Villaflor vs CA | G.R.

No 95694

October 9,1997 | Panganiban J.

Facts: In 1940, petitioner entered purchased an unregistered 140 hectare of land from four
different owners who possessed such openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously for 50
years. Sometime in 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with private respondent
Nasipit Lumber Co, Inc. After the said lease agreement, petitioner discovered that Nasipit
surreptitiously occupied a big portion of petitioners property, forcing the former to confront the
latter about the situation. Hence in 1948, the parties entered in an Agreement to Sell whereby
the petitioner conveyed two parcels of land to the respondent and whereby the latter binding itself
to pay the former P5,000 as downpayment and upon the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale, the
latter binds itself to pay the former P12,000. In December 1948, petitioner filed a Sales
Application in the Bureau of Lands to purchase the land subject to controversy. In the scheduled
date of auction of the said property, both parties emerged as the highest bidder. The parties
subsequently entered in a Deed of Relinquishment of Rights in favour of Nasipit. Nasipit only
filed its sales application on August 1950. In the same period, the Director of Lands awarded the
said land to Nasipit.
Sometime in 1974, petitioner who just came back from Indonesia learned that Nasipit
failed to pay the said P5,000 downpayment to his brother. Hence, petitioner protested the validity
of the Sales Application of Nasipit in the Bureau of Lands on the ground of non-payment, praying
for its nullity which was subsequently dismissed on the ground of his failure to adduce pertinent
evidence. The case was appealed to the Ministry of Natural Resources which likewise dismissed
the petition. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President and at the same time was then
forced to file a complaint in the trial court for the Declaration of Nullity of Contract and the
Recovery of Possession of the said land which again dismissed his petition on the ground that
petitioner was estopped from proving its nullity and that his actions were already barred due to
laches. The Appellate Court likewise affirmed the decision of the lower court on the ground that
petitioner no longer has a cause of action in this case. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the regular courts have jurisdiction over the said case.
Held: No. Under the doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, courts will not resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
Here, the said doctrine is applicable to this case since the questions on the identity of the
land and the factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application
require technical determination of the Bureau of Lands and thus behoves the court of jurisdiction
to try this case. The Director of Lands already ruled that the questioned land was a public land
and that respondent validly obtained the ownership of the land when it applied for a Sales
Application and when the said land was awarded to it which was affirmed by the Ministry of
Natural Resources and the Office of the President. It follows that its ruling deserves great respect
and as petitioner failed to show abuse of discretion on the part of the Director of Lands, the latters
decision already attained finality.
Hence, the regular courts have no jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Commissioner of Customs vs Navarro | G.R. No. L-33146
May 31, 1977 | Fernando, J.

Facts: Private respondents Juanito Flores and Asianic Incorporated imported 1,350 cartons of
fresh fruits in the Philippines. Since these were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294
and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary to law, they were thus made subject
to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of
the Tariff and Customs Code. Private respondents prayed for the issuance of preliminary
injunction in the trial court to restrain petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of the
perishable goods which was granted by respondent Judge Pedro Navarro. Petitioners now comes
to this court praying for the suspension of the judgement of the respondent and now question the
assumption of jurisdiction by the latter on the ground that the seizure of the said articles falls
under the exclusive competence of the Commissioner of Customs. SC required respondents to file
an answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by
petitioners to prevent the challenged order of respondent Judge from being implemented. Instead
of preparing an answer, they just submitted a manifestation stating that after an intensive and
serious study of the merit of the case, the respondents have decided to abandon its interest in the
case. The rationale behind such a move was ostensibly the desire to avoid additional expenses,
in view of the fact that the shipments, being perishable, have already deteriorated.
Issue: Whether or not the regular courts have jurisdiction over the said case.
Held: No. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not resolve a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact. In Enrile vs Vinuya, The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive
jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court
of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter. It is the settled rule, therefore,
that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes
of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector
of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
Here, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966,
and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes
of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less
then would the CFI of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot
be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest
the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by
respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for
mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance
of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Centeno vs Centeno | G.R. No. 140825

October 13, 2000 | Kapunan, J.

Facts: Private respondent Ignacia Centeno was the owner of two rice lands in Santa Isabel,
Malolos Bulacan. The said lands were subjected to a previous case before the Department of
Agrarian Reform for the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer held by petitioners
Cipriano Centeno, Leonila Calonzo, and Ramona Adriano on the ground that they obtained it
through fraud and misrepresentation. The DAR ruled in favor respondent, ordering the
cancellation of the CLTs and affirming respondents ownership over the said lands.
In the present case, respondent now comes to Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board for the Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Prayer for Injunction
against petitioners on the ground that the latter is continuing to prevent the former from
exercising exclusive possession over the said land through harassment and molesting. Petitioners
aver that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case and that they are rightfully entitled to the
said lands by reason of the establishment of their house there. The Provincial Adjudicator ruled
in favour of respondent which was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the instant petition
questioning the jurisdiction of the DARAB over the case at bar and the issue of application of res
juridicata.
Issue: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. Section 1 of the Revised Rules of DARAB provides that The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657,
Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Such jurisdiction also extends over f) Cases involving cancellation of CLTs.
Here, it is evident that the present case is an off-shoot of the previous case for the
cancellation of the CLT against petitioners. Respondent merely asserts it right arising from the
precious decision of the DAR. Because of this, the DARAB has an exclusive jurisdiction over the
case at bar. It is futile for petitioners to argue, by their strained reasoning, that res judicata is not
applicable. Petitioners' position is that they are in possession of the subject landholdings and have
houses thereon. They thus argue that the order of the DAR recalling and cancelling their CLTs "is
void from the beginning." This is begging the issue. Precisely, one of the main defenses of
petitioners in the earlier case for cancellation of CLTs is their alleged possession, but this was
ruled against them by the DAR since for one, Cipriano Centeno, a nephew of respondent, was just
a helper of respondent tending to the landholdings. For another, it was also ruled that respondent
has the preferential right over the land in dispute but that she was deprived of her rights as CLT
beneficiary on account of petitioners' acquisition of CLTs through fraud and misrepresentation.
Obviously, the issue of possession is a settled matter.
Hence, the DARAB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar.
Nuesa vs CA | G.R. No. 132408

March 6, 2002 | Quisumbing J.

Facts: On May 25, 1972, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an Order of Award in favour of
private respondent Jose Verdillo over two parcels of land in San Idelfonso, Bulacan under the
conditions that the latter shall personally cultivate the lot and develop at least of the lot and
that failure to pay the first instalment shall be a sufficient cause for the cancellation of the awards.
After 21 years, private respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of DAR for the
purchase of the said lot but was opposed by petitioner Restituto Rivera on the ground that he was
in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same. Petitioner likewise filed an
application.
The DAR Regional Office investigated on the matter and found that the subject lots were
tenanted by other persons for sixteen years causing the cancellation of the award against Verdillo.
Private respondent then filed a Petition with the Provincial Adjudication Board for the Annulment
of the said order which was again opposed by petitioner on the ground that the proper remedy of
appeal was to the Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform under Dar Memorandum circular
No. 5-8. Despite such opposition, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator chose to resolve the case and
ruled in favour of private respondent, ordering the immediate issuance of the deed of conveyance
to the latter. Hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Held: Yes. According to the Centeno vs Centeno case, the DAR is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The
DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A.
3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations. In order for the DARAB to have jurisdiction, there must be an agrarian reform
dispute meaning the existence of a tenurial agreement between the parties.
Here, the facts show that there was no tenurial, agrarian leasehold relation between the
parties. Thereby, it divests the DARAB of jurisdiction over the case. Also, the fact that the disputed
land was being possessed and cultivated by other people shows blatant violation of the conditions
of the order of award in favor of Verdillo and thereby disqualifying him from acquiring the said
land. The Court finds no reason to award the land to private respondent because of such violation.
The DARAB has not shown any proof or exemptions to award the land to private respondent.
Hence, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator committed grave abuse of discretion.
Regional Director, Region VII, DECS vs. CA
GR No. 110193, January 27, 1994
Vitug, J.

FACTS: In asserting their demand for the release of their salaries by the Department of Budget,
a three-day mass action or a strike from September 19-21, 1990, was held by private
respondents, together with other Negros Oriental public school teachers. A return-to-work order
was issued by one of the petitioners, Regional Director Teofilo Gomez of the DECS, with a
warning that if the striking teachers were not to resume their classes within 24 hours,
administrative charges would be filed. Since such order was not heeded, administrative
complaints were filed against the teachers and they were given 5 days from receipt of the
complaints to submit their respective answers and supporting documents.

Prior to the commencement of the hearings by the DECS Investigating Team, the teachers
(private respondents) filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction, prohibition and damages
with prayer for preliminary injunction. On March 26, 1991, the court a quo issued the writ of
preliminary injunction. The petitioners filed their answer, followed by a motion to dismiss. On
June 24, 1991, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for pre-trial hearing,
holding that the complaint stated a cause of action and that the court had jurisdiction thereover.

The pre-trial was pre-empted by petitioners when they filed with the SC a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus on July 25, 1991. Such petition was referred to the CA, which denied
the same on May 6, 1993.

ISSUE: Was the RTC correct in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss?

RULING: YES.

Citing the case of Vidad, et al vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, the Supreme Court ruled that
it has indeed been precipitate for the DECS officials to seek the dismissal of the
complaints filed in court by the school teachers even as no restraining order could
lawfully issue against the continuation of the administrative decisions. There cannot be a
full determination on whether the actions taken by them have been proper or improper,
or whether they have acted in good faith or bad faith, pending a full hearing that would
give all the parties a chance to ventilate their respective claims.

This notwithstanding, it behooves the court, in the interest of good order and
conformably with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to suspend its action on the cases
before it pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings.

CA decision affirmed; Writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC is hereby DISMISSED and it is
directed to suspend further hearings until after a final determination on the administrative proceedings
would have been made.
Laguna CATV Network Inc., vs. Maraan
GR No. 139492, November 19, 2002
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

FACTS: Pursuant to Art. 128 of the Labor Code, private respondents filed their separate complaints for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of other employee benefits. Impleaded as respondent was their
employer, Laguna CATV Network, Inc.

On April 1, 1998, DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection of the premises of Laguna CATV and found
that the latter violated the laws on payment of wages and other benefits. Laguna CATV was requested to
correct its violations but the latter refused. Such refusal prompted Regional Director Maraan to set the
case for summary investigation. Subsequently, an Order was issued directing Laguna CATV to pay the
concerned employees P261, 009.19, representing their unpaid claims within 10 days from notice and to
submit proof of compliance within the same period. Forthwith, Laguna CATV filed a motion for
reconsideration. In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the Order directing it to pay the unpaid
claims, Maraan issued a writ of execution ordering Sheriff Sagmit to collect in cash from Laguna CATV the
amount specified in the writ or in lieu thereof, to attach its goods and chattels or those of its owner, Dr.
Bernardino Bailon. Sheriff Sagmit levied on Dr. Bailons L300 van and garnished his bank deposits.

On March 2, 1999, Laguna CATV and Dr. Bailon, in his personal capacity, filed a motion to quash the writ
of execution, notice of levy and sale on execution and garnishment of bank deposits, alleging that the writ
was premature because Laguna CATVs motion for reconsideration of the Order dated August 19, 1998
has not yet been resolved by Maraan. On April 21, 1999, he issued an Order denying the motion to quash
the writ of execution, stating inter alia, that Laguna CATV failed to perfect its appeal of the August 19,
1998 Order because it did not comply with the mandatory requirement of posting a bond equivalent to the
monetary award of P261,009.19; and that the writ of execution dated January 29, 1999 should be
considered as an overt denial of Laguna CATVs motion for reconsideration.

Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor, Laguna CATV filed with the CA a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review, because it deemed it futile to appeal to the Secretary of Labor for it will
surely be disapproved. On May 13, 1999, the CA denied the petition of Laguna CATV for its failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Did Laguna CATV fail to exhaust the available administrative remedies?

RULING: YES.

The Court has consistently held that if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on the
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
courts judicial power can be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not merely
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its
appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court. The underlying principle of the rule rests on the presumption that
the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the
same correctly.

As provided under Art. 128 of the Labor Code, an order issued by the duly authorized
representative of the Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should
have first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing with the CA a motion for extension
of time to file a petition for review.
Corpus vs. Cuaderno Sr.
GR No. L-17860, March 30, 1962
De Leon, J.

FACTS: Marino Corpus, while holding the highly technical position of Special Assistant to the
Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, was charged in an administrative case for
alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority, oppression,
misconduct, et al., which resulted in his suspension by the Monetary Board. A 3-man committee
was created to investigate the case against Corpus. On May 5, 1959, the committee submitted its
Final Report stating that there was no basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action
against Corpus and therefore recommended his reinstatement. Despite this, the Monetary
Board adopted a Resolution on July 20, 1959 which considered Corpus resigned as of the date of
his suspension. Three days later, the Monetary Board approved the appointment of Mario
Marcos as the replacement of Corpus.

On August 18, 1959, petitioner filed with the lower court a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against the herein
respondents. The respondents and the intervenor filed separate motions to dismiss against
which an opposition was filed by petitioner. On June 14, 1960, after several hearings, an order
was issued granting the motions to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not exhaust all
administrative remedies available to him in law.

ISSUE: Was the lower court correct in dismissing the instant case for petitioners failure to
exhaust administrative remedies?

RULING: NO.

True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the President or the Civil
Service Commission. However, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that a report to these
administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into account the facts
obtaining in this case.

A perusal of the Civil Service Law sheds light on the instant case. Sec. 16(i) of the
aforementioned law provides that Except as otherwise provided by law, the
Commissioner of Civil Service shall have final authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all permanent officials and employees in the competitive or
classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of
such officials and employees; X X X. Considering the fact that the Charter of the Central
Bank provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to the
investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the Governor, coupled
with the fact that petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the non-competitive or
unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal to the Commissioner of the Civil Service
is not required or at most is permissive and voluntary.

** The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, by the terms or
implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only,
warranting the conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the
administrative remedy has not been exhausted.
Madrigal vs. Lecaroz
GR No. 46218, October 23, 1990
Medialdea, J.

FACTS: On November 25, 1971, public respondents abolished petitioner-appellant Madrigals

position as a permanent construction capataz. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor
financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position was not essential.

On April 2, 1972, Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission and such appeal was acted
on by the CSC on January 7, 1974, declaring, through a resolution, that the removal of Madrigal
was illegal. Respondent Gov. Aristeo Lecaroz moved for a reconsideration but the same was
denied by the CSC. Subsequently, Madrigal sent a letter to the Provincial Board requesting
implementation of the resolution of the CSC and consequently, reinstatement to his former
position. The Provincial Board denied Madrigals request for reinstatement because his former
position no longer exists.

On December 15, 1975, Madrigal filed a petition before the CFI of Marinduque against
respondents for mandamus and damages seeking inter alia 1.) restoration of his abolished
position, 2,) reinstatement to such position, and 3.) payment of his back salaries plus damages.

The CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that Madrigals cause of action was barred by
laches.

ISSUE: Was the CFI correct in dismissing Madrigals petition on the ground of laches?

RULING: YES.

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo
warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year
from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position.

The fatal drawback of Madrigals cause is that he came to court out of time. As
aforestated, it was only after 4 years and 20 days from the abolition of his position that
he filed the petition for mandamus and damages. This single circumstance has closed the
door for any judicial remedy in his favor.

Actually, the recourse of Madrigal to the CSC was unwarranted. It is fundamental that in
a case where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be
resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative
officer of orders involving questions of law would be an exercise in futility since
administrative officers cannot decide such issues with finality.
Cabada v. Alunan
G.R. No. 119645 | August 22, 1996 |
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: A complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and
Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the CHR by private respondent Valdez. The complaint
was referred to the Philippine National Police Eighth Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8)
which, after conducting its own investigation, filed an administrative charge of Grave
Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings. The Regional
Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision finding the petitioners guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police service. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed
or refused to act on the said motion, and that they asked that the said motion be treated as an
appeal to the RAB. The RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. It denied the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its decision. Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then
filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their "Appeal"
and "Petition for Review". The NAPOLCOM denied due course to the petitioners' appeal and
petition for review for lack of jurisdiction "it appearing . . . that both the Decision and the
Resolution of the Regional Appellate Board had long become final and executory and there
being no showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents' appeal within the reglementary
period of sixty (60) days." The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks to dismiss this petition
on the ground of prematurity because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies;
they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section
47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292).

ISSUE: Is this special civil action prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies?
HELD: NO. Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 262, the Secretary of the DILG has the power of
supervision and control of his Department. Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one
way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for
review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding
Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. We
would have sustained the OSGs plea if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due
course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner
De Guzman. By then, the appeal would have to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the
petitioners claim in their Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their case falls within the
exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government is DIRECTED to RESOLVE with reasonable dispatch the appeal and petition
for review of petitioners.
Datiles and Company v. Sucaldito
G.R. No. L-42380 | June 22, 1990 |
PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner has in its favor a fishpond lease agreement whereby the Republic agreed to
lease to the company 175.9959 hectares of public land located in Zamboanga del Sur. Petitioner-
lessee filed a complaint for "Injunction with Writ of Possession with Preliminary and
Prohibitory Injunction, with Damages" before the CFI against herein private respondents
Deypalubos and Cabelieza, after their vehement refusal to obey the orders of the then Philippine
Fisheries Commission and Bureau of Fisheries to vacate that portion of the area which they
(private respondents) were occupying without a fishpond permit and the knowledge and consent
of petitioner.

The RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against both
respondents. The Barrio Council prepared and submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries a resolution
which attests that the 49 hectare controverted fishpond area was never occupied by the Datiles
family and that it was Mr. Deypalubos who cleared the same and constructed all the
improvements therein. A memorandum was issued by the Bureau Director addressed to herein
public respondent Regional Director Guieb, directing "an immediate formal investigation of
those issues. Public respondent Guieb notified the parties of the scheduled hearing of the said
protest and resolution. Praying to restrain the proposed investigation on the fishpond conflict,
petitioner filed its petition for "Prohibition and/or Injunction with Preliminary Injunction"
before the CFI against public respondent Guieb and impleading respondents Deypalubos and
Cabelieza. Hon. Melquiades S. Sucaldito (now respondent), seeing that a possible irreparable
injury could be caused the petitioner if the investigation in question were to proceed, issued a
restraining order. Private respondents moved to dismiss the case and to dissolve the restraining
order, anchored on the ground of lack of the court's jurisdiction to try the case for failure on the
part of petitioner to exhaust available administrative remedies. The respondent judge dismissed
the case and lifted the restraining order.

ISSUE: Does the CFI lack jurisdiction to try the case for failure on the part of petitioner to
exhaust available administrative remedies?

HELD: NO. It is a well-settled rule that, for prohibition to lie against an executive officer, the
petitioner must first exhaust administrative remedies. This doctrine rests upon the assumption
that the administrative body, board or officer, if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or
error, may amend its/his decision on a given matter. It follows therefore that there has to be
some sort of a decision, order or act, more or less final in character, that is ripe for review and
properly the subject of an appeal to a higher administrative body or officer, for the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies to operate. In the present case, however, there is no
administrative order or act as above described, that can be appealed from. The respondent
Regional Director has not rendered any decision, or made any final finding of any sort, and is in
fact just about to conduct an investigation which happens to be the very act sought to be
prevented. Consequently, administrative remedies that must be exhausted, although available,
cannot be resorted to. There being urgency in stopping public respondent Guieb's investigation
but no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioner's recourse to
the respondent court for relief by way of a petition for prohibition was proper.
NFA v. CA
G.R. Nos. 115121-25 | February 9, 1996 |
PUNO, J.:

FACTS: The NFA conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the protection of
its properties and facilities all over the country. 12 security agencies were awarded one-year
contracts, among whom were private respondents Col. Felix M. Manubay, Continental
Watchman and Security Agency, Alberto T. Lasala, and Norman D. Mapagay. Petitioner Romeo
G. David became NFA Administrator. He caused a review of all security service contracts,
procedures on the accreditation of private security agencies and the bidding for security
services. Pending this review, he extended the services of private respondents and the other
incumbent security agencies on a periodic basis. A special order was thereafter issued for the
implementation of the new rules and procedure. The prebidding and bidding dates were set.
Upon a review of the documents submitted, the Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) disqualified respondents. 2 of the applicants who failed to prequalify, namely Lanting
Security and Watchman Agency and respondent Lasala, filed separate complaints with the RTC
to restrain Administrator David and the PBAC from proceeding with the public bidding.
Restraining orders were which the NFA received on the day of the scheduled bidding. No
bidding thus took place on said date. On respondent Lasala's application, the RTC issued a
preliminary injunction ordering the PBAC to refrain from proceeding with the bidding. During
the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction, Administrator David sent to all incumbent
security agencies, including four of herein private respondents, notices of termination.
Administrator David contracted the services of seven new security agencies on a month-to-
month basis pending resolution of the injunction against the bidding. The trial courts issued 5
separate restraining orders and injunctions ordering the NFA to desist from terminating the
services of respondents, and from awarding and installing the new security agencies replacing
them. These orders were challenged by NFA and David in separate petitions before the Court of
Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion by respondent judges. They allege that private
respondents did not exhaust available administrative remedies, thereby rendering their
complaint premature and legally deficient.

ISSUE: Is the complaint of private respondents premature and legally deficient for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies?

HELD: NO. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule.
It is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents' contracts were
terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely 5 days after
their termination. In fact, respondent Masada, a prequalified bidder, submitted all requirements
and was preparing for the public bidding only to find out that contracts had already been
awarded by negotiation. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the
Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 was not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The urgency of the
situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation of these
negotiated security contracts.
Gravador v. Mamigo
G.R. No. L-24989 | July 21, 1967 |
CASTRO, J.:

FACTS: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School
on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar,
Jr., through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on
the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. A few days later the
respondent Eutiquio Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the said elementary school.

Petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground
that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. He wrote to the
Division Superintendents of Schools, reiterating his claim that he had not reached the age of 65
and enclosing some papers in support thereof. He filed this suit for quo warranto, mandamus
and damages in the CFI. He asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of principal of
the Sta. Catalina Elementary School.

The trial court concluded that the petitioner was born on December 11, 1901 accordingly granted
his petition. Immediate execution was ordered, as a result of which the petitioner was
reinstated.

The respondents argue that the finding of the Superintendent of Schools that the petitioner was
born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding that should not be disturbed by the
court, and that petitioners action was prematurely brought because he had not availed of all
administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Is petitioners action prematurely brought for failure to avail of all administrative
remedies.

HELD: NO. Suit for quo warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one year.
Before filing this case the petitioner waited for 8 months for the school officials to act on his
protest. To require him to tarry a little more would obviously be unfair to him since, when this
case was filed, he had only four months left within which to bring the case to court. There was
neither manner nor form of assurance that the decision of the Director of Public Schools would
be forthcoming. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where
insistence on its observance would result in the nullification of the claim being asserted.
Almine v. CA
G.R. No. 80719 | September 26, 1989 |
GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of her riceland or for exemption
thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(MAR). After due hearing, Atty. Arresgado of the said office filed an investigation report for the
cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be
petitioner's tenant over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary action,
petitioner reiterated her application. A reinvestigation was conducted this time by Atty. Evasco
who filed his report recommending the cancellation of private respondent's CLT Said report was
elevated to the MAR. Then Minister Estrella denied petitioner's application for retention.

Petitioner appealed to the IAC (now CA). Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal. However, it was denied. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied. The
IAC rendered a decision dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction holding that
questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his land-
holdings, is to be determined by the Minister of Agrarian Reform, and are appealable and could
be reviewed only by the Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioner argues further
that on the assumption that the IAC has no jurisdiction on the matter, still the appeal should not
have been dismissed but should have been certified to the proper court citing Section 3 of Rule
50 of the Revised Rules of Court (Court of Agrarian Relations' Jurisdiction over Subject Matter).

ISSUE: Was the CA correct in dismissing the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction?

HELD: NO. A perusal of Section 3 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court reveals that
questions as to whether a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings
are exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose decision
may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of Agrarian Relations. These
cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts.
There is no appeal from a decision of the President. However, the said decision may be reviewed
by the courts through a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case
may be under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition
for review by way of certiorari brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform
allegedly made in grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the
competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The CA has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court
and the RTC over petitions seeking the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus.

The failure to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian
Reform in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies as the
latter is the alter ego of the President.
Tan v. Veterans Backpay Commission
G.R. 12944 March 30, 1959
Reyes, J.B.L., J.

Facts: On March 5, 1957, petitioner-appellee, Maria Natividad vda. de Tan filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a verified petition for mandamus seeking an order to compel the
respondent-appellant Veterans Back Pay Commission: (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee
alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, entitled to backpay rights, privileges, and prerogatives
under Republic Act No. 304, as amended by Republic Act No. 897; and (2) to give due course to
the claim of petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to her the corresponding
backpay certificate of indebtedness. Respondent Commission filed its answer in due time
asserting certain special and affirmative defenses, on the basis of which, the Commission
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition. The parties then submitted a stipulation of facts
and the the lower court rendered judgment ordering the Commission to give due course to the
claim of Tan to the backpay to which her deceased husband was entitled as a member of the duly
recognized guerrilla organization. Against the decision, the respondent instituted this appeal
averring once more, in its assignment of errors, the special and affirmative defenses that the
petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies; that the suit is, in effect, an action
to enforce a money claim against the government without its consent; that mandamus will not
lie to compel the exercise of a discretionary function.

Issue: Whether the mandamus is the proper remedy to correct the exercise of discretion of the
Commission?

Held: Yes. As to the claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy to correct the exercise of
discretion of the Commission, it may well be it may well be remembered that its discretion is
limited to the facts of the case, i.e., in merely evaluating the evidence whether or not the
claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United States Army. Nowhere in
the law is the respondent Commission given the power to adjudicate or determine rights after
such facts are established. Having been satisfied that deceased Tan Chiat Bee was an officer of a
duly recognized guerrilla outfit, certified to by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, having
served under the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla unit
recognized by the United States army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the respondent to give due course to his widow's application.
Arrow v. Board of Transportation
G.R. 39655 March 21, 1975
Fernando, J.

Facts: Both petitioner and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic corporations. The
former has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public utility bus air-
conditioned-auto-truck service from Cebu City to Mactan International Airport. Private
respondent on September 12, 1974 filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of
a certificate of public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line. Eight days later,
without the required publication, the Board issued an order granting it provisional permit to
operate such auto-truck service on the line applied for. There was a motion for reconsideration
and for the cancellation of such provisional permit filed on October 21, 1974, but without
awaiting final action thereon, this petition was filed. This is the explanation: "That petitioner has
not waited for the resolution of his Motion for Reconsideration before going to this Court
considering that the question involved herein is purely a legal one, aside from the fact that the
issuance of the Order without the Board having acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently
illegal or was performed without jurisdiction."

Issue: Whether the issue is ripe for judicial determination (judicial review)?

Held: Yes. The question of whether the controversy is ripe for judicial determination was
likewise argued by the parties. For it is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed. There
was pending with the respondent Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution
should be awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity can be raised.
Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would stress that certiorari lies as the failure to observe
procedural due process ousted respondent Board of whatever jurisdiction it could have had in
the premises. This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not
only because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest
in having the matter settled. As was set forth in Executive Order No. 101 which prescribes the
procedure to be followed by respondent Board, it is the policy of the State, as swiftly as possible,
to improve the deplorable condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing
public motor vehicles and eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as
well as update the standard of those carrying such business, making it "imperative to provide,
among other urgently needed measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining,
or modifying the lines and mode of operation of public utility motor vehicles that now or
thereafter, may operate in this country. It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms
engaged as well as of the riding public to ascertain whether or not the procedure followed in this
case and very likely in others of a similar nature satisfies the procedural due process
requirement. Thus its ripeness for adjudication becomes apparent. To paraphrase what was said
in Edu v. Ericta where the validity of a legislation was passed upon in a certiorari proceeding to
annul and set aside a writ of preliminary injunction, to so act would be to conserve both time
and effort. Those desiring to engage in public utility business as well as the public are both
vitally concerned with the final determination of the standards to be followed in the procedure
that must be observed. There is, to repeat, a great public interest in a definitive outcome of the
crucial issue involved. One of the most noted authorities on Administrative Law, Prof. Kenneth
Culp Davis, discussing the ripeness concept, is of the view that the resolution of what could be a
debilitating uncertainty with the conceded ability of the judiciary to work out a solution of the
problem posed is a potent argument for minimizing the emphasis laid on its technical aspect.
UP Board of Regents v. Rasul
G.R. No. 91551 August 16, 1991
Gancayco, J.

Facts: On June 26, 1986, plaintiff Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., was appointed by the defendant
Board of Regents BOR as Director of the Philippine General Hospital, to take effect 1 September
1986 until 30 April 1992. On September 16, 1987, barely two (2) weeks after assuming the
presidency of the University of the Philippines defendant Jose V. Abueva submitted a
memorandum to the Board of Regents to reorganize the U.P. Manila including the Philippine
General Hospital with a draft resolution for approval of the Board of Regents, recommending
that certain key positions of UP Manila including that of plaintiff be declared vacant. On March
20, 1988, the defendant Board of Regent upon recommendation of defendants Abueva and
Domingo approved the so-called reorganization plan for the Philippine General Hospital. On
April 29, 1988, defendant Dr. Ernesto Domingo acting on instruction of defendant Dr. Jose v.
Abueva, U.P. President, issued a memorandum creating the Nomination Committee for the UP-
PGH Medical Center Director; that on May 10, 1988, defendant-members of the Nomination
Committee thus created, are scheduled to nominate plaintiffs replacement as Director; that
consequently on May 2, 1988, plaintiff filed with this Court, his complaint for Injunction with
Preliminary Injunction of temporary restraining Order, seeking to enjoin defendants Abueva,
Domingo, the Nomination Committee and the ITP Board of Regents from proceeding with the
nomination of UP-PGH medical Center Director, in order to forestall the consequent
removal/dismissal of the plaintiff Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr., incumbent PGH Director, even
before the expiration of his term of office on April 30, 1992 without any cause provided by law.
On May 2, this Court issued the Restraining Order and on May 30, After due hearing the trial
court, thru its then Presiding Judge Hon. Julio Logarta issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, enjoining defendants from implementing the reorganization plan for the UP-PGH
Medical Center. Respondent Judge, based on the evidence presented, concluded that the
reorganization of PGH was done in bad faith. Accordingly, the regional trial court ruled that
respondent Dr. Estrella cannot be removed from office as a result of such defective abolition of
his position. Petitioners seek to annul and set aside the decision dated August 28, 1989 and the
order dated October 23, 1989 issued and rendered by respondent Judge, Honorable Jainal D.
Rasul of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Pasig, Metro Manila. Among the errors they allege
is that Respondent Judge acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
holding that Estrella need not exhaust administrative remedies before he can bring a suit
against the Board of Regents.

Issue: Can Estrella bring a suit against the Board of Regents without exhausting administrative
remedies?

Held: Yes. Anent the issue regarding respondent Estrella's failure to exhaust all administrative
remedies, the Court holds that this case has special circumstances that made it fall under the
jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the rule. As the facts show, respondent Dr. Estrella was
about to be replaced by the Nomination Committee. He must have believed that airing his
protest with the Board of Regents would only be fruitless and that unless he goes to the courts,
irreparable damage or injury on his part will be caused by the implementation of the proposed
reorganization. Respondent Judge did not commit any reversible error much less grave abuse of
discretion. The facts as supported by evidence established may no longer be disturbed.
Smart v. NTC
G.R. 151908. August 12, 2003
Ynares-Santiago, J.

Facts: Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services. Petitioners
Islacom and Piltel alleged, among others, that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of
law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service
by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Issue: Does the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies apply to legal nullification of
purely administrative regulation issued by an agency in the exercise of its rule-making powers?

Held: No, in questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-
making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v.
Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held: The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies before a party may seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General
on behalf of respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was
issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only judicial
review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. Even assuming arguendo that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners
sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages
leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to
register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective
position papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing
circular. After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 2000 and
July 5, 2000 asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called Billing Circular.
These letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the
second assailed Memorandum implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was
taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus
prompting them to seek judicial relief. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed,
the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial
power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-
2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional
Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. In Drilon v. Lim, it
was held: We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the
judicial power to determine what the valid and binding laws are by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, B.P. 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him,
particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders
of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred
that the Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional
prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. These are within the
competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised
in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge
who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone
service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially known to be within the
knowledge of a good percentage of our population and expertise in fundamental principles of
civil law and the Constitution.