respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in
the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" as he
was the one who prepared or drafted the said
instrument. Respondent could have simply
denominated the instrument as a deed of mortgage
and referred to himself and complainant as
"mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively, rather
than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If
only respondent had been more circumspect and
careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed,
then the controversy between him and complainant
could havebeen avoided or, at the very least, easily
resolved. His imprecise and misleading wording of
the said deed on its face betrayed lack oflegal
competence on his part. He thereby fell short of his
oath to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to
the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."
More significantly, respondent transgressed the
laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations
asembodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right
to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he
should have seen to it that his agreement with
complainant is embodied in an instrument that
clearly expresses the intent of the contracting
parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to
it that the agreement faithfully and clearly reflects
the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise,
the respective rights and obligations of the
contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens
the door to legal disputes between the said parties.
Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondents
poor formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal
controversy between respondent and complainant.
Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration
Act,19 the law in effect at the time the PNB acquired
the subject property and obtained TCT No. T-3211
in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of a
purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in
foreclosure proceedings becomes final, such
purchaser becomes entitled to the issuance of a
new certificate of title in his name and a
memorandum thereof shall be "indorsed upon the
mortgagors original certificate."20 TCT No. T-662,
which respondent gave complainant when they
entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981, does not
bearsuch memorandum but only a memorandum
on the mortgage of the property to PNB in 1963
and the subsequent amendment of the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith,
falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated
December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it
appear that the property was covered by TCT No.
T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the
owners copy of the said certificate oftitle, when the
truth is that the said TCT had already been
cancelled some nine years earlier by TCT No. T-
3211 in the name of PNB. He did not evencare to
correct the wrong statement in the deed when he
was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-
7235 on January 4, 1982,21 or barely a month after
the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent
clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and
deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Codeof Professional
Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under
Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to
personally obey the laws and the legal processes,
he is moreover expected to inspire respect and
obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01
states the norm of conduct that is expected of all
lawyers.22
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or
unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct
does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to
include such element.23
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy;
lacking inintegrity, honesty, probity, integrity in
principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the
other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as
follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to
the prejudice and damage of the party imposed
upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must
either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in
reckless and conscious ignorance thereof,
especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and
was done with the intent that the aggrieved party
act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance
of the false statement or deed in the manner
contemplated to his injury.24The actions of
respondent in connection with the execution of the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall
within the concept of unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil
Code. They show a disregard for Section 63 of the
Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith,
dishonesty, and deceit on respondents part. Thus,
respondent deserves to be sanctioned.
Respondents breach of his oath, violation of the
laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are
compounded by his gross disregard of this Courts
directives, as well as the orders of the IBPs
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an
agent of this Court pursuant to the Courts referral
of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation), which caused delay in the
resolution of these administrative cases.
In particular, the Court required respondent to
comment on complainants Affidavit-Complaint in
A.C. No. 4697 and Supplemental Complaint in A.C.
No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25, 1997,
respectively.25 While he requested for several
extensions of time within which to submit his
comment, no such comment was submitted
prompting the Court to require him in a Resolution
dated February 4,1998 to (1) show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure, and (2) submit the
consolidated comment.26Respondent neither
showed cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, nor
submitted the consolidated comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP and
during the proceedings before the IBPs
Investigating Commissioner, respondent was again
required several times to submit his consolidated
answer. He only complied on August 28, 2003, or
more than six years after this Court originally
required him to do so. The Investigating
Commissioner also directed the parties to submit
their respective position papers. Despite having
been given several opportunities to submit the
same, respondent did not file any position paper.27
Respondents disregard of the directives of this
Court and of the Investigating Commissioner, which
caused undue delay in these administrative cases,
contravenes the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
CANON 12 A lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining
extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes.
Respondents infractions are aggravated by the fact
that he has already been imposed a disciplinary
sanction before.1wphi1 In Nuez v. Atty.
Astorga,28 respondent was held liable for conduct
unbecoming an attorney for which he was
fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent the damage caused him; and/or indemnification for
from the practice of law for two years, as consequential damages,35 which may already cover
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is the P15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid
proper. for the subject property.

The Court, however, will not adopt the WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found
recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to GUILTY of the following: breach of the Lawyers
return the sum of P15,000.00 he received from Oath; unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct;
complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to and disrespect for the Court and causing undue
Repurchase." This is a civil liability best determined delay of these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED
and awarded in a civil case rather than the present from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
administrative cases. years, reckoned from receipt of this Decision, with
WARNING that a similar misconduct in the future
In Roa v. Moreno,29 the Court pronounced that "[i]n shall be dealt with more severely.
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
only concern is the determination of respondents Philippines for their information and guidance. The
administrative liability. Our findings have no Court Administrator is directed to circulate this
material bearing on other judicial action which the Decision to all courts in the country.
parties may choose to file against each
other."While the respondent lawyers wrongful SO ORDERED.
actuations may give rise at the same time to
criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities, each
must be determined in the appropriate case; and
every case must be resolved in accordance with
the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of
proof required in each. Section 5,30 in relation to
Sections 131 and 2,32 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
states that in administrative cases, such as the
ones atbar, only substantial evidence is required,
not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal
cases, or preponderance of evidence asin civil
cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.33

The Court notes that based on the same factual

antecedents as the present administrative cases,
complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa
against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No.
3112-A, before the MTC. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.34 Unless the
complainant waived the civil action, reserved the
right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil
action prior to the criminal action, then his civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from
the estafa committed by respondent is deemed
instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil
liability that complainant may recover in Criminal
Case No. 3112-A includes restitution; reparation of
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH
BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on
the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein
respondent. After respondent filed her answer,
petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition
by stating that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. In response,
respondent filed an amended answer denying the
allegation that she was psychologically
incapacitated.[1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court
promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage
entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel
Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4,
1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant
moral damages in the amount of 2.5
million pesos and exemplary damages
of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from
the date of this decision plus attorneys
fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendant expenses of litigation
of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of
the conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiffs
separation/retirement benefits
received from the Far East Bank [and]
Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and
paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the
net amount of P3,675,335.79
or P1,837,667.89 together with 12%
interest per annum from the date of this
decision and one-half (1/2) of his
outstanding shares of stock with Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in
favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount
of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the
minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to
revert back to the use of her maiden
family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the
appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the
Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to
increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente
lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner
filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied
or that such incident be set for oral argument.[3]
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals
issued a Resolution increasing the
support pendente lite to P20,000.[4]Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration questioning the said
Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court
promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners
appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial
courts decision.[6] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. From the
abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996
Resolution, which increased the monthly support for
the son.[7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to
question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari[8] and the Petition for Certiorari[9] were
ordered consolidated by this Court.[10]
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner
claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case
not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF P2.5
MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1
MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE
OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND
MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00
ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES
OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-
HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12%
INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS
DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID
RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS
AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND
ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH
THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE
PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES,
ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE
ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE
TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE,
THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND
CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR CHILD
TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING
THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS
OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM,
BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE
TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.[11]
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances
the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO SET
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED
SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES SON FOR
HEARING.[12]
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY
PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES.[13]
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR
THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE
EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT
OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS THERETO,
INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS
ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT
AS SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.[14]
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD
HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN OPPORTUNITY
TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW
THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE
JAVYS SUPPORT.[15]
With regard to the first issue in the main case,
the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after
findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not
only of the parties particularly the defendant-
appellee but likewise, those of the two
psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of
Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant
deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him
by professing true love instead of revealing to her
that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry
and that because of pride he married defendant-
appellee; that he was not ready to enter into
marriage as in fact his career was and always
would be his first priority; that he was unable to
relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband
but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no
inclination to make the marriage work such that in
times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that
of leaving defendantappellee and their son; that he
had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their
son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to
reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to
suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years
the parties were together but also after and
throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on
the ground that unlike those arising from a breach
in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a
consequence of marriage may not be awarded.
While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided
case by the Supreme Court where damages by
reason of the performance or non-performance of
marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow
that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer,
specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The
lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found
full justification of awarding at least half of what was
originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb
the ruling of the trial court.[16]
The award by the trial court of moral damages
is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because
Article 2219[17] of the Civil Code enumerates the
cases in which moral damages may be recovered
and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It
must be noted that Article 21 states that the
individual must willfully cause loss or injury to
another. There is a need that the act is willful and
hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral
damages, therefore, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts
on which the moral damages were based were done
willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral
damages would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the
marriage of the parties null and void based on Article
36 of the Family Code, due to psychological
incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined,
thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has
been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. . . .[18]
The Court of Appeals and the trial court
considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability
to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as
willful and hence as grounds for granting moral
damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as
a product of psychological incapacity, and hence
beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the
same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner
as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
awarding moral damages on the same set of facts
was negated. The award of moral damages should
be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into
the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological
incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that one must assume and
discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes
the basis for the contention that the petitioner
purposely deceived the private respondent. If the
private respondent was deceived, it was not due to
a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore,
the award of moral damages was without basis in
law and in fact.
 Since the grant of moral damages was not
proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary
damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides
that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil
Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
when as in this case the plaintiffs act or omission
has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur
expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2),
and where the Court deems it just and equitable
that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered. (par. 11)[20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral
and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award
of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial
court is likewise fully justified.[21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the
lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity,
and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment
of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly
compelling the private respondent to litigate, since
both are grounded on petitioners psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental
incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with
the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a
ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Furthermore, since the award of moral and
exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award
of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left
without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the
Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock
in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident
Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court
is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment
of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court has
held that the declaration of nullity of marriage
carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572
573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law
states that the final judgment therein shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4,
1979, and therefore, all property acquired during
the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116,
New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of
the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal
partnership properties. Among others they are the
following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or
profession of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or
received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive
property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without
prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are the
parties conjugal properties and what are the
exclusive properties of each spouse, it was
disclosed during the proceedings in this case that
the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager
and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank &
Trust Co. received separation/retirement package
from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00
which after certain deductions amounting
to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount
of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on
January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not
having shown debts or obligations other than those
deducted from the said retirement/separation pay,
under Art. 129 of the Family Code The net
remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlement or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code. In this particular case,
however, there had been no marriage settlement
between the parties, nor had there been any
voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant
wifes share in the conjugal partnership properties.
The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of
his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house
and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the
Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in
favor of the defendant as stipulated in their
Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and
approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated
August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full
settlement of any and all demands for past support.
In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some
concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for
were the law strictly to be followed, in the process
of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only
child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here,
what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the
house was ceded to defendant so that she will not
claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the
other half was transferred to their only child as his
presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the
defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she
be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the
plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal
partnership properties having been obtained or
derived from the labor, industry, work or profession
of said defendant husband in accordance with Art.
117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same
reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the
outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband
with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident
Group of Companies.[22]
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter
as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails
the order of the trial court for him to give one-half of
his separation/retirement benefits from Far East
Bank & Trust Company and half of his outstanding
shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident
Group of Companies to the defendant-appellee as
the latters share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial
Decision approving the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties. In the same
Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed
that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is
dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at
least half of the separation/retirement benefits
which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East
Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as
Vice-President of said company for the reason that
the benefits accrued from plaintiffappellants service
for the bank for a number of years, most of which
while he was married to defendant-appellee, the
trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true
with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-
appellant at the time he was married to defendant-
appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as
her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no
reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[23]
Since the present case does not involve the
annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the
Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage
is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102,
Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded on the
consequences of a void marriage on the property
relations of the spouses and specified the applicable
provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article
147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the
Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144
of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties
acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter
vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without
the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is
in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a
man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in
the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of
the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of
the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-
ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to
the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly
provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s]
inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during
the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad
faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-
ownership in favor of their common children; in
default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong
to the respective surviving descendants, or still in
default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the termination of the
cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the
marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue
on the settlement of the parties' common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor
precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to
declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed
likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of
the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code,
not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation
of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e.,
the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage
contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. The
latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the
philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages
are inexistent from the very beginning and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity.
In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the
previously contracted void marriage, the present
law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It
is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43,
in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a
subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not
to be assumed that the law has also meant to have
coincident property relations, on the one hand,
between spouses in valid and voidable marriages
(before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void
marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the
Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless,
even as it may merely state the obvious, that the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home,"
i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of
the Family Code, remain in force and effect
regardless of the property regime of the spouses.[25]
Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-
ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No.
127358) contesting the Court of Appeals
Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November
13, 1996 which increased the support pendente
lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and
is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by

the court a quo were found, both by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired
during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate
property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
owned in common by the parties herein as ordered
by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained,
but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over
their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now
moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of
age on May 27, 2005[26] and has, therefore, attained
the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in
the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be
moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the
age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution
dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the
Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby FILINVEST LAND, INC., petitioner,
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and vs.
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO,
litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving ANTONIO, JOSEFINA, RICARDO (JR.), all
respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of surnamed ALVAREZ and VENANCIA R. Vda. de
petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and ALVAREZ, for herself as guardian ad litem for
one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila her minor children, RAMON, VERONICA, and
Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
FLORDELIZA, all surnamed ALVAREZ, and as
necessary and indispensable party plaintiffs
JAIME, VICTORIA, and MANUEL, all surnamed
ALVAREZ, and ROSARIO PARAM Vda. de
ALVAREZ, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended,
seeking to set aside a Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated 11 November 1998 in CAG.R. SP
No. 48396 annulling the sale of a parcel of land
specified as Lot No. 329, GSS-877 of the Laguna
Resettlement Project, to the late Ricardo Alvarez
and the subsequent transfers to Mercedes Oliver
and petitioner Filinvest Land Inc. (Filinvest); and the
reversion of the subject property to the ownership
of the government. The Court of Appeals in its
assailed Decision affirmed the Decision2 of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) dated 1 July 1998.
The subject matter in this case is a parcel of land
registered as Lot No. 329 of the Laguna
Resettlement Project, located in Barrio San
Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, with an area of
16,495 square meters. The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) awarded to Ricardo Alvarez the right
to purchase the land in question, pursuant to an
Order of Award dated 9 October 1973.3 On 15
August 1977, Ricardo Alvarez, with the consent of
his wife, respondent Rosario Param, purchased the
land, evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by the
DAR.4 This Deed of Sale specifically prohibited the
transfer of the land within ten (10) years from the
issuance of the certificate of title to any person
other than the vendees relatives within the third
civil degree by consanguinity or affinity who are, at
the same time, qualified beneficiaries.5 This
restriction was in accordance with Section 62 of
Republic Act No. 3844, or the Agricultural Land
Reform Code.6
However, pending the issuance of the certificate of
title of the said land, Presidential Decree No. 1474,
Declaring the San Pedro Tunasan Estate (also
known as the Laguna Resettlement Project) of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Suitable for
Residential, Commercial, or Industrial, or other
Non-Agricultural Purposes, was enacted on 11
June 1978 and published in the Official Gazette on
27 November 1978. This effectively repealed the
ten-year prohibition on the transfer of agrarian
lands situated in the Laguna Resettlement Project.
Presidential Decree No. 1474 provided that:
Section 1. The Department of Agrarian
Reform, as Administrator of the San Pedro
Tunasan Estate, is hereby ordered to
convert such estate into a commercial,
industrial and residential site and to transfer
the same to the National Housing Authority.
Section 2. Individuals who have legally
acquired farm lots in the Estate under
Orders of Award or Certificates of Land
Transfer or Agreement to Sell or Deeds of
Sale, may sell or transfer their lots covered
thereby or convert the same for the
purposes mentioned in Section 1 hereof.
The Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
62731, covering the subject land, in the name of
Ricardo Alvarez on 25 May 1979. On 10 June
1979, only 16 days after the title was issued,
Ricardo Alvarez and his wife, Rosario Param, sold
the said land to Mercedes Oliver for Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10, 000.00). Oliver was not a relative
within the third degree of consanguinity and had no
capacity to personally cultivate the land, as
required of a qualified beneficiary. Thus, TCT No.
62731 was cancelled, and TCT No. 64967 was
issued in the name of Mercedes Oliver.7
On 22 December 1989, Mercedes Oliver sold the
subject land to Filinvest, resulting in the issuance of
TCT No. 201836 on 23 January 1990 in the name
of Filinvest.8
On 7 March 1982, the heirs of the late Ricardo
Alvarez filed a case for reconveyance, redemption
and damages against Mercedes Oliver, Avelino
Ramos and Jose Nunez, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna.9 Respondents filed
an Amended Complaint for Annulment of Title with
Reconveyance, dated 4 December 1985, wherein
they claim that the sale of the subject land was
made without their knowledge, and it was only in
the 1980s that they learned of such sale. They
alleged that their mother and father, both illiterate,
were deceived by the defendants into executing the
Deed of Sale covering the subject land in favor of
Mercedes Oliver. Respondents also argued that
such sale was void since the Deed of Sale was
executed in violation of the law which enjoins the
sale of the subject land.10 This case was, however,
dismissed for failure of the respondents and
counsel to appear during the hearing for the
reception of their evidence, despite due notice and
after eight postponements11. The RTC, in its
Order,12 dated 17 February 1989, ruled that:
Further considering that without the
evidence of said witness and the plaintiffs
not having presented any evidence on
record, upon motion of counsel for
defendants that this case be dismissed and
further manifestation by the defendants that
they are waiving their right to a
counterclaim, the Court hereby orders the
dismissal of this case (both the complaint
and counterclaim).
Let copy of this Order be furnished party
plaintiff.
The order became final and executory when the
respondents failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of this Order, despite receipt
thereof.13
On 26 March 1990, respondents filed a complaint
against Mercedes Oliver and Filinvest before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication (PARAD)
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, seeking to annul the Deed of
Sale between the Spouses Alvarez and Mercedes
Oliver and the subsequent transfer between
Mercedes Oliver and Filinvest, on grounds similar
to the complaint filed before the RTC of Bian.
They also sought the issuance of a restraining
order enjoining Filinvest from bulldozing the subject
land, which was occupied and cultivated by the
respondents. Mercedes Oliver filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and that the
PARAD had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. Filinvest similarly filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and laches.
It also alleged, in its defense, that it was a
purchaser for value and in good faith. In its Position
Paper, Filinvest likewise asserted that the
restriction against selling the subject land within ten
years, provided under the Deed of Sale executed
by DAR in favor of the Spouses Alvarez had
already been superseded by Presidential Decree
No. 1474, which took effect in 1978.14
On 25 August 1993, the PARAD of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, dismissed the complaint on the ground
of res judicata. Moreover, it ruled that the sale
between the Spouses Alvarez and Mercedes Oliver
was valid.15 The dispositive part of this
Decision16 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view therefrom, Judgment
is hereby rendered dismissing the instant
case for lack of merit.
On appeal, the DARAB reversed and set aside the
Decision dismissing the complaint, and ordered the
reversion of the subject property to the government.
The dispositive portion of the said Order,17 dated 1
July 1998 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
challenged decision dated August 25, 1993
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Annulling the transfer of the land in
question to the late Ricardo Alvarez and its
subsequent transfers to defendant
Mercedes Oliver and defendant Filinvest
Land Incorporated;
2. Ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 201836, covering the
subject land, issued by the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Laguna, Calamba
branch, in the name of defendant Filinvest;
and
3. Directing the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Laguna, Calamba branch, to
issue in lieu of TCT No. 201836, a
Certificate of Title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, through DAR,
for distribution to qualified farmer-
beneficiary in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1992,
which is the Revised Rules and Procedures
Governing the Disposition of Homelots and
other Lots in Barangay Sites and
Residential, Commercial, and Industrial Lots
in Townsites within DAR Settlement Project
and Similar Other Areas under DAR
Jurisdiction.
The DARAB ruled, too, that res judicata as a bar
against filing a complaint with the PARAD is not
applicable in this case since there was no
adjudication of the merits before the RTC of Bian.
The DARAB considered as self-serving and
unsupported by evidence the allegations of the
respondents that the consent of the Spouses
Alvarez was obtained through fraud in connection
with the sale made in favor of Mercedes Oliver. It
also ruled that the sale between Ricardo Alvarez
and Mercedes Oliver was a violation of the ten-year
prohibition against the transfer of the land imposed
by the Deed of Sale between the government and
Ricardo Alvarez, in accordance with Section 62 of
Republic Act No. 3844. Such act rendered the
Deed of Sale executed by the DAR in favor of
Ricardo Alvarez void, and, therefore, the
subsequent transfers to Mercedes Oliver and
Filinvest were, likewise, void.18
In negating Filinvests claim that Presidential
Decree No. 1474 has superseded Section 62 of
Republic Act No. 3844, the DARAB cited the case
of Tipon v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where
the Court upheld the validity of the ten-year
prohibition on the transfer of land given by the
government to farmer-beneficiaries. The DARAB
added that the restriction on transfer of land is
contained in our present agrarian laws, particularly
Republic Act No. 6675.20
The petitioners then filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Section 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals, but on 11
November 1998, the appeal was again dismissed
for lack of merit and the assailed Decision of the
DARAB was affirmed. 21
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was subsequently denied in a Resolution
dated 8 February 1999.22
Hence this petition, wherein Filinvest raised the
following issues:
I GROUP VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT
THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
LAND BY RICARDO ALVAREZ TO
MERCEDES OLIVER VIOLATED THE
TRANSFER RESTRICTION CONTAINED
IN THE PRIOR DEED OF SALE OF THE
SAME PROPERTY EXECUTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
IN FAVOR OF RICARDO ALVAREZ AND
SECTION 62, ARTICLE II, CHAPTER III OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3844
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING
SECTION 1 (C), RULE II OF THE NEW
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB),
CONFERRING JURISDICTION OF THE
DARAB OVER THE INSTANT CASE, IN
DISREGARD OF THE PROVISIONS OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1474
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO BAR
RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT IN DARAB
CASE NO. IV-032-L
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT PETITIONER IS A BUYER IN GOOD
FAITH WHO SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO
PROTECTION AGAINST THE ALLEGED
CLAIM OF THE RESPONDENT HEREIN,
PURSUANT TO THIS HONORABLE
COURTS RULING IN AGRICULTURAL
AND HOME EXTENSION DEVELOPMENT
AL., G.R. NO. 92319, SEPTEMBER 3,
199223
This petition is meritorious.
The first issue raised by Filinvest is whether the
sale between Ricardo Alvarez and Mercedes Oliver
was void because it violated the prohibitory
condition contained in the Deed of Sale between
Ricardo Alvarez and the Government, to wit:
2. That from the date of the pertinent Order
of Award and within TEN (10) years from
the date of issuance by the proper Register
of Deeds of the certificate of title, the land
subject hereof shall not, except by
hereditary succession, be subdivided, sold
or in any manner transferred or encumbered
except in favor of any of the VENDEES
relative within the third civil degree by
 consanguinity or affinity who fulfill the four
(4) requirements in Section 6 Land Authority
Administrative Order No. 4, Series of 1967,
or in favor of the Government and its
financial or banking institutions or rural
banks, and only upon prior written consent
of the Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform; and any sale, transfer,
encumberance or alienation made in
violation hereof shall be null and void: x x
x24
This condition is in accordance with Section 62 of
Republic Act No. 3844, The Agricultural Land
Reform Code, which provided that:
Section 62. Limitation on Land Rights. - Except in
case of hereditary succession by one heir,
landholdings acquired under this Code may not be
resold, mortgaged, encumbered, or transferred until
after the lapse of ten years from the date of full
payment and acquisition and after such ten-year
period, any transfer, sale or disposition may be
made only in favor of persons qualified to acquire
economic family-size farm units in accordance with
the provisions of this Code: Provided, That a
purchaser who acquired his landholding under a
contract to sell may secure a loan on the same
from any private lending institution or individual for
an amount not exceeding his equity on said
landholding upon a guaranty by the Land Bank.
Filinvest, however, contends that these restrictions
were already revoked by the issuance of
Presidential Decree No. 1474, Declaring the San
Pedro Tunasan Estate of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Suitable for Residential,
Commercial or Industrial, or Other Non-Agricultural
Purposes. This law reclassifies the San Pedro
Tunasan Estate, known as and hereinafter referred
to as the Laguna Resettlement Project, into a
commercial, industrial and residential site as it is no
longer conducive to agricultural development.
The position taken by Filinvest is justified. Section 2
of Presidential Decree No. 147425 categorically
empowers "individuals who have legally acquired
lots in the (San Pedro Tunasan) Estate" under
Orders of Awards or Deeds of Sale, among others
things, to "sell or transfer their lots covered
thereby." Therefore, transfers of land located within
the Laguna Resettlement Project, made after the
law took effect, are valid and the restriction on
transfer of the land within ten years after its
registration is no longer applicable.
In the present case, the government, through the
DAR had already issued an Order of Award and a
Deed of Sale in favor of Ricardo Alvarez covering a
parcel of land located within the Laguna
Resettlement Project, when Presidential Decree
No. 1474 was enacted on 11 June 1978. In 1979,
Alvarez, with the consent of his spouse, Rosario
Param, transferred the same parcel of land to
Mercedes Oliver. Such transfer was clearly
sanctioned. As earlier adverted to, Section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1474 revoked the
application of Section 62 of Republic Act No. 3844
and the condition prohibiting the transfer of the land
contained in the Deed of Sale executed by the DAR
in favor of Alvarez, in so far as land within the
Laguna Resettlement Project was concerned.
Since the transfer made by Ricardo Alvarez to
Mercedes Oliver was valid, the subsequent transfer
made by Mercedes Oliver to Filinvest is also valid.
DARABs reliance on the ruling of the Court
in Tipon v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,26 upholding the ten-year prohibition on the
transfer of land distributed by the government in
favor of its beneficiaries, is misplaced. This case is
not applicable for it did not take into account
Presidential Decree No. 1474 because of different
factual circumstances. It is true that the Tipon case
shares some similarities with the present case - the
subject property was part of the Laguna
Resettlement Project, and the Deed of Sale
between the DAR and the farmer-beneficiary,
Renato Tipon, was executed before the enactment
of Presidential Decree No. 1474 in 1978. However,
there is a crucial difference. Unlike the present
case where the subsequent transfer by the farmer-
beneficiary, Ricardo Alvarez, to Mercedes Oliver
was made in 1979 after Presidential Decree No.
1474 took effect, the subsequent transfer by
farmer-beneficiary Renato Tipon to Atty. Umiral
Matic, was made in 1976 before the enactment of
Presidential Decree No. 1474. The factual
background of the Tipon case, as recounted by the
Court, are thus:
Petitioner Renato Tipon acquired the lot in
question (Lot No. 386 of the Laguna
Settlement Project) from the government by
virtue of a Deed of Sale executed in his
favor by the Department of Agrarian Reform
on November 23, 1976, for the price
of P1,251.20. x x x.
xxxx
 On the day the Deed of Sale was executed
in his favor, Tipon filed a request with the
Department of Agrarian Reform for
permission to transfer his rights and interest
over the lot in question in favor of Atty.
Umiral P. Matic (respondent herein). This
request was granted by the Regional
Director of Region IV of the Department of
Agrarian Reform on December 9, 1976
"subject to the condition that the Deed of
Transfer is submitted to this department for
verification and final approval.
On December 10, 1976, Tipon submitted
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Matic
for approval and, on the same day, it was
approved by the Regional Director of
Region IV of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Thereafter, Matic caused the titling
of the property in the name of Tipon to
whom was issued Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 50617 and later, had the same
transferred to his name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 53850 dated July 12,
1977, of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Laguna.27
A basic principle of statutory construction mandates
that general legislation must give way to special
legislation on the same subject, and generally be
so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which
the special provisions are not applicable.28 There is
no question that Section 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 1474 is inconsistent with Section 62 of
Republic Act No. 3844. The former authorizes the
sale or transfer of agricultural lands within the
Laguna Resettlement Project, while the latter law
prohibits the transfer of agricultural lands
distributed by the government to farmer-
beneficiaries, at least for a limited period.
Presidential Decree No. 1474 as a special law
should govern lands within the Laguna
Resettlement Project, while Republic Act No. 3844
is a law generally applied to agrarian lands.
The second issue Filinvest raised is whether the
DARAB had jurisdiction over a case involving the
subject land. Rule II, Section 1, of the DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure provides that the
DARAB shall have primary jurisdiction, both original
and appellate over:
(c) Cases involving the annulment or
cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR
officials other than the Secretary, lease
contracts or deeds of sale or their
amendments under the administration and
disposition of the DAR and LBP; x x x.
However, Filinvest argued that under Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1474, the Laguna
Resettlement Project was no longer agricultural
land but was effectively converted into a
commercial, industrial and residential site, and was
therefore outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1474 reads:
Section 1. The Department of Agrarian
Reform, as Administrator of the San Pedro
Tunasan Estate, is hereby ordered to
convert such estate into a commercial,
industrial and residential site and to transfer
the same to the National Housing Authority.
From the aforecited provision, it is clear that the
DAR had lost jurisdiction over government lands
located in the Laguna Resettlement Project
formerly under its administration which it was
ordered to transfer to the National Housing
Authority (NHA). More importantly, the DARAB can
no longer annul the Deed of Sale between the
government and Ricardo Alvarez, or the
subsequent transfers, on the ground that Alvarez
violated Section 62 of Republic Act No. 3844 and
the conditions laid down in the Deed of Sale
regarding the ten-year restriction on the transfer of
the same land. At that time, the transfer between
Alvarez and Oliver was made, these
aforementioned rules were repealed by the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1474. These
rules were no longer applicable to the land in
question, as it was no longer under the
administration of the DAR nor agrarian in character.
The validity of the subsequent transfer of the
subject land between Ricardo Alvarez and
Mercedes Oliver, or even the later transfer between
Mercedes Oliver and Filinvest, was no longer
subject to agrarian laws, as the land was already
commercial, industrial, or residential in nature at the
time of the transfer. Therefore, any proceeding
which attacks the validity of the subsequent
transfers are within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
Clearly, the respondents filed the case before the
PARAD, not because the case involved a dispute
that would be properly resolved by the PARAD, but
because they were already barred from filing the
case before the proper forum. The allegations and
relief found in the Complaint filed by the
respondents before the PARAD are conspicuously
similar to those in the Amended Complaint which
they had earlier filed before the trial court of
Bian.29 As earlier discussed, the trial court ordered
the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute.
When the respondents failed to file a motion for
reconsideration, despite due notice, such order
became final.
This Court cannot countenance the party-litigants
recourse to such measures. The foundation
principle upon which the doctrine of res
judicata rests is that parties should not be permitted
to litigate the same issue more than once. When a
right or fact has been judicially tried and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, so long as it is not reversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them in law or estate.30
The following requisites must concur in order that a
prior judgment may bar a subsequent action: (1)
the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it
was rendered after a consideration of the evidence
or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of
the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and (4) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action. 31
A perusal of the records easily shows that the first,
third and fourth requirements have been complied
with in this case. The Order rendered by Branch
XXIV of the RTC of Bian, dated 17 February 1989,
dismissing the case, is clearly final, as it disposed
of all the rights and obligations of the parties before
it.32 There was never any question raised on the
jurisdiction of Branch XXIV of the RTC to hear and
decide the question of whether the sale executed
between Ricardo Alvarez and Mercedes Oliver was
valid. It is also obvious that the allegations of the
respondents in their Amended Complaint filed
before the RTC of Bian are substantially identical
to the Complaint filed before the PARAD; involved
the same subject matter, and raised the same
causes of action.33 Filinvest was named as a party
only in the complaint before the PARAD, since it
acquired the property from Mercedes Oliver only on
22 December 1989,34 after the case before the
RTC was dismissed on 17 February 1997.
Moreover, the fact that its predecessor-in interest,
Mercedes Oliver, was a party in the case filed
before the RTC of Bian satisfies the requirement
on the identity of parties. In the case of Camara v.
Court of Appeals,35 this Court has ruled that,
"[t]here is identity of parties not only where the
parties are the same, but also those in privity with
them, as between their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the
action, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity."
The only contention between the parties was
whether the second requirement, that the decision
or order must have been based on the merits of the
case, was met. In situations contemplated in
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court,36 where a
complaint is dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to
comply with a lawful order of the court, such
dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits.37 A dismissal for failure to prosecute has the
effect of an adjudication on the merits, and
operates as res judicata, particularly when the court
did not direct that the dismissal was without
prejudice.38
Having complied with the four requisites needed for
the doctrine of res judicata to operate, the Order
rendered by the RTC of Bian dismissing Civil
Case No. B-1941 finally determined the ownership
of the subject land, the heirs of the late Ricardo
Alvarez, Mercedes Oliver, and her successor-in-
interest, Filinvest, as no motion for reconsideration
on this Order was filed. Moreover, this would bar
any dispute over the subject land from being
brought before any judicial forum. Rule 39, Section
47 of the Rules of Court39 provides that in case of a
judgment or final order over a specific thing,
rendered by a court having jurisdiction, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title
to the thing and binding upon the parties and their
successors-in-interest.
Furthermore, the allegations of the private
respondents of their counsels negligence cannot
be given any credence. In the Affidavit of private
respondent Romeo Alvarez, and reiterated in the
Comment filed by the private respondents before
the Court of Appeals, it was alleged that on 12
December 1986, their counsel, Atty. Rosendo O.
Chavez, executed a Notice of Withdrawal, which
was not filed before the trial court and did not bear
the conformity of the private
respondents.40 Thereafter, Atty. Chavez allegedly
stopped attending the hearings before the trial
court. As a result thereof, the private respondents
were not notified of the 17 February 1989 hearing,
when the Order dismissing the case was issued.
Records clearly show that Atty. Chavez could not
have withdrawn from the case on 12 December
1986. As of 14 December 1987, Atty. Chavez
presented as his witness, Rosario Param, one of
the private respondents.41 Since he requested for
continuance, he was required to bring the witness
on the next hearing date. However, seven
postponements later, he was unable to bring the
witness he presented.42 On 17 October 1988, Atty.
Chavez attended the hearing. He failed to attend
the next hearing on 20 January 1989.
Nevertheless, he was still at that time the counsel
of the private respondents and therefore the notice
to him was binding upon the parties. Moreover, the
private respondent Rosario Param was perfectly
aware that her testimony was far from finished, and
that she still needed to appear before the Court.
Given the foregoing facts, private respondents
allegations that their counsel was grossly negligent
and that he had deceived them is not credible.

Even if the allegations of the private respondents

are to be believed, they should have raised them in
a Motion for Reconsideration, or a petition to annul
the Order of the trial court dismissing the case.
While they alleged that they did not receive the
Order requiring them to appear on the 17 February
1989 hearing, they never denied receiving the
Order of dismissal. As the records stand, the
counsel for the respondents received the Order
dismissing the case on 28 February 1989,43 and the
respondents never filed a Motion for
Reconsideration or even a belated appeal to
question the Order dismissing case. Instead, they
waited for a full year and filed with the DARAB a
case which was under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this

Court GRANTS this petition and REVERSES the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
48396, dated 11 November 1998, affirming the
Order of the DARAB nullifying the transfer
certificate titles issued in the names of Ricardo
Alvarez, Mercedes Oliver and Filinvest Land Inc.
since the DARAB was without jurisdiction to issue
the said Order. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
DOMINGO GONZALO, Petitioner,
vs.
JOHN TARNATE, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
The doctrine of in pari delicto which stipulates that
the guilty parties to an illegal contract are not
entitled to any relief, cannot prevent a recovery if
doing so violates the public policy against unjust
enrichment.
Antecedents
After the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) had awarded on July 22, 1997
the contract for the improvement of the Sadsadan-
Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-Benguet
Road in the total amount of 7 014 963 33 to his
company, Gonzalo Construction,1 petitioner
Domingo Gonzalo (Gonzalo) subcontracted to
respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate) on October
15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the
project under the latter s business known as JNT
Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among
others, that Tarnate would pay to Gonzalo eight
percent and four percent of the contract price,
respectively, upon Tarnate s first and second billing
in the project.2
In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo
executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment
whereby he, as the contractor, was assigning to
Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total
collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10%
retention fee (equivalent to P233,526.13) was the
rent for Tarnates equipment that had been utilized
in the project. In the deed of assignment, Gonzalo
further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt
of Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the
documents relative to the collection of the 10%
retention fee and in encashing the check to be
issued by the DPWH for that purpose.3 The deed of
assignment was submitted to the DPWH on April
15, 1999. During the processing of the documents
for the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that
Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of
assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation
of deed of assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in
the DPWH on April 22, 1999;4 and that the
disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee
had then been issued in the name of Gonzalo, and
the retention fee released to him.5
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee
from Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus, he brought this
suit against Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mountain Province to
recover the retention fee of P233,526.13, moral and
exemplary damages for breach of contract, and
attorneys fees.6
In his answer, Gonzalo admitted the deed of
assignment and the authority given therein to
Tarnate, but averred that the project had not been
fully implemented because of its cancellation by the
DPWH, and that he had then revoked the deed of
assignment. He insisted that the assignment could
not stand independently due to its being a mere
product of the subcontract that had been based on
his contract with the DPWH; and that Tarnate,
having been fully aware of the illegality and
ineffectuality of the deed of assignment from the
time of its execution, could not go to court with
unclean hands to invoke any right based on the
invalid deed of assignment or on the product of
such deed of assignment.7
Ruling of the RTC
On January 26, 2001, the RTC, opining that the
deed of assignment was a valid and binding
contract, and that Gonzalo must comply with his
obligations under the deed of assignment, rendered
judgment in favor of Tarnate as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and as prayed
for by the plaintiff, John Tarnate, Jr. in his
Complaint for Sum of Money, Breach of Contract
With Damages is hereby RENDERED in his favor
and against the above-named defendant Domingo
Gonzalo, the Court now hereby orders as follows:
1. Defendant Domingo Gonzalo to pay the
Plaintiff, John Tarnate, Jr., the amount of
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY
SIX and 13/100 PESOS (P233,526.13)
representing the rental of equipment;
2. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS
by way of reasonable Attorneys Fees for
having forced/compelled the plaintiff to
litigate and engage the services of a lawyer
in order to protect his interest and to enforce
his right. The claim of the plaintiff for
attorneys fees in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) plus
THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00)
clearly appears to be unconscionable and
therefore reduced to Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as aforestated making the
same to be reasonable;
3. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) by way of litigation expenses;
 4. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00) for moral damages and for the
breach of contract; and
5. To pay the cost of this suit.
Award of exemplary damages in the instant case is
not warranted for there is no showing that the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner analogous to the
case of Xentrex Automotive, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 291 SCRA 66.8
Gonzalo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Decision of the CA
On February 18, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.9
Although holding that the subcontract was an illegal
agreement due to its object being specifically
prohibited by Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1594; that Gonzalo and Tarnate were guilty of
entering into the illegal contract in violation of
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594; and that
the deed of assignment, being a product of and
dependent on the subcontract, was also illegal and
unenforceable, the CA did not apply the doctrine of
in pari delicto, explaining that the doctrine applied
only if the fault of one party was more or less
equivalent to the fault of the other party. It found
Gonzalo to be more guilty than Tarnate, whose guilt
had been limited to the execution of the two illegal
contracts while Gonzalo had gone to the extent of
violating the deed of assignment. It declared that
the crediting of the 10% retention fee equivalent
to P233,256.13 to his account had unjustly
enriched Gonzalo; and ruled, accordingly, that
Gonzalo should reimburse Tarnate in that amount
because the latters equipment had been utilized in
the project.
Upon denial of his motion for
reconsideration,10 Gonzalo has now come to the
Court to seek the review and reversal of the
decision of the CA.
Issues
Gonzalo contends that the CA erred in affirming the
RTC because: (1) both parties were in pari delicto;
(2) the deed of assignment was void; and (3) there
was no compliance with the arbitration clause in the
subcontract.
Gonzalo submits in support of his contentions that
the subcontract and the deed of assignment, being
specifically prohibited by law, had no force and
effect; that upon finding both him and Tarnate guilty
of violating the law for executing the subcontract,
the RTC and the CA should have applied the rule of
in pari delicto, to the effect that the law should not
aid either party to enforce the illegal contract but
should leave them where it found them; and that it
was erroneous to accord to the parties relief from
their predicament.11
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, but we delete the
grant of moral damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses.
There is no question that every contractor is
prohibited from subcontracting with or assigning to
another person any contract or project that he has
with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary has
approved the subcontracting or assignment. This is
pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1594, which provides:
Section 6. Assignment and Subcontract. The
contractor shall not assign, transfer, pledge,
subcontract or make any other disposition of the
contract or any part or interest therein except with
the approval of the Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, the Minister
of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as
the case may be. Approval of the subcontract shall
not relieve the main contractor from any liability or
obligation under his contract with the Government
nor shall it create any contractual relation between
the subcontractor and the Government.
Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project
in question, subcontracted the implementation of
the project to Tarnate in violation of the statutory
prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal, therefore,
because it did not bear the approval of the DPWH
Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of assignment
was also illegal, because it sprung from the
subcontract. As aptly observed by the CA:
x x x. The intention of the parties in executing the
Deed of Assignment was merely to cover up the
illegality of the sub-contract agreement. They knew
for a fact that the DPWH will not allow plaintiff-
appellee to claim in his own name under the Sub-
Contract Agreement.
Obviously, without the Sub-Contract Agreement
there will be no Deed of Assignment to speak of.
The illegality of the Sub-Contract Agreement
necessarily affects the Deed of Assignment
because the rule is that an illegal agreement cannot
give birth to a valid contract. To rule otherwise is to
sanction the act of entering into transaction the
object of which is expressly prohibited by law and
thereafter execute an apparently valid contract to
subterfuge the illegality. The legal proscription in
such an instance will be easily rendered nugatory
and meaningless to the prejudice of the general
public.12
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract
whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law is
a void or inexistent contract. As such, a void
contract cannot produce a valid one.13 To the same
effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code, which
declares that "a contract, which is the direct result
of a previous illegal contract, is also void and
inexistent."
We do not concur with the CAs finding that the guilt
of Tarnate for violation of Section 6 of Presidential
Decree No. 1594 was lesser than that of Gonzalo,
for, as the CA itself observed, Tarnate had
voluntarily entered into the agreements with
Gonzalo.14 Tarnate also admitted that he did not
participate in the bidding for the project because he
knew that he was not authorized to contract with
the DPWH.15 Given that Tarnate was a
businessman who had represented himself in the
subcontract as "being financially and
organizationally sound and established, with the
necessary personnel and equipment for the
performance of the project,"16 he justifiably
presumed to be aware of the illegality of his
agreements with Gonzalo. For these reasons,
Tarnate was not less guilty than Gonzalo.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the
guilty parties to an illegal contract cannot recover
from one another and are not entitled to an
affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or
in equal fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a
universal doctrine that holds that no action arises,
in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit
can be maintained for its specific performance, or
to recover the property agreed to be sold or
delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or
damages for its violation; and where the parties are
in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will
be given to one against the other.17
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in
pari delicto is not always rigid.1wphi1 An accepted
exception arises when its application contravenes
well-established public policy.18 In this jurisdiction,
public policy has been defined as "that principle of
the law which holds that no subject or citizen can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be
injurious to the public or against the public good."19
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR
Builders, Inc.,20 "when a person unjustly retains a
benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is
a recognized public policy of the State, for Article
22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very
person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him." It is well to note that Article 22 "is
part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated
as basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order; designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience; guides for human conduct that should
run as golden threads through society to the end
that law may approach its supreme ideal which is
the sway and dominance of justice."21
There is no question that Tarnate provided the
equipment, labor and materials for the project in
compliance with his obligations under the
subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it
was Gonzalo as the contractor who received the
payment for his contract with the DPWH as well as
the 10% retention fee that should have been paid to
Tarnate pursuant to the deed of
assignment.22 Considering that Gonzalo refused
despite demands to deliver to Tarnate the
stipulated 10% retention fee that would have
compensated the latter for the use of his equipment
in the project, Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched
at the expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be
barred from recovering because of the rigid
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The
prevention of unjust enrichment called for the
exception to apply in Tarnates favor.
Consequently, the RTC and the CA properly
adjudged Gonzalo liable to pay Tarnate the
equivalent amount of the 10% retention fee
(i.e., P233,526.13).
Gonzalo sought to justify his refusal to turn over
the P233,526.13 to Tarnate by insisting that he
(Gonzalo) had a debt of P200,000.00 to
Congressman Victor Dominguez; that his payment
of the 10% retention fee to Tarnate was conditioned
on Tarnate paying that debt to Congressman
Dominguez; and that he refused to give the 10%
retention fee to Tarnate because Tarnate did not
pay to Congressman Dominguez.23 His justification
was unpersuasive, however, because, firstly,
Gonzalo presented no proof of the debt to
Congressman Dominguez; secondly, he did not
competently establish the agreement on the
condition that supposedly bound Tarnate to pay to
Congressman Dominguez;24 and, thirdly, burdening
Tarnate with Gonzalos personal debt to
Congressman Dominguez to be paid first by
Tarnate would constitute another case of unjust
enrichment.

The Court regards the grant of moral damages,

attorneys fees and litigation expenses to Tarnate to
be inappropriate. We have ruled that no damages
may be recovered under a void contract, which,
being nonexistent, produces no juridical tie
between the parties involved.25 It is notable, too,
that the RTC and the CA did not spell out the
sufficient factual and legal justifications for such
damages to be granted.

Lastly, the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Civil

Code command Gonzalo to make a full reparation
or compensation to Tarnate. The illegality of their
contract should not be allowed to deprive Tarnate
from being fully compensated through the
imposition of legal interest. Towards that end,
interest of 6% per annum reckoned from
September 13, 1999, the time of the judicial
demand by Tarnate, is imposed on the amount
of P233,526.13. Not to afford this relief will make a
travesty of the justice to which Tarnate was entitled
for having suffered too long from Gonzalos unjust
enrichment.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision

promulgated on February 18, 2003, but DELETE
the awards of moral damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses; IMPOSE legal interest of 6%
per annum on the principal oLP233,526.13 JEROME CASTRO, G.R. No. 180832
reckoned from September 13, 1999; and DIRECT Petitioner,
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. P
resent:
SO ORDERED.
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
 AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Code[4] against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated: his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and

July 23, 2008 evident premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ed found that RIS code violation point system

--------------x
allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable
RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.: sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law).

The system therefore violated due process. Hence,

This petition for review on certiorari[1] emanated from the Dep-Ed nullified it. [5]

the complaint for grave oral defamation[2] filed by

Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-
Albert P. Tan against petitioner Jerome Castro.
Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any

The facts follow. condition.[6]Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS

and participate in the commencement ceremonies

On November 11, 2002, Reedley
held on March 30, 2003.
International School (RIS) dismissed Tans son,
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met
Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating
Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the
the terms of his disciplinary probation.[3] Upon Tans
course of their conversation, Tan intimated that he
request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed
was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS
non-appealable conditions such as excluding Justin
in their personal capacities, including petitioner who
Albert from participating in the graduation
was the assistant headmaster.
ceremonies.
Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the

Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the first week of April and told him that Tan was planning

Department of Education (Dep-Ed) for violation of to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities.

the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools, Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:

Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil

 Okay, you too, take care and be
careful talking to [Tan], thats Petitioner pleaded not guilty during
dangerous.
arraignment.

Ching then called Tan and informed him that The prosecution essentially tried to establish

petitioner said talking to him was dangerous. that petitioner depicted Tan as a dangerous person.

Ching testified that petitioner warned her that talking

Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral
to Tan was dangerous. Tan, on the other hand,
defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
testified that petitioners statement shocked him as it
Mandaluyong City against petitioner on August 21,
portrayed him as someone capable of committing
2003.
undesirable acts. He added that petitioner probably
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with
took offense because of the complaint he filed
grave oral defamation in the Metropolitan Trial Court
against RIS in the Dep-Ed.
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60[7] under the
For his defense, petitioner denied harboring
following Information:

That on or about the 13th day ill-feelings against Tan despite the latters complaint
of March, 2003 in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted
within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named conversing with Ching (whom he considered as a
[petitioner], with deliberate intent of
bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into
close acquaintance) on the telephone a few days
discredit, dishonor, disrepute and
contempt, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously after RIS 2003 commencement exercises, petitioner
speak and utter the following words
to Ms. Bernice C. Ching: asserted that he never said or insinuated that Tan or
OK, YOU TOO, YOU
TAKE CARE AND BE talking to Tan was dangerous. On cross-
CAREFUL TALKING
TO [TAN], THATS
DANGEROUS. examination, however, he did not categorically deny

and other words of similar import of a the veracity of Chings statement.

serious and insulting nature.

CONTRARY TO LAW. The MeTC found that Chings statements in

her affidavit and in open court were consistent and

that she did not have any motive to fabricate a false 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the

statement. Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored RTC ruled that prescription had already set in; it

personal resentment, aversion and ill-will against therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground. [9]

Tan since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his

On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor
son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that petitioner
General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari in the
told Ching talking to Tan was dangerous and that he
Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the decision of the
uttered the statement with the intention to insult Tan
RTC.[10] It contended that the RTC acted with grave
and tarnish his social and professional reputation.
abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioners

In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly

MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable misappreciated the antecedents which provoked

doubt of grave oral defamation:[8] petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory

WHEREFORE, judgment is statement against Tan.

hereby rendered finding accused,
Jerome Castro GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
Grave Oral Defamation, sentencing The CA found that the RTC committed grave
him therefore, in accordance to
Article 358(1) of the Revised Penal abuse of discretion when it misapprehended the
Code and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to suffer the penalty of totality of the circumstances and found petitioner
imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day
of arresto mayoras minimum to 4
guilty only of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA
months and 1 day of arresto
mayor as maximum.
reinstated the MeTC decision.[11]

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it

the factual findings of the MeTC. However, in view was denied.[12] Hence, this recourse.

of the animosity between the parties, it found

Petitioner basically contends that the CA
petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. But
erred in taking cognizance of the petition for
because Tan filed his complaint in the Office of the
certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on August
judgment (i.e., that the RTC misappreciated the (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been

evidence presented by the parties) but failed to entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or

prove that the RTC committed grave abuse of convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise

discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when the terminated without the express consent of the

RTC acquitted him. accused.[14] Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by

the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable

We grant the petition.
on the ground of double jeopardy.[15]

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

The only exception is when the trial court
[13]
punishment for the same offense. This
acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held
constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of
in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[16] when there was
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides:
mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the
Section 7. Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing
acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to
without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon prosecute and prove its case.[17]
a valid complaint or in information or
other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction
The rationale behind this exception is that a
and after the accused had pleaded to
the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the judgment rendered by the trial court with grave
case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It
or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no
offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or double jeopardy.
information.

xxxxxxxxx In this case, the OSG merely assailed the

RTCs finding on the nature of petitioners statement,

Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon
that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral
(1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court
defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of
 constitute a criminal offense, shall
grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs erroneous produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
evaluation and assessment of the evidence xxxxxxxxx

presented by the parties. (3) Intriguing to cause

another to be
alienated from his
What the OSG therefore questioned were friends;

xxxxxxxxx
errors of judgment (or those involving

misappreciation of evidence or errors of

Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator,
law). However, a court, in a petition for certiorari,
he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As
cannot review the public respondents evaluation of
such, he should always act with justice, give
the evidence and factual findings.[18] Errors of
everyone his due and observe honesty and good
judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a
faith.[22]
writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction

(or those involving the commission of grave abuse WHEREFORE, the petition is

of discretion).[19] hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007 decision

and December 5, 2007 resolution of the Court of

Because the OSG did not raise errors of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98649
jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November
petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings
20, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of
of the RTC.[20] We therefore reinstate the RTC
Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED.
decision so as not to offend the constitutional
Petitioner Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of slight
prohibition against double jeopardy.
oral defamation as defined and penalized in Article
At most, petitioner could have been liable for
358 of the Revised Penal Code.
damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code[21]:

Article 26. Every person shall respect

No pronouncement as to costs.
the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO
DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as private
respondents), respondents.

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the

respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
adjudging the petitioner, who was then the
President of the West Visayas College liable for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for failure to graduate a student with
honors.

The facts are not disputed.

An organization named Student Leadership Club
was formed by some students of the West Visayas
College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the
treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans
from the funds of the club to some of the students
of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act
of extending loans was against school rules and
regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the
School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that
she was being dropped from the membership of the
club and that she would not be a candidate for any
award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision
but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed
to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public
Schools.
The Director after due investigation, rendered a
decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary
investigation conducted by one of
the legal officers of this Office
disclosed the following: That Violeta
Delmo was the treasurer of the
Student Leadership Club, an
exclusive student organization; that
pursuant to Article IX of the of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the
club, it passed Resolution No. 2,
authorizing the treasurer to disburse
funds of the Club to student for
financial aid and other humanitarian
purposes; that in compliance with
said resolution and as treasurer of
the Club, Violeta Delmo extended
loans to some officers and members
of the Club upon proper application
duly approved by the majority of the
members of the Executive Board;
and that upon receiving the report
from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of
the funds of the Club, that Office
conducted an investigation on the
matter and having been convinced
of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the
other officers and members of the
Club, that Office rendered the order
or decision in question. In justifying
that Office's order or decision, it is
contended that approval by that
Office of the Constitution and By-
Laws of the Club is necessary for its
effectivity and validity and since it
was never submitted to that Office,
the Club had no valid constitution
and By-Laws and that as a
consequence, Resolution No. 2
which was passed based on the
Constitution and By-Laws- is without
any force and effect and the
treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who
extended loans to some officers and
members of the Club pursuant
thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she
and the other students involved are
deemed guilty of misappropriating
the funds of the Club. On the other
hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor
Golez and Violeta Delmo, President,
Secretary and Treasurer of the Club,
respectively, testified that the Club
had adopted its Constitution and By-
Laws in a meeting held last October
3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article
I of said Constitution and By-Laws,
the majority of the members of the
Executive Board passed Resolution
No. 2, which resolution became the
basis for the extension on of loans to
some officers and members of the
Club, that the Club honestly believed
that its Constitution and By-Laws
has been approved by the
superintendent because the adviser
of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon,
assured the President of the Club
that he will cause the approval of the
Constitution and By-Laws by the
Superintendent; the officers of the
Club have been inducted to office on
October 9,1965 by the
Superintendent and that the Club
had been likewise allowed to
cosponsor the Education Week
Celebration.
After a careful study of the records,
this Office sustains the action taken
by the Superintendent in penalizing
the adviser of the Club as well as the
officers and members thereof by
dropping them from membership
therein. However, this Office is
convinced that Violets M. Delmo had
acted in good faith, in her capacity
as Club Treasurer, in extending
loans to the officers and members of
the Student partnership Club.
Resolution No. 2 authorizing the
Club treasurer to discharge finds to
 students in need of financial
assistance and other humanitarian
purposes had been approved by the
Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon,
with the notation that approval was
given in his capacity as adviser of
the Club and extension of the
Superintendent's personality. Aside
from misleading the officers and
members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon,
had unsatisfactorily explained why
he failed to give the Constitution and
By-Laws of the Club to the
Superintendent for approval despite
his assurance to the Club president
that he would do so. With this finding
of negligence on the part of the Club
adviser, not to mention laxity in the
performance of his duties as such,
this Office considers as too severe
and unwarranted that portion of the
questioned order stating that Violeta
Delmo "shall not be a candidate for
any award or citation from this
school or any organization in this
school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted,
has been a consistent full scholar of
the school and she alone has
maintained her scholarship. The
decision in question would,
therefore, set at naught all her
sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of
graduating with honors in this year's
commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this
Office believes and so holds and
hereby directs that appellant Violeta.
M. Delmo, and for that matter all
other Club members or officers
involved in this case, be not
deprived of any award, citation or
honor from the school, if they are
otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp.
28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail
the decision of the Director and all the records of
the case. On the same day, petitioner received a
telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO
CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the
records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the
telegram as ordering him to also send the decision
back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the
records plus the decision of the Director to the
Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another
telegram from the Director order him to furnish
Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in
turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the
latter that he had sent the decision back and that
he had not retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the
petitioner received another telegram from the
Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any
honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to
include Delmo's name in the program as one of the
honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a
plain student instead of being awarded the Latin
honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5,
1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of the
latters" decision because he believed that Delmo
should not be allowed to graduate with honors. The
Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed
the Registrar of the school to enter into the
scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna
Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined
by her parents in flag action for damages against
the petitioner. During the pendency of the action,
however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an
Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by
her parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment
against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses
Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the
defendants (now petitioners) bad
faith. Per investigation of Violeta
Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano
Bernardino of the Bureau of Public
Schools (Exhibit L it was the
defendant who inducted the officers
of the Student Leadership Club on
October 9, 1965. In fact the Club
was allowed to cosponsor the
Education Week Celebration. (Exh.
"L"). If the defendant he not approve
of the constitution and by-laws of the
Club, why did he induct the officers
into office and allow the Club to
sponsor the Education Week
Celebration"? It was through his own
act that the students were misled to
do as they did. Coupled with the
defendants tacit recognition of the
Club was the assurance of Mr.
Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who
made the students believe that he
was acting as an extension of Mr.
Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts
want of good faith is the fact that,
although, he kaew as early as April
27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino,
Exhibit "L," he was directed to give
honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id
information to . He told the Court
that he knew that the letter of
Director Bernardino directed him not
to deprive Miss Delmo the honors
due her, but she (sic) says that he
has not finished reading the letter-
decision, Exhibit "L," of Director
Bernardino 0, him to give honors to
Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974,
testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-
35). It could not be true that he has
not finished reading the letter-
decision, Exh. "L," because said
letter consisted of only three pages,
and the portion which directed that
Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any
award, citation or honor from the
school, if otherwise entitled thereto
is found at the last paragraph of the
same. How did he know the last
paragraph if he did not read the
letter.
Defendants actuations regarding
Miss Delmo's cam had been one of
bias and prejudice. When his action
would favor him, he was deliberate
and aspect to the utter prejudice and
detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus,
although, as early as April 27, 1966,
he knew of the exoneration of Miss
Delino by Director Bernardino, he
withheld the information from Miss
Delmo. This is eloquently
dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh.
"13" On April 29,1966, Director
Bernardino cabled him to furnish
Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision,
Exh. "L," but instead of informing
Miss Delmo about the decision,
since he said he mailed back the
decision on April 28,1966, he sent a
night letter on April 29,1966, to
Director Bernardino, informing the
latter that he had returned the
decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the
record. Why a night letter when the
matter was of utmost urgency to the
parties in the case, because
graduation day was only four days
ahead? An examination of the
telegrams sent by the defendant
shows that he had been sending
ordinary telegram and not night
letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At
least, if the defendant could not
furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh.
"L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have
told her about it or that Miss Delmo's
honors and citation in the
commencement be announced or
indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one
who cannot admit a mistake. Very
ungentlemanly this is home out by
his own testimony despite his
knowledge that his decision to
deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to
her was overturned by Director
Bernardino, he on his wrong belief.
To quote the defendant,1 believed
that she did not deserve those
honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p.
43,Empasized supplied). Despite the
telegram of Director Bernardino
which the defendant received hours
before the commencement
executory on May 3-4,1966, he did
not obey Director Bernardino
because he said in his testimony
that he would be embarrassment .
Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently,
he knew only his embarrassment
and not that of r Bernardino whose
order was being flagrantly and
wantonly disregarded by bim And
certainly, not the least of Miss
Delmo's embarrassment. His acts
speak eloquently of ho bad faith and
unjust of mindwarped by his delicate
sensitivity for having been
challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere
student.
 xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour
relative to Miss s case smacks of
contemptuous arrogance,
oppression and abuse of power.
Come to think of it. He refused to
obey the directive of Be o and
instead, chose to feign ignorance of
it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of
Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for
moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to
Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00
and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to
the sole question of whether or not the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
finding that petitioner is liable for damages under
Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and
appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be
disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful
ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral
damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in
the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral
damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's
wrongly act or omission." (People v.
Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the
petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss
Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the
petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's
decision. Granting this to be true, it was
nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the
said decision. He could have done so considering
that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and
even though he sent it back with the records of the
case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which
consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the
petitioner should have had the decency to meet
with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the
latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the
petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the
attendant bad faith which the appellate court
correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant
could not furnish Miss Delmo of a
copy of the decision, he could have
used his discretion and plain
common sense by informing her
about it or he could have directed
the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor
in the printed commencement
program or announced it during the
commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of
the telegram of Director Benardino
hours before the commencement
exercises on May 3-4, 1966,
disobeyed his superior by refusing to
give the honors due Miss Delmo with
a lame excuse that he would be
embarrassed if he did so, to the
prejudice of and in complete
disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend
the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico
Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who
tried several times to see defendant
in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered
extreme disappointment and
humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer
should have acted with
circumspection and due regard to
the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch
as he exceeded the scope of his
authority by defiantly disobeying the
lawful directive of his superior,
Director Bernardino, defendant is
liable for damages in his personal
capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary
damages are also in order. In the same case
of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:

The rationale behind exemplary or

corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or
correction for the public good
(Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World
Airways, 16 SCRA 431).

However, we do not deem it

appropriate to award the spouses
Delmo damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 in their individual
capacity, separately from and in
addition to what they are already
entitled to as sole heirs of the
deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the
decision is modified insofar as moral
damages are awarded to the
spouses in their own behalf.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack

of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in
the preceding paragraph. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C.

TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S.
TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN,
ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND ATTY.
ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.

A.C. No. 8725

JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C.

TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE
P. CALUYA, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T.
QUILALA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:
In this consolidated administrative case,
complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C.
Torres seek the disbarment of respondents Atty.
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio,
Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala
and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly
falsifying a court order that became the basis for
the cancellation of their annotation of the notice of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the
Registry of Deeds in Quezon
City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad
as counsel of the complainants in a civil action they
brought to seek the annulment of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week
of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They
impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT
No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as
well as the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and
Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April
23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261),2 the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children
of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres,
they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a
residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano
Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-
64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that
TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the
names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that,
accordingly, they immediately caused the
annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT
No. N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable
settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby
the complainants agreed to sell the property and
the proceeds thereof would be equally divided
between the parties, and the complaint and
counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by
the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the
defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable
settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint dated February 26,
2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated
May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants' lack of
objection thereto and the defendants' willingness to
similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the
issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16,
2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty.
Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to his office; that they found out upon
verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
that new annotations were made on TCT No. N-
290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-
request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino,
Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2)
the arinotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008
rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC,
Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the
complainants' Motion to Withdraw Complaint;9 and
that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30,
2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds
of Quezon City, disclosed that it was defendant
Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the
complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as
Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful
cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and
their notice of lis pendens under primary entries
PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The LRA set
Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009,
and directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and/or supporting documents on or
before such scheduled hearing.10 However, the
records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707
was already resolved, or remained pending at the
LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from
Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for
his professional services, the complainants felt that
said counsel had abandoned their case. They
submitted that the cancellation of their notice of
adverse claim and their notice of lis
pendens without a court order specifically allowing
such cancellation resulted from the connivance and
conspiracy between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of
their positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds
by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar,
and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and
signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they
claimed to be thereby prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the verified
complaint.11
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated
August 17, 200912 that complainant Robert Torres
had been actively involved in the proceedings in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the
mediation process; that the complainants, after
having aggressively participated in the drafting of
the amicable settlement, could not now claim that
they had been deceived into entering the
agreement in the same way that they could not
feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein;
that he did not commit any abandonment as
alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties
as the counsel for the complainants in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held
responsible for their representation in other
proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which
required a separate engagement; and that the only
payment he had received from the complainants
were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00
for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy,
stressing that he was not acquainted with the other
respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had
met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-
59598; that although he had notarized the letter-
request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to
the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about
how said letter-request had been disposed of by
the Register of Deeds; and that the present
complaint was the second disbarment case filed by
the complainants against him with no other motive
except to harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated
September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr.,
another Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the
actual signing authority of the annotations that
resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT
No. N-290546; that the cancellation of the
annotations was undertaken in the regular course
of official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial
duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity
occurred or was performed in the cancellation of
the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds
was impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only
as a nominal party, thereby discounting any
involvement in the proceedings in the case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his
Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty.
Caluya, Jr.'s signature that appeared below the
cancelled entries, the complainants filed another
sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010
alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the
signature of Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment
complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was
later on consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because
the complaints involved the same parties and
rested on similar allegations against the
respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to
belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his
part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted
Atty. Quilala's Comment.19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being
bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether his
conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates all lawyers to
uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the
Legal Profession. Lawyers are similarly required
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to
engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or
deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of
the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes
the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or
for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents'
acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any
censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree) enumerates the
general duties of the Register of Deeds, as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10. General functions of Registers of
Deeds. - x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds
to immediately register an instrument presented
for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument
bears the proper documentary science stamps and
that the same are properly canceled. If the
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presenter of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason
therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal
by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds
is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act or
duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when its discharge requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of
judgment.22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court
underscores that registration is a merely ministerial
act of the Register of Deeds,
explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or
intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register of
Deeds to decide, but a court of competent
jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether
the documents sought to be registered conform
with the formal and legal requirements for such
documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of
authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala,
Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to
the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim and
the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-
290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May
16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30, 2008
had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for
them to determine inasmuch as their duty to
examine documents presented for registration was
limited only to what appears on the face of the
documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-
request and the RTC order, they found the same to
be sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with
existing requirements, it became obligatory for
them to perform their ministerial duty without
unnecessary delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents'
performance of duty, complainants were not bereft
of any remedy because they could challenge the
performance of duty by bringing the matter by way
of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section
11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as
enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of
Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a
court of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues
concerning the validity or invalidity of a document
registered by the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each
other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No.
Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement,
and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated
on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further
fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their
cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order
dated May 16, 2008.
The complainants' charges are devoid of
substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal
agreement in order to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances
attending the commission of an act, it is
nonetheless essential that conspiracy be
established by clear and convincing
evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard.
Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio,
Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each
other in order to cause the dismissal of the
complaint and then discharge of the annotations,
they presented no evidence to support their
allegation of conspiracy. On the contrary, the
records indicated their own active pjarticipation in
arriving at the amicable settlement with the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence,
they could not now turn their backs on the amicable
settlement that they had themselves entered into.
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated in the
settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in
their doing so. It was actually their obligation as
lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to
avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the
amicable settlement of the complainants and the
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598
subsisted.28
Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment
against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility are applicable, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
the complainants had no right to assume that Atty.
Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation was indefinite as
to extend to his representation of them in the LRA.
The Law Profession did not burden its members
with the responsibility of indefinite service to the
clients; hence, the rendition of professional services
depends on the agreement between the attorney
and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to
respond to the complainants' calls or visits, or to
provide them with his whereabouts to enable them
to have access to him despite the termination of his
engagement in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not
equate to abandonment without the credible
showing that he continued to come under the
professional obligation towards them after the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless
disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty.
Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and
Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal

matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed

of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for
information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged
the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr. vs.
assistance, the complainants obtained a fair ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-
settlement consisting in receiving half of the appellant.
proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without
any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
his legal fees. The complainants did not
competently and persuasively show any Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
unfaithfulness on the part of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far
as their interest in the litigation was concerned.
Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was not liable for
abandonment. ROMERO, J.:
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch
perceived inattention to any other matters
16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
subsequent to the termination of Civil Case No. Q-
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted
07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated
thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
between them at any time during the engagement,
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at 1. By the death of the
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio convict, as to the
respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic personal penalties;
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma and as to the
gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme pecuniary penalties
Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed liability therefor is
the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it extinguished only
required the Solicitor General to file its comment when the death of the
with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his offender occurs
commission of the offense charged. before final judgment;

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his With reference to Castillo's criminal
view that the death of accused-appellant did not liability, there is no question. The law
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his is plain. Statutory construction is
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor unnecessary. Said liability is
General, relying on the case of People extinguished.
v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still
be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his The civil liability, however, poses a
conviction by the lower court on which the civil problem. Such liability is
liability is based. extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other judgment. Saddled upon us is the
hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General task of ascertaining the legal import
arguing that the death of the accused while of the term "final judgment." Is it final
judgment of conviction is pending appeal judgment as contradistinguished
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In from an interlocutory order? Or, is it
support of his position, said counsel invoked the a judgment which is final and
ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo executory?
and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in
a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability We go to the genesis of the law. The
and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if legal precept contained in Article 89
accused should die before final judgment is of the Revised Penal Code
rendered. heretofore transcribed is lifted from
Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does Penal de 1870 which, in part,
death of the accused pending appeal of his recites:
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
La responsabilidad
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, penal se extingue.
this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the 1. Por la muerte del
death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal reo en cuanto a las
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence penas personales
of the alleged crime? siempre, y respecto a
las pecuniarias, solo
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition: cuando a su
fallecimiento no
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code hubiere
is the controlling statute. It reads, in recaido sentencia
part: firme.

Art. 89. How criminal xxx xxx xxx

liability is totally
extinguished. The code of 1870 . . . it will be
Criminal liability is observed employs the term
totally extinguished:
"sentencia firme." What is "sentencia
firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the
ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME.
La sentencia que
adquiere la fuerza de
las definitivas por no
haberse utilizado por
las partes litigantes
recurso alguno contra
ella dentro de los
terminos y plazos
legales concedidos al
efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be
understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is
such that, as Medina y Maranon
puts it, the crime is confirmed "en
condena determinada;" or, in the
words of Groizard, the guilt of the
accused becomes "una verdad
legal." Prior thereto, should the
accused die, according to Viada, "no
hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo,
ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal
de ninguna clase." And, as Judge
Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, "there cannot
be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony
upon which the civil action might
arise exists," for the simple reason
that "there is no party defendant." (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code,
Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final
judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and
78 of that legal body mention the
term "final judgment" in the sense
that it is already enforceable. This
also brings to mind Section 7, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal
case becomes final "after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal
or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served,
or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal
precepts and opinions here collected
funnel down to one positive
conclusion: The term final judgment
employed in the Revised Penal
Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment
has not become executory, it cannot
be truthfully said that defendant is
definitely guilty of the felony charged
against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to
final judgment is without reason. For
where, as in this case, the right to
institute a separate civil action is not
reserved, the decision to be
rendered must, of necessity, cover
"both the criminal and the civil
aspects of the case." People
vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2
O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure,
1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed
that as "the civil action is based
solely on the felony committed and
of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender
extinguishes the civil liability." I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the
present case: Castillo's criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is
sought to be enforced by reason of
that criminal liability. But then, if we
dismiss, as we must, the criminal
action and let the civil aspect
remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will
be called upon to clamp civil liability
in a case where the source thereof
criminal liability does not exist.
And, as was well stated in Bautista,
et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958,
"no party can be found and held
 criminally liable in a civil suit," which
solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in
the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme
Court in the cases of People of the Philippines
v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in
view of the death of the accused pending appeal of
said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando
in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant
Bonifacio Alison having been
established, and considering that
there is as yet no final judgment in
view of the pendency of the appeal,
the criminal and civil liability of the
said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89,
Revised Penal Code; Reyes'
Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia
C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently,
the case against him should be
dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent
cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the
civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all
criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the
offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled
therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the
civil liability has been extinguished,
in view of the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines of 1950
(Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the
revised Penal Code. As pointed out
by the Court below, Article 33 of the
Civil Code establishes a civil action
for damages on account of physical
injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of
defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries,
a civil action for
damages, entirely
separate and distinct
from the criminal
action, may be
brought by the injured
party. Such civil
action shall proceed
independently of the
criminal prosecution,
and shall require only
a preponderance of
evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express
reservation, Belamala's civil action
for damages was to be considered
instituted together with the criminal
action still, since both proceedings
were terminated without final
adjudication, the civil action of the
offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held
that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the
extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability
under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act
as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the
latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that
death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does
not apply in instant case wherein the
civil liability springs neither solely nor
originally from the crime itself but
from a civil contract of purchase and
sale. (Emphasis ours)
 xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced
that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its
genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the
first and second vendees of the property
subject matter of the contract of sale. It
therefore concluded: "Consequently, while
the death of the accused herein
extinguished his criminal liability including
fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect
to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his
death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil
liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred
prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions
for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant
supervenes after the CFI had rendered its
judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the
name of the offended party shall be included in the
title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-
accused should be substituted as defendants-
appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved
from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on
whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the
claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People
v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused
Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by
the lower court of malversation thru falsification of
public documents. Sendaydiego's death
supervened during the pendency of the appeal of
his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to
dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was
allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the
criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the
entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the
criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he
is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a
Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province
of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his
death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex
crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to
indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be
P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is
deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court). The civil action
for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action
(People and Manuel vs. Coloma,
105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz,
107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery
of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the
defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against
him by the Court of First Instance,
the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal (Torrijos vs.
Court of Appeals, L-40336, October
24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
 The accountable public officer may
still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he
has no criminal liability (U.S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine
National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil.
583).
In view of the foregoing,
notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, the Court
Resolved to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of
Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no
criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable,
in determining his civil liability,
Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and,
for that purpose, his counsel is
directed to inform this Court within
ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or
whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly
appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar
as the civil action for the civil liability
is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule
3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue
have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a
reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule
that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal
(civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon
dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of
the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old
ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977
in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can
proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to
death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code
and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is
brought to demand civil liability
arising from a criminal offense, and
no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the
civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient
to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend
support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its
text is there a grant of authority to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes
during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be
brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal
action. In the event that no criminal proceedings
are instituted during the pendency of said civil case,
the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible
with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the
criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is
because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil
liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on
this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to
the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from
the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims
for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso
facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with
the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as
though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to
an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution
of which does not even necessitate the filing of
criminal proceedings. 12One would be hard put to
pinpoint the statutory authority for such a
transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has
perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused pending appeal
inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the
civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all
things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising
from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution
of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-
appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs
out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal
proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that
which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil
Code which refers to the institution of a separate
civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal
proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this
fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival
of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delicto by treating the same as a separate civil
action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will
take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said
civil action to an independent one such as that
contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in
Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution
of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in
the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be
resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which
his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of
his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the
basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense
charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction
and pronounced the same as the source of his civil
liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not
applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's
civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal
action already extinguished which served as basis
for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also
invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing
Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type
involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims,
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal
if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the
Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery
of money" "and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided" in Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the
defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against
him by the Court of First Instance,
the action survives him. It may be
continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is
misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law,
this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be
sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice
Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the
justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego whic
h, relying on the provisions of
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, drew the strained implication
therefrom that where the civil liability
instituted together with the criminal
liabilities had already passed beyond
the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court), the Court of Appeals
can continue to exercise appellate
jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component
criminal liability of the deceased.
This pronouncement, which has
been followed in the Court's
judgments subsequent and
consonant
to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should
be set aside and abandoned as
being clearly erroneous and
unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of
civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority
nor justification for its application in
criminal procedure to civil actions
instituted together with and as part
of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category
of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a
criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary
money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the
deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21,
Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the
estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are
contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex
delicto may include even the restitution of personal
or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an
exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed
against the estate. These are: funeral expenses,
expenses for the last illness, judgments for money
and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from
delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis
in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to
survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of
the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
engendered by the death of the accused pending
finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party,
upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires
to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule
111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but
on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall
be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also
arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or
personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the
estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87
of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and
which may not be brought against
executor or administrator. No
action upon a claim for the recovery
of money or debt or interest thereon
shall be commenced against the
executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from
the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in
Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent
civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code,
the same must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of deceased accused
and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86
because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those
for funeral expenses, expenses for the last
sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and
claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
to purely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained
of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the
accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our
ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from
which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate
civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we
hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil
liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio
Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her
Attorney-in-fact, MARIE F. FUJITA, Petitioner,
vs.
FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed
by Bobie Rose V. Frias represented by her
Attorney-in-fact, Marie Regine F. Fujita (petitioner)
seeking to annul the Decision1 dated June 18, 2002
and the Resolution2 dated September 11, 2002 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
52839.
Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot located at
No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which she acquired from
Island Masters Realty and Development
Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
dated Nov. 16, 1990.3 The property is covered by
TCT No. 168173 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
in the name of IMRDC.4
On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST
PARTY, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison
(respondent), as the SECOND PARTY, entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement5 over the
property with the following terms:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
sum of THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00)
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the
FIRST PARTY from the SECOND PARTY, the
parties have agreed as follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period
of Six (6) months from the date of the
execution of this contract within which to
notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to
purchase the aforementioned parcel of land
together within (sic) the improvements
thereon at the price of SIX MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P6,400,000.00). Upon notice to the FIRST
PARTY of the SECOND PARTYs intention
to purchase the same, the latter has a
period of another six months within which to
pay the remaining balance of P3.4 million.
2. That prior to the six months period given
to the SECOND PARTY within which to
decide whether or not to purchase the
above-mentioned property, the FIRST
PARTY may still offer the said property to
other persons who may be interested to buy
the same provided that the amount
of P3,000,000.00 given to the FIRST
PARTY BY THE SECOND PARTY shall be
paid to the latter including interest based on
prevailing compounded bank interest plus
the amount of the sale in excess
of P7,000,000.00 should the property be
sold at a price more than P7 million.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no
other buyer within the first six months from
the execution of this contract, no interest
shall be charged by the SECOND PARTY
on the P3 million however, in the event that
on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY
would decide not to purchase the
aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY
has a period of another six months within
which to pay the sum of P3 million pesos
provided that the said amount shall earn
compounded bank interest for the last six
months only. Under this circumstance, the
amount of P3 million given by the SECOND
PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and the
property shall be considered as the security
for the mortgage which can be enforced in
accordance with law.
x x x x.6
Petitioner received from respondent two million
pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-
dated check dated February 28, 1990, instead of
1991, which rendered said check stale.7 Petitioner
then gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name
of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property between petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property
and notified petitioner through a letter8 dated March
20, 1991, which petitioner received only on June
11, 1991,9 reminding petitioner of their agreement
that the amount of two million pesos which
petitioner received from respondent should be
considered as a loan payable within six months.
Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent
the amount of two million pesos.
On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint10 for sum
of money with preliminary attachment against
petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30.
Respondent alleged the foregoing facts and in
addition thereto averred that petitioner tried to
deprive her of the security for the loan by making a
false report11 of the loss of her owners copy of TCT
No. 168173 to the Tagig Police Station on June 3,
1991, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a
petition12 for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate copy of said title with the RTC of Makati,
Branch 142; that the petition was granted in an
Order13 dated August 31, 1991; that said Order was
subsequently set aside in an Order dated April 10,
199214where the RTC Makati granted respondents
petition for relief from judgment due to the fact that
respondent is in possession of the owners
duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173, and ordered the
provincial public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation of petitioner for perjury and false
testimony. Respondent prayed for the ex-parte
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and
payment of two million pesos with interest at 36%
per annum from December 7, 1991, P100,000.00
moral, corrective and exemplary damages
and P200,000.00 for attorneys fees.
In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive
Judge of the RTC of Manila issued a writ of
preliminary attachment upon the filing of a bond in
the amount of two million pesos.15
Petitioner filed an Amended Answer16 alleging that
the Memorandum of Agreement was conceived and
arranged by her lawyer, Atty. Carmelita Lozada,
who is also respondents lawyer; that she was
asked to sign the agreement without being given
the chance to read the same; that the title to the
property and the Deed of Sale between her and the
IMRDC were entrusted to Atty. Lozada for
safekeeping and were never turned over to
respondent as there was no consummated sale yet;
that out of the two million pesos cash paid, Atty.
Lozada took the one million pesos which has not
been returned, thus petitioner had filed a civil case
against her; that she was never informed of
respondents decision not to purchase the property
within the six month period fixed in the agreement;
that when she demanded the return of TCT No.
168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and the
IMRDC from Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her these
documents in a brown envelope on May 5, 1991
which her secretary placed in her attache case; that
the envelope together with her other personal
things were lost when her car was forcibly opened
the following day; that she sought the help of Atty.
Lozada who advised her to secure a police report,
to execute an affidavit of loss and to get the
services of another lawyer to file a petition for the
issuance of an owners duplicate copy; that the
petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy was filed on her behalf without her knowledge
and neither did she sign the petition nor testify in
court as falsely claimed for she was abroad; that
she was a victim of the manipulations of Atty.
Lozada and respondent as shown by the filing of
criminal charges for perjury and false testimony
against her; that no interest could be due as there
was no valid mortgage over the property as the
principal obligation is vitiated with fraud and
deception. She prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint, counter-claim for damages and
attorneys fees.
Trial on the merits ensued. On January 31, 1996,
the RTC issued a decision,17 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED:
1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
sum of P2 Million plus interest thereon at
the rate of thirty two (32%) per cent per
annum beginning December 7, 1991 until
fully paid.
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
sum of P70,000.00 representing premiums
paid by plaintiff on the attachment bond with
legal interest thereon counted from the date
of this decision until fully paid.
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the
sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral,
corrective and exemplary damages.
4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
attorneys fees of P100,000.00 plus cost of
litigation.18
The RTC found that petitioner was under obligation
to pay respondent the amount of two million pesos
with compounded interest pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement; that the fraudulent
scheme employed by petitioner to deprive
respondent of her only security to her loaned
money when petitioner executed an affidavit of loss
and instituted a petition for the issuance of an
owners duplicate title knowing the same was in
respondents possession, entitled respondent to
moral damages; and that petitioners bare denial
cannot be accorded credence because her
testimony and that of her witness did not appear to
be credible.
The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that
she received from respondent the two million pesos
in cash but the fact that petitioner gave the one
million pesos to Atty. Lozada was without
respondents knowledge thus it is not binding on
respondent; that respondent had also proven that in
1993, she initially paid the sum of P30,000.00 as
premium for the issuance of the attachment
bond, P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994,
and P20,000.00 for the renewal in 1995, thus
plaintiff should be reimbursed considering that she
was compelled to go to court and ask for a writ of
preliminary attachment to protect her rights under
the agreement.
Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In a
Decision dated June 18, 2002, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision with modification, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense that the
rate of interest is reduced from 32% to 25% per
annum, effective June 7, 1991 until fully paid.19
The CA found that: petitioner gave the one million
pesos to Atty. Lozada partly as her commission and
partly as a loan; respondent did not replace the
mistakenly dated check of one million pesos
because she had decided not to buy the property
and petitioner knew of her decision as early as April
1991; the award of moral damages was warranted
since even granting petitioner had no hand in the
filing of the petition for the issuance of an owners
copy, she executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No.
168173 when she knew all along that said title was
in respondents possession; petitioners claim that
she thought the title was lost when the brown
envelope given to her by Atty. Lozada was stolen
from her car was hollow; that such deceitful
conduct caused respondent serious anxiety and
emotional distress.
The CA concluded that there was no basis for
petitioner to say that the interest should be charged
for six months only and no more; that a loan always
bears interest otherwise it is not a loan; that interest
should commence on June 7, 199120 with
compounded bank interest prevailing at the time
the two million was considered as a loan which was
in June 1991; that the bank interest rate for loans
secured by a real estate mortgage in 1991 ranged
from 25% to 32% per annum as certified to by
Prudential Bank,21 that in fairness to petitioner, the
rate to be charged should be 25% only.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated September 11,
2002.
Hence the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by petitioner raising the following
issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT THE
COMPOUNDED BANK INTEREST
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SIX (6)
MONTHS AS CONTAINED IN THE
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT THE
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL
DAMAGES.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF
CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IS
PROPER EVEN IF NOT MENTIONED IN
THE TEXT OF THE DECISION.22
Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at
32% per annum awarded by the trial court or at
25% per annum as modified by the CA which
should run from June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is
contrary to the parties Memorandum of Agreement;
that the agreement provides that if respondent
would decide not to purchase the property,
petitioner has the period of another six months to
pay the loan with compounded bank interest for the
last six months only; that the CAs ruling that a loan
always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan is
contrary to Art. 1956 of the New Civil Code which
provides that no interest shall be due unless it has
been expressly stipulated in writing.
We are not persuaded.
While the CAs conclusion, that a loan always bears
interest otherwise it is not a loan, is flawed since a
simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation
to pay interest,23 we find no error committed by the
CA in awarding a 25% interest per annum on the
two-million peso loan even beyond the second six
months stipulated period.
The Memorandum of Agreement executed between
the petitioner and respondent on December 7, 1990
is the law between the parties. In resolving an issue
based upon a contract, we must first examine the
contract itself, especially the provisions thereof
which are relevant to the controversy.24 The
general rule is that if the terms of an agreement are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall prevail.25 It is further required that
the various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly.26
In this case, the phrase "for the last six months
only" should be taken in the context of the entire
agreement. We agree with and adopt the CAs
interpretation of the phrase in this wise:
Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six
months each. The first six-month period was given
to plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up her
mind whether or not to purchase defendant-
appellants (petitioner's) property. The second six-
month period was given to defendant-appellant to
pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiff-
appellee decided not to buy the subject property in
which case interest will be charged "for the last six
months only", referring to the second six-month
period. This means that no interest will be charged
for the first six-month period while appellee was
making up her mind whether to buy the property,
but only for the second period of six months after
appellee had decided not to buy the property. This
is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six
months only". Certainly, there is nothing in their
agreement that suggests that interest will be
charged for six months only even if it takes
defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.27
The agreement that the amount given shall bear
compounded bank interest for the last six months
only, i.e., referring to the second six-month period,
does not mean that interest will no longer be
charged after the second six-month period since
such stipulation was made on the logical and
reasonable expectation that such amount would be
paid within the date stipulated. Considering that
petitioner failed to pay the amount given which
under the Memorandum of Agreement shall be
considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the
last six months continued to accrue until actual
payment of the loaned amount.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the
price or cost of the use of money and thus, until the
principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular
interest continues to accrue since the debtor
continues to use such principal amount.28 It has
been held that for a debtor to continue in
possession of the principal of the loan and to
continue to use the same after maturity of the loan
without payment of the monetary interest, would
constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the
debtor at the expense of the creditor.29
Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned
amount shall earn compounded bank interests, and
per the certification issued by Prudential Bank, the
interest rate for loans in 1991 ranged from 25% to
32% per annum. The CA reduced the interest rate
to 25% instead of the 32% awarded by the trial
court which petitioner no longer
assailed.1awphi1.nt
In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,30 we upheld
the validity of a 21% per annum interest on
a P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v. Court of
Appeals,31 we sustained the agreement of the
parties to a 24% per annum interest on
an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus, the interest rate of
25% per annum awarded by the CA to a P2 million
loan is fair and reasonable.
Petitioner next claims that moral damages were
awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a
fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her
security for the loan; that such finding is baseless
since petitioner was acquitted in the case for
perjury and false testimony filed by respondent
against her.
We are not persuaded.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.32
While petitioner was acquitted in the false
testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent
against her, those actions are entirely distinct from
the collection of sum of money with damages filed
by respondent against petitioner.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the
CA that petitioners act of trying to deprive
respondent of the security of her loan by executing
an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a
petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to
moral damages.1a\^/phi1.net Moral damages may
be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of
contract cases when the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not
simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes
of the nature of fraud.33
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in
the event that respondent opts not to buy the
property, the money given by respondent to
petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the
property shall be considered as the security for the
mortgage. It was testified to by respondent that
after they executed the agreement on December 7,
1990, petitioner gave her the owners copy of the
title to the property, the Deed of Sale between
petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy,
and the certificate of the Secretary of the IMRDC
who signed the Deed of Sale.34 However,
notwithstanding that all those documents were in
respondents possession, petitioner executed an
affidavit of loss that the owners copy of the title and
the Deed of Sale were lost.
Although petitioner testified that her execution of
the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she was
of the belief that since she had demanded from
Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she thought that
the brown envelope with markings which Atty.
Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991 already contained
the title and the Deed of Sale as those documents
were in the same brown envelope which she gave
to Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction with
respondent.35 Such statement remained a bare
statement. It was not proven at all since Atty.
Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate her
claim. In fact, even petitioners own witness,
Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to
establish petitioner's claim that the title was
returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's
testimony that after the brown envelope was given
to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she
placed it in petitioners attach case36 and did not
bother to look at the envelope.37
It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of
the affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing of
the petition with the RTC for the issuance of new
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173.
Petitioners actuation would have deprived
respondent of the security for her loan were it not
for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief
whereby the RTC set aside its previous order
granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award
of moral damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been
established, the award of exemplary damages is
proper.38Exemplary damages may be imposed
upon petitioner by way of example or correction for
the public good.39 The RTC awarded the amount
of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
While the award of moral and exemplary damages
in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way
of awarding said damages,40 no error has been
committed by CA. There is no question that
respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding
attorneys fees because the trial courts decision did
not explain the findings of facts and law to justify
the award of attorneys fees as the same was
mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the RTC
decision.
We agree.
Article 220841 of the New Civil Code enumerates
the instances where such may be awarded and, in
all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable
if the same were to be granted.42 Attorney's fees as
part of damages are not meant to enrich the
winning party at the expense of the losing litigant.
They are not awarded every time a party prevails in
a suit because of the policy that no premium should
be placed on the right to litigate.43 The award of
attorney's fees is the exception rather than the
general rule. As such, it is necessary for the trial
court to make findings of facts and law that would
bring the case within the exception and justify the
grant of such award. The matter of attorney's fees
cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion
of the decision.44 They must be clearly explained
and justified by the trial court in the body of its
decision. On appeal, the CA is precluded from
supplementing the bases for awarding attorneys
fees when the trial court failed to discuss in its
Decision the reasons for awarding the same.
Consequently, the award of attorney's fees should
be deleted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Decision dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution
dated September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees
is DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
MARLA OLIVA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are
the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated November 22, 2013 rendered by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
125113 finding petitioner Antonio L. Daluraya
(Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of Marina
Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having been
acquitted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.
 The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an
Information4 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide in connection with the death5 of Marina
Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the
afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was
crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing
plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near
the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her
over.6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the
hospital to receive medical attention,she eventually
died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent
Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
against Daluraya, the purported driver of the
vehicle.7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented
as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-
witness to the incident, who testified that on said
date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading
towards the island near the flyover and that the
latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing
plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also
offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified
as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a
result of her mothers death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr.
Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy
conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c)
Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI
Gomez), who conducted the investigation following
the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit
by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he
did not witness the incident.8
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed
an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer)9 asserting,
inter alia, that he was not positively identified by
any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of
the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no
clear and competent evidence of how the incident
transpired.10
The MeTC Ruling
In an Order11 dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38 (MeTC)
granted Dalurayas demurrer and dismissed the
case for insufficiency of evidence. It found that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
wanting in material details and that they failed to
sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the
crime imputed upon him.12 Deconstructing the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
individually, the MeTC found that: (a) Marla merely
testified on the damages sustained by her family
but she failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of
the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did
not identify
Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr.
Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d)
PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident,
likewise declared thathe did not witness the
same.13
Marla moved for reconsideration,14 which the MeTC
denied in an Order15 dated November 4, 2010,
clarifying that the grant of Dalurayas demurrer had
the effect of an acquittal and that reconsideration of
its Order granting Dalurayas demurrer would
violate the latters right against double
jeopardy.16 With respect to the civil aspect of the
case, the MeTC likewise denied the same, holding
that no civil liability can be awarded absent any
evidence proving that Daluraya was the person
responsible for Marina Olivas demise.17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed18 to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC), insisting
that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the
civil liability of Daluraya,19 which finding was not
precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect of
the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTCs
ruling,declaring that "the act from which the criminal
responsibility may spring did not at all exist."21
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration22 which,
although filed beyond the reglementary period, was
nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found
the same without merit and thus, sustained the
factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its
Order23 dated May 10, 2012. Dissatisfied, Marla
elevated the case to the CA via petition for review,
maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA
granted the petition and reversed the RTC
Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the
amounts of P152,547.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.25 In so ruling,
the CA held that the MeTCs Order showed that
Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not
exonerated from civil liability.26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces
of evidence to support its finding that Daluraya
must be held civilly liable: (a) the inadmissible
sworn statement executed by Daluraya where he
admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which hit
Marina Oliva; (b) the conclusion derived from
Serranos testimony that the woman he saw
crossing the street who was hit by a Nissan Vanette
with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who
eventually died, are one and the same; (c) the
Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one
Police Chief Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying
Daluraya as the suspectin the case of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the
death of Marina Oliva, and stating that he brought
the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for
treatment but was declared dead on arrival; and (d)
the subject vehicle was registered in the name of
Dalurayas aunt, Gloria Zilmar,27 who authorized
him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC.28
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration,29 which
the CA denied in a Resolution30 dated November
22, 2013,hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Courts resolution
is whether or not the CA was correct in finding
Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Olivas death
despite his acquittal in the criminal case for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged, however, does not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability.31 In Manantan v.
CA,32 the Court expounded on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by our law and their
concomitant effects on the civil liability of the
accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused
is not the author of the actor omission complained
of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for
a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated inRule 111 of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this
case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.33
In Dayap v. Sendiong,34 the Court explained
further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect
of the case.1wphi1 The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. However, the civil action based on
delictmay be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is
acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist. This is because when the accused files a
demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced
evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of
the case. The only evidence on record is the
evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is issue an order or partial judgment
granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting
the accused, and set the case for continuation of
trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case and for the private complainant
to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter,
the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect
of the case.35
(Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires
that the judgment state "whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist."36

A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order,

which the RTC sustained, will show that Dalurayas
acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist, given that the prosecution was not
able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and
categorical when the MeTC declared that "the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
wanting in material details and they did not
sufficiently establish that the accused precisely
committed the crime charged against
him."37 Furthermore, when Marla sought
reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting
Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified
that "the prosecution was not able to establish that
the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette
which bumped Marina Oliva"38 and that "there is no
competent evidence on hand which proves that the
accused was the person responsible for the death
of Marina Oliva."39

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the

findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that
Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable
doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of
the case to the court a quo for the reception of
Dalurayas evidence on the civil
aspect.1wphi1 Records disclose that Dalurayas
acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO
sufficiently establish that he was the author of the DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y
crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-
liability should be deemed as non-existent by the Appellants.
nature of such acquittal.
RESOLUTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the Resolution PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
dated November 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are hereby REVERSED Before the Court is an appeal assailing the
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
8,2011 and the Order dated May 10, 2012 of the Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y
REINSTATED. Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron
(Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos
SO ORDERED. (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003,
Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother
Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth
Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he
received a text message from another brother who
told him that Edwin had been kidnapped.2 Records
show that three (3) men, later identified as
Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a
bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and
pushed him inside a dark green Toyota car with
plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the
message, Roderick immediately reported the
incident to the police. At around 10 oclock in the
morning of the same day, he received a phone call
from Edwins kidnappers who threatened to kill
Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call
from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment
of ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00.
Roderick told them he had no such money, as he
only had P50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after
negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers
agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the
amount of P110,000.00. Roderick was then
instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait
for their next call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as
Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the
ransom money, the kidnappers called and
instructed him to open all the windows of the car he
was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he
reaches the designated place. After a while,
Roderick received another call directing him to exit
in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he
arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to
park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After
several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate
number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle
where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of
the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the
word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove
away.6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to
investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by
SPO3 Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and
PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the
Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER). During the course of the
investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is
Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he
was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he
was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato,
Armando and a certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio)
on the condition that he will be given a share in the
ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the
whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest
on June 12, 2003. In the early morning of the
following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER
team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio
Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick
identified.9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were
charged in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in
Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, being then private persons,
did then and there by force and intimidation willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor
vehicle and superior strength take, carry and
deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty
against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom
as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was made
as a condition of the victims release and on the
occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded
not guilty11 and interposed the defenses of denial
and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually
claimed that on said date and time, they were in
their respective houses when they were taken by
men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought
to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and
detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself,
averred that at around 8 oclock in the evening of
June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he
noticed that a van had been following him.
Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the
vehicle, boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and
eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he
was made to sign an extrajudicial confession,
purporting too that while a certain Atty.
Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist him,
the latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was
established through a Certificate of Death13 with
Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death)
showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a
gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in
Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-
appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
clearly established that it was the
accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied
Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of
his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accused-
appellants respective alibis and claims of torture,
which were not substantiated. It also held that the
crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable
by death. However, in view of the suspended
imposition of the death penalty pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of
reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the
RTC found that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, as the accused-
appellants individual participation was geared
toward a joint purpose and criminal design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim
Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and
eventually killed,19 a fact which is supported by the
subject certificate of death, it did not consider said
death in its judgment. The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA
affirmed in toto the RTCs conviction of accused-
appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to
clearly establish all the elements of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely:
(a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner
deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in
the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed simulating public authority; (3) any
serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him
are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained
is a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.21 It likewise
sustained the finding that the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as
sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of
the victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime,
as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from
the same purpose or common design, and they
were united in its execution.23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants
claims of torture were never supported, and that
Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial
confession and was afforded competent and
independent counsel in its execution.24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants
filed the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is
whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of
credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court
to determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great weight, and it is
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted
with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
has not been considered. Absent any showing that
the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, or that the
judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by
the appellate court.25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave
weight and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which they found to be
straightforward and consistent. Through these
testimonies, it was clearly established that
accused-appellants, who were all private
individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him
of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the
purpose of extorting ransom.26 Thus, seeing no
semblance of arbitrariness or misapprehension on
the part of the court a quo, the Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb its factual findings on
this score.1wphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds
the conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as
affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is
established, the responsibility of the conspirators is
collective, not individual, rendering all of them
equally liable regardless of the extent of their
respective participations.27 In this relation, direct
proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it
can be presumed from and proven by the acts of
the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design,
concerted action, and community of
interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in
this case clearly show that accused-appellants
acted in concert at the time of the commission of
the crime and that their acts emanated from the
same purpose or common design, showing unity in
its execution,29 the CA, affirming the trial court,
correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among
them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is,
however, constrained to modify the ruling of the
RTC and the CA, as the crime the
accusedappellants have committed does not, as
the records obviously bear, merely constitute
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that
of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the
victims (i.e., Edwins) death, which was (a)
specifically charged in the Information,30 and (b)
clearly established during the trial of this case.
Notably, while this matter was not among the
issues raised before the Court, the same should
nonetheless be considered in accordance with the
settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in
this case, throws open the entire case wide open
for review, and the appellate court can correct
errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the
appealed judgment.31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on
December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the
same Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have
lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating
public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have
been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have
been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall
be a minor, except when the accused is any
of the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or
detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v.
Mercado:32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty
of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for
ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994
and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court
modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of
the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for
ransom with murder under the last paragraph of
Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal
statutes the concept of special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively
eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the
kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim
was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where
the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no
longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated
as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a
special complex crime under the last paragraph of
Art. 267, as amended by RA No.
7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the
kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accused-appellants conviction
must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which
carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated,
the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the
imposition of the death penalty. This means that the
accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial court
properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the
accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC
and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well
as damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In
People v. Quiachon,35 the Court explained that
even if the death penalty was not to be imposed on
accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA
9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless
proper, not being dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition
of the death penalty attended the commission of
the crime.36 In the present case, considering that
both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and
the death of the victim during captivity were duly
alleged in the information and proven during trial,
civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 must
therefore be awarded to the family of the victim, to
conform with prevailing jurisprudence.37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral
damages is warranted in this case. Under Article
2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar
injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in
cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in
this case, that the kidnap victims family suffered
mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the
detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As
such, and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the
family of the victim.
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in
this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid
qualifying circumstances and in order to deter
others from committing the same atrocious acts. In
accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00
to the family of the kidnap victim.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the
accusedappellants herein are equally found
GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to
each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and
severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin
Navarro the following amounts: (1) P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all
with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the
Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental,
HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former Vice-
Mayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA, Incumbent
Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL
LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA
V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES,
and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF JIMALALUD,
NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD
DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN and DELIA
ESTRELLANES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners institute this special civil action Prosecutor, hereby accuses
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the REYNALDO V. TUANDA,
Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA,
of the Sandiganbayan dated 17 February 1992 and MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P.
its orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES,
Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and
denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA of
arraignment. Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, committed as
The present controversy arose from the following follows:
antecedents:
That during the period
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia from February 1989
Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were to February 1991 and
designated as industrial labor sectoral subsequent thereto,
representative and agricultural labor sectoral in the Municipality of
representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Jimalalud, Negros
Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by Oriental, and within
then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of the jurisdiction of this
Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan Honorable Court,
and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 accused, all public
February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively. officers, Mayor
REYNALDO V.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition TUANDA, Vice-Mayor
with the Office of the President for review and recall HERMENEGILDO G.
of said designations. The latter, however, in a letter FABURADA,
dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition and Sangguniang
enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize Members MANUEL
private respondents as sectoral representatives. LIM, NICANOR P.
AGOSTO,
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition ERENIETA K.
for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of MENDOZA, MAXIMO
Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special A. VIERNES,
Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as members HACUBINA V.
of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 SERILLO,
July 1991. ILUMINADO D.
ESTRELLANES and
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an SANTOS A.
action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete VILLANUEVA while in
City to declare null and void the designations of the performance of
private respondents as sectoral representatives, their official functions
docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo and taking advantage
Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department of their public
of Local Government, et al." positions, with evident
bad faith, manifest
partiality, and
On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before
conspiring and
the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case
confederating with
No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines
each other did, then
versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging
and there, wilfully and
petitioners thus:
unlawfully cause
undue injury to
INFORMATION Sectoral Members
Bartolome M.
The undersigned Special Binaohan and Delia
Prosecution Officer of the Special
 T. Estrellanes by before the President
refusing to pay (or the Secretary of
despite demand the the Department of
amount of NINETY Local Government)
FIVE THOUSAND may appoint
THREE HUNDRED members of the local
FIFTY PESOS legislative bodies to
(P95,350.00) and represent the
ONE HUNDRED Industrial and
EIGHT THOUSAND Agricultural Labor
NINE HUNDRED Sectors, there must
PESOS be a determination to
(P108,900.00) be made by the
representing Sanggunian itself that
respectively their per the said sectors are
diems, salaries and of sufficient number in
other privileges and the city or
benefits, and such municipality to
undue injury warrant
continuing to the representation after
present to the consultation with
prejudice and associations and
damage of Bartolome persons belonging to
Binaohan and Delia the sector concerned.
Estrellanes.
The Supreme Court further ruled
1
CONTRARY TO LAW.
For that matter, the
On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion Implementing Rules
with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the and Regulations of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the the Local
ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Government Code
Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial even prescribe the
Court of Dumaguete City. 2 time and manner by
which such
On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court determination is to be
rendered a decision declaring null and void ab conducted by the
initio the designations issued by the Department of Sanggunian.
Local Government to the private respondents as
sectoral representatives for having been done in Consequently, in
violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, cases where the
otherwise known as the Local Government Code. 3 Sanggunian
concerned has not
The trial court expounded thus: yet determined that
the Industrial and
The Supreme Court in the case of Agricultural Labor
Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v. Luis T. Sectors in their
Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along particular city or
with 7 companion cases of similar municipality are of
import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, sufficient number to
87602, 87792, 87935, 88072, and warrant
90205) all promulgated on August representation, there
24, 1990, ruled that: will absolutely be no
basis for the
B.P. Blg. 337 designation/appointm
explicitly required that ents.
In the process of such inquiry as to
the sufficiency in number of the
sector concerned to warrant
representation, the Sanggunian is
enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to
consult with associations and
persons belonging to the sector
concerned. Consultation with the
sector concerned is made a pre-
requisite. This is so considering that
those who belong to the said sector
are the ones primarily interested in
being represented in the
Sanggunian. In the same aforecited
case, the Supreme Court considers
such prior determination by the
Sanggunian itself (not by any other
person or body) as a condition sine
qua non to a valid appointment or
designation.
Since in the present case, there was
total absence of the required prior
determination by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court
cannot help but declare the
designations of private defendants
as sectoral representatives null and
void.
This verdict is not without
precedence. In several similar
cases, the Supreme Court invariably
nullified the designations where the
requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P.
Blg. 337 were not complied with.
Just to cite one case, the Supreme
Court ruled:
There is no
certification from the
Sangguniang Bayan
of Valenzuela that the
sectors concerned
are of sufficient
number to warrant
representation and
there was no
consultation
whatsoever with the
associations and
persons belonging to
the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor
Sectors. Therefore,
the appointment of
private respondents
Romeo F. Bularan
and Rafael Cortez are
null and void (Romeo
Llanado, et al. v. Hon.
Luis Santos, et al.,
G.R. No. 86394,
August 24, 1990). 4
Private respondents appealed the aforestated
decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 36769, where the same is currently
pending resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the
motion for suspension of proceedings filed by
petitioners. Said respondent Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case
No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Oriental, it appears,
nevertheless, that the private
complainants have been rendering
services on the basis of their
respective appointments as sectoral
members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Jimalalud,
Negros Oriental; and that their said
appointments enjoy the presumption
of regularity. Having rendered such
services, the private complainants
are entitled to the salaries attached
to their office. Even
assuming arguendo that the said
Regional Trial Court shall later
decide that the said appointments of
the private complainants are null and
void, still the private complainants
are entitled to their salaries and
compensation for service they have
actually rendered, for the reason that
before such judicial declaration of
nullity, the private complainants are
considered at least de facto public
officers acting as such on the basis
of apparently valid appointments
issued by competent authorities. In
other words, regardless of the
decision that may be rendered in
Civil Case
No. 9955, the private complainants
are entitled to their withheld salaries
for the services they have actually
rendered as sectoral representatives
of the said Sangguniang Bayan.
 Hence, the decision that may be
rendered by the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. 9955 would not be
determinative of the innocence or
guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the subject Petition
for the Suspension of Proceedings in
Virtue of Prejudicial Question filed by
the accused through counsel, is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned resolution in view of the decision
promulgated by the trial court nullifying the
appointments of private respondents but it was,
likewise, denied in an order issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the
justification that the grounds stated in the said
motion were a mere rehash of petitioners' original
motion to hold the case in abeyance. 6 The
dispositive portion of its order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the arraignment of the
accused which was scheduled today
is cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo
Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada,
Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K.
Mendoza, Hacubina V. Serillo and
Iluminado Estrellanes are, however,
hereby ordered to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from
service hereof why they should not
be cited for contempt of court for
their failure to appear in court today
for arraignment.
In case of an adverse resolution on
the motion to quash which is to be
filed by the counsel for the defense,
set this case for arraignment, pre-
trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993,
on all dates the trial to start at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. 7
On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan
issued an order holding consideration of all
incidents pending the issuance of an extended
resolution. 8
No such resolution, however, was issued and in its
assailed order dated 13 May 1992, respondent
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners
on 30 June 1993. The dispositive portion of the
order reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the
absence of the accused from the
scheduled hearing today which We
deem to be excusable, reset this
case for arraignment on June 30,
1993 and for trial on the merits on
June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on
all dates the trial to start at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.
Give proper notice to the accused
and principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso
Briones. Considering that the
accused come all the way from
Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no
postponement will be allowed.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent
Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' motions for the
suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of
the pendency of a prejudicial issue
before the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 36769;
B. The Respondent Court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to suspend the proceedings
that would entail a retrial and
rehearing by it of the basic issue
involved, i.e., the validity of the
appointments of private respondents
and their entitlement to
compensation which is already
pending resolution by the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769;
and
C. The Respondent Court committed
grave abuse of discretion and/or
acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in effectively allowing
petitioners to be prosecuted under
 two alternative theories that private
respondents are de jure and/or de
facto officers in violation of
petitioners' right to due process. 10
In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is
whether or not the legality or validity of private
respondents' designation as sectoral
representatives which is pending resolution in CA-
G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
against petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided
before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code)
because a decision on that point is vital to the
eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the
resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical
antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal
case. 11
A prejudicial question is defined as that which
arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another
court or tribunal. 12 It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from "the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. It comes into play generally in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case." 13
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It
has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action;
and
(b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at
bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA-
G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial
question to warrant suspension of the arraignment
and further proceedings in the criminal case against
petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly
and unmistakably present in this case. There is no
doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil
action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No.
16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal
case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality
and evident bad faith in not paying private
respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted
precisely to resolve whether or not the designations
of private respondents as sectoral representatives
were made in accordance with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case
will certainly determine if there will still be any
reason to proceed with the criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-
Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e])
due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with
manifest partiality, to pay private respondents'
salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal,
however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion
that said designations were made in violation of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus,
were null and void. Therefore, should the Court of
Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring
null and void private respondents' designations as
sectoral representatives for failure to comply with
the provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against
petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg
to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad
faith and partiality there being in the first place no
obligation on their part to pay private respondents'
claims. Private respondents do not have any legal
right to demand salaries, per diems and other
benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals'
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will
ultimately determine whether or not there is basis to
proceed with the criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their
designations are nullified, they are entitled to
compensation for actual services rendered. 16 We
disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne
out by the records, from the start, private
respondents' designations as sectoral
representatives have been challenged by
petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the
Office of the President copies of which were
received by private respondents on 26 February
1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath
of office. 17 Hence, private respondents' claim that
they have actually rendered services as sectoral
representatives has not been established.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent

Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that
private respondents' designations are finally
declared invalid, they may still be considered de
facto public officers entitled to compensation for
services actually rendered.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership

are the following:

1) There must be a de jure office;

2) There must be color of right or

general acquiescence by the public;
and

3) There must be actual physical

possession of the office in good
faith. 18

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the
aforestated elements are present. There can be
no de facto officer where there is no de jure office,
although there may be a de facto officer in a de
jure office. 19
REYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON.
JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the
Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
City, respondents.

WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February DECISION

1992 and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May
1993 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 16936 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial of
petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16936 pending
final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769.
SO ORDERED.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and
set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued
by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special
Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran
vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
city, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioners
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from
proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on
the ground that the pending petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his
wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E.
Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao,
Quezon City.[1]
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of
marriage and four children,[2] petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.[3]
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner
who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros
Salting.[4] Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal
complaint for concubinage[5] under Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his
paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of
Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16,
1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing
of an Information[6] against them. The case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a
Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance
of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil
case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed
a prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes
denied the foregoing motion in the Order[7] dated
August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said Order of denial was
likewise denied in an Order dated December 9,
1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the
proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner
went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders
dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998
issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[8] In an
Order[9] dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial
Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari.
Said Court subsequently issued another
Order[10] dated February 23, 1999, denying his
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his
petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that
should merit the suspension of the criminal case for
concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility
that two conflicting decisions might result from the
civil case for annulment of marriage and the
criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the
trial court might declare the marriage as valid by
dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal
case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because
the evidence shows that his marriage is void on
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
submits that the possible conflict of the courts'
ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be
avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended,
until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that
if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of
psychological incapacity then by reason of the
arguments submitted in the subject petition, his
marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly,
petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal
case because he was never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.[11]
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity
of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question
to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court
ruled that the import of said provision is that for
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable
basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute
nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The
pertinent portions of said Decision read:
"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive
of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage for purposes
other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation,
partition, distribution and separation
of property between the erstwhile
spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of
the latters' presumptive legitimes. In
such cases, evidence needs must
be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence
of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These needs not be limited
solely to an earlier final judgment of
a court declaring such previous
marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like
the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity
of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could
be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should
his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs.
Reloval[13] cited in Donato vs. Luna[14] where this
Court held that:
"xxx Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, that fact would
not be material to the outcome of the
criminal case. Parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the
judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy."
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and
MICHAELC. U. DE GUZMAN, Complainants,
vs.
JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO
Undersecretary for Communications,
Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the

reversal of the Decision1 dated 21 February 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. SP 49422.
The assailed Decision authorized the dismissal of a
civil complaint against respondent Josefina
Trinidad-Lichauco (Lichauco), former
Undersecretary for Communications of the
Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC), on the premise that the complaint
constituted a suit against the State.
A brief rundown of the relevant facts is in order.
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a
duly organized corporation, whose President and
Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael
C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a
consortium of private telecommunications
carriers2 which in 1994 had entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-
owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU,
the launch of the satellite was to be an endeavor of
the private sector, and the satellite itself to be
owned by the Filipino-owned consortium
(subsequently organized as PASI).3 The
consortium was to grant the Philippine government
one (1) transponder free of charge for the
government's exclusive use for non-commercial
purpose, as well as the right of first refusal to
another one (1) transponder in the Philippine
satellite, if available.4 The Philippine government,
through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to
secure from the International Telecommunication
Union the required orbital slot(s) and frequency
assignment(s) for the Philippine satellite.
PASI itself was organized by the consortium in
1996. The government, together with PASI,
coordinated through the International
Telecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots,
designated as 161 East Longitude and 153 East
Longitude, for Philippine satellites. On 28 June
1996, PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S.
Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine
government confirmation on the assignment of the
two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI
for its satellites, which PASI had designated as the
Agila satellites.5 Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in
a letter dated 3 July 1996, confirming "the
Philippine Government's assignment of Philippine
orbital slots 161E and 153E to [PASI] for its [Agila]
satellites."6
PASI avers that after having secured the
confirmation from the Philippine government, it
proceeded with preparations for the launching,
operation and management of its satellites,
including the availment of loans, the increase in its
capital, negotiation with business partners, and an
initial payment of US$3.5 Million to the French
satellite manufacturer. However, respondent
Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for
Communications, allegedly "embarked on a
crusade to malign the name of [Michael de
Guzman] and sabotage the business of PASI."
Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI
culminated allegedly in her offering orbital slot 153
East Longitude
for bidding to other parties sometime in December
1997, despite the prior assignment to PASI of the
said slot.7 It was later claimed by PASI that
Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to
an entity whose indentity was unknown to PASI.8
Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI and De
Guzman instituted on 23 January 1998 a civil
complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting
Secretary of the DOTC, and the "Unknown
Awardee" who was to be the recipient of orbital slot
153 East Longitude. The complaint, alleging three
(3) causes of action, was for injunction, declaration
of nullity of award, and damages. The first cause of
action, for injunction, sought to establish that the
award of orbital slot 153 East Longitude should be
enjoined since the DOTC had previously assigned
the same orbital slot to PASI. The second cause of
action, for declaration of nullity of award, averred
that the award to the unknown bidder is null and
void, as it was rendered by Lichauco beyond her
authority.9
The third cause of action, for damages, imputed
several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged
"crusade" to malign the name of plaintiff [D]e
Guzman and sabotage the business of [PASI]:
12. xxx
(a) On 4 December 1996, in a meeting with
the members of the Board of Directors of
plaintiff corporation, defendant Lichauco
then uttered disparaging and defamatory
comments against plaintiff de Guzman.
These defamatory remarks triggered efforts
from within the plaintiff corporation aimed at
ousting plaintiff de Guzman from his
position.
(b) Defendant Lichauco, then an
undersecretary of DOTC, wrote Mr. Jesli
Lapuz on 5 December 1996 (barely two
days after plaintiff de Guzman wrote him) to
deny that the DOTC has assigned the two
(2) Philippine orbital slots to plaintiff
corporation. Defendant Lichauco falsely
asserted that only orbital slot 161 E was
assigned to plaintiff, orbital slot 153 E was
not.
 In the same letter, defendant Lichauco
branded as FALSE plaintiff de Guzman's
claim that "Agila" is a registered corporate
name of plaintiff corporation.
A copy of the letter is attached as Annex E.
(c) Not contented, defendant Lichauco,
again for reasons known only to her, and
with malice aforethought, made defamatory
remarks against plaintiffs during a
telecommunications forum held in Makati
City sometime in October 1997 in the
presence of public officials and business
executives.
(d) Defendant Lichauco did not spare
plaintiff corporation from her unprovoked
defamation. Defendant Lichauco arrogantly
said that she had asked President Fidel V.
Ramos to sue plaintiff Michael de Guzman.
With the same degree of arrogance she
threatened plaintiff corporation not to use
the name "Agila", otherwise she would fight
plaintiff corporation and would make sure
that the name of Agila would never be given
back to plaintiff corporation.
(e) To top it all, defendant Lichauco without
basis and with evident bad faith, said that
plaintiff corporation will never pay its
contractors.
(f) In December 1997, defendant Lichauco
delivered the coup de' grace. Again, acting
unilaterally, without prior notice to plaintiff
corporation and in gross violation of DOTC's
earlier assignment to plaintiff corporation of
orbital slot 153 E, defendant Lichauco
offered said slot to interested applicants. A
copy of the notice of offer is attached as
Annex F.
13. Plaintiffs learned of defendant Lichauco's acts
after orbital slot 153 E was offered for bidding. To
plaintiff coproration's knowledge, the orbital slot
was eventually awarded to defendant Unknown
Awardee.
x x x x10
The complaint alleged that since Lichauco's act of
offering and awarding orbital slot 153 East
Longitude was patently illegal and violative of
DOTC's prior commitment to PASI, Lichauco
should be enjoined from performing any acts and
entering into or executing any agreement or
arrangement of whatever nature in connection with
the said orbital slot. The complaint also averred that
the purported award of the orbital slot to the
"Unknown Awardee was illegal, and thus should be
declared null and void. Finally, the complaint
alleged a cause of action for damages against
Lichauco, cast in the following manner:
xxxx
21. Defendant Lichauco attacked the good name
and reputation of plaintiffs.
22. She willfully caused damage to plaintiffs by
orchestrating the above-described acts which are
contrary to law; morals and basic norms of good
faith.
23. She interefered with and violated plaintiff
corporation's contract with DOTC by offering and
awarding orbital slot 153 E to defendant Unknown
Awardee.
24. Because of defendant Lichauco's reprehensible
acts, plaintiffs suffered actual damages of at least
P10 million each, for all of which defendant
Lichauco should be held liable to pay.
25. By reason of defendant Lichauco's illegal and
malicious acts, plaintiff corporation's business
name and goodwill was tarnished, for which plaintiff
corporation should be indemnified by way of moral
damages in the amount of at least P10 million.
26. For the same reasons, plaintiff de
Guzman suffered and continue to suffer
extreme mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings, moral shock and
besmirched reputation, for all of which
plaintiff de Guzman should be indemnified
in the amount of at least P10 million.
27. Defendant Lichauco should also be sanctioned,
as a deterrent for public good, to pay each plaintiff
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P5
million.
28. In order to protect and enforce their rights,
plaintiffs were compelled to institute this suit,
engage the services of counsel and incur litigation
expenses, for all of which plaintiffs should be
indemnified in the amount of at least P500
Thousand each.11
xxxx
In sum, petitioners sought the following reliefs for
the three (3) causes of action:
xxxx
3. After trial of the issues, render judgment as
follows:
[a] On the first cause of action, making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction;
[b] On the second cause of action, declaring
the offer and award of orbital slot 153 E to
defendant Unknown Awardee null and void.
[c] On the third cause of action, directing
defendant Lichauco to pay the following
sums:
i. P10 million each to plaintiffs as
actual damages;
ii. P10 million to plaintiff corporation
as moral damages;
iii. P10 million to plaintiff de Guzman
as moral damages;
iv. P5 million each to plaintiffs as
exemplary damages;
v. P500 Thousand each to plaintiffs
as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
x x x x12
The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, and
subsequently raffled to Branch 214. On 2 February
1998, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
against Lichauco, who received the summons
together with the complaint on 28 January 1998.
Lichauco failed to file an answer within the
reglementary period, but eight (8) days after the
lapse thereof, she filed a Manifestation and Motion
asking for a new five (5)-day period, or until 25
February 1998, to file a responsive pleading to the
complaint. However, she filed instead a Motion to
Admit with attached Motion to Dismiss on 27
February 1998. She rooted her prayer for the
dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds
that the suit is a suit against the State which may
not be sued without its consent; that the complaint
stated no cause of action; and that the petitioners
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by
failing to seek recourse with the Office of the
President.
In an order13 dated 14 August 1998, the RTC
denied the motion to dismiss. It characterized the
defense of state immunity as "at very least a
contentious issue which can not be resolved by
mere allegations in the pleadings but which can be
best threshed out in a litig[i]ous forum where parties
are accorded enormous (sic) opportunity to argue
for the ascertainment of whether the act
complained of are indeed within the parameters
and prerogatives of the authority exercising the
same."14 The RTC also noted that the allegations in
the complaint regarding the ultimate facts
sufficiently presented an ultra vires act of Lichauco,
and that she was being sued in her personal
capacity. As to the argument pertaining to the non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, the RTC
noted that the principle is not an inflexible rule, and
may be dispensed with when its application would
cause great and irreparable damage or when it
would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.15
Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals, which subsequently nullified the RTC
order in the Decision now assailed before us. The
Court of Appeals sustained the contention that the
complaint is a suit against the State with the
following ratiocination:
The suit is to the mind of this court a suit against
the state.1avvphil.net
The notice of offer signed by herein petitioner
allegedly tainted with bad faith was done in the
exercise of and in pursuance of an official duty. Her
duties are as follows:
SEC. 10. Powers and Duties of the
Undersecretary. The Undersecretary shall:
(1) Advise and assist the Secretary in the
formulation and implementation of
department objectives and policies;
(2) Oversee all the operational activities of
the department for which he shall be
responsible to the Secretary;
 (3) Coordinate the programs and projects of
the department and be responsible for its
economical, efficient and effective
administration:
xxxxxxxxx
It is apparent from the above enumeration that the
petitioner is directly under and answerable to the
DOTC Secretary. We can therefore conclude that
her official acts such as the said "notice of offer"
was with the blessing and prior approval of the
DOTC Secretary himself.
Being an official act, it is also protected by the
presumption that the same was performed in good
faith and in the regular performance of official duty.
"Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of
Authority. - As a rule, a public officer, whether
judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not
personally liable to one injured in consequence of
an act performed within the scope of his official
authority, and in the line of his official duty. In order
that acts may be done within the scope of official
authority, it is not necessary that they be prescribed
by statute, or even that they be specifically directed
or requested by a superior officer, but it is sufficient
if they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his control or supervision, or
that they have more or less connection with such
matters, or that they are governed by a lawful
requirement of the department under whose
authority the officer is acting. Under this principle,
state building commissioners who, in obedience to
a stature, discharge one who has been employed
to construct a state building, take possession of the
work, and place it in the hands of another
contractor, are not liable to the former contractor in
damages, since in so doing they are merely acting
in the line of their duty. An officer is not personally
responsible for the necessary and unavoidable
destruction of goods stored in buildings, when such
buildings were destroyed by him in the lawful
performance of a public duty imposed on him by a
valid and constitutional statute."
xxxxxxxxx
Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. -
Where an officer is invested with discretion and is
empowered to exercise his judgment in matters
brought before him he is sometimes called a quasi-
judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually
given immunity from liability to persons who may be
injured as the result of an erroneous or mistaken
decision, however, erroneous judgment may be,
provided the acts complained of are done within the
scope of the officer's authority, and without
willfulness, malice, or corruption." (43 Am. Jur., pp.
85-86).
In Sanders vs. Veridiano[16], the Supreme Court
held:
"Given the official character of the above-described
letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners
were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the
United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government and not the
petitioners personally, that is responsible for their
acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is
proved that the claimants have a right to the
payment of damages, such award will have to be
satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government as
their principal. This will require that
government, viz.: the appropriation of the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded,
thus making the action a suit against that
government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such
complaint cannot prosper unless the government
sought to be held ultimately liable has given its
consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in
Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld
the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not
only to our own government but also to foreign
States sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of
our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
The Court finds that, even under the law of public
officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by
the presumption of good faith, which has not been
overturned by the private respondents. Even
mistakes concededly committed by such public
officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown
that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith. This too is well-
settled."17
Preliminarily, we discuss the procedural grounds
cited by petitioners which they assert are sufficient
to have caused the dismissal of Lichauco's petition
before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners claim that
contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, Lichauco failed to attach all
pleadings and documents relevant to her petition,
and that those that were attached were merely
"duplicate original copies." Lichauco counters that
for the viability of her petition for certiorari, all that
she needed to attach were her motion to dismiss,
the RTC orders acting on such motion, her motion
for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to
dismiss, and petitioners' opposition to said motion
for reconsideration. She claims that only these
motions and submission were relevant to the
resolution of her petition.18
In her comment, Lichaucho claims that she did not
have to attach the complaint to the copy of the
petition she sent to the petitioners herein, since the
latter obviously retained the original copy of the
complaint they filed.19However, her petition before
the appellate court does not indicate that the same
complaint was included as an attachment, and
indeed, there is a curious absence of any averment
on Lichuaco's part that she indeed attached the
said complaint to her petition.20 Certainly, in a
petition for certiorari assailing the denial of a motion
to dismiss a complaint, the very complaint itself is a
document relevant and pertinent to the special civil
action. It should be remembered that unlike in an
ordinary appeal that is given due course,21 the case
record is not automatically elevated to the court
exercising jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari; hence there is an even more impelling
need to attach all pleadings and documents to the
special civil action, as mandated under Section 1,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. After
all, how could the court a quo properly ascertain
whether or not the motion to dismiss itself should
have been granted if it did not have a copy of the
complaint sought to be dismissed itself.
Nonetheless, the requirement to attach such
relevant pleadings under Section 1, Rule 65 is read
in relation to Section 3, Rule 46, which states that
the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
documentary requirements, such as the attachment
of such relevant pleadings, "shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition." The
procedural rule accords sufficient discretion to the
court hearing the special civil action whether or not
to dismiss the petition outright for failure to comply
with said requirement. If the court does dismiss the
petition on that ground, the dismissal would be
justifiable under Section 3, Rule 46, and generally
such action of the court cannot be assailed as
constituting either grave abuse of discretion or
reversible error of law. If the court, on the other
hand, takes cognizance of the petition despite such
lapses, the phrasing of Section 3, Rule 46
sufficiently justifies such adjudicative recourse.
Indeed, the ultimate logic behind rules of procedure
being the promotion of the objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding,22 the higher interests of
justice may at times sufficiently warrant the
allowance of the petition for certiorari despite such
lapses, especially if they are nonetheless
correctible through subsequent submissions.
In any event, the Court is willing to overlook
Lichauco's failure to attach the complaint in her
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
an oversight sadly ignored by the appellate court.
There are weighty issues at hand relating to the
doctrine of state immunity from suit and the
requisites of a motion to dismiss.
There is a connective issue between these two
aspects in that if the State is sued without its
consent, the corresponding suit must be dismissed.
At times, it would be teasingly obvious, even from
the moment of the filing of the complaint, that the
suit is one against the State. A cursory examination
of the caption of the complaint can sometimes
betray such proscribed intent, as when the suit is
directly initiated against the Republic of the
Philippines, any foreign government, or an
unincorporated government agency as the named
respondents. In such cases, obviously there is
need for immediate caution, although if it is
somehow established that those respondents had
given their consent to be sued, the suit may
nonetheless prosper.
The present action was denominated against
Lichauco and the unknown awardee, Lichauco was
identified in the complaint as "acting Secretary of
the [DOTC]."23 The hornbook rule is that a suit for
acts done in the performance of official functions
against an officer of the government by a private
citizen which would result in a charge against or
financial liability to the government must be
regarded as a suit against the State itself, although
it has not been formally impleaded.24 However,
government immunity from suit will not shield the
public official being sued if the government no
longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a
suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal
because it arises from a tortious act in the
performance of his/her duties.
Petitioner insists that Lichauco is being sued for her
acts committed in excess of her authority, ultra
vires in nature, and tortious in character. The Court
of Appeals responded that such acts fell within
Lichauco's official duties as DOTC Undersecretary,
thus enjoying the presumption that they were
performed in good faith and in the regular
performance of official duty. This rationale is pure
sophistry and must be rejected outright.
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions
of "good faith" or "regular performance of official
duty", yet these presumptions are disputable25 and
may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence.26 Many civil actions are oriented towards
overcoming any number of these presumptions,
and a cause of action can certainly be geared
towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to
allow a party to present evidence overcome the
disputable presumptions involved. Otherwise, if trial
is deemed irrelevant or unnecessary, owing to the
perceived indisputability of the presumptions, the
judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere
ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a
given case, nothing more. Consequently, the entire
Rules of Court is rendered as excess verbiage,
save perhaps for the provisions laying down the
legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of Appeals were ever
adopted as a jurisprudential rule, no public officer
could ever be sued for acts executed beyond their
official functions or authority, or for tortious conduct
or behavior, since such acts would "enjoy the
presumption of good faith and in the regular
performance of official duty". Indeed, few civil
actions of any nature would ever reach the trial
stage, if a case can be adjudicated by a mere
determination from the complaint or answer as to
which legal presumptions are applicable. For
example, the presumption that a person is innocent
of a wrong is a disputable presumption on the same
level as that of the regular performance of official
duty.27 A civil complaint for damages necessarily
alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act
or omission that would serve as basis for the award
of damages. With the rationale of the Court of
Appeals, such complaint can be dismissed upon a
motion to dismiss solely on the ground that the
presumption is that a person is innocent of a wrong.
So obviously, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
cannot receive the imprimatur of this Court. Still,
the question of whether Lichauco may validly
invoke state immunity from suit to secure the
outright dismissal of petitioners' complaint warrants
closer examination.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three (3)
causes of action against Lichauco: one for
injunction against her performing any act in relation
to orbital slot 153 East Longitude; one for
declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the
alleged award of orbital slot 153 East Longitude;
and one for damages against Lichauco herself.
Evidently, the first two causes of action stem from
Lichauco's act of offering orbital slot 153 East
Longitude for bidding, through the Notice of Offer
which was attached to the complaint.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Lichauco asserts that she
is being sued for issuing the aforementioned Notice
of Offer, which fell within her official functions as
DOTC Undersecretary for Communications. She
claims that it was Secretary Lagdameo who
authorized her to offer orbital slot 153 East
Longitude for bidding, and she thus acted well
within the scope of her authority to advise and
assist the DOTC Secretary in the formulation and
implementation of department objectives and
policies.
The Notice of Offer cites Department Circular 97-
01, signed by then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile,
as authority for it. The Court has examined the
aforementioned Department Circular, issued on 17
October 1997, which establishes the "Guidelines on
the Procurement of Orbital Slots and Frequency
Registration of Philippine Satellites". Therein, the
DOTC is mandated "to conduct a bidding process
in case there are competing applications for any
one of the assigned or applied-for-orbital slots"28.
Further, the Department Circular states that "the
DOTC shall publish in three newspapers of general
circulation a notice of offer for the government
assigned, initiated and applied for orbital slots."29
Thus, insofar as the first two causes of action are
concerned, Lichauco may have a point when she
asserts that they were based on acts which she
performed in her capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary. But does this necessarily mean
that these two causes of action may thus be
dismissed on the basis of state immunity of suit?
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the
performance of official functions by an officer of the
government will result in a charge against or
financial liability to the government that the
complaint must be regarded as a suit against the
State itself. However, the distinction must also be
raised between where the government official
concerned performs an act in his/her official and
jurisdictional capacity and where he performs an
act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In the latter case,
the Constitution itself assures the availability of
judicial review, and it is the official concerned who
should be impleaded as the proper party-
defendant or respondent.
On this point, our ruling in J.M. Tuazon & Co. v.
Land Tenure Administration30 is material.
Petitioners therein had filed a special civil action for
prohibition to nullify Republic Act No. 2616, or law
that directed the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate
in Quezon City. Impleaded as respondents were
the officials and government agency tasked to
undertake such expropriation. The respondents
alleged that the petition for prohibition was actually
a suit against the State without its consent. The
Court, through then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Enrique Fernando, debunked the
argument, ruling instead that the petition was within
the ambit of judicial review:
[T]he power of judicial review is granted, if not
expressly, at least by clear implication from the
relevant provisions of the Constitution. This power
may be exercised when the party adversely
affected by either a legislative or executive act, or a
municipal ordinance for that matter, files the
appropriate suit to test its validity. The special civil
action of prohibition has been relied upon precisely
to restrain the enforcement of what is alleged to be
an unconstitutional statute. As it is a fundamental
postulate that the Constitution as the supreme law
is binding on all governmental agencies, failure to
observe the limitations found therein furnishes a
sufficient ground for a declaration of nullity of the
government measure challenged. The argument
then that the government is the adverse party and
that, therefore, must consent to its being sued
certainly is far from persuasive. x x x x31
The Court further noted that it was well-settled for
the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity, "it is enough if the respondents or
defendants named be the government officials who
would give operation and effect to official action
allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality."32
Unlike in J.M. Tuason, the case at bar does not
seek to nullify an unconstitutional law or measure.
However, the first two causes of action do
sufficiently impute grave abuse of discretion against
Lichauco in her official capacity. Since judicial
review of acts alleged to have been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the
Constitution, it necessarily follows in such instances
that it is the official concerned who should be
impleaded as defendant or respondent in the
appropriate suit.
Moreover, if the suit had been directed against
Lichauco alone, and in her personal capacity, yet it
sought, as it now does, the nullification of the
Notice of Offer or the awards thereon, such remedy
could not avail even if granted. Lichauco, in her
personal capacity, cannot be directed to set aside
the Notice of Offer, the award of the bid, or to issue
a new award herself. It is only because Lichauco
was sued in her official capacity as the DOTC
Undersecretary that she, or her successors in
office, could be judicially compelled to act in such
fashion.
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court
rules that the defense of state immunity from suit
do not apply since said causes of action cannot be
properly considered as suits against the State in
constitutional contemplation. These causes of
action do not seek to impose a charge or financial
liability against the State, but merely the nullification
of state action. The prayers attached to these two
causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice
of Bid and the nullification of the purported award,
nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner
additionally sought damages in relation to said
causes of action, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. Had the
petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an
unincorporated government agency, and not
Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. But neither
circumstance obtains in this case.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that at the time of
the filing of the complaint, Lichauco herself was
already the acting head of the DOTC, owing to the
sudden death of then Secretary Enrile a few days
before. At that stage, any suit seeking to nullify the
Notice of Bid and the alleged award to the
"Unknown Bidder" should have properly
denominated Lichauco as the respondent, and not
the DOTC.
Nonetheless, as to the first two causes of action,
there was a viable ground to dismiss the complaint:
the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Indeed, such ground was alleged by Lichauco in
her Motion to Dismiss. Yet the principle of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies admits to
several exceptions. In its Order denying the motion
to dismiss the complaint, the RTC adequately
dispensed with the objection, applying the
established exceptions to the rule of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. To wit:
Turning to the matter pertaining to non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies, it is fundamental that
this principle is not an inflexible rule. It yields to
many accepted exceptions. (Rocamora vs. RTC -
Cebu, G.R. No. 65307). As in this case, this
principle can be dispensed with when its application
would cause great and irreparable damage and
when it does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
When the subject orbital slot 153 E was bidded out
to other applicants, the damage and injury plaintiffs
stand to suffer was clear, present, and
substantiated that this Court was impelled to
provide urgent needed measure such as the
issuance of writ of injunction against the public
defendant. Indeed, under the circumstances then
obtaining it was impractical for the plaintiffs to first
proceed to the administrative official concerned
before taking court action.33
A different set of principles applies to the third
cause of action, anchored as it is on alleged acts
that are tortious in character or otherwise beyond
the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The
complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several
disparaging and defamatory remarks against
petitioners and made false assertions against them
in her letter to the Land Bank President.
The veracity of those allegations is of course
presented at the trial to be determined on the basis
of the evidence. However, if proven, they would
establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not
shielded by the doctrine of state immunity from suit.
The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of
Appeals :34
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, such as the appropriation of the amount
needed to pay the damages awarded against them,
the suit must be regarded as against the state itself
although it has not been formally impleaded. It must
be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-
encompassing as to be applicable under all
circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official
is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights
of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice
Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et
al. 'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of
the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded
or violated by such acts, for the protection of
his rights, is not a suit against the State within
the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the
same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or
suit in equity against a State officer or the director
of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades
the personal and property rights or the plaintiff,
under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is
not a suit against the State within the constitutional
provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.35
The doctrine poses no controversy if after trial on
the merits, it is established that the public official
concerned had committed illegal or tortious acts
against the plaintiff. How does it apply in relation to
a motion to dismiss on the ground of state immunity
from suit, necessarily lodged before trial on the
merits?
Our ruling in United States of America v.
Reyes36 warrants due consideration. The Court
therein, through then Associate Justice (later Chief
Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., ruled that a motion to
dismiss averring immunity from suit of a State and
its functionaries was actually grounded on the
specific ground for dismissal of the lack of cause of
action, for even assuming that the defendants had
committed the injurious acts complained of, "no
action may be maintained thereon, because of the
principle of state immunity."37 Pertinently, the Court
noted that "a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint."
Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss
that she is shielded by the State's immunity from
suit, to hypothetically admitted the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical
admission has to be deemed a concession on her
part that she had performed the tortious or
damaging acts against the petitioners, which if true,
would hold her liable for damages.
Of course, Lichauco could very well raise the
defense of state immunity from suit in regard to the
third cause of action with the assertion that the acts
complained of constituting said cause of action fell
within her official functions and were not tortuous in
character. Still, to establish such assertions of fact,
a full-blown trial on the merits would be necessary,
as would the case be if Lichauco raised the
defense that she did not commit these acts
complained of. Certainly, these defenses cannot be
accorded merit before trial, factual as they are in
character.

All told, contrary to the ruling of the Court of

Appeals, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the RTC in denying Lichauco's Motion to
Dismiss.

WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 February
2000 is SET ASIDE and the Order dated 14 August
1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is
ordered to try and decide the case on the merits
with deliberate dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner,

vs.

HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos
City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1,
General Santos City; COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA
DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO,
Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and
set aside the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the Decision2 dated
April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap
are engaged in the real estate business through
their company Primetown Property Group.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several
real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In
consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued
several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses
Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses
Charlie and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the
checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored
by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the
remaining checks were deposited with the drawee
bank, they were dishonored for the reason that the
"Account is Closed." Demands were made by
Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the
petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this,
however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a
civil action for collection of sum of money, damages
and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General
Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231.3 On
December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed
suit and instituted a similar action, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.4
Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several
informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General
Santos City. The criminal complaints were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874,
34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5
In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate
motions to suspend proceedings on account of the
existence of a prejudicial question and motion to
exclude the private prosecutor from participating in
the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the
proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended
until the civil cases pending before the RTC were
finally resolved.
The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and
July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration8 relative to Criminal Case Nos.
34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings on Account of
the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to
Criminal Case No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent
motions were denied in the Order10 dated October
18, 2000.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction11 before the RTC, docketed
as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On
July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order12 denying
the petition.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,13 which was denied in an Order
dated October 18, 2001.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for
Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with Urgent
Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 68250.
On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision16
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not
pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of the
petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The CA ruled:
In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases
Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved
therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly
pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or
not the complainants therein are entitled to collect
from the petitioner the sum or the value of the
checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn
Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and
the rediscounting of the checks are two
transactions, separate and distinct from each other.
It so happened that in the subject civil cases it is
not the sale that is in question, but rather the
rediscounting of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's
contention that the main issue involved in said civil
cases is the validity of the sale stands on hollow
ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of
the sale that is contested in the subject civil cases,
then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never
contested such sale by filing an action for the
annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in
his answer that the sale be declared null and void.
Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and
6238 are tried and the resolution of the issues
therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that
the petitioner cannot be held liable anymore for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.17
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18
which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17,
2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES
(FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY
INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER,
CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD
WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE CRIMINAL
CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF
B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH ARE THE VERY
SAME CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO ORDER.20
The main contention of the petitioner is that a
prejudicial question, as defined by law and
jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the
petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and
6238 for collection of sum of money and damages
were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the
pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private
respondents are entitled to collect from the
petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an
issue that is a logical antecedent to the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court
rules that there is no valid consideration for the
check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it
necessarily follows that he could not also be held
liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically
requires, among other elements, that the check
should have been issued for account or for value.
There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no
violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued.
Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of
the checks was his order to the drawee bank to
stop payment and to close his account in order to
avoid necessary penalty from the bank. He made
this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to
him the titles to the purchased properties to him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial
question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which
would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is
not the validity of the sale between the petitioner
and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein
are entitled to damages arising from the checks.
These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor
of Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same
checks to private complainants. The checks were
subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of
such issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue
of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.21
The present case hinges on the determination of
whether there exists a prejudicial question that
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in
the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to
deny the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the former an issue
that must be preemptively resolved before the latter
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question
is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.22
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues,
or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues
raised in the other, then a prejudicial question
would likely exist, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only
that the civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that the resolution of the issues raised in the
civil action would be necessarily determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the
resolution of the issue in the civil action will not
determine the criminal responsibility of the accused
in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if
there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case,
the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question.23 Neither is there a prejudicial question if
the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other.24
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the
petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in
the civil case, it is whether the private respondents
are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or
the value of the checks that they have rediscounted
from Evelyn.lavvphil
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action
is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal cases against him, and
there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if
petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of
the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds
to support the checks is in itself an offense.25
In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under
determination was whether the daily interest rate of
5% was void, such that the checks issued by
respondents to cover said interest were likewise
void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the
cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In
resolving the issue, We ruled that "whether or not
the interest rate imposed by petitioners is
eventually declared void for being contra bonos
mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22
cases because what will ultimately be penalized is
the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the
primordial question posed before the court hearing
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been
breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been
issued."
Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg.
22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez,
we have declared that it is not the non-payment of
an obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation
of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious
effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not
as an offense against property, but an offense
against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said
that a check issued as an evidence of debt - though
not intended to be presented for payment - has the
same effect as an ordinary check and would fall
within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
xxxx
x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check -
whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as
evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum.
To determine the reason for which checks are
issued, or the terms and conditions for their
issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of
checks as currency substitutes, and bring about
havoc in trade and in banking communities. So
what the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
was issued or the terms and conditions relating to
its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless
check is malum prohibitum.28
Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is
misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint
for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of
an alleged double sale. While the civil case was
pending, an information for estafa was filed against
Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from
the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the
civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a
prejudicial question considering that the defense in
the civil case was based on the very same facts
that would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the estafa case.
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as
the determination of whether the petitioner is liable
to pay the private respondents the value of the
checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner because the material
question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner
had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose
or condition of its issuance.
Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear
that the determination of the issues involved in Civil
Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of
money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of
consideration may be raised as a defense during
the trial of the criminal cases against him. The
validity and merits of a partys defense and
accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight
of testimonies and evidence brought before the
court, are better ventilated during trial proper.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law
is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to
examine and to put to test all their respective
allegations and evidence through a well designed
machinery termed "trial." Thus, all the defenses
available to the accused should be invoked in the
trial of the criminal cases. This court is not the
proper forum that should ascertain the facts and
decide the case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed
against the petitioner.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in
affirming the decision of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the

Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution
dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

Petitioner,

vs.

CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A.

FAMINI, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the

reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision1 in SCA
No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed
the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12,
20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las
Pias City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its
President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-
President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P.
Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5,
20044 for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
(BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias
City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-
33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal
information for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined
by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 20065
for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch
197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case
No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the
criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July
24, 20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging
that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and
issues similar or intimately related such that in the
resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. In other words, private respondent
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to
Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial
Question7 on the grounds that: (1) there is no
prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of
the contract upon which the bouncing checks were
issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue
of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states
that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is
that "the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element
is missing in this case, the criminal case having
preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16,
2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of
contract and the nullification of the checks issued as
the same are without consideration, then the instant
criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be
dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the
herein accused did not detract from the correctness
of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a
criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised
Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a
Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008,
denying the petition. On the issue of the existence of
a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement
of a "previously" filed civil case is intended merely to
obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal
proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of any
intent to delay by private respondent was shown.
The criminal proceedings are still in their initial
stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the
fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal
action was instituted does not render the issues in
the civil action any less prejudicial in character.10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART
OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER
RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM.
CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO.
LP-06-0197.11
The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June
17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a
prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec.
5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two
(2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that
the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in
the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v.
People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, however, became effective and the
above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule
111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order
for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and,
thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be
established that the civil case was filed previous to
the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues,
is specifically to guard against the situation wherein
a party would belatedly file a civil action that is
related to a pending criminal action in order to delay
the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article
36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be
decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules
of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate
and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a
prejudicial question exists when the civil action is
filed either before the institution of the criminal action
or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private
respondent concludes that there is an apparent
conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and
the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case
to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction
that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to
change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase,
"previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial
question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of
"subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the
amendments except to qualify the relationship of the
civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must
precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15
that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and
resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying
their omnibus motion for the suspension of the
proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case
No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at
any time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is
understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before
a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected.
The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the
State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction
that "a statute should be construed not only to be
consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other
laws on the same subject matter, as to form a
complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This
principle is consistent with the maxim, interpretare et
concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus or every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.171 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to
harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be
made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec.
7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible
of an interpretation that would harmonize both
provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted
civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded
and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations.
The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed" in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the
motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed
during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or
during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the
Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil
Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the
preliminary investigation or during the trial may be
filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial
question.A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action
has been filed in court for trial, the petition to
suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at
any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction,
it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that
should govern in order to give effect to all the
relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present
in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil
action and the subsequent move to suspend the
criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a
prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial
question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a
criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the
civil action would not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In
resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case
clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was a
ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases.
Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him.
Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal
cases.19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the
institution of the criminal complaint and from the time
that private respondent allegedly withdrew its
equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting
that the civil case was instituted more than two and
a half (2 ) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the
proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission
of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years
from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the cases involved here
show that the filing of the civil action was a mere
afterthought on the part of private respondent and
interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by
petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private
respondents positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal
Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted
prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no
prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question
under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are:
(1) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a
prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule
111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such
rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if
the construction agreement between the parties is
declared null and void for want of consideration, the
checks issued in consideration of such contract
would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be
the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the
crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check
to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.20
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract
or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s
or that the checks were issued for valuable
consideration does not make up the elements of the
crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of
cases21 that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v.
People,22 we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the
offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant
to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To
determine the reason for which checks are issued,
or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the
stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking
communities. The clear intention of the framers of
B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a
worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In
that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable
consideration for the issuance of checks which were
later on dishonored for insufficient funds is
immaterial to the success of a prosecution for
violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on
account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that
upon issuance of a check, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable consideration.
Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in
some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the
party who makes the contract, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or
labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the
other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in
favor of the party who makes the contract, such as
the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed
several checks in blank, the subject check included,
in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of
loans that will be made from said account. This is a
valuable consideration for which the check was
issued. That there was neither a pre-existing
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of
petitioner when the subject check was given by
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993
because petitioner was no longer connected with
Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given
merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed to
adequately prove that he has severed his
relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes
is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. This is because
the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of
worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares
that the construction agreement between the parties
is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect
the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal
case. The fact of the matter is that private
respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is
this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
22.lawphil.net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element
required for the existence of a prejudicial question,
that the resolution of the issue in the civil action
would determine whether the criminal action may
proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no
prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are
inapplicable to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 2008
Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch
253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated October
16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las Pias City.
We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings
in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing

the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y
Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel
(petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon
City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons
to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and
trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine
Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim
is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC
Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13
May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of the case
before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case
could be tried even if the validity of petitioners
marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC
Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the
Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of
the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of
merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22
August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied
the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of
Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August
2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled
that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the
issue is whether the offender commenced the
commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt
acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations. The
Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal
case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated
parricide had already been committed. The Court of
Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge
of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still
subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court
assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution
of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure[6] provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be
instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.
In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated
Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled
to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the
stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for
pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner
was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on
7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and
was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case
for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the
civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a
prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action
may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.[11]
The relationship between the offender and the victim on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue
is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the
punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of recognition written into the law itself that such a
his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.[13] marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
The relationship between the offender and the victim legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared
distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the
or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the second marriage on the ground of psychological
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. States penal laws are concerned.[19]
Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is
under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply petitioner in the criminal case.
with the essential marital obligations. The issue in
parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In
this case, since petitioner was charged with WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
performed all the acts of execution which would have
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes SO ORDERED.
independent of petitioners will.[16] At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in
Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect
on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v.

Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial
declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated

by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial
question to stop the proceedings in a pending
criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa
through falsification. This is because the result of the
independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of
guilt or innocence of the accused.

The Case

On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on

August 18, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted the writ of certiorari upon petition by
the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252 entitled People v.
Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge, Branch
59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael
Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued
on November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the
arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-
120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his
motion on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question in the civil cases pending between him and
the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig City and
Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself
and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz)
various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from
Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured
by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of
land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Cavite registered under the name
of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its option to
purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed
to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz
and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and
paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The
other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner
of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop
the property, they learned that the title to the
property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of
Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from
whom the property had been allegedly acquired by
de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la Cruz
appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the
total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999
that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and
Consing, but the latter ignored the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759
in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig
civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to
enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for the
collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that
he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public
document against Consing and de la Cruz in the
Makati City Prosecutors Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the
RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the
recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment
(Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and
De la Cruz an information for estafa through
falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati
City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was
assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his
arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the
ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to
the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On
September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion
for deferment of his arraignment, citing the additional
ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the
CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution
opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order
suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal
case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied
the Prosecutions motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders
of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for
certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the
petition for certiorari and upholding the RTCs
questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to
the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the
Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent
may be held liable in the questioned transaction, will
determine the guilt or innocence of private
respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati
criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case,
Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite
criminal case show that: (1) the parties are identical;
(2) the transactions in controversy are identical; (3)
the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are
identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of
Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in
question are identical; and (6) the issue of private
respondents culpability for the questioned
transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised
in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately
related to the criminal cases in Cavite and Makati.
The similarities also extend to the parties in the
cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage
involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension
of the arraignment of private respondent in the
Makati case, in view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712,
where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so
pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial
notice of an official act of another judicial authority.
It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity
of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to
suspend private respondents arraignment in the
Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact
that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely,
in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus
Builders commenced its own suit for damages
against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the
RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa
through falsification of public document was filed
against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus,
Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and
assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case).
Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question,
i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil
cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC
handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consings
motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for
reconsideration. Thereafter, Consing commenced in
the CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his
arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The
CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later
promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting
Consing petition for certiorari and setting aside the
January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently
enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the
arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil
cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the
CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the
reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On
January 16, 2003, the Court granted the petition for
review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set
aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question
that would justify the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The
issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil
case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of
his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No.
99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and
his mother are liable to pay damages and to return
the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely
an agent of his mother in the transaction involving
the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged
free from criminal liability. An agent or any person
may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue
involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid
damages and the purchase price of the lot in
question will not be determinative of the culpability
of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI
is held entitled to the return of the purchase price
plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that
respondent should be held guilty of estafa through
falsification of public document. Stated differently, a
ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should
not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not
necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the
criminal case where his guilt may still be established
under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if
the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other. Under
Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused
in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the
Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel
mortgage on personal property in favor of another
party without consent of the previous mortgagee.
Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for
termination of management contract, one of the
causes of action of which consisted of petitioner
having executed a chattel mortgage while the
previous chattel mortgage was still valid and
subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment
and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on
the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial
question, the resolution of which was necessary
before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The
trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case
on the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We
affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
the resolution of the liability of the defendant in
the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based
on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel
mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the said
CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6
"Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was
"free from all liens and encumbrances" will not
determine the criminal liability of the accused in the
said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of
paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal
Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of
argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this
case, the fact remains that both the crime charged
in the information in the criminal case and the
eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based
upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases
could proceed independently of the other pursuant
to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides:
"In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries,
a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That,
therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the
orders referred to in the instant petition was not
made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in
selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it
will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State
moved for the reconsideration of the adverse
decision of the CA, citing the ruling in G.R. No.
148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and
Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial
question that justified the suspension of the
proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and
claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193,
the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a
prejudicial question that would cause the
suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the States motion for
reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193 was not binding because G.R.
No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was
different from Unicapital, the complainant in the
Makati criminal case. He added that the decision in
G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final and
executory, and could still be reversed at any time,
and thus should not control as a precedent to be
relied upon; and that he had acted as an innocent
attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be
held personally liable under a contract that had
involved property belonging to his mother as his
principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision,
reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No.
148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at
bench. The transactions in controversy, the
documents involved; the issue of the respondents
culpability for the questioned transactions are all
identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the
same parties with the exception of private
complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-
G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs.
Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January
16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
Damages and attachment on account of alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in
selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned
decision of the Supreme Court, We are thus
amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioners motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated
November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002 issued by
the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered
to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-
120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the
CA denied the motion through the second assailed
resolution of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision
in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to
C.A.-G.R. No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders,
not Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal Case No.
00-120. He posits that in arriving at its amended
decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of
the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which
raised a prejudicial question, considering that the
resolution of such civil action would include the issue
of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had
willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either
of which would determine his guilt or innocence in
Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the Makati
civil case as an independent civil action intended to
exact civil liability separately from Criminal Case No.
00-120 in a manner fully authorized under Section
1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20
It argues that the CA correctly took cognizance of
the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its
challenged amended decision that the Makati civil
case, just like the Manila civil case, was an
independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article
33 of the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not
raise a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that
as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil
case did not also raise any prejudicial question,
because the sole issue thereat was whether
Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any
obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil
case that he filed and Unicapitals Makati civil case
were not intended to delay the resolution of Criminal
Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such resolution;
and that such civil cases could be validly considered
determinative of whether a prejudicial question
existed to warrant the suspension of Criminal Case
No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question that warranted the
suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal
case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely
meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore
the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to
the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati
civil case was an independent civil action, while the
Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question. That
was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling
fully applied to him due to the similarity between his
case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the Makati civil
case reveals that the action was predicated on fraud.
This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital
in its complaint to the effect that Consing and de la
Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive,
or malevolent manner in offering as security and
later object of sale, a property which they do not
own, and foisting to the public a spurious title."22 As
such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant
to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as
follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on
defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the
Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal
case.23 This was precisely the Courts thrust in G.R.
No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if
the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other. Under
Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in
selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it
will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper for
the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his
case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and
Makati civil cases involved different complainants
(i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions
Plus Builders and Unicapital had separately
instituted against him were undeniably of similar
mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were
thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly,
the Makati criminal case could not be suspended
pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that
Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue
of Consings being a mere agent of his mother who
should not be criminally liable for having so acted
due to the property involved having belonged to his
mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No.
148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question
that would justify the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The
issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil
case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not
respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of
his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No.
99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and
his mother are liable to pay damages and to return
the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the
disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely
an agent of his mother in the transaction involving
the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged
free from criminal liability. An agent or any person
may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue
involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.25 (Words in
parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied
for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended
decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and
ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v.
VICTORIA R. ARAMBULO AND MIGUEL
ARAMBULO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to annul
the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated 5 February
2008 and 27 February 2009, respectively of the
Court of Appeals, Seventeenth Division in CA-G.R.
SP No. 86353 which effectively suspended the
criminal proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-62784,
an estafa case against respondents before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan
City.
Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo
(Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo
Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo Reyes (Domingo),
Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the
heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia
Reyes. Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped) was
incorporated as part of the estate planning or as
conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro
Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.
Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General
Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a
complaint for estafa against Victoria and her
husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He
alleged that Victoria failed to remit the rentals
collected from the time the ownership of the
commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.
On 24 April 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Alvin A.
Almora recommended the filing of an Information
against respondents. On 1 June 2001, respondents
were charged with estafa committed as
follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on [or] about the period from December, 1994
to June, 1997, in the City of Caloocan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another, and with unfaithfulness or
abuse of confidence, after having received rentals
from IMF International Corporation, in the total
amount of THREE HUNDRED NINETEEN
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT
(P319,888.00) PESOS, under the express obligation
of turning over or remitting the same to ANAPED
ESTATE INCORPORATED, once in possession of
the said amount and far from complying with their
obligation aforesaid and despite notice [to] that
effect, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply,
and convert the said amount to their own personal
use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of
ANAPED ESTATE, INC., in the sum above-
aforementioned.3
On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial
question in view of the pendency of two intra-
corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon
City and Makati City. SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 is a
petition filed by Victorias brother Oscar for
accounting of all corporate funds and assets of
Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership
and damages.4 SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is a
petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo
and Domingo questioning the authority of their elder
sibling Rodrigo Reyes and Emerenciana R. Gungab,
as well as the Anaped Board of Directors and
officers, including private complainant Buban to act
for and in behalf of the corporation.5chanrobleslaw
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents
asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their
favor particularly the issues of whether of the group
of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives
of the corporation and whether they are duly
authorized to make a demand for remittance would
necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal
case.
On 28 August 2003, the trial court, through Presiding
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for
suspension of the proceedings. The trial court
reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who
between the groups has the right to act for and in
behalf of the corporation, has a direct link to the
issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For indeed, if the aforesaid issues are resolved in
the [respondents] favor, they cannot be held liable
for misappropriation for they possess the authority to
collect rentals and hold the same on behalf of the
firm. They would then be justified in not remitting the
collections to the group of Jose Buban who would be
then deemed as mere usurpers of authority.6
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner, the trial court issued an Order dated 19
February 2004 setting aside its 28 August 2003
Order and setting the case for pre-trial. The trial
court noted that respondents failed to file an
opposition to the motion for reconsideration.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion praying that
they be allowed to file their Comment/Opposition to
the motion for reconsideration and that the pre-trial
be held in abeyance. Respondents claimed that the
Order of the trial court to file comment/opposition
was served on respondents themselves and not on
their counsel.
On 23 June 2004, the trial court denied respondents
Omnibus Motion. The trial court stressed that even if
the order was served upon respondents and not
upon their counsel, records show that a copy of the
motion for reconsideration was served by registered
mail upon counsel. Thus, the trial court stated that
respondents counsel was well aware of the
existence of the motion for reconsideration, thus he
could have taken the initiative to file his comment
thereto without waiting for any directive from the
court.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals asserting that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied them the opportunity to file their comment;
when it ruled that respondents counsel should have
filed the comment as he was furnished a copy of the
motion for reconsideration; and when it granted
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

On 5 February 2008, the Court of Appeals granted
the petition. The dispositive portion
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the
respondent Judge dated February 19, 2004 and July
23, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and she
is hereby enjoined from hearing the Criminal Case
No. C-62784 until the termination of the SEC Case
No. 03-99-6259. The August 28, 2003 Order of the
respondent Judge is hereby REINSTATED.7
Preliminarily, on the procedural question, the Court
of Appeals pointed out that respondents were given
the opportunity to present their side in their motion
to suspend proceedings. The appellate court treated
respondents arguments in said motion as their
Comment/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner. That is correct.
The appellate court ruled that in SEC Case No. 03-
99-6259:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]he issue is the legality of the election of Anaped
Board of Directors, as well as the authority of its
officers, which include private complainant Jose
Buban, to act for and in behalf of the corporation.
Clearly, it involves facts that are intimately related to
those upon which the criminal case is based. The
resolution of the issues raised in this intra-corporate
dispute will ultimately determine the guilt or
innocence of [respondents] in the crime of estafa
initiated by Jose Buban. It must be remembered that
one of the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse
of confidence under paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender. A valid demand must
therefore be made by an offended party to the
offender.8
The appellate court added that since respondents
are challenging the authority of Buban, then the
validity of Bubans demand to turn over or remit the
rentals is put in question. The appellate court
concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is
found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever
made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot
prosper.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied in a Resolution dated 27 February 2009.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
raises the lone ground of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a
prejudicial question which calls for the suspension of
the criminal proceedings before the trial court.
Petitioner argues that any decision of the trial court
in the SEC cases with respect to the question of who
are the lawful officers or directors of Anaped is not
determinative of the liability of respondents to remit
the rental collections in favor of Anaped. Petitioner
proffers that a corporation has a personality distinct
and separate from its individual stockholders.
Petitioner emphasizes that at the time the demand
for remittance of the rental collections was made
against respondents, Buban was an officer of
Anaped and until such time that his authority is
validly revoked, all his previous acts are valid and
binding. Moreover, petitioner avers that the duty of
respondents to remit the collection still subsists even
during the pendency of the SEC cases as the money
remitted goes directly to the corporation and not to
the person who demanded the remittance. Finally,
petitioner opines that question pertaining to the
authority of Buban to demand remittance may only
be considered as a defense in the estafa case and
not as a ground to suspend the proceedings.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be
determined.9chanrobleslaw
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure prescribes the elements that must concur
in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial
question, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present
for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a
criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the
civil case: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined;
and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal.10chanrobleslaw
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC
Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial
question to the criminal case for estafa. It is an action
for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of
Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership
and damages. Even if said case will be decided
against respondents, they will not be adjudged free
from criminal liability. It also does not automatically
follow that an accounting of corporate funds and
properties and annulment of fictitious sale of
corporate assets would result in the conviction of
respondents in the estafa case.
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259,
however, we affirm the Court of Appeals finding that
a prejudicial question exists. The Complaint in SEC
Case No. 03-99-6259 prays for the nullification of the
election of Anaped directors and officers, including
Buban. Essentially, the issue is the authority of the
aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the
corporation.
On the other hand, the issue in the criminal case
pertains to whether respondents committed estafa.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the
elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as
follows: (1) that the money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that
there is demand by the offended party to the
offender.11chanrobleslaw
The elements of demand and misappropriation bear
relevance to the validity or invalidity of the authority
of Anaped directors and officers. In Omictin v. Court
of Appeals,12 we held that since the alleged
offended party is the corporation, the validity of the
demand for the delivery rests upon the authority of
the person making such a demand on the companys
behalf. If the supposed authority of the person
making the demand is found to be defective, it is as
if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution
for estafa cannot prosper. The Court added that
mere failure to return the thing received for
administration or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver or return the same or
deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give
rise to a civil action and does not constitute the crime
of estafa.13chanrobleslaw
It is true that the accused may be convicted of the
felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proves
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of
the money or property subject of the Information. In
a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary
where there is evidence of misappropriation or
conversion.14 The phrase, to misappropriate to
ones own use has been said to include not only The underlying policy of the Corporation Code is that
conversion to ones personal advantage, but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right.15 In this case, the resolution of the
issue of misappropriation by respondents depends
upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is
ruled in the SEC case that the present Anaped
directors and officers were not validly elected, then
respondent Victoria may have every right to refuse
remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the essential
element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent
in this case.
In this connection, we find important the fact, noted
by the CA, that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It appears from the record of the case that Victoria
Arambulo for the last twenty (20) years had been
tasked with the management and collection of
rentals of the real properties the Reyes siblings
inherited from their parents, Ana and Pedro
Reyes.16
As earlier mentioned, SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 is
a petition filed by Victoria and her brothers Domingo
and Reynaldo questioning the very authority of their
elder siblings Rodrigo and Emerenciana, as well as
the Anaped Board of Directors and Officers,
including Buban to act for and in behalf of the
corporation. We find this issue consonant with the
provisions of the Corporation Code which provides
in Section 23 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 23. The Board of Directors or Trustees. -
Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the
corporate powers of all corporations formed under
this Code shall be exercised, all business conducted
and all property of such corporations controlled and
held by the board of directors or trustees to be
elected from among the holders of stocks, or where
there is no stock, from among the members of the
corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year
and until their successors are elected and
qualified.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Africa,17 we said
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the business and affairs of the corporation must be
governed by a board of directors whose members
have stood for election, and who have actually been
elected by the stockholders, on an annual basis.
Only in that way can the directors continued
accountability to shareholders, and the legitimacy of
their decisions that bind the corporations
stockholders, be assured. The shareholder vote is
critical to the theory that legitimizes the exercise of
power by the directors or officers over properties that
they do not own.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
From the foregoing, it is clear that, should
respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-
6259, then Buban, who does not own either by
himself or in behalf of Anaped which is the owner,
the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot
demand remittance of the rentals on the property
and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over
the rentals to Buban.
Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will
determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in
the criminal case for estafa.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 5 February 2008 and 27 February 2009
enjoining the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 121 from hearing Criminal Case No. C-
62784 until the termination of SEC Case No. 03-99-
6259, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her
parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge
Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No.
1590, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of
the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized
as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her
parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were
neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although
married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation,
and without her consent; that as a result she became
pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence,
she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss
for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's
motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint
to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff
had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore,
the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be
untenable. A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of
its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right
to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss),
even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;"
just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may
receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the
same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in
his testament may result in preterition of a forced
heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary
heir, even if such child should be born after the death
of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn
children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already
born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some,
or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that
Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children
"does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides
imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the
text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing
that "the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus
be alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a
condition precedent to the right of the conceived
child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in
his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding
Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points
this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son
simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico
que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino
que constituyen un caso de los propiamente
Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el
nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas
por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano),
sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos
declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed
from is that for a married man to force a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of
the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of
the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious
acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26,
27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the
child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause
of action for damages under the terms of the
complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to
state a cause of action was doubly in error.

October 13, 2009

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are
reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
to the court of origin for further proceedings - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the
Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the
CORPORATION, Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of
Petitioner, respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement
leave and other death benefits to Rolando P.
Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his
- versus - unborn child.

HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)
and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Respondents. Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity
of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment
and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company
agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any
employee in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7
days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT
INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and
accidental insurance to the employee or his family in
the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the
employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse,
and children). In case the employee is single, this
benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and
sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos
unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano,
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while
she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According
to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January
2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits,
consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental
Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and
other death benefits, the Union resorted to the
grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite
the series of conferences held, the parties still failed
to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file
a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital
Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission Agreement dated
9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel
submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement
leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X,
Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The
parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved
futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position
Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty.
Montao.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that
Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of
the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent
should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA
death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein
employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel)
and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel),
sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death
benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve
L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which
had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was
able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave,
and voluntary contribution under the CBA between
his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugans child was
only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as
opposed to Hortillanos child who was already 37-38
weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel
and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound
as Continental Steel; and the representatives of
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA
with their respective employees unions were the
same as the representatives of Continental Steel
who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil
Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety of and decent living for the
laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the
express provision of the CBA did not contemplate
the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements
for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death
and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of
which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel,
relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil
Code, contended that only one with civil personality
could die. Hence, the unborn child never died
because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was
dead from the moment of delivery was not a person
at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be
applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could
not be considered a dependent, since it never
needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right
to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the
CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of
the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the
legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure
of the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the
death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death
benefits bound the Union to the legally accepted
definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases
involving the employees of its sister companies,
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the
Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
given the separate and distinct personalities of the
companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim
that the grant of bereavement leave and other death
benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an
unborn child constituted company practice.
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement
to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the
benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X,
Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable
elements must be present: (1) there is death; (2)
such death must be of employees dependent; and
(3) such dependent must be legitimate.
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for
death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties
CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be
present: (a) there is death; (b) such death must be
of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must
be legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be
presented.[18]
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the
death of an employees legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by
the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for
support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone
else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she
died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully
married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is
hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner
Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the
amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine
Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement
leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing
death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is
ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully
abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19]
under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in
granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave
with pay and other death benefits because no death
of an employees dependent had occurred. The
death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy,
was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since
what was contemplated by the CBA was the death
of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did
not acquire any juridical personality. Continental for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial
Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered point.[20]
by the fact that the term death was qualified by the
phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the
status of a child could only be determined upon said
childs birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be
had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008
Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of
dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao
interpreted death to mean as follows: is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental

Steel].[21]
[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on
the legal sense in which the term death is used in
the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is
irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the
grant of bereavement leave and death benefits
In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of
thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23]
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition
of Continental Steel.
of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned
on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow
that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could
never be contemplated as a death as to be covered Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel
by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning
the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. of death should be applied. Only one with juridical
[Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired
technical significance to the term death of a a juridical personality.
legitimate dependent as condition for granting
bereavement leave and death benefits under the
CBA. Following [Continental Steels] theory, there We are not persuaded.
can be no experience of death to speak of. The
Court, however, does not share this view. A dead
fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for
than loss of human life, especially for the expectant
bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the
parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death
CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a
benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the
dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
latters immediate family, extend to them solace and
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of
support, rather than an act conferring legal status or
the dependent to the employee. The requisites for
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental
death and accident insurance under Article XVIII,
Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is
Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death
must be of a dependent, who could be a parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent,
brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4)
presentation of the proper legal document to prove
such death, e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated
assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of
the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its
fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim
for bereavement leave and other death benefits
rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the
terms death and dependent as used in the CBA. If
the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the
interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover,
Continental Steel itself admitted that neither
management nor the Union sought to define the
pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other
death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a
conceived child acquires personality only when it is
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant
herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article
37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn
child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not
a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior
to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed
by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child
upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do
not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation
of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the
womb already has life. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,[25] that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a
dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel
itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on
another for support; one not able to exist or sustain
oneself without the power or aid of someone else.
Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn
child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child
could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of
a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the
child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without
such qualification, then child shall be understood in
its more general sense, which includes the unborn
fetus in the mothers womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the
dependent childs status in relation to his/her
parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have
expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore,
implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no
legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on
the matter: Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis
ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified
an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of
children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and
illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside
a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself
gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and
the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed
that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and
that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able
to comply with the fourth element entitling him to
death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn
child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for
bereavement leave and other death benefits under
the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should
have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other
death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief
and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life
of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less
than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA
provisions on bereavement leave and other death
benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to
the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor
Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt
in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting
labor, such should be interpreted in favor of
labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA
provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In
Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[30] we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the
Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the
pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the
forces are equal on both sides, the same must be
stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it
insists that what is involved-here is the amended
CBA which is essentially a contract between private
persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice
to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v.

NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to

be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-
balanced by sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services

Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be

resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated
20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and
other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos
(P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on
the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation.