Dispute Settlement

Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

SECRETARY & REGIONAL DIRECTOR

People v. Broadcasting v. Secretary
May 8, 2009 G.R. No. 179652
Facts:
Juezan filed a complaint against Peoples Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo) for illegal deduction,
non-payment of services incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-coverage of SSS,
PAG-IBIG and Philhealth before the DOLE.
Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc denied that there is an ER-ER relationship with the complainant since
Juenzan is a drama talent hired on a per drama " participation basis."
Upon appeal, CA:dismiss the petition file by petitioner Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc and ruled that
the DOLE Secretary had the power to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws
irrespective of the amount of individual claims because the limitation imposed by Article 29 of
the Labor Code had been repealed by RA No. 7730.
Issue:
WON the DOLE Secretary, has jurisdiction over Juezans claim. NO.
Ruling:
Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act 7730 states that
Article 128 (b) and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still
exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to
the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation ...
SC said that the provision is explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE
comes into play only "in cases when the relationship of employer-employee still exists." The
clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists" signifies that the ER-
EE relationship must have existed even before the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLEs power
does not apply in 2 instances, namely: (a) where the ER-EE relationship has ceased; and (b)
where no such relationship has ever existed.
DOLE should have referred Juezan to the NLRC for the proper dispensation of his claims.

Republic v. Namboku Peak

July 18, 2014
Facts:

BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS

Diokno v. Cacdac
July 4, 2007
Facts:
FLAMSES Executive Board created the COMELEC to conduct union elections. Dispute arose
when COMELEC rejected Ongs candidacy alleging that the latter was a member of FLAMES.
COMELEC alleges that there was a collusion of non-members that resulted to the
disqualification of some member applicants the FLAMES violated their Constitution and By-
laws by allowing non-members to aid them in their campaign.
Respondents filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE-NCR which was subsequently
ruled by Arbiter Reyes favoring respondents Daya et al reversing COMELECs decision. The
BLR and the CA affirmed.
Issue:
WON BLR had jurisdiction. YES
Ruling:
ART. 226. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS. The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and
exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on
all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising
from or affecting labor-management relations in all workplaces...
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

An intra-union conflict would refer to a conflict within or inside a labor union, while an inter-
union controversy or dispute is one occurring or carried on between or among unions. The
controversy in the case is an intra-union dispute. There is no question that this is one which
involves a dispute within or inside FLAMES, a labor union.

LABOR ARBITER
Jaguar Security v. Sales
April 22, 2008
Facts:

Pioneer Concret Phil. v. Todaro

June 8, 2007
Facts:
Todaro filed with the RTC a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against herein
petitioners. Instead of filing an Answer, herein petitioners separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
RTC: denied MTD. CA: denied herein petitioners petition for certiorari. Hence, this petition
Issue:
WON RTC has jurisdiction over the matter & not NLRC. RTC has jurisdiction
Ruling:
Where no ER-EE relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be
resolved by reference to the LC, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it
is the RTC that has jurisdiction. In the present case, no ER-EE relationship exists between
petitioners and respondent.
In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the LC, but seeks
payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged breach of their obligation under their
agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is
intrinsically a civil dispute. In the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the
provisions of Art. 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within
the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.

Tegimenta Chemical Phils. V. Buensalida

June 17, 2008
Facts:

Milan v. NLRC
February 4, 2015
Facts:
MILAN and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village, a property owned by SOLID.
According to SOLID, it was for the benefit of MILANs families. On Oct 10, 2003, MILAN were
no longer allowed to work and they are required to sign a MOA w/ release and quitclaim before
their benefits be released. EEs who signed the MOA were considered to have agreed to vacate
SMI Village, and to the demolition of the constructed houses inside as condition for release of
their termination benefits and separation pay. MILAN filed complaints before LA this reached
up to the SC. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the NLRC may preliminarily determine issues related to rights arising from an EE-ER
relationship. YES
Ruling:
The NLRC has jurisdiction to determine, preliminarily, the parties rights over a property,
when it is necessary to determine an issue related to rights or claims arising from an
ER-EE relationship.
Article 217 provides that the LA, in his or her original jurisdiction, and the NLRC, in its appellate
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

jurisdiction, may determine issues involving claims arising from ER-EE relations.
Claims arising from an ER-EE relationship are not limited to claims by an employee.
Employers may also have claims against the employee, which arise from the same
relationship. In this case, SOLID claims that its properties are in MILANs possession by virtue
of their status as its employees. SOLID allowed MILAN to use its property as an act of
liberality. It would not have allowed MILAN to use its property had they not been its
employees. The return of its properties in MILANs possession by virtue of their status as
employees is an issue that must be resolved to determine whether benefits can be released
immediately. The issue raised by the employer is, therefore, connected to MILANs claim for
benefits and is sufficiently intertwined with the parties employer-employee relationship. Thus,
it is properly within the labor tribunals jurisdiction.

Indophil v. Adviento
August 4, 2014
Facts:

Am-Phil Food Concepts v. Padilla

Oct 1, 2014
Facts:
Padilla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA. LA Chuanico favored Padilla.
Am-Phil appealed to LA Chuanico arguing that the former was in erro
Issues:
Whether LA Chuanico was correct in ruling that Padilla was illegally dismissed despite Am-
Phils pending motion for leave to file supplemental rejoinder. NO!!! LA was not under any
obligation to accept supplemental rejoinder
Ruling:
From the provisions of the 2002 Rules, a supplemental rejoinder, as correctly ruled by the
NLRC is not a pleading which a labor arbiter is duty-bound to accept. Even following changes
to the NLRC Rules of Procedure in 2005 and 2011, a rejoinder has not been recognized as a
pleading that labor arbiters must necessarily admit. The 2005 and 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure only go as far as to recognize that a reply may be filed by the parties
Thus, LA Chuanico was under no obligation to grant Am-Phils motion for leave to admit
supplemental rejoinder and, thereby, consider the supplemental rejoinders averments and
annexes.
The requirements of due process in labor cases before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when
the parties are given the opportunity to submit their position papers to which they are
supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence that would prove
their respective claims, if the Labor Arbiter determines that no formal hearing would be
conducted or that such hearing was not necessary.

Pentagon Steel Corp. v. CA

June 26, 2009
Facts:

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
Negros Metal Corp. v. Lamayo
Aug 25, 2010
Facts:
Lamayo filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Negros submitted a Manifestation contending that
the complaint should be dismissed because the LA had no authority over it since, under their
CBA, such matters must first be brought before the companys grievance machinery. Hence, this
case.
Issue:
WON LA has jurisdiction over the case. YES
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

Ruling:
Articles 217, 261, and 262 of the Labor Code outline the jurisdiction of labor arbiters and
voluntary arbitrators wherein:
o Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after
the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in
the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 2. Termination disputes;
o Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators.The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA
and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article.
o ART. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also
hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and
bargaining deadlocks.
Under Art. 217, a labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination
disputes. On the other hand, a voluntary arbitrator has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over grievances arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
company policies.
As a rule, termination disputes should be brought before a labor arbiter, except when the
parties, under Art. 262, unmistakably express that they agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration. In the present case, the CBA provision on grievance machinery
being invoked by petitioner does not expressly state that termination disputes are
included in the ambit of what may be brought before the companys grievance machinery

Albert Teng Fish Trading v. Pahagac

Nov 17, 2010
Facts:
Manila Pavillion v. Delada
Jan 25, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner MPH was the ER of Delada. Delada was originally the Head Waiter of the Rotisserie,
the pets fine dining restaurant, but was later reassigned as Head Waiter of MPHs other
restaurant, the Seasons Coffee Shop, pursuant to a supervisory personnel reorganization
program. However, Delada declined the said transfer and instead, asked for a grievance meeting,
as stated in their CBA.
Despite demands to temporarily transfer, Delada refused to assume his new post. Due to his
continued disobedience, MPH initiated an admin charge against him. Meanwhile, as the
grievance meeting was unsuccessful, the parties agreed to submit for voluntary arbitration.
In lieu of safety and security reasons (because of Deladas actions that started to affect other EEs
and the business itself), Delada was placed on a 30-day preventive suspension. After finding him
guilty of insubordination, MPH then placed Delada on a 90-day penalty of suspension.
The PVA ruled that although Deladas transfer was a valid exercise of MPHs management
prerogative, there was no legal & factual basis for its imposition of preventive suspension on
Delada, and ruled that MPH had lost its authority to impose the 90-day Penalty of suspension &
its authority to continue w admin proceedings.
Issue:
WON MPH had jurisdiction/authority to continue the admin case. YES
WON PVA assumed jurisdiction. No.
Ruling:
Since the PVA herein didnt, in fact, assume jurisdiction over related issues and made rulings on
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

the matter, the MPH didnt lose its authority to discipline Delada for his continued refusal to report
to his new post/assignment. Both of the suspensions involved in the case (the preventive
suspension and penalty of suspension) were disciplinary measures.
The former (preventive suspension) is imposed by the ER when the EE might sabotage the
company operations pending investigation of an alleged malfeasance/misfeasance committed by
an EE. While, the latter (penalty of suspension) is imposed on the EE after an official
investigation/admin hearing is conducted. Hence, until the MPHs order is rendered invalid,
theres a presumption of validity of such, and the EE must comply therewith, Thus, since the PVA
eventually ruled that the said ordered were a valid exercise of management prerogative, later
affirmed by the CA, MPH did have the authority to continue w/ admin proceedings for
insubordination & willful disobedience against Delada.
Honda Cars v. HCTSS
Nov 19, 2014
Facts:
PHILEC v. CA
Dec 10, 2014
Facts:

NLRC; Decisions, Finality; Rule 65 Petition

Jordan v. Grandeur Security
June 18, 2014
Facts:
Sorana v. NLRC
Jan 18, 2012
Facts:
LA Gutierrez favored Sarona. Upon appeal to NLRC, respondents Royal claims that the finding
of illegal dismissal was attended w/ grave abuse of discretion. NLRC affirmed the decision of the
LA. CA denied Soranas motion. While this case was pending in the SC: Sarona asked for the
review of the computation of his back-wages. In its comment, respondent Royal claims that
petitioner Sarona is barred from questioning the manner by which his backwages and separation
pay were computed since it already paid him the full amount of the monetary award by virtue of a
writ of execution issued against it.
Issue:
WON the full satisfaction of the award under the NLRCs Decision bar petitioner Sarona from
questioning the validity thereof. NO.
Ruling:
SC said that the finality of the NLRCs decision does not preclude the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The NLRCs issuance of an entry of judgment after the lapse of 10
days from the parties receipt of its decision will only give rise to the prevailing partys right to
move for the execution but will not prevent the CA from taking cognizance of a petition
for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations. In turn, CA decision on a petition
for certiorari may be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. Since an appeal to this Court is not an original and independent action but a continuation of
the proceedings before the CA, the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45 cannot be barred
by the finality of the NLRCs decision in the same way that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
with the CA cannot
Metro Transit Organization v. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU
Apr 14, 2008
Facts:
PHILTRANCO v. PWU-AGLO
Feb 26, 2014
Facts:
Conciliator-Mediator (Aglibut) of the (NCMB) referred the case to the (SOL). Sec. Cruz issued a
Decision, ordering Philtranco to reinstate the employees with back-wages and remit union dues.
Company filed a MR but union submitted a "Partial Appeal." the SOL declined to rule on
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

petitioners MR and private respondents "Partial Appeal", citing a DOLE Regulation that
prohibited an MR for the voluntary arbitrators decisions, orders, resolutions or awards.
Company filed before the CA an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which was
dismissed because they should have filed under Rule 43 instead of rule 65 and it was filed out of
time. Company filed a MR, which was denied by the CA
Union Arguments; respondent argues that the Secretary of Labor decided the Case in his
capacity as voluntary arbitrator; thus, is only assailable via a petition for review under Rule 43;
and even granting that certiorari was the proper remedy, the same was filed out of time as the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was an unauthorized pleading, did not toll the running
of the 60-day period.
Issue:
what is the proper remedy to appeal the decision of the DOLE secretary?
Ruling:
MR then Rule 65. The case is remanded back to lower court
decisions of the Secretary of Labor come to the SC by way of a petition for certiorari even beyond
the ten-day period provided in the Labor Code and the implementing rules but within the
reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. that even
though a motion for reconsideration is not required or even prohibited by the concerned
government office, and the petitioner files the motion just the same, the 60-day period shall
nonetheless be counted from notice of the denial of the motion.

APPEAL
Prince Transportation v. Garcia
Jan 12, 2011
Facts:
Unilever v. Rivera
Jun 3, 2013
Facts:
Rivera filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal and other monetary claims against Unilever. LA:
dismissed her complaint, denied her claim for retirement benefits, but ordered Unilever to pay a
proportionate 13th month pay and the corresponding cash equivalent of her unused leave credits.
NLRC: Although she was legally dismissed from the service for a just cause, Unilever was guilty of
violating the twin notice requirement in labor cases, thus, Unilever was ordered to pay her P30K as
nominal damages, retirement benefits and separation pay.
Unilever asked for a reconsideration of the NLRC decision. NLRC: modified its earlier ruling by
deleting the award of separation pay and reducing the nominal damages to P20K, but affirmed the
award of retirement benefits to Rivera.
CA: affirmed with modification. It awarded separation pay in favor of Rivera as a measure of social
justice, since, there was no proof that she personally gained any pecuniary benefit from her
infractions, as her instructions were aimed at increasing the sales efficiency of the company and
competing in the local market. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON CA erred in granting affirmative relief to Rivera who did not appeal ruling of the NLRC disallowing
the award of separation pay to her
Ruling:
Rivera did not appeal the March 31, 2009 ruling of the NLRC disallowing the award of separation pay
to her. It was Unilever who elevated the case to the CA. It is axiomatic that a party who does not
appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any affirmative relief. Due process prevents
the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal. An appellee who is not an appellant
may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment, but he cannot seek
modification or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed. It
was, therefore, erroneous for the CA to grant an affirmative relief to Rivera who did not ask for it.
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

APPEAL BOND
McBurnie v. Ganzon, EGI-Managers
Oct 17, 2013
Facts:
Sara Lee v. Macaltang
Jun 4, 2014 & Jan 14, 2015
Facts:
LA: illegal dismissal, awarded separation pay and other monetary benefits amounting to P3.45
billion
Corporations motioned that the appeal bond be reduced to P1 million each because it was
impossible for any insurance company to cover such a huge amount and that in requiring them to
post in full the amount would be tantamount to denying them the right to appeal.
NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond but required corporations to post an additional
P4.5m bringing the total to P 9 million.
Macatlang filed a petition for certiorari with the CA charging the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion in giving due course to the appeal of petitioners despite the gross insufficiency of the
cash bond. They declared that the appeal bond must be equivalent to the amount of the award.
CA: reversed NLRC decision and required P1 billion be posted to perfect appeal
Issue:
WON the appeal bond may be reduced in the instant case. YES, to about P725 million
Ruling
The Rules only allow the filing of a motion to reduce bond of two (2) conditions: (1) that there
is meritorious ground and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted
We sustain the CA as far as it increases the amount of the required appeal bond. But we deem it
reasonable to reduce the amount of the appeal bond to P725 Million. This directive already
considers that the award if not illegal, is extraordinarily huge and that no insurance company
would be willing to issue a bond for such big money. The amount of P725 Million is approximately
25% of the basis above calculated. It is a balancing of the constitutional obligation of the state to
afford protection to labor which, specific to this case, is assurance that in case of affirmance of
the award, recovery is not negated; and on the other end of the spectrum, the opportunity of the
employer to appeal. By reducing the amount of the appeal bond in this case, the employees
would still be assured of at least substantial compensation, in case a judgment award is affirmed.
On the other hand, management will not be effectively denied of its statutory privilege of appeal.
Balite v. SS Venture
Feb 2015
Facts:
Hacienda Valentin-Balabag v. Secretary
Feb 11, 2008
Facts:
Petitioner filed with public respondent a Verified Appea and Supplement to the Verified Appeal,
posting therewith an appeal bond of P1,000.00 in money order and attaching thereto a
Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was able to perfect its appeal? NO!!
Ruling:
When petitioner filed her Verified Appeal and Supplement to the Verified Appeal, she posted a
mere P1,000.00-appeal bond and attached a Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with
Motion for Reduction of Bond. Public respondent rejected said appeal for insufficiency of the
appeal bond.
We note and stress that there is no analogous application in the Office of the Secretary of the
practice in the NLRC of reducing the appeal bond; the law applicable to the Office of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment does not allow this practice. In other words, the respondents
request for the reduction of the required bond cannot be allowed for lack of legal basis. Hence,
for lack of the required bond, the respondents appeal was never duly perfected and must
therefore be dismissed.
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

Just like the petitioner in the present case, the employer in Guico v. Secretary of Labor had also
sought a reduction of the appeal bond due to financial losses arising from the shutdown of his
business; yet, we did not temper the strict requirement of Article 128 (b) for him.
The rationale behind the stringency of such requirement is that the employer-appellant
may choose between a cash bond and a surety bond. Hence, limitations in his liquidity should
pose no obstacle to his perfecting an appeal by posting a mere surety bond.

EXECUTION; UPDATING OF AWARD

Nacar v. Gallery Frames
Aug 13, 2013
Facts:
University of Pangasinan v. Fernandez
Nov 12, 2014
Facts:
LA Gambito Backwages =l P 130,935.65; Separation Pay = P605,566.82; Attorneys Fees = P
20,000.00; TOTAL = P756,502.47. NLRC: initially affirmed but reversed upon petitioners MR.
CA: reinstated the order of LA. SC: affirmed.
An Entry of Judgment was issued by the Supreme Court declaring its Resolution dated February
21, 2005 final and executory as of July 11, 2005. Subsequently, Florentino and Nilda moved for a
re-computation of their award to include their backwages and other benefits from the date of the
decision of LA Gambito up to the finality of the decision on July 11, 2005. They likewise moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution.
LA: the decision rendered by the CA reinstating the decision of LA Gambito was declared final
and executory. Hence, there is a need to update and upgrade the computation of money claims
and separation pay which has amounted now to P2,165,467.02 as finally completed by Labor
Arbitration Associate Esperanza. LA Flores issued a writ of execution. NLRC: reversed. CA:
reinstated LA decision

Issue:
WON there should be a recomputation - YES
Ruling:
Updating the computation of awards to include as well backwages and separation pay
corresponding to the period after the rendition of LA Gambito's decision on Nov 6, 2000 up to its
finality on July 11, 2005 is not violative of the principle of immutability of a final and executory
judgment.
While the dispositive portion of the herein assailed CA decision did not explicitly refer to the
13th month pay, its inclusion in the computation approved by LA Flores is proper.
In computing the backwages and benefits awarded to the respondents, the reckoning period is
not interrupted by the NLRC's reversal of LA Gambito's finding of illegal dismissal.
The computation of backwages and separation pay due to Florentino and Nilda properly includes
the period from 2002-2005.
The petitioners point out that Florentino and Nilda turned 60 on December 11, 2002 and April 30,
2002, respectively. Thus, backwages and separation pay could only be computed up to those
dates since under both UPI's retirement plan and Article 287 of the Labor Code, 60 is the optional
retirement age. Further, on July 18, 2005, Florentino and Nilda filed separate claims for
retirement benefits, hence, effectively admitting that 60 and not 65 is the retirement age for UPI's
faculty members.
First, 60 is merely an optional but not the mandatory retirement age. Second, the evidence
submitted do not show at whose option it is to retire the faculty members before the age of
65. Third, there is no proof whatsoever that the faculty members of UPI indeed retire at 60 years
of age. Fourth, Florentino and Nilda filed claims for retirement pay in 2005 when they were both
63, hence, their acts did not necessarily constitute an admission that 60 is the retirement age for
UPI's faculty members.
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

Metroguards Security v. Hilongo

Mar 9, 2015
Facts:

MISCELLANEOUS
Masmud v. NLRC
Feb 13, 2009
Facts:
Alexander Masmud filed a complaint against First Victory Shipping Services for non-payment of
permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral & exemplary
damages, and attys fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Go.
Under the retainer contract, Alexander agreed to pay Go 20% of the total monetary claims and an
additional 10% in case of appeal.
During the pendancy of the case, Alexander died and was substituted by his wife petitioner
Evangelina Masmud, after the terms of lawyers fees were explained to the latter.
In the end, the NLRC ruled in favor of the complaint, and such was later affirmed by the CA.
When the decision became final and executory, an amount of P3.454M was given to Evangelina.
She, however, only gave P680K (20% of the monetary awards) to Atty. Go. In response, Go field
a motion to enforce the attys lien. The LA ruled for Go and ordered the payment of the unpaid
20% of attys fees, The NLRC & CA affirmed. Evangelina argued that the said amount violated
Art. 111 of the LC.
Issue:
W/N the CA erred in granting the award of 39% lawyers fees, in total
RULING:
NO
Contrary to Evangelinas argument, it wasnt Art. 111 of the LC which governed the case, but
rather it was Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the RoC and Rule 20.01m Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
There are 2 concepts of attys fees. In an ordinary sense, it represents the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered. In the extraordinary
sense, its awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the
prevailing party.
Herein, Art. 111 of the LC (which limits the award of atts fees to 10% of the monetary awards)
pertains to the extraordinary sense and doesnt apply to attys fees agreed upon by the parties.
Sec. 24, Rule 138 provides that (a) written contract of services shall control the amount to be
paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable/unreasonable. Its found unconscionable if
they affront ones sense of justice, decency/reasonableness. In this regard, Rule 20.01, Canon 20
of the CPR should also be considered. Clearly, the contingent fee contracts are still subject to the
courts supervision and close scrutiny to protect clients from unjust charges. Herein, considering
the facts of the case, the CA didnt err in awarding the 39% attys fees because theres nothing
illegal in the contingent contract between Go and Alexander. Thus, the CAs decision was
affirmed.
Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon
August 13, 2014
Facts:
Montero v. Times Transport
Mar 16, 2015
Facts:
Phil. Carpet Manufacturing Corp v. Tagyamon
Dec 11, 2013
Facts:
Am-Phil Food Concepts v. Padilla
Oct 1, 2014
Facts:
Padilla was hire, in 2002, as a Marketing Associate by Am-Phil, a corporation engaged in
Dispute Settlement
Labor Code: Arts. 128-129, 220-232, 266, 2730277, 278 (g-i), 303-304, 307 (b), 305-307.
Note the amendments introduced by R.A. 9347 and R.A. 10741

restaurant business. Subsequently, in 2004, Am-Phils officers informed Padilla that Am-Phil
would be implementing a retrenchment program, on account of serious and adverse business
conditions, that would affect 3 of its employees including Padilla. Thereafter, Am-Phil sent Padilla
a memorandum notifying him of his retrenchment. Padilla was paid separation pay of P26,245.38
and he executed a quitclaim and release in favor of Am-Phil.
However, Padilla still filed the complaint for illegal dismissal. For its defense, Am-Phil claimed that
Padilla was not illegally terminated and that it validly exercised a management prerogative. Also
Am-Phil claims that Padilla executed a quitclaim and release in its favor.
LA rendered the decision finding that Padilla was illegally dismissed, ordering respondent Am-Phil
to pay backwages. On the ground that Am-Phil failed to substantiate its claim of serious business
losses and that it failed to comply with the procedural requirement for a proper retrenchment, thus
the quitclaim and release executed by Padilla is contrary to law. Which was affirmed by NLRC
and CA.
Issue:
WON the LA is correct in disregarding the quitclaim and release which Padilla had executed to
relieve Am-Phil from liability
Ruling: Yes.
SC said that Padillas quitclaim and release does not negate his illegal dismissal.
Here, SC applied the case of F.F. Marine Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission
which involve an invalid retrenchment SIMILAR TO THIS CASE. SC said in FF. Marine Corp
case, since the retrenchment is declared illegal and of no effect, the quitclaims executed by
retrenched employees were, therefore, not voluntarily entered into by them. Their consent was
vitiated by mistake or fraud. As a rule, release or quitclaim cannot bar employees from contesting
the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would not amount to estoppel.