=========

Implied trust
FELOMINA ABELLANA
vs.
SPOUSES ROMEO PONCE and LUCILA PONCEand the REGISTER OF DEEDS of BUTUAN CITY
G.R. No. 160488 September 3, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:

FACTS:

Felomina Abellana is the aunt of respondent Lucila Ponce; on 15 Jul 1!"1#Felomina

bou$ht a parcel of a$ricultural land %hich she intended to $i&e to hern i e c e # L u c i l a '
( e c a u s e o f t h i s # t h e d e e d o f sa l e s h o % e d t h a t i t % a s L u c i l a % h o bou$ht
the land' )o%e&er# Felomina remained in possession and de&eloped thesame land
and continued pa in$ real propert ta*es relati&e to it' +ean%hile ther e l a t i o n s h i p
of the aunt and niece turned sour# as the latter e&en
t h r e a t e n e d Felomina ph sicall and has become disrespectful' (ecause of this
de&elopment#Felomina ,led a case for re&ocation of implied trust to reco&er the
propert and itsle$al title o&er it' -n Au$ust ."# .///# the trial court rendered a decision
holdin$that an implied trust e*isted bet%een Felomina and Lucila# such that the latter
ism e r e l holdin$ the lot for the bene,t of the former' It thu
s o r d e r e d t h e con&e ance of the sub0ect lot in fa&or of Felomina' -n appeal# the
Court re&ersedthe lo%er court s decision and said that Felomina %asn t able to
pro&e an impliedtrust'ISS23: 4hether or not there %as implied trust in the case at
bar') 3 L : Th e S u p r e m e C o u r t r u l e d t h a t i t % a s Fe l o mi n a a n d n o t L u c i l a
% h o t r u l o%ned the parcel of land' The lone testimon of Felomina is su6cient to
pro&eh e r c l a i m i f i t i s c r e d i b l e ' T h e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e b r o t h e r o f
t h e s e l l e r % h o %itnessed Felomina as the real bu er and paid the purchase
price# debun7s theclaim of Lucila'I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e # a d o n a t i o n o f a n
i m mo & a b l e % a s e 8 e c t e d 9 - T o n a public instrument as re uired b la%'
(ecause it %as onl an oral donation# it isthus &oid' 2nli7e ordinar contracts %hich
are perfected b the concurrence of the re uisites of consent# ob0ect and cause
pursuant to Article 1<1" of the Ci&ilCode=# solemn contracts li7e donations are
perfected onl upon compliance %iththe le$al formalities under Articles >?" and >?!' -
ther%ise stated# absent thesolemnit re uirements for &alidit # the mere intention of
the parties does
not$ i & e r i s e t o a c o n t r a c t ' ) e n c e # F e l o m i n a c a n s t i l l r e c o & e r t i t l e
f r o m L u c i l a ' ispensation of such solemnities %ould $i&e rise to anomalous
situations %heret h e f o r ma l i t i e s o f a d o n a t i o n a n d a % i l l i n d o n a t i o n s
intervivos
# and donations
mortiscausa
 respecti&el # %ould be done a%a %ith %hen the transfer
of thepropert is made in fa&or of a child or one to %hom the donor
stands in
locoparentis
' Such a scenario is clearl repu$nant to the mandator nature of the la%on donation'

====

FELOMINA ABELLANA, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES ROMEO PONCE and LUCILA PONCE and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of BUTUAN
CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 160488 September 3, 2004

FACTS:
On July 15, 1981, Felomina, a spinster, pharmacist and aunt of private respondent Lucila
Ponce, purchased from the late Estela Caldoza-Pacres a 44,297 square meter agricultural lot with
the intention of giving said lot to her niece, Lucila. Thus, in the deed of sale, the latter was
designated as the buyer of the lot. The total consideration of the sale was P16,500.00, but only
P4,500.00 was stated in the deed upon the request of the seller.

Subsequently, Felomina applied for the issuance of title in the name of her niece, which
remained in the possession of Felomina who developed the lot through Juanario Torreon and paid
real property taxes thereon.

The relationship between Felomina and spouses Romeo and Lucila Ponce, however, turned
sour. The latter allegedly became disrespectful and ungrateful to the point of hurling her insults and
even attempting to hurt her physically. Hence, Felomina filed the instant case for revocation of
implied trust to recover legal title over the property.

On August 28, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision holding that an implied trust existed
between Felomina and Lucila, such that the latter is merely holding the lot for the benefit of the
former. It thus ordered the conveyance of the subject lot in favor of Felomina.

The spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the trial court
ruling that Felomina failed to prove the existence of an implied trust and upheld the spouses
ownership over the litigated lot. The appellate court further held that even assuming that Felomina
paid the purchase price of the lot, the situation falls within the exception stated in Article 1448 of
the Civil Code which raises a disputable presumption that the property was purchased by Felomina
as a gift to Lucila whom she considered as her own daughter.
Felomina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.

ISSUE:
Who, as between Felomina and the spouses, is the lawful owner of the controverted lot?

RULING:

After a thorough examination of the records and transcript of stenographic notes, The
Supreme Court found that it was Felomina and not Lucila who truly purchased the questioned lot
from Estela, thus the lawful owner thereof.
It appears that Felomina, being of advanced age with no family of her own, used to purchase
properties and afterwards give them to her nieces. In fact, aside from the lot she bought for Lucila,
she also purchased 2 lots, one from Aquilino Caldoza and the other from Domiciano Caldoza ,
which she gave to Zaida Bascones (sister of Lucila)

======

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan),

Petitioners,vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 179987 April 29, 2009

The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the Court
en banc in order to provide definitive clarityto the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the PropertyRegistration Decree(PD No. 1529)

FACTS:

/ On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of
land identifiedas Lot9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Silang Cavite, and consisting of
71,324 square meters.

/ Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interesthad been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30)years.

/ Malabanan and Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a 22 hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
four sons
the fourth being Aristedess grandfather.

/ Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the
Velazco sons from their father, Lino.After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties,including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his
uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold byEduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

/ The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.

/ Malabanan presented evidence during trial a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
CENRO-DENR, which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.

/ On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanano

= had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain,and

= that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and
for thelength of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

/ CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan.

/ CA held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) any period of
possession prior tothe classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and
should be excluded from thecomputation of the period of possession.

=====
(PD 1529)Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper o!rt of "irst
#nstance
anapplication for registration of title to lan$% whether personally or thro!gh their $!ly a!thori&e$repres
entati'es (1) Those who y themsel'es or thro!gh their pre$ecessors*in*interest ha'e een in open%
contin!o!s%e+cl!si'e an$ notorio!s possession an$ occ!pation of aliena le an$ $isposa le lan$s of
the p! lic$omain !n$er a ona fi$e claim of ownership since ,!ne 12% 1945% or earlier.(2) Those
who ha'e ac-!ire$ ownership of pri'ate lan$s y prescription !n$er the pro'ision of e+istinglaws.( )
Those who ha'e ac-!ire$ ownership of pri'ate lan$s or a an$one$ ri'er e$s y right of accession
or accretion !n$er the e+isting laws.(4) Those who ha'e ac-!ire$ ownership of lan$ in any other
manner pro'i$e$ for y law.Where the lan$ is owne$ in common% all the co*owners shall file the
application /ointly.Where the lan$ has een sol$ !n$er pacto $e retro% the 'en$or a retro may file an
application for theoriginal registration of the lan$% pro'i$e$% howe'er% that sho!l$ the perio$ for
re$emption e+pire $!ring thepen$ency of the registration procee$ings an$ ownership to the property
consoli$ate$ in the 'en$ee aretro% the latter shall e s! stit!te$ for the applicant an$ may contin!e
the procee$ings. 0
tr!stee on ehalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any lan$ hel$ in tr!st y him%!nl
ess prohi ite$ y the instr!ment creating the tr!st. #3S " 03# 06070808 's. 3 P 76# "
T
P #6#PP#8 S #3S " 03# 06070808 's. 3 P 76# "T P #6#PP#8 S:3 8o. 1;99<; 0
pril 29% 2==9en anc"0 TS n 2= "e r!ary 199<% ario ala anan file$ an application for lan$
registration efore the 3T of a'ite*Tagaytay% co'ering a parcel of lan$ sit!ate$ in Silang a'ite%
consisting of ;1% 24 s-!aremeters. ala anan claime$ that he ha$ p!rchase$ the property from
$!ar$o >ela&co% an$ that he
an$his pre$ecessors*in*interest ha$ een in open% notorio!s% an$ contin!o!s a$'erse an$ peacef!lp
ossession of the lan$ for more than thirty ( =) years. >ela&co testifie$ that the property was
originally elonge$ to a twenty*two hectare property owne$ y his great*gran$father% 6ino >ela&co.
6ino ha$ fo!r sons? 7ene$icto% :regorio% $!ar$o an$ ste an?the fo!rth eing 0riste$es@s
gran$father. pon 6ino@s$eath% his fo!r sons inherite$ the property an$ $i'i$e$ it
among themsel'es. 7!t y 19AA% ste an@s wife% ag$alena% ha$ ecome the a$ministrator of
all the properties inherite$ y the >ela&co sons from their father% 6ino. 0fter the $eath of ste an
an$ ag$alena% their son >irgilio s!ccee$e$ them in a$ministering

======

REPUBLIC vs. ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 164408,
March 24, 2014
JULY 8, 2014 / ARDYESGUERRA
Facts:

Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an application for original registration
of land. Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor in interest had not
been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of land since June 12,
1945.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.

On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to establish the time when the
land became alienable and disposable, which is crucial in determining whether Zuburan acquired the
land by prescription.

ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for original registration of land?
RULING:

The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed..

The following are the bases for application:

1. On the basis of possession, wherein you need to show the following:

a. The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain (Example of non-alienable
lands are forests, lakeshores, etc)

b. the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and

c. the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier

Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is
sufficient that property is alienable and disposable at the time of application (Malaban vs. Republic)
2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:

a. Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property

b. continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and with just title OR 30 years
regardless of good faith or bad faith.

c. Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of 10-year or
30-year period of possession.

Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of Civil Code).
Property of public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of
patrimonial property of State. (Article 422 of Civil Code)

Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public use, service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, Such declaration shall be in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law.

In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation commenced
(no allegation that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the duration. So the
application is based on prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was
within an area expressly declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth.

======

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185092 June 4, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSGJ, assailing the
November 21, 2007 Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, which
dismissed its appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.

Factual and Procedural Antecedents:

Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed
with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of 10,
792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and
more particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan No. AP-03-004226.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their
mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was
not within a reservation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted the following documents, namely: (1) Tax
Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor, representing
their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2) Certificate of Technical Description
which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the Land Management Service, Region III, of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyors
Certificate issued by the same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment of real property tax over the
subject property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the
registered owners of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were Corazon Sese and
others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre, approved by the Regional
Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region III, of the DENR, stating that the land
subject of the survey was alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry
on March 1, 1927, was outside of any civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan,
there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a
certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.

On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that: "This survey is inside the
alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved
by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga, on
December 3, 1998.

Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10,
2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After compliance with all the
requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting, hearing on the merits of the
application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over
the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence, after which the
evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without objection from
the public prosecutor.

The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.

On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision,3 ordering the registration of the subject property
in the name of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and substance and the
applicants having established their right of ownership over the subject parcel of land and are
therefore entitled to registration thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.

Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land subject matter of this
petition which is more particularly described in Plan Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre and in their
corresponding technical descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.

Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots had been in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the applicants themselves or their
predecessor-in-interest. Such possession since time immemorial conferred an effective title on the
applicants, whereby the land ceased to be public and became private property. It had been the
accepted norm that open, adverse and continuous possession for at least 30 years was sufficient.
The MTC noted that evidence showed that the parcel of land involved was not covered by land patent
or a public land application as certified to by the Community Environment and Natural Resources of
Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247 were
prepared and secured from the Land Management Sector, DENR, Region III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and were verified and found to be correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional
Survey Division.

On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV No.
81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of
the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30)
years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts of possession.

The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from
inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as
alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would
start.

Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents supposed possession of the subject property.
Save for the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is occupying the
subject property," there was no evidence that respondents were actually occupying the subject tract
of land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.

On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming the judgment of the MTC ordering the
registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October 3, 2003 of the MTC
of Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the subject property with an
annotation, stating that the subject property was alienable and disposable land, was a public
document, having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the subject
property was indeed alienable and disposable.

With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession
was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed
on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on
October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a
small hut was built on the said land, which was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover,
neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual appeared to oppose the application for
registration of the subject property.

The CA also stated that respondents claim of possession over the subject property was buttressed
by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese, minor,
representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; the official receipt of
payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the certificate from the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered owner of a property under Tax Declaration
No. 99-19015-01557 were respondents.

The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of owner.

Hence, the OSG filed this petition.

ISSUES

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE APPROVED
SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF THAT THE SUBJECT
LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION

FOR REGISTRATION.

The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified as alienable and
disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the public domain. In the present case, the CA
relied on the approved survey indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. It
is well-settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove that the land sought to be
registered is alienable and disposable. What respondents should have done was to show that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration fell within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, they should
have adduced a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of
issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that respondents failed to present
specific acts of ownership to prove open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent
evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by respondents, it cannot be said that it clearly
manifested their adverse claim on the property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed
their claim of ownership, they should have regularly complied with their real estate obligations from
the start of their supposed occupation.

Position of Respondents

On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the subject land was alienable
and disposable. The approved survey plan of the subject property with an annotation, stating that the
subject property is alienable and disposable land, is a public document, having been issued by the
DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and
are sufficient to establish that the subject property is indeed alienable and disposable.

Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano,7 where the Court stated that a DENR Regional
Technical Directors certification, which was annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence,
constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The DENR certification enjoyed the
presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.

Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA correctly applied the doctrine
of constructive possession because they acquired the subject land from their mother, Resurreccion,
through a donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother, in turn, acquired the subject land
from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. They claim that a small hut was
built in the said land and was occupied by a worker of her mother. They countered that although tax
declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are entitled to the registration of
land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of
the same statute. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No. 1073,9 provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.

Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must establish and
prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is
indispensable for an application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to
validly prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially
defective.

Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and alienable
character of the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among
others, as follows: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC
Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military
reservation." The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office
III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan, however, fell
short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable and alienable character.

In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v. Republic,13 the Court
reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property
surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the
property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to
controvert the presumption that the property was inalienable. Thus:

To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and subdivision
plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that
"this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."

Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the lot is
alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.

"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State..."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to
be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has
no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors
assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared
alienable." (Citations omitted and emphases supplied)

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. The applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed
for the required number of years is alienable and disposable. 14

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was insufficient to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show
sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land classification and released the land in
question as alienable and disposable.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable character of
the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was
certified by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original registration.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a parcel of
land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not
sufficient.18

In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal, the
earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation
of the subject land was only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject
land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession
of the subject property commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date
expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of
land title was legally infirm.

The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

xxxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down the following rules:

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

xxxx

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership
of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one
ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires
ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted
adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good
faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and,
thus, incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.20

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate
against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The
applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared
through either a law enacted by Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject
land is no longer retained for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the
State, the land remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition
by virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.22

For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of P.O. No.
1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is alienable and
disposable; and (b) that their possession of the property dated back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject land, respondents all the more
cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant to Section 14 (2) which requires
possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only did respondents need to prove the classification
of the subject land as alienable and disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into
patrimonial. As to whether respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation were
of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the
foregoing considerations.

In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal
justification.1wphi1 Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the assailed CA decision and
resolution and deny the application for registration of land title of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and the October 8, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Application for Registration of Title of Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C.
Sese in Land Registration Case No. 026 is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

=====

SALES
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 160132 April 17, 2009

SERAFIN, RAUL, NENITA, NAZARETO, NEOLANDA, all surnamed NARANJA, AMELIA NARANJA-RUBINOS,
NILDA NARANJA-LIMANA, and NAIDA NARANJA-GICANO, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILIA P. BELARDO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, REBECCA CORDERO,
and THE LOCAL REGISTER OF DEEDS, BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This petition seeks a review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 13, 2002 and
Resolution2dated September 24, 2003 which upheld the contract of sale executed by petitioners predecessor,
Roque Naranja, during his lifetime, over two real properties.

Roque Naranja was the registered owner of a parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 4 in Consolidation-Subdivision
Plan (LRC) Pcs-886, Bacolod Cadastre, with an area of 136 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-18764. Roque was also a co-owner of an adjacent lot, Lot No. 2, of the same subdivision plan,
which he co-owned with his brothers, Gabino and Placido Naranja. When Placido died, his one-third share was
inherited by his children, Nenita, Nazareto, Nilda, Naida and Neolanda, all surnamed Naranja, herein petitioners. Lot
No. 2 is covered by TCT No. T-18762 in the names of Roque, Gabino and the said children of Placido. TCT No. T-
18762 remained even after Gabino died. The other petitioners Serafin Naranja, Raul Naranja, and Amelia
Naranja-Rubinos are the children of Gabino.3

The two lots were being leased by Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. for 30 years from 1962-1992. For his properties,
Roque was being paid P200.00 per month by the company.4

In 1976, Roque, who was single and had no children, lived with his half sister, Lucilia P. Belardo (Belardo), in
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. At that time, a catheter was attached to Roques body to help him urinate. But the
catheter was subsequently removed when Roque was already able to urinate normally. Other than this and the
influenza prior to his death, Roque had been physically sound.5

Roque had no other source of income except for the P200.00 monthly rental of his two properties. To show his
gratitude to Belardo, Roque sold Lot No. 4 and his one-third share in Lot No. 2 to Belardo on August 21, 1981,
through a Deed of Sale of Real Property which was duly notarized by Atty. Eugenio Sanicas. The Deed of Sale
reads:

I, ROQUE NARANJA, of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of Bacolod City, do hereby declare that I am the
registered owner of Lot No. 4 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Bacolod, consisting of 136 square meters, more
or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and a co-owner of Lot No. 2, situated at the City of
Bacolod, consisting of 151 square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762 and my
share in the aforesaid Lot No. 2 is one-third share.

That for and in consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine Currency, and other
valuable consideration, receipt of which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction, by these presents, I
hereby transfer and convey by way of absolute sale the above-mentioned Lot No. 4 consisting of 136 square meters
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18764 and my one-third share in Lot No. 2, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18762, in favor of my sister LUCILIA P. BELARDO, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to
Alfonso D. Belardo, and a resident of Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, her heirs, successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 21st day of August, 1981 at Bacolod City, Philippines.

(SGD.)
ROQUE NARANJA6

Roques copies of TCT No. T-18764 and TCT No. T-18762 were entrusted to Atty. Sanicas for registration of the
deed of sale and transfer of the titles to Belardo. But the deed of sale could not be registered because Belardo did
not have the money to pay for the registration fees.7

Belardos only source of income was her store and coffee shop. Sometimes, her children would give her money to
help with the household expenses, including the expenses incurred for Roques support. At times, she would also
borrow money from Margarita Dema-ala, a neighbor.8 When the amount of her loan reached P15,000.00, Dema-ala
required a security. On November 19, 1983, Roque executed a deed of sale in favor of Dema-ala, covering his two
properties in consideration of the P15,000.00 outstanding loan and an additional P15,000.00, for a total
ofP30,000.00. Dema-ala explained that she wanted Roque to execute the deed of sale himself since the properties
were still in his name. Belardo merely acted as a witness. The titles to the properties were given to Dema-ala for
safekeeping.9

Three days later, or on December 2, 1983, Roque died of influenza. The proceeds of the loan were used for his
treatment while the rest was spent for his burial.10

In 1985, Belardo fully paid the loan secured by the second deed of sale. Dema-ala returned the certificates of title to
Belardo, who, in turn, gave them back to Atty. Sanicas.11

Unknown to Belardo, petitioners, the children of Placido and Gabino Naranja, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
Among Heirs12 on October 11, 1985, adjudicating among themselves Lot No. 4. On February 19, 1986, petitioner
Amelia Naranja-Rubinos, accompanied by Belardo, borrowed the two TCTs, together with the lease agreement with
Esso Standard Eastern, Inc., from Atty. Sanicas on account of the loan being proposed by Belardo to her.
Thereafter, petitioners had the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs notarized on February 25, 1986. With Roques
copy of TCT No. T-18764 in their possession, they succeeded in having it cancelled and a new certificate of title,
TCT No. T-140184, issued in their names.13

In 1987, Belardo decided to register the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981. With no title in hand, she was
compelled to file a petition with the RTC to direct the Register of Deeds to annotate the deed of sale even without a
copy of the TCTs. In an Order dated June 18, 1987, the RTC granted the petition. But she only succeeded in
registering the deed of sale in TCT No. T-18762 because TCT No. T-18764 had already been cancelled.14

On December 11, 1989, Atty. Sanicas prepared a certificate of authorization, giving Belardos daughter, Jennelyn P.
Vargas, the authority to collect the payments from Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. But it appeared from the companys
Advice of Fixed Payment that payment of the lease rental had already been transferred from Belardo to Amelia
Naranja-Rubinos because of the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs.

On June 23, 1992, Belardo,15 through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Rebecca Cordero, instituted a suit for
reconveyance with damages. The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Belardo as the sole legal
owner of Lot No. 4, declaring null and void the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, and TCT No. T-140184, and
ordering petitioners to reconvey to her the subject property and to pay damages. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 7144.

Subsequently, petitioners also filed a case against respondent for annulment of sale and quieting of title with
damages, praying, among others, that judgment be rendered nullifying the Deed of Sale, and ordering the Register
of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel the annotation of the Deed of Sale on TCT No. T-18762. This case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 7214.

On March 5, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision in the consolidated cases in favor of petitioners. The trial court
noted that the Deed of Sale was defective in form since it did not contain a technical description of the subject
properties but merely indicated that they were Lot No. 4, covered by TCT No. T-18764 consisting of 136 square
meters, and one-third portion of Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-18762. The trial court held that, being defective in
form, the Deed of Sale did not vest title in private respondent. Full and absolute ownership did not pass to private
respondent because she failed to register the Deed of Sale. She was not a purchaser in good faith since she acted
as a witness to the second sale of the property knowing that she had already purchased the property from Roque.
Whatever rights private respondent had over the properties could not be superior to the rights of petitioners, who are
now the registered owners of the parcels of land. The RTC disposed, thus:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Dismissing Civil Case No. 7144.

2. Civil Case No. 7214.

a) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 21, 1981, executed by Roque Naranja, covering his
one-third (1/3) share of Lot 2 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-886, being a portion of
the consolidation of Lots 240-A, 240-B, 240-C and 240-D, described on plan, Psd-33443 (LRC)
GLRO Cad. Rec. No. 55 in favor of Lucilia Belardo, and entered as Doc. No. 80, Page 17, Book No.
XXXVI, Series of 1981 of Notary Public Eugenio Sanicas of Bacolod City, as null and void and of no
force and effect;

b) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City to cancel Entry No. 148123 annotate at the back
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18762;

c) Ordering Lucilia Belardo or her successors-in-interest to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees, the amount of P500.00 as appearance fees.

Counterclaims in both Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.16

On September 13, 2002, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA held that the unregisterability of a deed of sale
will not undermine its validity and efficacy in transferring ownership of the properties to private respondent. The CA
noted that the records were devoid of any proof evidencing the alleged vitiation of Roques consent to the sale;
hence, there is no reason to invalidate the sale. Registration is only necessary to bind third parties, which
petitioners, being the heirs of Roque Naranja, are not. The trial court erred in applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code
to the case at bar since petitioners are not purchasers of the said properties. Hence, it is not significant that private
respondent failed to register the deed of sale before the extrajudicial settlement among the heirs. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 5, 1997 in Civil Cases Nos. 7144 and 7214 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Civil Case No. 7214 is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.

2. In Civil Case No. 7144, the extrajudicial settlement executed by the heirs of Roque Naranja adjudicating
among themselves Lot No. 4 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs 886 of the Bacolod Cadastre
is hereby declared null and void for want of factual and legal basis. The certificate of title issued to the heirs
of Roque Naranja (Transfer Certificate of [T]i[t]le No. T-140184) as a consequence of the void extra-judicial
settlement is hereby ordered cancelled and the previous title to Lot No. 4, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
18764, is hereby ordered reinstated. Lucilia Belardo is hereby declared the sole and legal owner of said Lot
No. 4, and one-third of Lot No. 2 of the same consolidation-subdivision plan, Bacolod Cadastre, by virtue of
the deed of sale thereof in her favor dated August 21, 1981.

SO ORDERED.17

The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on September 24, 2003.18 Petitioners filed this petition for
review, raising the following issues:
 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN
IGNORING THE POINT RAISED BY [PETITIONERS] THAT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH DOES NOT
COMPL[Y] WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 496 IS [NOT] VALID.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED DEED OF SALE [OF REAL PROPERTIES] IS VALID
CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSENT OF THE LATE ROQUE NARANJA HAD BEEN VITIATED; x x x
THERE [IS] NO CONCLUSIVE SHOWING THAT THERE WAS CONSIDERATION AND THERE [ARE]
SERIOUS IRREGULARITIES IN THE NOTARIZATION OF THE SAID DOCUMENTS.19

In her Comment, private respondent questioned the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached
to the Petition for Review, which was signed by a certain Ernesto Villadelgado without a special power of attorney.
In their reply, petitioners remedied the defect by attaching a Special Power of Attorney signed by them.

Pursuant to its policy to encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal, the Court had previously excused the
late submission of a special power of attorney to sign a certification against forum-shopping.20 But even if we excuse
this defect, the petition nonetheless fails on the merits.

The Court does not agree with petitioners contention that a deed of sale must contain a technical description of the
subject property in order to be valid. Petitioners anchor their theory on Section 127 of Act No. 496,21 which provides
a sample form of a deed of sale that includes, in particular, a technical description of the subject property.

To be valid, a contract of sale need not contain a technical description of the subject property. Contracts of sale of
real property have no prescribed form for their validity; they follow the general rule on contracts that they may be
entered into in whatever form, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.22 The requisites of a
valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate
subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.

The failure of the parties to specify with absolute clarity the object of a contract by including its technical description
is of no moment. What is important is that there is, in fact, an object that is determinate or at least determinable, as
subject of the contract of sale. The form of a deed of sale provided in Section 127 of Act No. 496 is only a suggested
form. It is not a mandatory form that must be strictly followed by the parties to a contract.

In the instant case, the deed of sale clearly identifies the subject properties by indicating their respective lot
numbers, lot areas, and the certificate of title covering them. Resort can always be made to the technical description
as stated in the certificates of title covering the two properties.

On the alleged nullity of the deed of sale, we hold that petitioners failed to submit sufficient proof to show that Roque
executed the deed of sale under the undue influence of Belardo or that the deed of sale was simulated or without
consideration.1avvphi1

A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. It must be
sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it does not present strong, complete, and conclusive
proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects provided by law.23

Petitioners allege that Belardo unduly influenced Roque, who was already physically weak and senile at that time,
into executing the deed of sale. Belardo allegedly took advantage of the fact that Roque was living in her house and
was dependent on her for support.

There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving
the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice.24 One who alleges any defect, or the lack of consent to a contract by
reason of fraud or undue influence, must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence, such specific acts that
vitiated the partys consent; otherwise, the latters presumed consent to the contract prevails.25 For undue influence
to be present, the influence exerted must have so overpowered or subjugated the mind of a contracting party as to
destroy his free agency, making him express the will of another rather than his own.26
Petitioners adduced no proof that Roque had lost control of his mental faculties at the time of the sale. Undue
influence is not to be inferred from age, sickness, or debility of body, if sufficient intelligence remains.27 The
evidence presented pertained more to Roques physical condition rather than his mental condition. On the contrary,
Atty. Sanicas, the notary public, attested that Roque was very healthy and mentally sound and sharp at the time of
the execution of the deed of sale. Atty. Sanicas said that Roque also told him that he was a Law graduate.28

Neither was the contract simulated. The late registration of the Deed of Sale and Roques execution of the second
deed of sale in favor of Dema-ala did not mean that the contract was simulated. We are convinced with the
explanation given by respondents witnesses that the deed of sale was not immediately registered because Belardo
did not have the money to pay for the fees. This explanation is, in fact, plausible considering that Belardo could
barely support herself and her brother, Roque. As for the second deed of sale, Dema-ala, herself, attested before
the trial court that she let Roque sign the second deed of sale because the title to the properties were still in his
name.

Finally, petitioners argue that the Deed of Sale was not supported by a consideration since no receipt was shown,
and it is incredulous that Roque, who was already weak, would travel to Bacolod City just to be able to execute the
Deed of Sale.

The Deed of Sale which states "receipt of which in full I hereby acknowledge to my entire satisfaction" is an
acknowledgment receipt in itself. Moreover, the presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be
overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.29

Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest.30 As heirs of Roque, petitioners are
bound by the contract of sale that Roque executed in favor of Belardo. Having been sold already to Belardo, the two
properties no longer formed part of Roques estate which petitioners could have inherited. The deed of extrajudicial
settlement that petitioners executed over Lot No. 4 is, therefore, void, since the property subject thereof did not
become part of Roques estate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 13,
2002 and Resolution dated September 24, 2003 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

====

6. NOOL vs. CA

Facts:

:
Ireneo Mendoza, married to Salvacion Fermin, was the owner of the subject property located in
Quezon city which he purchased in 1954. (TCT No. 242655)
Ireneo had two children: respondents Josefina and Martina (respondents), Salvacion being their
stepmother.
When he was still alive, Ireneo, also took care of his niece, Angelina, since she was three years old
until she got married.
On October 25, 1977, Ireneo, with the consent of Salvacion, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
property in favor of Angelina and her husband, Mario (Spouses Intac).
Despite the sale, Ireneo and his family, including the respondents, continued staying in the premises
and paying the realty taxes. After Ireneo died intestate in 1982, his widow and the respondents
remained in the premises. After Salvacion died, respondents still maintained their residence there. Up
to the present, they are in the premises, paying the real estate taxes thereon, leasing out portions of
the property, and collecting the rentals.
The controversy arose when respondents sought the cancellation of TCT No. 242655, claiming that
the sale was only simulated and, therefore, void.
The heirs of Ireneo, the respondents in this case, alleged that: 1. When Ireneo was still alive,
Spouses Intac borrowed the title of the property (TCT No. 106530) from him to be used as collateral
for a loan from a financing institution; 2. they objected because the title would be placed in the names
of said spouses and it would then appear that the couple owned the property; that Ireneo, however,
tried to appease them, telling them not to worry because Angelina would not take advantage of the
situation considering that he took care of her for a very long time; that during his lifetime, he informed
them that the subject property would be equally divided among them after his death; and 3. that
respondents were the ones paying the real estate taxes over said property.
Spouses Intac countered, among others, that the subject property had been transferred to them
based on a valid deed of absolute sale and for a valuable consideration; that the action to annul the
deed of absolute sale had already prescribed; that the stay of respondents in the subject premises
was only by tolerance during Ireneos lifetime because they were not yet in need of it at that time; and
that despite respondents knowledge about the sale that took place on October 25, 1977,
respondents still filed an action against them.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents saying that the sale to the spouses Intac was null and void.
The CA also ruled that there was no consideration in the sale to the spouses Intac and that the
contract was one for equitable mortgage.

Issues:
WON the Deed of Absolute Sale was a simulated contract or a valid agreement.
WON the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 25, 1977, involving the subject real property in
Pagasa, Quezon City, was a simulated contract or a valid agreement.

Held:

The deed of sale executed by Ireneo and Salvacion was absolutely simulated for lack of
consideration and cause and, therefore, void.

Articles 1345 and 1346 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the
parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal their true agreement.

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not
prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.

Relatively simulated agreement vs. Absolute simulation

If the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is only
relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the
essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of
the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their
successors in interest

In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no
intention to be bound by it. "The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent
contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical
situation of the parties." "As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the
parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract."

No valid sale took place between Ireneo and Spouses Intac

In the case at bench, the Court is one with the courts below that no valid sale of the subject property
actually took place between the alleged vendors, Ireneo and Salvacion; and the alleged vendees,
Spouses Intac. There was simply no consideration and no intent to sell it.

Evidences to prove that there was no absolute deed of sale between the parties
Critical is the testimony of Marietto, a witness to the execution of the subject absolute deed of sale.
He testified that Ireneo personally told him that he was going to execute a document of sale because
Spouses Intac needed to borrow the title to the property and use it as collateral for their loan
application. Ireneo and Salvacion never intended to sell or permanently transfer the full ownership of
the subject property to Spouses Intac. Marietto was characterized by the RTC as a credible witness.

Aside from their plain denial, the heirs of Intac failed to present any concrete evidence to disprove
Mariettos testimony. They claimed that they actually paid P150,000.00 for the subject property. They,
however, failed to adduce proof, even by circumstantial evidence, that they did, in fact, pay it. Even
for the consideration of P60,000.00 as stated in the contract, petitioners could not show any tangible
evidence of any payment therefor. Their failure to prove their payment only strengthened Mariettos
story that there was no payment made because Ireneo had no intention to sell the subject property.

Angelinas story, except on the consideration, was consistent with that of Marietto. Angelina testified
that she and her husband mortgaged the subject property sometime in July 1978 to finance the
construction of a small hospital in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Angelina claimed that Ireneo offered the
property as he was in deep financial need.

The contract of sale was only for the purpose of lending the title of the property to Spouses
Intac to enable them to secure a loan.
Their arrangement was only temporary and could not give rise to a valid sale. Where there is no
consideration, the sale is null and void ab initio. The case of Lequin vs. VIzconde was cited in this
case.

The fact that Ireneo was still in physical possession of the subject property after the sale is a
strong evidence to prove that there was no valid sale between the parties.
More importantly, Ireneo and his family continued to be in physical possession of the subject property
after the sale in 1977 and up to the present. They even went as far as leasing the same and
collecting rentals. If Spouses Intac really purchased the subject property and claimed to be its true
owners, why did they not assert their ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why
did they have to assert their ownership of it only after the death of Ireneo and Salvacion? One of the
most striking badges of absolute simulation is the complete absence of any attempt on the part of a
vendee to assert his right of dominion over the property.

As heretofore shown, the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of both parties in this case, point to
the fact that the intention of Ireneo was just to lend the title to the Spouses Intac to enable them to
borrow money and put up a hospital in Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Clearly, the subject contract was
absolutely simulated and, therefore, void.

The Spouses Intac never became the owners of the property despite its registration in their
names.
It is also of no moment that TCT No. 106530 covering the subject property was cancelled and a new
TCT (TCT No. 242655)21 was issued in their names. After all, registration does not vest title. As a
logical consequence, petitioners did not become the owners of the subject property even after a TCT
had been issued in their names.

3 sales law
, 2007

Spouses Serrano are registered owners of a lot located in Las Pinas. On March 23, 1990, Caguiat
offered to buythe lot and the Serranos agreed to sell it at 1,500.00/sqm. Caguiat then paid them a
partial payment of 100,000.00 as evidenced by a receipt indicating therein Caguiats promise to pay
the remaining balance. Respondent, after making known his readiness to pay the balance,
requested from petitioners the preparationof the necessary Deed of Sale. Petitioners informed
respondent in a letter that Amparo Herrera would be leaving for abroad on or before April 15, 1990
and they are canceling the transaction and that respondent may recover the earnest money(100,000)
anytime. Petitioners also wrote him stating that they already delivered a managers check to
hiscounsel in said amount. Respondent thus filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with the RTC of Makati. The trial court relying on Article 1482 of the Civil Code ruled that
the payment of 100,000.00 being an earnestmoney signified perfection of the contract of sale and
ordered the petitioners to execute a final deed of sale infavor of respondent. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in affirmation of the lower courtsdecision.

WON there was a contract of sale. NO.

The transaction was a contract to sell. When petitioners declared in the Receipt of Partial Payment
that they Received from Mr. Godofredo Caguiat the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
asPartial payment of our lot situated in Las PinasMr. Caguiat promised to pay the balance of the
purchase price on or before March 23, 1990 And that we will execute and sign the final deed of
sale on this date, -- there can be no other interpretation than that they agreed to a conditional
contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only to the full payment of the purchase price. A
contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendors
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if
the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation
had never existed. The suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase price. In this
case, the Receipt of Partial Payment shows that the true agreement between the parties is a
contract to sell. First, ownership of the parcel of land was retained by petitioners and was not to pass
to respondent until full payment of the purchase price. Second, the agreement between the parties
was not embodied in a deed of sale. The absence of a formal deed of conveyance is a strong
indication that the parties did not intend immediate transfer of ownership, but only a transfer after full
payment of the purchase price. Third, petitioners retained possession of the certificate of the lot. It is
true that Article 1482 provides that whenever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be
considered as part of the price and proof of the perfection of the contract. However, this article
speaks of earnest money given in a contract of sale. In this case, the earnest money forms part of the
consideration only if the sale is consummated upon full payment of the purchase price. Clearly,
respondent cannot compel petitioners to transfer ownership of the property to him.

4 vagilidad

Implied Trust (Art . 1456)

Vagilidad vs. Vagalidad
G.R. No. 161136
Facts:

A parcel of land was bought by Gabino and later on without the consent of the wife of Gabino was
transferred to Wilfredo without any payment in conformity that Wilfredo can use the lot to as a
collateral to obtain loan. And when the loan was paid and the mortgaged was cancelled. Spouses
GABINO and Ma. Dorothy Vagilidad (hereafter DOROTHY), as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Damages. But Wilfredo claimed that they are the owner
the land because they already bought it to from the former owner who sold the same to Gabino. Then
Gabino claimed that Wilfredo resort to fraud to obtain ownership of the said property.

Issue: Who is the rightful owner of the property?

Ruling:

The contract of sale between LORETO and GABINO, JR. on May 12, 1986 could be legally
recognized. At the time of sale, LORETO had an aliquot share of one-third of the 4,280-square meter
property or some 1,426 square meters but sold some 1,604 square meters to GABINO, JR. We have
ruled that if a co-owner sells more than his aliquot share in the property, the sale will affect only his
share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.Be that as it may, the co-
heirs of LORETO waived all their rights and interests over Lot No. 1253 in favor of LORETO in an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated January 20, 1987. They declared that they have previously
received their respective shares from the other estate of their parents ZOILO and PURIFICACION.
The rights of GABINO, JR. as owner over Lot No. 1253-B are thus preserved. These rights were not
effectively transferred by LORETO to WILFREDO in the Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land.
Nor were these rights alienated from GABINO, JR. upon the issuance of the title to the subject
property in the name of WILFREDO. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership.
Its alleged incontrovertibility cannot be successfully invoked by WILFREDO because certificates of
title cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud.

On the issue of prescription, petitioners contend that the appellate court failed to apply the rule that
an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes after the lapse of four years. They cite Article
1391 of the Civil Code and the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.

We disagree. This Court explained in Salvatierra v. Court of Appeals, viz.:

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at
that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive
period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the
erroneous reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25,
1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming into effect until
August 30, 1950 xxx. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456 are new
provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the
latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for
reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.

[Thus,] under the present Civil Code, xxx just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of
xxx Art. 1456, xxx so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is
applicable[, viz.:]

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues:

1) Upon a written contract;

2) Upon an obligation created by law;

3) Upon a judgment.