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Human Relations

RCPI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA


G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986
FACTS:
Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not
only wounded his feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and
affected adversely his business as well because other people have come to
know of said defamatory words.

The alleged defamatory message:


SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA
DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

Defendant corporation as a defense, alleges that the additional words in Tagalog


was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and that they
were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of
the telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory. The telegram sent
through its facilities was received in its station at Legaspi City. Nobody other than
the operator manned the teletype machine which automatically receives
telegrams being transmitted. The said telegram was detached from the machine
and placed inside a sealed envelope and delivered to plaintiff, obviously as is.
The additional words in Tagalog were never noticed and were included in the
telegram when delivered.

ISSUE:
Whether petioner is liable to private respondent for damages.

RULING:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving
and transmitting messages. Everytime a person transmits a message through the
facilities of the petitioner, a contract is entered into. Upon receipt of the rate or
fee fixed, the petitioner undertakes to transmit the message accurately. There is
no question that in the case at bar, libelous matters were included in the
message transmitted, without the consent or knowledge of the sender. There is a
clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner in adding extraneous and
libelous matters in the message sent to the private respondent. As a corporation,
the petitioner can act only through its employees. Hence the acts of its
employees in receiving and transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner.
To hold that the petitioner is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the
pursuit of petitioner's business is to deprive the general public availing of the
services of the petitioner of an effective and adequate remedy. In most cases,
negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However, since
negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the
doctrine of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the
presence of facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, VS. CARMELITA S. SANTOS
G.R. No. 208293, December 10, 2014

FACTS:
Respondents discovered that their father maintained a premium savings
account with Philippine National Bank,. Later, respondents would discover that
their father also had a time deposit with PNB. Respondents went to PNB to
withdraw their father's deposit. Lina B. Aguilar, the Branch Manager of PNB,
required them to submit the following: "(1) original or certified true copy of the
Death Certificate of Angel C. Santos; (2) certificate of payment of, or exemption
from, estate tax issued by the BIR; (3) Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; (4)
Publisher's Affidavit of publication of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and (5)
Surety bond effective for two (2) years and in an amount equal to the balance of
the deposit to be withdrawn. When respondents had obtained the necessary
documents. They tried to withdraw the deposit. However, Aguilar informed them
that the deposit had already "been released to a certain Manimbo." The amount
was released upon presentation of: (a) an affidavit of self-adjudication
purportedly executed by one of the respondents, Reyme L. Santos; (b) a
certificate of time deposit; and (c) the death certificate of Angel C. Santos, among
others. A special power of attorney was purportedly executed by Reyme L.
Santos in favor of Manimbo and a certain Angel P. Santos for purposes of
withdrawing and receiving the proceeds of the certificate of time deposit.

ISSUE:
Whether PNB was negligent in releasing the deposit to Manibo.

RULING:
The contractual relationship between banks and their depositors is
governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan. Once a person makes a
deposit of his or her money to the bank, he or she is considered to have lent the
bank that money. The bank becomes his or her debtor, and he or she becomes
the creditor of the bank, which is obligated to pay him or her on demand. The
default standard of diligence in the performance of obligations is "diligence of a
good father of a family." Other industries, because of their nature, are bound by
law to observe higher standards of diligence. banking is a business that is
impressed with public interest. It affects economies and plays a significant role in
businesses and commerce. This is why we have recognized the fiduciary nature
of the banks' functions, and attached a special standard of diligence for the
exercise of their functions. Petitioners PNB and Aguilar's treatment of Angel C.
Santos' account is inconsistent with the high standard of diligence required of
banks. They accepted Manimbo's representations despite knowledge of the
existence of circumstances that should have raised doubts on such
representations. As a result, Angel C. Santos' deposit was given to a person
stranger to him. Petitioners PNB and Aguilar disregarded their own requirements
for the release of the deposit to persons claiming to be heirs of a deceased
depositor.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES v. BPI/MS INSURANCE
G.R. No. 193986
FACTS:
Sumimoto shipped thru a vessel owned by petitioner several coils of steel
sheets. The cargo was insured by Mitsui. The cargo is to be shipped from Japan
to Calamba steel, the consignee. Upon arrival, the cargo was inspected and it
was found that several of them were damaged. The cargo was then forwarded to
ATI for stevedoring and storage untill withdrawn by consignee. ATI also noted the
damage sustained by several of the cargo. When Calamba steel claimed the
cargo, it rejected the damaged goods. A second and a third shippment was made
by Sumimoto thru Petioner, insured by Mitsui. Several of cargo in both
shippments were damaged and rejected by Calamba. Calamba claimed the
insurance and was paid by Mitsui. Mitsui thru BPI its agent filed an action for
collection against ATI and petioner.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable against BPI/MS.
RULING:
It is settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being
unloaded generally remain under the custody of the carrier. As hereinbefore
found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA based on the evidence presented, the
goods were damaged even before they were turned over to ATI. Such damage
was even compounded by the negligent acts of petitioner and ATI which both
mishandled the goods during the discharging operations. Thus, it bears stressing
unto petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions
enumerated under Article 1734 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The
extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts from the time the goods
are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for
transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. Owing
to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general
rule, are presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods they
transported deteriorated or got lost or destroyed. That is, unless they prove that
they exercised extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods. In order to avoid
responsibility for any loss or damage, therefore, they have the burden of proving
that they observed such high level of diligence. In this case, petitioner failed to
hurdle such burden.
DAMAGES

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT


G.R. No. 163654 October 8, 2014

FACTS:
Armovit, a depositor of BPI, was issued by BPI Express Credit with a
credit limit of 20,000.00 that was to expire atthe end of March 1993. Sometime
thereafter, she treated her friends to lunch at a Restaurant. As the host, she
handed to the waiter her credit card to settle the bill, but the waiter soon returned
to inform her that her credit card had been cancelled upon verification with BPI
Express Credit and would not be honored. Inasmuch as she was relying on her
credit card because she did not then carry enough cash that day, her guests
were made to share the bill to her extreme embarrassment. Outraged, Armovit
called BPI Express Credit to verify the status of her credit card. She learned that
her credit card had been summarily cancelled for failure to pay her outstanding
obligations. She vehemently denied having defaulted on her payments. BPI
Express Credit claimed that it had sent Armovit a telegraphic message
requesting her to pay her arrears for three consecutive months, and that she did
not comply with the request, causing it to temporarily suspend her credit card. It
further claimed that she had been notified of the suspension and cautioned to
refrain from using the credit card to avoid inconvenience or embarrassment; and
that while the obligation was settled by April, 1992, she failed to submit the
required application form in order to reactivate her credit card privileges.

ISSUE:
Whether Armovit is entitled to damages.

RULING:
The relationship between the card issuer and the card holder is a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the
agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. In
case of their breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is
shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a
conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful actfor a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity. However, a conscious or intentional design need not always be
present because negligence may occasionally be so gross as to amount to
malice or bad faith. Yet, a review of such terms and conditions did not reveal that
Armovit needed to submit her new application as condition for her credit card to
be taken out from the list suspended cards. BPI acted in wanton disregard of its
contractual obligations with her. BPI Express Credits negligence was even
confirmed by the telegraphic message it had addressed and sent to Armovit
apologizing for the inconvenience caused in inadvertently including her credit
card in the caution list. It was of no consequence that the telegraphic message
could have been intended for another client, as BPI Express Credit apparently
sought to convey subsequently, because the tenor ofthe apology included its
admission of negligence in dealing with its clients.
Other Laws Excluded from the Syllabus

RENATO L. DELFINO, SR vs. AVELINO K. ANASAO


G.R. No. 197486 September 10, 2014

FACTS:
Delfino owns several parcels of land. A portion thereof is being tilled by
Anasao. Said portions were placed under Operation Land Transfer. After Anasao
had paid his amortizations he was issued Emancipation Patents. Delfino applied
for a Retention with the DAR Regional Director for all the parcels of land. DAR-
RD denied the application over those covered by the OLT, but granted retention
over those not covered. Delfino appealed to the DAR Secretary, the latter set
aside the decision of DAR-RD and granted Delfino retentention over all the
parcels of land. Delfino then sold several portions to SM Primeholdings, included
among them were the portions covered by the OLT. Delfino also applied for the
cancellation of the EPs over his land covered by OLT. PARAD approved the
cancellation of the EPs. Anasao argued that the implementation of the February
28, 1995 Order will have the effect of cancelling the EPs and consequently
deprive them of ownership of the landholdings they acquired pursuant to PD
27.Anasao pointed out that Delfino acted in bad faith when he sold a portion of
the OLT-covered land infavor of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. without the required
DAR clearance.

ISSUE:
Whether the inclusion of the twohectare portion sold to SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. in Delfinos retention area was in derogation of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6657.

RULING:
The right of retention can be exercised over tenanted land and even
where CLOAs or EPs have been issued to tenant-farmers provided that the right
of tenants under Section 6 of RA 6657 is similarly protected. For as long as the
area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention
ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowners choice of the area to be retained, must
prevail.Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, which supplies the
details for the exercise of a landowners retention rights, likewise recognizes no
limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although he is persuaded to retain other
lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers. Without doubt, this right of retention
may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries. What must be protected, however,
is the right of the tenants toopt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by
the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.

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