LEGAL ETHICS CASES(Case Digest)

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#1 :Cayetano vs. Monsod201 SCRA 210September 1991Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possesrequired qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. The 1987 constitutionprovides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and sixCommissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, atleast thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any electiveposition in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall bemembers of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Held:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to theconduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident toactions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them inmatters connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplatingan appearance before judicial
body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim inbankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estateand
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or
out court,which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practiceof law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past
work experience as a lawyer-economist, alawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELECchairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
theforegoing, the petition is DISMISSED.*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of
Monsod is in accordance with the requirement of law as having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. Monsods past work experiences as alawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and alawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that hehas been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of
Philippine LawyersAssociation vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases and litigation in court; itembraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident
to actions and social proceedings and othersimilar work which involves the determination by a
legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions.
#2: PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of
the Philippines Patent OfficeFACTS:
A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in
his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director
issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines
Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is
duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors
holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the
law. The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other
individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been
questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before thePatent
Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and theprosecution of
their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of theirrights in patent
cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation andapplication
of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established inaccordance
with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any
workinvolving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions.
Furthermore,the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final
order or decision of thedirector. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved
exclusively or mostlytechnical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal
should be taken not to acourt or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or
technical men, which is not the case.------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#3: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA,

defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-19450
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
Paredes,
J.
:On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva
with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.
Said accused was represented bycounsel
de officio
but later on replaced by counsel
de parte
. The complainant in the same case was representedby City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo
City, having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, aftersecuring the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that everytime he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that
hewould not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule
as private prosecutor wasquestioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of
Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al.
, L-1532, Nov.28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant ProvincialFiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law,
he ceased to engage in private law practice."Counsel then argued that the JP Court in
entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is aviolation of the above ruling. On
December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of theappearance of City
Attorney Fule.Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to
Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting asPrivate Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32,
Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from
practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under thislimitation. The JP Court ruled on
the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that he(Fule) was not
actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna,
presidedby the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the
pertinent portions of which read: The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being
no reservation by the offended party of the civilliability, the civil action was deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had,therefore, the right to intervene in
the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest inthe civil liability of
the accused.Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conducthis litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed
by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of theoffended party. It does not appear
that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in aprofessional capacity. As
Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever inthe
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal and not by the CityAttornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties
of Assistant City Attorney Fule asAssistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor
in this criminal case. On the other hand, asalready pointed out, the offended party in this criminal
case had a right to be represented by an agent or afriend to protect her rights in the civil action
which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.In view of the foregoing, this
Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justiceof the Peace
Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of
theoffended party.WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna, allowing theapprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed,
without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding. The appeal should be dismissed, for
patently being without merits.Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge,
heretofore reproduced, and which weconsider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense
counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employeeof the superior courts
or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
privateprosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated
appearance of CityAttorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and
contemplation of the Rules. Practice ismore than an isolated appearance, for it consists
in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of thesame kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S.768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habituallyholding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for
such services (State vs. Bryan,4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law.
The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:Essentially, the word private
practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the activeand continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
acompensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.For one thing,
it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediatesuperior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who
is a relative.CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be,
as it is hereby affirmed, in allrespects, with costs against appellant hqXv.
*** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists of frequents or customary actions, a succession of facts of the
same kind or frequent habitualexercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services. Themere appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. It is
alsoworth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given
permission by his immediatesuperior to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is
a relative.
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#4: JESUS MA. CUI vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, ROMULO CUIG.R. NO. L-18727AUGUST
31, 1964FACTS:
Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna
Cui, nowdeceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigentinvalids, and
incapacitated and helplesspersons." It acquired corporate existence bylegislation and
endowed with extensive properties by the saidspouses through a series of donations, principally
the deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gavethe initial
management to the founders jointly and, incase of their incapacity or death, to "suchpersons as
they may nominate or designate, inthe order prescribed to them."-Don Pedro Cui died in
1926,and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon
theadministration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro
Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became theadministrator.-
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui arebrothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and DoaBenigna Cui.On 27 February 1960
the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned infavor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant
to a "convenio" entered into between them andembodied in a notarial document. Thenext day,
28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took hisoath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice
of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on
August 27,1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter tothe defendant demanding that
the office be turnedover to him; and the demand nothaving been complied with the plaintiff filed
the complaint in this case. RomuloCui lateron intervened, claiming a right to the same office,
being a grandson of Vicente Cui,another one of thenephews mentioned by the founders of
the Hospicio in their deed of donation.-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon
their respective qualifications totheposition of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
therefore under equalcircumstances would bepreferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of
donation. However,before the test of age may be, applied thedeed gives preference to the
one, among thelegitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "queposea titulo de
abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que
pague alestadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The specific point in dispute is the meaning of
the term "titulo deabogado." Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the
University of Santo Tomas (Class1926)but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify himas one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on

the other hand, is a member of the Bar and althoughdisbarred by this Court, he was reinstated
by resolutionpromulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position
of administrator of theHospiciode Barili.-Court
a quo
- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado,"taken alone, means
that of afull-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donationand considering
the function or purpose of theadministrator, it should not be given astrict interpretation but
a liberal one," and therefore means a law degreeor diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is
assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by theintervenor.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. (YES)R
ATIO: Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not
merepossession of theacademic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after
dueadmission thereto, qualifying one forthe practice of law. A Bachelor's degree
alone,conferredby a law school upon completion of certain academicrequirements, does not
entitle itsholderto exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" islawyer or
attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that classof
personswho are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend, anduponwhom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as
aconsequence.In this jurisdictionadmission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the
authority of theSupreme Court. According to Rule138 such admission requires passing
the Barexaminations,taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificatefrom the Clerk of Court,
this certificatebeing his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws initself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance
withtherequirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all
theprescribed courses,in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education." For this purpose, however,possession of the degree itself is not
indispensable:completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in someother way. Indeed
there areinstances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons whohad
notgone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the
Barexaminationsand toqualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessaryqualifications of learningability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that
such personsdo not possess the "titulo de abogado"because they lack the academic degree of
Bachelorof Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de
Barili must have established the foregoing testadvisely, and provided in the deed of donation
that if not a lawyer, the administrator shouldbea doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in
thatorder; or failing all these, should be theonewho pays the highest taxes among those
otherwise qualified.A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of
the Hospicio shall "makeregulations for thegovernment of said institution; shall "prescribe the
conditions subject to which invalidsandincapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted
to the institute"; shall see to it thattherules andconditions promulgated for admission are not in
conflict with the provisions of theAct; and shall administerproperties of considerable value for
all of which work, it is to bepresumed, a working knowledge of the lawand a license to practice
the profession would beadistinct asset.Under this particular criterion we hold that theplaintiff is
not entitled, as against thedefendant, to the office of administrator.As far as moral character
isconcerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatementtothe office of attorney cannot
be less exactingthan that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the
office which is disputed in thiscase. When the defendant wasrestored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from hispreviousdisbarment were wiped out.For the claim
of intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also alawyer, grandsonof Vicente Cui, one
of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them inthedeed of donation. He is
further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,who is a son of Mariano Cui,
another one of the said nephews.Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio
Ma.Cui is older than he andtherefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal.
The intervenorcontends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by
line and successivelytothedescendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are
named. Thus, heargues, since the lastadministrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the
Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must comefrom the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenorbelongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed
of donation.
#5:
IN THE MATTER OF PREOCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST

ATTY. VINCENTE RAUL ALMACEN G.R.No. L-27654 February 18, 1970FACTS:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed
onSeptember 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed
against his clientby this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who arecalloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commitculpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His
client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved bythis Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In thesame breath that he alludes to
the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and

dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people
may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that werecommitted must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney andcounsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faithand confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the
noblest profession.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his Lawyers Certificate of Title.
RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he ishereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#6: IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN January 21, 1974FACTS:

Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief and he alleged that the
decisionof the City Court was based on an admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas
Lapatha on the basis of which the words "Confession of judgment" were written on the
"expediente" of the case and underneath wereaffixed the signature of said petitioner and that of
Atty. Felizardo deGuzman; that the alleged payments of Lagrimas Lapatha were made after the
rendition of the decision toforestall immediate execution of the judgment; that when petitioner
filed with the City Court a motion forreconsideration of the decision alleging fraud, the true
circumstances attending the hearing of November 2,1967, were brought out to the satisfaction
of petitioner's counsel, for which reason the City Court denied themotion for reconsideration;
that during the hearing on petitioner's motion for reconsideration Atty. de Guzmanagreed not to
press for the execution of the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she would vacate
thepremises by January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with her promise and
instead filed thePetition for Relief.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for relief against the respondent who committed any deceit or misconduct
in CivilCase No. 165187 of the City Court of Manila be approved.
RULING:
We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the evidence is wanting" to sustaina
finding that respondent committed any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City
Court of Manila. In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said: "It is quite elementary that in disbarment
proceedings, the burdenof proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the basis for
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the chargeagainst him must be established by convincing
proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case whichcompels the exercise by this
Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as of the
motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated."WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is
dismissed and respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, isexonerated of the charge.--------------
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#7: In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao vs. Severino G.
MartinezFacts:
Telesforo A. Diao took the law examinations in 1953 and was admitted to the Bar. Two years
later, Severino Martinez charged Diao of falsifying the information in his application for such
BarExamination. Upon further investigation, it was found that Diao did not finish his high school
training, andneither did he obtain his Associate in Arts (AA) degree from Quisumbing College in
1941.Diao practically admits first charge, but claims that he served the US army, and took the
General Classification Test which, according to Diao, is equivalent to a High School Diploma,
although he failed to submit certificationfor such claim from any proper school officials. The
claim was doubtlful, however, the second charge was clearly meritorious, as Diao did not obtain
his AAdegree from Quisumbing College. Diao claims that he was erroneously certified, and
asserts that he obtainedhis AA from Arellano University in 1949. This claim was still unacceptable,
as records would have shown that Diao graduated from the University in April1949, but he
started his Law studies in October 1948 (second semester, AY 1948-1949) and he would not
havebeen permitted to take the Bar, as it is provided in the Rules, applicants under oath that
Previous
to the studyof law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal
education (AA) as required bythe Department of Private Education
Issue:
Whether Telesforo A Diao should be Disbarred.
Ruling:
Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the Bar Exams, but did by falsifying information.
Admissionunder false pretenses thus give grounds for revoking his admission in the Bar, as
passing the Bar Exam is notthe only requirement to become an attorney at law.

Thus, the name Telesforo A. Diao is deleted from the roll of attorneys and he is required to return
his lawdiploma within thirty days.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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#8: Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr. vs. Atty. Rizalino T. SimbilloFacts:

Simbillo advertised himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist. These advertisements
appearedin the July 5, 2000 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and further research showed
that similaradvertisements were published in the Manila Bulletin in August 2 and 6, 2000 and in
the Philippine Star inAugust 5, 2000.In September 1, 2000, Simbillo was charged for improper
advertising and solicitation of legal services, filed byAssistant Court Administrator and Chief
of Public Information Office, Atty. Ismael G, Khan.Simbillos advertisement undermined
the stability and sanctity of marriage, and violated rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court.Simbillo professed repentance and beg
for the Courts indulgence, this rings hollow as he again advertised hisservices in an issue of Buy
and Sell Free Ads Newspaper in August 14, 2001, and again in October 5, 2001.
Issue:
WON Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of theRules of Court
Rulings:
Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore,
suspended from the practice of Law for One year. Repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely
.
Held: Petitioner was suspended from the practice of law for one year and was sternly warned
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely Ratio: The
practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money is
the primary considerationReasoning:-Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any
act designed primarily to solicit legal business- Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement orclaim regarding his qualifications or legal services.- Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of
Court states: Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, groundstherefore. A
member of the bar may bedisbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grosslyimmoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moralturpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before theadmission to practice, or for a willfuldisobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.- The following elements distinguish
legal profession from business:1. A duty of public service2. A relation as an officer of the court
to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability 3. A relation
to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary 4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertisingandencroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.- Respondent
advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he undermined the stability and
sanctity of marriage encouraging peoplewhomight have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained form dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.- Solicitation of legal
business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible withthe dignity of thelegalprofession.
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#9:
[A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005]
ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ,respondent
.Canoy was among those low-income clients whom Atty. Ortiz deigned to represent. He claims
having preparedthe position paper of Canoy, but before he could submit the same, the Labor
Arbiter had already issued theorder dismissing the case. Atty. Ortiz admits though that the period
within which to file the position paper hadalready lapsed. He attributes this failure to timely file
the position paper to the fact that after his election asCouncilor because he was too busy.
Eventually, he withdrew from his other cases and his free legal services.Complainant filed this
complaint but later on withdrew .Held: SUSPENDED: (1) month, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same negligence will be dealt with more severely. Still, the severance of the relation of
attorney-client is not effective until a notice of discharge by the client or a

manifestation clearly indicating that purpose is filed with the court or tribunal, and a copy thereof
served uponthe adverse party, and until then, the lawyer continues to be counsel in the
case.Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just
do so and leavecomplainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer
who withdraws or is dischargedshall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers
and property to which the client is entitled, and shallcooperate with his successor in the orderly
transfer of the matter. Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why hetook no further action on the case
was that he was informed that Canoy had acquired the services of anothercounsel. Assuming
that were true, there was no apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this
newcounsel.There are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning the
cause of the client in the midstof litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause
of desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legalpractice on account of what might be perceived as
a higher calling, election to public office, does not mitigatethe dereliction of professional duty.
Suspension from the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason todeviate from the norm
in this case. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------

#10:Borja, Sr. vs. Sulyap, Inc. 399 SCRA 601 (2003)

DOCTRINE: "Private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession does not pertain to
anisolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
FACTS:
Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a
one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila,Quezon City. Pursuant to
the lease, Sulyap, Inc.paid, among others, advance rentals,association dues and deposit for
electrical and telephone expenses. Uponthe expiration of their lease contract, Sulyap demanded
the return of the said advance rentals, dues anddeposit but Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap
filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money againstBorja. Subsequently, the parties
entered into and submitted to the trial court a Compromise Agreementstating that Borja is
bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any amount due is not paidwithin
the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month until fully paid plus 25%
attorneysfees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be issued as a matter of
right.Petitioner, however, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise.
Sulyapfiled a writ of executionagainst Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned
to quash the writ by stating that his failure topay the amounts within the agreed period was due
to Sulyaps fault; therefore, the penalty clause should not beimposed.Borja filed another motion
praying for the quashal of the writ of execution and modification of the decision. Thistime, he
contended that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise agreement. He claimed that
3 setsof compromise agreement were submitted for his approval. Among them, he allegedly
chose and signed thecompromise agreement which contained no stipulation as to the
payment of 2% monthly interest and 25%attorneys fees in case of default in payment. He alleged
that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, whoassisted him in entering into the said
agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreementwhere he affixed his
signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted tothe
court in order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.Sulyap
presented Atty. Cruz as witness, who declared that the petitioner gave his consent to the
inclusion of the penalty clause of 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the compromise
agreement. He addedthat the compromise agreement approved by the court was in fact signed
by the petitioner insidethe courtroom before the same was submitted for approval. Atty. Cruz
stressed that the penalty clause of 2%interest per month until full payment of the amount due,
plus 25% thereof as attorneys fees, in case of defaultin payment, was actually chosen by
the petitioner. The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony
of Atty. Cruz and even notedthat it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on
compromise on October 25, 1995, when hequestioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the
approved compromise agreement despite severalopportunities to raise said objection.
ISSUE:
Whether Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement.
HELD:
YES. While a judicial compromise may be annulled or modified on the ground ofvitiated consent
orforgery, we find that the testimony of the petitioner failed to establish the attendance of fraud
in the instantcase. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that
his former counselfraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where
he affixed his signature tothe compromise agreement submitted to the court.Petitioner cannot
feign ignorance of the existence of the penalty clause in the compromise agreementapproved by
the court. When he received the judgment reproducing the full text of the compromise
agreement,to February 19, 1997, he never raised the issue of the fraudulent inclusion of the
penalty clause in theiragreement. We note that petitioner is a doctor of medicine. He must have
read and understood the contents of

the judgment on compromise. In fact, on November 13, 1995, he filed, without the assistance of
counsel, amotion praying that the amounts of P50,000.00 and 37,575.00 be withheld from his
total obligation and insteadbe applied to the expenses for the repair of the leased premises which
was allegedly vandalized by the privaterespondentEven assuming that Atty. Leonardo Cruz
exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of thesaid clause is not void
but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified.17 Indeed, petitioners failure toquestion the
inclusion of the 2% monthly interest and 25% attorneys fees in the judicial compromisedespite
several opportunities to do so was tantamount to ratification. Hence, he is estopped from
assailing thevalidity thereof.Finally, we find no merit in petitioner's contention that the
compromise agreement should be annulled becauseAtty. Cruz, who assisted him in entering into
such agreement, was then an employee of the Quezon Citygovernment, and is thus prohibited
from engaging in the private practice of his profession. Suffice it to statethat the isolated
assistance provided by Atty. Cruz to the petitioner in entering into a compromise agreementdoes
not constitute a prohibited "private practice" of law by a public official. "Private practice" of a
profession,specifically the law profession does not pertain to an isolated court appearance;
rather, it contemplates asuccession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer. Suchwas never established in the instant case.--------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

#11:
[A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003]
LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G.FLORES, respondent.FACTS:
Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No. 1508 which mandates that
alldisputes, except those specifically cited (the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong
not included),between and among residents of the same city or municipality should be brought
first under the system of barangay conciliation before recourse to the court can be allowed.
Because of respondents transgressions, hisclient was haled to court as part-defendant.
Respondent also refused to return petitioners money in spite of hismeager service.Held: GUILTY
of negligence and incompetence. SUSPENDED for (6) months. RETURN the money
of complainantwith interest. STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act
in the future will be dealt withmore severely. The breach of respondents sworn duty as a lawyer
and of the ethical standards he was strictly to honor andobserve has been sufficiently
established. Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligencerequired of every
member of the Bar.
*****
CANON 17
. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18
. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Rule 18.03
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewithshall render him liable.Respondent erred in not returning complainants money despite
demands after his failure to file the case and hisdevious act of compelling complainant to sign a
document stating that he has no financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of
complainants papers. This conduct violated the following Canon:
CANON 15.
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.
Rule 16.03.
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client when due or upon demand.The failure
of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the presumption that he
hasmisappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him
by the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well as of professional
ethics; it also impairs public confidence in thelegal profession and deserves punishment. In short,
it is settled that the unjustified withholding of money belongingto his client, as in this case,
warrants the imposition of disciplinary action. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with
his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------

#12:Adelino H. Ledesma vs Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

(GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974)

Facts:
Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Provinceof Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As
he was counsel de parte forone of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge,
he filed a motion to withdraw as such.Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he
also appointed him counsel de oficio for thetwo defendants. Subsequently, on November 3,
1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed towithdraw as counsel de oficio, premised
on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full timeservice as well as on the volume
or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him fromhandling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied saidmotion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.The SC
found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order of the respondent judge, even
beforethe petitioner accepted the appointment to the Comelec, he knew that the case was going
to resume onthat day, that the case has been delayed eight times at the instance of the
petitioner, and that hiswork as anelection registrar will not be in conflict with his serving as
counsel de oficio for the said accused. The high courtdescribed the petitioner as unmindful of his
work as counsel de oficio and reminded him that membership in thebar is a privilege burdened
with conditions including that of being appointed counsel de oficio which makeseven more
manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade.In
the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as
defensecounsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only toerase doubts as to his fitness
to remain a member of the profession in good standing and added that the admonition is
ever timely for those enrolled in theranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this
is one of them, when duty to court and to client takesprecedence over the promptings of self-
interest.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------

#13:
CARLOS REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITANA.C. No. 5835CELIA ARROYO-
POSIDIO vs ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITANA.C. No. 6051VIOLETA TAHAW vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITA
NA.C. No. 6441MAR YUSON ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITANA.C. No. 6955Present: CORONA,
C.J.,
CARPIO, CARPIO-MORALES, VELASCO, JR.,
*
NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL
CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,PEREZ, andMENDOZA,
JJ
. Promulgated:August 10, 2010
R E S O L U T I O N NACHURA,
J.:
This refers to the undated Petition filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on July 28,
2009 byAtty. Jeremias R. Vitan, praying that he be reinstated as member in good standing of the
Philippine Bar and beallowed to resume the practice of law, claiming that he had already served
the penalty of suspension imposedon him, and that he is now reformed.As background, four (4)
administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each of whichhe was found
guilty and meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In the first case, A.C.
No. 6441
, (Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan
), promulgated on October 21,2004,
[1]
Atty. Vitan was suspended forsix (6)months, effective immediately upon receipt of the
Decision. He was further ordered to return theamount of P30,000 to complainant for
legal services he did not render. The records disclose that respondentreceived the Decision on
November 12, 2004 and the period of suspension would have ended on May 12,2005.In A.C. No.
5835, (
Carlos B. Reyes v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan
), promulgated on April 15, 2005,
[2]
Atty. Vitanwas suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay complainant P17,000.00 with
interest of 12% per annumfrom the date of the promulgation of the Decision until the full amount
shall have been returned. Per records,the Courts decision was received by him on May 13, 2005,
and his suspension would have ended on November13, 2005. In A.C. No. 6955 (
Mar Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan
), promulgated on July 27, 2006,
[3]
respondent wasfound liable for his failure to pay a just debt in the amount of P100,000.00. Upon
investigation, the IntegratedBar of the Philippines (IBP) imposed the penalty of Suspension for
two (2) years. This was modified by the Courtafter finding that there was partial payment of
the loan, and the penalty was reduced to six (6) months

suspension with warning, effective upon receipt of the Decision. In a Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension,respondent moved for the reconsideration of the decision, asserting that there was
full payment of theloan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 6, 2007. In this
connection, the OBC noted respondents shrewdness by moving out of his given address
to evadereceipt of the copy of the decision/resolutions of the Court. After diligent efforts at
searching for respondentscorrect address proved unavailing, the Court in its Resolution dated
July 17, 2007, considered the March 6,2007 Resolution as having been served on respondent. In
the decision in the fourth case, A.C. No. 6051, (
Celia Arroyo-Pesidio v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan
),promulgated on April 2, 2007,
[4]
respondent was found to have failed to render the legal services sought afterhe had received the
amount of P100,000, and was once again, suspended for one (1) year, with stern warning. The
Decision was received on April 18, 2007, so the suspension period should have lapsed on April
18, 2008. Upon the recommendation of the OBC, the four administrative cases were
consolidated.
[5]
In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has
been repeatedlysuspended

from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2

years. Accordingly,respondent should have served the orders of suspension successively
pursuant to the Courts resolution in A.M.No. RTJ-04-1857, entitled
Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adiong
, where the Court clearly stated that incase of two or more suspensions, the same shall be
served successively by the erring respondent.
[6]
It is,therefore, incumbent upon respondent to show to the Court that he has desisted from
the practice of law for aperiod of at least 2 years. The Court, in the recent case of
Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios,
[7]
issued the guidelines on thelifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance
thereof. However, the Court will not hesitateto withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it
is shown that respondent, as an officer of the Court, is stillnot worthy of the trust and confidence
of his clients and of the public. Thus, applying the guidelines in
Maniago,
the Court Resolved to
GRANT
Respondents Petition forReinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn
Statement attesting to the fact: 1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions
imposed on him successively;2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has
not appeared as counsel in any court during theperiods of suspension, as follows:(a) Six (6)
months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to November 13, 2005;(b) One (1) year
suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18, 2008;(c) Six (6) months suspension
in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to May 12, 2005; and(d) Six (6) months suspension
in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the Resolution dated March 6,2007 denying the
Motionfor Reconsideration of the Decision dated July 27, 2006. 3) that he has returned the sums
of money to the complainants as ordered by the Court in the
followingcases, attaching proofs thereof: (a) In A.C. No. 5835 the sum of P17,000 with interest
of 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of theDecision until the full amount shall have
been returned; and(b) In A.C. No. 6441 the amount of P30,000. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further
directed to
FURNISH
copies of the Sworn Statement to the IntegratedBar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s),
as mandated in
Maniago
.Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the Respondent under oath shall be a
groundfor the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
SO ORDERED.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------

#14:Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE

AC-5365. April 27, 2005
Facts:
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan.
After theloan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for
P50, 000 with differentmaturity date. All checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a
case for estafa against the spousesOlbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment
case against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of theBar Confidant of this Court. In the report,
Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspendedfrom the practice of law for
two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.
Held:
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon

individuals who are not only learned in the law, but also known to possess good moral character.
A lawyer isan oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible
norms of law and ethics,and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth
and justice, for which he has sworn to be afearless crusader. By taking the lawyers oath, an
attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,and an indispensable instrument in
the fair and impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act andcomport themselves with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publicsfaith in the
legal profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was
seriouslytransgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts
that had not beenagreed upon at all and despite respondents full knowledge that the loan
supposed to be secured by the checkshad already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification
of a commercial document, resorted to for hismaterial gain.Deception and other fraudulent acts
are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful anddishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conductthat merely enables
one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offensecommitted
by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from
thepractice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is
reprehensible. Hismisuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is
loathsome. Thus, he is sentencedsuspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective
immediately.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------

#15:
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--------------------

#16:
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--------------------
#17:People vs de luna et al GR 10236-48
Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.Pedro B. Ayuda.Alawadin I. Bandon.Roque J. Briones.Abraham C.
Calaguas.Balbino P. Fajardo.Claro C. Gofredo.Estela R. Gordo.Generoso H. Hubilla.Emilio P.
Jardinico, Jr.Angelo T. Lopez.Eustacio de Luna. Jaime P. Marco.Santos L. Parina.Florencio P.
Sugarol, andMaria Velez y Estrellas-took an oath as a lawyer even though they did not pass the
bar exams. (sa notary public pa jud)
RULING:
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol,have not passed
the examinations, it was resolved:A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for
investigation and appropriateaction in connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;B. As Pedro Ayuda
has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10days from notice thereof, within
which to explain why he should not be dealt withfor contempt of the Court;C. The notary public
Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegallyadministered the oath to the said
persons in disregard of this Court's resolutiondenying them admission to the Bar (except
Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), ishereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be
disbarred or suspendedfrom the pratice of law;D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy
of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial
Relations, thePublic Service Commission, and the Department of Justice;E. As to Capitulo,
Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in theirrespective cases. (pp. 36-37,
rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend
to exercise itsconcurrent jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by
appelleesherein and that we preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the CityFiscal
of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the
cases at the bar.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------

#18:Leslie Ui vs. Atty. Iris Bonifacio AC#3319 June 8, 2000Facts:

Leslie Ui and Carlos Ui were married on January 1971. On June 1988, Leslieconfronted the
respondentAtty. Iris Bonifacio for the illicit affair . Respondentadmitted the relationship and said
that she will cut off thesaid relationship. OnDecember 1988 Carlos and Iris had a second child.
On March 1989 complainantpleaded torespondent to stop their illicit relationship.On Atty Iris
side, she asserts that she had no knowledge of Carlospreviousmarriage. Carlos Ui was the
one who represented himself as single during theircourtship. Shesubmitted her Certificate of
marriage dated Oct. 1985 to court. Uponthe courts investigation it was found outthat the
marriage was in fact on Oct 1987.In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio
that when shemet Carlos Ui, she knew andbelieved him to be single. Respondent fell in love
withhim and they got married and as a result of suchmarriage, she gave birth to two (2)children.
Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she lefthim
ISSUE
:Whether or not Atty Iris Bonifacio is guilty of gross immoral conduct as aground for disbarment
RULING:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,the Reportand
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of thisResolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supportedby the evidenceon record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint forGross
Immorality against Respondent isDISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. IrisBonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfullyattaching to herAnswer a falsified Certificate of
Marriage with a stern warning thata repetition of the same will merit a moresevere penalty.-----
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------

#19: Elmer Canoy,

complainant
v. Atty. Jose Max Ortiz,
respondent
A.C. No. 5485 March 16,2005Facts:
This is a case wherein complainant Elmer Canoy accused his former counsel, Atty. Jose Max Ortiz
of misconduct and malpractice. In 1998, Canoy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against his
former employer,Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, and was represented in said case by Atty. Ortiz.
Canoy, explained Ortiz, was oneof his indigent clients, in that it was the latters practice since
commencing his practice of law to cater toindigent and law-income clients. In the labor
case against CCBP filed with the National Labor RelationsCommission, the labor arbiter ordered
the parties to submit their respective petition papers. Canoy submittedall the necessary
documents and records to Atty. Ortiz for the preparation of the position paper. Canoy
madeseveral follow-ups with the office of his attorney, said visits were unfruitful until it came to
his knowledge on2000, upon inquiring with the NLRC itself, that his complaint was already
dismissed way back in 1998 for failureto prosecute because the parties did not submit their
position papers. Atty. Canoy further claimed that Atty.Ortiz never informed him about the status
of his case nor of the fact that he failed to submit the position paper.In his
Comment
, Atty. Ortiz admitted to not being able to submit the position paper because the period
withinwhich to file it lapsed already, with arbiter already dismissing the case, but reasoned out
that his election as aCouncilor of Bacolod City made him very preoccupied with his functions. His
duties as a public servant and alawyer are beyond physical limitation, said Atty. Ortiz, so he had
to withdraw from his other cases. He alsoclaimed of not being able to remember whether he
immediately informed Canoy of the dismissal of the case,but recalled of Canoy conveying that he
already has a lawyer to handle the case. Hence, his office did not insiston refiling the case. Atty
Ortiz also pointed out that the dismissal of Canoys complaint was without prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and malpractice
Ruling:
Upon investigation of the case, the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesconcluded that clearly Atty.
Ortizfailed to exercise the degree of competence and diligence required of him in prosecuting his
client andrecommended that Atty. Ortiz be reprimanded. The Supreme Court, however, finds
the recommended penaltyof the IBP too lenent and instead suspended Atty. Ortize from
the practice of law for one month, in lieu of theadmonition or reprimand. According to the Court,
Atty Ortiz several canons and rules in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Specifically, Atty.
Ortiz was guilty of violating Rule 18.03 of the Code, which states, A lawyershall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
himliable, on account of his failure to file the position paper on time, tantamount to neglecting
a legal materentrusted to him. That the case was dismissed without prejudice does not mitigate
his liability. Further, Ortizalso violated Rule 22.02, which states,A laywer shall withdraw his
services only for good cause and uponnotice appropriate in the circumstances. Therefore, even
if Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his servicesdue to his elective position, he should have
coordinated with the new council of Canoy and turned over to thelatter all papers and property
which the Client is entitled and should have cooperated with his successor in theorderly transfer
of the matter, as per Rule 22.02.

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--------------------

#20: Laput vs. Remotigue , 6 SCRA 45(A.M. No. 219, 29 September 1962)LABRADOR,J. (En
Banc)FACTS:
Petitioner
ATTY. CASIANO U. LAPUT
charge respondents
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F.REMOTIGUE andATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG
with unprofessional and unethicalconduct in soliciting cases andintriguing against a brother
lawyer. In May 1952, NievesRillasVda. de Barrera retained petitioner Atty. Laput to
handle her"Testate Estate of MacarioBarrera" case in CFI-Cebu. By Jan. 1955, petitioner had
prepared twopleadings:
(1)
closing of administration proceedings, and (2) rendering of final accounting and partition of
saidestate.Mrs. Barrera did not countersign both pleadings. Petitioner found out later
thatrespondentAtty. Patalinghug had filed on 11 Jan. 1955 a written appearance as the new
counsel forMrs.Barrera. On 5 Feb. 1955, petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as
Mrs.Barrerascounsel.Petitioner alleged that:
(1)
respondents appearances were unethical and improper;
(2)
theymade Mrs. Barrera signdocuments revoking the petitioners Power of Attorney"
purportedly todisauthorize him from further collectingand receiving dividends of the estate from
Mr. MacarioBarreras corporations, and make him appear as adishonest lawyer and no longer
trusted byhis client; and
(3)
Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance withoutnotice to petitioner. Respondent Atty.
Patalinghug answered that when he entered his appearance on 11 Jan.1955Mrs. Barrera had
already lost confidence in her lawyer, and had already filed a pleading discharging
hisservices. The other respondent Atty. Remotigue answered that when he
filedhis appearance on 7Feb. 1955, the petitioner had already withdrawn as counsel.
The SC referred the case to the SolGen forinvestigation, report and recommendation. Thelatter
recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Remotigue and Atty Patalinghug are guilty of unprofessional
andunethicalconduct in soliciting cases.
RULING: No. The SC found no irregularity in the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug as counselfor
Mrs.
Barrera; and there was no actual grabbing of a case from petitioner becauseAtty.Patalinghug's
professional services were contracted by the widow. Besides, the
petitioner'svoluntarywithdrawal on 5 Feb. 1955, and his filing almost simultaneously of a motion
for thepayment of his attorney'sfees, amounted to consent to the appearance of Atty.
Patalinghug ascounsel for the widow. TheSC also held that respondent Atty. Remotigue was also
not guilty of unprofessionalconduct in as much as he entered his appearance, dated 5 Feb. 1955,
only on 7 February
1955,after Mrs. Barrerahad dispensed with petitioner's professional services, and after petition
erhad voluntarily withdrawnhis appearance.As to Atty. Patalinghugs preparation of documents
revoking the petitioners power of attorney,the SolGen found that the same does not appear to
be prompted by malice or intended tohurtpetitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the
interest of the administratrix.Case dismissed and closedfor no sufficient evidence submitted to
sustain the charges.