Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

www.elsevier.com/locate/pragma

Frames revisitedthe coherence-inducing

function of frames
Monika A. Bednarek
Department of English Linguistics, Augsburg University,
Universitatsstrae 10, D-86135 Augsburg, Germany
Received 20 September 2003; received in revised form 2 September 2004; accepted 19 September 2004

Abstract

The subject of this paper is the hearers1 application to discourse of frames mental knowledge
structures that capture the typical features of a situation in order to secure coherence. Having
established a working definition of frame, the paper will focus on the relation between text, context,
world-knowledge and coherence. Different types of frames (linguistic as well as non-linguistic) and
their coherence-inducing functions are discussed with reference to authentic examples. It is shown
that the hearers (re-)constructed coherence of texts is the result of a complex interplay of linguistic
(con)text and non-linguistic (frame) knowledge.
# 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Discourse; Coherence; Cohesion; Frames; Scripts; Schemas

1. Introduction: the relevance of frame theory in linguistics

After the cognitive turn in the 1980s, modern linguistics has increasingly favored an
approach to language that is based on our experience of the world and the way we perceive
and conceptualize it, i.e. the cognitive linguistic approach (cf. Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: x).
Some of the key concerns of this branch of linguistics are prototypes, categories, metaphors,
metonymy, and the topic of this paper frames.
Broadly speaking, frame theory deals with our knowledge of the world. In a first
definition, a frame can be regarded as a mental knowledge structure which captures

1
In this paper, hearer refers to hearer(s)/reader(s) and speaker refers to speaker(s)/writer(s).

0378-2166/$ see front matter # 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2004.09.007
686 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

Fig. 1. Overview of the use of the term frame.

the typical features of the world. Ever since its introduction, the frame concept
has interested researchers from various fields and backgrounds (cf. Tannen, 1993a: 3;
1993b: 15). Pioneers came from philosophy and psychology (cf. Konerding, 1993: 8), but
their concepts were developed and reinterpreted by researchers in artificial intelligence
(Minsky, 1975, 1977), and sociology (Goffman, 1974, 1981) to name but a few fields and
authors.2

2
For a discussion of a large number of fields and authors, cf. Tannen (1993b: 15-21) and Konerding (1993: 20-
77).
M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 687

Fig. 2. Overview of linguists terms.

688 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

Despite the fact that there is no unified frame theory with specific terms and definitions,
frame theory has also, in some way or other, gained widespread acceptance by linguists,
who concentrate on various aspects of the frame phenomenon: Raskin (1984) and
Konerding (1993), for instance, are interested in lexicography and the relation between
frames and meaning. Indeed, frame semantics plays a major role in linguistic frame theory.
The Round Table Discussion of frame semanticists (published in Quaderni di Semantica
1985 and 1986) counts among its participants such leading researchers as Fillmore,
Hudson, Raskin and Tannen (see e.g. Fillmore, 1985, 1986). The frame concept has also
been applied in discourse analysis (e.g. Brown and Yule, 1983; Muller, 1984). Chafe (1977)
is primarily concerned with frames and verbalization, i.e. those processes by which
nonverbal knowledge is turned into language (Chafe, 1977: 41) and Shanon (1981) deals
with linguistic indicators (Shanon, 1981: 35) of frames.
Unfortunately, but maybe inevitably, the result of this has been a terminological
confusion: frame became a term associated and linked with different, though related
phenomena. At the same time, a range of other expressions (script, schema, scenario) were
chosen to refer to these notions. Figs. 1 and 2 provide an overview of these developments.
It seems to me as if the competing terms (scenario, schema, script) usually differ only in
emphasis and cannot easily be distinguished, and that, considering the examples used in
their elaboration, they may be seen as particular instances of frames. I will hence follow
Fillmore in regarding frame as a general cover term for the set of concepts variously
known, in the literature on natural language understanding, as schema, script,
scenario, ideational scaffolding cognitive model, or folk theory (Fillmore, 1982:
111).
This paper is concerned with the relationship between frames and discourse, in
particular, the coherence-inducing function of frames. It will be seen that the hearers
application of frames is of crucial importance in enabling him/her to create coherence.
Having established a working definition of frame, I will then outline the various ways in
which such coherence-inducing frames may work in discourse.

2. A working definition of frame

Despite its roots in philosophy and psychology, frame theory is generally associated
with Minskys work in artificial intelligence (AI). In his research, Minsky takes up a
notion introduced by the psychologist Bartlett as early as 1932: [. . .] the past operates
as an organised mass rather than as a group of elements each of which retains its
specific character. (Bartlett, 1932: 197).3 Being a researcher in AI, Minsky is,

3
It is indeed a bit surprising that most of the relevant linguistic literature refers to research undertaken in AI
rather than to research undertaken in psychology and psycholinguistics (my thanks go to one of the reviewers of
this article for pointing this out), although much experimental research in these areas has focused on the role of
(schematic) knowledge in learning, understanding and remembering (Barsalou, 1992). Building on research by
Bartlett (1932) and Piaget (1969) as well as AI research, such experiments (e.g. Bransford, 1979; Bransford and
Johnson, 1973) often use linguistic data, and have shown how essential (frame) knowledge is to effective
comprehension, inferencing, elaboration, construction, recall, indeed virtually every cognitive task (Barsalou,
1992: 163).
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 689

however, first and foremost concerned with the question of how to equip computers
with the world knowledge they would need in order to perform certain otherwise
impossible tasks. But he also claims to be interested in a theory of human thinking
(Minsky, 1975: 215), and his definition of frames is now quite famous and an
often-cited reference in linguistics (e.g. Konerding, 1993: 24; Brown and Yule, 1983:
238):
Here is the essence of the frame theory: When one encounters a new situation [. . .],
one selects from memory a structure called a frame. This is a remembered framework
to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary. A frame is a data-
structure for representing a stereotyped situation like being in a certain kind of living
room or going to a childs birthday party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of
information. [. . .] Some is about what one can expect to happen next (Minsky,
1977: 355).
According to Minsky, then, a frame can be considered a mental representation of our
knowledge of the world, a data-structure that is located in human memory and can be
selected or retrieved when needed. A frame is thought of as a certain structure; it is a
network of nodes and relations (Minsky, 1977: 355) which seem to be structured as
different levels. There are the fixed top levels, representing those components of a
situation that are always true, and there are the lower levels, which have many terminals,
slots that must be filled by specific instances or data (Minsky, 1977: 355). Those
specific instances, or assignments, can themselves be smaller sub-frames, and usually
have to fulfill certain conditions given by the terminals through what Minsky calls
markers. Concerning the terminals, Minsky highlights the fact that
[a] frames terminals are normally already filled with default assignments. [. . .]
The default assignments are attached loosely to their terminals, so that they can be
easily displaced by new items that fit better the current situation. [. . .] Once a frame is
proposed to represent a situation, a matching process tries to assign values to each
frames terminals, consistent with the markers at each place (Minsky, 1977: 356,
original emphasis).
Apparently, some of these assignments are mandatory, others optional (Minsky,
1975: 239). Basically, this means that in our memory, knowledge is stored in a very
large number of frames and frame-systems (collections of related frames, Minsky,
1977: 355). For instance, we might possess something like a [BED-ROOM]4 frame, a
[HOSPITAL] frame, a [SCHOOL] frame and so on, each of which is comprised of certain
typical features such as BED, LAMP, BED-SIDE TABLE, etc. in the case of the [BED-ROOM]
frame. When we encounter a new situation (e.g. on entering a particular bed-room), a
selecting and matching process begins: first, a frame is evoked on the basis of partial
evidence or expectation (Minsky, 1977: 359). Then, we compare the new experience
(the particular bed-room) to this selected frame ([BED-ROOM]) and finally, we assign
features of this new experience (a particular bed, lamp, bed-side table, etc.) to the

4
Following Ungerer and Schmid, frames will be indicated typographically by small capitals in brackets.
Frame features or cognitive categories will be indicated by small caps only (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996: 206).
690 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

frames terminals (depending on whether the features satisfy the conditions governing
their assignments).
One of the problems with Minskys frame theory is its fuzziness. That is to say, most of
the time, he relies on the power of his hypotheses as well as on the readers power of
imagining the cognitive actions he proposes. As Minsky himself admits, his theory is
incomplete and fragmented:
[t]he schemes proposed herein are incomplete in many respects. First, I often
propose representations without specifying the processes that will use them.
Sometimes I only describe properties the structures should exhibit. I talk about
markers and assignments as though it were obvious how they are attached and linked;
it is not (Minsky, 1975: 213).
Despite its shortcomings, however, Minskys frame concept remains a helpful one, if its
specifics are disregarded. On the whole, a frame concept derived from the one Minsky
developed helps explain a number of linguistic phenomena and proves a useful tool in
discourse analysis.
As mentioned above, Minsky considered a frame a cognitive phenomenon, a structure
that is stored in the mind. In linguistics, it was at first regarded as a linguistic concept by
Fillmore, but experienced a cognitive reinterpretation in the course of the years; nowadays,
most linguists agree in their definition of frame as a mental phenomenon, as a knowledge
structure (e.g. Yule, 1996: 85, Tannen and Wallat, 1993: 60, Stubbs, 2001: 3). Such
knowledge structures are not innate but acquired through socialization, constructed out of
experience (out of our own experience or accounts of experiences by others etc.), and are
hence both diachronically and culturally dependent. The importance of cultural
dependency has been shown by Tannen (1993b) and Yule (1996: 87); as to diachronic
dependency, it is one of the logical consequences of socialization (e.g., before the invention
of the computer and other technical innovations, people did not possess any associated
frames). Once established, frames are rather stable (cf. Stubbs, 2001: 5), with some frames
seeming more stable than others, i.e. not as prone to change. It seems probable that such
stable frames usually concern situations or objects which have exhibited the same features
for centuries and are unlikely to change in the near future, for instance a [BED-ROOM] frame.
Other frames, dealing with more fluid situations or concepts (for example role-related
frames) are more likely to change.
Socialization is always both individual and social. We experience life individually
and subjectively, but we also possess certain innate perception patterns that we use to
interpret the world, and we have more or less the same social experiences depending on
our respective culture (cf. Muller, 1984: 57). Inasmuch as they are relevant to
communication, frames appear to be conventionalized and capture the prototypical
features of a situation.5
5
This does not mean that frames may not additionally include idiosyncratic features, but that these are, in
general, irrelevant to communication. This has been emphasized by Clark (1978), who argues that hearers, on
hearing an utterance such as hes crazy, may indeed associate this utterance with the fact that they have a mad
Uncle Harry. But, he says, they set aside this association, knowing that it cannot be relevant as far as the speakers
original intention is concerned. This suggests that the hearers idiosyncratic properties of frames are not usually
called up for the interpretation of the discourse at hand.
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 691

As far as the structure of frames is concerned, there is hardly any linguistic evidence for
frame structure (and no simple way to observe frame structure in detail). This is probably
why linguists often do not touch this matter and if they do, they usually refer back to
Minskys frame structure (e.g. Brown and Yule, 1983: 239). Ungerer and Schmid (1996:
212 f.) see a frame as being constructed out of categories and their specific
interrelations (e.g. X has a Y, X is on Y, X is a part of Y); the categories provide default
assignments (by supplying prototypes) and associated expectations. It does seem
reasonable to adopt such a more general view, since we cannot directly observe the
structure of frames.6
Some of the features/components in a frame seem to be more central to a frame than
others. In a [BED-ROOM] frame, for example, one would always expect something like a
bed. This would only change in the unlikely case that reality as we know it, has become
radically altered (for example, if no more beds could be found in bedrooms because
everyone sleeps on the floor). The BED feature seems to be a feature which is very central
to the [BED-ROOM] frame and associated expectations are very high. In contrast, other
features of the frame such as TV, or MIRROR, might not necessarily be expected in a
bedroom, but are still considered part of the frame. Minsky differentiates between
obligatory and optional features (cf. Minsky, 1975: 239), but I would prefer to speak of
central and peripheral features, the features being situated on a scale, simply because it
is not easy to discover which features are really obligatory: a bedroom, for example,
might still be considered a bedroom, even if there is no bed in it (e.g., when someone has
just moved in and sleeps on the floor); in this case, the function of a bed-room is the
central feature.
Quite often, a feature is itself a sub-frame. Consider the [FLYING ON A PLANE] frame,
which consists, according to Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 212), of various components such
as PILOT, FLIGHT ATTENDANT, LIFE VEST etc., as well as of sub-frames which stand for more
specific situations of a flight, e.g. [EATING], [WATCHING THE MOVIE] and [GOING TO THE TOILET].
This would be a (static) default hierarchy.
It is also possible to classify frames in different ways. Frames differ greatly in respect to
complexity and specificity: they have more general and more specific forms (going on
holiday versus going on a cheap last-minute package holiday to Spain). (Stubbs, 2001: 5).
Moreover, Tannen distinguishes between frames that refer to events ([PERSONAL ENCOUNTERS],
[CONFRONTATION], [ACCIDENT], [THEFT]) and those that refer to objects ([PEAR TREE], [ROAD])
(Tannen, 1993b: 35ff.). Probably, frames can also refer to persons, actions, places, types,
roles etc. Scripts or scenarios are, of course, also terms for frames which refer to events (see
above).
To sum up, in my working definition (derived from Minskys and Ungerer and
Schmids), a frame consists of cognitive features/components and their relations. A feature/
component can itself be a sub-frame. The features seem to exist on a scale ranging from
central to peripheral and provide default assumptions by supplying prototypes. Associated
expectations are higher with regards to central features than with regards to peripheral
features: if a feature is central to a frame, a speaker will most certainly expect an actual
instance of this feature when its respective frame is activated.

6
However, instead of categories, I shall speak of frame features or components.
692 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

3. Frames and coherence

The effort to establish a working definition of frame has shown that there are certain
drawbacks and shortcomings regarding frame theory (in particular, that the nature of
frames must remain highly speculative). Yet, as will be seen in the following, its
application provides an interesting angle on the relation between text, context, world
knowledge, and coherence.
Like the frame concept, coherence is a rather fuzzy notion in linguistics and there is as
yet no generally accepted definition or theory of coherence (cf. Bublitz, 1999:1). Here, I
shall not discuss the notion in detail, but will restrict myself to some observations
concerning the difference between cohesion and coherence. Cohesion is a property of texts
and refers to the linguistic means that provide texture (i.e., link the sentences of a text),
such as Halliday and Hasans (1976) reference, substitution, ellipsis, reiteration,
collocation and conjunction, Hoeys (1991) patterns of lexis, etc. Coherence, on the
other hand is best described as the semantic, logical, or cognitive connections that underlie
a text (cf. de Beaugrande and Dressler, 1981: 4; Bussmann, 1996: 80; Thompson and Zhou,
2000: 121). Rather than assuming that these connections exist independently of the speaker
or hearer, coherence is nowadays clearly defined in relation to the hearers contribution:
[. . .] coherence is only measurable in terms of a readers assessment (Hoey, 1991: 11).
Thus, we may come up with a simple distinction between coherence and cohesion:
coherence is not a text-inherent property; it concerns the logical relations in a given text
which are established by hearers. In other words, it refers to the extent to which hearers find
that this text holds together and constitutes a unified whole. Cohesion, on the other hand,
is a text-inherent property; it concerns the explicit textual means by which potential logical
connections are signaled. In other words, it refers to the way in which sentences are
connected in a text by lexical and structural means (cf. also Bublitz, 1999).
Thus, I shall assume that it is the hearers who establish coherence, and not the texts,
although the cohesive means of texts play a large role in helping hearers to establish
coherence. In general, we operate on a default principle of coherence (cf. Brown and Yule,
1983: 66 f.; Bublitz and Lenk, 1999: 156 f.), assuming that a text is coherent (and that the
speaker adheres to the principles of cooperation (Grice, 1975) that are taken for granted in
conversation). This is why we go to great lengths in order to create coherence, drawing on
all possible cues. Consider (1), which I have taken from Vuchinich (1977):

(1)
S: Well unless youre not a member; if yer a member of TM h=Transcendental
Meditationi people do, ah simply because its such a fucking high price
to get in there (1,0 sec) its like thirty five dollars
C: its like water polo
(2,0 sec)
S: Why, is it expensive
(Vuchinich, 1977: 246)

In this example, Ss assumption of coherence leads him/her to interpret Cs remark its

like water polo as relevant and coherent, although, in fact, C wanted to test the reaction of
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 693

his partner by deliberately uttering a non-coherent utterance (cf. Vuchinich, 1977: 235).
Thus, S tries to look for a way to make sense of this comparison, coming up with the most
likely explanation, namely that TM is like water polo because both are expensive. One
might argue that S takes into account two frames here: the established [TRANSCENDENTAL
MEDITATION] discourse frame with an emphasis on the feature EXPENSIVE and a default [WATER
POLO] frame. Induced by Cs statement, S tries to establish an analogy between these two
frames on the basis of the prominent feature EXPENSIVE. However, as his/her default [WATER
POLO] frame does not automatically include the feature EXPENSIVE, and because s/he is not
certain of this [WATER POLO] frame, i.e. s/he is not certain of the fact that EXPENSIVE is not
included in WATER POLO, s/he has to question C about it.7
In the following sections, I shall give some more examples in which hearers resort to
frames in order to establish coherence. It has been shown that frame breaks may cause
misunderstanding (Falkner, 1997: 115117), a disturbance in communication, or more
precisely, disturbed coherence (Bublitz and Lenk, 1999: 162 f.; 170 f.). The emphasis in
this paper, however, will be placed on the way in which hearers apply a certain frame to a
piece of text in order to create coherence, and on which grounds they do so. In this respect, I
will discuss both frames about non-linguistic phenomena in the world and frames about
language and communication. It is especially the latter that are often neglected in linguistic
research on frames.

3.1. Specialized frames: [RUGBY], [CRICKET]

It is quite obvious that our frames for non-linguistic phenomena in the world
contribute much to the coherence of discourse. This is also the reason that frame-
conflicts trigger lengthy explanations and cause contradictions or questions
(Tannen, 1993b; Tannen and Wallat, 1993). The importance of frames for understanding
a text becomes more than obvious in examples of highly specialized language use, such
as in (2):

(2)
Rugby
[...]The world champions [Australia] outscored the Maori in Saturday [...] five tries
to two but did not seal victory until replacement winger Graeme Bond went over to
score right on fulltime. [...] The Wallabies looked to have the match under control
when Larkham intercepted a loose pass from replacement David Hill and sprinted
half the length of the field to score untouched and give his side a 31-19 lead with 15
minutes to go. But the Maori pulled back to within two points with less than five
minutes to go with Spencers try and two penalties from Hill. [...]Walker went past
four defenders to score a wonderful solo try.

This example shows the significance of the existence of specialized frames in the
hearers mind. In (2), rugby induces the hearer to apply his/her [RUGBY] frame to the

7
A speaker certain of his/her [WATER POLO] frame, because s/he is, for instance, active in this sport, might have
answered something like Why, water polo isnt expensive instead.
694 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

text, and there are manifold expressions in the text which relate to this frame, for
instance five tries to two, replacement winger, to score right on fulltime, intercepted a
loose pass, to score untouched, to score a wonderful solo try, and so on. As Brown and
Yule point out, unless the reader has specialized knowledge about the [mentioned]
entity [...], this type of expression will create a potential discontinuity in the readers
interpretation and require inferencing. (1983: 267). The text itself guides the hearer to
make certain inferences about the actions and entities in question. Thus, the hearer may
assume that five tries are better than two, that to score untouched is a good thing, that in
rugby you score a try etc. The hearer might, in addition, apply related [SPORT] frames to
the text; in this case, linguistic expressions such as penalty and score may be
interpreted in reference to known frames with which they are also associated. Penalty
would then be seen as something negative, score as something positive, a desired goal
of the game. Hearers will generally try to establish coherence in this text both through
the text and through the application of other, related frames. In (3), this seems much
more difficult because of the high frequency of expressions which do not allow the
application of related frames, so that hearers have to rely on the context alone to infer
meaning.

(3)
Cricket
[...] But Australia set off in hot pursuit and were barely put out of their stride when
Shoaib did Adam Gilchrist for pace with a ball which bowled the wicketkeeper-
batsman between bat and pad from round the wicket. (http://uk.sports.yahoo.com/
010609/4/buk19/html)

In both (2) and (3), readers with the respective [RUGBY] and [CRICKET] frame, however,
would not have any difficulty in creating a perfectly understandable and coherent
interpretation of these texts. They would know for instance, that in (2) a try refers to the
games GOAL of getting the ball over the line at the end of the playing-field and touching
it down without being touched and that you SCORE 5 POINTS by doing so. They would
know wingers are players whose position is on the side of the pitch, that fulltime refers to
the END OF THE GAME and that scoring untouched means that no one even tackled the
player, whereas a solo try refers to a player not passing the ball to anyone else in scoring.
Readers with the relevant background would also apply their frame knowledge about
[CRICKET] to (3), i.e. that there are two TEAMS (of 11 men), who are alternatively BATTERS
and FIELDERS. They would know that when it is a teams turn to bat, two batsmen go in the
field and try to hit the CRICKET BALL as far as possible and get as many RUNS as possible
(by running the 22 yards between the two wickets (a set of three stumps topped by a pair
of bails)), while the fielders try to catch the ball. And that the BOWLERS GOAL is to hit the
wicket, while the wicketkeeper (who squats behind the wicket) tries to catch the ball to
get the batsman out. They would hence know the significance of what is described in
the text: the bowler (Shoaib) bowled a very fast ball which was too fast for the batsman
(Adam Gilchrist) to play against (did [him] for pace), and which went between his bat
and his pad (the wooden club and protective clothing for his legs with which he defends
his wicket). This ball was delivered by Shoaib with his non-bowling arm closest to the
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 695

wicket (from round the wicket) and bowled Gilchrist (hit his stumps causing him to lose
his wicket).8
While examples like these are full of specialized language use, more generally (as
confirmed by the findings of Tannen and Wallat, 1993) frame-conflicts are a considerable
source of disturbed coherence, and are responsible for translation problems as well as
cross-cultural misunderstandings. There seems to be an interaction between frame
instigating words and expressions (which guide the application of a certain frame to a given
piece of discourse), the frames existing in a hearers mind, and the creation of coherence.

3.2. Frames about communication

Frames about non-linguistic phenomena are not the only type of frames that contribute
to coherence; frames about communication, too, may create coherence. In the following, I
shall look at the establishment of coherence through communicative frames for text
types, genres, and communicative principles.
3.2.1. Frames about communication I: [TEXT TYPES], [GENRES]
[TEXT TYPE/GENRE] frames may play a certain role in creating coherence, for instance
where literature is concerned. Here is an example from a contemporary text (text source
follows at later point).
(4)
[Mrs. and Mr. Smith discuss the death of Bobby Watson]
Mrs. Smith No, its his wife Im thinking of. She was called Bobby. Like
him, Bobby Watson. Since they had the same name, one could not distinguish
between them when one saw them together. Only after his death could one really
know who was the one and who was the other. Still, even today there are people
who mix her up with the deceased and offer her their condolences. You know her?
Mr. Smith. Ive only seen her once, by chance, at Bobbys funeral.
Mrs. Smith. Ive never seen her. Is she beautiful?
Mr. Smith. She has regular facial features and yet one cannot say shes beautiful.
She is too tall and too big. Her features are not regular and still one can say that
she is very beautiful. She is a bit too short and too thin. She is a voice teacher.
[. . .]
Mrs. Smith. And when are the two planning to get married?
For any reader who approaches this text without any prior information, this extract
certainly seems incoherent and absurd, being full of contradictions and frame-breaks.
There do not seem to be any linguistic cues in the text that automatically would evoke a
frame in which this piece of discourse was coherent. Most of the time, however, readers
know in advance what type of text they are dealing with: a newspaper article, an 18th
century novel, a poem, a contemporary novel, a drama etc., and thus, the respective frame is
evoked simply because of the situation.9 Now, if a reader knows that what s/he is dealing
8
I would like to thank David Oakey for his help with these examples.
9
There may also be features in the text typical of a certain genre and allowing hearers to identify it as such, but
often readers know from the beginning what they are dealing with and they expect a piece of discourse consistent
with their frame for the text type/genre in question.
696 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

with in (4) is indeed an extract from Ionescos La Cantatrice Chauve (Ionesco,

1984: 11; my translation, MB), a piece of absurd theater, s/he may find it in a way
coherent within this frame. The application of an [ABSURD THEATER] frame may render
the text coherent because that frame includes features such as ABSURDITY OF LIFE,
INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SIGNIFIE AND SIGNIFIANT, or INSUFFICIENCY OF
10
LANGUAGE.

3.2.2. Frames about communication II: [JOKE]

Example (4) has already shown how [TEXT TYPE/GENRE] frames can be applied by hearers
to establish at least some degree of coherence for an otherwise completely incoherent piece
of discourse. A similar, if slightly different example is (5):

(5)
Jacob: Theres a guy driving his car down the road, okay? He was driving along. And hes
driving a nineteen-fifty-seven convertible, T-bird. And he sees uh Jay Leno
jogging along the side of the road. And he goes, I hate talk show hosts. He
swerves over and he runs him over, kills him. And hes driving, and he turns a
corner, driving down the road a bit. And he sees ah ah Johnny Carson. And he says,
God, I hate talk show hosts. He swerves over and he kills him. Then he- then
he sees the uh his minister hitchhiking on the side of the road. {tsk} And he stops
and he says, Hows it going father, do you need a ride? Hes like Yes, my son,
yes, could you take me to the uh church? And they start driving along he sees
Oprah Winfrey driving along- yknow jogging along on the side of the road. And
he goes, God, I hate talk show hosts, but Ive got a minister here, its kind of risky
to swerve over and kill her, yknow? {tsk} So he goes, Heres what Ill do: Ill

10
Here is the original French text:

Mme Smith. Non, cest a sa femme que je pense. Elle sappelait comme lui, Bobby, Bobby Watson. Comme
ils avaient le meme nom, on ne pouvait pas les distinguer lun de lautre quand on les voyait
ensemble. Ce nest quapres sa mort a lui, quon a pu vraiment savoir qui etait lun et qui etait
lautre. Pourtant, aujourdhui encore, il y a des gens qui la confondent avec le mort et lui
presentent des condoleances. Tu la connais?
M. Smith. Je ne lai vue quune fois, par hasard, a lenterrenment de Bobby.
Mme Smith. Je ne lai jamais vue. Est-ce quelle est belle?
M. Smith. Elle a des traits reguliers et pourtant on ne peut pas dire quelle est belle. Elle est trop grande et
trop forte. Ses traits ne sont pas reguliers et pourtant on peut dire quelle est tres belle. Elle est un
peu trop petite et trop maigre. Elle est professeur de chant.
[...]
Mme Smith. Et quand pensent-ils se marier, tous les deux?

The early criticism, or misunderstanding of Ionescos play is equally explicable by frame-theory. People did not
yet possess an [ABSURD THEATER] frame, only a [DRAMA] frame which they applied to the piece. Because of
what they saw on stage was not included in their frame, they could not make any sense of the play; in a way, this
was a case of disturbed coherence. (This also applies to other forms of art, for instance abstract art, or performance
art.)
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 697

pretend like I uh I sneeze and Ill swerve by mistake. So he is driving along.

When she comes up, he sort of sneezes, and he swerves over, and he has his eyes
closed, and he goes, Oh, my God, I heard a thud. Did I hit her? And the minister
goes, No, you missed her, but I got her with the car door.

Erik: Hehheh.
Jacob: I got a laugh.
(SBCCN: Two jokes, my emphasis)
In (5), there is a clear instance of a frame-break which could supposedly lead to
disturbed coherence. Minister evokes a default [MINISTER] frame in the hearer which should
include such features as PEACEFUL, LAW-ABIDING, NOT AGGRESSIVE etc. Thus, the fact that the
minister actually kills someone and the way he talks about it present clear frame-breaks. But
this does not lead to disturbed coherence, or indeed any miscommunication because of the
superordinate [JOKE] frame which is applied to this piece of discourse. In jokes, things do not
have to be probable, or realistic, nor do they have to conform to our knowledge of what
things typically are like in the world. Indeed, frame-breaks are an important feature in jokes,
and they often give rise to humorous effects. This becomes quite clear in the following
example:

(6):
Ralph: You ever hear that joke?
Mary: No. {laughing}
Ralph: Well, it was just one woman wanted a telegram? She always wanted a
singing telegram? Guy says, Maam I dont think you want this as a singing
telegram. Yeah, go ahead. Fred and the kids are dead. {singing and
clapping}
Mary: {laughs briefly} I didnt get it.
Ralph: You dont get it. You dont sing a telegram about death or anything bad
news.
(SBCCN: Singing Telegram, my emphasis)

To explain why the joke is funny, Ralph simply resorts to stating the frame-
break: You dont sing a telegram about death or anything bad news. The frame-break
may thus be seen as the very cause of laughter, the essence of the joke in this case as well as
in (5). The application of the [JOKE] frame by the hearer to both (5) and (6) leads to
unproblematic coherence of both pieces of discourse. In contrast to (4), the Ionesco example,
[JOKE] frames are usually triggered by the text. In all of the SBCCN examples of jokes,
the [JOKE] frame was either triggered by the context (i.e. people were talking about jokes
in general and then told a joke), or, more often, by introductory remarks by the speaker such
as:

 You know that joke?

 Have you heard the drunken Irishman one?/You ever hear that joke?
 Did I tell you my lumber joke?
698 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

 Didnt you tell the one about the the guy in the bar who who suddenly uh starts
hearing these very nice things said about him?
 Ive got a joke for you./Ive got a pretty a pretty topical joke, pretty uh current joke, pretty
important joke for the country to hear.11

With these introductions, speakers successfully guide hearers creation of coherence and
help them to apply the right frame to what follows.

3.2.3. Frames about communication III: communicative principles

Other frequent instances of the way in which frames about language help to establish
coherence are found in [COMMUNICATION] frames. These seem to be particularly called for
whenever no explicit cohesive means are present in the text. This is the case in the much
quoted example (7):

(7)
A: Theres the doorbell.
B: Im in the bath.
(Brown and Yule, 1983: 196)

as well as in the following example:

(8)
A: Wheres Bill?
B: Theres a yellow VW outside Sues house.
(Levinson, 1983: 192).

In both cases, one might argue that the first pair part of the exchange opens a frame
which allows to treat the second pair part as an answer. Apart from the application of what
one might term a [QUESTION] frame, other communicative principles may also play a part in
the coherent interpretation of these utterances. However, because communicative
principles/maxims have been treated so extensively in pragmatics I shall not discuss
them further in this section. Moreover, it seems as if texts which exhibit no cohesion
whatsoever are relatively rare (Bublitz and Lenk, 1999: 165).

3.3. Reference resolution

So far, we have seen how the application of linguistic and non-linguistic frames
may help hearers to establish the overall coherence of texts. The focus will now
be on the hearers application of frames in order to identify the referents of
referring expressions. As Bublitz and Lenk (1999: 165) point out, unclear reference
can lead to different degrees of disturbed coherence. Conversely, resorting to frames
for reference resolution may be regarded as a special case of establishing coherence.
In the following, I shall discuss the identification of referents of NPs with

11
All examples are taken from the SBCCN (now called the SCoSE, Saarbrucken Corpus of Spoken English).
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 699

de finite/indefinite articles, pronouns, and vague category identifiers (Channell,

1994:128).

3.3.1. Reference resolution I: definite/indefinite article

One of the most important aspects of how frames contribute to coherence is the
way they help the hearer to understand the reference of items introduced by a definite
article. Frames help to create coherence by allowing the hearer to identify the correct
(intended) referent of both definite and indefinite NPs, as seen in the following extract
(definite NP):

(9)
He slammed the door of his building behind him; in wet weather, the lock tended to
stick, and only violence would get the massive door to close or open. He shook his
umbrella a few times, then furled it and stuck it under his arm. With his right hand,
he grabbed the handrail and began the long climb to their apartment.
(Donna Leon, Acqua Alta, 207, my emphasis)

In this example, both the lock and the handrail are definite NPs whose interpreta-
tion depends on frame-knowledge. The use of the definite article here does not correspond
to its three basic functions usually described in traditional grammars (e.g. Quirk et al.,
1973: 72 f.):

 It does not presuppose an earlier mention of the item introduced by the definite article
such as in He saw a man on the street . . . The man wore a dark coat.
 There is no postmodification specifying the referent such as in He slammed the door of
his building behind him.
 The item introduced is not unique such as in the sun, the moon, the stars.12

Frame theory, however, may explain this specific use of the definite article quite clearly.
One might argue that the door of his building opens up two frames: a [DOOR] frame and a
[BUILDING] frame, with the [DOOR] frame probably constituting a sub-frame to the supe-
rordinate [BUILDING] frame. The [DOOR] frame allows the hearer to take for granted several
likely features of the frame: that a door may be opened, that you enter or exit a building/a
room through a door, that a door has a handle, that a door has a lock, and so on. Similarly,
the [BUILDING] frame might include such features as PLACE WHERE PEOPLE LIVE, PLACE IN WHICH
APARTMENTS MAY BE SITUATED, and the sub-frame [STAIRS] comprising the likely existence of a

12
The use of the definite article may be closely related, however, to one case of specific reference mentioned by
Quirk and Greenbaum only in passing:

Even more covert are the presuppositions which permit the definite article in examples like the following:
John asked his wife to put on the kettle while he looked in the paper to see what was on the radio.
No prior mention of a kettle, a paper, a radio is needed, since these things are part of the cultural situation (Quirk
et al., 1973: 73; original emphasis).
As in this constructed example, in (9) also, the lock and the handrail may, broadly speaking, be said to be part of
the cultural situation, but I feel it is more fruitful to analyse these NPs in terms of frame theory.
700 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

HANDRAIL. This is why the hearer will have no problems to understand the first reference to
the lock and to the handrail, even though there is no antecedent. The hearer simply takes
the speakers instructions (the use of a frame-instigating expression) and infers an
interpretative frame to which to relate the following text.13 Thus, frame-instigating
expressions/frame key-words and their associated default frames help the hearer to
understand discourse, in other words, to create coherence.
Indefinite NPs may sometimes also be employed with specific reference. Indeed, it is a
well-known property of indefinite NPs such as the one in the much quoted example, Hes
going to marry a Norwegian, that the NP may be used both with specific reference
(referring to a specific Norwegian) and with generic reference, (referring to any Norwegian
in general). This potential ambiguity is, however, usually resolved in discourse. Consider
now the following example:

(10)
It is strange that the present centurys greatest hero is likely to remain Winston
Churchill. For much of his life, respectable people regarded him as a reckless
adventurer. As a wartime leader, he was accused of terrible crimes, and of
mistakes which cost the nation dear. [...]
That Churchill should continue to symbolise the defence of freedom is partly
because of a coincidence in timing. [...]
Reading Martin Gilberts spare, lucid and sensitive biography, Churchill: A life,
one is reminded yet again of Churchills messiah-like quality arriving, God-given,
in the nick of time to raise the spirits of those who still believed in a political system
which had everywhere been reviled, corrupted and duped by the totalitarians. [...]
Of Hitler and even Roosevelt there have been revisionist accounts a-plenty, but
attempts to replace the propaganda newsreel images of Churchill have so far
been rare and unconvincing.
That Gilberts account of Churchill, the product of more than three decades of
meticulous research, reinforces the classic versions is probably inevitable. [...] Gilbert
makes no apology for being the official biographer par excellence, and as
such he has performed an inestimable service. The author tells the famous
story of how Parliament misguidedly expressed its gratitude to an ageing
premier by commissioning Graham Sutherland to paint his portrait with a result
so brutally candid that Clementine ordered its destruction.
(Ben Pimlett on: Churchill: A Life, by Martin Gilbert, The Guardian Weekly,
21 April 1991, my emphasis)

In the above extract, an ageing premier has a specific reference: Winston Churchill;
however, establishing this reference, or coherence, seems to be rather complex. On the one
hand, an ageing premier is used anaphorically, referring back to Churchill. On the other
hand, a) it does not refer back to the same Winston Churchill as in the previous text, but to
a Winston Churchill at a certain period of his life, and b) there is no mention in the text

13
Quirk et al. (1985: 267ff) explain this use of the definite article by reference to general knowledge and
ellipsis, but also note that this explanation does not [. . .] apply to all such cases (Quirk et al., 1985: 268).
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 701

whatsoever that Churchill was once prime minister of Great Britain. It is possible to argue
that the first mention of Winston Churchill in the text opens up a frame allowing the hearer
to take for granted the fact that he was prime minister, that he is an important figure in
British history and that his wife was called Clementine. If one knows these details and
even better if one knows the famous story of the painting, then one will have no trouble at
all to treat this text as coherent and identify the correct referent for an ageing prime
minister. It is equally probable, however, that the hearer does not possess all of this
knowledge and that s/he is only certain of the fact that Churchill was once prime minister of
Britain. In this case, the identification of the intended referent is still possible on the basis of
analogy and the expectation that an abrupt change of topic is not likely. Operating on the
default assumption of coherence, the hearer might make the following inferences: if the
text mentions Churchill, and if I know that Churchill was prime minister, it is likely given
the text type that an ageing prime minister does refer to Churchill. Thus the hearers
knowledge, both about Churchill and about certain text-specific principles, enable him/her
to establish coherence. These frames might even allow the hearer to infer that Clementine
was in fact the name of Churchills wife and thus permit the identification of this referring
expression as well.14

3.3.2. Reference resolution II: pronouns

Pronouns as stated by Halliday and Hasan (1976) constitute important cohesive
devices in that they create coherence. In unproblematic examples, the co-reference relation
between antecedent and anaphor is clear, the pronouns form a cohesive chain (cf.
Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 15) of co-reference and may thus be said to create coherence by
virtue of their reference property alone. This, however, is not always the case. Brown and
Yule (1983: 216 ff.) give a number of examples in which the antecedent-anaphor relation is
more problematic and in which the identification of the intended referent depends upon the
hearers knowledge and their correct inferences.15 In the following, I shall discuss two
examples, (11 and 12):

(11)
Theres a car going up the road and he comes to a crossroads
(Brown and Yule, 1983: 217)

Apparently, (11) presents a mismatch in terms of gender agreement, he referring to a

grammatically human antecedent, where there only seems to be a non-human
antecedent. The hearer is thus required to resolve this mismatch to create coherence. It
seems plausible that a car and going up the road (i.e. moving) combine to instigate a
[DRIVING A CAR] frame in the hearer, who then may assume the existence of a driver as
part of the default frame, and conclude that the he is used to refer to this driver. Thus,
the apparent mismatch between antecedent nominal and subsequent pronoun is
solved to a sufficient degree of satisfaction. Again, it is the default assumption

14
Note also that this use of the indefinite article (an ageing prime minister rather than the ageing prime
minister) is not easily explicable by reference to the criteria in Quirk et al. (1985: 272f.).
15
They do not analyze these examples in terms of frame theory, however.
702 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

of coherence, together with what seems a deviation from the norm of gender agreement in
co-reference, which prompts the hearers inferences and his/her creation of coherence.
In other instances of pronoun use, too, no direct antecedent nominal exists in the text;
but here, the text instigates a frame in the hearer which, in turn, provides the basis for
determining the intended referent of the pronoun. The use of the pronoun she in the
following example provides an example:

(12)
[Talking about the First World War]
I used to go about with a chap I dont know whether hes still alive now or not but
there was nine ten eleven in the family altogether two girls and nine boys
and she lost eight sons one after the other
(Brown and Yule, 1983: 218)

Brown and Yule point out, there is no linguistic expression which could be treated as the
direct antecedent for she (Brown and Yule, 1983: 218). However, this is not a case of
exophoric reference in the way Halliday and Hasan (1976: 32 ff.) understand the concept: the
pronoun does not refer to the context of situation. But neither can it be said to be strictly
anaphoric, referring to another item within the text (Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 32).
Instead, she relates to a frame feature. The key-word family seems to trigger a [FAMILY] frame
and, together with the mentioning of another frame element, namely SONS, permits the hearer
to treat she as referring to the frame element MOTHER. In a broader sense, this use of the pronoun
is anaphoric, because the preceding text is the source of the evocation of the frame.16 Thus, it
does relate to the text as well as to the frame. Linguistic cues given by the speaker are the
reason for the application of a certain frame by the hearer; without these cues and their
associated frame, the hearer could neither identify the referent nor create coherence.

3.3.3. Reference resolution III: Vague category identifiers

Frames may also be applied in order to help hearers identify the referents introduced by
vague category identifiers, i.e. structures consisting of exemplars of categories and tags
such as or something/anything, and things, and things like that, and that (Channell, 1994:
131), for instance:

(13)
There was no kind of social contact there was no coffee room or anything (Channell,
1994: 119).

The function of such structures is to direct[. . .] the hearer to access a set, of which the
given item is a member whose characteristics will enable the hearer to identify the set
(Channell, 1994: 122). Channell has carried out tests with native speaker respondents in
order to find out how hearers identify the respective category of such vague expressions and
points out that both linguistic and world knowledge are drawn upon in reference resolution.

16
Schwarz calls this type of anaphor-antecedent relation indirect anaphors (Schwarz, 1997: 449 f.). Compare
also Quirk et al., 1985: 267ff).
 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705 703

For instance, for the test sentence She said they eat rice and that, didnt she, one respondent
called up the following categories:

Respondent a.
vegetarian context: rice, beans, dried vegetables
Chinese context: rice, chicken, green vegetables, sweet and sour
Greek context: stuffed pepper, pilaf
(Channell, 1994: 127)

What is called context here could equally well be called frame. Frame theory would
then suggest that such vague category identifiers in fact call up associated frames (rice
could be associated with a [VEGETARIAN FOOD] frame, a [CHINESE FOOD] frame or a [GREEK
FOOD] frame) and that these frames alongside other information (e.g. that Chinese food is
eaten with chopsticks) include information about typical foods involved, which enables
hearers to identify the relevant category.
One might argue that some sort of bottom-up top-down interaction is involved: eat rice
and that activates a [CHINESE/VEGETARIAN/GREEK FOOD] frame, but the context instantiates only
one of its frame features (the category TYPICAL CHINESE/VEGETARIAN/GREEK FOODS) the one that is
necessary for the identification of the referent (other possible frame features being, e.g., [EATING
WITH CHOPSTICKS], [PREPARING CHINESE FOOD], [CHINESE RESTAURANT]). Other frame features are
activated, but not instantiated by the sentence, though they might be by additional discourse
(e.g. if the sentence above were followed by So, theyve got a wok, chopsticks and that or Oh, I
hate eating with chopsticks). The problem with the sentence above is that the respondent
does not know who they are, what preceded the sentence, and so on. Because the example
sentence does not give any additional information concerning which frame is involved, the
respondent comes up with the typical (zero-context, default) frames with which eating rice is
associated ([VEGETARIAN FOOD], [CHINESE FOOD], [GREEK FOOD]). Naturally, in a real conversation.
sentences are not uttered out of context and there will be many cues which help hearers to
guess which specific frame is involved. Thus, the only way to find out more about how frames
are activated is to look at utterances in a wider context. It is also necessary to explore in more
detail the relationship between frames, superordinate categories, and (proto)typicality.

4. Conclusion

Frames are indeed an important factor for the creation of coherence by hearers. Frame-
conflicts may lead to disturbed coherence, although they need not necessarily do so: the
application of a superordinate frame may override deviations from the norm and thus create
coherence. The examples given above have strengthened my assumption that coherence is
indeed based on cohesion (if we consider the lexical items, expressions, and phrases that
activate frames as cohesive devices). In almost all of the texts, frames were triggered in the
hearer through the text. Even in cases such as [TEXT TYPE] frames, one might argue that
certain topoi17 would lead the hearer to infer the correct interpretative frame even if s/he

17
Such as the list of the cast given at the beginning of a play, the text alignment of poems, etc.
704 M.A. Bednarek / Journal of Pragmatics 37 (2005) 685705

came to the text without prior knowledge or expectations. Decoding and inferring thus
seem, in fact, to be complementary actions (Bublitz, 2001: 7) helping the hearer to
understand a given text.

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Monika A. Bednarek is a doctoral candidate in linguistics at the University of Augsburg, Germany, with research
interests in cognitive linguistics, pragmatics and text linguistics. Specific interests include cohesion and
coherence, frames, and evaluation in the press. Her masters thesis was concerned with an assessment of the
application of frames in linguistics.