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Pointers in Remedial Law

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R PART I: The Velasco Cases

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PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY (Mendoza et al., v. Villas, et al)

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Question: X filed a Petition with the Supreme Court but failed to cite the particular rule upon

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which the petition was based. What are the corresponding effects if the petition will be treated as

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one filed under Rule 65 or one filed under Rule 45?

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Answer: If the petition is to be treated as a petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petition must be dismissed outright for having been filed prematurely. The principle of hierarchy

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of courts should be applied. Verily, a direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original

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jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and

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important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. On the other

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hand, direct recourse to this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under Rule 45 when

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only questions of law are raised. Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v. Tomas that Section 1 of

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Rule 45 clearly states that the following may be appealed to the Supreme Court through a

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petition for review by certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) final orders; or 3) resolutions of the Court

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of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or similar courts, whenever

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authorized by law. The appeal must involve only questions of law, not of fact. In this case, the

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Court exercised liberality and considered the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45. In
Artistica Ceramica, Inc. v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowners Association, Inc., citing Republic v.

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Court of Appeals, the Court noted that with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in

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the interest of justice, it has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed

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under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.

DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERFERENCE OR DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY


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(Rombe Eximtrade vs. Spouses Peralta)

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Question: X Corporation filed a Petition for the Declaration of a State of Suspension of

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Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan with the RTC (RTC A) which then
issued a stay order in X Corporation's favor. Thereafter, RTC A dismissed the petition for

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rehabilitation of X Corporation because of misrepresentations about its financial status in its
petition. On the other hand, respondent Z Corporation initiated a foreclosure proceeding against

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X Corporation's properties. However, Z Corporation was prevented by the issuance of TRO and
injunction issued by another RTC (RTC B) filed by X Corporation Did RTC B interfere with the
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jurisdiction of RTC A in issuing the TRO and injunction?

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Answer: No. The rehabilitation case is distinct and dissimilar from the annulment of
foreclosure case, in that the first case is a special proceeding while the second is a civil

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action. xxx Indeed, the two cases are different with respect to their nature, purpose, and the

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reliefs sought such that the injunctive writ issued in the annulment of foreclosure case did

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not interfere with the rehabilitation case. The purpose of the rehabilitation case and the reliefs
prayed for by Rombe are the suspension of payments because it "foresees the impossibility of

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meeting its debts when they respectively fall due," and the approval of its proposed rehabilitation
plan. The objective and the reliefs sought by Rombe in the annulment of foreclosure case are,
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among others, to annul the unilateral increase in the interest rate and to cancel the auction of the
mortgaged properties.
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MEANING OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER (Cojuangco, Jr. v.
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Republic)

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Question: May subject matter jurisdiction be conferred by the acquiescence of the parties?

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Answer: No. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law, not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the

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penumbra of a statutory conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless

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of whether or not the suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.

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JURISDICTION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY (Baltazar vs. Ombudsman)

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Question: X was hired by Y to serve as a fishpond watchman over Y's 7-hectare fishpond.
However, X's salaries and 10% share in the harvest as agreed upon by them remained unpaid. X

R o then filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) a Complaint for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sum of Money and Supervision of Harvest,

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alleging that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected

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from it. The case was assigned to a Provincial Adjudicator of DARAB. Y contends that the issue

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does not present an agrarian dispute; that X is not an agricultural tenant as alleged, but is a
watchman and therefore, the case is outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian

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Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Should DARAB take cognizance of the case?

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Answer: Yes. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint. The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the

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complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses asserted in the answer
or motion to dismiss. Given that X's complaint and its attachment clearly spells out the

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jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural tenant in possession of the fishpond and is

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about to be ejected from it, clearly, the Provincial Adjudicator could not be faulted in assuming

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jurisdiction as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. Besides, whatever defense

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asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in resolving the issue on

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jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations of the defendant.

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DOCTRINE OF ADHERENCE OF JURISDICTION (People v. Court of Appeals)

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Question: X was the accused in a criminal case for violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705 (Cutting,
gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license; Forestry Reform Code), as

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amended by EO 277 filed before the RTC. The offense is punished with the penalty of prisin

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correccional in its medium and maximum period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than

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6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

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During the proceedings, Republic Act 7691, a law expanding the jurisdiction of the MTCs to

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include criminal cases punishable by not more than 6 years of imprisonment, took effect. X was

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convicted by the RTC. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA granted X's appeal and dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. Is the CA correct?

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Answer: No. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be

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determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Where a court has

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already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to

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the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over

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such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule is where the statute expressly

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provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending

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before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive

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effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute. Where

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a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction continues to the final
conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not affected by new legislation placing

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jurisdiction over such dispute in another court or tribunal unless the statute provides for
retroactivity.

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JURISDICTION OF COURTS (PLEASE READ THIS CAREFULLY)

SUPREME COURT (Star Electric Corp vs. R&G Construction)


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Question: In what instances may the Supreme Court resolve not only questions of law but
questions of fact as well?
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Answer: It is an established rule that in the exercise of its power of review under Rule 45, the o
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Supreme Court only resolves questions of law and not questions of facts. However, this rule is
not absolute. Jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be

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resolved by the Supreme Court, such as: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,

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absurd or impossible; (3) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (4)
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when the findings of facts are conflicting; (5) when in making its findings the Court of

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Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;

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(7) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs

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are not disputed by the respondent; (8) when the findings of fact are premised on the

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supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (9) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,

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REVIEW OF FACTUAL FINDINGS (Estate of the late vda. De Panlilio v. Dizon)

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Question: May the Supreme Court review the factual findings of the PARAD, DARAB and the
CA?

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Answer: No. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not tasked to calibrate and

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assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial all over again.
However, in rare occasions, exceptions are allowed. One exception is when there are competing

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factual findings by the different triers of fact, such as those made by the quasi-agencies on the
one hand and the CA on the other, this Court is compelled to go over the records of the case, as

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well as the submissions of the parties, and resolve the factual issues.

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ANNULMENT OF FINDINGS IN AN ARBITRATION CASE (Please read very carefully)

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COURT OF APPEALS (Diesel Construction v. UPSI)
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Question: May the Court of Appeals annul the findings of a highly specialized agency such as

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the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)?

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Answer: Yes. The CA was correct in holding that it may validly review and even overturn such

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conclusion of the facts by the CIAC when the matter IS NOT adequately supported by

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substantial evidence duly adduced on record comes to the fore and is raised as an issue.

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In context, what the appellate court said is that the said members do not really enjoy a special

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advantage over the members of the CA in terms of fleshing out the facts from the evidence
on record. The fact remains that the CA stands justified in reviewing the CIAC decision.

JURIDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN OVER SHARES OF STOCKS OF A


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SEQUESTERED PRIVATE COMPANY (Cuenca v. PCGG)

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Question: UHC shares were sequestered by the PCGG for being the alleged ill-gotten wealth of

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former President Marcos and Cuenca. A civil case was filed with the RTC involving the
performance of contractual obligations relative to the said UHC shares, particularly, the transfer

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of stock and subscription rights thereof. Does the RTC have jurisdiction to decide the case?
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Answer: None. Under EO 14, Section 2: The Presidential Commission on Good Government
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exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.
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shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have

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Thus, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has

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jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged ill-gotten wealth of

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former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The benchmark is whether
said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their perceived cronies.

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More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents
affecting the UHC shares and PCGGs right of supervision or control over the UHC must be
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addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split

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jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted
effort, more expenses, and irreparable injury to the public interest.

JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER MATTERS INCAPABLE OF


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PECUNIARY ESTIMATION (Surviving heirs of Alfredo Bautista v. Lindo, et al)

Question: Is a complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent a civil action incapable of
pecuniary estimation, hence within the jurisdiction of the RTC?

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Answer: Yes. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable

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of pecuniary estimation, the Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the

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claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the

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municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where the

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basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the Court has considered

R o such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by

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RTCs. The instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance. It is clear

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that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is akin or

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analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific

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performance is incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. Having fully

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participated in all stages of the case, and even invoking the RTCs authority by asking for

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affirmative reliefs, respondents can no longer assail the jurisdiction of the said trial court. Simply

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put, considering the extent of their participation in the case, they are, as they should be,

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considered estopped from raising lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the dismissal of the action.

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JURISDICTION OF SHARI'A COURTS IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE

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(Tomawis v. Balindong)

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Question: Private respondents filed with the Sharia District Court (SDC) an action for quieting

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of title of a parcel of land against Tomawis who argued that SDC does not have jurisdiction over

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the case. The respondent judge asserted that SDC has original jurisdiction over the case,

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concurrently with the RTC by force of Article 143, paragraph 2(b) of Presidential Decree No.

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(PD) 1083 or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Is the judge correct?

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Answer: Yes. The allegations, as well as the relief sought by private respondents, the elimination
of the cloud of doubts on the title of ownership on the subject land, are within the SDCs

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jurisdiction to grant. We have held that a general law and a special law on the same subject

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are statutes in pari materia and should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a

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view to giving effect to both. In the instant case, we apply the principle generalia specialibus

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non derogant. A general law does not nullify a special law. The general law will yield to the

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special law in the specific and particular subject embraced in the latter. BP 129 and PD 1083

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must be construed together, then by taking PD 1083 as an exception to the general law to
reconcile the two laws. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court below cannot be made to

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depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for

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reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint

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CIVIL PROCEDURE

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CAUSE OF ACTION; MEANING OF CAUSE OF ACTION (St. Michael School v. Masaito

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Development Corp) (Please read carefully)

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Question: What are the requirements to establish a cause of action in an easement complaint
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under Article 649 (Easement of Right of Way) of the Civil Code?

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Answer: For a complaint to state a cause of action in an easement case, more specifically, Art.
649 of the Civil Code has laid down the following requirements: (1) the dominant estate is

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surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) there
is payment of proper indemnity; and (3) the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor

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of the dominant estate. The Complaint, first, asserts that petitioners have a right to an easement

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of right-of-way that cuts across respondents property; second, it refers to respondents

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correlative obligation not to fence off and close the single gate which is used as the only entry
and exit points of the school population; and third, it refers to respondents expansion and
excessive terms and conditions, constituting the acts violating petitioners right. Hence, the
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Complaints material allegations are enough to entitle petitioners to a favorable judgment if these

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are assumed to be true.

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FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION (Vitangcol v. New Vista Properties)

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Question: Is a lack of cause of action a ground for dismissal under Rule 16?

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Answer: No. Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a

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motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause
of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is

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failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a

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defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of the ultimate facts

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contained in the plaintiffs complaint. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to
state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on the facts alleged in the

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DEFINITION OF CAUSE OF ACTION (Basic information that you need to remember.)

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(BF Corp v. MIAA)

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Question: X Corporation, Y Corporation and two other corporations formed the MTOB

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Consortium, a distinct corporation, for purposes of bidding for the construction of the NAIA II

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Project. The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) awarded the contract to MTOB

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Consortium. Later, the members of MTOB had serious business differences. X Corporation filed
a complaint against the other corporations to receive what it alleged to be its share in the project.

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X Corporation likewise filed a complaint against MIAA to enjoin it from directly paying Y corp.
Does X Corporation have a cause of action against MIAA?

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Answer: None. A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a

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right of another. It has three elements: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty

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on the part of the defendant to respect the right of the plaintiff, and (3) a breach of the

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defendants duty. BF Corp has no right of action against MIAA for the following reasons:

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(1) There is no contractual relation between MIAA and BF Corp. The agreement over the
NAIA Terminal II Project was between MIAA and MTOB Consortium, as the contractor.

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From the start, MIAA recognized MTOB Consortium as a corporation with a distinct
personality from its component corporations.

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(2) The reliefs prayed for by BF Corp. are based on the consortium agreement, which is a

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contract among BF Corp. and the other members of the consortium. MIAA is not privy

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of, and is therefore a stranger to the consortium agreement. If BF Corp. wants its share in

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the consortium, its recourse is against MTOB Consortium, not MIAA.

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PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS: LEGAL STANDING AND CAPACITY TO SUE
(Samahang Magsasaka v. Mosquera) l
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Question: An association of farmer-beneficiaries filed a case against Z alleging that the land

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they tilled was sold to Z without a DAR clearance, in violation of Section 6-D of CARL. Z

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applied for exemption from the coverage of CARL alleging that the property is above 18% slope

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and unfit for cultivation. The Executive Secretary exempted the property from CARL coverage.

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The case subsequently reached the CA where it ruled that the association is not a real party-in-

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interest and has no legal standing to sue; that it is not an actual grantee of the land but mere

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qualified beneficiary. Is the CA correct?

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Answer: Yes. According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled

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to the reliefs of the suit. The Supreme Court stood by its ruling in Fortich v. Corona that

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farmer-beneficiaries, who are not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-interest for

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being mere recommendees. In the case at bar, members of petitioner Samahan are mere

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qualified beneficiaries of CARP but they have not yet been approved as awardees, actually

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awarded lands, or granted CLOAs.

JURISDICTION OF CIAC IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS LEGAL STANDING


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OF A TRANSFEREE PENDENTE LITE (Please read carefully) (Heritage Park

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Management v. CIAC)

Question: Public Estates Authority (PEA) was designated to develop the Heritage Park in
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Taguig. PEA entered into an agreement with X where X undertook to perform all landscaping
works on the Heritage Park. Due to delays, the contract period was extended and among the

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causes of delay was PEAs inability to deliver to X some 45 hectares of the property due to the

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presence of squatters and a public cemetery. X filed a Complaint with the CIAC seeking to

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collect from PEA damages. PEA executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of Heritage which then

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filed a petition for prohibition/injunction with TRO against the CIAC and X, claiming that when
PEA transferred its rights and obligations over the project to Heritage Park, the CIAC lost its

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jurisdiction. Is Heritage correct?

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Answer: No. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, it would be the height of injustice to allow

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expedient of transferring their interests or rights involved in the case. A transferee pendente lite

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stands in exactly the same position as its predecessor-in-interest, the original defendant,

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and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the property was transferred to it.

ULTIMATE FACTS IN PLEADINGS


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COMPLAINT (Locsin, et al vs. Sandiganbayan)

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Question: What are ultimate facts under Section 1 of Rule 8?

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Answer: Sec. 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides: Every pleading shall contain in a

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methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which

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the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of

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mere evidentiary facts. Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which

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either directly form the basis of the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up
the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.
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EFFECT OF FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER (Macalinao v. BPI)

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Question: X is a credit card holder. For failure to pay the charges and balance under his credit

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card, the bank initiated a complaint against X. X failed to file an Answer. Thus, the bank

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eventually won the case after judgment was rendered in accordance with the Rule on Summary

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Procedure. When the case reached the CA, the CA modified the amount due. X filed with the SC

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a petition asking for the dismissal of the case or its remand to the lower court for a more

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appropriate disposition. Is X correct?

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Answer: No. A plaintiff should not be made to suffer for the respondents failure to file an

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answer and concomitantly, to allow the latter to submit additional evidence by dismissing
or remanding the case for further reception of evidence. Based on the records, the summons

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and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner Macalinao and her husband failed to file
their Answer despite service of summons. Thus, respondent BPI moved that judgment be

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rendered accordingly. Thus, a dismissal of the case would cause great injustice to respondent

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BPI. Similarly, a remand of the case for further reception of evidence would unduly prolong

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the proceedings of the instant case and render inutile the proceedings conducted before the
lower courts.

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COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM (Metrobank v. CPR Promotions)

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Question: X obtained a loan from Metrobank secured by a real estate mortgage. For failure to
pay despite demands, Metrobank filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.

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Notwithstanding foreclosure, Metrobank alleged that there remained a deficiency balance plus

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other charges as agreed in the REM. For failure to pay the deficiency, Metrobank filed a

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collection suit. The RTC ruled in Metrobank's favor. The CA however reversed the decision and
ordered Metrobank to refund an amount representing an alleged remainder in the proceeds of the

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foreclosed property, which X alleged in his appeal brief before the CA. Is the CA correct?

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Answer: No. Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim. A counterclaim is
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compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing partys claim; (b) it does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount
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and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount. It is evident that a claim for recovery of the

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excess in the bid price vis--vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory
counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the debtor-

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mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their
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respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these

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two actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially
unpaid at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of

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transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would

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definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the

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court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same
evidence.

R o RES JUDICATA (Clark Development v. Mondragon)

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Question: What are the requisites of res judicata?

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Answer: Res judicata means a matter or thing adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or

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settled by judgment. Its requisites are: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the

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judgment or order must be one on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court

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having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (4) between the first and
second actions, there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.

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FORUM SHOPPING (Cuenca v. Atas)

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Question: X was the incorporator and President of ABC Corporation which was granted a

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franchise to construct the toll facilities of North Luzon/South Luzon Expressways. In the course

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of its operations, ABC incurred credit obligations from various Government Financial

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Institutions (GFIs). Then President Marcos issued a Letter of Instruction directing the creditor

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GFIs to convert into ABCs shares of stock. X filed with the Securities and Exchange

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Commission (SEC) a case to determine whether the GFIs are stockholders of ABC Corporation
and their respective number of shares. X likewise filed a civil case for the enforcement and

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compliance of the said Letter of Instruction. Did X commit forum shopping?

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Answer: Yes. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial

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remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the

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same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the

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same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." Forum

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shopping is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with

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the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to

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the already congested court dockets. A close perusal of both the Amended Complaint in SEC
and the Amended Complaint in Civil Case shows that both cases are derived from the same

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factual issues involving substantially the same parties. Although the actions seem to be different,
yet it can be seen that there is a splitting of a cause of action.

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VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING (Cagayan

h B
Valley Drug Corp. v. CIR)

C e
Question: Which officials and employees of a company may validly sign the Verification and
s
l
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping even without a board resolution?

o b
Answer: The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors,

R
(2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4)

n
Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. This complies with Sections

a
4 and 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure

C h
The rationale applied in the foregoing is to justify the authority of corporate officers or

s
e
representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping,

l
being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.

LITIS PENDENCIA (Subic Telecom v. SBMA)

o b
Question: What factors will indicate that there exists litis pendencia?
R
an
Answer: For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a)
identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b)

C h
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any

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a r
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,

B
would amount to res judicata in the other case

s
ELEMENTS OF LITIS PENDENCIA (Forbes Park Assoc v. Pagrel, Inc.)

e
l
Question: What are the elements of litis pendentia?

b
o
Answer: The essential elements of litis pendentia are as follows: (1) identity of parties or

R
representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for; (3) reliefs

n r
founded on the same facts and the same basis; and (4) identity of the two preceding

a
particulars should be such that any judgment, which may be rendered in the other action,

B
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

e s
DENIAL UNDER OATH - ALLEGATIONS IN A PLEADING (Casent Realty v.
PhilBanking Corp)

b l
o
Question: PhilBank was the assignee of two promissory notes issued by X Corporation. Upon

R
due date, X Corporation failed to pay PhilBank which promoted the latter to file a collection

an r
case. X corp. answered that the complaint stated no cause of action because the parties executed

a
a Dacion en Pago with the intention of extinguishing X Corporation's obligations, as evidenced

B
by a Confirmation Statement. PhilBank did not file any Reply. X corp. claims that the failure to

C h
file a Reply to the Answer which raised the defense of Dacion en Pago constituted an admission

s
of the genuineness and execution of the documents such as the Confirmation Statement. Is X
corporation correct?

l e
o b
Answer: Yes. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a
written instrument and provides the manner of denying it which must be under oath and

R
specifically denies the instrument otherwise its genuineness and due execution shall be

an r
admitted. It is more controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of

a
failure to file a Reply which is all the new matters alleged in the Answer were deemed

B
controverted. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an actionable document, a

Ch
Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the genuineness and due
execution of the document will be deemed admitted

e s
b l
MOTION TO DISMISS, NOT A RESPONSIVE PLEADING (Marcos-Araneta v. Court of
Appeals)

R o
Question: Is a Motion to Dismiss a responsive pleading the filing of which will preclude the

an r
amendment of the Complaint?

Answer: No. According to Sec. 2 Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, A party may amend his
B a
C h
pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Responsive

s
pleadings are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up defenses. A motion to dismiss

l e
is not a responsive pleading. According the Sec. 2 Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there

b
is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties should
be the basis for determining proper venue.

SUMMONS: SUBSTITUTED SERVICE (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan) (PLEASE COMMIT


R o
n
TO MEMORY)

a
Question: What are the requirements for a valid substituted service of summons?

C h
Answer: The following are the requirements for substituted service of summons to be valid: (1)
s
Impossibility of prompt personal service; (2) Specific details in the return; and (3)

l e
b
Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendants office or
regular place of business.

R o
an
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was
made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of

C h
summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted
service was made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where

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Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid

B
substituted service of summons was made. It was also held that Garcia did not voluntarily appear
before the court, because the pleadings filed by petitioner were filed solely for special

s
appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over her

e
l
person and that of her three children.

o b
INVALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS (Manotoc v. Court of Appeals)

R
Question: A foreign courts judgment involving the death of X committed by the Philippine

n r
Military Intelligence Officials allegedly under the command of Imelda Manotoc was sought to be

a
enforced. The trial court issued the summons which, along with the copy of the Complaint, was

B
served by the sheriff upon Manotoc's resident caretaker. The trial court declared Manotoc in
default for failure to file her Answer. Manotoc moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of

s
jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons

e
l
which the court denied. Is the position of Manotoc tenable?

o b
Answer: Yes. In an action strictly in personam, personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in

R
person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a

an r
reasonable period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of

a
summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the usual method of

h B
service." Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and

s
circumstances authorized by the rules. For the presumption of regularity in the performance of

C e
official duty to apply, the Sheriffs Return must show that serious efforts or attempts were

l
exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts failed. These facts must be

b
specifically narrated in the Return. It must clearly show that the substituted service must be made

o
on a person of suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant.

R
MOTION TO DISMISS (Quintos v. Nicolas)

an a r
Question: The court dismissed an action for partition for failure of the parties and their counsels

B
Ch
to appear despite notice. It was not mentioned in the decision whether the dismissal was with or

s
without prejudice. May a co-owner later ask for partition of the property by way of a

e
counterclaim in a case for Queting of Title, or should the counterclaim for partition be considered

l
already barred by the prior judgment of dismissal?

o b
Answer: The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment. Dismissal with
prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner

R
to ask for partition at any time, provided that there is no actual adjudication of ownership of

an r
shares yet. Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-
owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would

B a
h
diminish the substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules.

s
Substantive law cannot be amended by a procedural rule. The Court held that Art. 494 is an

C e
exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal

l
for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be

b
without prejudice.

ABSOLUTE IDENTITY NOT NECESSARY FOR RES JUDICATA TO EXIST (P.L. Uy


Realty Corp v. ALS Management)
R o
a n
Question: Is absolute identity of parties necessary for res judicata to apply?

h
Answer: No. Absolute identity of parties is not required for res judicata to apply; substantial

C s
e
identity is sufficient.

RES JUDICATA, REQUISITES (Cano v. Spouses Jose)


bl
Question: What are the requisites for the application of Res Judicata?

R o
an
Answer: Res judicata operates as bar by prior judgment if the following requisites concur: (1)
the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the

h
merits; (3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second action,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.

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RES JUDICATA, INTERPLEADER (Bliss Development v. Diaz)

B
Question: BDC sold its property to Sps. Melgazo, both of whom are now deceased. Diaz

e s
claimed to be the transferee of the said property and traced his right from one Domingo Tapay.
Diaz then paid BDC the amortizations due on the property, and BDC issued a permit to occupy

b l
the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then introduced improvements on the property. A contract to
sell was later issued in favor of Diaz. Arreza however claims that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold

R o to him the rights over the property. To resolve the conflicting claims, BDC filed a complaint for
Interpleader. The RTC ruled that Arreza had a better right over the property, which decision

n r
became final and executory. Later, Diaz filed a complaint for sum of money against BDC, Arreza

a
and Tapay. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing res judicata. Is the complaint barred by res

B
judicata because of the previous decision of the court in the interpleader case?

s
Answer: No. The essential elements of res judicata are not present. First, the interpleader case

e
l
was between Arreza and Diaz. While it was BDC that initiated the interpleader case, the

b
opposing parties in that prior case is, in fact, Arreza and Diaz. Second, the issues resolved in the
interpleader case revolved around the conflicting claims of Arreza and Diaz, and not whatever

R o
claim either of them may have against BDC. Thus, there is no identity of parties, nor identity of
subject matter, between the interpleader case and the one at bar.

an a r
RES JUDICATA, LABOR CASE (Oriental Ship management v. Bastol)

h B
Question: X, a seaman who was repatriated because of heart disease, won in the Labor Arbiter

C e s
level on his claim for disability benefits against his employer ABC. The NLRC however

l
remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the conduct of clarificatory hearings for a more

b
certain determination of the state of health of X. Later, the Labor Arbiter still ruled in favor of X
and granted him disability benefits, but the NLRC on appeal, reversed the decision. X appealed

R o
to the CA which reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision. The employer ABC claims that the
decision of the NLRC ordering the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter has attained finality;

an r
hence the CA violated the principle of Res Judicata and the law of the case. Is the employer

a
correct?

B
Ch s
Answer: No. The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. The July 30, 1999 NLRC Decision

e
cannot and does not constitute res judicata to the instant case. Res judicata has two concepts: (a)

l
bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. These concepts of the doctrine

b
of res judicata are applicable to second actions involving substantially the same parties, the same

o
subject matter, and cause or causes of action. In the instant case, there is no second action to
speak of, involving as it is the very same action albeit the NLRC remanded it to the Labor
Arbiter for further proceedings.
R
an
PRE-TRIAL, NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL (PNB v. Sps. Perez)

B a r
h
Question: May the judge validly consider or treat an ordinary hearing to be the pre-trial

C s
e
conference between the parties?

b
Answer: No. Section 3, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure unequivocally requires
l
that the notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel.

R o
The notice of pre-trial seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and place of the pre-trial and to
require them to file their respective pre-trial briefs within the time prescribed by the rules. Its

n
absence, therefore, renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings null and void.

a
h
In the case at bar, the order issued by the trial court merely spoke of a hearing and required

s
PNB to prepare a complete statement of account. The order does not mention anything about a

C
pre-trial to be conducted by the trial court. The CA aptly held that the Order which declared the
e
l
haring to be a pre-trial and allowed the Spouses to adduce evidence ex parte, is void. Similarly,

b
its ruling that the Decision and all subsequent orders issued pursuant to said judgment are also

o
null and void, is proper.

LIBERALITY IN APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES, APPEARANCE OF


R
an
PARTIES; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO APPEAR (Spouses Leyba v. Rural Bank of
Cabuyao) (Please take note of this case.)

C h
Question: Sps. A and B filed a complaint for Nullification of Real Estate Mortgage and Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) against Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. (RBCI) and Reyes alleging that A
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a r
was made to sign an SPA, granting Reyes the authority to mortgage a land; that Reyes used the

B
SPA to obtain loan from RBCI guaranteed by a real estate mortgage over the subject land. During
the pre-trial, Sps. A and B and their counsel failed to attend. Citing Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the Rules

s
of Court, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of interest to prosecute the case. Is the RTC

e
l
correct?

o b
Answer: No. It is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity
to enable them to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of

R technicalities. The Court noted that the subject matter of the complaint is to petitioners a

n r
valuable parcel of land measuring 259 square meters. Petitioners stand to lose a lot on account of

a
a mere technicality. They have manifested their interest to pursue the case even on appeal. They

B
also have adequately explained their failure to attend the pre-trial conference. In the interest of

s
substantive justice, we allow the petitioners an opportunity to present their side during a

e
trial on the merits, to obviate jeopardizing substantive justice. This liberality underscores

l
the importance of an appeal in our judicial grievance structure to give party-litigants the

b
amplest opportunity for the just disposition of their cause freed from the noose of

o
technicalities.

R
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (EPCIB v. RCBC) (Please read this very well)

an a r
Question: What is the mode of appeal in assailing the RTC decision that confirmed an arbitral

h B
award?

C e s
Answer: The proper mode of appeal assailing the decision of the RTC confirming an arbitral

l
award is an appeal before the CA pursuant to Sec. 46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9285,

b
otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, or completely, An Act to
Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to

R o
Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for other Purposes, promulgated on
April 2, 2004 and became effective on April 28, 2004 after its publication on April 13, 2004.

an a r
NATURE OF VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION (Benguet Corp. V. DENR)

B
Ch
Question: Is a stipulation requiring voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or
quasi-judicial agencies a valid contractual stipulation?

e s
b l
Answer: Yes. Availment of voluntary arbitration before resort is made to the courts or
quasi-judicial agencies of the government is a valid contractual stipulation that must be

R o
adhered to by the parties. In other words, in the event a case that should properly be the subject
of voluntary arbitration is erroneously filed with the courts or quasi-judicial agencies, on motion

an r
of the defendant, the court or quasi-judicial agency shall determine whether such contractual

a
provision for arbitration is sufficient and effective. If in affirmative, the court or quasi-judicial

h B
agency shall then order the enforcement of said provision.

C
EFFECT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN CASE OF CONFLICT (Korea Technologies,

e s
l
Co. V. Lerma)

o b
Question: X entered into a contract with Y whereby the former shall construct a liquefied gas
cylinder manufacturing plant. It was stipulated in the contract that in case of conflict between the

R
parties, the parties should first attempt to settle their dispute through arbitration. A conflict

n
erupted between the parties. Y was reminded of the arbitration stipulation in their contract and

a
filed an Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board pursuant to

h
Article 15 of the Contract. X contends that the arbitration stipulation in their contract is null and

s
void for being against public policy as it ousts the local courts of jurisdiction over the instant
controversy. Is X correct?
C e
Answer: No. The Court, reiterating its ruling in LM Power Engineering Corporation v. Capitol
Industrial Construction Groups, Inc., held: Being an inexpensive, speedy and amicable
bl
method of settling disputes, arbitration along with mediation, conciliation and negotiations
encouraged by the Supreme Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, arbitration also
R o
an
hastens the resolution of disputes, especially of the commercial kind. It is thus regarded as the
wave of the future in international civil and commercial disputes. Brushing aside a contractual

h
agreement calling for arbitration between the parties would be a step backward. The arbitration

C
clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. Submission to arbitration is a

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contract and that a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties

B
shall be referred to arbitration is a contract.

TRIAL

e s
b l
CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE OF HEARING OR TRIAL (Steel Corp. V.
Equitable PCIB)

R o Question: The trial court approved the Petition for Rehabilitation and appointed a Receiver for

n r
X Corp. X Corp. filed its own counter rehabilitation plan and submitted it for the consideration

a
of the court. Other creditors filed their respective comments on the petition and the Receiver

B
submitted his recommended rehabilitation plan which the court approved. From this order by the
Rehabilitation Court sprung several appeals filed with the CA. Should the CA consolidate the
appeals filed?

e s
b l
Answer: Yes. Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court. The purpose of this rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against

R o
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets, and simplify the work of the
trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to

an r
the parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the

a
aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before

B
the courts. Further, it results in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being

C h
rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single judgment.

s
JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS

l e
b
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS (DMCI v. Duvaz Corp)

o
R
Question: DMCI entered into a construction contract with Duvaz but after completion, the

an r
contractual price remained unpaid. Duvaz filed a petition for the declaration of a state of

a
suspension of payments with the SEC which SEC granted. This prompted DMCI to file with the

B
RTC a petition for the annotation of contractors lien on the property of Duvaz which the RTC

Ch
granted. When DMCI learned that Duvaz withdrew its petition with the SEC, DMCI made

s
demands from Duvaz which proposed settlement in the amount of 1million for the next three

e
l
years which DMCI found unacceptable. DMCI filed a collection suit against Duvaz. In its

b
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, Duvaz specifically denied DMCI's averment and by
way of affirmative defenses to support its counterclaims, Duvaz alleged serious defects in the

R o
construction. Later, DMCI moved for summary judgment alleging that Duvaz' counterclaims
have already prescribed. Is summary judgment proper in this case?

an a r
Answer: No. Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for

h B
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact,
except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary

C e s
judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In this case, genuine issues exist.

l
DMCIs posture on estoppel is untenable. Far from containing an admission of liability, Duvaz

b
Answer contained a specific denial of petitioners claim. Such doubt should be resolved against
the grant of the motion for summary judgment. When faced with a motion for summary

party the benefit of all favorable inferences.


R o
judgment, should resolve doubts in favor of the party against whom it is directed, giving such

a n
With the parties conflicting postures on, among others, the issues of estoppel, prescription, and

h
DMCIs liability and Duvaz corollary right for damages arising from the alleged mal-execution

s
of the construction works, the only way to ascertain whose position jibes with facts on the

C
ground is obviously through the presentation of evidence by the parties in a full blown trial on
e
l
the merits.

RENDITION OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS (MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of


Manila Bay)
o b
R
an
Question: In 2008, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering
various government agencies to clean up Manila Bay which decision had attained finality. To

h
implement the Decision, the Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and
evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the said agencies and to

C
monitor its execution. However, due to the absence of specific completion dates within which to
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accomplish the assigned tasks given to the agencies, the Committee recommended that time

B
frames be set for the said purpose. Hence, Resolutions were issued by the SC to implement the
Decision. This was viewed as an encroachment on the power and functions of the Executive

s
Branch headed by the President. Did the Court encroach on the power and function of the

e
l
President?

o b
Answer: No. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is

R but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. While additional activities are

n r
required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives

a
are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of

B
Court. It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged but also those matters actually and necessarily included therein or necessary

e s
thereto. With the final and executory judgment in the MMDA case, the writ of continuing

l
mandamus issued means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the

b
Courts orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the

o
judgment.

R
IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT (Mocorro v. Ramirez)

an a r
Question: Explain the principle of immutability of judgment vis-a-vis a final decision.

h B
Answer: A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality

C e s
of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is

l
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether

b
the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The
orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the

R o
judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose
is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice

an r
system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence
to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of

B a
Ch
adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down.

FINALITY OF JUDGMENT (Spouses Coloso v. Garilao)


e s
b l
Question: May the DAR Secretary modify a final and executory judgment of the court?

R o
Answer: No. A decision that acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may
no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous

an r
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the

a
highest court of the land.

h
COMPLETE PARTITION v. PARTIAL PARTITION OF LAND (Monteroso v. Court of
B
Appeals)
C e s
b l
Question: X prayed for partial partition of a parcel of land but the court ordered a complete
partition thereof with accounting. Is the court's order proper?

R o
Answer: Yes. The Philippine judicial system requires courts to apply the law and grant remedies

n
when appropriately called for by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate, courts have the

a
discretion to apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. In the instant case, a
disposition only ordering partial partition and without accounting, as petitioners presently urge,

C h
would be most impractical. Courts have been cautioned against being dogmatic in rendering

s
e
decisions, it being preferable if they take a complete view of the case and in the process

l
come up with a just and equitable judgment, eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather

b
than promote substantial justice. Verily, courts should always strive to settle the entire

o
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of future
litigation.

R
an
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENTS (Anastacio
Tuballa v. Cabrera, et al.)

Question: What are the exceptions to the rule on immutability of judgments?

C h
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a r
Answer: As a rule, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A

B
final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that rendered

s
it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that the

e
l
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the

b
law, rules, and regulations. The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no
longer be modified in any respect are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called

R o nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.

n r
POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES

B a
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION (SM land Inc. v. BCDA)

s
Question: When may the Supreme Court allow the filing of a second Motion for

e
l
Reconsideration of its decision?

o b
Answer: The concurrence of the following elements are required for a second motion for
reconsideration to be entertained:

R
an r
a. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest

a
of justice;

h B
b. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality;

C e s
c. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions,

Banc; and
b l
at least three (3) members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En

R o
d. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Bancs actual membership must be
mustered for the second motion for reconsideration to be granted. Unfortunately for respondent-

an a r
movants, the foregoing requirements do not obtain in the case at bench.

B
Ch
APPEALS IN GENERAL (Silverio, Jr. v. Court of Appeals)

e s
Question: What is the rationale for the rule disallowing appeals from interlocutory orders of the
court?

b l
o
Answer: The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory

R
order is to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing
party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be

an r
contested in a single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final
judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.

B a
C h
PERFECTION OF APPEAL (Batalla v. COMELEC)
s
l e
Question: X and Y were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay. X was proclaimed the

o b
Punong Barangay. Y filed an election protest and claimed that there was a misappreciation of
seven ballots. MCTC rendered its Decision finding that X and Y had garnered an equal number

R
of votes. Aggrieved, X timely filed his Notice of Appeal of the decision elevating the election
protest before the Comelec. X paid the PhP 1,000 appeal fee to the trial court within the five-day

a n
period from receipt of the decision and the additional PhP 3,200 appeal fee to the Comelec Cash
Division within 15 days from the filing of his notice of appeal. The Comelec First Division

C h
dismissed the appeal, and the Comelec En Banc denied his motion for reconsideration for X's
failure to pay the appeal fee and because of Verification issues. Is the Comelec correct?
s
Answer: No. In the instant case, we find that Batalla already perfected his appeal by filing his
l e
Notice of Appeal and by paying the PhP 1,000 appeal fee, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC,
within the five-day reglementary period, to the MCTC; and by paying the additional appeal fee
o b
R
of PhP 3,200 to the Comelec Cash Division on March 5, 2008..

an
C h
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MODES OF APPEAL
a r
B
RULE 45, LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW (Lim v. Desierto)

e s
Question: May the Supreme Court under Rule 45 review the exercise of discretion of the

l
Ombudsman in determining whether probable cause exists?

b
o
Answer: No. An appeal under Rule 45 should be limited to questions of law only, not

R
questions of facts. The main issue of whether probable cause exists that will warrant the filing

n r
of the appropriate complaint is a question of fact. In this case, resolving the issues presented by

a
petitioner, however, would require a review of the factual findings of the Ombudsman. Thus, it is

B
beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it. However, while the Ombudsmans

s
discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not absolute, nevertheless, petitioner

e
l
must prove that such discretion was gravely abused to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsmans

b
findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails. This Court's consistent policy has been
to maintain non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of

o
probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse of discretion.

R
an r
ISSUES TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL (Bote v. Sps. Veloso)

B a
Question: May a party change his cause of action or theory of the case on appeal? Is there an

C h
exception to the rule?

s
l e
Answer: The settled rule is that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of
action on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a

o b
question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate
something on which the court did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extrajudicial

R
and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. Nevertheless, such rule

an r
admits of an exception as enunciated in Canlas v. Tubil(G.R. No. 184285, 2009) to wit: When the

a
factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party

B
in order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, as in this case, the Court

Ch
may give due course to the petition and resolve the principal issues raised therein

e s
l
NEW MATTERS CANNOT BE RAISED ON APPEAL(CIR v. Puregold)

o b
Question: The CIR filed with the Supreme Court a petition introducing an entirely new matter
which it did not raise in its pleadings filed with the lower courts. May the Supreme Court

R
entertain the new matter?

an a r
Answer: No. During the proceedings in the CTA, the CIR never challenged Puregold's eligibility

B
to avail of the tax amnesty under RA 9399 on the ground that its principal place of business, per

C h
its Articles of Incorporation, is in Metro Manila and not in Clark Field, Pampanga. Neither did

s
the CIR present the supposed Articles of Incorporation nor formally offer the same in evidence

l e
for the purpose of proving that Puregold was not entitled to the tax amnesty under RA 9399.

b
Hence, the Court cannot take cognizance, much less consider, this argument as a ground to divest
Puregold of its right to avail of the benefits of RA 9399.

LIBERALITY OF APPLICATION PROCEDURAL RULES, PERFECTION OF APPEAL


R o
n
(Sps. Curata v. PPA)

a
Question: In what instances may the strict requirement of payment of docket fees for the
perfection of appeal be loosened up?

C h s
Answer: Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has recognized as justifying the
loosening up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket fees are: (1) to relieve a litigant
l e
from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (2) good faith of the defaulting party by paying within a reasonable time from
o b
R
the time of the default; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the

an
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to the
other party; and (7) importance of the issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation

adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules.


C h
of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to

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a r
COURT OF APPEALS, A TRIER OF FACTS, APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS OR FINAL

B
ORDERS OF THE RTC (PNB v. Pasimio)

s
Question: May the Court of Appeals entertain questions of fact raised in a Rule 41 appeal?

e
b l
Answer: Yes. Section 9 of Bates Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, categorically states that the CA has, inter alia, the power to try

R o cases, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction. It is also worthy to note

n r
that the appellate court's reliance on the factual findings of the trial court is hinged on the latter's

a
firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their demeanor during the trial.

B
However, when such findings are not anchored on their credibility and their testimonies, but on
the assessment of documents that are available to appellate magistrates and subject to their

s
scrutiny, reliance on the trial courts factual findings finds no application.

e
b l
REVIEW OF FINAL JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
(Aguilar v. Hernandez)

R o
Question: What is the remedy to question the Ombudsman's decision in administrative

an r
disciplinary cases?

B a
Answer: The nature of the case before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) determines the

C h
proper remedy available to the aggrieved party and with which court it should be filed. In

s
administrative disciplinary cases, an appeal from the OMBs decision should be taken to the CA

l e
under Rule 43, unless the decision is not appealable owing to the penalty imposed. In the case at

b
bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after due
investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and meted the

R o
corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of
appeal. Rule 43 governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasi-judicial

an r
agencies.

EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS (Dalida v. Sps. Naguit)


B a
Ch s
Question: Astra Corp. acting through its minority stockholder, Dalida, instituted a derivative suit

e
l
for accounting/receivership with TRO against Naguit because of Naguit's unauthorized

b
withdrawal of corporate funds. The parties filed a compromise agreement that mandated the
dismissal of the derivative suit and criminal complaints. The RTC granted Dalida's Motion for

R o
Execution but Naguit filed an Urgent Motion to Recall/Quash Writ of Execution on account of
supervening events Astras loss of revenues after the approval of the compromise agreement

an r
made it impossible for them to comply. The court stayed the execution. Is the stay of execution

a
proper?

h
Answer: No. The court may stay immediate execution of a judgment where supervening
B
C
events bring about a material change in the situation of the parties which makes the

e s
l
execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it

b
is not justified by the prevailing circumstances. However, the reason put forward by
respondents is insufficient to merit a stay of execution. Respondent Eliseo Naguit cannot renege

R o
on his obligation under the compromise agreement by claiming an inability to pay. It would be
an anathema to the orderly administration of justice if such an easy excuse is entertained to

n
abrogate a final decision based on a compromise agreement. Neither is there any supervening

a
event which materially and substantially altered the situation of the parties such that execution

h
would be unjust and inequitable. The compromise agreement has the force of law between the

C s
parties unless it is void, there is a vice of consent, or there is forgery, or if the terms are so

e
palpably unconscionable, none of which applies in this case.

DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION NOT ALLOWED IN EXPROPRIATION CASES


bl
o
(Curata v. PPA)

Question: Is execution pending appeal applicable to expropriation proceedings.


R
an
Answer: No. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under Sec. 2 (a) of Rule

h
39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. PPAs monies, facilities and assets are
government properties. PPA is a government instrumentality charged with carrying out

C
governmental functions through the management, supervision, control and regulation of major
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a r
ports of the country. It is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and

B
Communication pursuant to PD 505. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by virtue of
a final judgment or pending appeal. Funds of PPA partake of government funds, and such may

s
not be garnished absent an allocation by its Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot

e
l
be garnished and its properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of

b
execution pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot grant
discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established

R o jurisprudence that government properties are exempt from execution. What cannot be
done directly cannot be done indirectly.

n a r
ISSUANCE AND CONTENTS OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION (Parel v. Heirs of Prudencio)

B
Question: What are the instances when the issuance of a writ of execution may be appealed?

e s
l
Answer: The following are the instances where a writ of execution may be appealed: 1) the writ

b
of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties
making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is sought to be enforced against

R o
property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject
to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there

an r
remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that the writ of execution has been

a
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong

h B
party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued

s
without authority.

C e
l
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be

b
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That
mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action

o
of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

R
an r
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT, MINISTERIAL DUTY OF SHERIFF (Alconera v.

a
Pallanan)

B
Ch
Question: May the sheriff exercise discretion whether or not to execute the judgment?

e s
l
Answer: Well-settled is that the sheriffs duty in the execution of a writ is purely

b
ministerial; he is to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion
whether to execute the judgment or not. there was no legal impediment preventing respondent

R o
sheriff from performing his responsibility of enforcing the writ of execution. Since Rafols failed
to comply with the requirements under the Rules, Cua Beng who prevailed in the unlawful

an r
detainer case is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate execution.

B a
h
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

C
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT (Republic v. Estate of Lim)

e s
b l
Question: The Republic filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint averring that Lim, Sr. and
Lim, Jr., acted in unlawful collusion with the Marcoses, and took undue advantage of their

R o
relationship with the latter. The Republic then prayed for the reconveyance of all funds and
property acquired by them in abuse of power through unjust enrichment. When Lim, Sr. passed

n
away, his estate filed a motion to lift the sequestration over certain real properties. Such motion

a
was opposed by the Republic alleging that the sequestered lots stand as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment the Republic may obtain against the estate of Lim, Sr.

C h
The Sandiganbayan then lifted the sequestration order. The estate of Lim, Sr. then filed a
s
demurrer to evidence alleging that the Republics evidence did not prove or disprove that the
l e
b
defendants on their own or in concert with the Marcoses, amassed ill-gotten wealth. The
Republic also filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against
respondents in the amount of its claims, to counter the effects to the lifting of the sequestration
order. However, the Sandiganbayan, stating that bare allegations of the commission of fraud by
R o
an
respondents in incurring the obligations are not sufficient for the granting of the writ of
preliminary attachment, denied the motion. Is the Sandiganbayan correct?

C h
Answer: No. For a writ of attachment to issue under Sec.1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud

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a r
in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought. The

B
Court ruled that the Republic has sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating the
commission of fraud committed by the respondents as a condition sine qua non for the issuance

s
of a writ of preliminary attachment. The main supporting proving document of the Republic was

e
l
unqualifiedly admitted in evidence by the Sandiganbayan. It is incongruous, therefore, for the

b
Sandiganbayan to deny the writ of preliminary attachment when the pieces of evidence on record
which it used and based its findings and conclusions in denying the demurrer to evidence were

R o the same ones which demonstrate the propriety of the writ of preliminary attachment. The denial
of the prayed writ, thus, evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion on the part of

n r
Sandiganbayan.

B a
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (St. James College v. Equitable PCI Bank)

s
Question: Spouses Jaime and Myrna Torres, owner of St. James College, defaulted in their loan

e
l
of PhP25M secured by REM in favor of EPCIB. EPCIB made a counter proposal on the

b
restructuring of the loan. Jaime Torres chose and agreed to pay the equal annual amortizations of
PhP 6,100,000 payable every May. However, they failed to pay. Thereafter, partial payment was

R o
accepted by the bank. EPCIB reminded Spouses that its receipt of the check payment is without
prejudice to the bank's rights considering the overdue nature of Spouses loan. The Spouses

an r
ordered stop payment of the check. The bank demanded full settlement of spouses loan which

a
was unheeded. And so the bank filed a Petition for Sale to extra-judicially foreclose the

h B
mortgaged property. However, RTC issued an Order granting a writ of preliminary injunction in

s
favor of Spouses. Was the RTC Correct?

C e
l
Answer: No. The injunctive writ is conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right

b
of the applicant which should be protected, the writ being the strong arm of equity, an

o
extraordinary peremptory remedy which can be availed of only upon the existence of well-
defined circumstances. Foreclosure proceedings will not preclude the property to owner

R
participate in the auction; title does not ipso facto pass title to the winning bidder over the

an r
mortgaged property; and the same is subject to the right to redeem within one year from the
auction sale.

B a
Ch s
The one-year redemption period is another grace period accorded petitioners to pay the

e
outstanding debt, which would be converted to the proceeds of the forced sale pursuant to the

l
requisites under Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 3135, as amended, for the redemption of a property

b
sold in an extrajudicial sale, also in accordance with Sec. 78 of the General Banking Act, as

o
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1828. It is only upon the expiration of the redemption

R
period, without the judgment debtors having made use of their right of redemption, does
ownership of the land sold become consolidated in the purchaser or winning bidder.

an
REQUISITES FOR GRANT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (Marquez, et al. v.

B a r
h
Sanchez)

C e s
Question: Did the trial court's refusal in this case to grant injunction amount to grave abuse of

l
discretion?

o b
Answer: No. The requisites of preliminary injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory
are the following: (1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right

R
in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent

a n
need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) no other ordinary,
speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

C h
It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the
s
e
emergency demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests

l
in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of

b
pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown

o
to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. Extreme

R
caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion

an
REQUISITES FOR GRANT OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (Compania General v. Sevandal)

h
Question: What should the applicant comply with before an injunctive relief may be issued by

C
the court?

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a r
Answer: In order that an injunctive relief may be issued, the applicant must show that: (1) the

B
right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to
be protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount

s
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. All of these elements must concur and the

e
l
absence of even one of them would be fatal in petitioners application for the writ.

o b
ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER OF THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP v. Antonio-Valenzuela)

R
n r
Question: The Supervision and Examination Department (SED) of the Bangko Sentral ng

a
Pilipinas (BSP) conducted examinations of the books of the respondent banks. Thereafter, SED

B
sent separate letters to the Board of Directors of each bank, informing them that the SED found
that the banks failed to carry out the required remedial measures. The banks noted none of them

s
had received the Report of Examination (ROE) which finalizes the audit findings. Thus, the

e
l
respondent banks filed a complaint for nullification of the BSP ROE with application for a TRO

b
and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. The RTC ruled that the banks were entitled to
the writs of preliminary injunction prayed for, holding that the banks are entitled to copies of the

o
ROEs. Is the RTC correct?

R
an r
Answer: No. The requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of right

a
sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear

h B
and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to

s
prevent serious damage. The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is an

C e
unwarranted interference with the powers of the Monetary Board. The actions of the Monetary

l
Board under Sections 29 and 30 of RA 7653 may not be restrained or set aside by the court

b
except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction

o
or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

R
MANDATORY INJUNCTION (PLRA v. Court of Appeals)

an a r
Question: Should the court grant a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction if it will

B
Ch
result in a premature resolution of the case, or will grant the principal objective of the parties

s
before merits can be passed upon?

l e
Answer: No. Sec. 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the

b
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted provided that 1) the applicant must
have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse; 2) there is a material and

R o
substantial invasion of such right; and 3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy

an r
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

B a
h
The purpose of the ancillary relief is to keep things as they peaceably are while the court passes

s
upon the merits. Where a preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction will result in a

C e
premature resolution of the case, or will grant the principal objective of the parties before merits

l
can be passed upon, the prayer for the relief should be properly denied.

RECEIVERSHIP, APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER (Vivares v. Reyes)

o b
R
Question: S was the father of J and T. J and T had an oral partition of the properties left by their

n
father. Upon T's death and believing that T did not receive his full share in the estate of S, his

a
executor and remaining heir, (petitioners) filed for Partition and Recovery of Real Estate.

h
Petitioners later filed a Motion to Place Properties in Litigation under Receivership alleging that

s
to their prejudice, J had, without prior court approval, sold to third parties and transferred in his

C
own name several common properties. J filed his Opposition denying that he had fraudulently
e
l
transferred any property of the estate of S and asserting that any transfer in his name of said

b
properties was a result of the oral partition between him and T that enabled the latter as well to

o
transfer several common properties in his own name. The court appointed a receiver. Is the court
correct?

R
an
Answer: No. The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one and should be exercised with
extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary relief or where the

h
court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby caused be far

C
greater than the injury sought to be averted. The court should consider the consequences to

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a r
all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to produce irreparable

B
injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the appointment will injure the
interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration from the court as those of

s
the complainant. In Descallar v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the appointment of a receiver is

e
l
not proper where the rights of the parties, one of whom is in possession of the property, are still

b
to be determined by the trial court.

R o SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS

n r
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTION OF COMELEC

a
AND COA; APPLICATION OF RULE 65 UNDER RULE 64 (Querubin v. COMELEC)

B
Question: Are Orders issued by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions
covered by Rule 64?

e s
b l
Answer: No. The Court has consistently held that the phrase "decision, order, or ruling" of
constitutional commissions, the COMELEC included, that may be brought directly to the

R o
Supreme Court on certiorari is not all-encompassing, and that it only relates to those
rendered in the commissions' exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. In the case

an r
of the COMELEC, this would limit the provision's coverage to the decisions, orders, or rulings

a
issued pursuant to its authority to be the sole judge of generally all controversies and contests

B
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of elective offices. Consequently, Rule 64,

C h
which complemented the procedural requirement under Article IX-A, Section 7, should likewise

s
e
be read in the same sensethat of excluding from its coverage decisions, rulings, and orders

l
rendered by the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions.

Appeals)
o b
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (Francisco Motors v. Court of

R
an r
Question: What are the exceptions to the rule that errors not relating to jurisdiction nor

a
involving grave abuse of discretion shall not be decided upon by the court in a Petition for

B
Certiorari?

Ch s
Answer: The Court has consistently held that where the error sought to be corrected neither

e
l
relates to the courts jurisdiction nor involves grave abuse of discretion, review of the error

b
through certiorari will not be allowed. This rule, however, admits exceptions such as (1) when
it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party, (2) where the trial

R o
judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, (3) where there may be danger
of failure of justice, (4) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, (5)

an r
where the issue raised is one purely of law, (6) where public interest is involved, and (7) in

a
case of urgency.

h
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION (Parma, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman)
B
C e s
l
Question: Several complaints were filed against councillor X before the Office of the

b
Ombudsman: First was a complaint-affidavit for falsification of official documents, second was a
complaint-affidavit for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, third was

R o
another complaint for falsification of official document and a fourth, for the same crime and
offense charged in the first and second complaint. X, however, failed to file a counter-affidavit.

n
The OMB issued a resolution finding probable cause for Falsification of Official Document and

a
recommended the filing of information for said crime against X. The OMB later dismissed the

h
second and third complaints. X accused the OMB of committing grave abuse of discretion

s
against the OMB in recommending the filing of information for Falsification of Official

C
Document despite the OMB's dismissal of the other complaints filed. Did the OMB's act amount
e
l
to grave abuse of discretion?

Answer: No. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that an act of a court or
o b
tribunal may only be considered to have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the
R
an
act was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

h
Ombudsman cannot be sustained in the instant case because, Parma veritably latches his case on

C
the lame argument that had the Ombudsman duly considered its findings on the second and third

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a r
complaint, it would have found no reason to give due course to the fourth one.

B
EXPROPRIATION (Sps. Curata v. PPA)

e s
Question: Is execution pending appeal applicable to expropriation proceedings?

b l
Answer: The Court rules that discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under

o
Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings.

R As early as 1919 in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, the Court held: When the

n r
Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an order merely requiring

a
the payment of the award as a condition precedent to the transfer of the title, as a personal

B
judgment against the Government could not be realized upon execution. In Commissioner of

e s
Public Highways v. San Diego, no less than the eminent Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee
explained the rationale behind the doctrine that government funds and properties cannot be

b l
seized under a writ of execution, thus: The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up

R o
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be

an r
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious

a
considerations of public policy.

h B
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER (Flores v. Sps. Quitalig)

C e s
Question: In a complaint for forcible entry, is the MTC correct in dismissing the same for failure

l
of the plaintiff to prove her ownership over the subject premises?

b
o
Answer: No. Owing to the summary nature of an action for forcible entry, courts should resolve

R
the issue of possession, avoiding, as a rule, the issue of ownership. In actions for forcible entry,

an r
only prior possession de facto and deprivation thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or

a
stealth needs to be proved. Naturally, the complainant may recover such possession even from

B
the owner himself. In any case, the issue of ownership can be properly resolved in a separate and

Ch
more appropriate proceeding. Here, Flora through her agents and her predecessors-in-interest

s
have prior possession over the lot, and it was established that the Sps. Quitalig unduly deprived

e
l
Flora of her possession. Hence, the complaint should be granted.

b
EJECTMENT CASE, UNLAWFUL DETAINER (Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals)

o
R
Question: X had been leasing his land to Y for over 40 years. When a fire gutted the dwelling of

an r
Y, X made several verbal demands for her to vacate the lot, but Y refused. The subject lot was

a
eventually bought by Z who filed an ejectment complaint against Y. In turn, Y argued that MeTC

B
had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than

complaint for ejectment?


C h
one year had elapsed from Y's forcible entry. Does the MeTC have jurisdiction over the

s
l e
Answer: Yes. Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te's ejectment

o b
complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz
was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the

R
legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house,

n
the Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to

a
the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses
however tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was sold

C h
to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred to their

s
e
subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay of petitioner until she decided

l
to eject the latter by sending several demands, the last being the January 14, 1997 letter of

b
demand. Since the action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the action was
instituted well within the one (1) year period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the nature
of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint. Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the
R o
an
Tan Te's complaint, is a species of unlawful detainer cases.

h
FORCIBLE ENTRY, REQUISITES (Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals)

C
Question: What are the two mandatory allegations that should be found in a complaint for

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forcible entry?
a r
B
Answer: For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complaint must contain two mandatory

s
allegations: (1) prior physical possession, possession de facto, not possession de jure, of the

e
l
property by the plaintiff; and (2) deprivation of said possession by another by means of

b
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The purpose of the law is to protect the person
who in fact has actual possession. The person claiming rightful possession cannot be permitted to

R o exclude the actual possessor and thereby disturb social order and violate individual security. The
burden of instituting an action to try the property right is upon he who claims rightful possession

n a r
The proper remedy in the instant case is to file an accion publiciana case which differs from a

B
forcible entry action in that it does not require prior physical possession in order to prosper.

s
CONTEMPT (Buildner v. Ilusorio)

e
b l
Question: Y filed various manifestations and motions in relation to her appeals from the
decision of the CA denying the petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband. First,

R o
Y moved for its reconsideration. She followed this with a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Conference. An Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Clarification was filed thereafter. The CA

an r
once again denied the MR and resolved to expunge from the records her repetitive motions, with

a
the caveat that no further pleadings shall be entertained. However, represented by Dela Cruz

B
Albano & Associates, she sought leave to file an urgent MR. Moreover, she addressed two letters

C h
to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. Another letter was given where she called the decision

s
e
in the case Ramon K. Ilusorio v. Baguio Country Club, appalling, unilaterally brazen, and

l
unprecedented. Also, she published On the Edge of Heaven, a book carrying Y's name as author

b
and which contained her commentaries on the aforesaid habeas corpus case was also alleged to
be contemptuous. Are Y's acts contemptuous?

R o
Answer: Yes. With regard to Erlindas authorship of the On the Edge of Heaven, she is found

an r
guilty of indirect contempt. Indirect contempt is a deliberate act to bring the court or judge

a
into disrepute. Her statements pose a different threat to the Courts repute. Statements such as

B
Ch
Was justice sold? and How can the highest court of our land be a party to the breakup of

s
my family and, disregarding the Family Code, when taken together went beyond the

e
permissible bounds of fair criticism. While most of her statements were in the form of

l
questions instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the same: they constitute a

b
stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the Court and tend to undermine the

o
confidence of the public in the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land. Litigants, no
matter how aggrieved or dissatisfied they may be of courts decision, do not have the unbridled

R
freedom in expressing their frustration or grievance in any manner they want. However, the

an r
various motions and manifestations filed by Erlinda Ilusorio which neither contained offensively
disrespectful language nor tended to besmirch the dignity of the Court are not contemptuous. The

B a
h
letters to the Chief justice were also found not to be contumacious in character, but only a sleigh

C s
but sub-rosa attempt to influence the letter-addressee.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
l e
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS (Rebusquillo v. Sps. Domingo)
o b
Question: May issues on heirship be decided in a civil action?
R
a n
Answer: It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special

h
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that

s
recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a

C
good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the
e
l
rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented

b
their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment

o
upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.

LETTERS TESTAMENTARY AND OF ADMINISTRATION (Manungas v. Loreto)


R
an
Question: Florentino and Engracia were married with an adopted son, Samuel. Florentino and

h
Samuel predeceased Engracia. Engracia filed an illegal detainer suit against Diosdado, who
claimed to be the illegitimate son of Florentino. Engracia won the case and the decision has

C
become final and executory. Upon the death of Engracia, Diosdado filed with the court a petition
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a r
for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate

B
son of Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. The RTC appointed him as
Special Administrator. Is the RTC correct?

e s
Answer: No. While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special

b l
administrator of the estate, such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the
directives of equity, justice and legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate

R o that the role of a special administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is
appointed. Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent

n r
and reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution

a
to the heirs. To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia

B
Manungas. It must be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the
subject of intestate proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to

e s
the heirs with the issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of the intestate

l
estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino

b
Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part

o
of the Estate of Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no
interest in preserving its value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The

R
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of

an r
the Estate of Manungas

B a
h
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Tujanmilitante v. Cada-Deapera)

C e s
Question: X filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking

l
Y to produce before the court her biological daughter, minor C and to return to her the custody

b
over the child. RTC granted the same. Since the writ cannot be served despite diligent efforts,

o
RTC-Caloocan directed the Sheriff to serve the alias writ upon Y at the Office of the Assistant
City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Will RTC-Caloocan acquire jurisdiction over Y if the latter is

R
served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City?

an a r
Answer: Yes. The National Capital Judicial Region consists of the cities of Manila, Quezon,

B
Ch
Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan,

s
Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. In

e
view thereof, it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas

l
corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is

b
sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here. In the case at bar,

o
respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and

R
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can
still be implemented in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is

an r
immaterial in view of the above rule.

B a
h
CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN (Gamboa- Hirsch v. Court of Appeals)

C e
Question: What are some of the instances when the mother may be declared unsuitable to have
s
l
custody of her children?

o b
Answer: The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared

R
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances:

a n
neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, and drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.

PARTIES, LOCUS STANDI (Funa v. Villar)

C h s
Question: What is the general rule in the appreciation of the legal standing of a party to the
l e
b
case?

Answer: The Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has

R
accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by o
an
a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of critical significance is at
stake.

C h
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a r
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a

B
direct injury as a result of a government action, or have a material interest in the issue
affected by the challenged official act.

e s
The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court,

b l
in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived, or relaxed, thus
allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to

R o sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act.

n MOOT CASES (NARRA NICKEL MINING


a rand DEVELOPMENT

B
CORPORATIONCORP v. REDMONT CONSLIDATION CORP. G.R. NO. 195580
(2014))

e s
l
Question: Under what circumstances can courts decide a moot case?

b
Answer: Instances where courts can decide a moot case:

o
R
(1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

an r
(2) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved;

B a
h
(3) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the

C s
bench, the bar, and the public; and

l e
(4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review

o b
NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES (HEIRS of MESINA vs. HEIRS of FIAN, G.R. NO. 201816

R
[2013])

an r
Question: What is the remedy of a party who failed to include an indispensable party to case?

B a
Ch
Answer: The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.

s
The remedy in non-joinder of a party is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

CAUSE OF ACTION
l e
Question: What constitutes sufficiency of cause of action?

o b
R
Answer: A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential

an r
elements of a cause of action, namely:

B a
h
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

C
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and

e s
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right

b l
RECEIVERSHIP (TANTANO vs. ESPINA-CABOVERDE, G.R. NO. 203585 [2013])

R o
n
Question: What factors must be considered in determining the appointment of a receiver?

a
Answer: Receivership is a harsh remedy to be granted with utmost circumspection and only in

C h
extreme situations. Before appointing a receiver, courts should consider: (1) whether or not the
injury resulting from such appointment would probably be greater than
s
the injury ensuing if the status quo is left undisturbed; and (2) whether or not the appointment
l e
will imperil the interest of others whose rights deserve as much a consideration from the court as
those of the person requesting for receivership.
o b
Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co is instructive: The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one
R
an
and should be exercised with extreme caution and only under circumstances requiring summary
relief or where the court is satisfied that there is imminent danger of loss, lest the injury thereby

C h
caused be far greater than the injury sought to be averted. The court should consider the
consequences to all of the parties and the power should not be exercised when it is likely to

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a r
produce irreparable injustice or injury to private rights or the facts demonstrate that the

B
appointment will injure the interests of others whose rights are entitled to as much consideration
from the court as those of the complainant.

e s
l
QUESTIONS OF FACTS vs. QUESTIONS OF LAW (GENERAL MILLING CORP

b
(GMC) vs. RAMOS, G.R. NO. 193723 [2011])

R o Question: Under what circumstances may an appellate court proceed with resolving an issue in
the absence of assignment of errors?

n a r
Answer: In Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, we explained that an appellate

B
court has a broad discretionary power in waiving the lack of assignment of errors in the
following instances:

e s
(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter;

b l
o
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within

R
contemplation of law;

an r
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at

a
a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid

B
C h
dispensing piecemeal justice;

s
l e
(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or
which the lower court ignored;

o b
R
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;

an r
(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent.

B a
Ch s
APPEAL OF WRIT OF EXECUTION (PAREL vs. HEIRS of SIMEON PRUDENCIO

e
G.R. NO. 192217 [2011])

b l
Question: Cite instances when a Writ of Execution can be a subject of an appeal?

R o
Answer: Instances where a writ of execution may be appealed:

an r
(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

B a
h
(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;

C
(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
e s
b
(4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;
l
thereof; or
R o
(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation

a n
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or

C h
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;

s
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be

l e
b
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That
mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action
of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

R o
an
APPEAL OF CRIMINAL CASE (PEOPLE vs. GALLO, G.R. NO. 187730 [2010])

Question: What will trigger a review of findings of facts in a criminal case?

C h
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a r
Answer: It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are not

B
disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected the outcome of the
case.

e s
b l
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare
denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail. Moreover, the Supreme Court

R o accords the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in the absence of any
compelling reason to discredit the same.

n a r
CONVICTION BY NEW JUDGE (PEOPLE vs. PALING and VILBAR, G.R. NO. 185390

B
[2011])

s
Question: Is judgment valid despite the fact that the judge who rendered it was not the one who

e
l
heard the case?

o b
Answer: The fact that the judge who rendered judgment was not the one who heard the
witnesses does not adversely affect the validity of conviction. The new judge can rely on the

R
transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with

an r
their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such

a
reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.

h
(PEOPLE vs. ALFREDO, G.R. NO. 188560 (2010))
B
C e s
Question: Can a conviction be sustained despite the fact that the same was rendered by a judge
who did not hear the case?

b l
o
Answer: The circumstance that the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one, who

R
heard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. The trial

an r
judge who rendered judgment was not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor of

a
the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the records of the case, does not render the

B
judgment erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is sufficient to support its

Ch
conclusion. As this Court held in People v. Competente, 207 SCRA 591 (1992): The

s
circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the

e
l
witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction. Even a cursory perusal

b
of the Decision would show that it was based on the evidence presented during trial and that it
was carefully studied, with testimonies on direct and cross examination as well as questions from
the Court carefully passed upon.

R o
an r
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES (PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA, G.R. NO. 188601 (2010))

B
Question: What is the general rule in appreciating the testimonies of witnesses in case which is a
a
subject of an appeal?

C h s
l e
Answer: It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court. The trial court has the unique

o b
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grilling examination. This rule admits of exceptions, however, such as when the trial

R
courts findings of facts and conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or when

n
certain facts of substance and value, likely to change the outcome of the case have been

a
overlooked by the lower court, or when the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of
facts.

RIGHT TO BAIL (QUI vs. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 196161 (2012))


C h s
Question: When is bail a matter of right?
l e
Answer: Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the
o b
R
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

an
Question: When can the appellate court grant bail?

C h
Answer: Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114. The appellate court can deny
petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the ground that she is a flight risk, a bail-

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a r
negating factor under Sec. 5 (d) of Rule 114. The appellate court anchored its denial on several

B
circumstances, pointed out by the OSG, which showed petitioners propensity to evade the law,
as when she failed to attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled said court to issue

s
three warrants for petitioners arrest. There is no dispute, and petitioner does not deny the fact,

e
l
that on various dates, the RTC issued warrants for her arrest.

o b
This fact alone should weigh heavily against a grant of bail pending appeal.

R
Petitioners argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt

n r
against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly one is convicted by the trial court, the presumption

a
of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.

B
DISCREPANCY IN ALLEGATIONS AND DENOMINATION OFFENSE (SENADOR vs.

s
PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 201620 (2013)

e
b l
Question: Will an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party violates
petitioners constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against

o
her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal?

R
an r
Answer: No. In offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the

a
offended party would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently

B
described and identified.

C h s
Variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution

l e
does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal, more so if the variance relates to the
designation of the offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial
rights of the accused.

o b
R
In case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110,

an r
Sec.12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information not its dismissal.

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE (SALAPUDDIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

B a
Ch
G.R. NO. 184681 (2013))

Question: What is the determination of probable cause?


e s
b l
Answer: The determination of probable cause is, under our criminal justice system, an executive

o
function that the courts cannot interfere with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

R
Otherwise, a violation of the basic principle of separation of powers will ensue.

an r
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS

B a
h
Question: Will a valid extrajudicial confession bind his co-accused?

C e
Answer: An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted
s
inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
b l
against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them under the principle of res

R o
Tamargo vs. Awingan elaborated on the reason for this rule, viz.: [O]n a principle of good faith
and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against

a n
him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if

h
a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used

C s
as evidence against him. The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court to the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the
l e
conspiracy by evidence other than the confession.

o b
R
VALIDITY OF WARRANTLESS ARREST (PEOPLE vs. NG YIK BUN, G.R. NO. 180452
(2011))

Question: When may a law enforcer effect a valid warrantless arrest?


an
C h
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a r
Answer: In People v. Alunday, 564 SCRA 135 (2008), the Court held that when a police officer

B
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds
at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113

s
of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.

e
b l
In flagrante delicto arrest must consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding
the arrest of accused- appellants.

R o SWEETHEART DEFENSE IN RAPE (PEOPLE vs. CIAS, G.R. NO. 194379 (2011))

n a r
Question: Can an accuse claim sweetheart defense in a rape case?

B
Answer: Yes, the sweetheart defense can be claimed as an affirmative defense but it must be

s
supported by convincing proof.

e
b l
The theory that Cias and AAA were having an illicit affair is unsupported by evidence. As held
in People v. Cabanilla, 635 SCRA 300 (2010), the sweetheart defense is an affirmative defense

o
that must be supported by convincing proof. In the case at bar, accused-appellant relied solely on

R
his testimony and that of his wife. He did not offer any other evidencesuch as a love letter, a

an r
memento, or even a single photographto substantiate his claim that they had a romantic

a
relationship. Besides, granting they had an illicit affair, this fact alone does not rule out rape as it

B
does not necessarily mean that consent was present. As the Court held, A love affair does not

C h
justify rape for a man does not have an unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal
desires against her will.
s
l e
REQUISITES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE (PEOPLE vs. LUCERO, G.R. NO.
188705 (2011))

o b
R
Question: What factors will support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence?

an a r
Answer: Under Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence shall be
sufficient for conviction when the following requisites are complied with:

B
Ch s
(1) there is more than one circumstance;

(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and
l e
o b
(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond

R
reasonable doubt.

an r
As held in Salvador v. People:

B a
h
Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its

C s
conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial

e
evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which

b l
proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At
times, resort to circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in

o
many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community

DENIAL CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION (PEOPLE vs.


R
COMBATE, G.R. NO. 189301 (2011))

a n
h
Question: Can denial prevail over positive identification of the accused?

C
Answer: Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on
e s
l
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the defense of denial. Accused-

b
appellant was positively and categorically identified by the witnesses. They have no reason to

o
perjure and accused-appellant was unable to prove that the prosecution witnesses were moved by

R
any consideration other than to see that justice is done. Thus, the presumption that their
testimonies were not moved by any ill will and bias stands, their testimonies are entitled to full

an
faith and credit.

C h
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a r
MINOR INCONSISTENCIES IN TESTIMONIES (PEOPLE vs. SOBANGEE, G.R. NO.

B
186120 (2011))

s
Question: Will minor inconsistencies invalidate a conviction?

e
b l
Answer: Minor variances in the details of the witnesses accounts, more frequently than not, are
badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood and they often bolster the probative value of their

R o testimonies.

n r
Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details

a
concerning the principal occurrence.

B
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be

e s
able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.

b l
The trial court explained that the inconsistencies found in the testimonies of the witnesses for the

o
prosecution were minor and even made their testimonial evidence more believable and

R
unrehearsed.

an r
Minor discrepancies in their testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the

a
essential integrity of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the credibility

B
C h
of witnesses.

s
e
PART II: CONCEPTS, PRINCIPLES AND OTHER LEADING JURISPRUDENCE

l
b
Q. Is venue synonymous with jurisdiction?

o
R
A. No. Hon. [Justice] Florenz D. Regalado differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a)
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to

an r
be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c)

a
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation

B
Ch
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by

s
law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of
the parties. (Nocum v Lucio Tan, 2005)

l e
Q. Can inanimate objects be parties in environmental cases?

o b
R
A. The Supreme Court invoked the newly-adopted Rules on Environmental Cases holding that
since the resident mammals of Tanon Strait are represented by natural persons acting as stewards

an r
of creation, the Court may take cognizance of the case to protect the interests of the mammals. In
the case, Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972 United States

B a
C h
case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton, wherein Justice William O. Douglas, dissenting to the
conventional thought on legal standing, opined:
s
l e
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we

o b
fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies
or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded

R
by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage, x x x.

a n
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction
found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an

C h
acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary corporation is a "person"
for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic,
s
or charitable causes. (Resident Mammals v. Reyes, 2015)

l e
Q. A filed a case for forcible entry before a first level court of Manila against B praying that
the latter be ejected from a parcel of land situated at the boundary of Manila and Quezon City.
o b
R
B filed a motion to dismiss claiming venue was improperly laid as the larger part of the real

an
property is situated in Quezon City. Is B correct?

A. No. Section 1. of Rule 4 states that actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or

C h
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. It is also worth pointing

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out that B should not have filed a motion to dismiss based on an objection to venue as said

B
motion is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case under Sec. 13 Rule 70.

s
Q. What if A filed a motion to dismiss based on the fact that resort to conciliation had not been

e
l
previously resorted to?

o b
A. The motion to dismiss may be allowed as the rules allow said motion if based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and failure to comply with the conciliation

R
requirement under Section 12, Rule 70. (Sec. 13, Rule 70 in relation to Section 12, Rule 70)

n a r
Q. What are the factors to determine which court has jurisdiction?

B
A. Nature of action and amount claim will determine jurisdiction in civil actions while nature of

e s
the offense, imposable penalty, and territorial jurisdiction will determine jurisdiction in criminal
actions. In some criminal cases, you will have to consider who the accused is (ex. Sandiganbayan

b l
has jurisdiction over some offenses of public officers regardless of where the crime was
committed) or who the victim is (where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the

5)
R o
commission of the offense, family Courts have jurisdiction over the criminal case, RA 8396, Sec.

an a r
Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over cases involving real property?

h B
A. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts [include] "all civil actions which

C s
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of

e
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) [outside

b l
Metro Manila or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs.

R o
an r
Q. Suppose an action for reconveyance of real property valued at P19,999.99 is filed before a

a
Municipal Trial Court, would it be correct to ask for the dismissal of the case for lack of

B
jurisdiction over the subject matter as reconveyance is incapable of pecuniary estimation?

Ch s
A. No. In a number of cases, the Court has held that actions for reconveyance of or

l e
for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.

o b
(San Pedro v. Asdala, 2009) This means that the jurisdiction over the case will be determined
based on the assessed value of the real property involved. *Please refer to previous question.

R
an r
Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction over money claims and personal property?

A. In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interests, damages of whatever kind,

B a
C h
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property exceeds Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) outside Metro Manila or Four hundred thousand pesos
s
of BP 129, as amended - paraphrased)
l e
(P400,000.00) in Metro Manila, the Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction. (Section 19 (8)

Q. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?


o b
R
n
A. If a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and

a
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their proper

C h
jurisdiction. Note that the courts of law HAVE jurisdiction but will defer to administrative bodies
because of their expertise. (Euro Med Laboratory v. Province of Batangas, 2006)
s
Q. What is the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction?
l e
A. Once the court acquires jurisdiction by virtue of a valid complaint, that jurisdiction shall
o b
R
continue up to the end of the case. Intervening facts will not deprive the courts of jurisdiction.

an
(Example: when a public officer resigns during the pendency of a case against him before the
Sandiganbayan, the Sandiganbayan should not dismiss the case because of this principle as it had
already acquired jurisdiction.)

C h
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Q. What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

B
A. The court will defer to the administrative agency before taking cognizance of the case.

e s
Otherwise stated, a party must exhaust all remedies before administrative bodies before judicial
recourse unless case falls within the exceptions.

b l
Q. What are the exceptions?

R o A. x x x (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the

n r
challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where

a
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;

B
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and
oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided

s
by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may

e
l
cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when

b
the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l)

o
in quo warranto proceedings (Republic v Lacap, 2007.)

R
an r
Q. When may the Supreme Court En Banc take cognizance of a case?

B a
A. (a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive

C h
agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question;
s
l e
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or reclusion
perpetua;

o b
R
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;

an a r
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;

B
Ch
(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the

s
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;

l e
(f) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment

forty thousand pesos;


o b
of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine exceeding

R
(g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of

an r
a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judges
suspension or a lawyers suspension from the practice of law;

B a
C h
(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any
s
e
Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court;

b l
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division may be

o
modified or reversed;

(j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;


R
(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
a n
h
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects

C s
e
the welfare of a community;

(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three
bl
o
Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en
banc;

R
an
(n) Cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention; and

h
(o) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their
personnel. (Sec. 3, Rule 2 A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC)

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a r
Please take note of letter (n) just in case you forget any specific ground.

B
Q. How do you determine the sufficiency of a cause of action?

e s
A. The test is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in

b l
accordance with the prayer of the complaint (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. David).
To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and

R o circumstances or other matter aliunde are not considered but the court may consider in addition
to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or

n r
admissions in the records (Zepeda v. China Banking Corp, 2006).

B a
Q: May the Supreme Court look into or determine questions of fact?

e s
A. As a general rule, the Supreme Court may not look into the questions of facts passed to it on
an appeal. However, the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the lower courts in

b l
the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when

R o
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of

an r
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both

a
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8)

B
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

C h
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are

s
e
not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed

l
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the Court of

b
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Q. What is forum shopping?


R o
an a r
A. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order

B
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another

Ch
forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of

e s
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or

l
the other court would make a favorable decision. x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it

b
trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congest our
court dockets. A wilful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for

Tomas (2013)
R o
summary dismissal of the case, and may also constitute direct contempt. (Orpiano v. Spouses

an a r
Q. Atty. Santos filed a pleading before the trial court. In the Certification of Non-Forum

h B
Shopping, he signed it on behalf of his client. Atty. Reyes, opposing counsel, moved to dismiss

s
the case. As judge, will you grant the Motion to Dismiss?

C e
l
A. I will grant the Motion to Dismiss. The Court held in a decided case: In this light, the Court

b
finds that the CA correctly dismissed Andersons Petition for Review on the ground that the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her

R o
behalf sans any authority to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error
by later submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the

n
petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a

a
defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true

h
that in some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it

C s
did so only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding

e
the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. (Anderson v. Ho, 2013)

Q. What would suffice as compliance to the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum


bl
o
Shopping?

R
A It is settled that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping are

an
not jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Non-

h
compliance with the verification requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally

C
defective, and is substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge of

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the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition

B
have been made in good faith or are true ad correct. On the other hand, the certification against
forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party litigant should not be allowed to

s
pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. While the certification requirement is obligatory,

e
l
non-compliance or a defect in the certificate could be cured by its subsequent correction or

b
submission under special circumstances or compelling reasons or on the ground of substantial
compliance.(Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. CA, 2013)

R o Q: Distinguish question of law from question of fact.

n a r
A. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,

B
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative

s
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.49 Civil Procedure. As a general

e
l
rule, subject to exceptions, a Petition for Review on Certiorari (Rule 45) shall raise only

b
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. One who claims the benefit of an estoppel on
the ground that he has been misled by the representations of another must not have been misled

R o
through his own want of reasonable care and circumspection (F.A.T Kee Computer Systems, Inc.
v. Online Networks International, Inc., 2011).

an a r
Note: Liberal Application of the Rule in the following instances:

h B
It is settled that with respect to the contents of the certification against forum shopping, the rule

C e s
of substantial compliance may be availed of. This is because the requirement of strict compliance

l
with the provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its

b
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded. It does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions

o
under justifiable circumstances, as the Court finds in the instant case. (Estel v. Diego, 2012)

R
an r
Q. May the trial court motu proprio dismiss a case without conducting any proceeding without

a
violating the principle of due process?

B
Ch
A. Yes. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the court may motu

e s
proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis

l
pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.

o b
Q: X was the Chancellor for University of Science and Technology (UST). He retired as
chancellor and was subsequently hired by Aliga, the Dean for the College of Law, in the same

R
University, to teach Law subjects as a substitute professor. Musli, the new chancellor, wrote a

an r
letter addressed to X requiring him to retire. X then filed a Complaint for Injunction with

a
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before the

h B
RTC. The case was dismissed by the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction reasoning that

s
the case is an illegal dismissal complaint. X then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

C
denied, prompting him to file a petition under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA granted the
e
l
petition filed by X and reversed the omnibus motion dismissing the complaint directing the

b
RTC to hear the case.

R o
The case being remanded back to the RTC, X filed an amended complaint impleading UST as
a defendant. X then filed a motion for summary judgment. The RTC then granted the

a n
summary judgment ruling in favor of X and subsequently the motion for execution pending
appeal. Musli, aggrieved, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari in his personal capacity.

h
The CA denied the petition. Musli then filed a motion for reconsideration. UST then decided to

C s
intervene. May UST intervene?

A. No. While undoubtedly, UST has a legal interest in the outcome of the case, it may not avail
l e
itself of the remedy of intervention in this particular case where Musli filed the present appeal in
his personal capacity; and not on behalf of UST. Therefore, UST is not a third party in the
o b
proceedings herein. Jurisprudence describes intervention as a remedy by which a third party, not
R
an
originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to
protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The right to

C h
intervene is not an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant
establishes facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it. In X's Amended

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Complaint before the RTC, UST was already impleaded as one of the defendants in the first civil

B
case. UST came under the jurisdiction of the RTC when it was served with summons and

s
participated in the case. Evidently, the rights and interests of UST were duly presented before the

e
RTC in the former Civil Case. Intervention requires that they were not impleaded in a former

l
b
proceedings so as not to enable them to protect or preserve their right. (The Board of Regents of
Mindanao State University v. Osop, 2012).

R o Q. An election protest was filed by Montilla against Datu. The service of summons has been

n r
done through registered mail: this is according to their internal rules: In cases filed before

a
the Tribunal involving distant legislative districts and provinces, it has been its practice to

B
serve the summons through registered mail, it being impracticable to send the same by

s
personal service to protestee or respondents who reside in said far provinces. Datu was

e
unable to file his answer to counter the protest even after 43 days so HRET entered a general

l
denial for him. When Datu learned this, he filed a motion for reconsideration to accept his

b
answer but it was denied. May summons in HRET cases be served by registered mail?

R o
A. The 2004 HRET Rules on summons is silent on how the summons should be served on the
protestee. Significantly, Rule 80[15] of the 2004 HRET Rules provides that the 1997 Rules of

an r
Civil Procedure applies by analogy or suppletorily in so far as the latter may be applicable and

a
not inconsistent therewith as well as with the orders, resolutions and decisions of the HRET. In

h B
view of the failure of the HRET Rules to specify the authorized modes of service of summons,

s
resort then is necessary to Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which

C states:
e
b l
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be

o
served handling a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and
sign for it, by tendering it to him.

R
an r
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served

a
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)

B
Ch
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of

s
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at defendants

e
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.

b l
In the case at bar, the service of the summons was made through registered mail, which

o
is not among the allowed modes of service under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In Federico S.
Sandoval II v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Aurora Rosario A.

R
Oreta, this Court has held that in the matter of service of summons, Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of

an r
the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rules of the HRET. If in ordinary civil cases (which
involve only private and proprietary interests) personal service of summons is preferred and

B a
h
service by registered mail is not allowed on jurisdictional and due process grounds, with more

C s
reason should election cases (which involve public interest and the will of the electorate) strictly

e
follow the hierarchy of modes of service of summons under the Rules of Court. (Mangudadatu v.
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 2008).

b l
o
Q. What are the elements of res judicata?

R
A. 1) an identity between the parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both

a n
actions; 2) a similarity of rights asserted and relief prayed for (that is, the relief is founded on the
same facts); and 3) identity in the two particulars is such that any judgment which may be

h
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, fully adjudicate or settle

C s
the issues raised in the action under consideration (RCBC v. Hilario, 2012).

Q. Under the Rules, what are the two concepts of res judicata and when can each be applied?
l e
A. Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior
judgment as enunciated in Section 47(b) of the said Rule and (2) conclusiveness of judgment as
o b
explained in Section 47(c) of the same Rule.
R
an
Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then

h
res judicata in its aspect as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two cases,

C
only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as

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conclusiveness of judgment applies.

B
Identity of parties is a requisite in the application of conclusiveness of judgment. So long as the

e s
parties or their privies are identical, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which

b l
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions

R o is the same. For res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply, identity of
cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. For purposes of conclusiveness of

n r
judgment, identity of issues means that the right, fact, or matter in issue has previously been

a
either directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action45by a

B
competent court (Heirs of Miguel v. Heirs of Angel Miguel, 2014).

e s
Q. May a minute resolution be considered for purposes of res judicata?

b l
A. Yes. A "minute resolution may amount to a final action on the case but it is not a precedent x x
x x it cannot bind non-parties to the action. Corollary thereto, we can conclude that a minute

R o
resolution, while not a precedent relative to strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the parties
therein, and calls for res judicatas application. x x x x for purposes of the application of res

an r
judicata, minute resolutions issued by this Court are as much precedents as promulgated

a
decisions, hence, binding upon the parties to the action. (PNB v. LIM, 2013)

h B
Q.Valentino Development Co. moved to dismiss the case filed by Production Bank against it

C e s
since the new complaint raises the same issues in a prior case which has become final and

l
executory? As judge, will you grant the motion?

parties.
o b
A. Yes. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is binding and conclusive on the

R
an r
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact

a
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an

B
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains

Ch
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them .(LZK Holdings
and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, 2014)

e s
Q: What are the elements of litis pendentia?
b l
R o
A: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same

an r
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in

a
the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action

B
under consideration (PND v. Gateway Property Holdings, 2012).

Q. What is the Neypes Doctrine?


C h s
l e
A. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity

o b
to appeal their cases, the Court ruled that a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice
of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a

R
new trial or motion for reconsideration should be given to litigants (Neypes v. CA,2005)

Q. Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable to criminal cases?


a n
C h
A. Yes. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of
a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
s
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure . First, BP 129, as amended,
the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the
l e
periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Second, the provisions of Section 3 of
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
o b
Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. Third, while the Court
R
an
did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did
include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to

C h
the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals
by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by

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a r
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Yu v. Samson-Tatad, 2011)

B
Q. Is the Neypes Doctrine applicable to administrative cases?

e s
A. No. The Neypes ruling applies to judicial proceedings only as the reason for such ruling also

b l
known as the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules of
Court. (Panolino v. Tajala, 2010)

R o Q: Members of the Ibaloi Tribes of Baguio City claim that their parents inherited from their

n r
ancestors several parcels of land in the Busol Watershed Reservation. They then applied for a

a
TRO before the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) seeking to enjoin The

B
Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc. and others from fencing the Busol Watershed Reservation.
The NCIP granted the TRO application. It also ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all

s
claims and dispute involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and

e
l
Indigenous Peoples, and thus may issue injunctive writs. The Baguio Cleaning Movement Inc.

b
argued that NCIP has no jurisdiction over the case. Does RA 8975, the law which prohibits
TROs against national government project cover TROs issued by NCIP?

R o
A. No. The law provides:

an a r
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary

B
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme

C h Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary in junction or preliminary

s
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any

l e
person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the governments direction, to

b
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

R o
Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project; Bidding or awarding of cont ract/project of the national

an r
government as defined under Section 2 hereof; Commencement, prosecution, execution,

a
implementation, operation of any such contract or project; Termination or rescission of

B
any such contract/project; and The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful

Ch
activity necessary for such contract/ project.

e s
l
xxx

b
Should a judge violate the preceding section, RA 8975 provides the following penalty:

o
R
Section 6. Penal Sanction. In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she

an r
may incur under existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order,

a
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3

B
hereof, shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.

C h s
It is clear from the foregoing provisions of RA. 8975 that the prohibition against government

l
respect, Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 605and e
projects covers only judges, and does not apply to the NCIP or its hearing officers. In this

o b
Presidential Decree No. 1818, both of which enjoin only the courts. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court, cannot nullify the preliminary injunction order issued by NCIP on the ground of violation
of said laws (The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 2013).
R
a n
Q: Under the foregoing facts, is Baguio Cleaning Movement, Inc. entitled to its own
application of injunction against the tribes?

C h
A: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
s
restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that the tribes were entitled to the
relief granted by the Commission. 23 Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
l e
recognition of the tribes ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge
o b
vested rights over the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of preliminary
R
an
injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No.
180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ
of preliminary injunction issued therein.

C h
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a r
The conclusions of this Court in both the case at bar and that in G.R. No. 180206 as regards

B
private respondents ancestral land claim should therefore be considered provisional, as they
are based merely on the allegations in the complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced

e s
in a full-blown proceeding on the merits by the proper tribunal. The tribes are therefore not

l
barred from proving their alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding,

b
despite the denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed for (The Baguio Regreening
Movement, Inc. v. Masweng, 2013).

R o Q. Esteban is not a party to a case which has become final and executory. He was forewarned

n r
that the sheriff is about to execute the judgment which would adversely affect his substantive

a
right. What remedy is available to Esteban?

B
A. Section 16, Rule 39 specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the

s
remedies of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of

e
l
the property not belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent separate

b
action to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property.
However, the person other than the judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied

R o
properties is not precluded from taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. The right of a
third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary

an r
thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property

a
mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first

h B
unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon.

s
Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for a third-party claim or a terceria to prosper,

C e
the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on the property. (Villasi v. Garcia 2014)

b l
Q. What is the nature of orders covering support pendete lite?

R o
A. They are interlocutory in nature. The assailed orders relative to the incident of
support pendent lite and support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the

an r
rendition of the decision on the main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are

a
therefore interlocutory. They did not finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final

B
Ch
adjudication of the merits of petitioners claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and

s
other incidents as child custody, support, and conjugal assets. (Calderon V. Baldevia v. Roxas,

e
2013)

Q. May orders pendente lite be appealed?


b l
R o
A. No. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in

an r
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in
questioning the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioners appeal was correctly

B a
h
dismissed by the CA. (Calderon V. Baldevia v. Roxas, 2013)

C e s
Q. Distinguish a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 from a petition for review under Rule 43.

b l
A. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an
extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the

R o
two remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of
certiorari is proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

n
acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and

a
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. A petition for review, on the

h
other hand, seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer (Dee

C s
Ping Wee v. Lee Hiong Wee, 2010).

Q. If a decision is rendered with grave abuse of discretion, should there always be resort to a
l e
b
petition for certiorari under Rule 65?

A. No. The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on
the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court
R o
an
rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power
in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the

h
decision (Sawadjaan v. CA, 2005) Besides, the Rules expressly provide: Section 1. Petition for

C
certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

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a r
has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting

B
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in

s
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered

e
l
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such

b
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

R o Q. Y was adjudged loser in an ejectment case. Considering that ejectment is summary


proceeding, what remedy is available to Y to postpone the effectivity of the judgment?

n a r
A. As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

B
executory in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is

s
pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the

e
l
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits

b
the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to
comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the

R o
duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-
appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of

an r
the judgment would automatically follow.

B a
h
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the

s
appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period

C e
for the perfection of the appeal. In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit

l
is immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an

b
appeal; (2) file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during

o
the pendency of the appeal. (Acbang v. Hon. Luczon, Jr. 2014)

R
Q. Gabby filed an unlawful detainer case against Ali and won. Ali filed a petition for relief

an r
from judgment before the same MTC that rendered the decision in the unlawful detainer case.
Was Ali correct?

B a
Ch s
A. No. A Petition for relief from judgment is a prohibited pleading in an ejectment case

e
under Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

b l
Q. May Ali file his petition for relief from judgment before the RTC?

provides:
R o
A. No. The RTC has no jurisdiction over the petition. Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court

an a r
SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings. - When a

B
judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a

C h
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, he may file

s
e
a petition in such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or

l
proceeding be set aside.

Q. What is Alis remedy? What court has jurisdiction?

o b
R
A. The remedy is to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC. (Agdal v. Carlos, 2010)

a n
*Note that the Court treated the petition for relief from judgment before the RTC as a petition for
certiorari in this case.

C h
Q. Rosario filed a suit in the Small Claims Court. The judge ruled in her favor. When can she
s
ask for execution of the judgment?

l e
A. Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision
shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy
o b
R
thereof forthwith served on the parties.

an
Q. Can Fernando, the losing party appeal the ruling of the Small Claims Court?

C h
A. No, because said decision is unappealable. To question the decision, a petition for certiorari
must be filed. Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the

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a r
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and

B
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it

s
instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has

e
l
jurisdiction over the same. (A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, 2014)

o b
Q: May the determination of heirs be made in an action for recovery of ownership of property?

R
A. No. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased

n r
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery

a
of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery

B
of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made

s
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil

e
l
action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a

b
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the

R o
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here
are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

an a r
Q. What is criminal jurisdiction?

h B
A. It is the power of the State to try and punish a person for a violation of its penal laws.

C e s
l
Q. What is the rule on jurisdiction and venue in criminal cases?

provides:
o b
A. In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court

R
an r
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the

a
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential

B
ingredients occurred.

Ch s
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in

l e
the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip,
including the place of its departure and arrival.

o b
R
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal

an r
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or

a
territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles

B
of international law.

C h
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised
s
l e
Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed(the case must
be filed, generally, where the crime is committed exceptions are provided by law and the rules

multiple venues)
o b
such as the venue of actions for libel under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code which provides

R
n
Q. What are the requisites for a valid exercise of jurisdiction?

a
A. 1. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter - the offense is one which the court is by law
authorized to take cognizance of.

C h s
2. Jurisdiction over the Territory - the offense must have been committed within its territorial
jurisdiction.
l e
3. Jurisdiction over the Person of the Accused - the person charged with the offense must have
o b
R
been brought to its presence for trial, by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the

an
court.

Q. What are the distinctions between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?

C h
A. The distinction between the elements of the offense and the evidence of these elements is

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analogous or akin to the difference between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts in civil

B
cases. Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the
primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the

s
defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.

e
l
Applying this analogy to [a case under BP22 or the Bouncing Checks Law], knowledge of

b
insufficiency of funds is the ultimate fact, or element of the offense that needs to be proved, while
dishonor of the check presented within ninety (90) days is merely the evidentiary fact of such

R o knowledge. (Bautista v. CA, 2001)

n r
Q. What is the relevance of the distinction between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts?

B a
A. Every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence as
distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense do not need to be alleged.

e s
l
Q. Does it, then, follow, that a motion for bill of particulars cannot be used by an accused to

b
request that he be furnished with evidence?

R o
A. Yes. It is not the function of the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required to include in the bill of particulars matters

an r
of evidence relating to how the people intend to prove the elements of the offense charged or

a
how the people intend to prove any item of factual information included in the bill of particular.

B
(Enrile v. People, 2015)

C h s
Q. When should a motion to quash be filed instead of a bill of particulars?

l e
A. If the information does not charge an offense, then a motion to quash is in order.

o b
But if the information charges an offense and the averments are so vague that the accused cannot
prepare to plead or prepare for trial, then a motion for a bill of particulars is the proper

R
remedy. Thus viewed, a motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and

an r
separate remedies, the latter presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an

a
offense. (Enrile v. People, 2015)

B
Ch
Q. How must a conspiracy be alleged?

e s
A. A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege

b l
all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web

R o
of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment

an r
contains a statement of the facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and

a
concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that

B
can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision

C h
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the

s
e
same facts (People v. Quitlong)

Q. What are the elements of a prejudicial question?


b l
R o
A. (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines

n
whether or not the criminal action may proceed (Sec. 7, Rule 111).

a
Q. Is it possible that an action before an administrative body may be the basis to suspend a
criminal case due to a prejudicial question?

C h s
A. Yes. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet,
contrary to San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to
l e
speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for
specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
o b
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 2524 of Presidential
R
an
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an
action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. (San Miguel v. Perez, 2013)

C h
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Q. What are the elements of double jeopardy?

B
A. Double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly

e s
terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or

b l
otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid indictment for
which the accused has entered a valid plea during arraignment. (Ocampo v. Hon. Abando, 2014)

R o Q. When is bail a matter of right and when is it discretionary?

n a r
A. The general rule is x x x x that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense,

B
shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

e s
The grant of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable

b l
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under

o
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

R
an r
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the

a
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

h B
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated

C s
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

e
pardon;
b l
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional

R o
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on

an r
bail; or

a
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of

B
Ch
the appeal. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015)

e s
Q. Is it the trial court that determines whether the evidence of guilt is strong?

b l
A. Yes. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt

o
is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion

R
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. (Enrile v.
Sandiganbayan, 2015)

an
Q. What must the trial judge consider in granting bail in favor of an accused charged with a

B a r
h
capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment?

C
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an
e s
comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:
b l
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to

R o
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

a n
h
1. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail

C s
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the

e
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8,)

bl
o
2. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of

R
the prosecution; and

an
3. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond. (Section 19) Otherwise petition should be denied. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan,

h
2015)

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a r
Q. Can bail be granted based on humanitarian grounds, independent of the legal merits of the

B
case?

e s
A. Yes. Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly

b l
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration

R o during the trial. Granting bail x x x on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court: x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden

n r
by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is

a
a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of

B
the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit
the prisoner to bail;47 x x x [G]ranting provisional liberty to [ill accused] will then enable him to

e s
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians

l
in the hospitals of his choice. [The grant of bail is proper if it will aid in accuseds] adequate

b
preparation of his defense [and], more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the

o
trial. 1. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015)

R
Q. Gerry, Ricky and Nikki were charged with violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt

an r
Practices Act. Upon finding probable cause, the Ombudsman directed that a case be filed

a
against the three accused. During trial, the Ombudsman wanted to grant the request for

h B
immunity sought by Gerry and Ricky so that they may testify against the mastermind of the

s
corrupt act, Nikki. Is the power of the Ombudsman to grant immunity still subject to the

C provisions of the Rules of Court?


e
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A. Yes. RA 6770 provides: Sec. 17. Immunities. x x x. Under such terms and conditions as it may

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determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman
may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose

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possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the

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truth in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its

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authority, in the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory

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objectives. The immunity granted under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not

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exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for perjury or false testimony nor shall he be

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exempt from demotion or removal from office. (Quarto v. Ombudsman, 2011)

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Q. What are the requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness? What is the

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effect of an order granting the discharge of an accused as a state witness?

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A. The requirements for the discharge of an accused as a state witness are provided under

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Section 17 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

B a
h
Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly

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charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before

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resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with

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their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the

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prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at

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a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (ADSuMM)

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(a) There is Absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;

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(b) The is no other Direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense

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committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be Substantially corroborated in its material
l e
b
points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the Most guilty; and

R o
an
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving Moral
turpitude. (Baviera v. Zoleta, 2006) or an order granting immunity to an accused (Quarto

h
v. Ombudsman, 2011) and there is grave abuse of discretion, the party may question the
orders or resolutions before the Supreme Court via Rule 65.

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a r
Q: Can the courts interfere in the COMELEC's finding that probable cause exists?

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A. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear

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showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELECs exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election

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laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. The established
rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of

R o the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of only such evidence as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and the accused is probably guilty thereof.

n Q. What is the Best Evidence Rule?


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A. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is

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the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document

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itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded

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in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a

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certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides
that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having

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the legal custody or the record.

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Q. Mr. Cayetano is the custodian of the record of birth of Charie Mae. He executed an

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affidavit attesting to the truthfulness of the fact of birth of Charie Mae and he attached her

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e
duly-authenticated birth certificate of birth to his affidavit. Must Mr.Cayetano affirm his

l
affidavit in open court?

o b
A. No. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides
that entries in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in

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official records made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a

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person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the

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facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of

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requiring the officials attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the

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course of his duty. The documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of

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performance of official duty. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie

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evidence of the facts stated therein. (Dimaguila v. Monteiro, 2014)

Q. What is the Parol Evidence Rule?

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A. The Parol Evidence Rule applies to the parties and their successors in interest. Conversely,

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it has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol Evidence Rule, a

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person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such

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as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has been held that a third party who

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avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to that contract. This

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is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate

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his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. Moreover, to preclude the application

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of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown that at least one of the parties to the suit is not party

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or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. A

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beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore

a n
cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed

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stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners claim cannot prosper, because they are barred from

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proving them by oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule. (Heirs of Pacres vs. Heirs

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of Ygoa, 2010)

Q. Does a Protection Oder issued by a Barangay Chairman have any efficacy?


bl
A. Yes. The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical
R o
an
harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of

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his duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to

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maintain public order in the barangay.

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a r
Q. Can a trial court issue a Temporary Protection Order without hearing without violating the

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constitutional guarantee to due process?

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A. Yes. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,
the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the

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life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that
the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC

R o or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. The scope of reliefs in protection orders is
broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to

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curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be

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challenged as violative of the right to due process. It is a constitutional commonplace that the

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ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests. (Tua v. Hon. Mangrobang, 2014)

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Q. What is the nature of search warrant proceedings?

o b
A. A search warrant proceeding is a special criminal and judicial process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is designed by the Rules of Criminal Procedure to respond only to an incident in the

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main case, if one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since it is at most

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incidental to the main criminal case, an order granting or denying a motion to quash a search

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warrant may be questioned only via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

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Q. After receiving a complaint from PLDT of the illegal activity of X Corporation of using

C e s
Mabuhay card and other equipment capable of receiving and transmitting calls from the USA

l
to the Philippines without these calls passing through the facilities of PLDT, PAOCTF filed

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two applications for the issuance of search warrant for Violation of Article 308 of the RPC for
Theft of Telephone Services and for Violation of P.D. 401 for unauthorized installation of

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telephone communication. The trial court issued two search warrants for the said violations.
In implementing the search warrants, the police team searched the premises of X Corporation

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and seized the articles specified in the search warrants. Subsequently, the prosecutor

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conducted a preliminary investigation and found that the officers of X Corporation were

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probably guilty thereof. X Corporation and its officers sought to quash the search warrants on

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the grounds that there was no probable cause; and that the search warrants were general

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warrants and were wrongly implemented. Should the trial court grant the Motion to Quash?

l
What is probable cause? Are the search warrants in this case in the nature of general warrants

o b
A. The court should not grant the Motion to Quash the search warrants on the ground that there
was no probable cause. Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is

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such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that

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his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been

B a
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committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be

C s
searched. PLDT was able to produce pieces of evidence that, if taken together, are more than

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sufficient to support a finding that probable cause necessary to engender a belief that X

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to show probable cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof beyondl
Corporation, et al. had probably committed the crime of Theft through illegal activities. Evidence

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reasonable doubt which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required.

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The subject search warrants are not general warrants because the items to be seized were

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sufficiently identified and specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged
which are Theft and Violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 through the conduct of illegal ISR

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activities. A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and

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persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid, otherwise, it is considered as a general
warrant which is proscribed by both jurisprudence and the 1987 Constitution.

l e
In Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, the Court explained the purpose of the aforementioned requirement
for a valid search warrant, to wit: A Search Warrant should particularly describe the place to be
o b
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searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to
limit the things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant

an
- what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
made, - that abuses may not be committed (HPS Software and Communication v. PLDT, 2012).

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a r
Q. Does the issuance of a Hold Departure Order impair one's right to travel and is the

B
violation of the right to travel covered by the Writ of Amparo?

e s
A. A Hold Departure Order does not automatically impair a person's right to travel. There should
be proof to establish that the right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it

b l
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).

R o Q. May a writ of amparo or other reliefs granted by the writ be filed in another court if a

n r
criminal action has been filed or is pending?

B a
A. No. When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be
filed. The writ or any relief available under the writ should be filed by filing in the same court

s
where the criminal action was pending (Reverend Father Robert Reyes v. CA, 2009).

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b l
Q. Does failure to photograph or inventory the seized illegal drugs render them inadmissible
as evidence against the accused? May this failure be raised as a ground for the first time on

R o
appeal? A. Failure to photograph or inventory the confiscated illegal drugs is not fatal to the
prosecution of the case against the accused. The seized items may still be admitted in evidence as

an r
long as the evidentiary value thereof is preserved. Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of

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RA9165 reads:

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Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous

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Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,

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Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.-The PDEA shall take charge

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and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory

manner:
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equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following

an a r
The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately

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after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the

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presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or

e s
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the

l
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to

b
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof [.]

RA 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates:


R o
On the other hand, Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

an a r
(a)The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,

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immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same

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in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated

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e
and/ or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and

l
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to

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sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is

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served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,

a n
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the

h
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and

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custody over said items.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable
l e
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grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from

o
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial
the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were
R
an
instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial
court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and

h
evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a

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party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection.

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a r
Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal (People vs.

B
Taculod, 2013).

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Q. Can an action to rescind a donation be joined with an action for partition?

e
b l
A. As a general rule, no. An action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the

R o ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of
partition and in the ordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or

n r
their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern

a
the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite

B
elements of each particular cause of action.

s
Q. Is the foregoing rule absolute?

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A. No. [I]f there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio direct a
severance, and then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all the erroneously

R o
joined causes of action. x x x It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule only applies if the
court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of the causes of action therein notwithstanding the

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misjoinder of the same. If the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of

a
action, then such misjoined cause of action has to be severed from the other causes of action, and

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if not so severed, any adjudication rendered by the court with respect to the same would be a

C h
nullity. (Ada v. Baylon, 2012)

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l e
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the

b
court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall
be inadmissible in evidence.

R o
The effect of the discharge of an accused as a state witness is that of an acquittal under Section

an r
18 which states: Section 18. Discharge of accused operates as acquittal. The order indicated

a
in the preceding section shall amount to an acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar

B
to future prosecution for the same offense, unless the accused fails or refuses to testify against

Ch
his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.

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