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International Business Review

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Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms:

Evidence from some emerging markets
Abubakr Saeeda,* , Yacine Belghitarb , Amna Yousafa
a
Department of Management Sciences, COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Park Road, Chak Shahzad, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
b
Craneld School of Management, Craneld University, Bedford MK43 0AL, UK

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: This paper examines the determinants of board gender diversity in the context of emerging economies.
Received 7 November 2014 Specically, we investigate the impact of organizational characteristics on gender diversity in the
Received in revised form 16 December 2015 boardrooms of Brazilian, Russian, Indian and Chinese rms and compare our ndings with a control
Accepted 15 January 2016
sample from US and UK. Analysing data for 1002 rms between a period of 2005 and 2012, we nd some
Available online xxx
similarities between developed and emerging economies on the factors determining women
representation on boards. In particular, we observe board gender diversity is positively related to the
Keywords:
rm size, and it is inversely related to corporate risk across both emerging and developed economies.
Gender diversity
Women on corporate boards
Family control affects positively board gender diversity only in India, China, UK and US. However, in
BRICS contrast to developed countries, there is some evidence to suggest that state ownership has a negative
Institutional Theory effect on board gender diversity in India and Russia.
2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction world in their percentage of female directors, with 36.1%, followed

Over the last two decades, diversity on boards has gained
signicant attention of researchers, investors and policy makers.
Proponents of board diversity suggest that women representation
on boards enhances board effectiveness by providing a breadth of
resources, such as knowledge, legitimacy, strategic advice and
links to external sources of dependency (Carter, Simkins, &
Simpson, 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014).
Further, women directors are seen to contribute to better corporate
governance through efcient monitoring and controlling of
managers (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Huse & Solberg, 2006;
Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009). Hence, beyond the social and
ethical reasons, the economic arguments have stirred the demands
for increasing women representation on boards around the globe.
In response to this, several countries such as Norway, Iceland and
France have introduced laws mandating women representation on
corporate boards, while some others, such as UK and Canada, have
incorporated recommendations for gender equality in their
corporate governance codes. As a result, women are gaining
ground on boards, for instance, they hold 14.8% of board seats at
Fortune 500 companies in 2013. Particularly, Norway leads the
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: Abubakr.saeed@comsats.edu.pk (A. Saeed),
Yacine.belghitar@craneld.ac.uk (Y. Belghitar), amna.yousaf@comsats.edu.pk
(A. Yousaf).
by Sweden and Finland with 27% and 26.8%, respectively (GMI,
2013).
Increased demand for gender diversity on boards has led
researchers to examine the factors which inuence the presence of
women directors in the boardrooms. Specically, a burgeoning
literature shows that gender composition on board depends on the
organizational characteristics. Studies show the inuence of
several characteristics on female presence on boards such as rm
size (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; Carter et al., 2003; Hyland &
Marcellino, 2002), rm ownership (Martn-Ugedo & Minguez-
Vera, 2014), type of industry (Esteban-Salvador, 2011; Jonge, 2014),
and business risk (Mateos de Cabo, Gimeno, & Nieto, 2012;
Hillman, Shropshire, Albert, & Cannella, 2007). Despite the fact
that these studies have lled the research gap to some extent by
injecting fresh insights into the existing literature however, the
empirical investigations to date is seen to conne itself to rms
from developed countries and no or very little substantive research
on rms from emerging economies. Moreover, the institutional
setting of emerging countries is sharply different from the
developed ones which may include weak legal institutions,
inefcient markets, active political involvement, and high owner-
ship concentration (Saeed & Athreye, 2014; Wei &Varela, 2003).
According to Scott (1995), institutional environment includes
social, political and economic systems that surround rms and
grant them legitimacy. Specically, Scott (1995) enumerates
salient regulative, normative, and cognitive factors of institutions

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
0969-5931/ 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
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2 A. Saeed et al. / International Business Review xxx (2015) xxxxxx
that inuences rms decisions such as board gender composition.
One of these factors is the socio-economic factor including laws,
and institutional constituents attitudes which is considered to be
weak in many emerging markets relative to that in developed
markets (North, 1990). This is likely to raise the level of uncertainty
in business environment and consequently encourage a range of
conservative decisions such as board homogeneity. Further, higher
degree of political involvement may motivate rms to avoid board
diversity. On the other hand, globalization in many emerging
markets led to the infusion of non-traditional norms and expect-
ations e.g. gender equality on corporate boards which are
promulgated by NGOs and international agencies such as the
OECD, World Bank, and investment rms (Hafsi & Farashahi, 2005).
Thus, we can construe that conicting tendencies exist in
institutional setting of emerging markets which affect board
composition decision.
Motivated by the importance of a countrys institutions to
women board representation, we assess the role of institutional
environment in determining board gender diversication in
emerging countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC).
Specically, we address two fundamental questions. First, what is
the state of board gender diversity in the BRIC economies? Second,
do organizational determinants of board gender diversity in rms
from BRIC countries differ from those found in developed
economies?
To answer the above questions, we use a panel dataset of 1002
rms which have been observed over the period 20052012. The
results show that rm size, corporate risk, family control and state
ownership are common factors, in all countries, in determining
women representation on boards. Notably, board gender diversity
is positively related to rm size, and it is inversely related to
corporate risk across both emerging and developed countries.
However, there are country specic differences in the impact of
family and state ownership on board gender diversity. It is worth
mentioning that these results are robust to alternative measure of
board gender diversity, endogeneity, reduced sample size and
cross-country estimation.
This research thus contributes to the literature in two important
ways. Firstly, it provides understanding of the determinants of
female representation on boards in emerging economies (BRIC). A
study on BRIC countries is theoretically and empirically interest-
ing, because most of our understanding on board gender diversity
comes from single country studies that focus on developed
countries. As such this study will shed lights into how institutional
environment affect board diversity.
Secondly, unlike the extant studies, we develop our hypotheses
drawing on institutional theory. Historically, the resource-depen-
dency and agency theories (Hillman et al., 2007; Mateos de Cabo
et al., 2012) of the rm have been key theories employed in
literature examining predictors of female presence on boards.
While resources are certainly important, the issues such as culture,
legal environment, and economic situation can also impact rm
level factors and in turn shape the board gender composition.
Nowhere is this point more clearly borne out than in emerging
economies, where institutional frameworks differ greatly from
those in developed economies (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008).
Considering these institutional differences, this article draws on
the institutional theory to explore the extent to which institutional
elements inuence determinants of board gender diversity in
emerging economies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discuses the existing
literature and provide theoretical framework. Section 3 develops
the testable hypotheses. The data and methodology are discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 discusses
the results and lastly we conclude the study.
Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
2. Board gender diversity: empirical evidences and theoretical
framework
2.1. Empirical evidences
A burgeoning literature has focused on gender composition on
corporate boards. These include Adams and Ferreira (2009) and
Carter et al. (2003) using US data; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Johnson
(2001) and Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin (2009) in the UK
setting; Mateos de Cabo et al. (2012) and Rivas (2012) within an
European Union context, Lucas-Perez, Mnguez-Vera, Baixauli-
Soler, Martn-Ugedo, & Sanchez-Marn (2014) using Spanish data,
Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva (2007) using Swiss data; and Ahern and
Dittmar (2012) and Torchia, Calabro, & Huse (2011) within
Norwegian context. These papers consider developed countries,
with one exception of Terjesen and Singh (2008) that use
international data. Terjesen and Singh (2008) include Brazil but
not the remaining BRIC countries in their sample, and their main
interest has been to examine the impact of female presence in
legislative roles on board gender diversity.
There are a number of studies that particularly focus on
organizational determinants of board gender diversity. For
example, Hyland and Marcellino (2002) examine the inuence
of rm size and industry in women representation on US boards
and nd a positive relationship between organizational size and
the presence of women directors, while likelihood of having
women director is found to be signicant only in nancial sector.
Hillman et al. (2007) investigate this vein in US and nd that
organizational size and industry type signicantly impact the
likelihood of female representation on boards of directors.
However, rm diversication in terms of product is not found to
be signicantly related to female board representation. This is also
reected in the work of Mateos de Cabo et al. (2012) who seek to
identify the organizational factors which explain women presence
on the boards of European Union banks. Their analysis reveals that
banks that have larger boards and lesser risk of nancial distress
are more likely to have female directors on boards. Esteban-
Salvador (2011) analyses the determinants of board gender
composition in Spanish rms. She shows that board gender
composition is positively and signicantly related with rm size,
ownership concentration and industry. Similarly, Martn-Ugedo
and Minguez-Vera (2014), using a sample of Spanish rms, observe
that the probability of women on board increases with rm
performance and family ownership, but diminishes with rm risk
and institutional ownership.
Studies showing similar ndings for emerging markets are
scarce. Jonge (2014) shows that in China and India, women
presence on boards is above average in large rms and rms in the
nancial services sector. Sharma (2014) nds that large Indian
rms have at least one female director. Using a sample of Malaysian
rms, Abdullah, Ismail, and Nachum (2015) show that women
representation on boards has a positive and signicant correlation
with family ownership and state-ownership. In addition to the
determinants of board gender diversity, some researchers have
examined the link between gender diversity and rm performance
in emerging economies. For example, Liu, Wei, and Xie (2013)
provide evidence of a positive relationship between rm perfor-
mance and board gender diversity in China, and they also show
that the probability of women on the board increases with state
ownership.
Although much has been learned from these studies, their focus
is primarily on developed markets. There is limited research on
determinants of board gender diversity in emerging economies.
We aim to bridge this gap in the literature.
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2.2. Theoretical framework
Prior literature summarized in the last section documents the
relevance of countrys environment to board gender diversity. In
this section, we provide theoretical framework which may help to
understand how institutional setting may inuence board gender
diversity across emerging and developed countries.
Countrys institutional setting primarily concerns regulatory,
social and cultural inuences that promote survival and legitimacy
of an organization rather than focusing solely on efciency-seeking
behaviour (Roy, 1997). In this regard, Scott (1995) uses the above
basis to formulate three categories of institutional forces
regulative, normative, and cognitive. Each of them is explained
below in detail.
Regulative structures refer to formal laws, rules and regulations
which are derived from governmental legislation and industrial
agreements and standards. Importantly, these rules provide
guidelines on corporate board gender diversity which makes it
incumbent upon organisations to comply with laws. For instance,
some countries like Norway and Iceland have specic legislations
to encourage women participation in the corporate boardrooms;
others like UK and Canada incorporate recommendations on
gender equality in their corporate governance codes. However,
BRIC countries fall behind in the category and are yet to establish
mandatory regulation structure with the exception of India where
Companies Bill (enacted in 2013) requires listed companies to
appoint at least one woman on board.1
Normative, the second institutional pillar embodies social
norms, values, beliefs and assumptions that establish consciously
followed ground rules to which people conform (Scott, 1995).
These normative frameworks set the standards for, and encourage
conformity to, which is deemed as acceptable corporate behaviour
(Muthari & Gilbert, 2011). Additionally, national culture encour-
ages and rewards the pursuit of some types of goal while
discouraging and sanctioning others through these embodied
values, beliefs, and assumptions (Hui et al., 2004). Notably, the
normative pillar is particularly salient in relation to gender
equality in corporate boardrooms, where gender roles are clearly
shaped in societies through what deems desirable and correct for
one sex whereas some dene women through the roles associated
with family responsibilities (Parboteeach, Hoegl, & Cullen, 2008).
Similarly, some societies have norms which facilitate and promote
women leadership (such as in Western countries) while others
discourage by creating obstacles.
Finally cognitive conditions, the last institutional pillar, refers to
individual behaviour based on subjectively and (often gradually)
constructed rules that mostly stem from frames, inferential sets,
and representations which inuences the way people notice,
categorize, and interpret stimuli from the environment (Parbo-
teeach et al., 2008). Notably, the cognitive pillar may operate more
at the individual level in terms of culture and language (Scott,
1995). In essence, cognitive frameworks encompass common or
shared beliefs that constitute responsible corporate behaviour
where managers interpret these cognitive schemas and create
common denitions of socially acceptable behaviour (Muthari &
Gilbert, 2011). Subsequently, this pillar has gained prominence in
the area of gender equality as it helps to examine the ways through
which women leadership is accepted and encouraged, seeking to
answer how societies accept women empowerment, inculcate
values, and even create a cultural milieu (Parboteeach et al., 2008).
Nonetheless, cognitive pressures for having more women directors
may largely be absent in BRIC countries.
1
Indian Ministry of Corporate Affairs Press release: www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/
pdf/CompaniesAct2013.pdf.
Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
3
In summary, pressures and expectations from institutional
constituents as the state, professions, interest groups and public
opinion vary across developed and emerging countries. Despite the
absence of strong regulative and cognitive imperatives, normative
expectations may have compelled many rms to appoint more
women directors in emerging countries.
3. Hypothesis development
In this paper, we adopt institutional framework proposed by
Scott (1995) to develop our hypotheses. Prior literature suggests
that institutional environment affects rm characteristics. In
particular, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(2000) and Beck and Levine (2004) argue that country institutional
environment inuence rms decisions. Indeed, La Porta et al.
(2000) show that legal protection of minority shareholders differ
across countries and this difference determines the level of
ownership concentration. For instance, in countries with better
formal legal protection of investor rights, minority shareholders
tend to pay more for shares, and controlling shareholders are more
willing to diversify and reduce their ownership stakes; in turn,
concentrated ownership (such as family and state ownerships) is
less common in these countries. Other studies have also shown
that institutional features of a country affect the level of rm risk
taking. For example, Claessens and Nenova (2000) show that rms
operating in countries with strong protection of equity and creditor
rights take less risky decisions. With regard to rm size, Beck,
Demirg-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2006) nd that rms tend to
grow more slowly in markets with weak legal and nancial
institutions. Moreover, in the absence of a strong regulatory
framework within the domestic markets, rms operating interna-
tionally which are typically larger in size are more exposed to
international regulatory requirements (such as board diversity).
In short, we expect that institutional differences across
countries are responsible for variation in basic organizational
characteristics and hence the differences in board-gender diversi-
ty. In particular, we consider rm size, rm risk, family ownership
and state-ownership and investigate how cross-national differ-
ences in institutional arrangements relate to these rm character-
istics. The development of each hypothesis is discussed below.
3.1. Organizational size
As noted earlier, normative values are set by a variety of social
actors including government agencies, interest groups and
institutional investors. These institutional actors set standards
for legitimate organizational practices. Institutional theory sug-
gests that organizations seek to behave in ways that will not cause
them to be noticed as different and consequently singled out for
criticism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Therefore, rms adhere to the
prescribed organizational standards to gain legitimacy in a society.
By virtue of their size, large rms are most visible to the state,
media, and professional groups which bring them under more
pressure to conform to the societal expectations (Adams & Ferreira,
2003; Hillman et al., 2007). In fact, gender diversity is a part of
societal expectations that has been expressed globally from a
variety of business stakeholders.2 These large organizations
become increasingly accountable to external constituencies and
more vulnerable to public pressure (Goodstein, 1994). Zahra and
2
For instance, communities such as Womens Forum and Global Summit of
Women insert pressure on large rms to increase female representation in their
upper echelons. The demand for more diverse board from investors for better
monitoring and the increased scrutiny from regulatory authorities has intensied
pressure on large corporations to increase women representation on boards.
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Pearce (1990) assert that a large size rms have a better ability to
understand and respond to diverse stakeholders, therefore it may
be more vital for them to have diverse leadership (Hyland &
Marcellino, 2002).
In a number of empirical studies conducted in Western context,
researchers have found a positive relationship between organisa-
tional size and board gender diversity (e.g. Agrawal & Knoeber,
2001; Burke, 2000; Carter et al., 2003; Esteban-Salvador, 2011;
Hyland & Marcellino, 2002). Large rms in developed countries are
compelled to include women in their boardrooms; otherwise, they
suffer public outrage. Todays BRIC countries rms face similar
issues, as reported in both academic studies and the popular press
(e.g. Economic Times, 2015; Ghuman & Aswathappa, 2010; Hewlett
& Rashid, 2010). Importantly, due to the perceived lack of effective
regulations to improve board gender diversity in emerging
economies, various communities have stepped into the regulatory
vacuum. Therefore, large rms from emerging markets owing to
their visibility are becoming increasingly responsive to their
stakeholders needs, and in turn, these stakeholders confer
cognitive legitimacy to organizations that adhere to societal
norms. The small number of existing studies on emerging
countries provides support for the positive relationship between
rm size and board gender diversity. For instance, Ghuman and
Aswathappa (2010) reveal that large Indian rms are more likely to
have western-educated managers that are well aware of the
economic value of gender diversity. In addition, in Malaysia,
Abdullah (2013) document a positive association between rm size
and women on board. Based on this discussion, we expect to
observe a similar impact of rm size on board gender diversity in
BRIC countries to those reported for developed countries.
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive relationship between organiza-
tional size and board gender diversity in BRIC countries.
3.2. Corporate risk
Another important factor that may inuence the presence of
women on the board is degree of corporate risk. Institutional
theory emphasizes the inuence of environment in rm decision-
making. The institutional environment encompasses such ele-
ments as government interference in the markets, efciency of
government services and the freedom given to rms to operate.
Excessive bureaucracy and regulation, corruption, and weak rule of
law are just some of the many examples of institutional
inefciency that signicantly increase market and economic
uncertainty (Brouthers, 2002). Drawing on institutional theory,
Kanters (1977) suggests that group homogeneity (e.g. male
dominance on board in our case) is essential in highly uncertain
environment. Adams and Ferreira (2004) tested this conjecture in
the composition of directors on US boards and report that rms
facing higher uncertainty (that appears in volatile stock returns)
tend to have fewer women directors. Similarly, using Spanish bank
data, Mateos de Cabo et al. (2012) show that when a bank assumes
a signicant level of risk (due to uncertainty) it is less likely to hire
a woman for the board. Hillman et al. (2007) also report the
negative relationship between degree of corporate risk and board
gender diversity for US rms, and they reveal that the propensity of
a rm having women directors is higher in rms with lower risk.
Extending the Kanters (1977) notion of preference of homoge-
neity in uncertain environment to emerging economies, it can be
argued that rms operating in emerging markets are subject to
higher degree of risk due to the institutional uncertainty which
include expropriation risk, low property rights, over-regulations
and danger of corruption extraction (Brouthers, 2002). Indeed,
institutional framework of BRIC countries is transforming from a
command economy to a market oriented economy which raises the
Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
level of institutional and economic uncertainty in these countries.
Thus, we may assert that rms in emerging economies are facing
higher degree of risk, and therefore less likely to include women on
boards. The studies testing the relationship between the degree of
corporate risk and board gender composition in emerging markets
is very limited. Setiyono and Tarazi (2014) is a notable exception,
which report the inverse relationship between board gender
diversity and income volatility in Indonesian market. So, in view of
aforementioned arguments, we expect a negative impact of rm
risk on board gender diversity in emerging markets as compared to
developed markets. Thus:
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative relationship between rm risk
and board gender diversity in BRIC countries.
3.3. Family ownership
Institutional theory suggests that the relation between family
ownership and rms value may vary under different institutional
environments. Peng and Jiang (2010) nd that family rms value
depends on the efciency of a bundle of governance and regulatory
mechanisms. In an environment with more developed legal and
regulatory institutions, founding families and their heirs are
encouraged to delegate day-to-day management to professional
managers. On the other hand, when formal legal and regulatory
institutions are dysfunctional, founding families must run their
rms directly. Specically for women directorship in family rms,
informal normative and cognitive institutions have the potential to
exert signicant inuence on the perceptions of women partici-
pation in family rms management (Leaptrott, 2005). In a way, the
assumptions embedded in the expected gender roles in family
businesses reect the societal and general-level norms.
Earlier empirical research demonstrates that women seem to
have more opportunity to become directors in family rms than in
other types of rm (e.g. Laffarga, Pilar de Fuentes, & Giner, 2006;
Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva, 2007; Svanstrm, 2003). In Canada,
Burke (2000) shows that women are mostly included in the
boardroom on the basis of their family afliation with board
members. Laffarga et al. (2006) nd that Spanish rms with a
stronger presence of women among their top management have
family ownership. Likewise, Svanstrm (2003) reports that women
tend to have more opportunity to accede to senior management
positions in Swedish family rms, and that ownership can ease the
path towards a directorship. In Switzerland, women directors are
often chosen for their family relationship and not because of their
business expertise (Ruigrok et al., 2007).
Prior studies nd evidence for strong prevalence of family rms
in the emerging markets and report their vital role in the countries
economies, particularly in post-liberalization era (e.g. Khanna &
Palepu, 2000; Saeed & Athreye, 2014). In BRIC countries, women
have long played key roles in family businesses, though not always
visible (e.g. Chaudhary & Valsiner, 2013). The deeply embedded
traditional family roles, both within individual families and society
as a whole keep womens business contributions far from being
acknowledged (Rivers, 2010). However, in the last few decades the
role of women in family businesses has changed dramatically in
these economies. Particularly, the globalization of markets,
industries and rms has led to a trend toward common practices
around the world (Baughn, Bodie, & Mclntosh, 2007). Multina-
tional rms and the formation of international joint ventures and
alliances in emerging countries also led to the infusion of non-
traditional norms and expectations (Hafsi & Farashahi, 2005).
These expectations, which also include gender parity on boards,
are promulgated by not only customers and NGOs in emerging
countries, but also transnational agencies such as the OECD, World
Bank, and investment rms. Consequently, family rms in BRIC
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countries, which constitute almost 68% of these markets, have
evolved as an efcient response to the new market environment
and adjusted to economic and institutional changes took place due
to liberalization (Bertrand & Schoar, 2005). There are studies which
endorse this new trend and show an increase in the number of
women serving on boards of family rms in emerging markets. For
example, Jonge (2014) shows that family ownership in China
makes it more likely to include women on their boards. Zhang
(2013) reports that family businesses in China created fast tracks
to bring several females to the boardrooms. Similarly, Kickul, Liao,
Gundry, and Iakovleva (2010) show an increased presence of
women on boards of Russian family rms in recent years. Abdullah
(2013) also offers the same evidence in the Malaysian context.
Based on this literature, we anticipate observing a similar
(positive) relation between family ownership and board gender
diversity in BRIC countries as it has been reported for developed
countries. Thus, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between family
ownership and board gender diversity in BRIC countries.
3.4. State ownership
State controlled organizations have a context that reinforces
accountability to public concerns and heightens the importance of
maintaining legitimacy vis--vis public (Luoma & Goodstein,
1999). Indeed, state-owned rms nd themselves under increased
pressure to conform to corporate governance frameworks and
broader regulations that encompass a given country (Grosvold,
2011). More directly, maintaining a gender balance board in a
state-owned rm signals that government places more value on
diversity and the women's career advancement prospects exist.
Thereby, it brings the credibility to a rm and the government's
efforts towards gender equality. In developed countries, the public
sector boards tend to have a better representation of women than
private sector boards. The percentage of female directors in private
vs. public sector in Canada, UK, Spain and New Zealand is estimated
to be (15% vs. 42%), (11% vs. 33%), (9% vs. 45%), and (7% vs. 35%),
respectively (Sealy, Doldor, & Vinnicombe, 2009). Thus, indicating
a positive relationship between state-ownership and board gender
diversity.
Like in many emerging economies, BRIC countries have higher
percentage of state-ownership in both nancial and nonnancial
corporations. According to OECD report, BRIC are among the top
eight countries for the highest state-owned enterprise presence
among their largest rms (Buge, Egeland, Kowalski, & Sztajer-
owska, 2013). It is quite common in emerging economies,
particularly in China and Russia, that executives working in
government rms also hold top positions in the political system
(You & Du, 2012). As such, senior party members are often assigned
to state-run rms and ofcials of those companies get promoted to
the partys senior posts as well (Marquis & Qian, 2013). In the
context of board gender diversity, we contend that state ofcials
working in state-owned rms are more likely to respond to societal
pressure for increasing board gender diversity in order to sustain
their personal reputations. Additionally, by taking action in
accordance with social expectations for example including
women directors on boards not only the politically connected
executives but also rms as well as the government build up their
normative and cognitive dimensions of legitimacy in the eyes of
general public. Empirical studies support this conjecture and show
a positive relationship between state-ownership and board gender
diversity in emerging economics. Liu et al. (2013) nd that Chinese
state-owned rms are more likely to include women in their
boards to improve corporate performance. Similarly, Jonge (2014)
also observes a positive and signicant correlation between state
Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
5
ownership and board gender diversity in China. Based on these
arguments and empirical evidences, we suggest that state-owned
rms in emerging markets have stronger reasons to increase
gender diversity on their boards. Thus, we hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 4. There is a positive relationship between state
ownership and board gender diversity in BRIC countries.
4. Research methodology
4.1. Sample
We obtain the information on the board composition and rm
characteristics from the OSIRIS database provided by Bureau van
Dijk (BvD). The additional information on directors name and
family ownership, if required, is collected from company websites.
Firms without information about board of directors and main
variables are eliminated from the sample. In addition, each rm is
required to have at least three consecutive years information.3 Our
data collection procedure was as follows: for Brazil, we started
with the list of 365 rms listed as of 2005 on BM&F BOVESPA and
searched those rms in Osiris. We ended up with the 96 listed non-
nancial Brazilian rms. For Russia, we searched a list of 295 rms
listed on MICEX-RTS in Osiris and found 81 non-nancial rms
available in the database. Similarly, for India a list of 4763 rms
listed on BSE SENSEX were searched in Osiris and we found
269 non-nancial rms. Lastly, for China, a list of 833 rms listed
on SSE were matched in Osiris and found 280 non-nancial rms.
After excluding all observations with missing data on the main
variables and board information, we ended up with the following
sample: 84 rms from Brazil, 72 rms from Russia, 228 rms from
India, and 213 in China. For UK and USA, we started with the list of
top 250 rms based on market capitalization as of 2005 and we
start collecting data on board composition and other variables
from Osiris. After excluding nancial rms and rms with missing
data, the resulting dataset contains a sample of 209 US rms and
196 rms from UK. Thus, the overall sample consists of 1002 rms
for the period 20052012.
The nal sample represents more than 50% of the total market
capitalization in each country. We could not cover all rms that are
listed on stock market of each country; however, these gures are
fairly representative of listed rms in each country, with a
signicant tilt towards larger rms. In order to control for the
potential inuence of outliers, all variables are winsorised at the
5th and the 95th values.
To determine the boards gender composition, we looked for the
rst names of the directors and inferred the directors gender from
their rst names.4 Still, some ambiguities remained, mainly in
cases where rst names were abbreviated. To resolve these
ambiguities, we visited company websites and checked for the
gender of director by gender-specic language in a biography
provided in the annual report (e.g. Mr., Ms., he, she, his, her) and by
a photograph given in the annual report. Finally, this procedure
helps us to produce 2529 rm-year observations with female
directors. For convenience, sample distribution is presented in
Table 1.
3
Because our model will be estimated in rst-differences using lagged values
(dated t-1 and before) of the endogenous variables as instruments (see Section 4.3
for more details on our estimation methodology).
4
This method is widely used in the related literature (such as Ahern & Dittmar,
2012; Carter et al., 2010; Hillman et al., 2007) to identify the gender of the board
members.
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Table 1 primarily based on our relatively small number of rms from each
Proportion of women director on boards by years.
country and lack of industrial diversity. Studies that use similar
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 industrial classication include, among others, Skaggs et al. (2012),
Brazil 0.042 0.046 0.039 0.051 0.057 0.043 0.061 0.057 Marinova et al. (2010), and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
Russia 0.052 0.040 0.058 0.049 0.058 0.063 0.071 0.090 (2005).
India 0.037 0.044 0.075 0.060 0.054 0.047 0.065 0.078
China 0.062 0.090 0.068 0.080 0.103 0.125 0.111 0.119
4.3. Methodology
UK 0.105 0.091 0.118 0.095 0.084 0.140 0.117 0.138
US 0.118 0.129 0.101 0.122 0.133 0.117 0.152 0.179
In our analysis, there is a concern that rm characteristics and
female presence on board are jointly determined, which can give
4.2. Model and variables denition rise to the problem of endogeneity. In addition, it is likely that the
observed relation between women proportion on board and rm
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following model: characteristics reect the effects of women directors on the latter

Board gender diversity f Firm size; Corporate risk; Family control; State ownership; Controls; Errors

In the above model, the dependent variable is the board gender
diversity, and is measured as the number of female directors
divided by the total number of board members in each year.
Regarding explanatory variables, rm size is measured as the
natural logarithm of total assets. Two different variables are used
to measure corporate risk: one is the natural logarithm of the
variability of the return on assets over the previous ve years (as a
measure of a rms operational risk). and the second measure is the
level of debt (to capture a rm's nancial risk), computed as the
ratio of total debt to total assets. These ratios are commonly used in
the literature to measure rm risk (e.g. Martn-Ugedo and
Minguez-Vera, 2014; Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). Consistent
with Anderson and Reeb (2003), family-controlled rms are
identied as those where a family holds more board seats
(including seats held directly and through representatives) than
any other individual or group on the board. We manually check
annual reports for all rms to identify who occupies each of the
board seats, their family relationships and the entities they
represent. Further, the original founders of rms are identied
through analysing annual reports, company websites and internet
searches. In our analysis, a dummy variable, family control, is used
which takes a value 1 if the rm is family owned, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, state ownership is measured as the fraction of common
shares held by the government (Wei & Varela, 2003).
We also apply different control variables that are commonly
used in early gender diversity research. Specically, we control for
rm performance, as it was found to inuence the level of female
representation on boards (Martn-Ugedo & Minguez-Vera, 2014). It
is measured by return on assets, proxied as prot before taxes,
divided by total assets. As mature rms are associated with
increased womens representation on board (Skaggs, Stainback, &
Duncan, 2012), therefore rm age is controlled in the estimation
and is calculated as the number of years since the rm was
founded. Board independence is proxied by the proportion of the
independent directors on board (% independent directors). We also
control for board size measured as the natural logarithm of the
number of directors (Carter et al., 2003). Finally, as Skaggs et al.
(2012) and Hillman et al. (2007) indicate, the type of business a
company engages in may affect the opportunities for women to
take up corporate board positions. Therefore, the sampled rms are
classied into four sectors of activity: wholesale/retail (Industry 1);
professional services/hospitality/hospitality (Industry 2); high tech
(Industry 3); manufacturing/construction/utilities/transportation/
petroleum (Industry 4). To control for industry variation three
dummies are included representing rst three categories whereas
last group serves as the reference category. The decision to use a
few broad industry groups rather than more detailed groups was
rather than vice versa. Specically, rm characteristics such as rm
size and degree of risk may affect board gender diversity but it is
also possible that women directors may select to serve on boards of
large successful and low risk rms. Hence, it is important to control
for the potential endogeneity bias in board gender diversity
analysis.
The preferred estimator for our analysis is the rst-difference
generalised method of moments (GMM) advocated by (Arellano &
Bond, 1991). The GMM difference estimator is based on the
mechanism through which endogenous variables in rst-differ-
ences are instrumented with lags of their own levels.5 The GMM
estimator is suited for our analysis because of the following
reasons. First, our panel consists of a large number of rms (large
N) and a small number of time periods (small T). Second the GMM
system explicitly allows for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
within rms. Consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the
validity of instruments and the absence of higher-order serial
correlation in c error term. To this end, we report the Sargan test of
over-identifying restrictions, which is used to check the overall
validity of the instruments. We also report the rst (AR-1) and
second-order (AR-2) tests of serial correlation.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive analysis
Table 1 presents the evolution of gender diversity amongst
sample rms by years. Figures show a signicant variation in
female representation on Chinese and Russian boards. Specically,
we observe an increasing trend in female representation on
Chinese and Russian boards from year 2007 and 2008, respectively.
During this period, for China, it increased from 6.8% in 2007 to
11.9% in 2012 and from 4.9% in 2008 to 9.0% in 2012 for Russia.
However, the proportion of women in Brazilian and Indian
boardrooms appear to have plateaued over the years. The gures
also show some variation in gender composition of UK and US
boards over time.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used
in the analysis. The mean percentage of female directors in our
sample rms from emerging countries is low, as it represents
around 4.9% in Brazil, 5.7% in India, 6.0% in Russia, and 9.5% in
China, compared to 13.1% and 11.1% for the US and UK, respectively.
If we compare our results with previous studies, we nd that the
average proportion of female directors is slightly lower than the
5
We use one-period lagged independent (explanatory) variables as instruments.

Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
G Model
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A. Saeed et al. / International Business Review xxx (2015) xxxxxx 7

Table 2
Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses.

Whole sample Brazil Russia India China US UK

(1002 rms) (84 rms) (72 rms) (228 rms) (213 rms) (209 rms) (196 rms)

Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Proportion women 0.084 0.16 0.049 0.14 0.060 0.16 0.057 0.11 0.095 0.09 0.138 0.08 0.111 0.12
Firm size 5.43 1.85 5.32 1.35 5.20 2.03 5.48 1.90 5.63 1.42 5.71 1.45 5.29 1.95
Operational risk 5.74 2.46 6.21 3.28 6.59 3.41 5.69 2.01 5.84 2.33 5.51 1.95 5.40 2.10
Financial risk 0.70 0.31 0.94 0.40 1.01 0.53 0.57 0.25 0.66 0.19 0.52 0.16 0.47 0.28
Family-control 0.33 0.19 0.26 0.15 0.23 0.12 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.32 0.17 0.36 0.20
State-ownership 0.23 0.31 0.19 0.15 0.33 0.28 0.16 0.13 0.31 0.40 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.09
Return on assets 4.78 9.04 4.60 14.17 4.20 11.03 4.72 9.80 5.01 10.90 5.09 9.12 4.86 10.05
Firm age 26.31 18.61 24.04 19.25 25.16 21.05 25.18 16.81 28.70 21.15 27.73 24.00 26.87 22.22
Board size 9.23 3.09 9.05 2.90 8.75 3.12 9.51 2.70 8.94 2.94 9.46 2.45 9.37 2.52
% indep. directors 0.43 0.51 0.29 0.65 0.27 0.70 0.39 0.33 0.42 0.51 0.61 0.17 0.59 0.24

10% reported by Liu et al. (2013). Catalyst (2011) report board
gender diversity as follows: Brazil is 4.6%; Russia is 6.1%; India is
5.3%; China is 7.2%; the UK is 12.2%, and in the US is 15.2%. Grosvold
(2011) report a value of 12.5% for China, 3.8% for India, 3.1% for
Russia, 8.1% for UK, and 15.1% for US. The differences might be due
to the different sample size and the different investigated period.
The average rm size is between 5.20 and 5.63 across our main
sample and 5.295.71 in the US and the UK. It indicates that rm
size is almost similar across emerging and developed countries in
our sample. On average, rms from developed countries experi-
ence higher operational and nancial risk than their counterparts
from emerging countries. Similarly, the average value of state
ownership is higher in emerging countries than in the UK and the
US. The highest average state ownership is found in Russia, with a
mean value of 33%. India has the highest mean value of family
ownership (42%).
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. There are no extreme
correlations among the explanatory variables across our sample of
countries. Thus, multicolinearity is not a concern in our
regressions. Moreover, VIF analysis shows no multicollinearity
problems with the conducted regressions.
5.2. Multivariate analysis
Table 4 reports the rst-difference GMM regression results. The
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions does not reject the
validity of the instruments. The statistic of second-order serial
correlation of error term shows that the error term does not exhibit
second-order correlation. The values of the Wald test for the joint
signicance of the regressors indicate their importance in
explaining variations in the dependent variable. The statistics of
these tests conrm the validity of the estimation results. The result
obtained for each country is discussed below.
For Brazil, the results show that rm size and corporate risk are
the main determinants of female presence on boards. There is a
positive relationship between rm size and the proportion of
women on board. This evidence reinforces the notion that large
rms are more likely to appoint women to their board of directors.
This result supports the prediction of Hypothesis 1 and it
corroborates the ndings of Esteban-Salvador (2011), Carter
et al. (2003) and Hyland and Marcellino (2002). Furthermore,
we nd that rms operational as well as nancial risk insert a
negative impact on board diversity, conrming Hypothesis 2.
These results are in line with that of Martn-Ugedo and Minguez-
Vera (2014), who nd that Spanish rms with lower risk are more
inclined to hire women for their board of directors. Family control
and state ownership are not found to be signicant determinants
of women representation on boards in Brazil.
The Russian perspective shows that rm size, corporate risk and
state ownership determine board gender diversity. Firm size has a
positive and signicant relationship with gender diversity,
providing support for Hypothesis 1. Consistent with Hypothesis
2, we nd a negative relation between rm risk and board gender
diversity (operational and nancial risks are signicantly nega-
tive). Surprisingly, state ownership appears to have a negative
effect on board gender diversity. This evidence is contrary to what
was expected in Hypothesis 4 and to the ndings reported by Liu
et al. (2013). One potential reason for the lack of gender diversity
on a state owned rm's board could be attributed to the fact that
politics is a male dominated arena in emerging economies,
particularly in Russia (Chhibber, 2002; Howell, 2006; Tinker,
2004), therefore male candidates are most likely to be on the
boards of state owned rms due to tight old-boys network.
Whereas, women nd it difcult to establish political relationships
in a network dominated by men, and hence they are less likely to be
considered for directorship based on connections. Russian politics,
especially under Putins rule, is characterised by the dominance of
a powerful male administrative regime. The regime has strength-
ened the situation of men in elite and professional positions by
using Putins brand of masculinity. As Johnson (2013) highlights,
Russia elites are overwhelmingly male and bonded through Putins
masculinity and it is evident from the fact that approximately 35%
of the new appointees at the top administrative level under Putins
management, which are often sent to corporate sector to carry out
governments policies in the state-owned organizations. Moreover,
most of these appointees were formerly employed in the military
or intelligence elds. This fact could partly explain the growing
gender gap in Russia at the top level.6
Turning to India, the results show that women representation
on boards is determined by rm size, corporate risk, family
ownership and state ownership. Consistent with Hypothesis 1,
rm size positively associates with board gender diversity. This
nding also conrms results in Jonge (2014), where women
director are found to be more prevalent in Indian large rms. In line
with Hypothesis 2, a negative relationship is reported between
corporate risk and board gender diversity. Moreover, family control
associates positively with proportion of women directors, which
supports Hypothesis 3. This nding may be viewed as an outcome
of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act which was enacted in
2005 with aim to ensure women equal inheritance in Indian joint
family businesses. Additionally, increased board gender-diversity
on family rms may partly be explained by the fact that the
daughters of wealthy business families in India are increasingly
being educated abroad and obviously on their return they want to
join family business and make a difference. To mention a few: Priya
6
The persecution of Pussy Riot, crackdown on feminists on Women International
Day 2013, restrictions on abortion and state-driven campaign to raise the birth rate
are good examples of state reliance on traditional gender norms which increases
gender inequality.

Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
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8 A. Saeed et al. / International Business Review xxx (2015) xxxxxx

Table 3
Correlation matrix.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Panel A: Brazil
1. Proportion women 1 0.32 0.18 0.21 0.05 0.10 0.43 0.57 0.32 0.10
2. Firm size 1 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.53 0.26 0.14 0.39 0.18
3. Operational risk 1 0.45 0.02 0.14 0.32 0.09 0.01 0.07
4. Financial risk 1 0.13 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.02
5. Family- control 1 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.10
6. State-ownership 1 0.27 0.03 0.16 0.15
7. Return on assets 1 0.08 0.07 0.01
8. Firm age 1 0.14 0.09
9. Board size 1 0.26
10. % indep. directors 1

Panel B: Russia
1. Proportion women 1 0.28 0.14 0.20 0.02 0.09 0.30 0.19 0.44 0.15
2. Firm size 1 0.19 0.31 0.03 0.35 0.20 0.26 0.16 0.33
3. Operational risk 1 0.29 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06
4. Financial risk 1 0.07 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.01
5. Family- control 1 0.02 0.11 0.21 0.07 0.03
6. State-ownership 1 0.16 0.30 0.09 0.18
7. Return on assets 1 0.02 0.01 0.04
8. Firm age 1 0.16 0.05
9. Board size 1 0.31
10. % indep. directors 1

Panel C: India
1. Proportion women 1 0.49 0.26 0.39 0.58 0.04 0.19 0.51 0.32 0.07
2. Firm size 1 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.40 0.23 0.52
3. Operational risk 1 0.11 0.20 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03
4. Financial risk 1 0.16 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.08
5. Family- control 1 0.10 0.39 0.08 0.11 0.16
6. State-ownership 1 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.04
7. Return on assets 1 0.04 0.10 0.00
8. Firm age 1 0.05 0.01
9. Board size 1 0.42
10. % indep. directors 1

Panel D: China
1. Proportion women 1 0.23 0.14 0.30 0.29 0.05 0.15 0.50 0.36 0.19
2. Firm size 1 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.53 0.18 0.44 0.62 0.25
3. Operational risk 1 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.11 0.01
4. Financial risk 1 0.03 0.22 0.20 0.07 0.03 0.04
5. Family- control 1 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01
6. State-ownership 1 0.25 0.00 0.14 0.10
7. Return on assets 1 0.09 0.05 0.14
8. Firm age 1 0.01 0.19
9. Board size 1 0.43
10. % indep. directors 1

Panel E: US
1. Proportion women 1 0.36 0.43 0.15 0.47 0.30 0.19 0.31 0.28 0.03
2. Firm size 1 0.09 0.14 0.18 0.54 0.02 0.58 0.62 0.45
3. Operational risk 1 0.06 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.05
4. Financial risk 1 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.11
5. Family- control 1 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.03
6. State-ownership 1 0.20 0.04 0.36 0.14
7. Return on assets 1 0.00 0.01 0.07
8. Firm age 1 0.09 0.02
9. Board size 1 0.16
10. % indep. directors 1

Panel F: UK
1.Proportion women 1 0.17 0.11 0.42 0.46 0.09 0.05 0.21 0.25 0.39
2. Firm size 1 0.20 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.07 0.29 0.43 0.17
3. Operational risk 1 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.00
4. Financial risk 1 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.00
5. Family- control 1 0.19 0.32 0.11 0.04 0.08
6. State-ownership 1 0.25 0.24 0.18 0.01
7. Return on assets 1 0.15 0.02 0.06
8. Firm age 1 0.17 0.02
9. Board size 1 0.29
10. % indep. directors 1

All correlations above 0.13 are signicant at the p < 0.05 level.

Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
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A. Saeed et al. / International Business Review xxx (2015) xxxxxx 9

Table 4
Dynamic panel GMM estimates.

Brazil Russia India China US UK

Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
Firm size 0.377*** 0.091 0.112*** 0.028 0.302*** 0.060 0.534*** 0.141 0.457*** 0.105 0.273*** 0.028
Operational risk 0.202*** 0.030 0.285*** 0.043 0.104*** 0.013 0.052** 0.016 0.104*** 0.018 0.209*** 0.051
Financial risk 0.178** 0.055 0.012** 0.005 0.008*** 0.000 0.035*** 0.009 0.708*** 0.161 0.448** 0.202
Family- control 0.002 0.448 0.001 0.382 0.040*** 0.010 0.020** 0.008 0.035** 0.015 0.009*** 0.000
State-ownership 0.061 0.102 0.008** 0.003 0.015** 0.006 0.387 0.705 0.004* 0.002 0.006** 0.002
Return on assets 0.053** 0.020 0.040 0.885 0.065 0.539 0.190 1.004 0.206 0.606 0.172** 0.059
Firm age 0.081 0.354 0.004 0.012 0.006 0.102 0.002 0.057 0.033 0.229 0.004 0.060
Board size 0.092*** 0.019 0.082* 0.034 0.214*** 0.040 0.030*** 0.001 0.112*** 0.014 0.062* 0.027
% indep. directors 0.047*** 0.002 0.107* 0.041 0.020** 0.007 0.014** 0.005 0.050** 0.019 0.031*** 0.001
Industry 1 0.102* 0.045 0.015 0.080 0.044 0.310 0.035 0.118 0.014*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.000
Industry 2 0.150 0.503 0.010*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 0.040*** 0.005 0.093*** 0.024 0.033** 0.012
Industry 3 0.007*** 0.002 0.022 0.065 0.025*** 0.002 0.013*** 0.000 0.010*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.004
No. of obs. 433 388 1271 1152 1212 1092
Sargan test (p- 28.41 22.86 (0.37) 45.76 (0.19) 32.60 (0.42) 14.25 (0.18) 19.30 (0.21)
value) (0.26)
Wald test (joint) 31.92 24.61 (0.00) 52.04 (0.01) 26.77 (0.00) 46.82 (0.00) 27.60(0.00)
(0.00)
AR-1 (p-value) 1.98 2.40 1.63 2.79 2.05 1.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.32)
AR-2 (p-value) 1.05(0.71) 0.32 (0.45) 1.30 1.21 (0.65) 0.90 0.27 (0.45) aa
(0.85) (0.94)

***, **, and * indicate the coefcient is signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Agarwal studies at University of Warwick joined the board of
her fathers company Cairn Energy India; Isha a Yale graduate
joined the board of Reliance; Roshni Nadar graduated from
Kellogg school of Management appointed CEO of the HCL
Technologies; Jayanti Chauhan graduated from University of
London steers the Bisleri Group through holding the directorship
position.7
Lastly, contrary to the signalling advantage of resource-
dependency theory and Hypothesis 4, we observe a negative
effect of state ownership on gender diversity. This indicates that
gender diversity on Indian boards diminishes when state is the
main shareholder. Although India has a history of women political
leaders, however, the mere presence of women in formal political
arenas does not guaranty gender parity because the practices and
norms of patriarchy and orthodox-religion remain strong. Despite
the fact that Indian constitution guarantees women equality (e.g.
women can divorce her husband, daughters have equal right of
inheritance as sons in familys property, and the reservation of a
minimum of 3% of constituencies for women), however the reality
is very contrasting (Sarawagi, 2012). To have a broader impact of
gender-equality legislative efforts, law and society have to work in
tandem, laws need to be supplemented with progressive educa-
tion, training, and role modelling in both workplace and non-
workplace settings (Chaudhary & Valsiner, 2013). Womens
descriptive representation may prove critical not just in legis-
latures, but also within executive branches, bureaucracies, and on
corporate boards, especially that are run by the government. This
7
It is important to note that the positive impact of family ownership on board
gender diversity can be resulted in attracting both female directors who are
relatives of owner (family related) and non-family related female directors. In
Indian sample, for example, 16% (21 out of 126 female directors) female directors are
found to be family related. This low proportion indicates that positive impact of
family ownership is stronger for non-family related women directors. Nevertheless,
we must keep in mind that information on family relationship is mainly retrieved
through checking female director family name (which commonly changes after
marriage, particularly in emerging countries) or from local newspapers, media
reports and the internet. Considering that print and electronic media is usually
under the inuence of large companies in emerging countries (for example, India's
largest company Reliance Industries also owns Indias largest media companies-
Network 18; Russian Gazprom owns NTV) therefore reliable data on family business
boards processes is very difcult to retrieve.
result is inconsistent with the work of Jonge (2014) who reported
that women are more likely to be included in Indian state owned
rms.
Regarding Chinese rms, the results are consistent with the
hypotheses. In line with Hypothesis 1, a positive relationship
between rm size and board gender diversity is observed. Focusing
on risk variables, we nd that rms with low operational and
nancial risks have, on average, more women on the boards. It
indicates that in the Chinese context, women are choosing to serve
on rm boards with lower risk, which is consistent with
Hypothesis 2. The result for family control reveals that women
presence on the board increases when rm is owned by a family.
Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Following Jonge (2014) we may
also attribute our nding to the fact that when there are
insufcient men in the family network able to ll the executive
positions (might be due to the one-child policy), family-related
women are more likely to be considered for that position. Finally,
we fail to nd support for Hypothesis 4, which asserts positive
impact of state ownership on board gender diversity. Our result for
state ownership is at odds with those of Liu et al. (2013) and Jonge
(2014), who nd that state ownership has a positive effect on board
gender diversity in China.
With regard to the results of the UK and the US, we nd strong
support for all of our hypotheses. It is detected that rm size,
corporate risk, family ownership and state ownership are the
determinants of board gender diversity with the expected signs.
Taken together, the organizational factors, namely rm size and
corporate risk, are fully supported and are common predictors of
women representation on boards in emerging as well as developed
countries. Family ownership is partially supported in emerging
countries. However, state ownership is rejected/not supported
across all emerging countries.
5.3. Robustness test
5.3.1. Alternative measure of board gender diversity: at least one
woman on the board
For additional robustness test, we test the sensitivity of our
ndings to the use of an alternative proxy of women representa-
tion on board which has been widely used in related studies such

Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
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10 A. Saeed et al. / International Business Review xxx (2015) xxxxxx

Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Martn-Ugedo and Minguez-Vera
(2014). Specically, we employ a dummy variable taking value one
if there is at least one female director in the boardroom, and zero
otherwise. As our dependent variable is a dummy variable, we
apply Logit regression model, which is commonly used in studying
cases of binary dependent variable. Panel A of Table 5 shows the
results of the Logit regressions. The coefcients for rm size and
corporate risk in all samples remain statistically signicant,
conrming our earlier ndings. Family control remains statistically
signicant for India and China while state-ownership is found
signicant for Brazil and Russia. Largely, we continue to nd
similar effects of organizational variables on board gender
diversity for both BRIC and developed countries as reported
earlier in Table 4. In sum, the results suggest that our main results
are robust to alternative denition of board gender diversity.
5.3.2. Alternative estimation techniques
To further assess the robustness of our ndings, we re-estimate
our results with three different estimation techniques. Firstly, we
run the pooled OLS regression. The results (see panel B of Table 5)
show that the coefcients on the main variables remain similar to
those reported in Table 3. Secondly, due to the large number of
zeros in number of women in the sample, we also use Tobit
regressions to test the robustness of results. The regression results
presented in panel C of Table 5 show low statistical signicance for
the main variables in several instances; however results generally

Table 5
Robustness tests.

Brazil Russia India China US UK

Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E. Coefcient S.E.
Panel A: alternative measure of dependent variable: at least one woman on the board
Firm size 0.083*** 0.020 0.042*** 0.009 0.126** 0.050 0.205*** 0.057 0.106*** 0.029 0.225*** 0.065
Operational risk 0.528*** 0.164 0.176*** 0.038 0.370* 0.184 0.190*** 0.039 0.151*** 0.040 0.104*** 0.032
Financial risk 0.111*** 0.031 0.051*** 0.014 0.022** 0.008 0.070** 0.034 0.068 0.542 0.159** 0.051
Family- control 0.148 0.306 0.012 0.065 0.043*** 0.010 0.031* 0.015 0.060** 0.024 0.026** 0.010
State-ownership 0.090** 0.029 0.032*** 0.008 0.040 0.272 0.104 0.186 0.076*** 0.018 0.101* 0.043
No. of obs. 433 388 1271 1152 1212 1092
Pseudo R-square 0.17 0.20 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.24

Panel B: OLS estimates

Firm size 0.206*** 0.031 0.184*** 0.041 0.266*** 0.018 0.318*** 0.040 0.394*** 0.101 0.180*** 0.015
Operational risk 0.158*** 0.016 0.231*** 0.020 0.112*** 0.022 0.029*** 0.001 0.157*** 0.020 0.225** 0.070
Financial risk 0.090*** 0.020 0.070** 0.013 0.026* 0.009 0.054*** 0.007 0.440*** 0.073 0.471** 0.193
Family-ownership 0.017 0.074 0.010 0.019 0.017*** 0.001 0.062* 0.029 0.101*** 0.008 0.004*** 0.000
State-ownership 0.225 0.159 0.021*** 0.01 0.101*** 0.015 0.244** 0.076 0.001 0.002 0.021*** 0.001
No. of obs. 433 388 1271 1152 1212 1092
R-squared 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.30 0.42

Panel C: Tobit estimates

Firm size 0.518** 0.191 0.173** 0.056 0.245*** 0.040 0.776** 0.302 0.502*** 0.095 0.461** 0.150
Operational risk 0.276** 0.094 0.220*** 0.038 0.090** 0.029 0.040*** 0.005 0.335** 0.106 0.300*** 0.095
Financial risk 0.140** 0.047 0.045* 0.021 0.160*** 0.040 0.093** 0.029 0.489** 0.184 0.128** 0.049
Family- control 0.010 0.053 0.004 0.052 0.039* 0.018 0.018* 0.006 0.066** 0.023 0.050* 0.018
State-ownership 0.105 0.312 0.020* 0.009 0.061 0.123 0.074 0.197 0.024* 0.011 0.010* 0.005
No. of obs. 433 388 1271 1152 1212 1092
Pseudo R-square 0.14 0.22 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.19

Panel D: Heckman sample selection estimates

Firm size 0.260** 0.086 0.151*** 0.045 0.446*** 0.117 0.399*** 0.091 0.349*** 0.071 0.275*** 0.042
Operational risk 0.233*** 0.097 0.198** 0.070 0.270** 0.088 0.086** 0.030 0.212*** 0.054 0.180*** 0.031
Financial risk 0.147*** 0.039 0.083** 0.029 0.055** 0.021 0.021* 0.010 0.535*** 0.120 0.316* 0.148
Family- control 0.030 0.100 0.012 0.051 0.014*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.005 0.018*** 0.001 0.030* 0.015
State-ownership 0.110 0.246 0.027* 0.013 0.033** 0.011 0.260 0.342 0.017* 0.008 0.052** 0.023
Inverse Mills ratio (l) 0.329 0.618 0.570 0.849 0.223 0.180 0.118 0.075 0.046* 0.021 0.415 0.747
No. of obs. 433 388 1271 1152 1212 1092
R-squared 0.25 0.18 0.21 0.32 0.20 0.23

Panel E: cross-country estimations Panel F: additional control variables

Emerging countries Developed countries All countries

Firm size 0.136*** 0.015 0.214*** 0.036 0.201*** 0.004

Operational risk 0.041** 0.020 0.008* 0.005 0.067** 0.020
Financial risk 0.028** 0.013 0.010*** 0.000 0.020** 0.045
Family- control 0.006** 0.002 0.013** 0.005 0.008* 0.051
State-ownership 0.185** 0.075 0.004* 0.002 0.114* 0.093
%Female higher education 0.081 0.367
%Female labor force participation 0.012** 0.010
%Female participation in parliament 0.005 0.103
No. of obs. 3244 2304 5548
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test (p-value) 214.72 (0.31) 50.43 (0.64) 91.04 (0.44)
Wald test (joint) 58.16 (0.00) 35.50 (0.00) 22.05 (0.00)
AR-1 (p-value) 1.83 (0.00) 0.67 (0.00) 2.49 (0.00)
AR-2 (p-value) 0.32(0.12) 0.12(0.88) 1.10 (0.30)

***, **, and * indicate the coefcient is signicant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
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conform to those presented earlier. Lastly, to ascertain that our
results are not driven by the sample self-selection bias we re-
estimate our results using the Heckman (1979) two-stage self-
selection model. In the rst stage, we run a probit model using a
dummy variable indicating the presence of woman on board as a
dependent variable and the set of explanatory variables from
Eq. (1). Additionally, we have included the ratio of females in
management. The increased supply of qualied women increases
the likelihood that rm will appoint female directors. In the second
stage, we run OLS regressions and also include the inverse Mills
ratio, obtained from rst stage probit regression, to correct for
potential self-selection issue.8 Panel D of Table 5 reports the results
from second stage regressions. We nd that the estimated
coefcients of explanatory variables are qualitatively similar to
earlier results, suggesting that our results hold after considering
the sample self-selection bias. Collectively, the evidences suggest
that our results are robust to alternative estimation techniques and
are not driven by the sample self-selection bias.
5.3.3. Cross-country estimation
To check the robustness of our results, we run the cross-country
regression analyses. To do so, we keep separate pools for the
emerging (BRIC) and the developed countries; subsequently, we
run the GMM regressions separately in these two subsamples and
report the regression results in Panel E of Table 5.
Firm size is positive and signicant in BRIC countries, which
testies our earlier ndings on country-by-country analysis. For
corporate risk, support for the Hypothesis 2 is robust to the new
pooled sample of emerging economies. Result indicates that less
risky rms assimilate more women in their boardrooms. We nd a
positive and signicant relationship between family control and
the proportion of women on the board of directors. Moreover, the
coefcient of state ownership is found to be negative, implying that
state ownership discourages board gender diversity in emerging
countries. The results in developed countries subsample are also
consistent with those reported earlier. Thus, we may conclude that
after employing alternative estimation technique, rm specic
factors continue to play an important role in determining board
gender diversity.
5.3.4. Additional control variables
Further, we include macro-economic variables to control for the
country level factors. In doing so, we include the following three
variables: the ratio of female to male that has attained higher level
education, the percentage of female labour force participation, and
the percentage of women in the parliament. These variables are
derived from social, economical and economic forces, respectively,
which may affect the pool of female candidates available for
director selection. The data on these variables are taken from the
United Nations Development Programme Gender Empowerment
Index. Results for pooled regression are shown in Panel F of Table 5.
We nd that our results for main variables remain unaffected.
Regarding macro-economic variables, % female labour force
participation is found to be positive and statistically signicant,
which supports the supply-side perspective argument for the need
of qualied women who are available to boards. Overall, we may
conclude that the base-line results are stable even after controlling
for additional country-level factors.
8
For technical details on Heckman two-stage self-selection model, see Saeed
et al. (2014)
Please cite this article in press as: Saeed, A., et al. Firm-level determinants of gender diversity in the boardrooms: Evidence from some
emerging markets. International Business Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.01.002
11
6. Discussion
Our multivariate analysis suggests that board gender diversity
is positively related to rm size, and it is inversely related to
corporate risk across both emerging and developed countries.
Furthermore, there are country specic differences in the effects of
family control and state ownership on the board gender diversity.
Noticeably, women representation on the boards of Indian and
Russian rms decreases with state ownership, which is in contrast
to US and UK sample rms.
Taken together, our ndings provide further evidence that
institutional theory plays important roles in understanding board
diversity decisions in emerging economies. Theoretically, we move
beyond the typical resource dependency and agency theories and
employ institutional theory to contextualize the organizational
factors with board gender diversity. The results suggest that the
factors determining female representation on boards in both
emerging and developed countries are largely similar. There is,
however, some variation for the effect of ownership structure in
emerging countries. Essentially, although the regulatory and legal
framework of BRIC countries does not create an environment
conducive to increase women presence on board, however,
normative pressures and regulatory forces from outside the
domestic boarders do play an important role in improving the
women number in the boardrooms of emerging market rms.
The empirical evidence in this study offers useful guidance for
the policymakers and regulators concerning board gender
diversity that even if emerging markets differ in institutional
structures yet they share almost the same organizational
predictors of board gender diversity. However, we recommend
that policy makers and various communities in emerging countries
should especially take into account the ownership structure of
companies which has a contrasting effect on the board gender
diversity. As domestic and international agencies have increasingly
focused on workforce gender equality in emerging economies, they
can be helpful in institutionalizing a normative climate which
family and state-owned rms should conform to in order to remain
socially relevant. Further, there is need for the government to
strengthen and develop workforce gender equality institutions to
create more awareness of the benets of gender diversity in top
leadership, and for the implementation of workforce diversity
processes that benet both business and society.
This area of research is ripe for future study. While we
considered gender diversity on boards, future research should
consider other ner aspects of board gender diversity, such as
proportion of executive and independent female directors on
boards. As research suggests women face even more difculty in
getting executive board positions compared to independent
directorship, this phenomenon is termed as double-glass-ceiling
(Nekhili & Gataoui, 2013). Lord Davies, the UK former minister and
champion of board gender diversity highlighted this issue by
stating that top executives are mainly men and not easily replaced,
that leaves non-executive seats as the route for getting more
women on to the board (reported in The Guardian). This is an
indication of the severity of the problem which needs further
investigation. In addition, future research could expand the current
study by focusing on the internal organizational factors such as
organizational culture, human resource practices, and leadership
styles. Case studies could reveal interesting insights into the
director selection process on corporate boards, since quantitative
studies may experience severe difculties in capturing impact of
language and ethnicity or gender diversity; as well as the cultural
biases toward women directorship. Finally, while encapsulating
the unique contextual factors of emerging markets, it would be
interesting to see how Companies bill-2013 impacted on gender
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diversity on Indian corporate boards and to what extent the
outcomes of quota differ from developed countries.
7. Conclusion
Investigating the determinants of the board gender diversity is
fundamental to understand the role of female directors in board
dynamics and effectiveness. However, there is only limited
evidence on this issue, and the existing scholarship on women
representation on boards is mainly focused on studies from the
developed countries. This study extends this sparse literature by
providing new evidence on the organizational determinants of
board gender diversity in emerging markets. Using a unique
dataset of rms from BRIC countries, we present new empirical
insights into the determinants of board gender diversity. Drawing
on the institutional theory, our study investigates the extent to
which organizational determinants of board gender diversity in
BRIC countries differ from those in economies with stable
institutional frameworks owing to institutional differences. The
results suggest that board gender diversity is positively related to
the rm size, and it is inversely related to corporate risk across both
emerging and developed economies.
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