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Case No. 257 | GR No. 132601 | January 19, 1999 | Puno, J.

Judicial Department

LEO ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,

FACTS:
The Supreme Court issued a TRO On January 4, 1999, staying the execution of petitioner Leo
Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the
issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been
rendered.

RULING: NO.
The respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by
final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do
not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers
of the three branches of our government.

Background of the Case:


1998 Decision

FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouses ten year old
daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659
The Death Penalty Law, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions
were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing
Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of
execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated
the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections
to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and
Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City
and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of
execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for
TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and
degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished
the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply
stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE : Whether or not R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and
obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of legislative powers.

RULING:
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION
19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes the imposition of "cruel,
degrading or inhuman" punishment. This is the challenge thrown at RA 8177 and its
implementing rules and regulations.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out
the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to
give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said
that all punishments are cruel. The Constitution, however, does not mean that crime, for this
reason, is to go unpunished."
II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates the International
Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the Philippines on December 19, 1966 and
October 23, 1986, respectively.
Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individuals right to life, it also particularly
recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the
limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol has gone astray
since dates and circumstances related to its adoption prove that the Philippines neither signed nor
ratified said document.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION
19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each
department has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of
non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest." (what
has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this rule and one of the
recognized exceptions is Delegation to Administrative Bodies
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the
task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do
it, and what is the scope of his authority.

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out
its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.

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