GRACE POE vs.

COMELEC
(CASE DIGEST: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 MARCH 8, 2016)

Facts:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born
citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and
11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good.
Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines.
She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to
the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her
petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a
voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed
chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225
requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly,
among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that
her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she
committed material misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC,
and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over
the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the
President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of
candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in
determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied
by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue
of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen

Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical
of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child
born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents nationality. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show
that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935
Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties
and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of
these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that
an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in
this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to
abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is
clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC

Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is
suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny
due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate
for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her
citizenship and residency.
 SAGUISAG vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR 212426 JAN 12, 2016

Facts:

Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers and former legislators, questioned before the SC the constitutionality
of EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement), an agreement entered into by the executive
department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US
forces the access and use of portions of PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the
right to access and to use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities
within the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training activities;
humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may be agreed upon by the
parties.
Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement with US violated
the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA involves foreign military bases,
troops and facilities whose entry into the country should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the
Senate. The Senate, through Senate Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs
congressional ratification.

Issue 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in assailing the
constitutionality of EDCA

No. In assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act, petitioners suing as citizens may dodge the
requirement of having to establish a direct and personal interest if they show that the act affects a
public right. But here, aside from general statements that the petitions involve the protection of a
public right, and that their constitutional rights as citizens would be violated, the petitioners failed to
make any specific assertion of a particular public right that would be violated by the enforcement of
EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens
suits that would justify a disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

Issue 2: W/N the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers

No. Petitioners cannot sue as taxpayers because EDCA is neither meant to be a tax measure, nor is it
directed at the disbursement of public funds.
A taxpayers suit concerns a case in which the official act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. Here, those challenging the act must specifically
show that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of public money, and that
they will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed act. Applying that
principle to this case, they must establish that EDCA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending powers. A reading of the EDCA, however, would show that there has been neither an
appropriation nor an authorization of disbursement.

Issue 3: W/N the petitions qualify as legislators suit

No. The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional prerogative

granted by the Constitution to the Senate. In a legislators suit, the injured party would be the Senate as
an institution or any of its incumbent members, as it is the Senates constitutional function that is
allegedly being violated. Here, none of the petitioners, who are former senators, have the legal
standing to maintain the suit.
Issue 4: W/N the SC may exercise its Power of Judicial Review over the case

Yes. Although petitioners lack legal standing, they raise matters of transcendental importance which
justify setting aside the rule on procedural technicalities. The challenge raised here is rooted in the
very Constitution itself, particularly Art XVIII, Sec 25 thereof, which provides for a stricter mechanism
required before any foreign military bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the country. Such is
of paramount public interest that the Court is behooved to determine whether there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Executive Department.

Brion Dissent
Yes, but on a different line of reasoning. The petitioners satisfied the requirement of legal standing in
asserting that a public right has been violated through the commission of an act with grave abuse of
discretion. The court may exercise its power of judicial review over the act of the Executive
Department in not submitting the EDCA agreement for Senate concurrence not because of the
transcendental importance of the issue, but because the petitioners satisfy the requirements in invoking
the courts expanded jurisdiction.

Issue 5: W/N the non-submission of the EDCA agreement for concurrence by the Senate violates the
Constitution

No. The EDCA need not be submitted to the Senate for concurrence because it is in the form of a mere
executive agreement, not a treaty. Under the Constitution, the President is empowered to enter into
executive agreements on foreign military bases, troops or facilities if (1) such agreement is not the
instrument that allows the entry of such and (2) if it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
EDCA is in the form of an executive agreement since it merely involves adjustments in detail in the
implementation of the MTD and the VFA. These are existing treaties between the Philippines and the
U.S. that have already been concurred in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the
requirements of the Constitution under Art XVIII, Sec 25. Because of the status of these prior
agreements, EDCA need not be transmitted to the Senate.

De Castro Dissent
No. The EDCA is entirely a new treaty, separate and distinct from the VFA and the MDT. Whether the
stay of the foreign troops in the country is permanent or temporary is immaterial because the
Constitution does not distinguish. The EDCA clearly involves the entry of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities in the country. Hence, the absence of Senate concurrence to the agreement makes it
an invalid treaty.
BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL.
(G.R. NO. 208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL.
(G.R. NO. 208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES. AQUINO (G.R. NO. 209251) NOVEMBER 19,
2013

FACTS

HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

The term pork barrel, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of
government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.

The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the
Public Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds and realignment of
unexpended portions of an item or appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being representatives of the people, also became involved
in project identification.

The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial law was declared.

It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called Support for
Local Development Projects (SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum allocations to
individual legislators. The SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or hard
projects but also covered soft projects such as those which would fall under education,
health and livelihood.

After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was
revived through the Mindanao Development Fund and the Visayas Development Fund.

In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The CDF was
meant to cover small local infrastructure and other priority community projects.

CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President, released directly to implementing agencies subject
to the submission of the required list of projects and activities. Senators and congressmen could
identify any kind of project from hard projects such as roads, buildings and bridges to soft
projects such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.

In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual legislators. This was
also the first time when the Vice-President was given an allocation.

The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996 except that the Department of Budget and
Management was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Appropriations regarding the releases made from the funds.

Congressional insertions (CIs) were another form of congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF.
 Examples of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, and the Public Works Fund, among others.

The allocations for the School Building Fund were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned and the legislators had the power to direct
how, where and when these appropriations were to be spent.

In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food
Security Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii) Rural/Urban Development
Infrastructure Program Fund. All three contained a provision requiring prior consultation with
members of Congress for the release of funds.

In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required
prior consultation with the representative of the district before the release of funds. PDAF also
allowed realignment of funds to any expense category except personal services and other
personnel benefits.

In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general
programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-
2010.

It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-governmental
organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.

The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual
legislators.

In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated
for individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also contained a provision on realignment of
funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed only once.

The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were
also allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds
and release of funds were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.

MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND

The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).

The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
910 issued by President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.

The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD No. 1993. The PSF is
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the share
 of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

PORK BARREL MISUSE

In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money regularly
went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.

In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the
form of kickbacks.

In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the
government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects.

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year audit investigation
detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.

Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a
dummy NGO.

ISSUE/S

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy, (b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial review, (c)
petitioners have legal standing to sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-
delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy

There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal
rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the constitutionality of
the pork barrel system.
The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the laws allowing for their utilization
are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners.

The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional authority to
nullify or annul the legal existence of the PDAF.

The moot and academic principle cannot stop the Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b) the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of paramount public interest,
(c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the systems constitutionality to guide the
bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an
annual occurrence.

(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable

The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom
of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon.

The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the
power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of the government.

(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue

Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases

The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the Philconsa case
was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress.

On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those related to
the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.

Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies considering that
the authority to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is
a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power cannot be exercised by
 individual members of Congress and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised after the
GAA has already been passed.

The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management does not
also bar judgment on the present case because it was dismissed on a procedural technicality and
hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has
been violated.

The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to
the executive department.

Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational
aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities and the regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers
principle.

Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional.

That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law.

Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They
even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement
before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source.

(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated

The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which as settled in Philconsa is
lodged in Congress.

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines
(a) how much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
 themselves also determine.

(c) Checks and balances

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would
then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.

This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation
of a budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the Presidents power of item veto.

It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the
specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda
and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects.

In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum
appropriation. This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of
the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible
item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.

(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is

incapable of checking itself or its members.

The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing, investigating or
monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.

The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.

The concept of post-enactment authorization violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government, because it renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislators control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office.

The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.

Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit political
 dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
Since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy

The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.

The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking
into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents.

The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.

This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the
various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated toassist
the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.

Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only
when acting as a body.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.

For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law, it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.

Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount: a Special
Fund comprised of all fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy Development] Board from
any and all sources.

It also specified a public purpose: energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation law because it set apart a determinable amount:
[a]fter deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the
Government in the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.
It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines.

(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue delegation of
legislation powers.

The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to
the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.

This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he
may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.

This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.

Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law.

The law does not supply a definition of priority infrastructure development projects and hence,
leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.

The delimitation of a project as one of infrastructure is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility.