Filipinas Colleges v Timbang

Facts: Filipinas Colleges acquired the rights of the Timbang spouses over a parcel of land. Filipinas is ordered to pay
spouses P15,807.90.

Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to be a builder in good faith of the school building constructed on the lot in question
and entitled to be paid the amount of P19,000.00 for the same.

Filipinas Colleges, purchaser of the said building was ordered to deliver to Blas stock certificate for 108 shares of Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. with a par value of P10,800.00 and to pay Blas the remaining.

Filipinas defaulted in payment to the spouses. Spouses chose to compel Filipinas to pay them the value of the land.
Sps. Timbang obtained an Order of execution against Filipinas.

Blas filed a motion for execution of her judgment (remaining) which was granted by the court.

Blas wanted the proceeds of the auction of the building , over which she has a lien of P8,200.

But the Sps. Said that failure of payment of the price of the land will entitle them to the ownership of the builing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the Sps is valid? What is the recourse or remedy left to the parties in
such eventuality where the builder fails to pay the value of the land

HELD: No. There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion of
appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the valueof the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner,
the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445.

The SC cited several remedies:

1. If the builder fails to pay the price of the land, when such is demanded by the landowner, the parties may decide
to leave the thing as they are and assume the relationship of lessor or lessee.
2. If the parties do not agree to assume such relationship, the owner of the land is entitles to have the
improvements removed; or
3. The land and the improvement will be sold at the public auction be the proceeds be applied first to the owner of
the land and the excess to the owner of the improvement.

Calapan Lumber v Com. Sawmill

Facts: Calapan Lumber Co. (Calapan) constructed a road and bridge at its own expense with the knowledge and consent
of the Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro. Before the construction, the personnel of the Office of the District Engineer
surveyed the layout of the road to be constructed, also at the expense of Calapan. Calapan also secured and used road-
right-of-way agreements executed in his favor by the owners of the several parcels of land traversed by the said road.

The road was used by the public without any restriction except logging and lumber concerns, which was questioned by
Sawmill.

Issue: Whether the road is private and Calapan could legally deny its use to Sawmill.

Held: No, the road is not private. Everything that Calapan did for the construction of the road does not convert it into a
private property for the part of land where the road was laid out and constructed are not owned by Calapan. The
owners also ceded their parts of the land owned by them without consideration.

Pecson v CA

Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For failure to pay
realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for
P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City, the RTC upheld the spouses title but
declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This was affirmed by
the CA.

The Nuguids became the uncontested owners of commercial lot. The Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession
of the lot and the apartment building

ISSUE: WON the Nuguids should reimburse Pecson for the benefits derived from the apartment building?

HELD: YES. Since petitioners opted to appropriate the improvement for themselves as early as June 1993,when they
applied for a writ of execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include the apartment building, they
could not benefit from the lots improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full, based on the current market
value of the property.

Under Article 448, the landowner is given the option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own upon payment
of the proper amount of indemnity or to sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly, Article 546 provides that
a builder in good faith is entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and useful expenses incurred; it also gives
him right of retention until full reimbursement is made.

The right of retention is considered as one of the measures devised by the law for the protection of builders in good
faith. Its object is to guarantee full and prompt reimbursement as it permits the actualpossessor to remain in possession
while he has not been reimbursed (by the person who defeated him inthe case for possession of the property) for those
necessary expenses and useful improvements madeby him on the thing possessed.

Given the circumstances of the instant case where the builder in good faith has been clearly denied his right of retention
for almost half a decade, we find that the increased award of rentals by the RTC was reasonable and equitable. The
petitioners had reaped all the benefits from the improvement introduced by the respondent during said period, without
paying any amount to the latter as reimbursement for his construction costs and expenses. They should account and pay
for such benefits.

Ignao v IAC

FACTS:

The case involves Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his Uncles Juan and Isidro Ignao as Respondents. Both Petitioner and
Respondents co-owned land with 534 sqm (about the size of an Olympic swimming pool.) in Cavite. The parties had a
falling out (maybe the uncles had bad breath) and so attempted to partition the land, with 133 going to the uncles and
266 going to Petitioner. The attempt failed. Later, Petitioner discovered that the two houses of Respondent uncles
encroached his land. Juan ate 42 sqm and Isidro ate 59 sqm for the grand total of 101 sqm. He complained.

The RTC said that uncles built in good faith therefore that exempts them from damages. Art 448 therefore applies But
things didnt go to well for the Petitioner. The RTC said that if Petitioner opted to appropriate the sections of the
encroaching houses, the Uncles will be left with worthless hovels. Hence, RTC ordered Petitioner to just sell his land
which was encroached. No Good! cried Petitioner and he appealed to the IAC. He lost again. Petitioner trooped to the
SC for vindication

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Petitioner has the right to choose whether to appropriate the house encroaching his land or to sell his
land.

2. Whether or not the courts and respondents can rob Petitioner of the options provided for under Art 448.
HELD: Petitioner has the right whether to appropriate the houses or to sell his land! The ruling of the RTC and IAC
contravened the explicit provisions of Art 448 which granted him the explicit right to choose. The law is clear when it
bestows choice upon the aggrieved land owner and not upon the builders or the courts.

Gardner v CA-

Facts: Ruby H. Gardner, obtained on credit from the grocery store of the private respondents, spouses Eugenio de Castro
and Trinidad Mar located in Los Baos, Laguna, some petty cash and a variety of consumer goods such as groceries,
toilet articles, rice, and other necessities for home use, which totalled P7,000.00. Without enough cash to pay her debt,
petitioner executed on October 23, 1957 in favor of the private respondents a public instrument entitled "Deed of Sale
with Right of Repurchase"

After the execution of the above instrument, petitioner continued her credit line with the private respondents' store
incurring additional obligations totalling P3,436.75. Still unable to pay, petitioner on April 10, 1958 executed in favor of
the private respondents another public instrument entitled "Document of the Increase of the Amount Involved in the
Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase"

Gardner tendered the agreed repurchase price of 10k but the private respondents son refused to accept is as they
demanded 50,000 because they already introduced improvements.

Issue: WON the mortgagee is entitles to reimbursement for the improvements introduced.

Ruling

NO. The mortgagee who is in possession of the mortgaged property and introduces improvements therein is not entitled
to reimbursement for the value thereof upon the redemption of the mortgage. According to Art. 2125, par. 2, NCC "the
persons in whose favor the law establishes a mortgage have no other right than to demand execution and the recording
of the document in which the mortgage is formalized."

In the case at bar, respondents-spouses have no right to claim for reimbursement of the value of the improvements
introduced by them on the land. for the possession of the mortgagee is subject to the right of redemption by the
mortgagor who at any time may exercise such right within the period stipulated. If the mortgagee improves the land, he
does so at his risk.

To hold otherwise would render redemption oppressive and onerous to the owner-redemptioner, if not nugatory and
inoperative for all that a scheming mortgagee interested in owning the land would do is to saddle the land with so much
improvements that the owner will find himself financially incapable of redeeming the mortgage. The value of the
improvements will have to be added to the principal indebtedness thereby driving the debtor deeper and deeper into
debt until he is finally "improved out" of his property.

Felices v Iriola

Silverio Fences was the grantee of a homestead Camarines Sur, and by virtue of which he was issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 104 over said property. The month following the issuance of his patent, Felices conveyed in conditional sale
to defendant and appellant Mamerto Iriola a portion of his homestead of more than four hectares, for the consideration
of P1,700. The conveyance expressly stipulates that the sale was subject to the provisions of Sec. 119 of Act 141, as
amended, and to the prohibitions spread on the vendor's patent; and that after the lapse of five years or as soon as may
be allowed by law, the vendor or his successors would execute in vendee's favor a deed of absolute sale over the land in
question.

Two years after the sale, Felices tried to recover the land in question from Iriola, but the latter refused to allow it unless
he was paid the amount of P2,000 as the alleged value of improvements he had introduced on the property. In view of
appellant's persistent refusal, plaintiff deposited the received price in court and filed this action .
Issue: WON Iriola can recover or be reimbursed the value of his improvements on the land in question, on the theory
that as both he and appellee knew that their sale was illegal and void, they were both in bad faith and consequently, Art.
453 of the Civil Code applies in that "the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good
faith"?

Ruling: NO.

The rule of Art. 453 of the Civil Code invoked by appellant can not be applied to the instant case for the reason that the
lower court found, and appellant admits, that the improvements in question were made on the premises only after
Felices had tried to recover the land in question from appellant, and even during the pendency of this action in the court
below.

Iriola, recognizing Felices right to get back his property, continued to act in bad faith when he made improvements on
the land in question after he had already been asked extra-judicially and judicially, to surrender and return its possession
to appellee; and as a penalty for such bad faith, he must forfeit his improvements without any right to reimbursement
therefor. "He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses that is built, planted, or sown without
right to indemnity"

Ignacio v Director

Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of
accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application
holding that said land formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain

HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case because it refers to accretion or deposits on
the banks of rivers while this refers to action in the Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores by accretions caused by actions of the sea
form part of the pubic domain when they are no longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the executive and
the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any said land is no longer
necessary for public use. Until such declaration is made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.

Rep. v CA 131 scra 532

FACTS: Subject land was 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. It was owned by Benedicto del Rio.
After his death, it was acquired by Santos del Rio. Private oppositors sought permission and obtained the same
to construct duck houses. They violated agreement by consructing residential houses. Santos then sought to
register the land which was opposed. The oppositors was able to obtain sales application on the land. The director of
Lands alleged that since a portion of the land is submerged in water 4 to 5 months, then it forms part of the public
domain.

HELD: According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools is the covered by their
waters when at their highest ordinary depthregular, common, natural, which occurs almost or most of the time
during the year.

Laguna de Bay is a lake and that part around it which becomes covered with water 4 to 5 months a year, not due
to tidal action, but due to rains cannot be considered as part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay nor as a foreshore
land. Property not being so, the land is registrable.
Rep. v CA 132 scra 514

FACTS: Tancincos are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered situated in, Bulacan bordering on the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. Respondents sought the registration of land adjacent to their fishpond. Fiscal
Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for
registration. The lower and appellate court allowed registration but this was opposed by the government.

HELD:

There is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the
private respondents simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan Rivers, and thus, if
there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible
sedimentation by the waters of the river. Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.

Yorobe v Soreta

Hilario v Manila

Facts: Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land in San Mateo, Rizal. Upon his death this property
was inherited by his son, Jose Hilario, Jr., to whom a new certificate of title was issued. During the lifetime of plaintiffs
father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San Mateo River.

To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side.
This was further fortified by a stonewall built on the northern side. For years, these safeguards served their purpose.
However, in 1937, a great and extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place including the neighboring
barrios and municipalities. The River destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed and meandered into the
Hilario estate, segregating from the rest thereof a lenticular piece of land. The disputed area is on the eastern side of
this lenticular strip which now stands between the old riverbed site and the new course. In 1945, the US Army opened a
sand and gravel plant within the premises, and started scraping, excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the
nearby areas along the River. The operations eventually extended northward into the strip of land. Consequently, a
claim for damages was filed with the US War Department by Luis Hidalgo, the then administrator of Dr. Hilarios estate.
The US Army paid. In 1947, the plant was turned over to herein defendants-appellants and appellee who took over its
operations.

On 22 October 22, 1949, plaintiff filed his complaint for injunction and damages against the defendants City Engineer of
Manila, District Engineer of Rizal, the Director of Public Works, and Engr. Busuego, the Engineer-in-charge of the plant.
Subsequently, the Bureau of Mines and Atty. Maximo Calalang were respectively allowed to join the litigation as
intervenors; as per issue of fees and penalties for materials (sand and gravel) extracted. On 14 March 1954, defendants
filed a petition for injunction against plaintiff and intervenor Calalang in the same case, alleging that the latter have
fenced off the disputed area in contravention of an agreement had between the latter and the Director of Public Works
wherein the defendants were allowed to continue their operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit.
On 13 May 1954, plaintiff amended his complaint and impleaded as additional defendants the City of Manila, the
Provincial Treasurer of Rizal, and Engr. Eulogio Sese, the new Engineer-in-charge of the plant. Plaintiff also converted his
claim to one purely for damages directed against the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, solidarily, in the
amount of P1,000,000.00, as the cost of materials taken since 1949, as well as those to be extracted therefrom until
defendants stop their operations. On 21 December 1956, the lower court rendered its decision, ordering the City of
Manila and Director of Public Works to pay Hilario in solidum the sum of P376,989.60 as cost of gravel and sand
extracted from the plaintiffs land, plus costs; and ordering the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal to reimburse intervenor
Calalang of P36.80 representing gravel fees illegally collected. None of the parties litigants seemed satisfied with this
decision and they all sought a reconsideration of the same. On August 30, 1957, the lower court resolved the motions to
reconsider with an order, holding that the 2/5 portion of the area in controversy to Hilario, and dismissing the case
against the Bureau of Public Works insofar as money claims are concerned without prejudice to Hilario taking action
against proper party in such claim. Hilario and Calalang filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the lower court
denied. Hence, the appeal.

The Supreme Court set aside the decision and orders appealed from, and entered another judgment to the effect that
the City of Manila and the Director of Public Works, and his agent and employees, are absolved of liability from
extracting materials from subject property (of public domain); and the portion within the strip of land question declared
not part of public domain and confirmed as part of Hilarios private property. No Costs.

Jagualing v CA

FACTS:

Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in size due to erosion caused
by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas provided that they prevent
squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura which was the
subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In the amicable settlement the
heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of 1,289 square meters more or less to
Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real owners of the land in
litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. According to them, they acquired the land by
acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They presented tax declarations and photos of
actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against Jagualing. RTC
dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership over
the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public domain not susceptible of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent thereto the accumulation of
alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true owners of the land subject of this case and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the land to private respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?

HELD: No.

From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave actually existed
and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. The CA, therefore, properly applied Article 463 of
the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or isolated by river movement to be retained
by the owner thereof prior to such separation or isolation. The parcel of land in question is part of an island that formed
in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its
present size due to the gradual and successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err in
applying Article 465 of the Civil Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer
margin as sole owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private respondents,
they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property along the
margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under Article 465,
also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the
best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no specific act of possession over the
accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse
possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens system must itself still be
registered.

However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and their possession cannot
be considered in good faith since by their admission they have recognized Eduaves ownership over the land. Thus the
land still belongs to Eduave.

Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such accretion may be lost to
third parties thru prescription.

Bucton v Gasbar

Facts: Sps Bucton bought a portion of Gabars.. read page 104 of book

Issue: Is an action to quiet title imprescriptible?

Yes. Even though the Civil Code does not include an action to quiet title as one of those actions which are
imprescriptible, the SC in this case held that such action is imprescriptible. The basis of the court is Art. 480. The
imprescriptibility of an action to quiet title is a general principle from American jurisprudence. (Bucton v. Gabar, G.R. No.
L-36359, Jan.31, 1974)