Deadly Education - Evaluating Which Universities Are Attractive To International Terrorists

DEADLY EDUCATION:
EVALUATING WHICH UNIVERSITIES ARE ATTRACTIVE TO

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
CYNTHIA J. LEE
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

MERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
MAY 2009
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
MERCYHURST COLLEGE
ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
DEADLY EDUCATION:
EVALUATING WHICH UNIVERSITIES ARE ATTRACTIVE TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS
A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
Submitted By:
CYNTHIA J. LEE
Certificate of Approval:
___________________________________
Kristan J. Wheaton
Associate Professor
Department of Intelligence Studies
___________________________________
Dawn Wozneak
Administrator of Grants/Instructor
Department of Intelligence Studies
___________________________________
Phillip J. Belfiore
Vice President
Office of Academic Affairs
May 2009
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Deadly Education: Evaluating Which Universities Are Attractive to International

Terrorists
By
Cynthia J. Lee
Master of Science in Applied Intelligence
Mercyhurst College, 2009
Professor Kristan Wheaton, Chair
It is increasingly evident that terrorists are likely to consider developing and
deploying weapons of mass destruction. To do such things, it is necessary to acquire a
skill set reflecting advanced scientific or engineering training, which may be obtained at a
university or college. By examining the criteria that terrorists might use to select a
university for specific degree offerings, a multi-criteria decision-making matrix can be
used to determine which universities are most likely to attract terrorists on the basis of
course availability, advanced degree levels, and specific research opportunities.
Universities can be further examined by studying the international student population in
science/engineering disciplines. This project is a case study of such an analysis that
examines colleges and universities in Germany to determine which universities are most
attractive to international terrorists seeking to learn the skills necessary to develop or
employ chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………… iii
…
TABLE OF iv
CONTENTS……………………………………………………………
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………….. v
CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………... 1
LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………… 4
PROCEDURES………………………………………….. 44
RESULTS…………………………………………………… 55
CONCLUSIONS…………………………………………… 64
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………................................... 73
APPENDICES…………………………………………………………………….... 83
Appendix A………………………………………………… 84
Appendix B………………………………………………….. 93
Appendix C………………………………………………….. 96
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 3.1 Physics Curriculum Score Criteria 51
iv
Table 3.2 Chemistry Curriculum Score Criteria 51
Table 3.3 Biology Curriculum Score Criteria 51
Table 3.4 Engineering/Mathematics Curriculum Score Criteria 51
Table 4.1 University Course Evaluations 56
Table 4.2 Top 15 University Statistics for Science/Engineering 58

Programs and International Student Populations
Table 4.3 Number of International Students Enrolled in 60

Science/Engineering/Mathematics at Top Universities
Table 4.4 Final University Ranking with Academic/Anonymity Coefficient 62
Table A.B.1 University Subject Population Data 93
Table A.C.1 Germany: Stock of Foreign Population by Select Country 96

of Nationality
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
v
Figure 2.1 Multi-Criteria Decision Making Sample Matrix 41
vi
1
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Terrorist groups who are interested in using unconventional means of destruction,
such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, require individuals with technical
training in the sciences. The best means of acquiring such training is at the university
level, particularly at research-oriented universities with access to high-quality
laboratories and opportunities for independent student research projects. It is highly
likely that certain universities, even if they are similar in size, scope and opportunities,
will be more likely than others to attract students interested in using technical skills to aid
a terrorist organization. All colleges and universities are not created the same, and
certain universities offer more opportunities in different areas, offering a unique skill set
that is more attractive to certain groups of students than others.
Due to discrepancies in coursework, laboratories, and available equipment,
different schools are likely to be more or less attractive to terrorists seeking a technical
education to construct nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Certainly, it is highly
unlikely that there can be terrorists at every school seeking such skills. There is a natural
narrowing that takes place, drawing such ill-minded individuals to certain institutions.
Knowing which colleges and universities are most likely to attract a terrorist is beneficial
to not only law enforcement and intelligence professionals seeking to prevent terrorism,
but also to academics and educators interested in keeping such potentially deadly
knowledge out of dangerous hands. For the purposes of this study, the focus will be on
international terrorists that consider an outside country for education purposes.

2
To examine this method, Germany will be used as a test case to evaluate this
approach. Germany has a number of schools offering training and research opportunities
in scientific disciplines. It has also been linked to international terrorist activity, with the
most notorious being the al Qaeda Hamburg cell associated with the 9/11 attacks on the
US.1 If there are still al Qaeda operatives or other international terrorists, living in
Germany, they could be attending German universities and could even be studying to be
scientists, possibly with the intent to later use those skills to help develop unconventional
weapons for terrorist purposes.
The purpose of this study, generally, is to determine if a methodical approach
based on available evidence and logical assumptions, can identify universities most likely
to be attractive to international terrorists trying to learn the skills necessary to develop or
use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Specifically, I intend to look at the
universities that exist in Germany, the test case subject. It is important to note that the
results will not indicate whether or not these German schools contain terrorists, whether
international or home-grown. The results will indicate whether or not these schools are
attractive to terrorists seeking a technological education to construct nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons. The same methodology could be applied to any country, or any
group of universities, to determine which schools would be the most attractive, or
unattractive schools to terrorists seeking a technological education to construct nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons.
The study will look at mid-level universities that offer a good-quality education,
while avoiding the high-profile activity and attention associated with a top-tier school.
1
Jennie Brookman Frankfurt, “Terrorist hunt hits campuses,” Times Higher Education, (October 5, 2001),
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=165151&sectioncode=26.
3
The research will take into account the courses, technology, and materials available at the
institution, as well as the research opportunities and faculty research interests.
The study will examine universities and degree programs for international student
populations. The intersections of curriculums likely to provide the skill set necessary to
develop unconventional weapons with schools or programs that foster an environment
attractive to international terrorists, represent the greatest possibility for international
terrorist groups acquiring skills to make and/or use unconventional weapons.
Limitations of the Study
There are limitations to this study. One limitation is the nature of the research
itself. The research will be largely qualitative, and the most useful resources for
gathering information will be the internet and books. While anecdotal evidence
reflecting historical instances of international terrorism may be interesting, it is not useful
to this examination. Terrorist groups with a serious desire to cause harm through
clandestine attacks will not advertise the specific details of their plans. They will factor
in the element of surprise, which can cause an attack to be all the more deadly. In
addition, those groups will not likely do much to publicize the location of group meetings
or identities of group members. Therefore, it may be difficult to identify some or all of
the locations of known or unknown terrorist groups. Therefore, identifying the most
likely locations of international terrorists requires relying on international population
data, which is limited.

4
CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW
When looking at the ways to prevent terrorism as a whole, there are different
ways to approach this topic. Some may want to prevent terrorism by eliminating
terrorists and preventing them from recruiting new members. Some may think that the
best way to prevent terrorism is to keep material, whether communication technology,
explosives, or existing weapons, out of the grasp of the people most likely to cause harm.
Another route would be preventing an attack, such as by securing nuclear facilities, or
scanning and searching bags at airports and athletic events.
The purpose of this report will be to look for ways of preventing international
terrorists from gaining a critical scientific education at a university, with Germany used
as a test case. On 9/11, the hijackers used primitive weapons to fight for control of the
cockpit. However, they also had some flight training, learned at US flight schools, which
was apparently enough to guide the aircraft. 2 By predicting that a terrorist would
consider attending flight school in the US to someday hijack an airplane, investigators
could have developed a watch list and monitored who attended such schools. Al Qaeda’s
9/11 hijackings may have been prevented if anyone exploited and investigated the
eventual conspirators’ conspicuous behavior at flight schools.3 Likewise, by assuming
that a terrorist would need advanced scientific training to develop a dangerous
unconventional weapon, such as a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon, it is useful to
look at universities where such skills are taught and to develop a watch list that includes
universities that may attract terrorists.
2
UE, comment on The 19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, comment posted March 14, 2008,
http://the19kids.blogspot.com/ (accessed January 26, 2009).
3
Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 8.
5
For this study, the multi-criteria decision making methodology will be used to
examine the decision making process of a potential terrorist student. The main goal will
be to look at possible intersections of readily available education in a technical discipline,
such as science and engineering, with known, or even likely geographic regions of
possible international terrorist groups that may pose a national security threat to the US.
Multi-criterion decision making (MCDM) will be used to analyze the matrix, accounting
for the technical training available in physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics and
engineering. Finally, international populations at the universities will be considered.
This research can offer a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in
national security. Facts have linked known terrorists to Europe, and particularly
Germany. German legislature has, in the past, supported religious freedom to the extent
that extremist group members flocked to Germany.4 With regard to the hijackers who
carried out the 9/11 attacks in the US, the New York Times called Germany the “haven of
choice.”5 This study will examine whether or not Germany’s universities are likely to
attract international terrorists for the purpose of acquiring skills to build weapons of mass
destruction.
There are several considerations and assumptions that are useful to take into
account when examining this topic. First, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are
difficult to make, and a widespread attack using such devices would be technologically
challenging.6 Therefore, anyone attempting to make such a weapon would require

4
Sam Francis, “Mass Immigration Creates Terrorist Haven in Europe,” (October 18,
2001), http://www.vdare.com/francis/terrorist_haven.htm.
5
Ibid.
6
William J. Broad, Stephen Engelberg, and James Glanz, “A Nation Challenged: The
Threats; Assessing Risks, Chemical, Biological, Even Nuclear,” The New York Times, (November 1, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/01/us/a-nation-challenged-the-threats-assessing-risks-chemical-
biological-even-nuclear.html?n=Top/News/Health/Diseases,%20Conditions,%20and%20Health
%20Topics/Smallpox&pagewanted=all.
6
advanced training in a technical discipline. In addition, the assumption is that the
necessary advanced training, or at least the preliminary advanced training, is accessible at
the university level.
Europe: An International Mix
Europe, by its very nature, allows for a blended mix of cultures and nationalities.
This is particularly evident in the college and university atmosphere, as students
representing a multitude of nationalities come together to form student populations with
striking international flair. European universities attract students not only from
throughout Europe, but also from Asia, Africa, and the Americas.
In Germany, the influx of international students is apparent. During the
2000/2001 school year, German universities had 187,027 registered foreign students, and
only one third of those had graduated from German high schools. 7 By 2005, the number
of international students studying in Germany jumped again to 259,797 students.8 These
foreign students come to Germany, temporarily, to study. What is striking about
Germany is that the number of international students studying in Germany increased by
21.1% between 1997/1998 and 2000/2001, and that the increase in students from EU
countries accounted for only 2.1%, leaving the rest of the new influx of international
students traveling to Germany from Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, and Asia.9 Other
7
Christiane Kuptsch, “Foreign Students in Europe: Between Red Carpet and Red Card,”
(September 18, 2003), http://74.125.47.132/search?
q=cache:0ItpDbtw8G0J:www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/kuptsch.pdf+foreign+students+i
n+europe&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.
8
Susan Robertson, “Europe Challenges US for Foreign Students by Adding More English
Courses,” Global Higher Ed, http://globalhighered.wordpress.com/2007/09/27/europe-challenges-us-for-
foreign-students-by-adding-more-english-courses/.
9
7
European countries have also seen an increase in the number of foreign students,
especially those from developing countries.
However, it is no surprise that Germany has experienced such an
internationalization at the university level. During the 1990s, Germany initiated a plan to
attract foreign students, specifically promoting Germany as a center for science and
education.10 Also, European universities, including those in Germany, now offer more
courses in the English language as a means to stay competitive and attract students who
may have otherwise considered attending universities in the US.11
Terrorists and College Campuses
Movements on college campuses, where there is a greater likelihood of fostering a
great mix of ideas, backgrounds, and interests, can be particularly powerful. Supporters
of any movement have a large pool of students who are open to new ideas and can be
fairly easily persuaded to try out a new movement or organization. In addition,
international students who are new to the country and university may wish to seek out
companionship from other students who share the same nationality and background for
familiarity.
In 2007, Rebecca Miller, an FBI intelligence analyst, spoke at the National
Council of State Directors of Community Colleges summer conference and addressed
10
11
8
issues concerning international terrorism on US college campuses. 12 According to Miller,
US colleges and universities, along with those from other countries, must continually deal
with the possibility that domestic or international terrorist groups could recruit on
campus.13 She also pointed out that in the US, there has been evidence of international
terrorists enrolled in English as a second language (ESL) programs, which likely suggests
an effort to further grasp the language as a means to blend in. 14 Also, if a potential
international terrorist is taking classes to refine English language skills, it could be a sign
that he or she is considering applying for advanced courses that are offered in English.
Advanced courses, including those in science and engineering, are now offered in more
European countries as a means to entice students who may have otherwise considered
schools in the US.15
In the US, the Virginia Tech massacre demonstrated how an unstable individual
with intent to kill remained under the radar of authorities and was able to carry out a
shooting rampage. While the shooter did not utilize weapons of mass destruction, and
did not need an advanced scientific degree to carry out his acts of violence the case
provides evidence that college campuses, especially schools with greater opportunity for
off-campus living and commuting, often offer an open environment that allows students
to go about in relative anonymity. Professor and student suspicion surrounding the
12
Carisa Chappell, “Colleges Especially Vulnerable to Crime, Terrorism,” Community
College Times, (August 16, 2007). http://www.communitycollegetimes.com/article.cfm?
TopicId=18&ArticleId=453.
13
14
15
9
Virginia Tech perpetrator did not surface until after the shootings. 16 This university
environment, where suspicious activity can be ignored, allows for anonymity that could
attract international terrorists seeking to stay under the radar.
Islamic Extremism on College Campuses
There is evidence that indicates that Islamic extremists encourage recruitment
efforts on college campuses, taking advantage of large pools of young adults who are
likely to be more open to experimenting with new religious experiences. In 1979,
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat showed support for Islamists, and Egyptian universities
experienced an Islamic Jihad emergence, along with increased activity within other
Muslim groups on campuses.17 In 1981, Ayman al-Zawahiri established recruiting efforts
on campus at Asiut University, and he eventually became an Osama bin Laden
associate.18 Ayman al-Zawahiri was one of about 40 members in the radical group Al-
Gama’a al-Islamiyya, and he reportedly gave campus tours and boasted that the Islamist
movement, “found its greatest recruiting success in the university’s two most elite
facilities—the medical and engineering schools.”19 Also in 1981, the Muslim groups that
first gathered strength on Egyptian college campuses produced Sadat’s assassin. This is
an example of how a relaxed attitude towards certain groups with potentially harmful
16
17
Mamoun Fandy, “Middle East Terrorists with ‘Global Reach’: From Hizballah to Egyptian Islamic
Jihad,” in War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), 101.
18
19
David Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, “Engineers of Jihad” (Oxford: Department of
Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007), 4.
10
ideas essentially opened the flood gates, allowing terrorism to establish a presence in
Egypt.
Following the March 2004 Madrid bombings, The Sunday Times in Britain
revealed information from a leaked British intelligence dossier, writing that Islamic
“extremists are known to target schools and colleges where young people may be very
inquisitive but less challenging and more susceptible to extremist reasoning/arguments.” 20
In “Engineers of Jihad,” Gambetta and Hertog also revealed that “Jemaah Islamiyah has
actively recruited in leading technical institutes, including the University of Technology
of Malaysia, Universitas Semerang, and Bandung Institute of Technology.” 21 This
evidence emphasizes that college campuses are, in general, an ideal location for
recruiting for terrorist movements.
Terrorists at German Universities
As in many places of the world, Germany has a history of terrorism that includes
involvement on college and university campuses. Germany’s college and university
terrorist associations and activities have included both domestic and international terrorist
groups, as well as domestic terrorist groups that have branched out to associate with
international organizations.
German universities experienced a rush of student-led movements in the 1960s
and 1970s. Some students, primarily those with Marxist connections, disrupted classes
20
Robert Winnet and David Leppard, “Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda’s British
Recruits,” The Sunday Times, July 10, 2005,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece
21
11
and damaged property as a means to speak out against capitalism. 22 Though most student
protests disintegrated, some radical groups did carry out more dangerous terrorist acts,
such as fire-bombing department stores and attacking US military installations.23
A terrorist group known as the Red Army Faction (RAF) grew out of the radical
student movement in Germany and was a brutal group that sought to bring down
imperialism, carrying out kidnappings and airline hijackings.24 Despite the capture of the
group’s leaders, the organization still managed to carry out terrorist plots through its
support from international terrorist groups.25
There are also specific examples of Islamic extremism activity on German
university campuses. At least three of the 19 al Qaeda operative involved with the 9/11
attacks lived in Hamburg, Germany, two of which studied at German universities, and
investigators believe that Hamburg was also home to at least four senior al Qaeda
members.26 Ziad Samir Jarrah, the hijacker who piloted United Airlines flight 93, studied
aerospace engineering at the University of Applied Sciences in Hamburg, Germany. 27
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Marwan Yousef al-Shehhi, the hijacker who took control of
United Airlines flight 175, traveled to various countries, living in Germany for a few
years, studying at a language institute in Bonn, Germany.28
22
“The Student Movement and Terrorism in Germany,” German Culture,
http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_student_movement_terrorism.htm.
23
“Student Movement and Terrorism in Germany, The.” German Culture,
24
“Who were the Baader-Meinhof gang?” BBC News. (February 12, 2007)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6314559.stm.
25
26
Ann Robertson, Terrorism and Global Security (New York, Infobase Publishing, 2007), 95.
27
19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, The, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/.
28
12
Terrorism in Europe
Europe has a wide variety of terrorist groups, and some groups have a tendency to
cling to different areas and support varying causes. However, all terrorist groups seek to
intimidate and/or cause destruction to bring attention to a cause, and generally inflict fear.
Organizations include groups such as the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) group,
and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA),
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party.29 ETA, which operates mainly in Spain and
France, has carried out assassinations and sophisticated bombings during its quest to
create an independent homeland region.30 While these terrorist groups have managed to
instill fear and cause hardship in Europe, Middle Eastern Islamic extremists have
attracted the worldwide terrorist spotlight in recent years.
During recent years, Middle Easterners have flocked to Europe in unprecedented
numbers.31 This is due to a number of factors, including more relaxed immigration and
travel laws. With a greater population of individuals of Middle Eastern descent comes a
greater tendency for a higher Muslim population. The more relaxed immigration and
travel abilities in Europe also inadvertently encouraged a greater population of extremists
and mujahideens within those Muslim populations, who certainly do not represent
European culture.
Lorenzo Vidino wrote that, “Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought
and political development,” noting that Muslim Brotherhood members who migrated to
Europe, along with their descendents, have managed to establish a presence throughout
29
US Department of State, “Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations,”
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm.
30
Office of the Secretary of State. “Background Information on Terrorist Groups.”
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/backg.html.
31
Sam Francis, “Mass Immigration Creates Terrorist Haven in Europe,” (October 18,
2001), http://www.vdare.com/francis/terrorist_haven.htm.
13
Europe.32 The influx of Islamic extremists to Europe also brings with it the opportunity
for Islamic recruitment of non-extremist Muslims or Europeans for terrorist activity.
Though it is difficult to determine exactly how many Muslims are in the European
countries, estimates indicate that, “between 15 and 20 million Muslims now call Europe
home and make up four to five percent of its total population…France has the largest
proportion of Muslims (seven to ten percent of its total population), followed by the
Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Given
continued immigration and fertility rates, the National Intelligence Council projects that
Europe’s Muslim population will double by 2025.”33
Islamic Extremism
According to Mary Habeck, the nineteen men who attacked the US on 9/11, and
other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, who continue to seek destruction of the US,
make up a radical faction of Islam, jihadi or jihadist. 34 These extremists have a
commitment to the violent overthrow of the current international community in favor of
an Islamic state.35 All nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Arabs, and fifteen of those men were
from Saudi Arabia.36 All nineteen were middle-class, well-educated men with a potential
for a bright future, as ten had either enrolled in or attended school at the university
level.37 They chose to act as hijackers not out of necessity, but because they chose to deal
32
Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brotherhoods’ Conquest of Europe,” The Middle East
Quarterly, Winter 2005, vol. XXII, n. 1,
http://www.meforum.org/687/the-muslim-brotherhoods-conquest-of-europe.
33
Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs (2005): 120.
34
Mary Habeck, Knowing the Enemy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 4.
35
36
37
14
with community problems by killing Americans.38 This powerful mindset, exemplifying
the determination and desire to rise above the rest of the world, is what makes up the
Islamic extremist mentality. Islamic extremists are, however, just one example of the
kinds of terrorists who might seek to use weapons of mass destruction, and they will be
considered in this examination, along with other possible international terrorist groups.
Terrorist groups without supporting patrons, such as al-Qaeda and the other
Islamic extremists, are particularly dangerous, as they are not accountable to specific
states, such as Hizballah or Hamas are, so there are no states that could be held
accountable by other states for supporting terrorism.39
Islamic Extremism in Germany
Prior to 9/11, Germany was a quite attractive location for militant Islamic groups.
Germany lacked laws banning foreign terrorists from working and had liberal
immigration and asylum laws, so a person could easily claim to be attending a German
university without even paying for to going to school. Also, after the Holocaust,
Germany established a relaxed policy towards religious affiliations.40 Therefore,
Germany attracted approximately 3 million Muslims by the late 1990s, many of which
relocated from France.41
Al Qaeda’s Hamburg cell prepared for the 9/11 hijackings in a Hamburg,
Germany apartment. The cell included Mohamed Atta and Mounir al-Motassadeq.
Mohamed Atta was the lead hijacker of the first jetliner to slam into the World Trade
38
39
40
41
15
Center.42 Prior to living in Germany, he studied English and German in Cairo. 43 Mounir
al-Motassadeq, an Algerian national living in Hamburg, was accused of being the
“financial officer” behind the 9/11 hijackings.44
They likely selecting Hamburg as an ideal base due to its ethnic diversity.
Hamburg has approximately 130,000 Muslims, comprising 8% of the city’s population,
whereas Muslims make up 4% of the overall German population. Also, the Hamburg
Technical University has a large foreign student population, so the al Qaeda operatives
were likely able to blend in easily as international college students.45
Numerous other Islamic extremists have been linked to Germany. Mohamedou
Ould Slahi lived in Germany in the 1990s prior to heading to Canada. In 1999, he
relayed a message from bin Laden, aiding in planning the thwarted attack on the Los
Angeles International Airport.46
On September 5, 2007, officials thwarted an alleged attack targeting Americans
and US installations in Germany.47 The group had liquid explosives equivalent to 550 kg
of TNT, and were planning car bomb attacks.48 One of the three men, a German convert,
Fritz Martin Gelowicz, allegedly the leader of the Islamic Jihad Union terror cell,
enrolled in 2003 at the University of Applied Sciences in Ulm for an engineering
degree.49
42
Mitchell Young, ed., The War on Terrorism (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2003), 165.
43
44
45
46
Paul L. Williams, The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World (Amherst, NY:
Prometheus Books, 2007), 181.
47
48
James Joyner, “German Terrorist Plot Foiled,” Outside the Beltway, (2007),
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/german_terrorist_plot_foiled/.
49
16
Screening for International Terrorists in Germany
Following the 9/11 attacks, Germany established a more aggressive stance,
outlawing joining or aiding terrorists, granting the government the ability to outlaw
religious organizations believed to encourage terrorism. Germany’s “Second
Counterterrorism Packet” in 2002 gave the government greater ability to monitor terrorist
suspects’ activities and also made way for advanced technology to better monitor
immigration. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, a profiling system identified 10,000
“suspicious students” in Hamburg alone, clearly pointing to the need for further
investigation.50
In this specific example of Hamburg’s efforts to profile students, it is evident that
the goal was to quickly determine all of the individuals who were likely to be a threat.
However, those 10,000 students were likely selected largely due to race or nationality.
Common sense would suggest that not all 10,000 students pose an actual threat. In
addition, from a logistics standpoint, it would be extremely costly and time-consuming to
carry out individual background checks on or conduct interviews with all 10,000
students. However, some students might pose a more significant threat than others, and a
methodology to narrow the list down to a smaller number of highly suspicious
individuals would make the task of filtering for potential terrorists far easier. If law
enforcement could narrow that list of 10,000 students down to a much more manageable
list of suspicious students, the investigation would likely be more efficient and effective.
There might be a very reasonably means to narrow the list of students based on
readily available data. A more nuanced approach, rather than just grouping students
50
17
based on nationality, could yield more promising results. For instance, it is likely that the
list of students includes students from many universities, representing a variety of degree
programs. Due to these factors, not all students should be treated equally. For instance, a
student studying literature at a very small university is not likely to have the same
educational or career aspirations as a student pursuing a doctoral degree in chemistry at a
larger, research-oriented university. Therefore, a methodology to determine which
universities support the educational needs of a potential terrorist seeking the skills to
build nuclear weapons would be very helpful in narrowing the list of students that could
provide an immediate threat as international terrorists with deadly capabilities.

18
Terrorists and Unconventional Weapons
There is fear that terrorists could utilize unconventional weapons to cause more
destruction than ever before. “Acquiring nuclear weapons…is a religious duty.” – Osama
bin Laden, 1999.51 While bin Laden’s al Qaeda operatives demonstrated during the 9/11
attacks that terrorists do not need an unconventional weapon to carry out a tragedy, there
is reason to believe that some may someday try to use such weapons. 52 The 9/11 attacks
demonstrated that terrorists had both the desire and ability to cause destruction and this
further expanded fears that terrorists may resort to more unconventional weapons, such as
biological or nuclear weapons, or dispersing radioactive material.53
For the purpose of this study, the assumption will be that terrorists are looking to
acquire the knowledge to construct weapons of mass destruction. Research indicates that,
while difficult, terrorists could acquire nuclear materials or even complete weapons.
Caravelli, who wrote Nuclear Insecurity, worked on President Clinton’s White
House National Security Council Staff from 1996-2000, dealing with US nuclear material
security policies, as well as the US Department of Energy’s largest international nuclear
security program. According to Caravelli, there is a strong danger of terrorists acquiring
nuclear material or weapons. His thoughts echo those of George Tenet in this comment:
We have learned that it is not beyond the realm of possibility for a terrorist
group to obtain nuclear weapons. I have often wondered why this is such
a hard reality for so many people to accept … nuclear terrorism remains
now a terrifying possibility and extraordinarily hard to stop … the
terrorists are endlessly patient … one mushroom cloud would change
history. My deepest fear is that this is exactly
what they intend.54
51
Jack Caravelli, Nuclear Insecurity (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 1.
52
Judith Miller, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges for US Policy,” in
War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, ed. Robert B. Satloff (Washington: The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, 2002), 121.
53
Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 199.
19
Nuclear Weapons
In this study, it is useful to determine the feasibility that terrorists would consider
developing nuclear weapons, whether or not they would be able to develop such
weapons, and how they would acquire the material for such weapons. In 2004, Senator
Joseph Biden reported on an experiment carried out by national laboratories to determine
the feasibility of terrorists constructing a nuclear weapon, saying,
I gathered the heads of all the national laboratories and asked them a
simple question. I said, ‘I would like you to go back to your laboratory
and try to assume for a moment you are a relatively informed terrorist
group with access to some nuclear scientists. Could you build, off the
shelf, a nuclear device? Not a dirty bomb, but something that would start
a nuclear reaction – an atomic bomb.’ They came back several months
later and said, ‘We built one.” They put it in a room and explained how—
literally, off the shelf, without doing anything illegal—they actually
constructed the device.55
This example of Senator Biden’s national laboratory experiment demonstrated that if the
right, educated intellectuals, have the time, material, and drive, it is possible to construct
a nuclear device. That creates another obstacle for authorities trying to protect people
and prevent nuclear terrorism. In On Nuclear Terrorism, Levi asserts that nuclear
terrorism is complex in that there are so many aspects, so it is difficult to effectively
develop a system for combating nuclear terrorism.56
No naturally occurring material can be used to make a nuclear bomb without first
undergoing the extensive enrichment process.57 Access to stockpiles of enriched uranium
or plutonium offers a helpful gateway to producing a nuclear weapon.
54
George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 279-
80.
55
56
57
20
Bombs that terrorists manufacture themselves are known as Improvised Nuclear Devices
(INDs), and are most likely made using stolen materials. 58 In 2005, the majority of a
group of leading experts identified that terrorists are more likely to manufacture a nuclear
weapon than acquire one.59
There are some indications that at least certain groups do have the desire for
nuclear weapons. In a 1998 Time interview, Osama bin Laden said, “Acquiring nuclear
weapons for the defense of Moslems is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these
weapons, then I thank Allah for enabling me to do so.”60
Despite the fact that evidence suggests that certain terrorists are likely to desire
nuclear weapons, they face obstacles. James S. Gilmore III, former governor of Virginia
and chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, said, “There is no doubt that the idea
of nuclear weapons may appeal to terrorists…Yet, the obstacles to the acquisition or
fabrication of nuclear weapons by terrorists remain formidable.” 61 According to Thomas
Schelling, a professor of national security and nuclear strategy, developing a nuclear
weapon is not a trivial task, and would require a large group of highly skilled people
working for a long time.62 Terrorists have an advantage in that they can maintain
networks by privately communicating using encryption technology, and freely traveling,
58
Ibid., 26.
59
Richard Lugar, The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, lugar.senate.gov (accessed
March 11, 2009), 17.
60
Walid Phares, Future Jihad Terrorist Strategies Against America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 243.
61
62
Ibid., 299.
21
seeking refuge in countries that essentially serve as a sanctuary.63 However, they must
find ways to acquire skill sets and materials that are not easily obtained.
It is useful to glance back to historical examples of terrorist groups and weapon
development. In the 1960s, the concept of international terrorism began to surface, but
early terrorists had few skills, struggling with dynamite to make little bombs.
Nonetheless, early fears about nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists began to
emerge, even though evidence would indicate that such individuals would lack the skill
set necessary to develop a complex nuclear weapon.64
In 1964, in an attempt to show that terrorists would not need to organize another
Manhattan Project to construct a nuclear bomb, officials at Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory, in California, recruited a few young postdoctoral physicists to see if they
could build a weapon. With no access to classified information, in twenty-eight months,
they submitted a design that weapons designers determined could work.65
In the wake of increasing international terrorism, a group formed in 1986 to more
closely examine the nuclear terrorist threat.66 The Nuclear Control Institute, a research
center focusing on preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism, teamed up with the
State University of New York. The task force included a variety of both government and
private sector scientists and representatives.67 For one part of the project, they recruited
the help of five scientists with nuclear weapons experience at Los Alamos Laboratory,
who concluded that, “terrorists could build a crude nuclear device using either weapons-
63
Leon Fuerth, “Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges for US Policy,” in
64
65
Ibid., 40.
66
67
Ibid.
22
grade material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium-239) or material used in research
or commercial reactors (including highly enriched uranium or plutonium). But it would
by no means be easy either to acquire the greater quantities of material needed or to
fabricate the weapon.”68 They also concluded that it was unrealistic to assume that “one
bright lunatic” could provide the technological knowledge and skill to develop a nuclear
weapon, but rather constructing such a bomb would require, at the very least, a team with
specialists in physics, nuclear material, metallurgy, and explosives. They would also need
special equipment.69
There is also the possibility that experienced scientists will turn from worthwhile
research and give those skills, or possibly material, to terrorists for the right price, or just
because they want to. There are several examples of well-recognized members of the
scientific community allegedly having dangerous connections with terrorist groups.
Rifaat Hussain, chairman of Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad,
spoke of Dr. Sultan Mahmood, former Director General of the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission, who was suspected of having connections with the Taliban, saying,
“Mahmood was one of the nuclear hawks. People say that he was a very capable scientist
and a very capable engineer, but he had this totally crazy mind-set.”70
Another example is that of the notorious Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who stole
blueprints for obtaining highly enriched uranium through centrifuge technology from
Urenco, a top-secret uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands, where he worked as a
technician. By trade and training, he was a metallurgist, not a nuclear scientist, and
68
Ibid., 53.
69
Ibid.
70
23
lacked the ability to implement the design and to actualize the enrichment. 71 Khan
received a PhD in metallurgical engineering from the Catholic University of Leuven in
Belgium in 1974, and accepted a position with the Physical Research Laboratory in the
Netherlands, a subcontractor for the Ultra Centrifuge Nederland (Urenco). Khan used the
classified blueprints he stole and took them to Pakistan to help his homeland become a
nuclear power.72 From these examples, the research indicates that a scientist could easily
use his knowledge and technical skills to aid terrorists for ill purposes, and an individual
with enough power and access to nuclear material would likely be able to supply
necessary equipment and materials to aid such terrorists.
Another mechanism that terrorist groups could theoretically use to obtain nuclear
material to construct a weapon would be to acquire it by stealing, or purchasing from a
nation. The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University
reported in 2002 that more than forty kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) has
been reported missing from Russia and 50 other countries, including Romania, India,
Germany, and the Congo, and that the actual amount of missing HEU is ten times that
amount.73 Regarding the actual amount of missing HEU and plutonium, Bill Keller
writes, “No doubt enough nuclear material to built twenty nukes was lost in the transition
from the Soviet Union to Russia.”74 If that material is truly unaccounted for, it could
likely be within reach of a terrorist group, or someone that a terrorist group might be able
to persuade to hand over the material. Given that scenario, that the terrorist group
already has access to the material, all that would be needed is a person or group with the
71
Ibid., 106.
72
Ibid., 124.
73
74
Ibid.
24
ability to construct the weapon. This would be likely to drive a terrorist organization to
encourage members to obtain science and engineering training (likely through a
university) or to recruit directly from a university well-known for offering a competitive
scientific education.
For Islamic extremists, a major religious doctrine is sacrificing for the other life,
which, in the case of a suicide bomber, can mean sacrificing one’s own life, as they do
not fear death.75 According to Phares, Islamic extremists do have the will to use nuclear
weapons. He points to the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks. In 1993, Ramzi
Yousef and Sheik Omar abdul Rahman hoped to kill tens of thousands, the “equivalent of
a nuclear detonation.”76 In 2001, bin Laden expected tens of thousands to die as well. 77
By Phares’ analysis, if the Islamic extremists expected such high death tolls, they would
be unlikely to balk at the opportunity to use a nuclear weapon.
Jenkins called al Qaeda, “the world’s first terrorist nuclear power without, insofar
as we know, possessing a single nuclear weapon.” 78 According to Jenkins, al Qaeda is
“certainly the first terrorist group to have a nuclear policy,” and has been seeking nuclear
weapons since the mid-1990s.79 Al Qaeda’s continued interest in nuclear weapons,
coupled with its success in carrying out the 9/11 attacks, and its top leaders still at large,
have combined to cause a great deal of fear, whether or not any al Qaeda member
actually even has a nuclear weapon.80
75
Walid Phares, Future Jihad Terrorist Strategies Against America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 243-244.
76
Ibid., 244.
77
Ibid.
78
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid., 242.
25
According to Paul Williams, two British agents, of Arab descent, submersed
themselves in Islamic customs and became involved with a radical mosque in London,
gaining access to al Qaeda science laboratories and learned that al Qaeda was doing a
great deal of research and developing a radiological device.81 Those agents revealed their
findings to Eliza Manningham-Butler, who was in charge of MI5, Britain’s Security
Service, who leaked the news and told an audience in London that,
We are faced with the realistic possibility of a form of an unconventional

attack that could include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
[CBRN] weapons. We know renegade scientists have cooperated with al
Qaeda and provided them with the knowledge they need to develop these
weapons. It is only a matter of time before a crude version of a CBRN is
launched on a Western city and it is only a matter of time before the crude
weapon becomes more sophisticated.82
Biological and Chemical Weapons
Research indicates that a nuclear weapon would offer the greatest widespread
means of destruction in the hands of terrorists. However, such weapons require a
significant amount of effort to produce, which may be enough to deter groups and
persuade them to look for other means of destruction. Biological and chemical weapons
are likely easier to develop, though terrorists would need to deal with the distribution, and
even a successful attack would not likely be as destructive as a nuclear attack. Martin
Rees fleshed out this idea in a 2006 Guardian article:
We are collectively endangering our planet, but there is a potential threat

from individuals too. "Bio" and "cyber" expertise will be accessible to
millions. It does not require large, special-purpose facilities as do nuclear
weapons. Even a single person will have the capability to cause
widespread disruption through error or terror. There will always be
disaffected loners, and the "leverage" each can exert is ever-growing. It
81
82
Ibid., 95.
26
would be hard to eliminate such risks, even with very intrusive

surveillance. The global village will have its global village idiots.83
Rees’s concern touches on the subject of the dual-use issue, which will be discussed in
the next section. It also demonstrates, to some extent, how difficult it can be to combat
such means of terrorism.
Chemical weapons are, by definition, relatively inexpensively produced weapons
that inflict damage through the toxic properties of the chemicals.84 Any country or
organization with a chemical industry has the capability to manufacture toxic chemicals,
and there are thousands of chemicals that could technically be used in chemical
weapons.85 According to the Federation of American Scientists, civilian populations are
poorly prepared for chemical attacks, so a successful release of chemical agents is likely
to produce severe results.86 Also, biological weapons “deliver toxins and
microorganisms, such as viruses and bacteria, so as to deliberately inflict disease among
people, animals, and agriculture.”87 In the biological weapons category, anthrax and
smallpox are the most viable agents.88 Anthrax, in particular, has a long storage life.89
Prior to 1945, a number of individual states carried out research with biological
weapons. Bacteriology’s “Golden Age” took place at the end of the nineteenth century,
as scientists made great leaps in understanding infectious diseases, and some countries
83
Martin Rees, “Dark Materials,” Guardian, June 10, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jun/10/science.comment.
84
“Chemical Weapons Technology.” Federation of American Scientists.
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec04.pdf (accessed January 20, 2009), II-4-1.
85
Ibid., II-4-11.
86
Ibid., II-4-5.
87
“Introduction to Biological Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/bio/resource/introtobw.html.
88
89
Ibid.
27
developed an interest in this research for military applications. In World War I, Germany
initiated efforts to attack military draft animals with diseases such as anthrax and
glanders.90 Following World War I, fear that the next military conflict would involve a
great deal more use of chemical and biological weapons spurred countries, including
Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the US,
to develop more biological weapons as a deterrent. 91 Therefore, most nations entered
World War II with at least some initial exposure to biological weapons development.
However, the UK was the only country from Europe or North America to mass
produce a usable biological weapon during the war. The UK produced unsophisticated
cattle cakes with anthrax spores to use if the Germans used unconventional weapons
against the Allies, but they were not necessary. 92 However, in Asia, Japan used biological
and chemical weapons against the Chinese, and killed as many as hundreds of thousands
of Chinese troops and civilians.93 The 1925 signing of the Geneva Protocol banned
biological and chemical weapons in warfare.94
According to Balmer, a great deal of secrecy has succeeded in concealing past
biological warfare research and that state and sub-state sponsored research programs have
been covered in complete secrecy. For example, in the former Soviet Union, entire cities
might be hidden, not revealed on maps, so as not to leak any information regarding
90
Mark Wheelis, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed., Deadly Cultures (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006), 3.
91
Ibid., 4.
92
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
28
military research activities.95 Also, twentieth-century state-sponsored warfare research
programs have been recorded in many countries, including Germany.96
In 1981, the South African minister of defense, General Magnus Malan,
authorized a secret chemical and biological weapons program, codenamed Project Coast,
a military operation, for the South African Defense Force. 97 The Roodeplaat Research
Laboratory (RRL) was home to chemical agent testing.98 The South African President F.
W. De Klerk vaguely described the biological weapons program in a briefing, revealing
few details as he said, “The aim of Project Coast is that of covert research and
development of chemical and biological weapons and the establishment of production
technology in the sensitive and critical areas of chemical and biological warfare to
provide the South African security forces with a chemical and biological weapons
capacity following the chemical and biological weapons philosophy and strategy.” 99 After
some years of various research, development, and testing, RRl underwent privatization in
1991, with its scientists heading in various directions.100 Allegedly, during the closing-
down phase, biological weapon-related technical reports underwent unauthorized
scanning and saving.101 During the same time period, South Africa was experiencing
waves of political and social difficulties as it transitioned to democracy. 102 According to
Dr. Daan Goosen, the first managing director of RRL, in the wake of the RRL closing,
95
Brian Balmer, “How Does Secrecy Work? Keeping and Disclosing Secrets in the History of the UK
Biological Warfare Programme,” in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish
(London: Earthscan, 2007), 174.
96
Ibid.
97
98
“Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.” United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1847.pdf
99
100
Ibid., 206.
101
Ibid., 207.
102
Ibid., 212.
29
there was little managerial oversight, and that scientists took the liberty to keep cultures,
that may have been related to biological weapons research, for future research. 103
Whether or not there was a real threat from the poorly-managed closure of the laboratory,
the RRL example does indicate that a country may struggle when closing down a
biological weapons program, and that it is likely that samples or reports could be stolen
or sold without record.104
Nations are not the only possibly dangerous entity to explore chemical or
biological weapons. According to Wheelis and Sugishima, terrorist groups have
expressed interest in chemical and biological weapons, but the biggest obstacle to those
groups actually obtaining and using such means of destruction is lack of expertise and
training.105 However, there is limited historical evidence of terrorist groups actually using
them. The assumption is that the terrorist groups would need to overcome not only a
high degree of technical training, but also attaining the necessary raw materials. 106
According to Wheelis and Sugishima, bioterrorism has four elements: “(1) the deliberate
use, or the threat of use, of biological agents or toxins (2) by individuals or groups (but
not states) (3) against nonmilitary targets (such as civilians or agricultural targets) (4) to
achieve a political, ideological, or religious goal.”107 While there have only been two
confirmed attempts to use biological weapons as a tool for targeting humans, there have
also been cases of biocriminality (biological weapons used for goals such as profit),
103
Ibid., 207.
104
Ibid., 212.
105
106
107
30
hoaxes involving biological attacks, and allegations of biological weapon use against
plants and animals.108
In al Qaeda’s 5,000 page “Encyclopedia of Jihad,” the eleventh volume focuses
on constructing chemical and biological weapons.109 According to the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, a manual describing how to construct an al-
Mubtakkar, a device to disperse hydrogen cyanide, surfaced on various al Qaeda websites
since 2005, and the device was similar to the one intended for use in the aborted 2003
New York City subway attack.110 According to the report, most operational al Qaeda
manuals get reposted to as many sites as possibly to maximize exposure in the jihadi
community, so it is likely that the instructions were proliferated extensively.111
According to Wheelis and Sugishima, there have been hints that al Qaeda has
shown interest in developing anthrax as a biological weapon, but no evidence indicates
whether or not any group members has the required expertise or materials, but some
accounts suggest that some individuals associated with al Qaeda have attempted to
accumulate ricin, a potent toxin found naturally in castor beans, so it is relatively simple
to manufacture.112
According to the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, there have
been numerous accounts of ricin used or possessed, possibly for terrorism uses, since the
108
109
Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons
Use: Placing the Threat in Context.” (March 28, 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf.
110
Sammy Salama, “Special Report: Manual for Producing Chemical Weapon to Be Used in New York
Subway Plot Available on Al Qaeda Websites Since Late 2005.” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, (July 20, 2006), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/salama_060720.htm.
111
Ibid.
112
31
1970s.113 Ricin, which does have limited medical applications, would require large
quantities to be a successful mass terrorism tool. However, a small amount of 500
micrograms can kill a human, so small quantities are enough to make people fall ill, as
was the case with the man in February 2008, who became ill in his Las Vegas hotel
room.114
The instances of terrorist use of biological weapons against humans include the
1984 outbreak of restaurant-acquired salmonellosis in The Dalles, Oregon, carried out by
the religious commune associated with the East Indian guru Bagwan (“enlightened one”)
Shree Rajneesh.115 In that instance, a registered nurse obtained Salmonella and used a
small team of fewer than twelve people to cultivate and disseminate the cultures, using
only ordinary laboratory materials.116
Another example of the use of bioterrorism against humans was the Aum
Shinrikyo religious cult’s attacks between 1990-1995.117 Using a well-educated
microbiologist and a fairly sophisticated laboratory, the cult members isolated botulinum
toxin, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), and sarin.118 In the 1995 chemical attack on the
Tokyo subway, sarin, a nerve agent, killed twelve people, and injured 5,000. 119 More
would have likely been killed if the terrorists had been more prepared. The group
113
Raymond Zilinskas, Jonathan B. Tucker, and Burke Zimmerman, “Previous Incidents Involving the
Use/Possession of Ricin,” http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/080229_ricin.pdf.
114
Kevin Bohn, “Police: Man in critical condition after exposure to ricin,” CNN, (February 29, 2008),
http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/02/29/ricin.hotel/index.html.
115
116
Ibid., 291.
117
118
119
32
experienced failures with dissemination, spore concentration, and workable agent
formulations on several occasions, and was eventually caught and charged with serious
crimes.120 The failures were likely mostly associated with little expertise, despite the fact
that the group did have a rather highly educated population and spent approximately 20
million USD on preparation work.121
The threat of biological weapons attacks attracts international attention. Concerns
about terrorists having access to biological weapons became a prominent issue in the
early 1990s, especially as the lethality per terrorist attack increased, likely as a result of
terrorists having greater access to information and a greater capability to develop
chemical and biological weapons.122 Anthrax letter attacks in 2001 heightened fear and
intelligence suggested interest in biological weapons among international terrorist
organizations, which particularly was sound for alarm in the US. 123 Benevolence
International Foundation (BIF), a so-called Islamic charity, served to transfer funds to al
Qaeda cells throughout the world.124 BIF also allegedly became involved in the
development of weapons of mass destruction, including smallpox as an instrument of
terror.125
Scientific Knowledge in Terrorist Hands
120
121
Ibid., 303.
122
123
124
125
Ibid.
33
When considering the presence of terrorism in the world and the desire of
terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction, there is reason for concern from a security
standpoint. History has pointed out that terrorists have the desire and ability to cause
harm, and they also have the ability to stealthily live and educate themselves without
raising much, if any, suspicion. However, cases such as the Aum Shinrikyo chemical
attacks, reveal how terrorists’ deadly intentions can be limited by technological
abilities.126
There is a growing concern that terrorist groups may have more access to
scientific knowledge and abilities. With that knowledge comes greater risk for potential
targets, as terrorist groups could have a greater technical aptitude allowing them to carry
out terrorist acts with greater precision and damage.
With increasing educational opportunities, including those related to the hard
sciences, and an increasing prevalence of international students attending European
universities, terrorists could find themselves with greater opportunities to achieve
technical educations than ever before. According to Kreuger, literature suggests that
most terrorist organizations are composed of intellectual and economic elites. 127 These
individuals, if they experience a greater desire to develop and deploy weapons of mass
destruction, could use their intellectual prowess to seek out advanced scientific
capabilities. And, as schools push for diversity, a greater international student population
allows greater opportunities for international terrorists to blend in, and acquire skills and
knowledge with a certain degree of anonymity.
126
127
Alan Kreuger, What Makes a Terrorist (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 44.
34
Scientific Presence in Islamic Extremism
While a more diverse international environment at a European university could
allow any international terrorist a greater opportunity to blend in with the campus
population, and take advantage of acquiring scientific skills, evidence suggests that there
is a particular tendency for Islamic extremist group members to be scientists and
engineers.128 Numerous high-profile al Qaeda members have carried engineering titles,
and some evidence points to extremist sects heightening recruiting efforts on technology
campuses. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) case officer, wrote Understanding Terror Networks and included studies
on education and occupation of al Qaeda members.129 His results showed that nearly 35%
had received some college education, and nearly 45% were from a skilled profession. 130
Research has even indicated that Osama bin Laden studied economics, physics, and
engineering at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah.131
In “Engineers of Jihad,” Gambetta and Hertog examined the prevalence of
engineering, medicine, and science graduates in terrorist organizations, finding that such
individuals are over-represented in Islamist movements in the Muslim world, but not
among extremist Islamic groups that emerged in Western countries. 132 They also point
out that specifically engineers are “strongly over-represented” in violent sects within
Islamic movements in both the Muslim world and Western countries. 133 Gambetta and
128
129
130
131
132
133
Ibid.
35
Hertog’s main goal was to systematically explain why there is a link between radical
Islam and science and engineering.134 Gambetta and Hertog had some difficulty in
researching this topic, as they could not find educational or occupational information for
all of the desired populations, so they only examined subjects for which they could find
information.
Among their findings, Gambetta and Hertog concluded that Western-based
Islamic extremists tend to come from a lower class background than Middle Eastern
Islamic extremists, so they are less educated, but still show a high proportion of
engineers.135 Gambetta and Hertog also examined the presence of engineers among non-
Islamic extremists, to determine if engineers, in general, are linked to extremism, and
found that left-wing extremists included virtually no engineers, and that right-wing
extremists did contain some engineers.136 For example, Dick Butler, Aryan Nation
founder, and Wilhelm Schmitt, the leader of a militant anti-government group, both
worked as engineers.137
When Gambetta and Hertog considered that engineers are selected by radical
Islam groups due to technical skills, they found that technical skills do appear to bring
high levels of value and honor to the individual in some groups. Hamas websites use
“engineer” as an honorable title.138 Gambetta and Hertog also concluded that outside of
violent Islamist groups, the only other case of prominent engineer trends lies within
extreme right-wing movements, especially in the US and Germany, which is particularly
134
Ibid., 6.
135
Ibid., 24.
136
Ibid., 30.
137
Ibid.
138
Ibid., 40.
36
interesting because members of such movements tend to have lower education. 139
Furthermore, the leaked British dossier that revealed that Islamic extremists were
recruiting on college campuses also indicated that the recruiters were specifically
targeting students with “technical and professional qualifications, particularly
engineering and IT degrees.”140
Mamdouh Mahmud Salim – aka Abu Hajer – electrical engineer from Iraq
described as bin Laden’s “best friend.”141 In Sudan, Salim operated bin Laden’s Al
Hajira Company, and he had a permit to import explosives for demolition and
construction.142 He also allegedly became the point man for the acquisition of nuclear
weapons and began to comb the world for off-the-shelf nuclear weapons and highly
enriched uranium and plutonium for use in the production of atomic bombs.143
According to Levi, terrorist groups acquire particular capabilities through
different approaches, learning from both within the group, and from outside avenues. 144
As a group turns to greater outside interaction (through universities or technical training
centers), there is a greater chance of acquiring the necessary skills to carry out a
successful plot, but also a greater risk of involving less-trusted individuals, and therefore
a greater chance of being caught. 145 In the case of the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda used both
high-ranking, loyal members, training them as pilots, as well as newer recruits, training
them at American flight schools, and also used another new recruit who already had
139
Ibid., 78.
140
Robert Winnet and David Leppard, “Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda’s British
Recruits,” The Sunday Times, July 10, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece
141
142
Ibid.
143
Ibid.
144
145
Ibid., 47.
37
training as a pilot.146 Also, three of the four 9/11 pilots were engineers by education or
trade, showing that they were well-educated with technical capabilities.147
The Dual-use Issue
The dual-use issue reflects concern that scientific advancement may be hindered
by individuals abusing science to cause harm. “The life sciences could become the death
sciences.”148 This statement reflects the conflict in science research and development.
Further laboratory work in anything from pathology and pharmacology to genetics can
offer a great potential to improve the quality of life and duration of life, eradicate disease,
and make it easier and less expensive to keep people healthier. However, if certain
knowledge or tools are misused, whether by accident or with intent do cause harm, a
deadly rash of destruction may result.
Concern over legitimate research being abused and used for terrorist purposes is
concern over dual use research.149 This is not a new issue, as the concern over how to
protect scientific research has been apparent since the inception of modern science. 150 In
1626, Sir Francis Bacon wrote, “And this we do also: we have consultations, which of the
inventions and experiences which we have discovered shall be published, and which not;
and take all an oath of secrecy, for the concealing of those which we think fit to keep
146
Ibid., 49.
147
148
Ronald Atlas and Margaret Somerville, “Life Sciences or Death Sciences: Tipping the Balance Towards
Life with Ethics, Codes, and Laws,” in A Web of Prevention, ed. Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish
149
150
38
secret; though some of those we do reveal sometime to the State, and some not.” This
shows that for hundreds of years, scientists have realized the need for responsibility to
prevent the abuse of scientific advancements for the purpose of doing harm.151
In 2005, the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues, a global network of
science academies, stated, “In recent decades, scientific research has created new and
unexpected knowledge and technologies that offer unprecedented opportunities to
improve human and animal health and environmental conditions. But some science and
technology can be used for destructive purposes, as well as for constructive purposes.
Scientists have a special responsibility when it comes to problems of ‘dual use’ and the
misuse of science and technology.”152
The National Institutes of Health established the National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) as a US initiative to encourage important research
objectives while monitoring national security concerns, and it aims to reach out to the
international community, encouraging other nations to adopt similar oversight
initiatives.153 In 2004, Malcolm Dando, from the University of Bradford, UK, and Brian
Rappert, from the Department of Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Exeter,
UK, came up with a question-and-answer, interactive seminar idea to promote
communication between scientists, to talk about dual-use issues without threatening the
research these scientists carried out.154 While these seminars began in the UK, by 2007,
there were similar seminars set up in six countries, with one seminar in Germany.155
151
Ibid.
152
Ibid., 19.
153
154
Brian Rappert, “Education for the Life Sciences: Choices and Challenges,” in A Web of Prevention, ed.
Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 59.
155
Ibid., 61.
39
According to Abigail Salyers, who served as president of the American Society of
Microbiology from 2001-2002, despite the fact that although bioterrorism is frightening,
scientific research should not be censored. She asserted that the free exchange of
information is important to the scientific community. For example, methodology
sections in publications could grant terrorists necessary information to formulate certain
materials, but deleting those sections would hurt other researchers looking to replicate
results.156
According to Rappert, Germany is one country that has addressed the need for
scientists to fully understand safety procedures related to research, that, when given to the
wrong individuals, can have potentially deadly results, and understand that certain
research carries with it a very challenging ethical dilemma.157
Multi-Criterion Decision Making
To examine the test case universities, those located in Germany, multicriteria
decision-making (MCDM) appeared to represent the best approach. MCDM is useful
because it allows subjects of interest to be evaluated and compared based on a set of
criteria.158 For each criterion, the subject is evaluated accordingly. The score, or
evaluation that the subject receives regarding each criterion, is tabulated in a decision
matrix or table that also shows that subject’s evaluation regarding the other criteria. For
example, in Figure 2.1, Options A, B, and C are evaluated based on Criteria X, Y, and Z.
156
Abigail Salyers, “Scientific Research and Publication Should Not Be Restricted,” in Fighting
Bioterrorism, ed. Lisa Young (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004), 112-113.
157
Brian Rappert, “Education for the Life Sciences: Choices and Challenges,” in A Web of Prevention, ed.
Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish (London: Earthscan, 2007), 53.
158
Information for Decision-Making for Sustainable Development for Caribbean Small
Island Developing States. “Multi-Criteria/Dimensions in Decision Making.”
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/idsd/methodologies/criteria.htm
40
A value is assigned to each option and the values are totaled at the right of the matrix. If
A, B, and C are universities, and they are being evaluated for prestige, student research
opportunities, and job placement, with a 9 being the best-possible total score, University
B would be the best overall university, with a total score of 7.

41
Figure 2.1: Multi-Criteria Decision Making Sample Matrix
Criteria
X Y Z
A 1 2 3 6
Options B 2 3 2 7
C 3 1 1 5
This would be a useful tool for evaluating universities, because MCDM allows
you to factor in multiple criterion, and terrorists are likely to consider a number of factors
when searching for a university. It is necessary to develop a set of criteria that terrorists
are likely to consider when searching for a university, and develop a methodology for
evaluating universities for those criteria.
In this instance, previous analyses completed using MCDM offered worthwhile
examples for how this analysis should be carried out. Kiker et al., examined the
possibilities and provided recommendations for applying techniques related to
multicriteria decision analysis to examine decision making in environmental projects. 159
They chose to examine MCDM as a decision-making tool in this case, because
environmental projects often deal with a variety of factors, some of which can not be
easily evaluated due to ethical and moral principles associated with environmental
concerns.
This is similar to concerns associated with evaluating universities in this study.
The purpose is not to flag certain universities as having high risk for attracting terrorists;
the purpose is to examine what factors associated with universities are likely to be most
attractive to terrorists. MCDM offers a medium through which one can evaluate
159
Gregory A. Kiker, et al., “Application of Multicriteria Decision Analysis in Environmnetal Decision
Making,” Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 1, no. 2 (2005),
http://www.allenpress.com/pdf/ieam-01-02_95_108.pdf.
42
universities to show the likelihood that terrorists will consider studying at those
universities to gain the knowledge to construct nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
Literature Conclusion
Based on the examined literature, there are gaps in the research offering
worthwhile studies. The research indicated that nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons are a real threat in the hands of rogue international terrorist groups, and
historical evidence indicates that groups are likely to try to use any of these weapons in
the future. Research also indicated that individuals with science and engineering
backgrounds could be highly desirable to terrorist groups interested in developing
weapons of mass destruction. Weapons of mass destruction require advanced
technological skill and equipment, and the most likely cause for failed chemical or
biological attacks in the past is inadequate preparation.
The research suggested that terrorist groups, in general, are likely to consider
manufacturing unconventional weapons, and to do so, they are likely to recruit members
with science and/or engineering skills. The purpose of this report is not to suggest that
Germany would likely be a top location for recruiting efforts. The purpose of this report
is to suggest that international terrorists are likely to consider obtaining university-level
training to develop weapons, and that it is possible to determine which universities are
most likely to attract terrorists.
Germany was selected as a test case for several reasons. It has a fairly deep pool
of educational institutions offering science and technology disciplines, a high
international student population, and continues to attract foreign students in growing

43
numbers to study in Germany.160 Also, Germany received attention when it was
discovered that some of the 9/11 hijackers attended German universities; therefore,
Germany is likely to be a good test case.
The first hypothesis for this study is that a multi-criteria decision making model
can be developed to examine universities and determine which universities will be most
likely to be attractive to international terrorists seeking a technical education to construct
weapons of mass destruction. The second hypothesis is that this methodology can be
applied to Germany, as a test case, to show that certain German universities are more
likely than others to be attractive to international terrorists seeking a technical education
to build weapons of mass destruction.
160
“Germany Attracts Foreign Students,” Young Germany, (November 21, 2006),
http://www.young-germany.de/university-education/university-education/article/e7ef5198b1/germany-
attracts-foreign-students.html.
44
CHAPTER III. PROCEDURES
This study incorporated a combination of qualitative and quantitative research
strategies. I relied on open-source information to both establish the need for this
research, and to examine universities for the Germany test case, but utilized multi-criteria
decision-making to analyze and compare the results.
The internet was the most useful source for information concerning German
universities, as the internet contains general information concerning the schools, as well
as some information concerning course schedules, curriculum, research projects, and
laboratories. The internet was also the primary source for information considering
international populations in Germany. Great care was taken to validate data and extract
information from trustworthy sources.
In this study, the role of the researcher was to collect data, organize information,
and draw conclusions based on the material available.
The first step to begin this study was to compile a list of universities for
evaluation. I selected Germany as a test case due to its academic opportunities, large
international student population, and associations with terrorist cells, as described in the
literature review. With its wide array of universities and deep scientific academia
offerings, combined with Germany’s historical evidence of terrorist activity, Germany is
likely to be a worthwhile model for a test case for this study.
To develop a list of schools to examine, I made several assumptions. The first
was that a potential international terrorist would be unlikely to seek out an education
from a very high-profile, world-renowned university. A high-profile university is more

45
likely to attract attention, especially from the media, and potential terrorists are likely to
want to stay under the radar. It also seems logical that a potential terrorist interested in
gaining the necessary skills to construct weapons of mass destruction, would select a
university based on the school’s academic offerings rather than prestige. Therefore, it is
more important for a school to have adequate academic opportunities than for a school to
be highly ranked or carry a great deal of clout in academia. Also, an international
terrorist would be unlikely to seriously pursue a high level university because attending
such an institution would require additional effort to get in. There would be a more
demanding application process, possibly with interviews and extra fees associated with
the applying. Also, an international terrorist with a specific educational goal would not
be concerned with bragging rights associated with getting accepted to or attending a
prestigious university. Furthermore, a more prestigious university is likely to cost more
to attend, and an international terrorist would likely want to avoid paying extra to obtain
an education.
I also made the assumption that an international terrorist would also be unlikely to
attend a very low-ranked school. First of all, a low-ranked school is likely to have a
rather small student population. It would be more difficult for an international, terrorist-
minded student to blend in with a small student population. Also, smaller schools tend to
focus more on education rather than on research, so professors are more likely to pay
closer attention to students. A terrorist-minded student would not want to stand out at a
smaller institution and would not want professors to suspect that he or she is up to
anything other than obtaining a legitimate education.

46
Furthermore, smaller schools are less likely to have advanced programs necessary
to provide certain skills necessary to construct weapons of mass destruction. For
example, Mercyhurst College lacks upper-level, specialized chemistry and physics
courses, while Germany’s Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz has an Institute of
Nuclear Chemistry and carries out specialized research with a nuclear research reactor. 161
It is unlikely that an international terrorist interested in constructing weapons of mass
destruction would consider such a university, simply because the advanced training is
unlikely to be available.
A middle-range school is still likely to offer a good education, opportunity for
advanced coursework, laboratories, and research. In addition, there is likely to be a
student body population that is diverse enough to allow international terrorist-minded
students to blend in, without attracting attention from professors or authorities.
The first step to find a suitable list of universities to examine was to find a list of
German universities. There are several ways to evaluate German universities. The
Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD), or German Academic Exchange
Service, in conjunction with the Centre for Higher Education Development (CHE)
releases detailed rankings of German Universities.
Research into the DAAD and CHE revealed that these institutions are likely to be
the most reputable and thorough system for ranking German institutions, so that data was
used to evaluate these universities. The German language version of this ranking is
published annually by “DIE ZEIT,” in a special edition version of the weekly news
magazine. The CHE/DIE ZEIT ranking boasts the most comprehensive ranking system,
161
“Physicists at Mainz University Generate Ultracold Neutrons at the TRIGA Reactor.”
Science Centric. (December 29, 2008), http://www.sciencecentric.com/news/article.php?q=08122908-
physicists-at-mainz-university-generate-ultracold-neutrons-at-the-triga-reactor.
47
collecting data from 290 German universities and surveys from more than 300,000
students and 31,000 professors.162
The purpose of publishing the ranking in the English language was to offer
international students an opportunity to gain a thorough understanding of German
university offerings.163 This is particularly useful for this study, because potential
international terrorists could be looking for a university in Germany to acquire skills to
aid in terrorist acts implementing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Any student
researching German schools using the internet is likely to come across this ranking, and
possibly pick a school based largely on the information provided in this ranking. So, it is
very applicable for the purposes of this study.
As a result of reading about the rankings and universities described on the DAAD
website, I learned that German higher education institutions can be described several
ways. Germany has 167 Fachhochschulen (FHs), which are universities of applied
sciences. These schools are designed to give a great deal of practical experience to
students, and have close ties to real, working world applications. With the help of
required internships, programs at these schools have the potential to better prepare
students for the working world, in fields such as technology, engineering, management,
and design. These programs seem to be similar to programs offered in the US at
technical schools or trade schools, where students learn skills for a particular job,
whereas students who attend universities earn a degree that can, in most cases, be applied
to a diverse variety of potential jobs. The degrees awarded at such schools are equivalent
162
German Academic Exchange Service. “What’s so special about the CHE / DIE ZEIT
university ranking?” http://www.daad.de/deutschland/hochschulen/hochschulranking/06544.en.html.
163
Ibid.
48
to Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees at traditional universities, but universities of applied
sciences do not award doctoral degrees, as traditional universities do.
For the purpose of this project, I used the following methodology to create a list
of schools. From the DAAD university ranking portal, German universities were selected
to be ranked according to subject. From there, I selected the broad field of Mechanical-,
Process-, and Chemical Engineering. This field appeared to represent a careful
consideration of schools with technological opportunities for engineering education.
Next, the Ranking Overview for studies at universities was selected. I selected
universities, as opposed to universities of applied sciences, because I made the
assumption that terrorist-minded students would be more likely to consider universities in
Germany. A terrorist would be more likely to select a university over a university of
applied sciences, because the terrorist’s goal is to learn as much as possible to use those
skills for destruction. There would not be much sense in attending a university of applied
science to learn skills to carry out a job, and possibly miss out on some of the
independent research opportunities available at a regular university.
From this 2007 DAAD list of universities, all of the schools that received a
middle group (improved, decline, or neither) rating for the “overall study situation”
category were considered. This yielded a list of 15 schools.
This same process was carried out for the Chemistry subject field for schools
falling under the University category, last updated in 2006. Chemistry was selected over
fields such as physics and biology, because chemistry seemed to be a good starting base,
as it often incorporates a variety of classes from physics and biology, as well as
chemistry. Most chemistry programs require students to take courses in physics,

49
mathematics, and biology. Those other science programs are likely to be near a similar
level as the chemistry programs.
From the DAAD evaluation, there were 31 Universities categorized as middle
group for the overall study situation. Some schools appeared twice on the combined list,
as they fell into the middle-tier category for both engineering and chemistry. Once I
eliminated the duplicates (those schools that made the middle tier list for both
engineering and chemistry), I had a list of 40 schools.
This left a list of 40 schools classified as middle-tier universities in Germany. I
screened each university’s website, and found that 39 had at least some English-
translation to help me overcome the language barrier. In most cases, I also found it
necessary to utilize Google translator to translate certain web pages to more fully
understand the workings of the universities. For the one school that had no English
translation available, I relied solely on the Google translate function to gather data.
I then evaluated each of these 40 universities with a more quantitative approach,
using multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) to determine whether or not they have any
indicators that would make them particularly attractive to terrorists seeking an education
to construct weapons of mass destruction.
I decided to evaluate each university based on its opportunities for 1) physics
education/research opportunities, 2) chemical education/research opportunities, 3)
biological education/research opportunities, and 4) engineering/mathematics
education/research opportunities. The assumption here is that some schools may offer
particular courses or laboratories in, for example, nuclear physics, that would be most
useful for a terrorist seeking skills to build a nuclear bomb. Therefore, some schools are
50
more likely to offer a very good physics education, with fewer opportunities for
biological classes and laboratories. Also, some schools are likely to have greater
opportunities for research in particular fields than other schools. If a particular program
has significant chemical education opportunities, and ample research possibilities, it is
likely that students with a high level of chemical understanding will have opportunities
for personal time in laboratories conducting research. If they have ulterior motives, those
students may take advantage of that time to experiment with chemicals and technologies
to see if they can develop a chemical weapon.
When evaluating course offerings at a university, I used a scale of 1-5 for each
category. Each university is assumed, initially, to be a 3. This score was lowered to a 2
or 1, or raised to a 4 or 5, if the university has significant shortfalls or opportunities that
make it less, or more likely, respectively, to give a terrorist an education to manipulate
science to cause harm. To develop a more systematic approach to evaluate universities, I
developed a set of indicators, shown in Tables 3.1-3.4, to help categorize schools in the
physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering/mathematics disciplines.

51
Table 3.1: Physics Curriculum Score Criteria

Score Criteria
1 No physics bachelor degree available; classes possible
2 Physics bachelor degree available
3 Physics master degree available
4 Bachelor/Master programs in atomic physics, or other specialized physics
course
5 Physics doctoral degree available, or nuclear engineering degree, or specialized
physics research, including work with hadron colliders
Table 3.2: Chemistry Curriculum Score Criteria

Score Criteria
1 No chemistry bachelor degree available; classes possible
2 Chemistry/biochemistry bachelor degree available
3 Chemistry/biochemistry master degree available
4 Materials science/nanotechnology master degree available, or
pharmacy/pharmacology programs
5 Chemistry/biochemistry doctoral degree available
Table 3.3: Biology Curriculum Score Criteria

Score Criteria
1 No biology bachelor degree available; classes possible
2 Biology or biotechnology bachelor degree available
3 Biology or biotechnology master degree available
4 Bioengineering or biomedical engineering master degree available, or medical
degree
5 Biology (or related field) doctoral degree available
Table 3.4: Engineering/Mathematics Curriculum Score Criteria

Score Criteria
1 No math/engineering bachelor degree; classes possible
2 Either math or engineering bachelor degree available
3 Either math or engineering master degree available
4 Both math and engineering master degrees available
5 PhD courses in math or engineering available
Once a school had a score for each category, the scores were totaled in the matrix.
Based on the curriculum scores, schools with higher scores (totals of 15-20) represent the
greatest likelihood that a terrorist would consider attending that institution to gain
scientific skills to build deadly weapons, schools with moderate scores (6-14) represent a
52
moderate likelihood that a terrorist would consider attending that institution to gain
scientific skills to build deadly weapons, while schools with lower scores (1-5) represent
the least likelihood that a terrorist would consider attending that institution to gain
scientific skills to build deadly weapons.
Finally, I needed to evaluate the university’s student population for international
students. Specifically, I needed to determine the international student population within
science, math, and engineering departments at each educational institution. If this data
had been readily available, the process would have been simplified. However, I had to
use the limited available data to calculate a representative value to reflect the
approximate international student populations within the science/eng./math disciplines at
each institution to allow for comparison between universities.
First, I made the assumption that an international terrorist would desire a school
where he or she was less likely to cause suspicion. The most logical approach to avoid
this would be to select a school where it is easier to blend in. It would be easiest for an
international student to achieve anonymity at an institution with a high international
student population, especially in the department where he or she would be studying. For
example, an international terrorist would be less likely to arouse suspicions in a nuclear
physics department if there are already a high number of international students.
Using the DAAD’s extensive website, I was able to gather some data concerning
the students enrolled in the science and engineering curriculums. The DAAD website
included information about most universities, including the number of students and
proportion of international students in specific departments. I recorded the total number
of students at the institution, as well as the percentages of the student populations that
53
were enrolled in the science and engineering disciplines. This data is recorded in
Appendix B. By multiplying the total student population by the percentages given, I was
able to determine the number of students, from each university, that were enrolled in
science or engineering-related courses, to get the Science/Eng./Math population. This
data is recorded in Table 4.2.
Next, I wanted to determine the number of international students within the
Science/Eng./Math population at each institution. The DAAD website gave data for
some programs available at each university. For each science/engineering-related
program for which data was available, I recorded the number of students enrolled, and the
percentage of international students. This data is also recorded in Appendix B. By
multiplying the number of students enrolled in a given program by the percentage of
international students, I was able to calculate the number of international students in a
given program. I repeated this for every science/engineering/mathematics program at a
given school, until I found the total number of international students from those
departments. I then found the total number of students from those departments. Finally,
I divided the number of international students enrolled in
science/engineering/mathematics programs by the total number of students in those
programs, and found an overall percentage of international students in the
science/engineering/mathematics division of each school.
Lastly, I multiplied the overall percentage of international students enrolled in
science, mathematics, and engineering disciplines, by the total number of students
enrolled in science, mathematics, and engineering disciplines to determine the number of
international students enrolled in these programs at each of the top 15 universities.

54
The final step to analyze the data was to assign a ranking to the top 15 universities
based on the quality of the available programs (from the course evaluation score) and the
level of presumed anonymity (using the number of international students enrolled in
science/engineering/mathematics programs). The school with the highest course
evaluation was ranked “1,” and the school with the next highest course evaluation was
ranked “2,” and the rest of the universities were numbered, in order, accordingly. Due to
the fact that some of the schools had equal course evaluation scores, those schools
received the same ordinal ranking. For instance, five schools received a total course
evaluation of 16, so they each were ranked 3 in the final matrix, as they tied for having
the third-highest course evaluation total. Then, the 15 schools were ranked according to
the number of international students enrolled in science/engineering/mathematics
programs, with the school with the highest number receiving a 1. The schools were
grouped according to the approximated international student population, as some had
similar numbers of students, and then schools in groups (where populations only differed
by about 150 students or fewer) all received the same value for the population ranking.
Finally, each of the top 15 schools received two values. Since a school’s program
quality was the initial determining factor that would make a school attractive to an
international terrorist, the program quality ranking was weighted twice as heavily as the
approximated international student ranking. The weighted values were averaged in the
matrix, yielding an Academic/Anonymity Coefficient, and the universities were re-
ranked according to this coefficient. The universities with lower Academic/Anonymity
Coefficients reflect universities with high quality academic programs combined with the
greatest opportunity for international students to achieve a level of presumed anonymity.

55
CHAPTER IV. RESULTS
The German universities were first evaluated based on available courses at the
institutions. Each institution was evaluated based on available physics, chemistry,
biology, and engineering/mathematics-related degrees. The criteria described in the
methodology was used to assign a score to each university for each subject, and then a
total score for available courses was obtained. This course total represents a broad
overview of the level for science/math/engineering offerings at the university. University
data was obtained from university websites, as shown in Appendix A. This information
was used to determine the course evaluations shown in Table 4.1.

56
Table 4.1: University Course Evaluations

Eng./Mat Course
University Physics Chemistry Biology h total
Leibniz University of Hannover 5 5 5 5 20
Munich Technical University 5 5 4 4 18
Rostock University 5 5 5 3 18
Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University 3 4 5 4 16
Bayreuth University 4 4 4 4 16
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg 3 4 4 5 16
University of Frankfurt 5 5 5 1 16
University of Siegen 5 5 1 5 16
Berlin Technical University 3 4 4 4 15
Dortmund Technical University 1 5 4 5 15
Ilmenau Technical University 3 4 4 4 15
Heinrich-Heine University 4 4 4 3 15
Karlsruhe University 3 5 4 3 15
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz 4 4 4 3 15
Ulm University 3 4 4 4 15
Braunschweig Technical University 3 4 3 4 14
Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel 3 3 4 4 14
University of Münster 3 4 4 3 14
Saarland University 3 4 4 3 14
University of Würzburg 3 4 4 3 14
RWTH Aachen University 2 4 4 3 13
Ruhr University Bochum 2 3 4 4 13
Bremen University 3 5 3 2 13
University of Hamburg 3 4 4 2 13
Konstanz University 3 4 3 3 13
University of Oldenburg 4 3 3 3 13
Chemnitz University of Technology 3 4 1 4 12
University of Freiburg 2 4 4 2 12
University of Potsdam 3 3 3 3 12
Stuttgard University 3 2 2 5 12
University of Wuppertal 3 3 2 4 12
Freie Universität Berlin 2 4 3 2 11
University of Duisburg-Essen (Duisburg campus) 3 3 1 4 11
University of Duisburg-Essen (Essen campus) 1 4 3 3 11
Paderborn University 3 3 1 4 11
University of Tübingen 1 4 4 1 10
Brandenburg University of Technology 3 1 1 4 9
Dresden Technical University 2 2 2 2 8
Bundeswehr Munich University 1 1 1 4 7
Hamburg University of Technology 1 1 1 3 6
57
Of the examined universities, there were fifteen schools with course evaluation
totals of 15-20, indicating that a terrorist considering attending an institution to gain
scientific skills to build deadly weapons is highly likely to consider attending one of
those fifteen schools, on the basis of academic offerings. Leibniz University of Hannover
had a total course evaluation of 20, the highest possible, indicating that Leibniz University of
Hannover had the greatest diversity and depth of high-level scientific degrees. Munich Technical
University and Oostock University had total course evaluations of 18. Ludwig-Maximilians
Universität Munich, Bayreuth University, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, University of
Frankfurt, and University of Siegen had total course evaluations of 16. Finally, Berlin Technical
University, Dortmund Technical University, Ilmenau Technical University, Heinrich-Heine
University, Karlsruhe University, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, and Ulm University had
total course evaluations of 15. The other 25 universities had total course evaluation scores of
between 6 and 14, so they all fell within the spectrum of a moderate likelihood that a terrorist
would consider attending that institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons,
and there were no universities with a low likelihood that a terrorist would consider
attending that institution to gain scientific skills to build deadly weapons.
These fifteen top universities were considered equivalent as far as academic
offerings in science/engineering/mathematics, and were re-ordered to determine
likelihood of an international terrorist selecting one on the basis of ability for
international students to blend in.
Table 4.2 shows, for each of the top 15 universities, the total
science/engineering/math populations, the science/engineering/math international student
populations, and the science/eng./math international student populations, arranged by the
percentage of international students enrolled in science/engineering/math disciplines.

58
Table 4.2: Top 15 University Statistics for Science/Engineering/Mathematics

Programs
Percentage (%) of Science/Eng./Math
Total International International
Science/Eng./Math Students in Student
University Student Population Science/Eng./Math Population
University of
Siegen 4,129 41.49 1,713
Dortmund 1,942
Technical
University 11,213 17.32
Munich Technical 2,740
Berlin Technical 2,193
Karlsruhe 2,089
Leibniz University 1,401
of Hannover 9,493 14.76
Ilmenau Technical 552
University of 1,002
Erlangen-Nürnberg 11,173 8.97
Heinrich-Heine 670
Ulm University 6,579 8.75 576
Ludwig-
Maximilians
Munich University 14,136 8.29 1,172
University of 849
Frankfurt 10,252 8.28
Rostock University 6,475 4.95 320.5
Johannes Gutenberg 481
University Mainz 10,618 4.53
Bayreuth University 3,328 2.29 76
This data shows that there is a discrepancy in international student populations
and that some universities set themselves apart because they offer environments that
enable international students to blend in more easily. According to these calculations, the
University of Siegen has a surprising science/engineering/mathematics population

59
demographics, as international students comprise 41.49% of those departments for which
data was available. Dortmund Technical University, Munich Technical University,
Berlin Technical University, Karlsruhe University, Leibniz University of Hannover, and
Ilmenau Technical University fall into the tier below, each having between 12% and 18%
of the science/engineering departments comprised of international students. University
of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Heinrich-Heine University, Ulm University, Ludwig-Maximilians
Munich University, and University of Frankfurt all have very similar international student
population percentages, with the science/engineering departments each having between
8-9% international students. Rostock University and Johannes Gutenberg University
Mainz had slightly lowered international student compositions, with international
students making up 4.95% and 4.53%, respectively, of the science/engineering students.
Bayreuth University had the lowest international representation amongst
science/engineering students, with international students comprising only 2.29% of the
science/engineering students.
Table 4.3 shows the top 15 universities, rank ordered by the number of
international students enrolled in science/eng./math.

60
Table 4.3: Number of International Students Enrolled in

Science/Engineering/Mathematics at Top Universities
Number of International Students
University Enrolled in Science/Eng./Math
Munich Technical University 2,740
Berlin Technical University 2,193
Karlsruhe University 2,089
Dortmund Technical University 1,942
University of Siegen 1,713
Leibniz University of Hannover 1,401
Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University 1,172
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg 1,002
University of Frankfurt 849
Heinrich-Heine University 670
Ulm University 576
Ilmenau Technical University 552
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz 481
Rostock University 320.5
Bayreuth University 76
Based on the available data, Munich Technical University had the greatest
number of international students enrolled in science/eng./math, followed by Berlin
Technical University and Karlsruhe University, all of which had over 2,000 international
students in those departments. Dortmund Technical University had the next highest
number of such students, with 1,942 international students, following by the University
of Siegen with 1,713 international students, Leibniz University of Hannover with 1,401
international students, Ludwig-Maximilians University of Munich with 1,172
international students, and the University of Erlangen- Nürnberg with 1,002 international
students. The remaining seven universities each had fewer than 1,000 international
students enrolled in science/eng./math disciplines.
Despite the fact that the science/eng./math departments at the University of
Siegen offered a much higher percentage of international students, the University of

61
Siegen is only ranked fifth based on the actual number of international students. For an
international terrorist attempting to blend in to a science/eng./math department at a
German university, the University of Siegen would likely be attractive. However,
statistically, since there are more international students at Munich Technical University,
Berlin Technical University, Karlsruhe, and Dortmund Technical University, there are
more likely to be international terrorists at those institutions which have larger pools of
international students.
For the final evaluation of universities, the top 15 schools were assigned ordinal
numbers to rank them according to program quality and the level of presumed anonymity
for international students. Each numerical ranking also reflects schools that have been
grouped according to program quality and presumed level of anonymity, so some schools
do share the same ranking. The program quality ranking was weighted twice to reflect its
greater importance in the overall ranking, and then these values were used to calculate the
Academic/Anonymity Coefficient. The universities are shown ranked, according to this
coefficient, in Table 4.4.

62
Table 4.4: Final University Ranking with Academic/Anonymity Coefficient

Program Level of Presumed Academic/Anonymity
University Quality Anonymity Coefficient
Leibniz University of Hannover 1 2 2
Munich Technical University 2 1 2.5
Berlin Technical University 4 2 5
University of Siegen 3 4 5
Karlsruhe University 4 3 5.5
Ludwig-Maximilians Munich 3 6 6
University
Dortmund Technical University 4 5 6.5
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg 3 7 6.5
Rostock University 2 9 6.5
University of Frankfurt 3 8 7
Heinrich-Heine University 4 9 8.5
Ulm University 4 9 8.5
Ilmenau Technical University 4 9 8.5
Bayreuth University 3 11 8.5
Johannes Gutenberg University 4 10 9
Mainz
It is reasonable to divide the universities, according to Academic/Anonymity
Coefficients, into three tiers. Two universities have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients
between 2 and 2.5, eight universities have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 5
and 7, and five universities have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 8.5 and 9.
Leibniz University of Hannover and Munich Technical University have
Academic/Anonymity Coefficients of 2 and 2.5, respectively, so they make up the first
tier of universities, and can be considered roughly equivalent in terms of program quality
and the level of presumed anonymity for international students. Therefore, they are
roughly equivalent in ability to be attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to
construct weapons of mass destruction. Berlin Technical University, University of
Siegen, Karlsruhe University, Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University, Dortmund
Technical University, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Rostock University, and

63
University of Frankfurt, have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 5 and 7, make
up the second tier of universities, and should be considered roughly equivalent in ability
to be attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass
destruction. However, this second tier of universities is likely to be slightly less attractive
than the first tier of universities to international terrorists seeking skills to construct
weapons of mass destruction. Finally, Heinrich-Heine University, Ulm University,
Ilmenau Technical University, Bayreuth University, and Johannes Gutenberg University
Mainz have Academic/Anonymity Coefficients between 8.5 and 9, make up the third tier
of universities, and should be considered roughly equivalent in ability to be attractive to
international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction.
Furthermore, this third tier of universities is likely to be slightly less attractive to
international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass destruction than the
first and second tier universities.

64
CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the study was to determine a method for examining colleges and
universities and designating which schools would have the greatest likelihood of
attracting international terrorists interested in acquiring the skills necessary to develop
unconventional weapons of mass destruction. German colleges and universities were
used as part of a test case to examine this methodology.
By applying the outlined steps to evaluate the universities, it was evident that a
natural narrowing occurred, and that certain universities are more likely than others to
theoretically be attractive to terrorists seeking skills in the hard sciences. Within the
German test-case, it was found that Leibniz University of Hannover and Munich
Technical University made up the first tier of universities, Berlin Technical University,
University of Siegen, Karlsruhe University, Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University,
Dortmund Technical University, University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Rostock University,
and University of Frankfurt made up the second tier of universities, and Heinrich-Heine
University, Ulm University, Ilmenau Technical University, Bayreuth University, and
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz made up the third tier of universities, grouped
according to Academic/Anonymity Coefficients. The universities in each tier can be
considered roughly equivalent in terms of program quality and the level of presumed
anonymity for international students, and are, therefore, roughly equivalent in ability to
be attractive to international terrorists seeking skills to construct weapons of mass
destruction.
The first hypothesis for this study was satisfied, because a multi-criteria decision
making model was developed to examine universities and determine which universities
65
will be most likely to attract international terrorists seeking a technical education to
construct weapons of mass destruction. The model followed logical assumptions, and
considered that an international student seeking skills to construct weapons of mass
destruction would be most interested in achieving a high quality education at an
institution with a significant international student population to allow a level of presumed
anonymity. The international student population did take all international students into
account, and did not differentiate between international students whose country of origin
may make them more or less likely to partake in terrorist activity. While it is difficult to
prove whether or not the quality of education and ease of anonymity are likely to be the
only factors international terrorists may consider when selecting a university, these
factors are very likely to be important. The quality of the education is important to an
international terrorist, because constructing weapons of mass destruction can require a
high degree of skill level that may not be obtained at every institution. Also, the ease
with which an international terrorist can blend in with the student population plays a
significant role in whether or not that individual’s activity arouses suspicion on campus,
and whether or not foul play or intentions are found out.
The second hypothesis was satisfied, as the methodology was applied to
Germany, as a test case, to show that certain German universities are more likely than
others to attract international terrorists seeking a technical education to build weapons of
mass destruction. There was a natural narrowing that occurred, and of the 40 original
universities, 15 made the top group of schools for consideration. Those 15 were analyzed
through a MCDM matrix, and grouped into three tiers of universities. While the
universities within each of the top tiers were considered roughly equivalent, this
66
methodology did prove that the list of original universities could be narrowed, producing
a more manageable, prioritized list of universities for law enforcement to focus on.
Implications for Intelligence Theory
There are possible implications of this study for intelligence theory. From a
national security standpoint, as well as a global security standpoint, data points to the fact
that terrorists are likely to consider unconventional weapons that are capable of mass
destruction. Individuals interested in such weapons must find some way to acquire the
necessary knowledge to construct and deploy them, and a logical means is through
attending a college or university. Members of the intelligence community should be
aware that this is a potential threat, and that certain universities are going to attract more
terrorists than others.
When applied to any set of universities, this methodology can be used to
determine which universities are most attractive to international terrorists interested in
skills to construct weapons of mass destruction. When they have the “watch list” of
potential universities for attracting such individuals, the details to determine the extent of
the threat are knowable to local police. Local law enforcement or university officials will
have the details needed to determine who, if anyone, has the greatest potential for being
an international terrorist.
While it may be more difficult to pinpoint universities that are more attractive to
“homegrown” terrorists, this study reveals that there is data available to narrow the list of
possible universities that may attract international terrorists. While this data should not
create alarm for the universities that are on the lists, this should be a wake-up call to
67
analysts that certain universities, as a result of educational offerings and demographics,
present a more attractive environment for opportunistic international terrorists with
aspirations of mass destruction.
Certain universities may opt for implementing a more rigorous background-check
process to screen university applicants as an attempt to discourage students with
potentially dangerous histories or associations. In addition, care must be taken to not
offend a potential student based on nationality. If a university becomes more aware of its
potential attraction for international terrorists, this will help influence professors,
researchers, and university employees, especially from certain departments, such as
laboratory areas, to be especially aware of any suspicious activity and be alert to report to
authorities. If a threat goes unreported because it is not taken seriously, the threat could
escalate and develop into something more dangerous.
It is very important to note that the nature of this profiling also carries dangers.
The odds are still very much against any one individual being a terrorist. Country of
origin does not automatically designate a person as a terrorist, and a great deal of care
must be taken to consider all factors before labeling an individual as a terrorist. This
issue is an important reminder in the wake of the backlash associated with the Virginia
Fusion Center’s 2009 assessment of the terrorist threat in Virginia. The document, issued
by the Virginia Fusion Center, indicated that there is a “significant” potential for Virginia
to be targeted by terrorists due to “the presence of extremists, evidence of trends linked to
terrorism, and the abundance of potential targets.”164 The document received a great deal
of criticism, particularly as a result of implying racism within the document, as well as
164
Virginia Fusion Center, 2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment, (March 2009),
http://www.infowars.com/media/vafusioncenterterrorassessment.pdf .
68
referring to Virginia colleges and universities as “nodes for radicalization.” 165 The report
identified a number of colleges and universities as having historical links or associations
with certain organizations, such as anarchist extremists, therefore setting those
universities apart as being dangerous places. This specific designation of certain
universities as dangerous places proved to be in poor taste, aiding to the criticism
associated with the Virginia Fusion Center’s report.
Finally, while the methodology does produce a narrowed search field to scout for
the most likely international terrorists, international terrorists could still be located
outside of that narrowed field. Therefore, it is important to be aware that international
terrorists could actually be at universities where you would be less likely to expect them.
It is still vital that law enforcement and national security officers keep an open mind and
a willingness to consider that international terrorists could come from diverse locations,
and it is important to not miss clues that may signal international terrorists’ whereabouts.
Thoughts for Future Studies
There are some opportunities for further research and study related to the work
found in this study. Despite the fact that this test case involves Germany, the same
approach and methodology could theoretically be applied to any country or group of
universities.
First, determine the middle tier of universities, using whatever methodology is
available (in this test case, Germany had its own ranking system through the DAAD),
then examine the available courses and research available to give each school a
165
Anthony L. Kimery, “Virginia Fusion Center Report Draws Misdirected Fire, Backers
Say,” (April 9, 2009), http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/8013/149/.
69
curriculum score using the methodology from this study. Then, determine the percentage
of international students in science/engineering/mathematics and the number of
international students in science/engineering/mathematics. A higher percentage of
international students produces an environment more conducive to allowing potential
international terrorists to blend in, and a higher number of international students provides
a greater probability that international terrorists could be in the student population. I
think it would be extremely useful, from a national security standpoint, to examine
universities in Saudi Arabia, as four of the 9/11 hijackers attended Saudi Arabian
universities.166
It would also be useful to examine cities, colleges, and universities for historical
evidence of international terrorist activity. However, that would present a more anecdotal
approach, and, for the purposes of this study, and to allow the application of this
methodology to other geographic regions, it seemed more reasonable to use a quantitative
element to score and rate universities.
It may also be useful to consider the international population of the city where a
university is located. Certain cities may be more likely to attract international students
from particular countries if those cities have an established history of harboring certain
ethnicities or international communities. Also, a large city with a high international
population offers greater opportunity for any international person to blend in, but for a
student, the university environment is likely to be the most important factor for enabling
anonymity, so it is likely to be more important to have a high international population on
campus, and less important that the city has a high international population.
166
19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, The, http://the19kids.blogspot.com/.
70
Since the number of international students enrolled in science/engineering classes
takes all international students into consideration, it does not fully account for the
international students most likely to act as terrorists. The number of international
students includes all international students, as data could not be obtained to differentiate
between other European students, and international students from more geographically
remote areas. Under the assumption that an international student is most likely to carry
out terrorist activities as a result of his or her upbringing, environment, ancestry, or
familial ties associated with his or her native land, an international student’s likelihood of
terrorist involvement is directly linked to country of origin. To determine how likely
international populations are to produce terrorists, it is important to determine where
those populations are from.
One method to do this is to start with a published list of countries that are
categorized as states that sponsor terrorism. The US Department of State publishes a list
of countries that meet this profile. According to the State Department website, the
Secretary of State designates countries as state sponsors of terrorism if they have
“repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” 167 Currently, the
website designates Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of terrorism.168
Data could not be found to reflect where immigrants from Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and
Syria reside in Germany. Such data would be ideal to pinpoint the locations most
susceptible to international terrorism due to concentrations of immigrants from state
sponsors of terrorism.
167
US Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,”
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm.
168
Ibid.
71
Data was obtained from the Migration Policy Institute’s Data Hub to determine
the countries of origin of the foreign population in Germany. The data shown in
Appendix C reflects 2007 data.169 Data was obtained that reflected the populations of
Iranians and Syrians residing in Germany, but no data was available for Cubans or
Sudanese residing in Germany. According to the available data for 2007, 56,178
immigrants from Iran live in Germany, and 28,161 immigrants from Syria live in
Germany. The data also reveals that in 2007, there were 6,744,879 people comprising
the foreign population in Germany from all countries. Therefore, those 84,339
individuals whose country of origin is considered a US State Department state sponsor of
terrorism, with the known data available, comprise 1.2504% of the total foreign
population residing in Germany.
169
Migration Policy Institute, “Country and Comparative Data,”
http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub/countrydata/data.cfm .
72
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Atlas, Ronald and Margaret Somerville. “Life Sciences or Death Sciences: Tipping the
Balance Towards Life with Ethics, Codes, and Laws.” In A Web of Prevention,
edited by Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish, 15-31. London: Earthscan, 2007.
Baker, Michelle, and Margaret E. Kosal. “Osmium Tetroxide – a New Chemical

Terrorism Weapon?” Journal Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (April
13, 2004), http://cns.miis.edu/stories/040413.htm.
Balmer, Brian. “How Does Secrecy Work? Keeping and Disclosing Secrets in the
History of the UK Biological Warfare Programme.” In A Web of Prevention,
edited by Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish, 173-185. London: Earthscan,
2007.
“Biological Warfare.” CBC News Online, (February 18, 2004),

http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/bioweapons/.
Bohn, Kevin. “Police: Man in critical condition after exposure to ricin.” CNN, (February
29, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/02/29/ricin.hotel/index.html.
Boston, William. “Germany’s Islamic Terrorists: Echoes of Baader-Meinhoff.” Time,

(December 16, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1866785,00.html.
Brinkhoff, Thomas. “Cities and Agglomerations of Germany.” City Population.

http://www.citypopulation.de/Deutschland.html (accessed April 24, 2009).
Broad, William J., Stephen Engelberg, and James Glanz. “A Nation Challenged: The
Threats; Assessing Risks, Chemical, Biological, Even Nuclear.” The New York
Times. (November 1, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/01/us/a-nation-
challenged-the-threats-assessing-risks-chemical-biological-even-nuclear.html?
n=Top/News/Health/Diseases,%20Conditions,%20and%20Health
%20Topics/Smallpox&pagewanted=all, (accessed May 8, 2009).
Brodsky, Benjamin H. “Industrial Chemicals as Weapons: Chlorine.” James Martin

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (July 31, 2007),
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_89.html.
Brown, Stephen. “The German Train Terror Plot.” Assyrian International News Agency.
(August 23, 2006), http://www.aina.org/news/20060823102444.htm.
Carafano, James Jay and Mark A. Sauter. Homeland Security. New York: McGraw-Hill,
2005.
73
Caravelli, Jack. Nuclear Insecurity. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security

International, 2008.
Chappell, Carisa. “Colleges Especially Vulnerable to Crime, Terrorism.” Community

College Times. (August 16, 2007).
http://www.communitycollegetimes.com/article.cfm?TopicId=18&ArticleId=453.
Chase, Alston. “Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber.” The Atlantic Online, (June
2000), http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/06/chase.htm.
“Chemical Weapons Technology.” Federation of American Scientists.

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec04.pdf.
Cohen, Ariel. “Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia.”
The Heritage Foundation. (May 30, 2003),
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm.
Cowell, Alan. “Germans Rebuff US on Plans for Nuclear Research Reactor.” The New
York Times. (July 22, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/22/world/germans-
rebuff-us-on-plans-for-nuclear-research-reactor.html.
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons
Use: Placing the Threat in Context.” (March 28, 2003),
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31831.pdf.
Deutsche Welle Staff. “Spanish Businessman Killed by Suspected ETA Terrorists.” DW-
WORLD, (December 4, 2008),
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,3848046,00.html.
Dhimmi Watch. http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/003006.php.
“Dissidence and Terrorist Activity in Germany.” German Culture,

http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/facts/bl_dissidence_terrorism.htm
(accessed March 27, 2009).
“Düsseldorf Strassenbahn and Stadtbahn, Germany.” http://www.railway-

technology.com/projects/dusseldorftramway/, (accessed April 20, 2009).
Fuerth, Leon. “Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges
for US Policy.” In War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, edited by Robert
B. Satloff, 125-130. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
2002.
“Formation Process of the 25 State EU, The.”

74
http://www.ine.es/en/prodyser/pubweb/espue25/espue25_proc_en.pdf (accessed
March 28, 2009).
Francis, Sam. “Mass Immigration Creates Terrorist Haven in Europe.” (October 18,
2001), http://www.vdare.com/francis/terrorist_haven.htm, (accessed January 26,
2009).
Frankfurt, Jennie Brookman. “Terrorist hunt hits campuses.” Times Higher Education.
(October 5, 2001), http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?
storyCode=165151&sectioncode=26.
Gambetta, Diego, and Steffen Hertog. “Engineers of Jihad.” Oxford: Department of

Sociology, University of Oxford, 2007.
Gathmann, Florian. “The Rumble in Rostock.” Spiegel Online. (June 3, 2007),

http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,486330,00.html.
Gebauer, Matthias, and Yassin Musharbash. “Islamist Terrorists Planned Massive

Attacks in Germany.” Spiegel Online International, (September 5, 2007),
Gerges, Fawaz A. Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy. Orlando: Harcourt,
Inc., 2006.
German Academic Exchange Service. “What’s so special about the CHE / DIE ZEIT
university ranking?”
http://www.daad.de/deutschland/hochschulen/hochschulranking/06544.en.html
(accessed January 25, 2009).
“Germany Attracts Foreign Students.” Young Germany. (November 21, 2006).

http://www.young-germany.de/university-education/university-
education/article/e7ef5198b1/germany-attracts-foreign-students.html. (accessed
May 9, 2009).
“Germany - The Student Movement and Terrorism.” (August 1995),

http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-4890.html.
Gillespie, Thomas W., John A. Agnew, Erika Mariano, Scott Mossler, Nolan Jones, Matt
Braughton, and Jorge Gonzalez. “Finding Osama bin Laden: An Application of
Biogeographic Theories and Satellite Imagery.” MIT International Review,
(February 17, 2009), http://web.mit.edu/mitir/2009/online/finding-bin-laden.pdf.
Graduate School of Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. “Academic Ranking of

World Universities.” http://www.arwu.org/. (accessed 20 January 2009).
Griffith, Victoria, Peter Spiegel, and Hugh Williamson. “How the hijackers went
75
unnoticed.” Financial Times. (November 29, 2001),

http://specials.ft.com/attackonterrorism/FT3LAJ6UMUC.html.
Habeck, Mary. Knowing the Enemy. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2006.
Henning, Dietmar. “Germany: Arab students witch-hunted.” World Socialist Web Site.
(October 6, 2001), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/oct2001/germ-o06.shtml.
Hergersberg, Peter, and Thomas Rode. “The Race for the First Reactor.” (accessed April
20, 2009),
http://www.mpg.de/english/illustrationsDocumentation/multimedia/mpResearch/2
009/heft01/016/pdf18.pdf.
“HEU-offer for Research Reactor in Garching?” WISE News Communique. (October 13,
1995), http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?
http://www10.antenna.nl/wise/441/4353.html.
Hudson, Rex A. “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist
and Why?” The Library of Congress. (September 1999).
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf.
“Hundreds of Potential Terrorists Live in Germany, Official Says.” Liberty & Security.
(December 16, 2008), http://www.libertysecurity.org/article2345.html.
Information for Decision-Making for Sustainable Development for Caribbean Small

Island Developing States. “Multi-Criteria/Dimensions in Decision Making.”
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/idsd/methodologies/criteria.htm
“Introduction to Biological Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists,

http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/bio/resource/introtobw.html (accessed March
22, 2009).
Jenkins, Brian Michael. Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,
2008.
Joyner, James. “German Terrorist Plot Foiled.” Outside the Beltway, (September 5,
2007), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/german_terrorist_plot_foiled/.
Kaiser, Simone. “How the CIA Helped Germany Foil Terror Plot.” Spiegel Online.
(September 10, 2007),
Karmon, Ely. “German and Palestinian Terrorist Organizations: Strange Bedfellows – An

76
examination of the coalitions along terrorist organizations.” Originally published

in German in Politische Studeien, no. 368 (November/December 1999),
http://212.150.54.123/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=120.
Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.
Kiker, Gregory A., Todd S. Bridges, Arun Vargese, Thomas P. Seager, and Igor Linkov.
“Application of Multicriteria Decision Analysis in Environmnetal Decision
Making.” Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 1, no. 2 (2005),
http://www.allenpress.com/pdf/ieam-01-02_95_108.pdf.
Kimery, Anthony L. “Virginia Fusion Center Report Draws Misdirected Fire, Backers
Say.” (April 9, 2009). http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/8013/149/.
Kreuger, Alan. What Makes a Terrorist. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2007.
Kuptsch, Christiane. “Foreign Students in Europe: Between Red Carpet and Red Card.”
(September 18, 2003). http://74.125.47.132/search?
q=cache:0ItpDbtw8G0J:www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/kuptsc
h.pdf+foreign+students+in+europe&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. (accessed
May 9, 2009).
Lake, Eli. “Al Qaeda bungles arms experiment.” The Washington Times, (January 19,
2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/19/al-qaeda-bungles-
arms-experiment/.
Lambroschini, Sophie. “Germany: Court Appeal By Hizb Ut-Tahrir Highlights Balancing

Act Between Actions, Intentions.” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. (October
26, 2004), http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055527.html.
Landler, Mark. “German Police Arrest 3 in Terrorist Plot.” The New York Times.
(September 6, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/06/world/europe/06germany.html?
_r=1&pagewanted=print.
Landler, Mark. “Threats and Responses: Security; Bomb Plot Shocks Germans Into
Antiterrorism Debate.” The New York Times. (August 22, 2006),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9E0CE2D9123EF931A1575BC0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=
all.
Leiken, Robert S. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs (2005): 120-135.
Levi, Michael. On Nuclear Terrorism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University

77
Press, 2007.
Levitin, Michael. “Suspected terrorists arrested on KLM plane in Germany.” Telegraph

Online, (September 26, 2008),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/3087750/Suspected
-terrorists-arrested-on-KLM-plane-in-Germany.html.
Lugar, Lugar. The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses,

lugar.senate.gov (accessed March 11, 2009).
Mamoun Fandy. “Middle East Terrorists with ‘Global Reach’: From Hizballah to
Egyptian Islamic Jihad.” In War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, edited by
Robert B. Satloff. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
2002.
Maytree Foundation. “City/Country Profiles for Germany.” Cities of Migration.

http://citiesofmigration.ca/tag/germany/#Page_3 (accessed April 23, 2009).
McLeish, Caitriona, ed., and Brian Rappert, ed. A Web of Prevention. London:
Earthscan, 2007.
Meining, Stefan, and Ahmet Senyurt. “The Case of the Bavarian Taliban.”
http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/the-case-of-the-bavarian-
taliban (November 11, 2008).
Migration Policy Institute. “Country and Comparative Data.”

http://www.migrationinformation.org/DataHub/countrydata/data.cfm (accessed
April 23, 2009).
Miller, Judith. “Weapons of Mass Destruction in and from the Middle East: Challenges
for US Policy.” In War on Terror The Middle East Dimension, edited by Robert
B. Satloff. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002.
“Multiculturalism ‘Drives Young Muslims to Shun British Values,’” Daily Mail, January
29, 2007.
Musharbash, Yassin, and Marcel Rosenbach. “Germany Prepares for Homegrown Terror
Trial.” Spiegel Online. (April 16, 2009),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-619381,00.html.
Office of the Secretary of State. “Background Information on Terrorist Groups.”

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_92/backg.html (accessed March 27, 2009).
Phares, Walid. Future Jihad Terrorist Strategies Against America. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005.
78
“Physicists at Mainz University Generate Ultracold Neutrons at the TRIGA Reactor.”

Science Centric. (December 29, 2008),
http://www.sciencecentric.com/news/article.php?q=08122908-physicists-at-
mainz-university-generate-ultracold-neutrons-at-the-triga-reactor.
“Protests and discussion event on 30 August 2008 in Siegen (Germany).” Mideast

Freedom Forum Berlin. (accessed April 20, 2009),
http://www.mideastfreedomforum.org/node/78.
Rappert, Brian. “Education for the Life Sciences: Choices and Challenges.” In A Web of
Prevention, edited by Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish, 51-63. London:
Earthscan, 2007.
Rees, Martin. “Dark Materials.” Guardian, June 10, 2006,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/jun/10/science.comment.
Robertson, Ann. Terrorism and Global Security. New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007.
Robertson, Susan. “Europe Challenges US for Foreign Students by Adding More English
Courses.” Global Higher Ed.
http://globalhighered.wordpress.com/2007/09/27/europe-challenges-us-for-
foreign-students-by-adding-more-english-courses/. (accessed May 9, 2009).
“Roodeplaat Research Laboratories.” United Nations Institute for Disarmament

Research. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1847.pdf (accessed March 28,
2008).
Salama, Sammy. “Special Report: Manual for Producing Chemical Weapon to Be Used
in New York Subway Plot Available on Al Qaeda Websites Since Late 2005.”
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (July 20, 2006),
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/salama_060720.htm.
Satloff, Robert B., ed. War on Terror The Middle East Dimension. Washington: The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002.
Salyers, Abigail. “Scientific Research and Publication Should Not Be Restricted.” In

Fighting Bioterrorism, edited by Lisa Yount, 112-113. San Diego: Greenhaven
Press, 2004.
Schwabe, Alexander. “Friendly, Unremarkable and Pious.” Spiegel Online. (August 21,
2006), http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,druck-432746,00.html.
“Search for Suspects Continues After Averted Terror Attacks.” DW-WORLD, (September
5, 2007), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,2765971,00.html.
Stark, Holger. “Suspect in German Bomb Plot Tells His Story.” Spiegel Online.
79
(November 15, 2007)

Steinberg, Guido. “The Threat of Jihadist Terrorism in Germany.” Real Institute Elcano.
(June 11, 2008)
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?
WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI142-2008.

http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_student_movement_terroris
m.htm.
“Ted Kaczynski – The Education of a Genius.”

http://law.jrank.org/pages/12223/Kaczynski-Ted-education-genius.html (accessed
March 27, 2009).
Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York:
HarperCollins, 2007.
“Terrorists threaten to attack Germany.” Middle East Times, (January 28, 2009),
http://www.metimes.com/Security/2009/01/28/terrorists_threaten_to_attack_germ
any/747b/.
“Terrorists Used Germany as Base.” NewsMax.com Wires, (October 24, 2001),

http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/10/23/153926.shtml.
“Thousands Attend Opening of New Mosque in Germany.” DW-WORLD. (October 26,

2008). http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3741549,00.html.
“Three Islamist Terror Suspects Arrested in Germany.” Spiegel Online. (September 5,

2007), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,503959,00.html.
Tucker, Jonathan B. “Bioweapons from Russia: Stemming the Flow.” Issues in Science
and Technology, (2007), http://www.issues.org/15.3/p_tucker.htm.
US Department of State. “Background Information on Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2801.htm (accessed March 27, 2009).
US Department of State. “State Sponsors of Terrorism.”

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm (accessed April 22, 2009).
Vidino, Lorenzo. “The Muslim Brotherhoods’ Conquest of Europe.” The Middle East
Quarterly, Winter 2005, vol. XXII, n. 1,
http://www.meforum.org/687/the-muslim-brotherhoods-conquest-of-europe
Vermaat, Emerson. “Hizb ut-Tahrir - A Dangerous Terrorist Organization - On The Rise

80
In Europe.” Pipe Line News. (February 19, 2008).

http://www.pipelinenews.org/2008/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-A-Dangerous-Terrorist-
Organization-On.html.
Virginia Fusion Center. 2009 Virginia Terrorism Threat Assessment. (March 2009).
http://www.infowars.com/media/vafusioncenterterrorassessment.pdf (accessed
May 18, 2009).
Wheelis, Mark, ed., Lajos Rozsa, ed., and Malcolm Dando, ed. Deadly Cultures.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Whiteman, Dominic. “Ban Tablighi Jamaat?” Westminster Journal. (September 15,

2008) http://westminsterjournal.com/content/view/199/30/.
“Who were the Baader-Meinhof gang?” BBC News. (February 12, 2007)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6314559.stm.
Williams, Paul L. The Day of Islam: The Annihilation of America and the Western World.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007.
Winnet, Robert, and David Leppard. “Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda’s British
Recruits.” The Sunday Times, July 10, 2005,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece (accessed March 20
2009).
Young, Mitchell, ed. The War on Terrorism. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2003.
Yount, Lisa, ed. Fighting Bioterrorism. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2004.
Zilinskas, Raymond , Jonathan B. Tucker, and Burke Zimmerman. “Previous Incidents

Involving the Use/Possession of Ricin.”
http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/080229_ricin.pdf (accessed March 27, 2009).
“3 Arrested for Planning Attacks on Frankfurt Airport, US Base.” KATU.com. (accessed

April 20, 2009), http://www.katu.com/internal?
st=print&id=9581802&path=/news/national.
19 Kids of 9/11 Blog, The. http://the19kids.blogspot.com/.

81
82
APPENDICES:
83
Appendix A:
Aachen University
Website: http://www.rwth-aachen.de/go/id/bdz/
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, materials science
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology, biotechnology/molecular biotechnology; Master’s in
biomedical engineering, biotechnology
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, electrical engineering, mechanical
engineering, materials engineering; Master’s in materials engineering
Bayreuth University
Website: http://www.uni-bayreuth.de/
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics, technical physics, biophysics; Master’s in physics,
biological physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in biochemistry, chemistry, polymer and colloid chemistry;
Master’s in biochemistry and molecular biology, materials chemistry and catalysis,
natural and chemical substance, polymer science, energy science and technology,
materials science and engineering
Biology: Bachelor’s in bioinformatics, biology, biophysics; Master’s in bioinformatics,
biodiversity and ecology, biological physics, biotechnology and process engineering,
molecular ecology
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, technomathematics; Master’s in
Automotive Engineering Components and Mechatronics, engineering computer science
Berlin Technical University:

Website: http://www.tu-berlin.de/menue/home/parameter/en/
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics; Master’s in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, materials science; Master’s in chemistry, polymer
science, materials science
Biology: Bachelor’s in biotechnology; Master’s in biomedical engineering
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, electrical engineering, mechanical
engineering, technological mathematics; Master’s in mechanical engineering
Brandenburg University of Technology

Website: http://www.tu-cottbus.de/btu/en.html
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics, Master’s in physics
Chemistry: N/A
Biology: Bachelor’s in Biogenic raw materials technologies, Master’s in Biomedical
equipment, energy from biomass and waste
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, electrical engineering, Master’s in
applied mathematics, power engineering, mechanical engineering, process engineering
and plant design
84
Braunschweig Technical University

Website: http://www.tu-braunschweig.de/
Physics: Bachelor’s and Master’s in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, materials science, pharmacy; Master’s in chemistry;
PhD in chemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology, biotechnology, bioengineering; Master’s in biology,
biotechnology, bioengineering
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in electrical engineering, mechanical engineering,
mechatronics, mathematics; Master’s in electrical engineering, mathematics,
mechatronics
Bremen University
Website: http://www.uni-bremen.de/index_en.html
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics; Master’s in physics, environmental physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry; Master’s in biochemistry; Graduate work in
chemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology; Master’s in molecular biology, medical
biometry/biostatistics, neurosciences
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, mechanical engineering,
technomathematics
Bundeswehr Munich University

Website: http://www.unibw-muenchen.de/startseite/index-en.html
Physics: N/A
Chemistry: N/A
Biology: N/A
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s and Master’s in electrical engineering and
information technology, aerospace engineering, mathematical engineering, mechanical
engineering
Chemnitz University of Technology

Website: http://www.tu-chemnitz.de/en/
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry; Master’s in chemistry, micro and nanosystems
Biology: N/A
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, mechanical engineering,
microtechnology, electrical engineering; Master’s in unique mechanical engineering and
computer science-related fields
Christian-Albrechts University of Kiel

Website: http://www.uni-kiel.de/index-e.shtml
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in biochemistry, chemistry, materials science;
Research funding priorities include research in nanoscience/surface research
Biology: Bachelor’s and Master’s in biology; Graduate work in medicine, dentistry
85
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s and Master’s in electrical and information

engineering, mathematics
Dortmund Technical University

Website: http://www.tu-dortmund.de/uni/International/index.html
Physics: N/A
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, chemical biology; Master’s in chemistry, chemical
biology; PhD in chemistry, chemical biology
Biology: Bachelor’s in bioengineering; Master’s in bioengineering; PhD in biology,
bioengineering; specializes in chemical biology and biotechnology research
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in chemical engineering, electrical engineering;
Master’s in chemical engineering, electrical engineering; PhD in chemical engineering,
electrical engineering
Dresden Technical University

Website: http://tu-dresden.de/index_html/newsboard_view?cl=en
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, Diplomas in materials science; specialized research
in materials science, biomaterials and nanotechnology
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology, molecular biotechnology; specialized research in
regenerative medicine and molecular bioengineering
Mathematics/Engineering: Diplomas in chemical engineering, electrical engineering,
mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics
University of Duisburg-Essen (Duisburg campus)

Website: http://www.uni-duisburg-essen.de/en/index.php
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in metallurgy and metal forming, nano engineering
Biology: N/A
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s and Master’s in Electrical and electronic
engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, techno mathematics
University of Duisburg-Essen (Essen campus)

Website: http://www.uni-duisburg-essen.de/en/index.php
Physics: N/A
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in chemistry, Master’s in pharmaceutical medicine;
specialized research in Fundamentals and Applications of Nanotechnologies
Biology: Bachelor’s and Master’s in medical biology; Graduate work in medicine,
specialized research in Genetical Medicine and Medical Biology
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s and Master’s in mathematics
86
University of Erlangen-Nürnberg
Website: http://www.uni-erlangen.org/
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics; Center for medical physics and technology
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemical and bioengineering, chemistry; Master’s in advanced
materials and processes, chemical and bioengineering, materials science and engineering,
molecular medicine
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology, molecular medicine; Master’s in biology; Graduate work
in dentistry, medicine
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in electrical engineering, life science engineering,
materials science and engineering, mathematics, mechanical engineering, mechatronics;
Master’s in advanced optical technologies, electrical engineering, life science
engineering, mechanical engineering, mechatronics; PhD in engineering
University of Frankfurt
Website: http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/english/index.html
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in chemistry; graduate work in pharmacy
Biology: Graduate work in medicine
Mathematics/Engineering: N/A
University of Freiburg
Website: http://www.uni-freiburg.de/index_en.php
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics; Specialized research with Hadron colliders
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, Microtechnology; Master’s in Crystalline Materials,
Microtechnology
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology; Master’s in bioinformatics and systems biology;
Graduate work in medicine
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics
Freie Universität Berlin

Website: http://www.fu-berlin.de/en/index.html
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in biochemistry, chemistry, pharmacy
Biology: Bachelor’s in bioinformatics, Institute of Biology
University of Hamburg
Website: http://www.uni-hamburg.de/index_e.html
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, nano science and technology; Graduate work in
pharmacy
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology, molecular life sciences; master’s in biology; graduate
work in medicine, dentistry
87
Hamburg University of Technology

Website: http://www.tu-harburg.de/index_e.html
Physics: N/A
Chemistry: N/A
Biology: N/A
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in general engineering science, bioprocess
engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, mechatronics, process
(chemical engineering), some PhD research available
Heinrich-Heine University
Website: http://www.uni-duesseldorf.de/
Physics: Bachelor’s and Master’s in medical physics, physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in chemistry, biochemistry, chemical industry;
Graduate work in pharmacy
Biology: Bachelor’s and Master’s in biology; graduate work in medicine; specialized
research in biotechnology
Ilmenau Technical University

Website: http://www.tu-ilmenau.de/uni/1+M54099f70862.0.html
Physics: Bachelor’s and Master’s in technical physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in materials science, micro- and nanotechnologies
Biology: Bachelor’s and Master’s in biomedical engineering
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s and Master’s in electrical power and control
engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics, optronics; specialized
research in nanoengineering, precision engineering and precision metrology
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
Website: http://www.uni-mainz.de/eng/
Physics: Specialized research with the Max Planck Institute for polymer research
Chemistry: Diplomas available in chemistry, biomedical chemistry; Graduate work in
pharmacology
Biology: Bachelor’s in molecular biology; Master’s in biomedicine; Graduate work in
pharmacology
Karlsruhe University
Website: http://www.uni-karlsruhe.de/index_en.php
Chemistry: Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD in chemistry
Biology: Master’s in bioengineering
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in electrical engineering, mathematics, mechanical
engineering; Master’s in electrical engineering
88
Konstanz University
Website: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/index.php?lang=en
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in chemistry, molecular materials science
Biology: Bachelor’s and Master’s in biological sciences
Leibniz University of Hannover

Website: http://www.uni-hannover.de/en/index.php
Physics: Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in biochemistry, chemistry; Master’s in biochemistry, chemistry,
materials chemistry and nanochemistry, medicinal and natural product chemistry,
nanotechnology; PhD in chemistry, materials chemistry and nanochemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology; Master’s in biology; PhD in biology
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mechanical engineering, mathematics,
mechatronics; Master’s in mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics, optical
technologies; PhD in mechanical engineering, mathematics, mechatronics, optical
technologies
Ludwig-Maximilians Munich University

Website: http://www.en.uni-muenchen.de/index.html
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, biochemistry, pharmaceutical sciences, Master’s in
advanced materials science (English course), biochemistry(English course), chemistry,
pharmaceutical sciences, Graduate work in Pharmacy
Biology: Bachelor’s in bioinformatics, biology, Master’s in bioinformatics, PhD in
Neurosciences (English course), Nano-bio-technology (English course), Graduate work
in veterinary medicine, dentistry, medicine
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, Master’s in mathematics, software
engineering
Munich Technical University
Website: http://portal.mytum.de/welcome/document_view?
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics, nuclear engineering; Master’s in engineering physics;
Research available in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in biochemistry, chemistry; Master’s in advanced materials
science, biochemistry, chemistry; Research available in chemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s in bioinformatics, biology, molecular biotechnology; Master’s in
bioinformatics, biology, biomedical computing
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in chemical engineering, electrical engineering,
energy and process technology, engineering in life science, mathematics, mechanical
engineering, mechatronics, medical engineering; Master’s in chemical engineering,
electrical engineering, mathematics, mathematics in science and engineering, mechanical
engineering, mechatronics, medical engineering, microelectronics, microwave
engineering, nuclear engineering; Research available in mechanical engineering,
electrical engineering
University of Münster
89
Website: http://www.uni-muenster.de/en/
Physics: Bachelor’s and Master’s in physics; specialized research in physics (focus on
geophysics, nanophysics, nonlinear physics, particle physics, and didactics)
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry; Master’s in chemistry, chemical industry,
pharmaceutical sciences; Graduate work in pharmacy
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology; Master’s in biology, biotechnology, molecular
biomedicine; Graduate work in medicine
University of Oldenburg
Website: http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/en/
Physics: Bachelor’s and Master’s in physics, engineering physics; Specialized research in
radiation conversion and semiconductor physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in chemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology; Master’s in biology, microbiology
Paderborn University
Website: http://www.uni-paderborn.de/en/
Biology: N/A
mathematics, technomathematics; Master’s in Applied mechatronics, electrical
engineering, mechanical engineering, mathematics, technomathematics; Research is
primarily engineering-based
University of Potsdam
Website: http://www.uni-potsdam.de/english/
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, life sciences; Master’s in biochemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology; Master’s in bioinformatics, biotechnology, medical
technology
Rostock University
Website: http://www.uni-rostock.de/
Physics: PhD in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD in chemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s in biological science, biomedical technology, medical
biotechnology; Master’s in biomedical technology; Graduate work in medicine; PhD in
biology and technology of new materials
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in electrical engineering, mathematics, mechanical
engineering; Master’s in electrical engineering
Ruhr University Bochum

90
Website: http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/international/index_en.html
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s in chemistry, biochemistry
Biology: Bachelor’s and Master’s in biology; Graduate work in medicine
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s and Master’s in electrical engineering, mechanical
engineering, mathematics
Saarland University
Website: http://www.uni-saarland.de/en
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, materials science and engineering, microtechnology
and nanostructures; Master’s in advanced materials science and engineering; Graduate
work in pharmacy
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology; Master’s in bioinformatics, biotechnology; Graduate
work in medicine, dentistry
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in mathematics, mechatronics; Master’s in applied
mathematics
University of Siegen
Website: http://www.uni-siegen.de/aaa/letsgotosiegen/index.html.en?lang=en
Physics: Bachelor’s and Master’s and PhD in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s and Master’s and PhD in chemistry
Biology: N/A
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s and Master’s in Mechanical engineering, electrical
engineering, mechatronics, mathematics; PhD in mechatronics, mathematics
Stuttgard University
Website: http://www.uni-stuttgart.de/index.en.html
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry and materials science
Biology: Bachelor’s in technical biology
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in aerospace engineering, electrical engineering,
engineering cybernetics, mechatronics, mechanical engineering, mathematics; Master’s in
electrical engineering; PhD in advanced manufacturing engineering, advanced solid state
science
University of Tübingen
Website: http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/qvr/e-30/m30-01.html
Physics: N/A
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in biochemistry; Graduate work in pharmacy
Biology: Bachelor’s in molecular medicine, biology, bioinformatics; Master’s in
neuroscience and behavioral science, cellular and molecular neuroscience,
bioinformatics; Graduate work in medicine
Mathematics/Engineering: N/A
Ulm University
91
Website: http://www.uni-ulm.de/en/university-news.html
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry, biochemistry; Master’s in biochemistry, chemistry,
advanced materials (in English)
Biology: Bachelor’s in molecular medicine, biology; Master’s in molecular medicine,
biology; Graduate work in medicine; PhD in molecular medicine
Mathematics/Engineering: Bachelor’s in electrical engineering, mathematics,
mathematical biometry; Master’s in electrical engineering, mathematics
University of Würzburg
Website: http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/en/home/
Physics: Bachelor’s in physics, mathematical physics; Master’s in physics
Chemistry: Bachelor’s in chemistry; Master’s in chemistry, technology of functional
materials, nanostructure technology
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology, biomedical; Master’s in biomedical; Graduate work in
medicine; Research focus on biomedical technology
University of Wuppertal
Website: http://www.uni-wuppertal.de/index-en.html
Biology: Bachelor’s in biology
mathematics; Master’s in electrical engineering, mathematics
92
Appendix B:
Table A.B.1: University Subject Population Data

Total
Number
of Percentage of Students in
Student Science/Math/Engineerin Percentage International Students in
University s g Departments Science/Math/Engineering Programs
Biochemistry: 228 - 5%; Biology: 35 -
11%; chemistry: 446 - 15%; Chemical
Analysis: 15 - 87%; Electrical
engineering: 69 - 58%; Mechatronics: 73
- 14%; Electrical engineering (masters):
114 - 86%; Mechatronics (Masters): 15 -
80%; mathematics: 284- 19%;
Leibniz mechanical engineering: 1223 - 11%;
University math/natural science 21%; Physics: 325 - 12%; Technical Physics:
of Hannover 21575 engineering science: 23% 88 - 16%
Electrical engineering: 1239 - 38%; EE
(masters) 88 - 76%; medicine: 1337 - 4%;
Biochemistry: 97 - 3%; Biochemistry
masters - 54 - 2%; chemistry: 61 - 12%;
chemistry (masters) 20 - 20%; math: 262
- 8%; technomath: 141 - 5%; math
(masters) 3 - 67%; aeronautical and
aerospace engineering: 528 - 12%; ME -
Munich medicine: 8%; math/natural 82 - 13%; ME masters 44 - 64%; physics
Technical sciences: 26%; engineering 676 - 2%; engineering physics: 32 - 12%;
University 21904 science: 42% engineering physics (masters) 19 - 79%
medicine: 12%; Biology: 528 - 1%; chemistry: 170 - 6%;
math/natural sciences: dentistry: 122 - 7%; EE: 202 - 9%; math:
Rostock 21%; engineering science: 113 - 16%; technomath: 23 - 0%; physics
University 14076 13% 163- 2%; physics (masters) : 2 - 100%
chemistry and biochem: 322 - 4%;
biochem (masters): 5 - 0%; biology: 815 -
Ludwig- 3%; chemistry (masters): 33 - 0%;
Maximilian medicine 12%; dentistry: 599 - 11%; math: 344 - 15%;
s Munich mathematics/natural math (masters): 23 - 83%; pharmaceutical
University 44174 sciences 20% sciences: 27 - 4%; pharmacy: 675 - 9%
Physics: 154: 3% int; Materials science:
Math/natural science: 28%; 121-2% int; environment &
Bayreuth medicine: 2%; bioengineering science: 253 - 2% int;
University 9245 engingeering science: 6% biochem: 41 - N/A; chemistry: 45 - N/A
University 25983 medicine: 11%, Chemistry: 266 - 5%; Molecular science:
of Erlangen- math/natural science: 102 - 0%; Molecular science (Masters):
Nürnberg 20%;engineering science: 21 - 0%; Electrical engineering: 526 -
12% 15%;Mechatronics: 458 - 6%;
Mathematics: 208 - 11%;
Technomathematics: 70 - 6%; Materials
science: 261: 3%; mechanical engineering
93
(masters): 92- 62%; Materials science

(masters): 24 - 38%; Physics: 387 - 2%
Pharmacy: 298 - 5%
Biochemistry: 179 - 6%; Bioinformatics:
medicine: 10%, 108 - 68%; Dentistry: 513 - 8%;
University mathematics/natural Mathematics: 1537 - 5%; Pharmacy: 665
of Frankfurt 34174 science: 20%, - 7%
Biology: 43 - 2%; chemistry: 55 - 18%;
chemistry (masters): 67 - 96%;
mechatronics: 92 - 97%; math: 64 - 12%;
math (masters) 2 - 100%; ME: 180 - 6%;
mechatronics (masters): 92 - 97%;
University math/natural science : 18%; physics: 51 - 8%; physics (masters): 106 -
of Siegen 12512 engineering science:15% 32%
Chemistry: 484; 15% int, Electrical
engineering: 60- 32% int; Electrical
Engineering (Masters): 35 - 71% int;
Berlin mathematics: 531 - 13% int; Technical
Technical Math/natural science: 23%; mathematics: 621 - 20%; Physics: 786 -
University 27367 Engineering science: 30% 9% int
Chemical biology: 207 - 2% int;
Chemistry (Masters): 7 - 29%; Chemical
biology (Masters): 211 - 6%; Automation
and robotics (Masters): 95 - 96%;
Dortmund Mathematics: 274 - 5%; Chemical
Technical Math/natural science: 28%; engineering (Masters): 59 - 97%; Physics:
University 21,564 engineering science: 24% 357 - 8%
Ilmenau
Technical math/natural sciences:18; electrical engineering: 75 - 12%;
University 6623 engineering sciences: 49% Biomedical engineering: 61 - 13%;
Biochemistry: 56 - 7%; Biology: 1029 -
5%; Chemistry: 382 - 15%; Industrial
chemistry: 183 - 7%; Dentistry: 300 - 9%;
Heinrich- Medicine: 17%; Math: 318 - 15%; math ( masters): 9 -
Heine Mathematics, natural 56%; pharmacy: 585 - 8%; physics: 41 -
University 17946 science: 25% 15%
Biology: 299 - 3%; chemistry: 450- 12%;
math/natural sciences: EE: 276 - 28%;EE(masters): 82 - 94%;
Karlsruhe 38%; engineering science: math 237 - 10%; technomath: 123 - 3%;
University 17975 40% ME: 2291 - 17%; Physics: 834 - 6%
Biology: 1187 - 2%; molec bio: 84 - 0%;
biomedicine (masters): 17 - 12%;
Johannes chemistry: 627 - 4%; biomedical
Gutenberg chemistry: 443 - 2%; dentistry: 629 -
University medicine: 10%; 14%; math: 81 - 5%; pharmacy: 481 -
Mainz 34252 math/natural sciences: 21% 5%; physics: 599 - 2%
Ulm 7074 medicine: 38%; biochem: 64 - 2%; biochem (masters): 4 -
University math/natural sciences: 0%; biology: 343 - 2%; chemistry: 214 -
48%; engineering science: 4%; industrial chemistry: 79 - 10%;
7% dentistry: 286 - 11%; math: 139 - 5%;
94
physics: 247 - 6%; advanced materials

(English language masters course): 42 -
100%; medicine: 2080 - 9%; molecular
medicine: 35 - 6%
95
Appendix C: Foreign Population Data
Table A.C.1: Germany: Stock of Foreign Population by Select Country of Nationality

Region/Sub-region/Country of Citizenship 2007
All countries 6,744,879
Africa 269,937
Eastern Africa 34,365
E
thiopia 10,293
Central Africa 31,156
C
ameroon 14,650
C
ongo, Democratic Republic 11,150
Northern Africa 119,079
A
lgeria 13,217
E
gypt 11,217
M
orocco 67,989
T
unisia 23,228
Southern Africa 16,208
S
outh Africa 4,863
Western Africa 68,352
G
hana 20,392
N
igeria 16,747
T
ogo 11,454
Americas 215,666
Northern America 113,252
U
nited States 99,891
Central America and the Caribbean 29,934
South America 72,453
A
rgentina 4,634
B
razil 31,461
C
hile 5,959
Asia 2,527,242
Eastern and Central Asia 268,119
96
A
fghanistan 49,808
C
hina 78,096
J
apan 30,230
K
azakhstan 55,393
K
orea, Republic 23,595
T
aiwan 4,676
South-east Asia 284,811
I
ndia 42,495
I
ndonesia 11,233
P
akistan 28,999
P
hilippines 19,246
S
ri Lanka 29,977
T
hailand 53,952
V
iet Nam 83,333
Western Asia 1,971,429
A
rmenia 9,727
A
zerbaijan 14,586
C
yprus 875
G
eorgia 13,627
I
raq 72,597
I
ran 56,178
I
srael 9,742
J
ordan 7,840
L
ebanon 38,613
T
urkey 1,713,551
S
yria 28,161
97
Europe 3,662,186
A
lbania 10,009
A
ustria 175,875
B
elarus 18,266
B
elgium 22,559
B
osnia and Herzegovina 158,158
B
ulgaria 46,818
C
roatia 225,309
C
zech Republic 34,266
D
enmark 18,658
E
stonia 4,065
F
inland 13,394
F
rance 106,549
G
reece 294,891
H
ungary 56,165
I
celand 1,224
I
reland 10,059
I
taly 528,318
L
atvia 9,806
L
ithuania 19,833
L
uxembourg 9,796
M
acedonia 62,474
M
alta 410
M
oldova 12,365
M
ontenegro 2,632
98
N
etherlands 128,192
N
orway 6,357
P
oland 384,808
P
ortugal 114,552
R
omania 84,584
R
ussian Federation 187,835
S
erbia 91,525
S
erbia and Montenegro (former) 236,451
S
lovakia 24,458
S
lovenia 20,971
S
pain 106,301
S
weden 17,126
S
witzerland 37,291
U
kraine 126,960
U
nited Kingdom 97,070
Australia and Oceania 11,116
A
ustralia 8,786
Stateless or not reported 58,732
S
tateless 13,310
U
nknown and data missing 45,422
SOURCE: Central Register of Foreigners

99

Deadly Education - Evaluating Which Universities Are Attractive To International Terrorists

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Deadly Education - Evaluating Which Universities Are Attractive To International Terrorists

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DEADLY EDUCATION:

EVALUATING WHICH UNIVERSITIES ARE ATTRACTIVE TO

Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

Deadly Education: Evaluating Which Universities Are Attractive to International

Master of Science in Applied Intelligence

Mercyhurst College, 2009

Professor Kristan Wheaton, Chair

It is increasingly evident that terrorists are likely to consider developing and

deploying weapons of mass destruction. To do such things, it is necessary to acquire a

university for specific degree offerings, a multi-criteria decision-making matrix can be

course availability, advanced degree levels, and specific research opportunities.

Universities can be further examined by studying the international student population in

science/engineering disciplines. This project is a case study of such an analysis that

attractive to international terrorists seeking to learn the skills necessary to develop or

employ chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

Table 3.1 Physics Curriculum Score Criteria 51

Table 3.3 Biology Curriculum Score Criteria 51

Table 3.4 Engineering/Mathematics Curriculum Score Criteria 51

Table 4.1 University Course Evaluations 56

Table 4.2 Top 15 University Statistics for Science/Engineering 58

Table 4.3 Number of International Students Enrolled in 60

Table 4.4 Final University Ranking with Academic/Anonymity Coefficient 62

Table A.B.1 University Subject Population Data 93

Table A.C.1 Germany: Stock of Foreign Population by Select Country 96

Terrorist groups who are interested in using unconventional means of destruction,

such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, require individuals with technical

level, particularly at research-oriented universities with access to high-quality

laboratories and opportunities for independent student research projects. It is highly

that is more attractive to certain groups of students than others.

Due to discrepancies in coursework, laboratories, and available equipment,

education to construct nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Certainly, it is highly

international terrorists that consider an outside country for education purposes.

weapons for terrorist purposes.

The purpose of this study, generally, is to determine if a methodical approach

to be attractive to international terrorists trying to learn the skills necessary to develop or

use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Specifically, I intend to look at the

attractive to terrorists seeking a technological education to construct nuclear, chemical, or

group of universities, to determine which schools would be the most attractive, or

unattractive schools to terrorists seeking a technological education to construct nuclear,

chemical, or biological weapons.

institution, as well as the research opportunities and faculty research interests.

develop unconventional weapons with schools or programs that foster an environment

attractive to international terrorists, represent the greatest possibility for international

terrorist groups acquiring skills to make and/or use unconventional weapons.

Limitations of the Study

reflecting historical instances of international terrorism may be interesting, it is not useful

or identities of group members. Therefore, it may be difficult to identify some or all of

likely locations of international terrorists requires relying on international population

data, which is limited.

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

best way to prevent terrorism is to keep material, whether communication technology,

Another route would be preventing an attack, such as by securing nuclear facilities, or

scanning and searching bags at airports and athletic events.

consider attending flight school in the US to someday hijack an airplane, investigators

eventual conspirators’ conspicuous behavior at flight schools.3 Likewise, by assuming

that a terrorist would need advanced scientific training to develop a dangerous

unconventional weapon, such as a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon, it is useful to

universities that may attract terrorists.

be to look at possible intersections of readily available education in a technical discipline,

engineering. Finally, international populations at the universities will be considered.

This research can offer a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in