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Academy of Finland
The paper studies a pattern of thought, sometimes called "the practical syllogism".
The first premise of this pattern is a statement about an agent's intention to achieve
a certain result. The second premise is a statement about what he considers
necessary for him to do in order to achieve this aim. The conclusion is a statement
to the effect, roughly speaking, that the agent proceeds to do the necessary
things. What is the logical status of this type of argument or inference? The paper
purports to show that the argument, when it is logically conclusive, is a schema of
understanding behaviour in the light of assumed intentions and cognitive attitudes
of an agent. The argument also has uses for explanatory and predictive purposes.
The author contends that, as a schema of explanation, the practical inference
pattern holds a position in the human and social sciences similar to that of the
deductive-nomological inference pattern ("the covering law model") in the natural
sciences. Since the patterns are of different logical type, there is thus also a
difference in kind between explanation in the natural sciences and in the sciences of
man.
140
of a complex and perhaps not very clear idea.) And in his lectures on the Logik, Bk. 11,Sect. iii,
Ch. 2 B.
philosophy of history Hegel applied the same schema to the historical
process as a realization, through the actions of individual and collective
agents, of the "aims" immanent in the absolute mind. The Hegelian
conceptualization of action as inference also left an impact on Marx and
5 Asshownby
Marxist thinking5.
In this paper I shall discuss only practical inference which views actions Juha Manninen in
"Praktisen paattelyn
as the use of means to attain ends. mukaisista ajatusmal-
leista Hegelilla ja
2. Let it be assumed that the premises of a practical argument, when Marxilla" ("On Practi-
conducted in the first person, are: cal Inference Models
in Hegel and Marx"),
I want to attain the end E (e.g. make this hut habitable).
Psykologia 5, 1970.
Unless I do action A (e.g. heat the hut) I shall not attain E
It may very well be the case that, if I have this end in view in
combination with that opinion of the means to its realization, then I
shall actually proceed to act in the appropriate way. But what sort of
connexion would this signify between want and thought on the one hand
and action on the other? Can I say that wanting and opining make me
act? If so, would this be a form of causal efficacy? Or would it be more
like a logical compulsion?
Before we proceed to answering these questions we must consider the
following "objection" to the first person premise as stated above. Cannot
a person at the same time want to attain several ends? And can it not
then happen that some of his ends (wants) are mutually incompatible?
For example, that in order to attain one of the ends, he thinks he must
forbear doing something which he thinks he must do in order to
attain another end of his? Then there are two practical arguments for
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Shall we call this a valid argument? The answer again depends upon our
understanding of the "must" here. The argument is conclusive, if "Y
must do A " is short for "Someone is in pursuit of an end of action which
he will not attain unless Y does A ". Is this a feasible interpretation?
Perhaps must-statements are sometimes thus understood. But why not
then take an even more "liberal" attitude and say that sometimes "Y
must do A" means simply "Unless Y does A, something or other will not
happen (be the case)"? Here the necessity of action need not be related
to any end at all, nor to anybody's intentions.
Consider finally the following variant:
X intends to make it true that E
Unless Y does A, he (i.e. X) will not achieve this
Therefore he must make Y do A
But must he? Assume that we (or X himself) know that he cannot
make Y do A, that nothing he does will move Y to this. Then we should
perhaps say that X must give up pursuing E as an end. And if pressed
about the meaning of this last "must" we might say: X must do this, or
else he will suffer frustration. But maybe X is so keen on his end that
giving it up involves a still bigger frustration for him. Then we might
conclude that X must learn how to make Y do A (which may or may not
involve teaching Y how to do A). And this conclusion would follow,
logically, if we change the second premise to "unless. X learns how to
make Y do A, he will not make it true that E". We are back at the first
pattern. 6
That an agent is
Generally speaking: If there is something which an agent cannot do and (generically) able to do
which is such that, unless he does it, he will not attain a certain end of something shall mean
that on most
his, then he must learn how to do it or else he will not attain this end. occasions, when there
Learning how to do something can be a practical necessity in much the is an opportunity for
same sense as is doing something. Furthermore, that somebody else does doing this thing and
he sets himself to
something can be necessary (causally or logically), if an agent is to attain do it, he will also
his ends in much the same sense in which it may be necessary for this accomplish it. He
that something should happen. These last two are comparable cases. I has the necessary
"know how". This
propose, however, that the term practical necessity be reserved for the he may, but need not,
first pair of cases. Practical necessity is the necessity of doing something possess as a result of
under which an agent is, if he is to attain some end of his own. learning.
7 My position here
An agent thus is under a practical necessity of doing everything which
differs slightly from the
it is necessary that he should do, if he is to attain the ends he pursues. one which I took in
But can an agent intend to do anything (make it true that E, for Explanation and Under-
example) without being able (generically) to do this6? Does intention standing. There (pp.
101- 103) I suggested
presuppose ability - pursuit of ends ability to obtain them? I would that an intention to do
answer as follows: something necessarily
involves an opinion on
One can intend to do only such things which one either thinks one can
the agent's part that he
do or realizes that one cannot do but intends to leam to do and thinks can do the thing.
one can learn to do7. (This is not a psychological observation about
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The mere fact therefore that in ever so many cases an agent will never
do what he considers himself under a practical necessity of doing, if he is
to attain some end of his, is by itself quite irrelevant to our problem. For
in many of those cases the agent had changed his mind before the time
was up in which he had to do the thing he never did.
Is the statement that an agent will do a certain thing now a
"prediction"? The answer depends upon what we think of the "now". Is
"now" the present instant? Very often we conceive of the "now" as
having duration, extension in time; sometimes we mean by it to-day or
even this year. So what is "now" supposed to mean in the argument we
are discussing here? Not necessarily an instant in time, but rather a
temporal location of some duration. Of this "location", however, the
following must hold true: We cannot slice it up into an earlier part of
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Postscript on Understanding
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