PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
G.R. No. 148748 January 14, 2015
IMELDA, LEONARDO, FIDELINO, AZUCENA,
JOSEFINA, ANITA and SISA, all surnamed
SYJUCO, Petitioners,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner-
Intervenor,
vs.
FELISA D. BONIFACIO and VSD REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the Decision1 dated February 23, 2001 and
Resolution2 dated June 26, 2001 of the Court Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777, which affirmed in toto the
Decision3 dated January 9, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 126 of Caloocan City in Civil Case
No. C-366.
The present controversy involves a parcel of land,
measuring around 2,835 square meters, which
originally formed part of a wider tract of land, dubbed as
the Maysilo Estate (subject land). The factual
antecedents, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioners Imelda, Leonardo, Fidelino, Azucena, Anita,
and Sisa, all surnamed Syjuco (collectively referred to
as petitioners) are the registered co-owners of the
subject land, located in the then Barrio of Balintawak,
Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1085304 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City on March 26,
1984. The subject land is particularly described under
petitioners certificate of title as follows:
It is hereby certified that certain land situated in the
Caloocan, Metro Manila, Philippines, bound and
described as follows:
Un terreno (Lote No. 3-B del plano de subdivision
Psd-706, parte del Lote No. 23-A, plano original
Psu-2345 de la Hacienda de Maysilo), situado en el
Barrio de Balintawak, Municipio de Caloocan, Provincia
de Rizal. Linda por el NE. con el Lote No. 3-D del plano
de subdivision; por el SE., con el Lote No. 3-C del plano
de subdivision; por el SO. con el Lote No. 7; y por el
No. con el Lote No. 3-A del plano de subdivision. x x x
midiendo una extension superficial de DOS MIL
OCHOCIENTOS TREINTA Y CINCO METROS
C U A D R A D O S C O N T R E I N TA D E C I M E T R O S
CUADRADOS (2, 835), mas o menos. x x x la fecha de
la medicion original 8 al 27 de Septiembre, 4 al 21 de
Octubre y 17-18 de Noviembre de 1911 y la de la
subdivision, 29 de Diciembre de 1924. (Consta la
descripcion decinica en el Certificado de Transferencia
de Titulo No. 10301)
xxxx
is registered in accordance with the provisions of the
Land Registration Act in the name of IMELDA G.
SYJUCO; LEONARDO G. SYJUCO; FIDELINO G.
SYJUCO; AZUCENA G. SYJUCO; JOSEFINA G.
SYJUCO; ANITA G. SYJUCO; SISA G. SYJUCO, all of
legal age, single, Filipinos, - -
1
as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the
encumbrances mentioned in Section 39 of said Act as
may be subsisting, and to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the inheritance
left by the deceased Monica Galauran and Mariano
Mesina. (From T.C.T. No. 12370)
Petitioners have been in open, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
since 1926. Petitioners traced back their title over the
subject land to TCT No. 10301 issued on February 26,
1926 to Monica Jacinto Galauran. Thereafter, TCT No.
10301 was replaced by TCT No. 8685 under the names
of Avelina Baello, Felisa Baello, Dolores Baello,
Eduardo Mesina, and Fausto Galauran (Avelina Baello,
et al.). TCT No. 8685 was then replaced by TCT No.
12370 under the names of the brothers Martin V. Syjuco
(Martin) and Manuel V. Syjuco (Manuel) pursuant to a
Deed of Sale of Real Estate5dated February 7, 1949
executed by Avelina Baello, et al. in favor of the siblings
Martin and Manuel. TCT No. 12370 was, in turn,
replaced by TCT No. 48566 issued on July 1, 1964 in
Martins name alone in accordance with a Partition
Agreement7 executed by the brothers on June 16,
1964. Upon Martins death, petitioners inherited the
subject land, and following the extrajudicial partition
they executed on June 27, 1976, they registered said
land in their names, as co-owners, under TCT No.
T-108530 issued on March 26, 1984. Petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest have been paying the real
property taxes over the subject land since 1949.8
Among the annotations on TCT No. T-108530 are two
encumbrances constituted by petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest on the subject land,
particularly: (1) a lease agreement dated September 24,
1963, in favor of Manufacturers Bank and Trust
Company (Manufacturers Bank), over a portion of the
subject land, with the condition that the buildings which
the lessee had constructed thereon shall become the
property of the lessor/s after the expiration of the lease
agreement; and (2) another lease agreement dated
December 20, 1971, in favor of a certain Chan Heng,
over the remaining portion of the subject land.9
Sometime in 1994, however, petitioners learned that a
broker named Exequiel Fajardo, through a
Letter10 dated March 9, 1994,offered for sale the subject
land along with the improvements thereon to a certain
Luis Ong, giving the following description of the
property and terms of the offer:
AREA: 2,835.30 square meters
Lot No. 23-A-4-B-2A-3B, PSD 706,
TCT265778,
Register of Deeds, Kalookan City
Location: Kalookan City (beside LRT Station)
Owner: Felisa D. Bonifacio
The terms of this offer are as follows:
Price: P35,000.00 per square meter
P a y m e n t 50% downpayment;
Terms: Balance subject to negotiation
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Petitioners found out that the purported owner of the
subject land, respondent Felisa D. Bonifacio
(Bonifacio), was the sub-lessee of Kalayaan
Development Corporation, which, in turn, was the sub-
lessee of Manufacturers Bank, which was the direct
lessee of petitioners. Petitioners also learned that
respondent Bonifacio was able to register the subject
land in her name under TCT No. 265778, which was
issued on March 29, 1993 by the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City. Respondent Bonifacios certificate of title
described the subject land as follows:
It is hereby certified that certain land situated in the
Caloocan City, Philippines, bounded and described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of the subd.
plan, Psd-706, L.R.C. Rec.No. ), situated in Balintawak,
Caloocan Rizal, Bounded of the E., along line 1-2 by
Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-D,on the SE., along line 2-3 by lot
23-A-4-B-2-A-3-C; both of the subd. plan on the SW.,
along line 3-4 by lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-6; and on the NW.,
along line 4-1 by Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A of the subd.
plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N.
71 deg. 17E., 1,285.85 m. from BLLN No. 1, Caloocan
thence; S. 01 deg. 46W., 27.70 m. to point 2; S 64 deg.
30W., 105.15 m. to point 3; N 23 deg. 12 W., 26.39 m.
to point 4; N. 65 deg. 22E., 116.78 m. to pt. of
beginning, containing an area of TWO THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FIVE SQ. METERS AND
THIRTY SQ. DECIMETERS (2,835.30). All pts. referred
to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by old pts. Bearings true; date of original survey,
Date of subd. survey, Dec. 29, 1922, is registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree in the name of FELISA D.
BONIFACIO, of legal age, Filipino, widow, -
as owner thereof in fee simple, subject to such of the
encumbrances mentioned in Section 44 of said Decree
as may be subsisting[.] x x x.11
Respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued
pursuant to an Order12 dated October 8, 1992 of the
RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 125, in L.R.C. Case No.
C-3288, entitled In the Matter of Petition for Authority to
Segregate an Area of 5,680.1 Square Meters from Lot
23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD-706 (PSU-2345) of Maysilo
Estate and Issuance of Separate Certificate of Title in
the Name of Felisa D. Bonifacio. RTC-Branch 125
granted respondent Bonifacios petition for segregation
because:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that
in Case No. 4557 for Petition for Substitution of
Names, in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 1, the then Presiding Judge Cecilia Muoz
Palma, issued an Order dated May 25, 1962
(EXHIBIT "N") substituting Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal as one of the registered owners of several
parcels of landforming the Maysilo Estate and
covered by, among others, Original Certificate of
Title No. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal with
among others Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio to the
extent of 1/6 of 1-189/1000 per cent of the entire
Maysilo Estate. On January 29, 1991, Eleuteria
Rivera Bonifacio executed in favor of Felisa D.
Bonifacio, herein petitioner, a Deed of Assignment
(EXHIBIT "M") assigning all her rights and interests
over Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A, Psd-706 and Lot 23-A-4-
2
B-2-A-3-B, Psd-706, both lots being covered by
O.C.T. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. That
even prior to the execution of the Deed of Assignment
but while negotiations with Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio
were going on, petitioner already requestedthe Lands
Management Sector, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, National Capital Region, to prepare
and issue the Technical Descriptions of the two lots
subject of this petition. As requested by petitioner,
Elpidio T. de Lara, Chief, Technical Services Section,
Lands Management Sector, DENR-NCR, issued on
June 20, 1990, two technical descriptions (EXHIBITS
"J" and "K") covering the two lots. After the issuance of
the technical descriptions, the petitioner requested
Geodetic Engineer Jose R. Rodriguez to prepare a
sketch plan of the two lots subject of this petition. As
requested, Engr. Rodriguez prepared a sketch plan
(EXHIBIT "L") based from Exhibits "J" and "K" which
was submitted to the Lands Management Services,
formerly Bureau of Lands, for verification and checking.
That Mr. Benjamin V. Roque, Chief, Topographic and
Special Map Section, Land Management Services,
formerly Bureau of Lands, certified on July 31, 1992
that the sketch plan (EXHIBIT "L") is a true and correct
plan of Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B,
both on Psd-[706]. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, RTC-Branch 125 decreed in the same Order:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
hereby GRANTS the petition and orders the
segregation of Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-B-2-
A-3-B both on Psd-[706] from Original Certificate of Title
No. 994 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in favor of the
herein petitioner. Upon the finality of this order and the
payment of the prescribed fees if any and presentation
of the clearances of said lots, the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City is ordered to issue a new transfer
certificate of title in the name of herein petitioner Felisa
D. Bonifacio over Lots 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and 23-A-4-
B-2-A-3-Bboth on Psd-[706] of O.C.T. 994 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal.13
For unexplained reasons, the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City issued TCT No. 265778 to respondent
Bonifacio on March 29, 1993 even before RTC-Branch
125 declared its Order dated October 8, 1992, granting
respondent Bonifacios petition for segregation, final
and executory on April 6, 1993.14
Civil Case No. C-366 before
RTC-Branch 126
To protect their rights and interest over the subject land,
petitioners lodged a Petition15 on July 28, 1994,
docketed as Civil Case No. C-366 before RTC-Branch
126, Kalookan City, praying for the declaration of nullity
and cancellation of respondent Bonifacios TCT No.
265778 over the subject land in view of petitioners
subsisting TCT No. T-108530 over the very same
property. In an Order16 dated July 28, 1994, RTC-
Branch 126 deemed Civil Case No. C-366 as a special
civil action for quieting of title and not an ordinary civil
action for recovery of ownership of land.
Subsequently, petitioners discovered that respondent
Bonifacio sold the subject land in favor of respondent
VSD Realty & Development Corporation (VSD Realty),
and that TCT No. 265778 in the name of respondent
Bonifacio had already been cancelled and replaced by
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
TCT No. 28531317 in the name of respondent VSD
Realty on September 12, 1994. As a result, petitioners
filed on April 25, 1995 an Amended Petition,
18 impleading respondent VSD Realty in Civil Case No.
C-366.
Petitioners contended before RTC-Branch 126 that
although TCT No. T-108530 of petitioners, on one hand,
and TCT No. 265778 of respondent Bonifacio and TCT
No. 285313 of respondent VSD Realty, on the other
hand, contained different technical descriptions, said
certificates of title actually pertained to one and the
same property. According to petitioners, respondents
certificates of title over the subject land could have only
been obtained fraudulently given that:
a) No subsequent survey of the Lot could have been
obtained, approved by the Director of Lands, and
presented by the respondent as there exists an original
isolated survey thereto for which Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 10301 covering the said land was issued as
early as 26 February 1926 in the name of Monica
Jacinto Galauran, married to Mariano Mesina.
b) TCT No. 265778 was issued in the name of the
respondent Felisa Bonifacio on [29] March 1993 before
the issuance on 6 April 1993 by the Branch Clerk of
Court (RTC Branch 125 in L.R.C. No. C-3288) of a
Certificate of Finality of the aforesaid Order dated 8
October 1992.
c) TCT No. 265778 was issued to Felisa Bonifacio on
29 March 1993 without the Register of Deeds of
Kalookan City requiring the presentation of the owners
duplicate copy of O.C.T. No. 994.19
Respondent Bonifacio filed her Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim20 on October 11, 1994. She
denied knowledge of petitioners TCT No. T-108530 and
maintained that the technical description of the land
covered by petitioners TCT No. T-108530 is different
from that in her TCT No. 265778. Respondent Bonifacio
also averred that the technical description of the land
covered by her TCT No. 265778 had been verified and
approved by the Land Management Services of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR); that she acquired a valid title, TCT No.
265778, over the subject land pursuant to a court order
in a land registration case; and that Civil Case No.
C-366 was a collateral attack on the validity of her TCT
No. 265778. Respondent VSD Realty, in its
Manifestation21 filed on June 31, 1995, adopted
respondent Bonifacios aforementioned Answer.
In the Pre-Trial Order22 dated February 23, 1995 of
RTC-Branch 126, the parties agreed on the following
stipulation of facts and issues:
STIPULATION OF FACTS:
1. That the petitioners are in possession of the lot in
question; and
2. That the respondent is never in possession of the lot
in question.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Technical Description is one and
the same as appearing on both titles; and
3
2. Whether or not the TCT No. 265778 of the
respondent is a valid title.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Petitioners presented several documentary
exhibits23 and the testimonies of Leonardo de Guzman
Syjuco, one of the petitioners;24 Renato T. Malindog,
Land Registration Examiner of the Caloocan City
Registry of Deeds;25 and Engineer (Engr.) Elpidio T.de
Lara (De Lara), Chief of Technical Services Section,
Land Management Sector(LMS), DENR.26 In its
Order27 dated November 29, 1995, RTC-Branch 126
admitted all the evidence presented by petitioners.
RTC-Branch 126 summarized petitioners evidence as
follows:
Leonardo Syjuco testified that he, together with the
other petitioners in this case, inherited the subject
property from their late father, Martin Syjuco, as shown
in Entry No. 15033/T-No. 108530 annotated in TCT No.
T-108530 (Exhibit "A"). His father and his uncle, Manuel
Syjuco, in turn acquired the same from the Baello
Family through a Deed of Real Estate (Exhibit "H").
Thereafter, Martin and Manuel executed a deed of
partition (Exhibit "I") and their father was issued TCT
No. 4856 (Exhibit "G") over the subject property. He has
been paying the tax declaration on said property as
evidenced by tax receipts (Exhibits "J" to "J-14"). They
then leased the property to Manufacturers Bank who
was the one who built the improvements on the same
with stipulation that they will become the owners of
these improvements after the expiration of the lease.
They also subleased the property to Kalayaan
Development Corporation (KDC, for short) and
respondent Bonifacio is a lessee of KDC. One of their
tenants informed him that their property was being
offered for sale and so he instituted measures to protect
their interest. He also discovered the existence of TCT
No. T-265778 (Exhibit "C") in the name of respondent
Bonifacio which he claims to be void as there can be no
segregation of a property that was previously
segregated. Witness admits having executed a lease in
favor of a certain John Hay. He likewise admitted that
the technical description appearing on the property
lease to John Hay is not the same as the technical
description appearing on Exh. "A." He claims that when
they inherited the property, the technical description
was already recorded thereon and it was the Registry of
Deeds who placed the same on the property.
Renato T. Malindog, an examiner of the Register of
Deeds of Kalookan City, testified that prior to the
issuance of TCT No. 265778, derivative documents
were filed before their office such as the Court Order
dated October 8, 1992 in L.R.C. Case No. C-3288; the
Certificate of Finality to said Order dated April 6,1993;
the subdivision plan to Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A and Lot
23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B also PSD-706 with Plan No.
SK-007501-00024-D and annexed to said documents
were the technical description for Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-A,
PSD-706 and the technical description for Lot 23-A-4-
B-2-A-3-B also of PSD-706. Based on their record,
documents were [received] regarding the order of
finality but there was no showing that the tax clearance
[was] registered in their office. Likewise, based on the
document presented to them, the office who issued the
technical description was from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Land
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Management Sector, and one Teodoro E. Mundo, Jr. is
the Chief Survey Division of said office.
Elpidio T. de Lara, Chief of the Technical Services
Section of the Department of Agrarian and Natural
Resources, affirms to having certified to the technical
description [o]n July 9, 1990, referred to as Lot 23-A-4-
B-2-A-3-B of subdivision plan PSD 706, based on a
request by Felisa Bonifacio. He made the "Note:
Subject for field survey" on Exhibit "M" so that the
corresponding technical description be identified in the
plan. Before issuing the technical description for the
subject lot, he complied with the processes of having
the technical description researched from their records.
From their record, he had not issued a technical
description for the subject lot and they have no record
in their office of such. The corresponding B-37 technical
description attached to the letter request came from the
Land Management Bureau, which is the survey of the
technical description. At the time the request was made
until the time the certification was issued, he did not
meet Felisa Bonifacio and said request was filed in their
office and sent to the technical services department.28
Respondents, in turn, presented documentary
exhibits29 and called to the witness stand Geodetic
Engr. Evelyn G. Celzo (Celzo) of the Land Management
Services, DENR;30 Fernando D. Macaro (Macaro), Land
Registration Examiner of the Caloocan City Register of
Deeds;31 and Attorney (Atty.) Kaulayao V. Faylona,
Director and Corporate Secretary of respondent VSD
Realty.32
RTC-Branch 126 summed-up respondents evidence as
follows:
Evelyn G. Celzo, a geodetic engineer from the Land
Management Services, testified that she was ordered to
conduct a verification survey of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B of
PSD 706 by their Regional Technical Director, Roquesa
de Castro. The survey was conducted on August 23,
1994 and its result [was] contained in a report dated
April 17, 1995 (Exhibit "4") which she prepared and
submitted. She and her team personally went to the
place and found out that two (2) stores, namely, Fairy
Mart and Zenco Footstep were the present occupants
of the lot. They likewise informed the adjoining lots that
they were going to execute a verification survey. BPM
119 in Kalookan Cadastre was the reference point to
determine whether the lot was really in that place. BPM
153, Kalookan Cadastre were used as common points
to identify the technical description in Felisas lot.
However, insofar as Exhibit "A" is concerned, the
technical description of said property did not contain
these common points. The DENR, NCR, has record of
all technical descriptions approved and verified in said
office. She points out that only one (1) technical
description is allowed for a particular lot. In conducting
the survey verification, the certified TCT was furnished
to them by Felisa Bonifacio, together with the relocation
survey filed at the Technical Reference Section. As to
the adjoining lots, they secured the map of the Maysilo
Estate Plan, under the relocation survey, they found out
that the lot belonged to Felisa Bonifacio and the
technical description is the same as the technical
description submitted to her. Her verification survey was
approved as reflected in the original plan from the
Bureau of Land Verification Survey (Exhibit "7"). She
also stated that before the survey, she conducted a
research as to the origin of the technical description
4
from her office and from the Bureau of Lands in
Binondo but there were no available record. Neither
was there any record about the original owner. When
the certified copy of TCT No. 265778 was given to her,
there were no annotations of adverse claims and so she
did not anymore inquire from the Registry of Deeds
whether there were new annotations made thereon.
Atty. Kaulayao V. Faylona, a director and Corporate
Secretary of VSD Realty Corporation, testified that a
real estate broker offered for sale to VSD two (2) lots
along Avenida and occupied by Fairmart and Uniwide
Sales, Inc. Among the documents shown to him by the
seller were the Order of Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 125
(Exhibit "2"), as well as the Transcript of Case No.
C-3288 (Exh. "3"). While he found the issuance of said
Order by the Court regular, he also requested for a
verification survey from the sellers group in order to
make sure that the lot appearing in the technical
description is also the lot actually being occupied by the
buildings already mentioned thereon. The actual
verification survey was conducted by the DENR through
Engr. E. Celzo as evidenced by a report (Exh. "4")
submitted for the purpose. Moreover, a verification plan
(Exh. "7") approved by the DENR was likewise
prepared in connection with the verification survey. He
even personally went to the sala of Judge Mangay and
verified from the then Deputy Branch Clerk of Court, the
authenticity of the transcript that was given to him which
the said Branch Clerk of Court confirmed as having
been issued by said court. He did not however go over
the petition filed by Felisa Bonifacio since what was
important was that the title was issued in the land
registration proceedings. He knew that Felisa was not in
possession of the said property as it was being
occupied by business establishments who were all not
owners of the lot. As to payments of realty taxes due on
the property, he claims that the title would not have
been issued in the first place [and] the taxes [would] not
[have] been previously paid. Insofar as VSD is
concerned, the corporation was up-to-date in its
payment of realty taxes over their property. He stresses
that there is no other owner of the lot in question except
Felisa Bonifacio because there was only one(1) lot with
that technical description. The said approved technical
description appearing on Felisas lot was issued by the
DENR which is actually the custodian of the technical
descriptions of lands under the Land Registration
System, which was confirmed by Mr. Elpidio T. de Lara,
complainants witness.33
Macaros testimony was not included in the foregoing
prcis of respondents evidence by RTC-Branch
126.Macaro affirmed before RTC Branch 126 the
existence of respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778.
Macaro further testified that the standard operating
procedure at the Caloocan City Registry of Deeds was
to require the presentation of the certification stating
that the court order directing issuance of the certificate
of title had already become final and executory, before
actually issuing said certificate of title; but he was
unable to explain how in this case respondent
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued on March 29,
1993, before the Certificate of Finality of the Order
dated October 8, 1992 in Civil Case No. C-3288 was
issued by RTC-Branch 125 on April 6, 1993.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
On January 9, 1998, RTC-Branch 126 rendered its
Decision in Civil Case No. C-366, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the petition of the petitioners;
2) Declaring that the technical description described in
TCT No. 108530 by the petitioners is not the same as
the technical description on [respondent] Bonifacios
title (TCT No. 265778, now TCT No. 285313);
3) Declaring that TCT No. 265778 is a valid title and
considering that respondent VSDs title, T-285313,
replaced the former title, VSD is hereby declared the
owner of the land in question, that is, Lot 23-A-4-B-2-
A-3-B of PSD 706;
4) For petitioners to pay attorneys fees and the costs of
this suit.34
Comparing the technical descriptions in petitioners TCT
No. T-108530 and respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and
285313, RTC-Branch 126 noted the bare differences in
the land areas and lot numbers contained therein, and
concluded that said technical descriptions were not one
and the same and that petitioners TCT No. T-108530
did not pertain to the same parcel of land described in
respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778. RTC Branch
126 also pointed out that petitioners own witness, Engr.
De Lara, testified that his office, Technical Services
Section of the DENR, had not previously issued the
technical description appearing on respondent
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778. Engr. De Laras
certification of the technical description of respondent
Bonifacios property was issued for the first time on July
9, 1990 only "after complying with all the legal
processes necessary for the purpose, such as, among
other things, conducting a research from their office
records which showed that no such technical
description on the subject property was previously
issued and further stating that the B-37 technical
description came from the Land Management Bureau
which was the survey of the technical
description."35 RTC-Branch 126 further cited the
testimony of Engr. Celzo of Land Management Services
who conducted the verification survey during which it
was revealed that "while common points were used in
identifying the technical description in TCT No. 265778,
no such common points existed in the technical
description appearing on petitioners[] title." RTC-
Branch 126 saw no reason to doubt the testimonies of
Engrs. De Lara and Celzo consistent with the rule that
government officials are presumed to perform their
functions with regularity and strong evidence is
necessary to rebut this presumption.
RTC-Branch 126 also categorically upheld the validity
of respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 as it was
issued pursuant to the Order dated October 8, 1992 of
the Caloocan City RTC-Branch 125. RTC-Branch 126
said that it could not question the order of a co-equal
court and brushed aside petitioners claim of continuous
possession of the subject property because such fact
alone could not defeat respondents title over said
property registered under the Torrens system. Absent
any showing by clear and convincing proof that TCT No.
265778 of respondent Bonifacio, now TCT No. 285313
5
of respondent VSD Realty, was irregularly issued, RTC-
Branch 126 accorded said titles the conclusive
presumption of validity.
CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 before the
Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal36 before the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777, with the
following sole assignment of error:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ANNUL[L]ING
[RESPONDENTS] TITLES WHICH OVERLAP THE
EXISTING TITLE IN THE NAMES OFTHE
PETITIONERS.37
Petitioners asserted that the technical description of the
land in their TCT No. T-108530 and that in respondents
TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 pertain to one and the
same land. Petitioners argue that RTC-Branch 126
failed to appreciate the probative value of Engr. De
Laras testimony on this particular issue. According to
petitioners, Engr. De Laras certification dated July 9,
1990 on the correctness of the technical description of
Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B, PSD 706, was based merely on
the "B-37 survey" attached to respondent Bonifacios
letter-request, hence, Engr. De Laras certification
included a notation "[s]ubject for field survey" since he
did not know the location of the land referred to by the
technical description. The "B-37 survey" or the
subdivision plan of PSD 706 was neither presented
before RTC-Branch 126 in this case nor before RTC-
Branch 125 in Civil Case No. C-3288 (respondent
Bonifacios Petition for Segregation38 ); thus, petitioners
contended that there was no evidence as to "when the
survey was made, under whose name the survey was
made, and as to whether or not the said survey had the
requisite government approval."39 Petitioners added
that it was incorrect for RTC-Branch 126 to conclude
that Engr. De Laras office had never issued any
technical description pertaining to the subject land prior
to July 9, 1990, and what Engr. De Lara actually said
was that there was no record in his office of the
technical description of the subject land as appearing in
petitioners TCT No. T-108530.Petitioners also
maintained that the Survey Order dated August 22,
1994 and the Verification Plan of Lot 23-A-4-B-2-A-3-B,
PSD 706, dated April 28, 1995 had no probative value
as (1) said Survey Order was not authenticated; (2) said
Survey Order was incomplete and uncertain as it did
not specify the lot to be surveyed, its location, and its
technical description; and (3) the verification survey was
conducted only on August 23, 1994, after respondent
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was issued on March 29,
1993, consequently, said survey could not validate the
irregular issuance of TCT No. 265778.
Additionally, petitioners alleged the following
irregularities in the issuance of respondent Bonifacios
TCT No. 265778:
(1) Civil Case No. C-3288, respondent Bonifacios
Petition for Segregation, is rooted in a Deed of
Assignment of the subject land purportedly executed on
January 29, 1991 by Eleuteria Rivera Bonifacio in favor
of respondent Bonifacio, but said Deed merely copied
the technical description of the land issued and certified
on June 19, 1990 upon the request of respondent
Bonifacio herself.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
(2) Respondent Bonifacio merely attached to her
Petition for Segregation in Civil Case No. C-3288 a
sketch plan of the subject land, not an approved survey
or subdivision plan.
(3) Respondent Bonifacio stated in her Petition for
Segregation in Civil Case No. C-3288 that her and her
transferors possession of the subject land was "open,
public, and notorious without any known
claimants[,]"40 but she later admitted that she had never
been in possession of the said property.
(4) Respondent Bonifacio attached to her Petition for
Segregation a real property tax computation sheet for
the subject property which was in the name of Martin V.
Syjuco, who was petitioners predecessor-in-interest.41
(5) Respondent Bonifacio obtained TCT No. 265778
over the subject property on March 29, 1993 whereas
the order authorizing the issuance of said certificate of
title became final and executory only on April 6, 1993.
(6) The Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 265778 to
respondent Bonifacio without requiring the presentation
of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994,which
covered the vast land from whence respondent
Bonifacios property was purportedly segregated, and
the requisite tax clearance in respondent Bonifacios
name.
Respondents asseverated that the technical
descriptions contained in their TCT Nos. 265778 and
285313, on one hand, and in petitioners TCT No.
T-108530, on the other, do not pertain to the same land;
that respondent Bonifacios TCT No. 265778 was
issued pursuant to a valid court order by RTC-Branch
125 in Civil Case No. C-3288; and that petitioners Civil
Case No. C-366 before RTC-Branch 126 was a
collateral attack on the validity of respondents titles.
In its Decision dated February 23, 2001, the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal and affirmed in
toto the Decision dated January 9, 1998 of RTC-Branch
126 in Civil Case No. C-366. Aside from essentially
adopting the ratiocination in the appealed judgment of
RTC-Branch 126, the Court of Appeals also espoused
respondents argument that Civil Case No. C-366,
instituted by petitioners before RTC-Branch 126, was a
collateral attack on the validity of respondent
Bonifacios TCT No. 265778, in violation of Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree. The appellate court,
comparing the parties respective certificates of title,
further ruled that:
[A] careful scrutiny of TCT Nos.108530 and 265778
revealed relevant similarities. Both TCTs originate from
OCT No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455, Record
No. 4429. TCT No. 108530 was first originally
registered on May 03, 1917, in contrast to Bonifacios
title (TCT No. 265778) which was [registered] in 1912.
In view of this, we quote the ruling enunciated by the
court in Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System v.
Court of Appeals and reiterated in the cases of Heirs of
Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals and Mascarias v.
Court of Appeals.
"Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails. x x x. In
6
successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and the
person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who
is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or
indirectly from the person who was the holder of the
earliest certificate issued in respect thereof."
Hence, in point of priority in issuance, the title of
Bonifacio prevails over that of the [petitioners]. Since,
the land in question has already been registered under
OCT 994, in the year 1912, the subsequent registration
of the same land on May 03, 1917 is null and void.
42 (Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals lastly pointed out that petitioners
possession of the subject land cannot defeat
respondent Bonifacios title thereto:
While we recognize the fact that the [petitioners] have
been in 44 years of continuous possession, still, we
should not lose sight of the fact that [respondent]
Bonifacio is an owner of an earlier issued title. The
imprescriptibility of Bonifacios title cannot be defeated
by the [petitioners] continuous possession of the
questioned lot. To hold otherwise, the efficacy of the
conclusiveness of the certificate of title, which the
Torrens System seeks to insure, would be futile and
nugatory.43 (Citations omitted.)
The Court of Appeals concluded that since respondent
Bonifacio is the owner of the subject land, validly
registered in her name, she is within her rights in selling
said property to respondent VSD Realty, making the
latters TCT No. 285313 also valid.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Petitioners reiterate their position that their TCT No.
T-108530 and respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and
285313 pertain to one and the same land, and that the
latter titles have been fraudulently obtained. Petitioners
also aver that their undisturbed possession of the
subject property gives them a continuing right to seek
the aid of a court to ascertain and determine the nature
and effect of respondents adverse claim on the subject
land.
In addition, petitioners pray for this Court to take judicial
notice of supervening events relative to the
indiscriminate issuance or proliferation of fake titles
derived from OCT No. 994 covering the Maysilo Estate.
They point out that the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights, Urban Planning, and Housing and
Resettlement, already conducted separate
investigations of this serious land title anomaly and had
submitted their respective reports on the matter. The
DOJ Committee Report dated August 28, 1997 and
Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25,
1998 validated OCT No. 994 registered on May 3,
1917; declared OCT No. 994 registered on April 19,
1917 as nonexistent; and recommended the
cancellation of all titles derived from OCT No. 994
registered on April 19, 1917. Petitioners, thus, argue
that respondent Bonifacios title, which originated from
OCT No. 994 registered in 1912, is null and void as the
only authentic OCT No. 994 is the one issued pursuant
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
to Decree No. 36455 originally registered on May 3,
1917.
In their Comment, respondents stand by the propriety of
the Decision dated February 23, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 57777 and the Decision
dated January 9, 1998 of RTC-Branch 126 in Civil Case
No. C-366. Respondents also exhort this Court not to
take judicial notice of the DOJ and Senate committee
reports because those are irrelevant to the present case
as the true date of registration of OCT No. 994 has
never been an issue herein. At any rate, respondents
insinuate that there was a mistake in the indication in
the title of respondent Bonifacio that it originated from
OCT No. 994 registered in 1912, claiming that the same
"must have been [caused by either] a clerical error or
a mental lapse."
RULING
The petition is meritorious.
On the propriety of petitioners
action to quiet title over the subject
land.
The Court, at the outset, finds untenable the contention
that the action instituted by petitioners is a prohibited
collateral attack on the certificate of title of respondents
over the subject land. Section 48 of Presidential Decree
No. 152944 states:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
To determine whether an attack on a certificate of title is
direct or indirect, the relevance of the object of the
action instituted and the relief sought therein must be
examined. The rule was explained in Catores v.
Afidchao45 as follows:
When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the
object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title,
and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the
title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object
of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand,
the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof. (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted.)
The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct
attack on a certificate of title to real property. In their
complaint for quieting of title, petitioners specifically
pray for the declaration of nullity and/or cancellation of
respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313 over the
subject land. The relief sought by petitioners is certainly
feasible since the objective of an action to quiet title, as
provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, is precisely to quiet, remove, invalidate,
annul, and/or nullify" a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title."
7
The Court also finds bereft of merit the contentions that
petitioners action to quiet title had already prescribed
and/or that the titles of respondents over the subject
land have already become incontrovertible and
indefeasible based on Section 32 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529. Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 states:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent
purchaser for value.- The decree of registration shall
not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of
any person, including the government and the branches
thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the
decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration,
but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the
court where an innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights
may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent
purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in
this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued
shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by
such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or
any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphases
added.)
The above-quoted rule has well-settled exceptions.
It is an established doctrine in land ownership disputes
that the filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible
if the disputed real property is in the possession of the
plaintiff. One who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being that his undisturbed possession gives him a
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right
can be claimed only by one who is in possession.46
In this case, petitioners have duly established during
the trial that they and/or their predecessors-in-interest
have been in uninterrupted possession of the subject
land since 1926 and that it was only in 1994 when they
found out that respondent Bonifacio was able to register
the said property in her name in another title. It was
also only in 1995 when petitioners learned that
respondent Bonifacio was able to sell and transfer her
title over the subject land in favor of respondent VSD
Realty.
Moreover, the rule on the incontrovertibility or
indefeasibility of title has no application in this case
given the fact that the contending parties claim
ownership over the subject land based on their
respective certificates of title thereon which originated
from different sources. Certainly, there cannot be two or
even several certificates of title on the same parcel of
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
real property because "a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier land
registration case" and "a second decree for the same
land would be null and void, since the principle behind
original registration is to register a parcel of land only
once."47 The indefeasibility of a title under the Torrens
system could be claimed only if a previous valid title to
the same parcel of land does not exist. Where the
issuance of the title was attended by fraud, the same
cannot vest in the titled owner any valid legal title to the
land covered by it; and the person in whose name the
title was issued cannot transmit the same, for he has no
true title thereto. This ruling is a mere affirmation of the
recognized principle that a certificate is not conclusive
evidence of title if it is shown that the same land had
already been registered and that an earlier certificate
for the same land is in existence.48
Accordingly, petitioners filing of an action to quiet title
over the subject land is in order.
On the propriety of remanding this
case for further proceedings before
the Court of Appeals.
In VSD Realty & Development Corporation v. Uniwide
Sales, Inc.,49 this Court remanded the case before the
Court of Appeals, citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation,50 and held:
In the main, respondent Baello contends that the Court
erred in not declaring petitioner VSDs TCT No.
T-285312 as null and void, considering that it is derived
from Felisa Bonifacios TCT No.
265777/T-1325, which, in turn, is derived from the false
and fictitious OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917. The
records of this case, however, show that Felisa
Bonifacios TCT No. 265777/T-1325 and VSDs TCT
No. T-285312 are derived from the legitimate OCT No.
994 registered on May 3, 1917, which date has been
held as the correct date of registration of the said OCT
in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation. In her Motion for Leave and Time to File
Judicial Affidavit of Mr. Felino Cortez and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted,
respondent Baello contends that she has additional
evidence showing that the copy of Felisa Bonifacios
TCT No. 265777/T-1325 that was presented to the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan, for the purpose of the
issuance of petitioner VSDs TCT No. T-285312, was
tampered with to fraudulently reflect that it was derived
from the legitimate and authentic OCT No. 994 dated
May 3, 1917. It is alleged that the original microfilm
copy retained by the LRA shows that Felisa Bonifacios
TCT No. 265777/T-1325 did not originate from the
legitimate and authentic OCT No. 994 dated May 3,
1917, but was instead derived from OCT No. 994 dated
April 19, 1912. Baello cited Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation, which allowed the
presentation of evidence before a Special Division of
the Court of Appeals to ascertain which of the
conflicting claims of title should prevail, even though the
case had already been decided; and the additional
evidence was presented in connection with a motion for
reconsideration of this Courts decision.
The Court notes that in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation, the Court pronounced
8
that there is only one OCT No. 994, which is correctly
registered on May 3, 1917, and that any title that traces
its source to OCT No. 994 dated April 17, 1917 is void,
for such mother title is inexistent.
The Court recognizes the importance of protecting the
countrys Torrens system from fake land titles and
deeds. Considering that there is an issue on the validity
of the title of petitioner VSD, which title is alleged to be
traceable to OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917,
which mother title was held to be inexistent in Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, in
the interest of justice, and to safeguard the correct
titling of properties, a remand is proper to determine
which of the parties derived valid title from the
legitimate OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917.
Since this Court is not a trier of facts and not
capacitated to appreciate evidence of the first instance,
the Court may remand this case to the Court of Appeals
for further proceedings, as it has been similarly tasked
in Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation on these bases:
Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to
original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever
necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the
reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its
members or to an appropriate court, agency or office.
The delegate need not be the body that rendered the
assailed decision.
The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to
review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to findings of
fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court.
It is a body that is fully capacitated and has a surfeit of
experience in appreciating factual matters, including
documentary evidence.
In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a
factual matter pending before it to the Court of Appeals.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court
commissioned the former Thirteenth Division of the
Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the
controversy, more particularly to determine "the actual
area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center
Complex which are open spaces and/or areas
reserved for certain purposes, determining in the
process the validity of such postulates and the
respective measurements of the areas referred to." The
Court of Appeals therein received the evidence of the
parties and rendered a "Commissioners Report" shortly
thereafter. Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a
deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as
governing the grant of authority to the Court of Appeals
to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section
2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu
proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a
question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises
upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for
carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of
reference can be limited exclusively to receive and
report evidence only, and the commissioner may
likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The
commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in
writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him
by the order of reference. In Republic, the
commissioners report formed the basis of the final
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same
result can obtain herein."51 (Emphases added.)
The Court notes, however, that several matters have
already transpired during the pendency of this case that
bear considerable relation in the resolution of the main
question of which of the respective titles of the parties
over the subject land is valid.
Firstly, the Court observes that the certification as
indicated in petitioners title, which the latter submitted
during the trial, shows that it originated from OCT No.
994 registered on May 3, 1917, thus:
It is further certified that said land was originally
registered on the 3rd day of May, in the year nineteen
hundred and seventeen, in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume A-9,
page 226, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree
No. 36455, issued in L.R.C. ___ Record No. 4429.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 4856/T-25, which is cancelled by virtue hereof
in so far as the above-described land is concerned.
52 (Emphasis added.)
On the other hand, the title of respondent Bonifacio, the
one presented during the trial, shows that it likewise
originated from OCT No. 994, but such mother title
states only the day and the year of its original
registration as follows:
It is further certified that said land was originally
registered on the 19th day of ___, in the year nineteen
hundred and twelve, in the Registration Book of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila, Volume ___,
Page ___, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ___,
Record No. 4423, in the name of ___.
This certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of
Title No. 994, which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so
far as the above-described land is concerned.
53 (Emphasis added.)
Curiously, the title of respondent VSD Realty is
supposed to be a direct transfer from the title of
respondent Bonifacio, yet, the certification as to the
original registration of its mother title OCT No. 994
provides the registration date of May 3, 1917, thus:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was
originally registered on the 3rd day of May, in the year
nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration
Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume A-9-A, Page 226, as Original Certificate of Title
No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C.
___ Record No. 4429 in the name of ___.
This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 265778/T-1325 which is cancelled by virtue
hereof in so far as the above-described land is
concerned.
Entered at the City of Kalookan,
Philippines, on the 12th day of September in
the year nineteen hundred and ninety-four at
1:23 p.m.54 (Emphases added.)
9
Furthermore, a certified true copy of respondent
Bonifacios title, which petitioners have obtained just
prior to the filing of the Petition at bar and attached to
their Reply dated December 12, 2001, now shows that
the date of the original registration of respondent
Bonifacios mother title - OCT No. 994 - has changed
from the 19th day of an unspecified month55 in 1912 to
May 3, 1917, and the place of registration from Manila
to Rizal. Aside from these changes, the portions that
were left blank in the earlier copy of respondent
Bonifacios title have already been filled-up in the latest
copy of the same, thus:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was
originally registered on the 3rd day of May, in the year
nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration
Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume A-9-A, Page 226, as Original Certificate of Title
No. 994, pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C.
___ Record No. 4429 in the name of ___.
This certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of
Title No. 994 which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so
far as the above-described land is concerned.
Entered at Caloocan City,
Philippines, on the 29th day of March in the
year nineteen hundred and ninety-three at
3:20 a.m.56 (Emphases added.)
Secondly, the Court notes that the Republic,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed herein a Motion for Intervention with
attached Petition-in-Intervention, pursuant to the
recommendation in the Report dated May 25, 1998 of
the Senate Committees on Justice, Human Rights,
Housing, and Urban Planning and Resettlement, that
the OSG be mandated "to intervene in land disputes
before the court, on cases whether pertaining to
government or private lands as the OSG may
determine, involving fake titles, duplication of titles or
similar anomalies, to guide the court on the position of
the government and to involve the concerned
government entities particularly the Land Registration
Authority in a concerted effort to protect the integrity of
the Torrens system of land title registration."57 The
motion was granted and the Petition of the Republic
was admitted in the Courts Resolution 58 dated
December 8, 2004.
The OSG manifests, among others, that petitioners
TCT No. T-108530, in reliance to the conclusions of the
DOJ and Senate committees, is the valid certificate of
title covering the subject land as it could be traced back
to the authentic OCT No. 994 registered on May 3,
1917; conversely, respondents TCT Nos. 265778 and
285313 are null and void as these originated from the
spurious OCT No. 994 registered in 1912.
Respondents filed their Comment [to the Republics
intervention] 59 on June 1, 2005. Interestingly,
respondents now contend that their TCT Nos. 265778
and 285313 are derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered
on April 19, 1917, hence, they capitalize on the rulings
of this Court in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals60 and Heirs of
Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals61 that those titles
derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917
prevail over those titles derived from OCT No. 994
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
registered on May 3, 1917 considering the priority of the
date of registration.
Thirdly, the Court reiterates that the validity of OCT No.
994 registered on May 3, 1917, and the non-existence
of a purported OCT No. 994 registered on April 19,
1917, have already been exhaustively passed upon and
settled with finality in the Resolution[s] dated December
14, 2007 and March 31, 2009 in Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
CLT Realty Development Corporation.62
In Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice,63 this Court
reiterated its pronouncements in Manotok Realty, Inc. v.
CLT Realty Development Corporation64 that the true
and valid OCT No. 994 was registered on May 3, 1917,
not on April 19, 1917, and that any title that traces its
source to the latter date is deemed void and inexistent.
The Court was also explicit that the cases of MWSS v.
Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals had
already been rendered functus officio, thus, these cases
can no longer be cited as precedents. The Court
expounded as follows: It is important to emphasize at
this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court
En Bancin 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation(the 2007 Manotok
case), as well as the succeeding resolution in the same
case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case),
the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the
question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have
been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said
estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are
bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said
resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on
previous cases decided by this Court which have held
that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated
differently, and the one from which she and her co-
plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights
was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title.
Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to
stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior
decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is
whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are
valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT
No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or
otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since
the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No.
994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs
from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga
decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus
officio except on the basis of the "law of the case"
doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as
precedents. Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore
insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19,
1917 validly and actually exists, given the following
conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok
case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on
the record, that mother title was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917,
and that should be the date which should be reckoned
as the date of registration of the title. It may also be
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No.
994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on [19] April 1917, although such date
10
cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994
dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is
inexistent.1wphi1 The fact that the Dimson and CLT
titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated
[19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles
since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply
to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their
recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a
title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither
could the conclusions in MWSSor Gonzaga with
respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind
any other case operating under the factual setting the
same as or similar to that at bar.
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ
and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007
Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division
of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand,
declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not
prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and
the Senate, or even consider whether these are
admissible as evidence, though such questions may be
considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of
the parties. x x x. The reports cannot conclusively
supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if
admissible they may be taken into account as evidence
on the same level as the other pieces of evidence
submitted by the parties. The fact that they were
rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in
itself, persuade the courts to accept them without
inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the
reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis,
and certainly the courts will have the discretion to
accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the
properties that could only be threshed out in the remand
to the Court of Appeals. x x x.
xxxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive
evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this
Court a report on its findings and recommended
conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution.
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated
the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and
adopted the latters conclusions as to the status of the
original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case
affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only one OCT
No. 994, the registration date of which had already
been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April
1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994
which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its
registration date is null and void."65 (Emphases added.)
In Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v.
Bonifacio,66 this Court upheld the validity of the titles to
a portion of land which originally formed part of the
Maysilo Estate which were sourced from OCT No. 994
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
registered on May 3, 1917, and declared as null and
void a title purportedly overlapping the said land which
traced its roots from OCT No. 994 registered on April
19, 1917. The Court found that it was physically
impossible for Eleuteria Rivera, the person whom
respondent Bonifacio claims to be her predecessor-in-
interest, to be an heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal
because it would turn out that Eleuteria Rivera was
older than her alleged grandmother Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, to wit:
Eventually, on March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court
issued a Resolution reversing its Decision of November
29, 2005 and declaring certain titles in the names of
Araneta and Manotok valid. In the course of discussing
the flaws of Jose Dimsons title based on his alleged
25% share in the hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera,
Eleuteria Riveras co-petitioner in LRC No. 4557, the
Court noted:
. . . However, the records of these cases would
somehow negate the rights of Rivera to claim from
Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration
Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera
was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the
records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496). It can thus
be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in
1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On
the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912;
hence, she could have been born only on [1903]. This
alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not
ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Rivera's alleged
Grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her
alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether
Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a
share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.
The same is true in this case. The Death Certificate of
Eleuteria Rivera reveals that she was 96 years old
when she died on February 22, 1997. That means that
she must have been born in 1901. That makes Rivera
two years older than her alleged grandmother Maria de
la Concepcion Vidal who was born in 1903. Hence, it
was physically impossible for Eleuteria Rivera to be an
heir of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted.) Considering all of the above
matters, especially the fact that respondents claim that
their respective titles, TCT Nos. 265778 and 285313,
are derivatives of OCT No. 994 registered on April 19,
1917, which this Court had already repeatedly declared
to be a non-existent and invalid title, the Court rules in
favor of petitioners. As held in Manotok, "[a]ny title that
traces its source to OC'f No. 994 dated [19) April 1917
is void, for such mother title is
inexistent."67 WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 23, 2001, as well as the Resolution dated
June 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 57777 which affirmed in toto the Decision dated
January 9, 1998 of Branch 126 of the RTC of the City of
Caloocan in Civil Case No. C-366, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. TCT No. 265778 in the name of Felisa D.
Bonifacio and TCT No. 285313 in the name of VSD
Realty & Development Corporation are declared NULL
and VOID. The Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City is
DIRECTED to CANCEL the said certificates of title.
SO ORDERED.
11
G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015
MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA, REPRESENTED BY
JOVIER TAGUFA, Petitioner, v. GREGORIA TAGUFA,
R O B E R TO TA G U FA A N D R O G E L I O
LUMABAN, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the September 13, 2012
Decision1 and the January 25, 2013 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. SP No. 122648
which reversed and set aside the July 1, 2011
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
Cabagan, Isabela (RTC), in an action for reconveyance
and recovery of possession.
The Facts:
The undisputed facts were succinctly summarized in the
August 31, 2010 Decision4 of the 3rd Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Tumauini-Delfin Albano, Tumauini, Isabela
(MCTC) before which a complaint5 for Reconveyance
and Recovery of Possession with Damages was filed by
petitioner Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela (Hortizuela)
represented by Jovier Tagufa against respondents
Gregoria Tagufa, Roberto Tagufa and Rogelio Lumaban
(respondents). As quoted by the CA, said undisputed
facts are:
Gleaned from the joint testimonies of R[u]nsted Tagufa
xxx and Jovier Tagufa xxx are the following facts:
The property involved in this case is a parcel of land
located at District IV, Tumauini, Isabela containing an
area of 539 square meters, more or less, and covered
by OCT No. P-84609 of the Registry of Deeds of
Isabela. By virtue of the special power of attorney xxx
executed by Mariflor Tagufa Hortizuela, Jovier Tagufa
instituted this case against herein defendants praying
for the peaceful surrender of the above-described
property unto them and further ordering defendant
Gregoria Tagufa to reconvey in plaintiffs favor the same
property which was titled under her name via fraud.
Before it was titled in the name of Defendant Tagufa,
said property was originally owned by plaintiffs parents,
Spouses Epifanio Tagufa and Godofreda Jimenez.
Although untitled, the spouses mortgaged the property
with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP, for
brevity). For failure to redeem the property, DBP
foreclosed the same and sold it to Atty. Romulo
Marquez xxx who, in turn, sold it back to Runsted
Tagufa, husband of defendant Gregoria Tagufa, on April
4, 2002 xxx using the fund sent by plaintiff Hortizuela
who was in America and with the agreement that
Runsted will reconvey the said property to her sister
when demanded.
However, plaintiff discovered that the same
unregistered property was titled in the name of Gregoria
Tagufa under OCT No. P-84609 of the Registry of
Deeds of Isabela xxx. Investigating further, plaintiff
discovered that Gregoria Tagufa was able to title the
said property by virtue of a free patent application
before the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the execution of a Deed of
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late
Spouses Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig dated
May 9, 2003 xxx. Plaintiff now seeks to recover
possession of the said property which is presently
occupied by Gregoria Tagufa and her co-defendants
and have the same be reconveyed unto them.6
In its Order, dated May 5, 2010, the MCTC granted the
motion to declare defendants in default and allowed
Hortizuela to present her evidence ex parte. Thereafter,
on August 31, 2010, the MCTC dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit ruling that in the judicious analysis by
this court, plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of
action.7cralawlawlibrary
Not in conformity, Hortizuela appealed to the RTC. In its
July 1, 2011 Decision, the RTC reversed the MCTC
ruling. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby granted and the Decision dated August 31,
2010, is hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Gregorio Tagufa to
reconvey to the plaintiff Mariflor Tagufa
Hortizuela the land described in paragraph 4 of
the complaint;
2. Ordering the defendants to vacate the same
land and to surrender the peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff
the following amounts, jointly and severally:
cralawred
a) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as Moral
Damages;
b) Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorneys
Fees.
SO DECIDED.8
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied by the RTC.
The reversal being unacceptable to them, respondents
filed a petition for review before the CA questioning the
RTC decision. This time, the case was disposed in their
favor. According to the CA, although Hortizuela filed
with the MCTC a complaint for reconveyance and
recovery of possession of the subject lot, she was also
questioning the validity of the Torrens title, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-846609. 9 The CA
pointed out that this was in contravention of Section 48
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which provides:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.- A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law
It cited the well-settled rule that a Torrens title could not
be collaterally attacked; that the issue of whether or not
the title was fraudulently issued, could only be raised in
12
an action expressly instituted for that purpose; and that
an action for reconveyance and recovery of possession
was not the direct action contemplated by law.10 Hence,
the dispositive portion of the CA decision reads in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
dated July 1, 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The present Complaint for reconveyance and
recovery of possession with damages is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.11
Hortizuela filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied in a Resolution,12 dated January 25, 2013.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR
R E C O N V E YA N C E A N D R E C O V E R Y O F
POSSESSION CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT OR
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
SUBJECT CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHICH IS
PROSCRIBED BY LAW.
Hortizuela claims that respondent Gregoria Tagufa
(Gregoria), being the wife of Runsted, was certainly
aware that the subject land was actually sold by Atty.
Romulo Marquez (Atty. Marquez) to her (Hortizuela).
Runsted, only acted as attorney-in-fact in the sale
transaction. Thus, the action for reconveyance was not
a collateral attack on the said title because Hortizuela
was not seeking the nullification of the title, but rather
the reconveyance of the property, covered by the said
title, which Gregoria was holding in trust for her benefit
as the real owner. Gregoria should, therefore, reconvey
the property and its title to her, being the rightful owner.
Position of Respondents
Respondents counter that although Hortizuelas
complaint was denominated as one for reconveyance
and recovery of possession, its main objective was to
nullify the title held by Gregoria over the subject
property. For said reason, the complaint would amount
to a collateral attack on the title which was proscribed
under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. To
rule that the action for reconveyance was not a
collateral one would result in the nullity of the decree of
registration.
Another argument that respondents want this Court to
consider in resolving the subject petition is the fact that
the overriding reason why Hortizuela chose to file a
complaint for reconveyance and recovery of possession
was that she failed to avail of the remedy provided
under Section 3813 of Act 496 within the prescribed
period of one (1) year, counted from the issuance of the
free patent by the government.
Finally, granting that the title over the property would be
nullified and the property be reconveyed to Hortizuela,
still the latter would be ineligible to own the same
pursuant to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 223 which
requires, among others, that an applicant for a free
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
patent must be a Filipino citizen. Hortizuela, by her own
admission, is an American citizen who has been
residing in Las Vegas, Nevada.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The Court is not unmindful of the principle of
indefeasibility of a Torrens title and Section 48 of P.D.
No. 1528 where it is provided that a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack.14 A Torrens title
cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law. When the
Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an
action is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin
its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is
indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding
is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.15 In its
decision, the MCTC wrote:
Obviously, the bone of contention in this case are the
deed of sale by and between Romulo Marquez and
Runsted Tagufa, the estranged husband of defendant
Gregoria Tagufa, and OCT No. P-84609 registered in
the name of Gregoria Tagufa who, according to the
plaintiff, fraudulently caused the titling of the same.
In their lamentations, plaintiff pointed out the
following indicia of fraud committed by Gregoria Tagufa
that would allegedly justify reconveyance:
First, Gregoria Tagufa made it appear in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of spouses
Leandro Tagufa and Remedios Talosig that she is an
heir when, in truth, she is only a grand daughter-in-law,
Second, she already knew when she applied for free
patent that plaintiff was already the owner of the land
she was applying for;
Third, she already knew that when she applied for free
patent that plaintiffs parents were not anymore the
owners of the land as the same was mortgaged with the
DBP; and
Fourth, defendant has never been in actual possession
of the property when she applied for it.
All in all, plaintiff argued, Gregoria Tagufa never
acquired any valid right or legal title over the property.
Studying the merits of this case and removing all its
superfluities, plaintiffs plainly question the title
generated in the name of defendant Gregoria Tagufa
having been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.
However, in the judicious analysis by this court,
plaintiffs have resorted to a wrong cause of action.16
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the MCTC
was convinced that fraud was attendant in the
registration of the land but was not convinced that
reconveyance was an accepted remedy.
Contrary to the pronouncements of the MCTC and the
CA, however, the complaint of Hortizuela was not a
collateral attack on the title warranting dismissal. As a
13
matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a
recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to
a person whose property has been wrongfully
registered under the Torrens system in anothers name.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree is not sought
to be set aside. It does not seek to set aside the decree
but, respecting it as incontrovertible and no longer open
to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from
the registered owner to the rightful
owner. Reconveyance is always available as long as
the property has not passed to an innocent third person
for value.17cralawlawlibrary
There is no quibble that a certificate of title, like in the
case at bench, can only be questioned through a direct
proceeding. The MCTC and the CA, however, failed to
take into account that in a complaint for reconveyance,
the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible and is not being questioned. What is
being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another's name to its rightful
owner or to the one with a better right. If the registration
of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the
land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the
real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance
of the property.18cralawlawlibrary
The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her
name does not operate to vest ownership upon her of
the subject land. Registration of a piece of land under
the Torrens System does not create or vest title,
because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title over the particular property described therein. It
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner; nor can it be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of others. Its issuance in
favor of a particular person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be
held in trust for another person by the registered
owner.19cralawlawlibrary
Furthermore, respondents argument that the overriding
reason why Hortizuela chose to file a complaint for
reconveyance and recovery of possession was that she
failed to avail of the remedy provided under Section 38
of Act 496 within the prescribed period of one (1) year,
counted from the issuance of the patent by the
government, is weak. As was similarly held
in Cervantes v. CA,20 with the land obtained by
respondent Gregoria through fraudulent machinations
by means of which a free patent and a title were issued
in her name, she was deemed to have held it in trust for
the benefit of Hortizuela who was prejudiced by her
actions. Article 1456 provides:
ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake
or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of
the person from whom the property comes.
The remedy of reconveyance, based on Section 53 of
P.D. No. 1529 and Article 1456, prescribes in ten (10)
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property.
The Court is not unaware of the rule that a fraudulently
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
acquired free patent may only be assailed by the
government in an action for reversion pursuant to
Section 101 of the Public Land Act.21 In Sherwill
Development Corporation v. Sitio Sto. Nio Residents
Association, Inc.,22 this Court pointed out that:
x x x It is to the public interest that one who succeeds in
fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be
allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State should,
therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly-
authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end
that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other
officer who may be authorized by law, may file the
corresponding action for the reversion of the land
involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to
disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with
law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land
previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been
acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to
determine whether or not fraud had been committed in
securing such title in order that the appropriate action
for reversion may be filed by the Government.23
An action for reconveyance is proper
The foregoing rule is, however, not without exception. A
recognized exception is that situation where plaintiff-
claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant of
public land unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by
him, on the principle of enforcement of a constructive
trust. This was the ruling in Larzano v. Tabayag, Jr.,24
where it was written:
A private individual may bring an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof
was issued through a free patent since such action
does not aim or purport to re-open the registration
proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but
only to show that the person who secured the
registration of the questioned property is not the real
owner thereof.
In Roco, et al. v. Gimeda, we stated that if a patent had
already been issued through fraud or mistake and has
been registered, the remedy of a party who has been
injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for
reconveyance, thus:
cralawred
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the
decree issued in the registration proceeding. The
purpose is not to annul the title but to have it conveyed
to plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were made in the
application for the patent and no notice thereof was
given to plaintiffs, nor knowledge of the petition known
to the actual possessors and occupants of the property.
The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it
can be instituted within four years from the discovery of
the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil Code, as based on Section 3,
paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.) It is to be noted that as
the patent here has already been issued, the land has
the character of registered property in accordance with
the provisions of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party
who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is
an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs.
14
Registered of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. 3 935;
Section 55 of Act No. 496.)
In the same vein, in Quiiano, et al. v. Court of Appeals,
et al., we stressed that:
The controlling legal norm was set forth in succinct
language by Justice Tuason in a 1953 decision, Director
of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal. Thus: The sole
remedy of the land owner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name
is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set
aside the decree, as was done in the instant case, but,
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer
open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, for damages." Such a doctrine
goes back to the 1919 landmark decision of Cabanos v.
Register of Deeds of Laguna. If it were otherwise the
institution of registration would, to quote from Justice
Torres, serve "as a protecting mantle to cover and
shelter bad faith ...." In the language of the then Justice,
later Chief Justice, Bengzon: "A different view would
encourage fraud and permit one person unjustly to
enrich himself at the expense of another." It would
indeed be a signal failing of any legal system if under
the circumstances disclosed, the aggrieved party is
considered as having lost his right to a property to
which he is entitled. It is one thing to protect an
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter, and
one devoid of justification, if [deceit] would be rewarded
by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his
nefarious deed. As clearly revealed by the undeviating
line of decisions coming from this Court, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be
guarded against. So it has been before; so it should
continue to be. (Citations omitted)
In this case, in filing the complaint for reconveyance
and recovery of possession, Hortizuela was not seeking
a reconsideration of the granting of the patent or the
decree issued in the registration proceedings. What she
was seeking was the reconveyance of the subject
property on account of the fraud committed by
respondent Gregoria. An action for reconveyance is a
legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the name of another, to compel the
registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to
him.25 Thus, the RTC did not err in upholding the right
of Hortizuela to ask for the reconveyance of the subject
property. To hold otherwise would be to make the
Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud. To
reiterate,
The fact that petitioner was able to secure a title in her
name did not operate to vest ownership upon her of the
subject land. Registration of a piece of land under the
Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it
is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of
title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
particular property described therein. It cannot be used
to protect a usurper from the true owner; nor can it be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither
does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
others. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does
not foreclose the possibility that the real property may
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate,
or that it may be held in trust for another person by the
registered owner.26
Finally, respondents supposition that Hortizuela was
ineligible to own the subject property pursuant to B.P.
Blg. 223 because she was no longer a Filipino citizen
cannot be considered for having been raised only for
the first time on appeal. It must be noted that points of
law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by
a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.27 The reason therefor is due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
September 13, 2012 Decision and the January 25, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. SP No.
122648 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
July 1, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014
VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-
Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I.
DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
F L O V Y I . D A N C E L ; a n d C ATA L I N O L .
IBARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO
L. IBARRA, PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L. IBARRA,
GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L.
I B A R R A , n a m e l y C O N C H I TA R . , I B A R R A ,
APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and
the spouses RECTO CANDELARIO and
ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed under Rule 45 challenging the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013,
respectively. The challenged rulings affirmed the May 7,
15
2012 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac that petitioners and
respondents are co-owners of the subject property,
which should be partitioned as per the subdivision plan
submitted by respondent spouses Recto and
Rosemarie Candelario.
The Facts
As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as
follows:
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and
Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli
Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra,
Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings.
Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were
the owners of the subject property, a 281 sqm. parcel of
land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C,
Camiling, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate Title
(TCT) No. 318717.
By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already
passed away, leaving to their ten (10) children
ownership over the subject property. Subsequently,
sometime in 2002, respondent siblings brought an
action for partition against petitioners. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the
RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. However, in an
Order4 dated March 22, 2004, the trial court dismissed
the case disposing as follows:
For failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to
appear despite due notice, this case is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial
court became final, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Finality5 it eventually issued on August 22, 2008.
Having failed to secure a favorable decision for
partition, respondent siblings instead resorted to
executing a Deed of Adjudication6 on September 21,
2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10)
siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and
in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in its place
by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the
ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra spouses.
Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10
undivided share over the property in favor of their co-
respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie
Candelario. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated
April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses
Candelario and an Agreement of
Subdivision 8 purportedly executed by them and
petitioners, TCT No. 390484 was partially canceled and
TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the
Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion.
On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for
Quieting of Title and Damages against respondents
wherein they alleged that during their parents lifetime,
the couple distributed their real and personal properties
in favor of their ten (10) children. Upon distribution,
petitioners alleged that they received the subject
property and the house constructed thereon as their
share. They likewise averred that they have been in
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the property for over four (4) decades
and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They
also deny any participation in the execution of the
aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September
21, 2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.
Respondents countered that petitioners cause of action
was already barred by estoppel when sometime in
2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10
undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point
out that this is an admission on the part of petitioners
that the property is not entirely theirs. In addition, they
claimed that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra
mortgaged the property but because of financial
constraints, respondent spouses Candelario had to
redeem the property in their behalf. Not having been
repaid by Bienvenido and Escolastica, the Candelarios
accepted from their co-respondents their share in the
subject property as payment. Lastly, respondents
sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the
property.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 09-15 of the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac, the quieting of title case was
eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court, the same
trial court that dismissed Civil Case No. 02-52. During
pre-trial, respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted
having filed an action for partition, that petitioners did
not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that served
as the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 390484, and
that the Agreement of Subdivision that led to the
issuance of TCT No. 434304 in favor of respondent
spouses Candelario was falsified. 9 Despite the
admissions of respondents, however, the RTC, through
its May 27, 2012 Decision, dismissed petitioners
complaint. The court did not find merit in petitioners
asseverations that they have acquired title over the
property through acquisitive prescription and noted that
there was no document evidencing that their parents
bequeathed to them the subject property. Finding that
respondent siblings were entitled to their respective
shares in the property as descendants of Bienvenido
and Escolastica Ibarra and as co-heirs of petitioners,
the subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of
respondent spouses Candelario was then upheld by the
trial court. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled
case is hereby Dismissed.
Also, defendants-spouses Rosemarie Candelario and
Recto Candelario are hereby declared as the absolute
owners of the 7/10 portion of the subject lot.
Likewise, the court hereby orders the partition of the
subject lots between the herein plaintiffs and the
defendants-spouses Candelarios.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial courts
Decision to the CA, pleading the same allegations they
averred in their underlying complaint for quieting of title.
However, they added that the partition should no longer
be allowed since it is already barred by res judicata,
respondent siblings having already filed a case for
partition that was dismissed with finality, as admitted by
respondents themselves during pre-trial.
16
On July 8, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision
denying the appeal. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Decision dated May 7, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch
68, in Civil Case No. 09-15, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Similar to the trial court, the court a quo found no
evidence on record to support petitioners claim that the
subject property was specifically bequeathed by
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra in their favor as their
share in their parents estate. It also did not consider
petitioners possession of the property as one that is in
the concept of an owner. Ultimately, the appellate court
upheld the finding that petitioners and respondent
spouses Candelario co-own the property, 30-70 in favor
of the respondent spouses.
As regards the issue of partition, the CA added:
x x x Since it was conceded that the subject lot is now
co-owned by the plaintiffs-appellants, (with 3/10
undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses
Candelarios (with 7/10 undivided interest) and
considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already
constructed a 3-storey building at the back portion of
the property, then partition, in accordance with the
subdivision plan (records, p. 378) undertaken by
defendants-appellants [sic] spouses, is in order.10
On November 22, 2013, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issues
In the present petition, the following errors were raised:
I . T H E C O U RT O F A P P E A L S M A N I F E S T LY
OVERLOOKED RELEVANT AND UNDISPUTED
FACTS WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED,
WOULD JUSTIFY PETITIONERS CLAIM OF
EQUITABLE TITLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF PARTITION DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR
PARTITION, BASED ON THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED IN 2007, IS BARRED BY LACHES.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A
SUBSTANTIALLY FLAWED JUDGMENT WHEN IT
NEGLECTED TO RULE ON PETITIONERS
CONTENTION THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR
PA R T I T I O N I S A L S O B A R R E D B Y P R I O R
J U D G M E N T, D E S P I T E I T S H AV I N G B E E N
SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED AS ERROR AND
PROPERLY ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF, AND WHICH,
IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT
ORDERED PARTITION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
SUBDIVISION PLAN MENTIONED IN ITS DECISION,
IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROCEDURE
ESTABLISHED IN RULE 69 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.11
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
To simplify, the pertinent issues in this case are as
follows:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove
ownership over the property;
2. Whether or not the respondents counterclaim for
partition is already barred by laches or res judicata; and
3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the
subdivision agreement as basis for the partition of the
property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious in part.
Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or
ownership over the property
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title
to real property.12 For an action to quiet title to prosper,
two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1)
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of the action;
and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or efficacy.13 In the case at bar,
the CA correctly observed that petitioners cause of
action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the
absence of the first requisite.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the
determination of whether or not petitioners sufficiently
proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is
substantially a factual issue that is generally improper
for Us to delve into. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court explicitly states that the petition for review on
certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must
be distinctly set forth." In appeals by certiorari,
therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because
this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the contending parties during the trial.14 Although
there are exceptions15 to this general rule as eloquently
enunciated in jurisprudence, none of the circumstances
calling for their application obtains in the case at bar.
Thus, We are constrained to respect and uphold the
findings of fact arrived at by both the RTC and the CA.
In any event, a perusal of the records would readily
show that petitioners, as aptly observed by the courts
below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their
alleged open, continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property is belied by the fact
that respondent siblings, in 2005, entered into a
Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co.
over the subject lot without any objection from the
petitioners.16 Petitioners inability to offer evidence
tending to prove that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra
transferred the ownership over the property in favor of
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latters claim. On the
contrary, on May 28, 1998, Escolastica Ibarra executed
a Deed of Sale covering half of the subject property in
favor of all her 10 children, not in favor of petitioners
alone.17
17
The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not
suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence.
18 Regrettably, petitioners, as such plaintiff, in this case
failed to discharge the said burden imposed upon them
in proving legal or equitable title over the parcel of land
in issue. As such, there is no reason to disturb the
finding of the RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the
subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica
Ibarra, and after the respondent siblings sold their
aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and
respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior
judgment
This brings us to the issue of partition as raised by
respondents in their counterclaim. In their answer to the
counterclaim, petitioners countered that the action for
partition has already been barred by res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment
in a first case is final as to the claim or demand in
controversy, between the parties and those privy with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but
as to any other admissible matter which must have
been offered for that purpose and all matters that could
have been adjudged in that case.19 It precludes parties
from relitigating issues actually litigated and determined
by a prior and final judgment.20 As held in Yusingco v.
Ong Hing Lian:21
It is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied
in various maxims of the common law; the one, public
policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of
the state that there should be an end to litigation
republicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on
the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa.
A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and
quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratitude identification of a litigious disposition on the
part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquility and happiness.22
The rationale for this principle is that a party should not
be vexed twice concerning the same cause. Indeed, res
judicata is a fundamental concept in the organization of
every jural society, for not only does it ward off endless
litigation, it ensures the stability of judgment and guards
against inconsistent decisions on the same set of facts.
23
There is res judicata when the following requisites are
present: (1) the formal judgment or order must be final;
(2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is,
it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action.24
In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they
filed an action for partition docketed as Civil Case No.
02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order
dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of the parties to
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise
admitted that since they no longer appealed the
dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot
be disputed that the subject property in Civil Case No.
02-52 and in the present controversy are one and the
same, and that in both cases, respondents raise the
same action for partition. And lastly, although
respondent spouses Candelario were not party-litigants
in the earlier case for partition, there is identity of
parties not only when the parties in the case are the
same, but also between those in privity with them, such
as between their successors-in-interest.25
With all the other elements present, what is left to be
determined now is whether or not the dismissal of Civil
case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits
that would complete the requirements of res judicata.
In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no
justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date
of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or
in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court.
The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances
when a complaint may be dismissed due to the
plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply
with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal
of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of
adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily
understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another
action, unless otherwise provided in the order of
dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be
regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only
exception is when the order of dismissal expressly
contains a qualification that the dismissal is without
prejudice.26 In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the
Order does not in any language say that the dismissal
is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the
dismissal be on the merits is present.
Truly, We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal
with prejudice under the above-cited rule amply
satisfies one of the elements of res judicata.27 It is, thus,
understandable why petitioners would allege res
judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition
at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication
of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article
494 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any
18
time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar
as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided
for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years,
shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new
agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall there
be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
(emphasis supplied)
From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that
the law generally does not favor the retention of co-
ownership as a property relation, and is interested
instead in ascertaining the co-owners specific shares
so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain
perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3
and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the
Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe
otherwise would diminish the substantive right of a co-
owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.
Such a construction is not sanctioned by the principle,
which is too well settled to require citation, that a
substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural
rule.28 This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New
Civil Code, viz:
Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement
between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
1wphi1 Partition shall be governed by the Rules of
Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory
provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is an
exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that even if the order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice,
it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the action for partition
will never be barred by res judicata. There can still be
res judicata in partition cases concerning the same
parties and the same subject matter once the
respective shares of the co-owners have been
determined with finality by a competent court with
jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is
improper for co-ownership does not or no longer exists.
So it was that in Rizal v. Naredo,29 We ruled in the
following wise:
Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is
co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided
thing or right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the
one hand, a co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is
an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises
the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the
owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On the other
hand, there is no co-ownership when the different
portions owned by different people are already
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even
if not yet technically described.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is
obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and his proper
remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court, which he may bring at anytime in so far
as his share is concerned. Article 1079 of the Civil Code
defines partition as the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. It has been held that the fact that
the agreement of partition lacks the technical
description of the parties respective portions or that the
subject property was then still embraced by the same
certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition,
where the different portions allotted to each were
determined and became separately identifiable.
The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the
approved Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 36-
C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent
any showing that said Compromise Agreement was
vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot
set aside a judgment based on compromise. It is
axiomatic that a compromise agreement once approved
by the court settles the rights of the parties and has the
force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on
the ground of vice of consent or forgery.
Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise
judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C settled as well the
question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252
accrued to the parties separately as their proportionate
shares therein. Through their subdivision survey plan,
marked as Annex "A" of the Compromise Agreement
and made an integral part thereof, the parties
segregated and separately assigned to themselves
distinct portions of Lot No. 252. The partition was
immediately executory, having been accomplished and
completed on December 1, 1971 when judgment was
rendered approving the same. The CA was correct
when it stated that no co-ownership exist when the
different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even
if not yet technically described. (emphasis supplied)
In the quoted case, We have held that res judicata
applied because after the parties executed a
compromise agreement that was duly approved by the
court, the different portions of the owners have already
been ascertained. Thus, there was no longer a co-
ownership and there was nothing left to partition. This is
in contrast with the case at bar wherein the co-
ownership, as determined by the trial court, is still
subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses
Candelario. Consequently, there is no legal bar
preventing herein respondents from praying for the
partition of the property through counterclaim.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches
We now proceed to petitioners second line of attack.
According to petitioners, the claim for partition is
already barred by laches since by 1999, both
Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died and
yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the
action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in 2002. And
since laches has allegedly already set in against
respondent siblings, so too should respondent spouses
Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they
19
could not have acquired a better right than their
predecessors-in-interest.
The argument fails to persuade.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that whichby
the exercise of due diligencecould or should have
been done earlier. It is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it.30 The principle is a
creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping upon ones right, but rather
to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result
in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable
defense, laches does not concern itself with the
character of the petitioners title, but only with whether
or not by reason of the respondents long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from
asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to do
so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.31
As correctly appreciated by the lower courts,
respondents cannot be said to have neglected to assert
their right over the subject property. They cannot be
considered to have abandoned their right given that
they filed an action for partition sometime in 2002, even
though it was later dismissed. Furthermore, the fact that
respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease
with Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject
property is evidence that they are exercising rights of
ownership over the same.
The CA erred in approving the Agreement for
Subdivision
There is merit, however, in petitioners contention that
the CA erred in approving the proposal for partition
submitted by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier
cited, provides that partition shall either be by
agreement of the parties or in accordance with the
Rules of Court. In this case, the Agreement of
Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses
Candelario and petitioners cannot serve as basis for
partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein
respondents admitted that the agreement was a falsity
and that petitioners never took part in preparing the
same. The "agreement" was crafted without any
consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at
mutually acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore,
lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to
approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be
tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to divide
unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on
their own whims and caprices. Such a result could not
be countenanced.
To rectify this with dispatch, the case must be
remanded to the court of origin, which shall proceed to
partition the property in accordance with the procedure
outlined in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
98919 dated July 8, 2013 and November 22, 2013,
r e s p e c t i v e l y, a r e h e r e b y A F F I R M E D w i t h
MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
partitioning the subject property in accordance with
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123509 March 14, 2000
LUCIO ROBLES, EMETERIA ROBLES, ALUDIA
ROBLES and EMILIO ROBLES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses VIRGILIO SANTOS
and BABY RUTH CRUZ, RURAL BANK OF
CARDONA, Inc., HILARIO ROBLES, ALBERTO
PALAD JR. in his capacity as Director of Lands, and
JOSE MAULEON in his capacity as District Land
Officer of the Bureau Of Lands, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To be entitled to the remedy of quieting of title,
petitioners must show that they have title to the real
property at issue, and that some deed or proceeding
beclouds its validity or efficacy. Buyers of unregistered
real property, especially banks, must exert due
diligence in ascertaining the titles of mortgagors and
sellers, lest some innocent parties be prejudiced.
Failure to observe such diligence may amount to bad
faith and may result in the nullity of the mortgage, as
well as of the subsequent foreclosure and/or auction
sale. Unless the co-ownership is clearly repudiated, a
co-owner cannot, by prescription, acquire title to the
share of the other co-owners.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,
assailing the June 15, 1995 Decision and the January
15, 1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 34213.2 In its Decision, the CA ruled: 3
WHEREFORE, the trial court's June 17, 1991 decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and in lieu thereof a
new one is hereby entered ordering the dismissal of the
plaintiffs-appellees['] second amended complaint.
Earlier, the trial court had disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring free patent Title No. IV-1-010021 issued by
the Bureau of Lands as null and void;
20
2. Ordering the defendant spouses Vergel Santos and
Ruth Santos to deliver the property subject of this case
to the plaintiff; and
3. Declaring the heirs of Silvino Robles as the absolute
owner of the land in controversy.
The January 15, 1996 CA Resolution denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The present Petition is rooted in a case for quieting of
title before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal,
filed on March 14, 1988, 4 by Petitioners Lucio Robles,
Emeteria Robles, Aludia. Robles and Emilio Robles.
The facts were narrated by the trial court in this wise:
There seems to be no dispute that Leon Robles
primitively owned the land situated in Kay Taga,
Lagundi, Morong, Rizal with an area of 9,985 square
meters. He occupied the same openly and adversely.
He also declared the same in his name for taxation
purposes as early as 1916 covered by Tax Declaration
No. 17865 (Exh. "I") and paid the corresponding taxes
thereon (Exh. "B"). When Leon Robles died, his son
Silvino Robles inherited the land, who took possession
of the land, declared it in his name for taxation
purposes and paid the taxes thereon.1wphi1.nt
Upon the death of Silvino Robles in 1942, his widow
Maria de la Cruz and his children inherited the property.
They took adverse possession of said property and paid
taxes thereon. The task of cultivat[ing] the land was
assigned to plaintiff Lucio Robles who planted trees and
other crops. He also built a nipa hut on the land. The
plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to
their co-heir and half-brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the
parcel of land in the, name of Silvino Robles was
canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena (Exh.
"19"), father of Andrea Robles who is the wife of
defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena
secured a loan from the Antipolo Rural Bank, using the
tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax
declaration was transferred [to] the name of Antipolo
Rural Bank (Exh. "17") and later on, was transferred [to]
the name of defendant Hilario Robles and his wife (Exh.
"16").
In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the
Cadona Rural Bank, Inc., using the tax declaration as
security. Andrea Robles testified without contradiction
that somebody else, not her husband Hilario Robles,
signed the loan papers because Hilario Robles was
working in Marinduque at that time as a carpenter.
For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure
proceedings were had and defendant Rural Bank
emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale
in October 1968.
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the
property and so the tax declaration was transferred in
the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September 25,
1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the
Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
In September 1987, plaintiff discovered the mortgage
and attempted to redeem the property, but was
unsuccessful. On May 10, 1988, defendant spouses
Santos took possession of the property in question and
was able to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their
names. 5
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals summarized
the facts of the case as follows:
The instant action for quieting of title concerns the
parcel of land bounded and more particularly described
as follows:
A parcel of land located at Kay Taga, Lagundi, Morong,
Rizal. Bounded [i]n the north by the property of
Venancio Ablay y Simeon Ablay; [i]n the east by the
property of Veronica Tulak y Dionisio Ablay; [i]n the
south by the property of Simeon Ablay y Dionisio Ablay;
and [i]n the west by the property of Dionisio Ablay y
Simeon Ablay, with an area of 9,985 square meters,
more or less, assessed in the year 1935 at P60.00
under Tax Declaration No. 23219.
As the heirs of Silvino Robles who, likewise inherited
the above-described parcel from Leon Robles, the
siblings Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and Emilio, all
surnamed Robles, commenced the instant suit with the
filing of their March 14, 1988 complaint against
Spouses Virgilio and Ruth Santos, as well as the Rural
Bank of Cardona, Inc. Contending that they had been in
possession of the land since 1942, the plaintiff alleged,
among other matters, that it was only in September of
1987 that they came to know of the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage constituted thereon by the half-
brother, Hilario Robles, in favor of defendant Rural
Bank; and that they likewise learned upon further
inquiry, that the latter had already sold the self-same
parcel in favor of the Santos spouses (pp. 1-3, orig,
rec.). Twice amended to implead Hilario Robles (pp.
76-80, orig. rec) and, upon subsequent discovery of the
issuance of Free Patent No. IV-I-010021 in favor of the
defendant spouses, the Director of Land as parties-
defendants (pp. 117-121, orig. rec). The plaintiffs'
complaint sought the following reliefs on the theory that
the encumbrance of their half-brother, constituted on
the land, as well as all proceedings taken subsequent
thereto, were null and void, to wit:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (a) a
preliminary mandatory injunction be issued forthwith
restoring plaintiffs to their possession of said parcel of
land; (b) an order be issued annulling said Free Patent
No. IV-I-010021 in the name of defendants spouses
Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos, the deed of sale
aforementioned and any tax declaration which have
been issued in the name of defendants; and (c)
ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs pray for other relief as [may be] just and
equitable under the premises. (pp. 120-121, orig. rec.)
xxx xxx xxx
With the termination of the pre-trial stage upon the
parties-litigants' agreement (p. 203, orig. rec.) the trial
court proceeded to try the case on the merits. It
thereafter rendered the challenged June 17, 1991
decision upon the following findings and conclusions:
21
The real estate, mortgage allegedly executed by Hilario
Robles is not valid because his signature in the
mortgage deed was forged. This fact, which remains
unrebutted, was admitted by Andrea Robles.
Inasmuch as the real estate mortgage executed
allegedly by Hilario Robles in favor of the defendant
Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. was not valid, it stands to
reason that the foreclosure proceedings therein were
likewise not valid. Therefore, the defendant bank did not
acquire any right arising out of the foreclosure
proceedings. Consequently, defendant bank could not
have transferred any right to the spouses Santos.
The fact that the land was covered by a free patent will
not help the defendant Santos any.
There can be no question that the subject [property was
held] in the concept of owner by Leon Robles since
1916. Likewise, his successor-in-interest, Silvino
Robles, his wife Maria de la Cruz and the plaintiffs
occupied the property openly, continuously and
exclusively until they were ousted from their possession
in 1988 by the spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering
that "open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public lands for the period prescribed by law
(30 years), creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other action, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property. Possession
of public land . . . which is [of] the character and
duration prescribed by the statute is the equivalent of
an express grant from the State, considering the dictum
of the statute itself[:]; "The . . . shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title . . ." No proof is admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption[,] and confirmation
proceedings would be a little more than a formality, at
the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time.
Registration thereunder would not confer title, but
simply recognize a title already vested. (Cruz v. IAC,
G.R. No. 75042, November 29, 1988) The land in
question has become private land.
Consequently, the issuance of [a] free patent title to the
Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth C. Santos is not valid
because at the time the property subject of this case
was already private land, the Bureau of Lands having
no jurisdiction to dispose of the same. (pp. 257-259,
orig. rec.)
Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Santos
spouses and the defendant Rural Bank jointly filed their
July 6, 1991 Notice of Appeal (p. 260, orig. rec.) . . . . 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held
that petitioners no longer had any title to the subject
property at the time they instituted the Complaint for
quieting of title. The CA ratiocinated as follows:
As correctly urged by the appellants, the plaintiff-
appellees no longer had any title to the property at the
time of the institution of the instant complaint. (pp.
25-27, rec.) The latter's claim of continuous possession
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
notwithstanding (pp. 3-5, TSN, July 5, 1990; p. 12, TSN,
July 12, 1990), the aforesaid loss of title is amply
evidenced by the subsequent declaration of the subject
realty for taxation purposes not only in the name of
Exequiel Ballena (Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 23-24, orig,
rec.) but also in the name of the Rural Bank of Antipolo
(Exhibit 17, vol. II orig. rec). On the theory that tax
declarations can be evincive of the transfer of a parcel
of land or a portion thereof (Gacos v. Court of Appeals,
212 SCRA 214), the court a quo clearly erred in simply
brushing aside the apparent transfers [which] the land
in litigation had undergone. Whether legal or equitable,
it cannot, under the circumstances, be gainsaid that the
plaintiff-appellees no longer had any title to speak of
when Exequiel Ballena executed the November 7, 1966
Deed of Absolute Sale transferring the land in favor of
the spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles (Exhibit "3", p.
25, orig. rec.)
Even on the theory that the plaintiffs-appellees and their
half-brother, Hilario Robles, are co-owners of the land
left behind by their common father, Silvino Robles, such
title would still be effectively discounted by what could
well serve as the latter's acts of repudiation of the co-
ownership, i.e., his possession (p. 22, TSN, November
15, 1990) and declaration thereof for taxation purposes
in his own name (Exhibit "4", p. 26, orig. rec.). In view of
the plaintiffs-appellees' inaction for more than twenty
(20) years from the time the subject realty was
transferred in favor of Hilario Robles, the appellants
correctly maintain that prescription had already set in.
While it may be readily conceded that an action to quiet
title to property in the possession of the plaintiff is
imprescriptible (Almanza vs. Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718;
Coronel vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA
270; Caragay-Layno vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
718; Charon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124
SCRA 784; Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441;
Burton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 4999), it equally bears
emphasis that a co-owner or, for that matter, the said
co-owner[']s successors-in-interest who occupy the
community property other than as co-owner[s] can
claim prescription as against the other co-owners (De
Guzman vs. Austria, 148 SCRA 75; Ramos vs. Ramos,
45 Phil. 362; Africa vs. Africa, 42 Phil. 902; Bargayo vs.
Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil.
23). If only in this latter sense, the appellants correctly
argue that the plaintiffs-appellees have lost their cause
of action by prescription.
Over and above the foregoing considerations, the
court a quo gravely erred in invalidating the real estate
mortgage constituted on the land solely on the basis of
Andrea Robles' testimony that her husband's signature
thereon was forged (p. 257, orig. rec.),
xxx xxx xxx
In according to the foregoing testimony . . . credibility
which, while admittedly unrebutted, was altogether
uncorroborated, the trial court lost sight of the fact that
the assailed deed of real estate mortgage (Exhibit "5",
Vol. II, orig. rec.) is a public document, the
acknowledgment of which is a prima facie evidence of
its due execution (Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 206
SCRA 339). As such, it retains the presumption of
validity in the absence of a full, clear and convincing
evidence to overcome such presumption (Agdeppa vs.
Ibe, 220 SCRA 584).
22
The foregoing principles take even more greater [sic]
when it is, moreover, borne in mind that Hilario Robles
made the following admissions in his March 8, 1989
answer, viz:
3. The complaint filed against herein answering
defendant has no legal basis considering that as the
lawful owner of the subject real property, defendant
Hilario Robles has the right to mortgage the said real
property and could dispose the same in whatever
manner he wishe[s] to do. (p. 96, orig. rec.)
Appropriately underscored by the appellants, the
foregoing admission is binding against Hilario [Robles].
Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by the
parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no
evidence being required to prove the same. They
cannot be contradicted unless shown to have been
made through [a] palpable mistake or [unless] no such
admission was actually made (Philippine American
General Insurance, Inc. vs. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212
SCRA 194).
It does not help the plaintiffs-appellees cause any that,
aside from complying with the requirements for the
foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage (Exhibits
"6", "7", "8" and "10", Volume II [)], the appellant Rural
Bank had not only relented to the mortgagor's request
to postpone the (Exhibit "g", Vol. II, orig. rec.) but had
likewise granted the latter's request for an extension of
the redemption period therefor (Exhibits "11" and "12",
pp. 35-36, orig. rec.). Without going into minute detail in
discussing the Santos spouses' rights as purchasers for
value and in good faith (Exhibit "21", Vol. II, orig. rec.),
the mortgagor and the plaintiffs'-appellees cannot now
be heard to challenge the validity of the sale of the land
after admittedly failing to redeem the same within the
extension the appellant, Rural Bank granted (pp. 10-11,
TSN, November 15, 1990).
Being dependent on the supposed invalidity of the
constitution and foreclosure of the subject real estate
mortgage, the plaintiffs-appellees' attack upon . . . Free
Patent No. IV-I must necessarily fail. The trial court,
therefore, misread, and ignored the evidence o[n]
record, to come up with erroneous conclusion.
Contending that such ruling was contrary to law and
jurisprudence, Petitioners Lucio, Emeteria, Aludia and
Emilio all surnamed Robles filed this Petition for
Review. 7
The Assigned Error
Petitioners ascribe the following error to the respondent
court:
Respondent Court of Appeals grievously erred in ruling
that with the transfers of the tax declaration over the
parcel of land in question from Silvino Robles to
Exequiel Ballena, then to the Rural Bank of Antipolo,
then to Respondent Hilario Robles, then to Respondent
Rural Bank of Cardona Inc., and then finally to
Respondent Spouses Santos, petitioners, who by
themselves and their predecessors in interest have
been in open, actual and adverse possession of said
parcel of land since 1916 up to their forced removal
therefrom in 1988, have lost their title to said property
by prescription to their half-brother, Respondent Hilario
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Robles, and then finally, to Respondent Spouses
Santos. 8
For a better understanding of the case, the above issue
will be broken down into three points: first, the nature of
the remedy of quieting of title; second, the validity of the
real estate mortgage; and third, the efficacy of the free
patent granted to the Santos spouses.
First Issue:
Quieting of Title
Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides:
Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any
interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
Based on the above definition, an action to quiet title is
a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or
doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. 9 It is
essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. 10 Also, the
deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being
alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 11
That there is an instrument or a document which, on its
face, is a valid and efficacious is clear in the present
case. Petitioners allege that their title as owners and
possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the
tax declaration and, subsequently, the free patent
thereto granted to Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
The more important question to be resolved, however,
is whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that
will entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy of
quieting of title.
Petitioners anchor their claim to the disputed property
on their continued and open occupation and possession
as owners thereof. They allege that they inherited it
from their father, Silvino, who in turn had inherited it
from his father, Leon. They maintain that after their
father's death, they agreed among themselves that
Petitioner Lucio Robles would be tending and cultivating
it for everyone, and that their half-brother Hilario would
be paying the land taxes.
Petitioners insist that they were not aware that from
1962 until 1987, the subject property had been declared
in the names of Exequiel Ballena, the Rural Bank of
Antipolo, Hilario Robles, the Rural Bank of Cardona,
Inc., and finally, Spouses Vergel and Ruth Santos.
Maintaining that as co-owners of the subject property,
they did agree to the real estate mortgage constituted
on it, petitioners insist that their shares therein should
not have been prejudiced by Hilario's actions.
23
On the other hand, Private Respondents Vergel and
Ruth Santos trace their claim to the subject property to
Exequiel Ballena, who had purportedly sold it to Hilario
and Andrea Robles. According to private respondents,
the Robles spouses then mortgaged it to the Rural
Bank of Cardona, Inc. not as co-owners but as
absolute owners in order to secure an agricultural
loan worth P2,000. Upon their failure to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgage was foreclosed and the
property sold to the bank as the highest bidder.
Thereafter, private respondents purchased the property
from the bank.
Undisputed is the fact that the land had previously been
occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the
different tax declarations issued in their names. Also
undisputed is the fact that the petitioners continued
occupying and possessing the land from the death of
Silvino in 1942 until they were allegedly ousted
therefrom in 1988. In 1962, the subject property was
declared in the name of Exequiel for taxation purposes.
On September 30, 1965, it was again declared in the
same name; on October 28, 1965, in the name of the
Rural Bank of Antipolo; on November 7, 1966, in the
name of Hilario and Andrea; and thereafter, in the name
of the Rural Bank of Cardona and, finally, in the name
of the Santos spouses.
Ostensibly, the Court of Appeals failed to consider
irregularities in the transactions involving the disputed
property. First, while it was declared in the name of
Exequiel in 1962, there was no instrument or deed of
conveyance evidencing its transfer from the heirs of
Silvino to him. This fact is important, considering that
the petitioners are alleging continued possession of the
property. Second, Exequiel was the father-in-law of
Hilario, to whom petitioners had entrusted the payment
of the land taxes. Third, considering that the subject
property had been mortgaged by Exequiel to the Rural
Bank of Antipolo, and that it was foreclosed and in fact
declared in the bank's name in 1965, why was he able
to sell it to Spouses Hilario and Andrea in 1966? Lastly,
inasmuch as it was an unregistered parcel of land, the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., did not observe due
diligence in determining Hilario's title thereto.
The failure to show the indubitable title of Exequiel to
the property in question is vital to the resolution of the
present Petition. It was from him that Hilario had
allegedly derived his title thereto as owner, an allegation
which thereby enabled him to mortgage it to the Rural
Bank of Cardona. The occupation and the possession
thereof by the petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest until 1962 was not disputed, and Exequiel's
acquisition of the said property by prescription was not
alleged. Thus, the deed of conveyance purportedly
evidencing the transfer of ownership and possession
from the heirs of Silvino to Exequiel should have been
presented as the best proof of that transfer. No such
document was presented, however.
Therefore, there is merit to the contention of the
petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed property
to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere
co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not
divest them of title to the property at the time of the
institution of the Complaint for quieting of title.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Contrary to the disquisition of the Court of Appeals,
Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the
co-ownership. It is a fundamental principle that a co-
owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor
of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-
owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the other co-owner; and (3) the
evidence thereof is clear and convincing. 12
In the present case, Hilario did not have possession of
the subject property; neither did he exclude the
petitioners from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as
they had indisputably shared in its fruits. 13 Likewise, his
act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank
cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-
ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest
in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he
in fact did. 14Neither should his payment of land taxes in
his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be
construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership. The
assertion that the declaration of ownership was
tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued
occupation and possession of the disputed property by
the petitioners as owners.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Real Estate Mortgage
In a real estate mortgage contract, it is essential that
the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to
be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is void. 15 In the
present case, it is apparent that Hilario Robles was not
the absolute owner of the entire subject property; and
that the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., in not fully
ascertaining his title thereto, failed to observe due
diligence and, as such, was a mortgagee in bad faith.
First, the bank was utterly remiss in its duty to establish
who the true owners and possessors of the subject
property were.1wphi1 It acted with precipitate haste in
approving the Robles spouses' loan application, as well
as the real estate mortgage covering the disputed
parcel of land. 16 Had it been more circumspect and
assiduous, it would have discovered that the said
property was in fact being occupied by the petitioners,
who were tending and cultivating it.
Second, the bank should not have relied solely on the
Deed of Sale purportedly showing that the ownership of
the disputed property had been transferred from
Exequiel Ballena to the Robles spouses, or that it had
subsequently been declared in the name of Hilario.
Because it was dealing with unregistered land, and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction between
Hilario and his father-in-law Exequiel were suspicious,
the bank should have exerted more effort to fully
determine the title of the Robleses. Rural Bank of
Compostela vs. Court Appeals 17invalidated a real
estate mortgage after a finding that the bank had not
been in good faith. The Court explained: "The rule that
persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on
the certificate of title does not apply to banks." In Tomas
v. Tomas, the Court held:
24
. . . Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and
prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than
private individuals, for their business is one affected
with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to
their depositors, which they should guard against loss
by not committing any act of negligence which amounts
to lack of good faith by which they would be denied the
protective mantle of land registration statute, Act 496,
extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith,
as well as to mortgagees of the same character and
description. . . . 18
Lastly, the Court likewise finds it unusual that,
notwithstanding the bank's insistence that it had
become the owner of the subject property and had paid
the land taxes thereon, the petitioners continued
occupying it and harvesting the fruits therefrom. 19
Considering that Hilario can be deemed to have
mortgaged the disputed property not as absolute owner
but only as a co-owner, he can be adjudged to have
disposed to the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., only his
undivided share therein. The said bank, being the
immediate predecessor of the Santos spouses, was a
mortgagee in bad faith. Thus, justice and equity
mandate the entitlement of the Santos spouses, who
merely stepped into the shoes of the bank, only to what
legally pertains to the latter Hilario's share in the
disputed property.
Third Issue:
Efficacy of Free Patent Grant
Petitioners repeatedly insist that the disputed property
belongs to them by private ownership and, as such, it
could not have been awarded to the Santos spouses by
free patent. They allege that they possessed it in the
concept of owners openly, peacefully, publicly and
continuously as early as 1916 until they were forcibly
ousted therefrom in 1988. They likewise contend that
they cultivated it and harvested its fruits. Lucio Robles
testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, why do you know this parcel of land?
A Because before my father died, he showed me all the
documents.
Q Before the death of your father, who was the owner of
this parcel of land?
A My father, sir.
Q How did your father acquire this parcel of land?
A My father knew that it [was] by inheritance, sir.
Q From whom?
A From his father, Leon Robles, sir.
Q And do you know also [from] whom Leon Robles
acquired this land?
A It was inherited from his father, sir.
Q What is the nature of this parcel of land?
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
A It's an agricultural land, sir.
Q Now, at the time of the death of your father, this land
was planted with what crops?
A Mango trees, santol trees, and I was the one who
planted those trees, sir.
Q When did you plant those trees?
A Before the death of my father, sir.
Q Now, after the death of your father, who cultivated
this parcel of land?
A I took charge of the land after the death of my father,
sir.
Q Up to when?
A Up to the present, sir, after this case was already
filed. 20
The preceding claim is an assertion that the subject
property is private land. The petitioners do not concede,
and the records do not show, that it was ever an
alienable land of the public domain. They allege private
ownership thereof, as evidenced by their testimonies
and the tax declarations issued in the names of their
predecessors-in-interest. It must be noted that while
their claim was not corroborated by other witnesses, it
was not controverted by the other parties, either.
Carlos Dolores insisted that the Rural Bank of Cardona,
Inc., of which he was the manager, had acquired and
possessed the subject property. He did not, however,
give any reason why the petitioners had continued
occupying it, even as he admitted on the stand that he
had visited it twice. 21
In the light of their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land,
petitioners are "deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued." 22 The
land was "segregated from the public domain."
Accordingly, the director of lands had no authority to
issue a free patent thereto in favor of another person.
Verily, jurisprudence holds that a free patent covering
private land is null and void. 23
Worth quoting is the disquisition of the Court in Agne v.
Director of Lands, 24 in which it held that a riparian
owner presently in possession had a better right over
an abandoned river bed than had a registered owner by
virtue of a free patent.
Under the provisions of Act 2874 pursuant to which the
title of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest was
issued, the President of the Philippines, or his alter ego,
the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a free
patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and
has passed to private ownership and a title so issued is
null and void. The nullity arises, not from fraud or
deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands is limited only to public lands and
does not cover lands publicly owned. The purpose of
the Legislature in adopting the former Public Land Act,
Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands
of the public domain, and lands held in private
25
ownership are not included therein and are not affected
in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in
freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitutes
no part of the public domain, and cannot possibly come
within the purview of said act 2874, inasmuch as the
"subject" of such freehold or private land is not
embraced in any manner in the title of the Act and the
same is excluded from the provisions of the text thereof.
We reiterate that private ownership of land is not
affected by the issuance of the free patent over the
same land because the Public Land Act applies only to
lands of the public domain. Only public land may be
disposed of by the Director of Lands. Since as early as
1920, the land in dispute was already under the private
ownership of herein petitioners and no longer a part of
the lands of the public domain, the same could not have
been the subject matter of a free patent. The patentee
and his successors-in-interest acquired no right or title
to said land. Necessarily, Free Patent No. 23263 issued
to Herminigildo Agpoon is null and void and the
subsequent titles issued pursuant thereto cannot
become final and indefeasible. Hence we ruled
in Director of Lands v. Sicsican, et al. that if at the time
the free patents were issued in 1953 the land covered
therein were already private property of another and,
therefore, not part of the disposable land of the public
domain, then applicants patentees acquired no right or
title to the land.
Now, a certificate of title fraudulently secured is null and
void ab initio if the fraud consisted in misrepresenting
that the land is part of the public domain, although it is
not. As earlier stated, the nullity arises, not from the
fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. Being null
and void, the free patent granted and the subsequent
titles produce no legal effect whatsoever. Quod nullum
est, nullum producit effectum.
A free patent which purports to convey land to which the
government did not have any title at the time of its
issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as
against the true owner. The Court has previously held
that the Land Registration Act and the Cadastral Act do
not give anybody who resorts to the provisions thereof a
better title than what he really and lawfully has.
xxx xxx xxx
We have, therefore, to arrive at the unavoidable
conclusion that the title of herein petitioners over the
land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered
owner which is a total nullity. The long and continued
possession of petitioners under a valid claim of title
cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner
whose title is defective from the beginning.
The Santos spouses argue that petitioners do not have
the requisite personality to question the free patent
granted them, inasmuch as "it is a well-settled rule that
actions to nullify free patents should be filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General at the behest of the
Director of Lands." 25
Private respondents' reliance on this doctrine is
misplaced. Indeed, the Court held in Peltan
Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 26 that only the
solicitor general could file an action for the cancellation
of a free patent. Ruling that the private respondents,
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
who were applicants for a free patent, were not the
proper parties in an action to cancel the transfer
certificates covering the parcel of land that was the
subject of their application, the Court ratiocinated thus:
The Court also holds that private respondents are not
the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The
complaint, praying as it did for the cancellation of the
transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground
that they were derived from a "spurious" OCT No. 4216,
assailed in effect the validity of said title. While private
respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to
the government, we agree with the petitioners that the
prayer in the complaint will have the same result of
reverting the land to the government under the Regalian
Doctrine. Gabila v. Barinaga 27 ruled that only the
government is entitled to this relief. . . . .
Because the cancellation of the free patent as prayed
for by the private respondents in Peltan would revert the
property in question to the public domain, the ultimate
beneficiary would be the government, which can be
represented by the solicitor general only. Therefore, the
real party-in-interest is the government, not the private
respondents.
This ruling does not, however, apply to the present
case. While the private respondents in Peltan
recognized that the disputed property was part of the
public domain when they applied for free
patent, 28 herein petitioners asserted and proved private
ownership over the disputed parcel of land by virtue of
their open, continued and exclusive possession thereof
since 1916.
Neither does the present case call for the reversion of
the disputed property to the State. By asking for the
nullification of the free patent granted to the Santos
spouses, the petitioners are claiming the property
which, they contend, rightfully belongs to them.
Indeed, the same issue was resolved by this Court
in Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals. 29 In
that case, the trial court dismissed a Complaint seeking
the declaration of nullity of an Original Certificate of Title
issued pursuant to a free patent, reasoning that the
action should have been instituted by the solicitor
general. In reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court
held:
It is settled that a Free Patent issued over private land
is null and void, and produces no legal effect
whatsoever. Quod nullum est, nullum producit affectum.
Moreover, private respondents' claim of open, peaceful,
continuous and adverse possession of the 2,250 square
meter portion since 1920, and its illegal inclusion in the
Free Patent of petitioners and in their original certificate
of title, gave private respondents a cause of action for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
In any event, the Office of the Solicitor General was
afforded an opportunity to express its position in these
proceedings. But it manifested that it would not file a
memorandum, because "this case involves purely
private interests." 30
The foregoing considered, we sustain the contention of
petitioners that the free patent granted to the Santos
spouses is void. It is apparent that they are claiming
ownership of the disputed property on the basis of their
26
possession thereof in the concept of owners openly,
peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since
1916. Because they and their predecessors-in-interest
have occupied, possessed and cultivated it as owners
for more than thirty years, 31 only one conclusion can be
drawn it has become private land and is therefore
beyond the authority of the director of lands.
Epilogue
We recognize that both the petitioners and the Santos
spouses fell victim to the dubious transaction between
Spouses Hilario and Andrea Robles and the Rural Bank
of Cardona, Inc. However, justice and equity mandate
that we declare Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and
Emilio Robles to have the requisite title essential to their
suit for quieting of title. Considering the circumstances
peculiar to this complicated problem, the Court finds
this conclusion the logical and just solution.
The claim that petitioners were guilty of laches in not
asserting their rights as owners of the property should
be viewed in the light of the fact that they thought their
brother was paying the requisite taxes for them, and
more important, the fact that they continued cultivating it
and harvesting and gaining from its fruits.
From another viewpoint, it can even be said that it was
the Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., which was guilty of
laches because, granting that it had acquired the
subject property legally, it failed to enforce its rights as
owner. It was oblivious to the petitioners' continued
occupation, cultivation and possession thereof.
Considering that they had possessed the property in
good faith for more than ten years, it can even be
argued that they thus regained it by acquisitive
prescription. In any case, laches is a remedy in equity,
and considering the circumstances in this case, the
petitioners cannot be held guilty of it.
In sum, the real estate mortgage contract covering the
disputed property a contract executed between
Spouses Hilario and Andrea on the one hand and the
Rural Bank of Cardona, Inc., on the other is hereby
declared null and void insofar as it prejudiced the
shares of Petitioners Lucio, Emerita, Aludia and Emilio
Robles; it is valid as to Hilario Robles' share therein.
Consequently, the sale of the subject property to the
Santos spouses is valid insofar as it pertained to his
share only. Likewise declared null and void is Free
Patent No. IV-1-010021 issued by the Bureau of Lands
covering the subject property.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Except as modified by the last paragraph of this
Decision, the trial court's Decision is REINSTATED. No
costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
P H I L - V I L L E G.R. No. 167391
DEVELOPME
NT AND
HOUSING
CORPORATI Present:
ON,
Petiti
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
x---------------------------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside
the Decision [2] dated January 31, 2005 and
Resolution[3] dated March 15, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the Complaint[4] for Quieting of Title
and Damages filed by Phil-Ville Development and
Housing Corporation (Phil-Ville) and denied its Motion
for Reconsideration.[5]
The factual antecedents, as culled from the records, are
as follows.
Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation is the
registered owner of three parcels of land designated as
Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 of the subdivision plan
Psd-1-13-006209, located in Caloocan City, having a
total area of 8,694 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 270921,
[6] 270922[7] and 270923.[8] Prior to their subdivision, the
lots were collectively designated as Lot 1-G of the
subdivision plan Psd-2731 registered in the name of
Phil-Ville under TCT No. T-148220.[9] Said parcels of
land form part of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 994[10] registered on May 3, 1917 in the name of
Isabel Gil de Sola as the judicial administratrix of the
estate of Gonzalo Tuason and thirty-one (31)
others.Phil-Ville acquired the lots by purchase from N.
Dela Merced and Sons, Inc. on July 24, 1984.
Earlier, on September 27, 1961, a group composed of
Eleuteria Rivera, Bartolome P. Rivera, Josefa R.
Aquino, Gregorio R. Aquino, Pelagia R. Angeles,
Modesta R. Angeles, Venancio R. Angeles, Felipe R.
Angeles Fidela R. Angeles and Rosauro R. Aquino,
claiming to be the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, a co-owner to the extent of 1-189/1000% of the
properties covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985
and 994 of the Hacienda Maysilo, filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Land
Registration Case No. 4557. They prayed for the
substitution of their names on OCT No. 994 in place of
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal. Said petition was granted
by the CFI in an Order[11] dated May 25, 1962.
Afterwards, the alleged heirs of Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal filed a petition for the partition of the properties
covered by OCT Nos. 982, 983, 984, 985 and 994. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the CFI
of Rizal, Branch 12, Caloocan City. On December 29,
1965, the CFI granted the petition and appointed three
commissioners to determine the most equitable division
of the properties.[12] Said commissioners, however,
failed to submit a recommendation.
Thirty-one (31) years later, on May 22, 1996, Eleuteria
Rivera filed a Supplemental Motion[13] in Civil Case No.
C-424, for the partition and segregation of portions of
the properties covered by OCT No. 994. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120, of Caloocan City,
through Judge Jaime D. Discaya, to whom the case
27
was transferred, granted said motion. In an
Order[14] dated September 9, 1996, Judge Discaya
directed the segregation of portions of Lots 23, 28-A-1
and 28-A-2 and ordered the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City to issue to Eleuteria Rivera new
certificates of title over them. Three days later, the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan, Yolanda O. Alfonso,
issued to Eleuteria Rivera TCT No.
C-314537[15] covering a portion of Lot 23 with an area of
14,391.54 square meters. On December 12, 1996, the
trial court issued another Order directing the acting
Branch Clerk to issue a Certificate of Finality of the
Order dated September 9, 1996.
Thereafter, one Rosauro R. Aquino filed a petition for
certiorari contesting said Order of December 12, 1996
and impugning the partial partition and adjudication to
Eleuteria Rivera of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 of the
Maysilo Estate. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 43034 at the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, a writ of possession[16] was issued in
Eleuteria Riveras favor on December 26, 1996 upon the
Order[17] of Judge Discaya issued on the same
date. Accordingly, Sheriff Cesar L. Cruz served a Notice
to Vacate[18] dated January 2, 1997 upon Phil-Ville,
requiring it to vacate Lots 23-A and 28. Bonifacio
Shopping Center, Inc., which occupied Lot 28-A-2, was
also served a copy of the notice. Aggrieved, Bonifacio
Shopping Center, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43009, before
the Court of Appeals. In a Decision[19] dated February
19, 1997, the appellate court set aside and declared as
void the Order and Writ of Possession dated December
26, 1996 and the Notice to Vacate dated January 2,
1997. The appellate court explained that a party who
has not been impleaded in a case cannot be bound by
a writ of possession issued in connection therewith.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1997, Eleuteria
Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio died at the age of 96.[20]
On April 23, 1997, the Secretary of Justice issued
Department Order No. 137 creating a special committee
to investigate the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles.
On April 29, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[21] in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034 granting Rosauro
R. Aquinos petition and setting aside the RTCs Order of
September 9, 1996, which granted Eleuteria Riveras
prayer for partition and adjudicated in her favor portions
of Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 of the Maysilo
Estate. The appellate court likewise set aside the Order
and the Writ of Possession dated December 26, 1996.
Nonetheless, on June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a
complaint for quieting of title and damages against the
surviving heirs of Eleuteria Rivera Vda. de Bonifacio
(namely Maximo R. Bonifacio, Ceferino R. Bonifacio,
Apolonia B. Tan, Benita B. Caina, Crispina B. Pascual,
Rosalia B. de Gracia, Teresita S. Doronia, Christina B.
Goco, Arsenio C. Bonifacio, Carmen B. Bernardino and
Danilo C. Bonifacio) and the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. C-507 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 122.
On October 7, 1997, then Senator Marcelo B. Fernan
filed P.S. Resolution No. 1032 directing the Senate
Committees on Justice and Human Rights and on
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement to conduct
a thorough investigation, in aid of legislation, of the
irregularities surrounding the titling of the properties in
the Maysilo Estate.
In a Decision[22] dated March 24, 2000, the Caloocan
RTC ordered the quieting of Phil-Villes titles over Lots
1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, declaring as valid TCT Nos.
270921, 270922 and 270923 in Phil-Villes
name. The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the quieting of title of the plaintiff over
Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, all the subd. plan
Psd-1-13-006209, being a portion of Lot 1-G, Psd-2731,
LRC Rec. No. 4429, situated in Kalookan City, as owner
thereof in fee simple and with full faith and credit;
2. Declaring Transfer Ce[r]tificates of Title Nos.
270921, 270922 and 270923 in the name of Phil-Ville
Development and Housing Corporation over the
foregoing parcels of land issued by the Registry of
Deeds for Kalookan City, as valid and effective;
3. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No.
C-314537 over Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo Estate
situated in Maysilo, Kalookan City, in the name of
Eleuteria Rivera, issued by the Registry of Deeds for
Kalookan City, as null and void and with no force and
effect;
4. Ordering the private defendants to surrender to
the Registry of Deeds for Kalookan City, thru this Court,
the Owners Duplicate Certificate of said Transfer
Certificate of Title No. C-314537 in the name of
Eleuteria Rivera;
5. Directing the public defendant, Register of Deeds
of Kalookan City to cancel both Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera on
file with the Register of Deeds for Kalookan City, and
the Owners Duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. C-314537 being required to be surrendered by
the private defendants; and
6. Ordering the private defendants to pay plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the sum of P10,000.00, as and by
way of attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[23]
In upholding Phil-Villes titles, the trial court adopted the
conclusion in Senate Committee Report No.
1031[24] dated May 25, 1998 that there is only one OCT
No. 994, registered on May 3, 1917, and that OCT No.
994, purportedly registered on April 19, 1917 (from
which Eleuteria Riveras title originated) does not
exist. The trial court also found that it was physically
impossible for respondents to be the heirs of Eleuteria
Riveras grandmother, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal,
one of the registered owners of OCT No. 994, because
Maria de la Concepcion was born sometime in 1903,
later than Eleuteria Rivera who was born in 1901.
[25] Lastly, the RTC pointed out that contrary to the
contentions of Riveras heirs, there is no overlapping of
titles inasmuch as Lot 23 lies far from Lot 23-A, where
Phil-Villes lands are located.
28
On April 13, 2000, Atty. K.V. Faylona, on behalf of
respondents, addressed a letter[26] to the Branch Clerk
of Court of the Caloocan City RTC requesting the
complete address of Phil-Ville and its
counsel. Supposedly, respondents counsels of record,
Attys. Nicomedes Tolentino and Jerry D. Baares, had
abandoned the defense but still kept the records of the
case. Thus, the Notice of Appeal[27] on behalf of
respondents was filed by Atty. Faylona while two of the
heirs, Danilo Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino, filed a
separate Notice of Appeal[28] through their own counsel.
The appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 66547.
On April 17, 2000, respondents withdrew their appeal
and instead filed before this Court a Petition for Review
on Certiorari,[29] which was docketed as G.R. No.
142640. In a Resolution[30] dated September 25, 2000,
the Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals
for adjudication on the merits since the case does not
involve pure questions of law. Respondents moved for
reconsideration of the Resolution, but the Court denied
their motion. Thus, respondents petition was transferred
to the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 62211.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2002, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision[31] in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547,
dismissing the appeal as regards Danilo Bonifacio and
Carmen Bernardino. Yet, along with Danilo and
Carmen, respondents moved for reconsideration on the
contention that they are not bound by the judgment
since they had withdrawn their appeal therein. The
Court of Appeals denied said motion in a Resolution
dated June 7, 2004. Danilo, Carmen and respondents
elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 163397. Said petition, however, was denied
by this Court in a Resolution dated September 8, 2004
for being filed out of time.
Subsequently, on January 31, 2005, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 62211, setting aside the RTC judgment and
dismissing Phil-Villes complaint. The appellate court
held that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear Phil-Villes
complaint as it effectively seeks to annul the Order
dated May 25, 1962 of the CFI in LRC No. 4557, which
directed the substitution of the late Eleuteria Rivera and
her co-heirs in place of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as
registered owners on OCT No. 994. The appellate court
likewise affirmed the validity of OCT No. 994 registered
on April 19, 1917 citing the Supreme Court Decisions
in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v.
Court of Appeals[32] and Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v.
Court of Appeals[33] as precedents.
Phil-Ville sought reconsideration[34] of the decision, but
the Court of Appeals denied its motion in the assailed
Resolution dated March 15, 2005. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
NINTH DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION
ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF RESPONDENTS
MAXIMO BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-G.R SP NO.
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
62211 BECAUSE OF THE EARLIER DISMISSAL OF
THEIR APPEAL IN CA-G.R NO. 66547.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
NINTH DIVISION) ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION
ON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY
RESPONDENTS MAXIMO BONIFACIO, ET AL. IN CA-
G.R. NO. SP 62211 WHICH DOES NOT RAISE PURE
Q U E S T I O N [ S ] O F L AW O R I S S U E [ S ] O F
JURISDICTION AND THEREFORE THE PROPER
REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THEM IS ORDINARY
APPEAL WHICH, AS STATED, HAD ALREADY BEEN
DISMISSED IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 66547.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER
NINTH DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION ON THE
COMPLAINT FOR QUIETING OF TITLE FILED BY
PETITIONER PHIL-VILLE IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-507,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IN FAILING TO DECLARE
RESPONDENTS MAXIMO [BONIFACIO], ET AL.
ALREADY IN ESTOPPEL TO RAISE THE SAID ISSUE
OF JURISDICTION.[35]
Condensed, petitioner puts in issue the following: (1)
whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of respondents petition;
and (2) whether the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in declaring that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. C-507.
Pertinently, however, the genuine issue in this case is
whether TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria
Rivera constitutes a cloud over petitioners titles over
portions of Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate.
Petitioner argues mainly that the Court of Appeals acted
without jurisdiction in resolving respondents petition for
review since it had dismissed their appeal in CA-G.R.
CV No. 66547 for failure to file brief. Petitioner also
points out that respondents petition is defective
because Maximo Bonifacio alone signed its verification
and certification of non-forum shopping without proof
that he was authorized to sign for the other
respondents. It contends that the ruling in MWSS v.
Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals will not invalidate its titles because it is not a
party to any of said cases. As well, petitioner invokes
the finding in the joint investigation by the Senate and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) that there is only one
OCT No. 994, that is, the one registered on May 3,
1917. It maintains that the trial court had jurisdiction to
hear its action since it is one for quieting of title and not
for annulment of the CFI Order dated May 25, 1962.
Conversely, respondents rely on MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that
upheld the titles emanating from OCT No. 994
registered on April 19, 1917. Therefore, they insist that
petitioner has no cause of action to seek the nullification
of their title which is a derivative of said
OCT. Respondents reiterate that since they had
withdrawn their appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547, the
Court of Appeals decision therein applies only to Danilo
29
Bonifacio and Carmen Bernardino. Lastly, they believe
that petitioners action is one for annulment of judgment,
which is foreign to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Petitioner argues in its first two assignments of errors
that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining respondents
petition. However, said contention deserves scant
consideration since the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 62211, properly assumed jurisdiction over
respondents case after the same was referred to it by
this Court through our Resolution dated September 25,
2000. The issue raised by respondents, as petitioners in
G.R. No. 142640, was purely a question of fact that is
beyond the power of this Court to resolve. Essentially,
respondents asked the Court to determine the
ownership of the lots purportedly covered by petitioners
titles.
Neither do we find merit in petitioners contention that
the dismissal of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 66547 is
binding on respondents. The appellate court itself
recognized the withdrawal of appeal filed by
respondents, thus:
However, defendants Maximo R. Bonifacio, et al.
withdrew their appeal so that the only appellants herein
are defendants-appellants Danilo R. Bonifacio, et al.[36]
So did the trial court err in taking cognizance of
petitioners action for quieting of title contrary to
respondents assertion that it is actually one for
annulment of the CFI Order dated May 25, 1962? To
this query, we rule in the negative.
The nature of an action is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought by plaintiff, and the law in effect when the
action was filed irrespective of whether he is entitled to
all or only some of such relief.[37]
In its complaint, petitioner alleges:
27. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria
Rivera, although apparently valid and effective, are in
truth and in fact invalid and ineffective[;]
27.1. An examination of Decree No. 36455 issued on
April 19, 1917 in LRC Case No. 4429 and also of OCT
No. 994 which was issued pursuant thereto will show
that Lot 23 covered by the said TCT No. C-3145[3]7 of
the late Eleuteria Rivera is not one of the 34 parcels of
land covered by said Decree No. 36455 and OCT 994;
27.2. That, as hereinbefore stated, the same TCT No.
C-314537 of the late Eleuteria Rivera is a direct transfer
from OCT No. 994 which was registered on April 19,
1917. The fact, however, is that there is only one OCT
No. 994 which was issued pursuant to Decree No.
36455 in LRC Case No. 4429 and said OCT 994 was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3,
1917. The Office of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan
City or of Malabon or of Pasig City has no record of any
OCT No. 994 that was allegedly registered on April 19,
1917;
27.3. That said TCT No. C-314537 of the late Eleuteria
Rivera could not cover Lot 23-A or any portion/s thereof
because, as hereinbefore recited, the whole of Lot 23-A
had been totally disposed of as early as July 24, 1923
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
and she and/or any of her alleged predecessors-in- 8059 S e p t e m b e r -ditto-
interest is not among those named in the memorandum 3, 1923
of encumbrances of OCT No. 994 as vendees or
vendors of said Lot 23-A;[38] 8160 October 24, -ditto-
1923
Ultimately, petitioner submits that a cloud exists over its
titles because TCT No. C-314537 in the name of 8164 November 6, Juan Cruz Sanchez
Eleuteria Rivera purports to cover the same parcels of 1923
land covered by petitioners TCT Nos. 270921, 270922
8321 February 26, -ditto-
and 270923. It points out that what appears to be a
1924
valid and effective TCT No. C-314537 is, in truth, invalid
because it covers Lot 23 which is not among those 8734 S e p t e m b e r Emilio Sanchez
described in the OCT No. 994 on file with the Register 11, 1924
of Deeds of Rizal and registered on May 3,
1917. Petitioner notes that the OCT No. 994 allegedly 12946 N o v e m b e r -ditto-
registered on April 19, 1917 and from which TCT No. 21, 1927
C-314537 was derived, is not found in the records of
the Register of Deeds. In other words, the action seeks 28315 July 1 6 , Eastern Syndicate
the removal of a cloud from Phil-Villes title and/or the 1935 Mining Co., Inc.
confirmation of its ownership over the disputed 39163 N o v e m b e r Royal Lawrence
properties as the successor-in-interest of N. Dela 18, 1939 Rutter
Merced and Sons, Inc.
43559 July 2 6 , Mapua Institute of
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the 1941 Technology
removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty
affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud 18767 J u n e 1 6 , Sofia Nepomuceno
on title to real property or any interest in real property 1950
by reason of any instrument, record, claim, 57541 M a r c h 1 3 , Leona N. de Jesus,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or 1958 P a c i f i c o
effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, Nepomuceno, Sofi
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to a Nepomuceno,
said title, an action may be brought to remove such S o l e d a d
cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent Nepomuceno de
court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the Jesus
complainant and the other claimants, not only to place
things in their proper places, and make the claimant, 81679 December P a c i f i c o
who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not 15, 1960 Nepomuceno,
disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of Sofia N. Jugo,
both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud Soledad N. de
of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can Jesus
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the (81680) D e c e m b e r P a c i f i c o
property.[39] 17745 15, 1960 Nepomuceno & Co.

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, C-1379 A p r i l 2 1 , P a c i f i c o

two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in
the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.[40]
As regards the first requisite, we find that petitioner was
able to establish its title over the real properties subject
of this action. Petitioner submitted in evidence the Deed
of Absolute Sale[41] by which it acquired the subject
property from N. Dela Merced and Sons, Inc., as well as
copies of OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and all the
derivative titles leading to the issuance of TCT Nos.
270921, 270922 and 270923 in petitioners name as
follows:
T i t l e Registration Holder
No. Date
8004 July 2 4 , Vedasto Galino
1923
30
4 1978 Nepomuceno & Co.
Inc.
C-1460 M a y 1 6 , N. de La Merced &
3 1978 Sons, Inc.
T-1482 A p r i l 2 2 , P h i l - V i l l e
20 1987 Development and
Housing Corp.[42]
Petitioner likewise presented the Proyecto de particion
de la Hacienda de Maysilo[43] to prove that Lot 23-A, of
which petitioners Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3 form
part, is among the 34 lots covered by OCT No. 994
registered on May 3, 1917. It produced tax receipts
accompanied by a Certification[44] dated September 15,
1997 issued by the City Treasurer of Caloocan stating
that Phil-Ville has been religiously paying realty taxes
on the lots. Its documentary evidence also includes a
Plan[45] prepared by the Chief of the Geodetic Surveys
Division showing that Lot 23-A of the Maysilo Estate is
remotely situated from Lot 23 portion of the Maysilo
Estate. Petitioner ties these pieces of evidence to the
finding in the DOJ Committee Report[46] dated August
28, 1997 and Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
May 25, 1998 that, indeed, there is only one OCT No.
994, that is, the one registered on May 3, 1917.
On the other hand, respondents have not adduced
competent evidence to establish their title to the
contested property or to dispute petitioners claim over
the same. It must be noted that the RTC Order dated
September 9, 1996 in Civil Case No. C-424, which
resulted in the issuance of TCT No. C-314537 in the
name of Eleuteria Rivera had long been set aside by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034. Clearly,
respondents claim anchored primarily on TCT No.
C-314537 lacks legal basis. Rather, they rely simply on
the Courts pronouncement in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals that
OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 and all titles
emanating from it are void.
The Supreme Court sustained said decisions in the
case of Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation[47] promulgated on November
29, 2005. In said case, the Court declared void the titles
of the Manotoks and Aranetas which were derived from
OCT No. 994 registered on May 3, 1917 consistent with
its ruling in MWSS and Gonzaga. The Court
disregarded the DOJ and Senate reports on the alleged
anomalies surrounding the titling of the Maysilo Estate.
However, on motion for reconsideration, the Court
issued a Resolution[48] dated December 14, 2007 which
created a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to
hear the consolidated cases on remand. The Special
Division was tasked to hear and receive evidence,
conclude the proceedings and submit to the Court a
report on its findings as well as recommend conclusions
within three months from the finality of said
Resolution. However, to guide the proceedings before
the Special Division, the Court laid the following
definitive conclusions:
First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the
record, that mother title was received for transcription
by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that
should be the date which should be reckoned as the
date of registration of the title. It may also be
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No.
994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on [19] April 1917, although such date
cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No.
994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother
title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT
titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated
[19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles
since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone
is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT
claims over the subject property if singular reliance is
placed by them on the dates appearing on their
respective titles.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of
Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply
to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their
recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a
title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither
could the conclusions in MWSS [and] Gonzaga with
respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind
any other case operating under the factual setting the
31
same as or similar to that at bar.[49] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Eventually, on March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court
issued a Resolution[50] reversing its Decision of
November 29, 2005 and declaring certain titles in the
names of Araneta and Manotok valid. In the course of
discussing the flaws of Jose Dimsons title based on his
alleged 25% share in the hereditary rights of Bartolome
Rivera, Eleuteria Riveras co-petitioner in LRC No. 4557,
the Court noted:
However, the records of these cases would somehow
negate the rights of Rivera to claim from Vidal. The
Verification Report of the Land Registration
Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera
was 65 years old on 17 May 1963 (as gathered from the
records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496). It can thus
be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in
1963, then he must have been born around 1898. On
the other hand, Vidal was only nine (9) years in 1912;
hence, she could have been born only on [1903]. This
alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not
ridiculous, situation wherein Vidal, Riveras alleged
grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her
alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether
Rivera was in fact an heir of Vidal, for him to claim a
share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo Estate.[51]
The same is true in this case. The Death
Certificate[52] of Eleuteria Rivera reveals that she was
96 years old when she died on February 22, 1997. That
means that she must have been born in 1901. That
makes Rivera two years older than her alleged
grandmother Maria de la Concepcion Vidal who was
born in 1903. Hence, it was physically impossible for
Eleuteria Rivera to be an heir of Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal.
Moreover, the Partition Plan of the Maysilo Estate
shows that Lot 23-A was awarded, not to Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, but to Isabel Tuason, Esperanza
Tuason, Trinidad Jurado, Juan O Farrell and Angel O
Farrell.[53] What Vidal received as her share were Lot 6
and portions of Lots 10 and 17, all subject to the
usufructuary right of her mother Mercedes
Delgado. This was not at all disputed by respondents.
On the other hand, Vedasto Galino, who was the holder
of TCT No. 8004 registered on July 24, 1923 and to
whom petitioner traces its titles, was among the
successful petitioners in Civil Case No. 391
entitled Rosario Negrao, et al. v. Concepcion Vidal, et
al., who sought the issuance of bills of sale in favor of
the actual occupants of certain portions of the Maysilo
Estate.
Be that as it may, the second requisite in an action for
quieting of title requires that the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy. Article 476 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and
in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
Thus, the cloud on title consists of: (1) any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is
apparently valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and
(4) may be prejudicial to the title sought to be
quieted. The fourth element is not present in the case at
bar.
While it is true that TCT No. C-314537 in the name of
Eleuteria Rivera is an instrument that appeared to be
valid but was subsequently shown to be invalid, it does
not cover the same parcels of land that are described in
petitioners titles. Foremost, Riveras title embraces a
land measuring 14,391.54 square meters while
petitioners lands has an aggregate area of only 8,694
square meters. On the one hand, it may be argued that
petitioners land could be subsumed within Riveras
14,391.54-square meter property. Yet, a comparison of
the technical descriptions of the parties titles negates
an overlapping of their boundaries.
The technical description of respondents TCT No.
C-314537 reads:
A parcel of land (Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo
Estate) situated in Maysilo, Caloocan, Metro Manila,
Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2 by
Blk. 2; on the SW., along line 2-3 by Jacinto Street,
along lines 3-4-5 by Blk. 4; along line 5-6 by Bustan
St., and San Diego St., on the S., along lines 6-7-8 by
Blk. 13, all of Caloocan Cadastre; on the NE., along line
8-9 by Caloocan Cadastre; and on the N., along line 9-1
by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. Beginning at a
point marked 1 on plan, being S. 28 deg. 30E., 530.50
m. from MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre; thence S. 07
deg. 20W., 34.00 m. to point 2; S. 17 deg. 10E., 12.00
m. to point 3; (0/illegible)
S. 15 deg. 31E., 31.00 m. to point 4; S. 27 deg. 23E.,
22.50 m. to point 5;
S. 38 deg. 41E., 43.20 m. to point 6; S. 71 deg. 35E.,
10.60 m. to point 7;
N. 84 deg. 30E., 38.80 m. to point 8; N. 11 deg. 40W.,
131.20 m. to point 9;
N. 89 deg. 10W., 55.00 m. to the point of beginning;
containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED NINETY ONE SQUARE METERS AND
FIFTY FOUR SQUARE DECIMETERS (14,391.54).
more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the
plan and are marked on the ground by Old Ps. cyl.
conc. mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true;[54] (Emphasis
supplied).
On the other hand, the technical description of
petitioners lands before they were subdivided under
TCT No. T-148220 is as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 1-G of the subdivision plan
Psd-2731, being a portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo Estate,
GLRO Rec. No. 4429), situated in the Municipality of
32
Caloocan, Province of Rizal. Bounded on the North.,
by Calle A. Samson; on the East., by properties of
Gregoria de Jesus, Arcadio de Jesus and Felix de
Jesus; on the South., by properties of Lucas
Bustamante and Patricio Galauran; and on the West.,
by property of Patricio Galauran; and Lot No. 1-E of
the subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked 1 on
plan, being N.69 deg. 27E., 1600.19 m. from BLLM No.
1, Mp. of Caloocan, more or less, thence S. 21 deg.
25E., 44.78 m. to point 2; thence S. 14 deg. 57E., 37.24
m. to point 3; thence S. 81 deg. 11W., 20.28 m. to point
4; thence S. 86 deg. 06W., 15.45 m. to point 5; thence
N. 67 deg. 20W., 15.91 m. to point 6; thence N. 35 deg.
19W., 37.56 m. to point 7; thence N. 27 deg. 11W.,
12.17 m. to point 8; thence N. 19 deg. 26W., 23.32 m.
to point 9; thence N. 13 deg. 08W., 28.25 m. to point 10;
thence S. 78 deg. 45W., 13.00 m. to point 11; thence N.
0 deg. 56E., 48.92 m. to point 12; thence N. 89 deg.
13E., 53.13 m. to point 13; thence S. 21 deg. 24E.,
67.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area
of EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY FOUR
(8,694) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points
referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on
the ground points 1,2,3 and 13 by Old PLS conc. mons.
point 4,6,7,8 and 9 by Old PLS stone mons.; points 5 to
10 and old stakes points 11 and 12 by PLS conc. mons.
bearings true, declination 1 deg. 08E., date of the
original survey, Sept. 8-27, Oct. 4-21 and Nov. 17-18,
1911 and that of the subdivision survey, Oct. 14 and 15,
1927.[55] (Emphasis supplied).
Such disparity in location is more vividly illustrated in
the Plan prepared by Engr. Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief of
the Geodetic Surveys Division, showing the relative
positions of Lots 23 and 23-A. As it appears on the
Plan, the land covered by respondents TCT No.
C-314537 lies far west of petitioners lands under TCT
Nos. 270921, 270922 and 270923. Strictly speaking,
therefore, the existence of TCT No. C-314537 is not
prejudicial to petitioners titles insofar as it pertains to a
different land.
Significantly, an action to quiet title is characterized as a
proceeding quasi in rem.[56] In an action quasi in rem,
an individual is named a defendant and the purpose of
the proceeding is to subject his interests to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a
particular property but which are intended to operate on
these questions only as between the particular parties
to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the
rights or interests of all possible claimants.The
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties who
joined in the action.[57]
Yet, petitioner was well aware that the lots
encompassed by its titles are not the same as that
covered by respondents title. In its complaint, Phil-Ville
alleges:
27.4. That Lot 23, being a portion of Maysilo
Estate, as described in said TCT No. C-314537 of the
late Eleuteria Rivera when plotted using its tie line to
MBM No. 1, Caloocan Cadastre is outside Lot 23-A of
the Maysilo Estate. This must be so because Lot 23 is
not [a] portion of Lot 23-A, Maysilo Estate.[58]
This brings petitioners action within the purview of Rule
63 of the Rules of Court on Declaratory Relief. Section
1 of Rule 63 provides:
PROPERTY- QUIETING OF TITLE
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.-Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet

title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or
to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil
Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis
supplied).

An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there

has been no actual breach of the instruments involved
or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of
an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of
the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their
guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance
therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to
which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a
practical remedy for ending controversies that have not
reached the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of action
that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a
repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.

In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for

quieting of title after it was served a notice to vacate but
before it could be dispossessed of the subject
properties. Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which
granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and
the Writ of Possession issued pursuant thereto. And
although petitioners complaint is captioned as Quieting
of Title and Damages, all that petitioner prayed for, is for
the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that
of respondents. This is consistent with the nature of the
relief in an action for declaratory relief where the
judgment in the case can be carried into effect without
requiring the parties to pay damages or to perform any
act.[59]

Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate that

respondents TCT No. C-314537 in the name of
Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over its title, it has
nevertheless successfully established its ownership
over the subject properties and the validity of its titles
which entitles it to declaratory relief.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari

is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 31, 2005
and Resolution dated March 15, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62211 are SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated March 24, 2000 of the Caloocan RTC in
Civil Case No. C-507 is hereby REINSTATED and
UPHELD.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

33