Professional Documents
Culture Documents
INTRODUCTION
R
ecent developments in performance evaluation systems have advocated the use of
nonfinancial performance measures to overcome the inadequacies of traditional fi-
nancial measures (Kaplan and Norton 2001; Kaplan and Atkinson 1998). Financial
measures have been criticized as too late, too aggregate, and too one-dimensional in nature
to be useful (Kaplan 1984; Lynch and Cross 1991; Ittner and Larcker 1998). In contrast,
nonfinancial measures are considered broader, forward-looking, and useful for developing
and sustaining long-term competitive advantages (Kaplan 1983; Kaplan and Atkinson
1998).
This study seeks to explain how nonfinancial performance measures affect employee
behaviors. Specifically, it investigates if and how the use of nonfinancial measures affects
employee procedural fairness perceptions and how such perceptions translate into favorable
outcomes like high employee organizational commitment and job performance. Employee
performance appraisals are important to employees. Not only are their compensation pack-
ages, such as their remuneration, rewards, and promotions, closely linked to their perform-
ance appraisals, such appraisals are also a reflection of their success or failure. They affect
We are grateful to Rona Duthie for her assistance with the data collection. We thank the editor and two anonymous
referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
55
56 Lau and Moser
employees intrinsic values, such as their self-esteem and self-confidence (Kaplan and
Atkinson 1998). It should therefore not be surprising that employees are sensitive to their
performance appraisals including the type of the performance measures, such as financial
or nonfinancial, used to arrive at these appraisals (Kaplan 1984; Lipe and Salterio 2000;
Banker et al. 2004; Libby et al. 2004). Anthony and Govindarajan (1995, 567) note that
senior management can create the desired long-term versus short-term profit orientation
on the part of business unit managers ... by a judicious choice of financial and nonfinancial
criteria. Hence, the evaluation process, especially the evaluation criteria used, are likely
to have a significant effect on employees attitudes towards their organizations and their
jobs.
In this regard, the fairness of the evaluation system is likely to be a major determinant
of employee behaviors where a fair evaluation process is expected to result in favorable
employee commitment and performance (Lind and Tyler 1988; Lau and Lim 2002). Over
the past few decades, the passing of antidiscrimination legislation in many countries has
resulted in an entrenchment of justice. Employees are now more conscious of fairness and
equity on the job. They hold their superiors and their organizations accountable and re-
sponsible for their wellbeing, especially with regard to the provision of fair treatment for
their effort and performance. Kaplan and Atkinson (1998, 682) underscore the importance
of fairness in performance evaluation systems as follows: There are important behavioral
considerations that the performance measurement system must reflect. First and above
all, the individual must believe that the system is fair ... Absent this belief, the motiva-
tional potential of incentive compensation will be lost (emphasis added). Anthony and
Govindarajan (1995, 556) similarly suggest that top management should be aware that
objectives, goals and standards are likely to provide strong incentives only if the manager
perceives them as fair (emphasis added).Procedural fairness refers to the fairness of the
process or procedures used to determine these outcomes (Leventhal et al. 1980). In their
study on procedural fairness, Lind and Tyler (1988, 141) conclude that:
Wherever research has examined procedural justice it has been found that people
care about the fairness of procedures. People may give different weights to
various concerns as they decide in different situations what constitutes proce-
dural justice, but they appear always to make procedural justice judgments and
these judgments are always important to them. (emphasis added)
Because fairness in performance evaluation is a critical aspect of employee wellbeing
and the attainment of organizational objectives, it is useful to examine how employees who
are used to being evaluated by traditional financial measures react to nonfinancial measures,
particularly with regard to their perceptions of procedural fairness of nonfinancial perform-
ance measures.
Several issues are addressed in this study. First, would employees evaluated by nonfi-
nancial measures perceive such measures as procedurally fair or unfair? If they perceived
them as fair, would such fairness perceptions affect their relationships with their organi-
zations and, importantly, their job performance? Do nonfinancial measures affect employee
job performance directly or are their effects indirect through higher employees perceptions
of procedural fairness and higher level of employee organizational commitment? The next
section of the paper discusses the theoretical justification for the hypotheses developed to
address these issues. This is followed by a description of the method used and the presen-
tation of the results. The final section provides the conclusions and the limitations of the
study.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Figure 1 depicts the model used to investigate the research issues of this study. It
proposes that the use of nonfinancial measures as employee performance evaluation criteria
is associated with both procedural fairness and organizational commitment. These two var-
iables, in turn, are likely to be associated with improvement in employee job performance.
These relationships suggest that the effect of nonfinancial measures on employee organi-
zational commitment is indirect through procedural fairness. Further, the effect of nonfi-
nancial measures on employee job performance is indirect through (1) employee perceptions
of procedural fairness, and (2) employee organizational commitment.
FIGURE 1
Relationship between Nonfinancial Performance Measure Use and Employee
Behavioral Outcomes
Procedural
fairness
D
B
C
A Organizational E
commitment
Nonfinancial Managerial
measure performance
use
and Larcker 1998; Fisher 1992). With respect to time horizon, because of the need to
produce periodic financial reports, financial measures are generally short-term measures
corresponding to monthly, quarterly, or annual reporting periods (Kaplan 1984). Because
of these preoccupations with objectivity, financial outcomes, and short-term horizon, finan-
cial measures may generally be (1) too narrow, (2) too aggregate, and (3) too myopic to
capture comprehensively employee effort and performance in broader and longer-term set-
tings (Kaplan 1983, 1984; Kaplan and Norton 2001). Performance evaluations based on
such criteria may be problematic.
In contrast, nonfinancial measures are generally less closely tied to the annual financial
reporting cycle. Hence, there may be fewer constraints from accounting regulations and
less pressure on time horizon. Consequently, these measures may be (1) expressed in
broader (nonmonetary) terms, (2) measured over a longer time horizon, and (3) tailor-made
to reflect individualized situations (Fisher 1992; Ittner and Larcker 1998; Banker et al.
2004; Libby et al. 2004). Such a wide diversity of possible measures (e.g., setup time and
defect rate) facilitates a greater focus on the causes as opposed to the outcomes of mana-
gerial actions. Problems are highlighted so that managers know where to focus their atten-
tion. Managers evaluated by such measures are likely to harbor favorable organizational
attitudes, including their commitment to the organization which uses such measures. Ac-
cordingly, we suggest the following hypothesis:
1
Concepts of distributive fairness are based on the principle of equity. The allocation of benefits and costs within
a group should be proportional to the contributions of group members.
Because of the loose link with the financial reporting cycles, nonfinancial measures are
broad, long-term, and cause-focused. Such characteristics allow a broader spectrum of per-
formance to be measured. Financial measures are limited to what can be measured objec-
tively in financial terms, which tends to exclude or delay the effects of intangible invest-
ments (Kaplan and Norton 2001). The benefits of managers efforts expended to improve
intangible assets (e.g., investments in improving employees skills and customer relation-
ships) are generally excluded by financial measures. Nonfinancial measures provide the
means to overcome such inaccuracies by measuring intangible assets in nonmonetary terms.
This allows the intangible to be valued and ensures that managers efforts are more accu-
rately reflected.
Nonfinancial measures may also be more accurate in measuring performance that is
spread over several years. The benefits arising from operating managers efforts to enhance
organizational long-term viability in areas such as investment in innovation, future tech-
nologies and capabilities are generally not realizable within the annual financial reporting
cycle (Shank and Govindarajan 1994). Because financial measures may be constrained by
the annual financial reporting cycle, their use here may be problematic. In contrast, nonfi-
nancial measures are unconstrained by time considerations. They may therefore measure
employee long-term performance more accurately. Since accuracy and completeness of
information are fundamental fairness criteria (Leventhal 1980), employees may perceive
the use of such measures as fair procedurally.
Employee procedural fairness judgments may also be influenced by time period con-
siderations. The Self-Interest Theory of procedural fairness suggests that people are fun-
damentally concerned with self-interests (Lind and Tyler 1988). However, because they
may gain more in the long term if they engage in social interactions, the long-term effects
of group procedures may matter more to them than any possible short-term losses. This
suggests that procedural fairness judgment is influenced by long-term considerations. Be-
cause nonfinancial measures are unconstrained by time considerations, they are more useful
as a means for communicating long-term organizational goals, expectations, and results.
This allows employees to understand how their association with their organizations will be
paid off in the long term. They may therefore view long-term nonfinancial measures as fair
procedurally.
Procedural fairness judgments may also be enhanced if there are provisions for unfair
decisions to be rectified (Leventhal 1980; Lind and Tyler 1988). Because nonfinancial
measures are measured in nonmonetary terms, they may be interpreted in a more flexible
and subjective manner. Additionally, nonfinancial measures such as setup time and customer
satisfaction rates may be easier to understand than aggregate financial measures such as
efficiency variances (Johnson 1988; Fisher 1992). Given that (1) subordinates are likely to
have a better understanding of the appraisal criteria, and (2) the appraisals are subject
to flexible interpretations, the subordinates may be in a better position to seek explanations
about their performance appraisals and to submit alternative interpretations. This increases
the likelihood for unfair appraisals to be properly discussed, explained, and rectified.
The use of nonfinancial measures as evaluation criteria may provide employees with a
better sense of control over their performance appraisals and a means to protect their self-
interest. Leventhal (1980, 44) considered control an essential fairness criterion. Hence, even
though people have surrendered the final decision making to others, they still need to have
some control to protect their interests (Thibaut and Walker 1975). With financial measures,
employees may find it difficult to see the connection between their actions and financial
outcomes such as variances, which may have several causes, not all directly controllable
expect procedural injustice to be a potent source of anger and dislike with respect to
whoever is seen as producing the injustice.
Empirically, several studies document a positive association between procedural fairness
and organizational commitment (Cropanzano and Folger 1991; Kim and Mauborgne 1993).
Some studies also found an association between procedural fairness and job performance
(Cornelius 1985; Earley and Lind 1987). In a management accounting context, Libby (1999)
found high procedural fairness (combination of voice and explanation) to be positively
associated with performance improvements. Wentzel (2002) similarly found fairness per-
ception to be positively associated with performance through goal commitment. Hence,
both the instrumental and noninstrumental theories suggest that high procedural fairness
promotes organizational commitment and job performance. We therefore propose the
following:
Organizational commitment in turn may be associated with job performance (Link E).
Jaros et al. (1993) suggest that unlike continuance commitment that reflects a cold calcu-
lation of costs and benefits, affective commitment involves the formation of an emotional
bond. Employees who perceive procedural fairness in their organizations procedures are
likely to remain in their organization because they want to and not because they have to
or are obligated to. If employees choose to stay because they want to, they are likely to do
so because of their emotional attachment and loyalty to the organization. This implies a
strong belief and acceptance of their organizations goals and values and hence the will-
ingness to exert effort to achieve these goals to help the organization to be successful.
Hence, apart from a desire to maintain organizational membership, Porter et al. (1974, 604)
suggest that affective organizational commitment is characterized by a willingness to exert
considerable effort on behalf of the organization. Affective organizational commitment is
therefore likely to be positively associated with employee job performance. Several studies
have found such positive relationships (e.g., Mowday et al. 1979; Ferris and Larcker 1983;
Meyer et al. 1989). Based on the above discussion, we suggest the following hypothesis:
METHOD
We collect survey data from a sample of organizations from Kompass, the United
Kingdom online database. We include only manufacturing organizations with more than
100 employees and an annual turnover of more than U.K. 75 million pounds. The selection
of manufacturing organizations provided some degree of control for industry. We select
relatively large-size organizations because accounting and control procedures tend to be-
come more sophisticated and specialized with increasing firm size. The development and
implementation of nonfinancial measures by themselves or in conjunction with financial
measures may be a relatively complex and time-consuming process. For this reason, it is
probable that only large organizations with significant managerial expertise and resources
will have the need and means to implement such systems. In order to avoid a potential bias
that could result from different levels of management, we target functional department
heads.
The selection criteria were met by 142 organizations, which we contacted to obtain the
names of their departmental heads to send the questionnaires. Six companies could not be
contacted and 33 were not willing to participate because their policies prohibited the dis-
closure of their managers names. Contact with the remaining 103 resulted in a list of 296
functional heads. In order to avoid a company bias, we select no more than four managers
from each organization. Consistent with previous studies, the selection of participants from
different functional areas allows the results to be generalized to different functional areas
(e.g., Hopwood 1972; Brownell 1982).
A questionnaire, together with a cover letter explaining the purpose of the study and
assuring confidentiality of responses, was mailed to each of the 296 selected managers. A
total of 158 responses were returned, which constitutes a response rate of 53.5 percent.
Seven of the responses were substantially incomplete and two were completed incorrectly,
which we excluded from the study, thus leaving 149 usable responses. To check for non-
response bias, we split the sample in half based on the response dates. Mean comparisons
for the variables used in the study indicate that there are no significant differences between
early and late responses (Oppenheim 1992).
The average functional head in our sample is about 45 years of age, has spent nine
years in the current job, and has 125 employees in their unit. These data suggest that the
respondents are generally high level and experienced managers in their organizations. The
mean score of the use of nonfinancial measures as performance criteria is 4.57 out of a
maximum of 7. One hundred and nine out of the 149 respondents reported nonfinancial
measures use scores in excess of the scale midpoint of 4. Selecting the highest mean score
from among the three nonfinancial perspectives (customer, internal business, and learning
and growth) for each respondent resulted in a much higher mean score of 5.53 for non-
financial measures use. These results indicate that the use of nonfinancial measures
for employee performance evaluation was prevalent in the organizations selected for our
study.
Measurement Instrument
Nonfinancial Measures Use
Because our study is designed to investigate the behavioral responses of individual
employees to nonfinancial measures use, we employ an instrument that measures the eval-
uation of individual employee performance rather the organizational or business unit per-
formance. Hopwoods (1972) instrument asks respondents: When your superior is evalu-
ating your performance, how much importance do you think he or she attaches to the
following items? (emphasis added). As this reflects individual rather than organizational
performance, we adopt this wording for our study.
The nonfinancial measures items are based on the performance measures of a Balanced
Scorecard. The Balanced Scorecard nonfinancial perspectives are customer, internal busi-
ness, and learning and growth. We employ 15 nonfinancial performance items based on the
generic measures suggested by Kaplan and Atkinson (1998). The five learning and growth
measures are employee satisfaction rate, number of employees trained, employee turnover
rate, number of innovations developed, and the adoption of new technology. The five in-
ternal business perspective measures are quality of output, defect rates, setup time, manu-
facturing cycle, and inventory level. The five customer perspective measures are number of
new customers acquired, response time to customers, number of customer complaints, num-
ber of overdue deliveries, and customer satisfaction rate. We use a seven-point scale for
each item.
Table 1 contains the results of a factor analysis with varimax rotation indicating that
the 15 items load on three factors, each with an eigenvalue greater than 1. The three factors
TABLE 1
Nonfinancial Measures: Factor Analysis Results and Cronbach Alphas
Internal Learning
Items Processes Customer and Growth
Rotated factor loadings:
Employee satisfaction rate 0.721
Number of employees trained 0.694
Employee turnover rate 0.840
Number of innovations 0.729
Adoption of new technology 0.789
Quality of manufacturing output 0.872
Defect rates 0.852
Setup times 0.890
Manufacturing cycle time 0.900
Inventory level 0.691
Number of new customers acquired 0.662
Response time to customers 0.828
Number of customer complaints 0.847
Number of overdue deliveries 0.742
Customer satisfaction rate 0.855
Eigenvalue 4.12 3.54 3.18
Variance explained 27.4% 23.6% 21.2%
Cronbach alpha 0.927 0.899 0.847
correspond with the three different perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard. All items load
satisfactorily onto their respective perspectives, with loadings ranging from 0.662 to 0.900.
The Cronbach alpha for the 15 items is 0.910. These results support the internal consistency
of the instrument.
We calculate the mean for each perspective to obtain an overall nonfinancial measure
score per perspective, which are then averaged to obtain an overall mean. Table 2 presents
the descriptive statistics of this overall mean of nonfinancial measure use. The standard
deviation is 1.21 and the mean is 4.57, which is reasonably close to the scale midpoint of
4. The actual range of between 1.07 and 6.87 is close to the scale endpoints (i.e., 1 to 7).
Organizational Commitment
We measure this variable using Mowday et al.s (1974) instrument that comprises nine
items measured on a seven-point Likert scale. This instrument has been tested extensively
and used widely in both management accounting studies and other disciplines. Respondents
are asked to rate statements such as the following: I find that my values and this orga-
nizations values are very similar, I am proud to tell others that I am part of this orga-
nization, and I really care about this organization. Combining the nine items of this
variable with the four items from procedural fairness above, the factor analysis results in
Table 3 support the unidimensional nature of the nine items for the organizational com-
mitment instrument. All nine items load on one factor with an eigenvalue of 5.18 and
explain 40 percent of the variance. Only one item loads at 0.473, which is close to the 0.5
benchmark. The remaining item loadings range from 0.674 to 0.853. The scales Cronbach
alpha is 0.913. The mean is 44.65 and the standard deviation is 9.2.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Theoretical
Range Actual Range
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Min Max
Nonfinancial measure use 4.57 1.21 1 7 1.07 6.87
Procedural fairness 13.75 2.91 4 20 6 20
Organization commitment 44.65 9.20 9 63 19 63
Managerial performance 5.60 0.73 1 7 4 7
TABLE 3
Factor Analysis Results for Procedural Fairness and Organizational Commitment
Organizational Procedural
Items Commitment Fairness
Rotated factor loadingsa:
OC1 0.693
OC2 0.722
OC3 0.473
OC4 0.674
OC5 0.853
OC6 0.829
OC7 0.825
OC8 0.782
OC9 0.781
PF1 0.808
PF2 0.829
PF3 0.814
PF4 0.781
Managerial Performance
We use the Mahoney et al. (1963) instrument to measure managers performance. This
instrument requires managers to rate nine dimensions of performance: planning, coordi-
nating, evaluating, investigating, supervising, staffing, negotiating, representing, and overall
performance. According to Brownell (1982), this instrument is able to capture the multi-
dimensional nature of performance without introducing excessive dimensionality. We base
the performance score for our study on the overall performance of the respondents. This
approach is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Brownell 1982; Kren 1992; Lau. et al.
1995). In order to ensure that the overall performance score is a reflection of the subdi-
mension scores, we regress the eight dimensions of performance on the overall performance
score. The results indicate that the eight dimensions account for 57.7 percent of the vari-
ations in overall performance, which is slightly higher than the 55 percent benchmark
suggested by Mahoney et al. (1963). Accordingly, we use the overall performance scores
to test the hypotheses pertaining to managerial performance.
RESULTS
This study investigates whether the relationships between nonfinancial performance
measures use and employee organizational commitment is indirect through procedural fair-
ness. It also examines if procedural fairness and organizational commitment mediate the
relationship between nonfinancial measures use and managerial performance. Structural
equation modeling is the appropriate technique to analyze these hypothesized relationships.
We use AMOS for the structural equation analysis.
Tests of compliance with the assumptions of multivariate analyses indicate that the data
are normal and homoscedastic and the residuals are randomly distributed. As different
managers completed the surveys, free of influence from one another although sometimes
within the same organization, the data are reasonably independent.
We assess the goodness of fit of the structural equation models by the comparative fit
index (CFI), which is 0.931, the IFI (delta2) which is 0.932 and the TLI (rho2) which is
0.916. These fit indices are all higher than the recommended 0.9 benchmark (Segars and
Grover 1993; Hartwick and Barki 1994; Bentler 1995), thus indicating acceptable model
fit. Consequently, we use the standardized direct effects (path coefficients), the standardized
indirect effects, and the standardized total effects generated by the structural equation for
hypotheses testing.
Tests of H1 to H5
Table 4 presents the correlations among the variables in Figure 1. It indicates that the
correlation coefficients of the relations between (1) nonfinancial measure use and organi-
zational commitment (H1, r 0.396, p 0.01), (2) nonfinancial measure use and proce-
dural fairness (H2, r 0.290, p 0.01), (3) procedural fairness and organizational com-
mitment (H3, r 0.537, p 0.01), (4) procedural fairness and job performance (H4, r
0.346, p 0.01), and (5) organizational commitment and job performance (H5,
r 0.370, p 0.01), are all significant and in the predicted direction. These results provide
support for H1 to H5. They also provide the justification for further analysis of the data to
test H6 and H7.
Tests of H6 and H7
According to H6, the relationship between nonfinancial measures use and subordinates
organizational commitment is indirect through procedural fairness. From H7, the relation-
ship between nonfinancial performance measures use and subordinates job performance is
indirect through procedural fairness and organizational commitment. In order to test for the
intervening effects of procedural fairness and organizational commitment, it is necessary to
ascertain the direct and indirect effects. We obtain the standardized direct effect (path
coefficients), standardized indirect effects, as well as the standardized total effects of
the various relationships in Figure 1 from the outputs of AMOS as shown in Table 5 and
Figure 2.
The results in Table 5 indicate that, first, nonfinancial measures use is positively and
significantly related to organizational commitment as indicated by the total standardized
effect of 0.385 (p 0.01). Of this total effect, the direct effect is 0.218 and the indirect ef-
fect through procedural fairness is 0.167. This also can be computed from the path coef-
ficients in Figure 2 as follows: nonfinancial measure use minus procedural fairness minus
TABLE 4
Correlation Matrix among Independent and Dependent Variables
TABLE 5
Standardized Direct, Indirect, and Total Effectsa
FIGURE 2
Standardized Direct Effectsa
Procedural
fairness
0.221**
0.312***
0.536***
0.218** Organizational
commitment 0.193**
Nonfinancial Managerial
measure performance
use
0.134
a
** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01.
The results indicate that the indirect effect through procedural fairness is 0.069. The
indirect effect through organizational commitment is 0.074. As both again are above
the meaningful threshold of 0.05, they are presumed meaningful. Hence, H7 is supported.
The studys findings have important practical and theoretical implications. First, the
results highlight the importance of maintaining fairness in the workplace, particularly with
respect to employee performance evaluations. Management accountants should ensure that
performance evaluation procedures are designed to be fair. This will help to promote fa-
vorable employee behaviors. From a theoretical perspective, the results support both the
self-interest and the group value theories of procedural fairness. Lind and Tyler (1988, 232)
suggest that because procedures are very important aspects of the perceptions of groups,
evaluation of procedures ... would be expected to have strong effects on group relevant
attitudes (emphasis added). Our results indicate that evaluation of institutions, as measured
by the level of employee commitment to the organization, is not only an important outcome
of procedural fairness judgments, but also serves as the intervening variable through which
procedural fairness affects job performance. Finally, our study highlights the role of non-
financial measures in promoting workplace fairness. While research on the consequences
of procedural fairness helps practitioners to appreciate the importance of procedural fair-
ness, research on the antecedents of procedural fairness is even more useful as it demon-
strates to practitioners how procedural fairness can be enhanced. In this regard, most prior
management accounting studies that investigate fairness issues have focused primarily on
how employee participation, particularly in the budget-setting context, enhances procedural
fairness (e.g., Libby 1999; Lindquist 1995; Wentzel 2002; Lau and Tan 2006). In contrast,
the role of nonfinancial measures in enhancing procedural fairness has generally been over-
looked. Hence, the results of our study may provide some insights into how these increas-
ingly popular measures can be used to enhance fairness in the workplace.
There are a number of limitations associated with this study. First, while care was taken
to obtain a representative sample, bias in the sample may still occur. For instance, there
may be a higher likelihood for those who generally have good experiences with their
performance measurement systems to respond than those with poor experiences. Second,
problems of error in measurement may occur because of our reliance on self-reported
performance measures. Finally, our study has focused only on fairness issues; namely,
perception of procedural fairness so that the role of fairness in the context of nonfinancial
measures can be better understood. It is likely that there are other variables that may have
important intervening effects. The existence of such intervening effects is evident from our
results. Note that while the magnitudes of the indirect effects found in our study are sub-
stantial, they are unable to account for all the effects of performance measure use on
employee behaviors. This is not surprising as employee behaviors are likely to be affected
by more than fairness considerations. Variables such as the business strategy employed and
the extent of employee involvement in the selection of performance measures may also
have intervening effects. As always, this leaves opportunities for further research in this
important and relevant area.
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