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The Creative- Studies of organizational change have tended to focus on
Destructive Process of identifying the reasons for change while ignoring the
OrganizationalChange: process of change. Even those that analyze the process
of change are concerned with the challenge of creating
The Case of the Post new organizational structures. This paper discusses the
Office destructive aspects of reorganizing that must take place if
change is to be successful. The 1970-71 reorganization of
Nicole Woolsey the U.S. Post Office Department is used as a model.*
Biggart
Studies of organizationalchange have most often been
concerned with the reasons for change and have taken the
process for granted. Researchers have attempted to identify
the stimulithat triggeradaptive behaviors and have seen
change as a productof such influences as organizational
structure(Hummon,Doreianand Teuter, 1975), growth and
ageing (Labovitzand Miller,1974), technological innovation
(Bell, 1973), environmentalchanges (Sherwood, 1976), con-
stituency changes (Mazmanianand Lee, 1975), leadership
style (Meyer, 1975), and the dissatisfaction of the deprived
(Benson, 1973). Such studies emphasize the initiatingcause
and the evolutionarynatureof the process ratherthan see-
ing change as inherentlyproblematic.Even those that do
identify change as problematictreat it as a problemof the
creation of territoriesand structures (Downs, 1967) or of
managerial"teams" and conducive climates (Golembiewski
and Kiepper,1976).
It is not generally recognized that change is an act of de-
structionas much as of creation. Because most organiza-
tions do change slowly, experimentingwith and selectively
incorporatingnew forms, the destructionof old forms and
methods is relativelyobscured. But the destructive process
must either precede or exist simultaneouslywith the cre-
ative. This act of undoing and dismantlingis important
theoretically:reorganizationpresumes the rejectionor
supercession of old methods in favor of the new and the
organizationmust systematicallydestroy former,competing
structures before it can successfully implantthe new.
Generally,destruction is an extreme concept but in an or-
ganizationit rarelyfinds expression in any dramaticway,
principallybecause few organizationalchanges are of revo-
lutionarydimension and are often never completed before
opposing interests can mute the effects. The concept of
destructionas partof organizationalchange is useful be-
cause it properlydescribes the treatment of organizational
accouterments that have lost their use or are in disfavor.
Destruction,as used in this paper, includes any action that
abolishes, discredits,suppresses, or otherwise renders use-
less an organizationalstructure.Among the features a new
regime often destroys in the course of conversion are the
formerformalstructure,leadership,ideology, power al-
liances, decision-makingmodel, and technology. This pro-
cess can in some ways be thought of as the resocialization
of the organization:an organizationcannot be isolated from
its formerself (althoughsymbolic attempts such as moving
the corporateheadquartersand changing the name are
Iwould liketo thankGaryG. Hamilton,
Universityof California,Davis, for his common), but punishments can be meted out for re-
help and encouragement. establishing old patterns and rewardsgranted those adopt-
September 1977, volume 22 Science Quarterly
410O/Administrative
Creative-Destructive Process
Postmaster General
and
Deputy Postmaster General
Posta l Regional
Data Center Directors
412IASQ
Creative-Destructive Process
r ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Employm
Opportunity
International
Finac] Management
Information Personnel Administration Affairs
PostalI
41 6/ASQ
Creative-Destructive Process
IDEOLOGY
Ideologyis usuallyassociated with politicalparties,social
classes, and advocacy groups, but rarelywith businesses.
This seeming oversight is because the profitideology,
widely shared throughoutcapitalistindustries, is considered
a given by most organizationalanalysts. Untilreorganization,
the ideology behind the PODwas service, service at all
costs. Itgave logic to the POD's operatingmethodology,
417/ASQ
sustenance to the entwined power relationsamong mailers,
postal employees, and Congress, and even supportto such
economicallydebilitatingpolicies as subsidized rates and
ruralpost offices.
Dependable publicservice is a noble ideology and gives a
sense of purpose to employees in routinejobs in factory-
like conditions. The fact that the PODwas not in business
for profitelevated the workers' positions in the minds of
many employees. Phrases such as the "sanctityof the
mails"and the "mails must go through" reifiedthe postal
mission. Callingmailers "patrons"and workers "civilser-
vants" emphasized the subservient relationshipthat existed
between the PODand the general population.Postmasters
had to reside in the town in which they worked so that
they could be accountable to the citizens there (Kappel
Commission, 1968: 41).
The almost exclusive preoccupationwith this concept of
service was expressed in the absence of financialand cost
data, even for processing activities. In its investigation, the
KappelCommission found "postal financialmanagement
concentrates on acquisitionand controlof the inputside of
postal operations,"and informationabout costs was "inad-
equate or non-existant"(Annex 1,1968: 89). Postmasters
were given "budgets" of man hours, not dollars,and were
paidaccordingto the numberof employees they super-
vised. There was no incentive to be efficient; ratherthe
incentive was to use as many workers as possible and
elaboratejustificationproceduresgrew up aroundrequests
for more workers.The best justificationwas that service
would suffer.
This ideology of good mailservice uncompromisedby con-
siderations such as cost, competition, and even marketde-
mand had considerableemotional appeal even if, objec-
tively, service was deterioratingwith increasing volume and
outdated methods. Such traditionalvalues were held most
tightlyby the senior employees who had the greatest per-
sonal investment in them. There was no doubt that change
was coming with the recruitmentof younger employees in
the 1960s as volume soared, but the senior employees still
held power as supervisors and in the unions where they
largelydetermined the posture of employees on issues be-
fore Congress.
The PODwas what Downs calls a "non-market"organiza-
tion where "there is no direct relationshipbetween the ser-
vices a bureauprovides and the income it receives for pro-
viding them" (1967: 30). The service-at-all-costsideology
was congruent with this organizationalform but posed a
fundamentalthreat to the new "quasi-market"government
corporation.The ideology of service gave reason to the
non-rationaland justificationto the inefficient. Unless chal-
lenged and destroyed the old ideology would be the founda-
tion for the new business-like structure.The Postal Service
management used a four-foldstrategy to discreditthe old
ideology and implanta new one supportiveof the new re-
gime: symbolic reorientation,internalcommunications, ex-
ternal communications, and trainingand indoctrination.
418/ASQ
Creative-Destructive Process
Internalcommunications. Internalcommunications,that is
the formalcommunicationnetworkwithin the postal organi-
zation, are forms of symbolic reorientationbut they are sep-
aratedin this study because they were directed exclusively
at employees and includedsubstantive as well as symbolic
content. The internalcommunications effort was aimed at
both preachingthe new ideology and counteractingoppos-
ing efforts by employee unions and supervisoryorganiza-
tions. The POD's Office of PublicInformationwas reorga-
nized into the Departmentof Communicationsand Public
Affairsand includeda new Office of InternalCommunica-
tions whose mission was to formulatepolicy for explaining
corporatedecisions to employees, create house organs for
disseminating informationand act as a clearinghouse for
offices wishing to communicate with employees through
mass publications.The highlydispersed work force placed
unusualburdens on printedcommunicationsas a medium
of information.Eventually,videotape equipment supple-
mented printedpublicationsas a method of communicating
with middle-levelmanagers.
419/ASQ
The POD had initiateda fairlyprofessional employee house
organ, Postal Life, in the mid-1960s that was issued
bimonthlyand sent to the homes of all employees. Itwas a
generally innocuous compendium of human interest stories
and bits of informationabout postal historyand lore. After
the reorganizationit became an importantmedium for dis-
seminating management's point of view on automation,
labornegotiations, work conditions, and other issues of im-
portance to management-union relations.It also served as a
way of breakingdown the formerways of thinkingof em-
ployees used to the previous ideology and non-competetive
posture of the POD.Articlespraisedpost offices that were
meeting new efficiency standards- "What Makes Ft. Worth
No. 1," May-June 1971: 8 - encouraged employees to be-
come aggressive in their selling of postal products- "Little
Stamps, Big Business," March-April1972: 17-and even
sought to instillsome fear of competition, something postal
workers never considered when Congress appropriated
funds- "ThatOther PackageService and How It Suc-
ceeded," November-December1972: 12.
Middle-levelmanagement was perhaps the most important
target of top management: without convincing them to
supportthe system there would be no way to controlthe
rank a nd file employees. In 1971 the InternalCommunica-
tions staff initiateda monthly management newsletter,
Postal Leader,that denigratedformer policies - "SmallP.O.
Inspection No LongerNit-Picking,""Postmasters Get Free-
dom to Move," May 1971 - and praised new ones -
"PromotionsOpen to All in Seattle Region,"January1971.
The Postmaster General held unprecedented management
briefingsstaged by Burnafordand Companyfor field man-
agers all over the countryto make them feel partof the
"team" and managers were flown to Washington to con-
tributetheir ideas for the new organization(Meyers, 1975:
158). The contrast with the formerlyhighlystructuredand
authoritariansystem was striking.Certainly,much of it was
for effect, but it aimed at dividingsupervisors from any
oppositionto the USPS and neutralizingtheir associations in
Was hington.
LEADERSHIP
Althoughthe younger career supervisors were reasonably
willingto change with the new organization,there were
relativelyfew of them, especially in the regionaloffices and
in Washington. Althoughthe top positions in Washington
were occupied by politicalappointees, almost all of whom
were from industry,the newly importantfield management
and technical positions near the top were filled primarilyby
people with enough seniorityto have worked up from the
bottom. In May, 1971, the Postmaster General,in a sweep-
ing move to purgethese older postal officials, gave regional
and headquartersemployees a one-time bonus of six
months' pay if they would leave immediately."A dramatic,
and some say heartless move, to point up the reorganiza-
tion and cut away senior officials," a total of 2,099 "took
the bait"(Business Week, May 13, 1972). About4,000 em-
ployees were left in the five regions and Washington. Klas-
sen reorganizedthe remainderand then used 14 profes-
sional recruitersto seek people from industry.The USPS
was able, in one stroke, to destroy much of the former
leadership,replace some of it with people alreadyembrac-
ing the new ideology, and serve notice to those who had
not been purgedthat the USPS did not operate on the
same basis as the POD.
In orderto assure a steady supply of leaders loyalto the
USPS the organizationhad to dismantle the former man-
agement recruitmentsystem. It did this in fourways. First,
it weakened the seniority system by makingclerks and car-
riersalmost immediatelyeligible for supervisorypositions
(Postal Bulletin,August 8, 1970: 2) and encouraged more
ambitiouspersons to stay in the postal system. Second, it
allowed supervisors to compete for promotionsoutside their
own post office for the first time, thus promotingloyaltyto
the largerorganizationat the expense of loyaltyto the
workers or management of any one office (PostalLeader,
January1971: 1). Third,it subverted the former"up the
ladder"promotionsystem by establishing management
trainee programsthat recruitedcollege graduates, especially
those with an MBA,for middle-managementpositions
(PostalLife, November-December1971: 2). The trainees
were relativelyfew in number,two or three hundred,but
they had substantialimpactbecause they were young, and
after relativelylittletime were allowed to manage the previ-
ously sacrosanct operations activities. Finally,the former
postmaster and ruralcarrierpositions were removed from
politicsand filledby disinterested parties. Postmasters were
selected by the recommendationof Postmaster Advisory
Selection Boardswhich were interview committees com-
posed of postal managers and local business leaders. Fur-
thermore, postmasters were no longer requiredto reside in
the town in which they worked (PostalBulletin,April8,
1971: 1).
422/ASQ
Creative-Destructive Process
CONCLUSIONS
The reorganizationof the U.S. Postal Service unleashed in-
credibleforces both in and out of the organization;the
forces were aimed at protectingor consolidatingthe power
of interest groups. In the sense that all organizationsare
distributionsof power and that these subunits of power
compete or cooperate depending on their interests at the
time, they are politicalsystems (Harveyand Mills, 1970:
185). As polities, organizationshave supporters,enemies,
and neutralobservers. Politicalpartiesengage in competi-
tion for control of the resources and their allocationin the
politicalstate. In a similarfashion, unions, management,
423/ASQ
and departments compete for the allocationof organiza-
tional resources. As nations battle to impose their will and
protect their own economic interests in the world economy,
so too do competing businesses, opposing agencies, and
consumer groups struggle to protect their own economic
interests. Certainly,the analogy of the organizationas a
politicalstate does not extend to all spheres, but it is a
useful model for understandingthe process of organiza-
tional change.
Students of organizationswill recognize that politicalsys-
tems are in a continuous fight for survival,but that this
survivalprocess is muted in "mature"states which have
established alliances and substantialmeans for maintaining
independence. It is in new states in their earlydays, follow-
ing politicalcoups, that control is most vulnerableto upset,
and that successful revolutionariesseek to stabilizetheir
positions by formingcoalitions and destroying the previous
regime. Downs recognizes that an organizationexpresses
the same needs as a new politicalregime as it attempts to
reach an "initialsurvivalthreshold." Before then "it has not
yet generated enough externalsupportto resist severe at-
tack" (1967: 9). Hence, it is only in the birthof a new
organizationor in a reorganizationof revolutionarypropor-
tions that routinesurvivalprocesses are revealed fully.
These processes are clearlyseen in the case of reorganiza-
tion of the Post Office, in which the beneficiaries of the
formerstatus quo had nothing to riskby declaringa chal-
lenge and everything to gain by successful opposition.
The newly restructuredorganization,faced with attack in its
unstable youth, retaliatedby destructive actions against
what it perceived to be the most debilitatingaspects of the
formerorganization:the formalstructure,the ideology, the
leadership,and opposing alliances and power bases. De-
structiontook place at the same time the new organization
was engaged in the constructive activities of creating new
work methods, buildingnew facilities, developing technolog-
ical improvements, and creating alliances. Destructionis an
inherent partof successful change; without destroying
competing forms the organizationallows its competition to
flourishunimpeded.
To extend the analogy of organizationsto politicalsystems,
politicalleaders who seize power through revolutionary
means recognize that they must destroy enough of the op-
position's leadership,ideology, and organizationto give the
new regime an opportunityto develop supporters.As Mao
said, "Before a brandnew social system can be builton the
site of the old, the site must be swept clean," (1967: 18).
Destructionis never total, but must be enough to weaken
the opposition without incurringthe wrath of potentialsup-
porters.This process is not analyticallyneat; there are many
restrictionson the actions an organizationcan take and
rarelywill it be able to act, even in extreme circumstances,
in the most effective way possible. Certainlyits enemies
can thwart its efforts and force it to change tactics. Norwill
all organizationsseek to destroy the same structures.
Targetswill be those that pose the greatest threat to the
organizationand can be partof the formalstructure,
424/ASQ
Creative-Destructive Process
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