USMANU DANFODIYO UNIVERSITY, SOKOTO

FACULTY OF ARTS AND ISLAMIC STUDIES,

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

HIS 407: SOKOTO CALIPHATE (SPECIAL PAPER)

TUTORIAL PRESENTATION

BY

YAZID HUSSAINI
1210104020

QUESTION: DISCUSS THE SOKOTO JIHAD IN KANO

8TH JULY, 2017.

Introduction

Between 1807 and 1903, Kano came under the control of the Sokoto Jihadists. The Sokoto Jihad

which started in 1804 was extended to Kano in 1807 on the excuse that the Habe rulers of the city

had incorporated some elements of the Maguzawa (animists) practices into the administration1.

The Jihad in Kano was carried out successfully and Kano was finally incorporated into the Sokoto

Caliphate. Other developments that Kano witnessed after the Jihad include intellectual and

commercial developments. This paper examines the extension of the Jihad into Kano and its major

legacies.

The Early contacts between the Jihadists and Kano Scholars

The Kano Jihadists were in touch with Sheikh Usman bn. Fodio long before his breach with Yunfa.

In fact, at least three prominent members of Kano leading families were studying under Shehu at

the time of his fight to Gudu. Some of the early scholars from Kano who had contact with Shehu

include Dikkoye and his younger brothers, Dattiwa and Abdullahi al-Kanawi. When Shehus

conciliatory later, written after his victory at Tabkin Kwatto, was first brought to Sarkin Kano

Alwali, he was apparently on the point of accepting it but something caused him to change his

mind2. We do not know what this was but it might either been Yunfas warning message or the

news the Sarakunan Katsina and Daura were ready to mobilise their forces to his. Whatever the

reason might be, Alwali rejected Shehus overtures and the war therefore spread to Kano3. The

Jihad in Kano was spearheaded by seven men drawn from the six territorial groups. These men

were:

i. Sulaimanu of the Mundubawa, one of Shehus ablest and most devoted disciple.

ii. Muhammadu Dabo of the Dambazawa, the second of Shehus disciple.

 iii. Muhammadu Bakatsine of the Jobawa, the third of shehus disciple.

iv. Jibrin of the Yolawa

v. Dan Zabuwa of the Danejawa

vi. Jammo and Ibrahim Dabo of the Sullubawa.

Jihad Campaigns in Kano

Under these leaders, they formed a war camp in the bush at a place called Kwazazzabo Yar

Kwando about thirty miles west of the city. There they recruited their strength until they were

ready to strike. Their first move, which was probably made in the dry weather of 1804-5, was to

assault the neighbouring town of Karaye. This was the headquarters of the Wambai, one of the

territorial magnates of the Hausa hierarchy, and their object may well have been to forestall an

attack by him on their own unfortified camp. Whatever the purpose, the assault was completely

successful and Karaye, though defended by a wall, was captured4.

The Yolawa, Sullubawa, Dambazawa, Danejawa, the Hausawa and other clans of Eastern Kano

assembled at Fagoje as agreed at the meeting when the Shehus later was received while Jobawa,

Jullubawa (Gyanawa), Yoligawa and other clans of the Eastern Kano made their Hijrah in the East.

All these groups were known as the Jamaa. The first battle of the Jihad was fought at a settlement

somewhere around Bebeji which was under the jurisdiction of its chief, near the predominately

Sullubawa area of Kiru. It was the Danyaya who might have been a member of Yolawa clan who

shot the first arrow of the Jihad, which killed Bimma. Sarkin Kano was informed about this

encounter and the coincident death of the chief of Bebeji. As a result of which he appointed

Gyanako the son of the late chief to succeed his father, on the condition that he must fight the

Jamaah vigorously.
The western Jamaah engaged Alwalis forces under the leadership of the Gyanako. Both sides

suffered heavy casualities and even though Alwalis forces were successful, his advisers blamed

the lack of complete victory on the composition of his army and they suggested that well trained

and experienced soldiers from the city should dispatched to confront the Jamaah. Alwali accepted

this advice and he appointed Barde Bakure to command the newly formed battalion but the

Jamaah who were becoming more confident also defeated them. This defeat frightened Sarkin

Kano Alwali. He therefore summoned his councilors and scholars. They advised him that he

should send envoys to negotiate with the Jamaah and if there is no agreement between the two

parties, he should form a very large army, composed of all the able bodied men of his kingdom.

Alwali accepted this advice and appointed Mallam Dan Dhulnima, Zayan al-Arabi, Jakadan

Kardewa (who died on their way back to Kano after the meeting) and Mallam Hayu to negotiate a

truce with the Jamaah. They were informed by the leaders of the Jamaah that before they accept

Alwali, he must make the Hijra similar to the one they had made and if they were successful they

shall restore him as the legitimate Sarkin Kano under the authority of the Shehu.

Sarkin Kano Alwali assembled his council and elites to advise him on the next line of action. He

was about to accept these conditions just like Sarkin Zazzau Jatau but was discouraged by his

councilors, the most outspoken of whom was the chief Imam Abdulkadir, who condemned the

leaders of the Jamaah as ignorant. Sarki Alwalis scholars also added that they never heard of any

prophet whose name was Faty Jaoje or Dabo, some of the common names of the leaders of the

Jamaah. Therefore it seemed they advised him that, Jamaah had no divine guidance and as such,

he should ignore their call and assemble a large army against the Jihadists. Consequently, Sarki

Alwali decreed that, able-bodied men in his kingdom including minorities such as Kanuri and

Tuareqs should be drafted into the army, which should be commanded by Sarkin Dawaki Ali.
Alwali instructed them to kill all males including babies and enslave all females but the leaders of

the Jamaah should be chained and brought to him. This army was very large and it had many arms

and ammunitions, which were carried by camels. The Jamaah were terrified at this development

more especially as people stopped joining their camp. Both forces met at a decisive battle known

as Yakin Daukar Girma and the Jamaah were victorious.

The victory of Yakin Daukar Girma boasted the morale of the Jamaah and it made prominent

chiefs who were hitherto in Alwalis camp such as Dantunku to join the Jamaah. Several other

battles were later fought and the most notable were the battle of Kabo, Masnawa, Gwodiya, Kofa,

Kura and Karaye. Turmi who was the chief of Kofa joined the Jamaah and was appointed the

chief of the strategic Town of Bebeji. Only a few of the local Fulani joined the Jamaah among

whom was Ardo Sabti, who was later martyred just before the battle of Karaye. Barde Bakure one

of Alwalis bravest commanders was killed at the battle of Karaye.

At Gora before the decisive battle of Danyaya there was misunderstanding within the Jamaah,

Mallam Jammo chief of the Sullubawa suggested that they should move eastwards and join

Mallam Bakatsine who had not yet liberated Gaya but Mallam Abdul-Rahman, the chief of the

Yolawa observed that if they concentrated all their strength in one area, Sarki Alwali will defeat

them with the help of Sarakuna of Katsina and Damagaram. They later reached a consensus that

they should remain in the west. Mallam Danzabuwa the leader of the Jamaah was martyred in a

encounter between Jalli and Madachi.

Sarki Alwali was later aided by the Sarkin Daura. This development frightened the Jamaah and

some of them suggested that they should move eastward and join Mallam Bakatsine whose

command had then liberated the important town of Gaya. But Mallam Jibril who was one of their
most learned and upright scholars, admonished and advised them that they should remain and fight

the decisive battle. At Danyaya the Jamaah defeated Sarki Alwalis forces in his presence. He was

unable to leave the town until after the intervention of the Jamaah leaders who ordered that he

should be allowed to leave since he has experienced one of the great signs of Allah. Sarki

Alwali returned to Kano and was deserted by most of his councilors. At this point Sarki Alwali

was a defeated king.

The Jamaah of both east and west camped at Tomas waiting for their final entry into Kano. He

therefore sent a delegation to plead with the Jamaah which was made up of Mallam Kabara,

Mallam Gabto, Dan Gwauranduma Sumailu, Mallam Jabbo al-falati and Mallam Goja. Alwali

pleaded that he was ready to accept all the conditions of the Jamaah and that he was ready to reach

them even if it was on foot. The Jamaah rejected this plea, because according to them he was

given that choice earlier but he refused and decided to fight them vigorously by forming a very

large army, which they eventually defeated. They informed his Ambassadors that they shall

takeover Kano on the 12th of Rabiu Awwal Insha-Allah. Sarki Alwali left Kano city on the same

night after the return of his representatives with the reply from the Jamaah. He stayed in Zaria for

a year and later he returned to Rano where he was killed at Burum-Burum in an encounter with

the Jamaah led by Mallam Bakatsine during the reign of Emir Sulaiman Dan Aba-Hama5.

Some major Legacies of the Jihad in Kano

After its conquest in 1807 by the Jihadists, Kano came under the Sokoto caliphate. Kano therefore

was no longer an independent state as it was before the Jihad. It became an emirate, incorporated

into the Sokoto Caliphate. The Habe ruling dynasty was then overthrown. However, as the Sokoto

Caliphate was not a dictator state and thus Kano was allowed to choose its own leaders. This
tradition continued until the 1890s when Caliph Abdul-Rahman rejected Yusuf and appointed

Tukur. This incidence contributed in Kano Civil War. Also important was intellectual development

which further contributed in the consolidation of Islam in Kano to the status of a prominent Islamic

centre. Moreover, Kano became an important commercial centre in the caliphate as most of traders

moved from Katsina to Kano mainly due to insecurity of trade routes at Katsina as a result of

constant attacks from Maradi areas.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study has demonstrated the nature of the Jihad in Kano and its major impact.

The Jihad in Kano was championed by many scholars. Also, the composition of the people who

fought the Jihad at Kano indicated that, it was from being call a tribal movement as peoples of

diverse ethnic background became involved. The Jihad contributed in the intellectual development

of Kano. It also laid the basis for the current position of Kano as a centre of commerce.

\
References

1. A. I. Kurawa, The Jihad in Kano: Translation and Analysis of Taqyid al-Akhbar of Qadi
Muhammad Ibn Salih Kano.
2. H. M. Maishanu, Five Centuries of Historical Writing in Hausaland and Borno 1500
2000, Ibadan, Macmillan Nigeria Publishers Ltd, 2007.
3. H.A.S. Johnston, The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, London, 1967.
4. H.I. Said, Revolution and Reaction: The Fulani Jihad in Kano and its Aftermath, Phd
Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1978.
5. J.N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1973
6. M.G. Smith, The Kano Chronicle as History, in B.M. Barkindo, (ed) Studies in the
History of Kano, Ibadan, 1983.

7. Mahadi, A., The Jihad and its Role in Strengthening the Sarauta (Kingship) System in
Hausaland in the 19th Century: The Case Study of Kano, in J. F. Ajayi, and B. Ikara (eds)
Evolution of Political Culture in Nigeria. Ibadan, Macmillan, 1985.

8. S. J. Hogben, Introduction to the History of the Islamic States of Northern Nigeria, Ibadan,
University Press, 1967.