In re: Valenzuela received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latters office and had not been transmitted
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998 yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacaang copy of his
Narvasa, C.J.
Facts:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by
Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the
constitutionality of appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998
Presidential elections. Senior Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and
Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was in the position that election ban had no
application to the CA based on the Commissions records. This hypothesis was then submitted
to the President for consideration together with the Councils nominations for 8 vacancies in the
CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the
Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed
on March 11, 1998 (day immediately before the commencement of the ban on appointments),
which implies that the Presidents Office did not agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of
the list of final nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from
Feb 13, date present vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no
session has been scheduled after the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not
share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11,
1998 appointments. However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary and the other members of
the Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for a meeting on
May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where the
President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the
whole article being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPT. He posited that appointments in the Judiciary
have special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Article 8 Sec 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacaang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the
RTC mentioned. Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court
resolved by refraining the appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took
oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It
should be noted that the originals of the appointments for both judges had been sent to and
appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential elections, Art. 8 shall apply
where vacancies in SC shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be
considered where the President shall not make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the
reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of the incoming Pres through midnight
appointments.
Issue:
whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article
VII of the, Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in
view of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII; whether he can make appointments to the judiciary
during the period of the ban in the interest of public service.
Held:
The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may
sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be
filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :
The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution (t)wo months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1)
and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within
the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy
that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments
made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are
declared elections offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises money or
anything of value gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private,
or makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be
made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or community in order to induce anyone or
the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to
vote for or against any aspirant for thenomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or
similar selection process of a political party.
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases.
During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a
government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional,
temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless, it is satisfied that the
position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and
that the position shall not be filled in a manner that may influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-
called midnight appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions which
have to be made even after the proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as
they are few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications, can be made by
the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight
appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the
time of their making but also appointments of the Presidential election.
The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making
oftemporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of
the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts
and the restriction on the Presidents power of appointments, it is the Supreme Courts view that,
as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the
prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of
court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of
the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years.
Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But
prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier
pointed out, their making is considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment,
during the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be
the case should the membership of the Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should
the voting on a particularly important question requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided.
Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of
Article VIII.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days after
the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio
member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to
the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en
banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed to start the
process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice
for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC
resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite
to the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than
February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief
Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the
act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent frequently
cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela
and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court
held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to
judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination.
3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice.
4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of
nominees by the JBC.
HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for this case was waived by the Court.
Legal standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not covered by the definition, it is still
within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to
its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions set forth an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced
the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to
the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief
Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of
nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the
list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation
ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates,
the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of constitutional experts, as may
be needed. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.
questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or
that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling,
and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the
framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the
Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department,
and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential
power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers
intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It is proper when the act
against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus
is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way. For
mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal
right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it
is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined
by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
DE RAMA VS CA
353 SCRA 94 G.R. No. 131136 February 28 2001 [Midnight appointments]
Conrado L. De Rama, petitioner, vs. The Court Of Appeals (Ninth Division, The Civil Service
Commission), Eladio Martinez, Divino De Jesus, Morell Ayala, Aristeo Catalla, Daisy Porta,
Flordeliza Oriasel, Graciela Glory, Felecidad Orinday, Ma. Petra Muffet Luce, Elsa Marino,
Bernardita Mendoza, Jane Macatangay, Adelfo Glodoviza and Florino Ramos, respondents.
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L.
de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking
the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request
on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of
the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioners request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen
employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that
they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for
petitioners failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said
appointments.
Issue: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Ruling: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only
when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the
civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of
the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that an appointment accepted by the
appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following
grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit
Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation
of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion;
or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.
IBP VS ZAMORA
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President
Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned
the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject
to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of
judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an
actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the
Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render
logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that
military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to
assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount
to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4),
Article XVI of the Constitution.
DAVID VS MACAPAGAL ARROYO
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate
Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as
provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President
Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
XXX
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
unconstitutional.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the
AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial
law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have
factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers
to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did
not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State
of National Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the
Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without
legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In
declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States
extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

Sanlakas vs. Exec Sec (2004)
Tinga, J.
FACTS: July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny -Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a "state
of rebellion" & General Order No. 4 directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion. -by evening,
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. GMA, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a
state of rebellion, only doing so on August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.
Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and
promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized
classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human
rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens freedom of speech and of expression under
Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and
legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same; assert that S18, Art7 of
the Consti does not require the declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert further that
there exists no factual basis for the declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs & bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7
of the Consti does not require the declaration of the state of rebellion, declaration a "constitutional
anomaly" that misleads because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such
proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens";
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same S18, Art7, commanding
the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law;
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress
has not delegated any such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives
whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of
rebellion; the declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of
emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of
Congress granted by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution
4. Pimentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted,
illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution;
petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion
Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot by the lifitng of the proclamation;
questions standing of petitioners
ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by the lifting of the proclamation
3. whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is proper
RULING: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the House and Sen Pimentel have
standing. Sanlakas & PM have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez " petitioner
has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a
juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest.
Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless
arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for declaratory relief, which is
not in the original jurisdiction of SC. Even assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's
organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the Consti, they are still not endowed with
standing for as in Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed the traditional rule
that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial
power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by
the "case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This requirement lies at the very heart of the
judicial function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not endowed with standing since "A
taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation.No such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled out
the doctrine of "transcendental importance" regarding constitutional questions in this particular
case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as provided in the Consti on giving the Pres
emergency powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the legality of the proclamation of
the state of rebellion.
2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the
determination of "actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise
moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case, since
prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove that
it can be repeated.

3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated

power[s]." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the
exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions,
namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.
However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are
not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes
necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18, Art7 does not expressly prohibit the
President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. The
ponencia then traced the evolution of executive power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina
situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that
"the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken
together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the
plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address
exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the
State." This, plus Marcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on
the executive power of the Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity of the
proclamation. However, the Court maintains that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance
for being superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with
more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions.
Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are
likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or
suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless
arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so
long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. The argument that the declaration
of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of
the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President has attempted
to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can
the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon
a grant of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution. The petitions do not cite a specific
instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as
Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by S1
& 18, Art7, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article
VI.