1. EMILIO NATIVIDAD vs.

BASILIA GABINO

Facts: The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who died in
1868, leaving a daughter named Higinia who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died in 1913, survived
by two children Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. Tiburcio Salvador disposed of all his
property in the manner recorded in the will executed in legal form on November 9, 1914, instituting as sole heirs his
grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed Natividad y Salvador. In the sixth clause of this will the
testator left to Basilia Gabino the legacy mentioned therein. Literally, this clause is as follows:

I bequeath to Doa Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the urban property, consisting of a
house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares of the said district of San Nicolas and designated by No. 520,
and in addition eleven meters by two meters of the lot designated by No. 419, situated on Calle Madrid.
This portion shall be taken from that part of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of said property No. 520. If
the said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this house, together with the lot on
which it stands, to my grandson Emilio Natividad, upon payment by the latter to the former of the sum of
four thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency.

The executor of the estate of the decedent is the decedent's own heir, Emilio Natividad, who in due season and by
counsel presented to the court for its approval a proposed partition of the property pertaining to the estate, setting
forth in the fourth basis the following relative to the legacy made to Basilia Gabino:

Summarizing the statements made in respect to this matter, we are of the opinion that the sixth clause
expresses in itself a right of usufruct, in favor of Doa Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520 Calle
Lavezares, and a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of the sum of P4,000 whenever Basilia
should die; but that the ownership of the property upon which this right and legacy are established belongs
to the heir Emilio Natividad who, by the express will of the testator, had been made liable for these
encumbrances.

By a writing of August 5, 1915, counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino opposed the approval of the proposed
partition with regard to the adjudication to the legatee of the usufruct only of the property at No. 520 Calle
Lavezares, claiming that said legatee ought to be recognized as entitled to the dominion and ownership of the
same. For this and the other reasons set forth, her counsel requested that the testamentary executor be ordered to
amend the fourth basis of the proposed partition in order that ownership and dominion, instead of usufruct only, of
said property be adjudicated to the objector-legatee, Basilia Gabino.

After proper legal steps had been taken and the written briefs of the parties and the schedule of the proposed
partition filed by the testamentary executor had been examined, the trial judge issued the order aforementioned.
Appeal was taken by counsel for the executor to this court, and a transcript of the record of the proceedings below
was forwarded to the clerk of this court.

Issue: What construction must be given to the above-quoted sixth clause of the will executed by Tiburcio Salvador?

Held: A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him, provided the testamentary
provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with respect to the
institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter
do not fall within the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be
governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and 791.)

In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes, he bequeathed to Basilia
Gabino the ownership and dominion of the property therein specified as to its location and other circumstances, on
condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the
testator's grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the latter.

The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the event
constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to
article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as
provided in article 1116 of said code.

The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property to the
heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby
fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these legacies being the
voluntary reservation to Basilia Gabino of the ownership of the said house, and the second, the conditional legacy
of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador.

Making use of his right, the testator provided in his will that the dominion, that is, the ownership and possession of
his house situated on Calle Lavezares, No. 520 together with a part of the lot at No. 419, should be delivered as a
legacy, provided that if the legatee should die, this property instead of passing to the successor, would revert to the
testator's grandson and heir, provided that he in turn would pay to Lorenzo Salvador the sum of P4,000. It cannot
be understood that the legacy conveyed only the usufruct of the property because the plain and literal meaning of
the words employed by the testator in the said clause sixth clearly shows beyond all doubt the express wished of
the testator who, establishing a voluntary reservation of the ulterior and final disposition of the bequeathed property,
ordered that the legatee's right of dominion should end at her death, and that on this occurrence his wish was that
the ownership of the property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided the latter in turn delivered said P4,000 to
Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the son of the legatee Gabino.

If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it cannot be understood that the testator
meant to bequeath to Basilia Gabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable language
employed in the said sixth clause, he bequeathed her the ownership or dominion of the said property language
which expresses without the slightest doubt his wishes which should be complied with literally, because it is
constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last wills and testaments the testator's will is the law.

It is true that the legatee could not make any disposal of the bequeathed real property to be effective after her
death, nor could the property be acquired from her by her heir through testate or intestate succession; but if we
take into account that the institution of donations and legacies depends on the full free will of the testator, and that if
the testator intended no more than that Basilia Gabino should enjoy the ownership of the property during her
lifetime, this testamentary provisions is not contrary to law or to public morals, inasmuch as the testator thereby
intended that the property should revert to its lawful heir, the latter being obliged to make a monetary compensation
to Lorenzo Salvador who appears to be the successor of the legatee Gabino.

2. ELENA MORENTE vs. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA

FACTS: Sometime in the early 1900s, Consuelo Morente died leaving a will which provides that she is leaving all
her real estate in favor of her husband, Gumersindo De La Santa. It is also provided in the will that De La Santa
shall not remarry anyone.
But four months after the death of Consuelo, De La Santa contracted a subsequent marriage.
Elena Morente, sister of Consuelo, now filed a petition to annul the institution made in favor of De La Santa on the
ground that by reason of De La Santas subsequent marriage, he ad forfeited his inheritance.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid prohibition in the case at bar.
HELD: No. It is true that a prohibition to remarry imposed by the testator on his or her spouse is allowed. However,
in this case, from the clauses in the will left by Consuelo, the prohibition was not so worded. There was no express
prohibition. The phrase that De La Santa shall not remarry anyone was a mere statement or declaration. There
was even no provision as to what consequences will happen if in the event that De La Santa will remarry. The will
did not say that he should reconvey the property to the estate of Consuelo. Therefore, his second marriage did not
give rise to an action for the annulment of the institution made in his favor in the will of his deceased wife.

3. Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator vs. ANDRE BRIMO

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish
laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void
as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
 national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and
in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been
conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having
resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection
with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever
disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides
the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not
appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

4. LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial
Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil
Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of certain properties that were originally
owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".

The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos,
Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona
Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto
Villaflor.

Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .

SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y universales
herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de
mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la
forma siguiente: .

SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi
amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .

OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos
legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.

The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the
moment he bore any child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .

DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de institucion de
herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que
podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran
mis herederos.

Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno.
The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial
administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of
November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project of partition and declared the
proceeding closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue
thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the
said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and personal properties mentioned and
referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly
provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas
Villaflor." .

On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and without having
begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-
1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.

The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don
Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".

Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta
Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the
ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will,
pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties
aforesaid became absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.

We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament,
was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject
to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease,
even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties,
even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras
viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or
"propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of
these particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is
in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's
brother (clause 6). 1wph1.t
 SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales
herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de
mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la
forma siguiente.

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could succeed to the
properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly
discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio"
(ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59
of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.

ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some
effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .

SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument
where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all." .

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his testament
should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the
primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole
condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been
unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the following: .

ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear
intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .

Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a
contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that
he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that
the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation,
and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30
Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).

La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley
unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera,
hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece
la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio
de alguna de los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918)
.

The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases where the only
condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don
Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the
legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his
will, the legacies should pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the
widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the aforesaid
properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due
to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have intervened.