The Sources of International Law

What sources are.

The task of ascertaining what the laws are in the domestic sphere is a relatively
simple matter. Domestic laws are found in statute books and in collections of court
decisions. It is an altogether different matter with international law. In the absence
of a centralized legislative, executive and judicial structure, there is no single body
able to legislate and there is no system of courts with compulsive power to decide
what the law is nor is there a centralized repository of international law. Thus there
is the problem of finding out where the law is. This problem is exacerbated by the
anarchic nature of world affairs and the competing sovereignties. Nevertheless
international law exists and there are “sources” where, with some effort, the law can
be found.

Sources are often classified into formal sources and material sources. Authors,
however, differ in defining these concepts. Formal sources can refer to the various
processes by which rules come into existence. Thus, for instance, legislation is a
formal source of law. So are treaty making and judicial decision making as well as
the practice of states. Material sources, on the other hand, are not concerned with
how rules come into existence but rather with the substance and content of the
obligation. They identify what the obligations are. In this sense, state practice, UN
Resolutions, treaties, judicial decisions and the writings of jurists are material sources
in so far as they identify what the obligations are. They are also sometimes referred
to as "evidence" of international law.

The doctrine of sources lays down conditions for verifying and ascertaining the
existence of legal principles. The conditions are the observable manifestations of the
“wills” of States as revealed in the processes by which norms are formed -- that is,

6
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

treaty and state practice accepted as law. The process of verification is inductive and
positivistic.

It is interesting, however, that the most widely accepted statement of the

"sources" of international law, that is, Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, does not speak of sources. Rather, Article 38 is primarily a directive
to the Court on how it should resolve conflicts brought before it. Article 38 says:

1.  The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a.   international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing  rules 
expressly recognized by contesting states;
b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c.  the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.
2.  This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide ex aequo 
et bono,  if the parties agree thereto.1

Another authoritative statement is the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations

Law of the United States which says:

1.  A  rule  of  international  law  is  one  that  has    been  accepted  as  such   by  the 
international community of states
a) in the form of customary law;
b) by international agreement; or
c) by derivation from general principles common to the major legal systems of 
the world.
2.  Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of 
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
3.   International agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may 
lead   to   the   creation   of   customary   international   law   which   such   agreements   are 
intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.
4.     General   principles   common   to   the   major   legal   systems,   even   if   not 
incorporated   or   reflected   in   customary   law   or   international   agreements,   may   be 
invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate.

Briefly, therefore, the "sources" of international law are custom, treaties and other
international agreements, generally recognized principles of law, judicial decisions
and teachings of highly qualified and recognized publicists. We shall discuss these
sources one by one.

Custom or customary law.

1
 Article 59 says:  "The decision  of the Court has no binding force except between the parties 
and in respect to that particular case."
7
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice

of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris].”
(Restatement) This statement contains the two basic elements of custom: the
material factor, that is, how states behave, and the psychological or subjective factor,
that is, why they behave the way they do.

The material factor: practice of states

The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of
states. This includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the
practice of states.

The required duration can be either short or long. An example of customary law
that is the result of long, almost immemorial, practice is the rule affirmed in The
Paquete Havana2 on the exemption of fishing vessels from capture as prize of war.

We are then brought to the consideration of the question whether, upon the facts 
appearing in these records, the fishing smacks were subject to capture by the armed 
vessels of the United States during the recent war with Spain. 
By   an   ancient   usage   among   civilized   nations,   beginning   centuries   ago,   and 
gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing 
their   vocation   of   catching   and   bringing   in   fresh   fish,   have   been   recognized   as 
exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war. 

In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,3 however, the Court indicated that a
short duration, by itself, will not exclude the possibility of a practice maturing into
custom provided that other conditions are satisfied:

. . . Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, 
a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of 
what was purely a conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that 
within the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that 
of states whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive  and 
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked ­­ and should moreover have 
occurred in such a way as to show a general  recognition that a rule of law or legal 
obligation is involved.

Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the
consistency and the generality of the practice. The basic rule on consistency, that is,
continuity and repetition, was laid down in the Asylum Case (ICJ Reports 1950).
The facts in the case were as follows:

On October 3rd, 1948, a military rebellion broke out in Peru; it was suppressed 
the same  day. On the following day, a decree  was published charging  a political 
party,   the   American   People's   Revolutionary   Party,   with   having   prepared   and 

2
 175 U.S. 677, 687 (1900).
3
  [1969] ICJ Rep.
8
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

directed  the  rebellion.  The  head  of the  Party,  Victor  Raúl Haya  de  la Torre, was 
denounced   as   being   responsible.   With   other   members   of   the   party,   he   was 
prosecuted on a charge of military rebellion. . . . 

On   January   4th,   1949,   the   Colombian   Ambassador   in   Lima   informed   the 

Peruvian Government of the asylum granted to Haya de la Torre, at the same time 
he asked that a safe­conduct be issued to enable the refugee to leave the country. On 
January  14th,   he  further  stated   that   the   refugee  had  been  qualified  as   a political 
refugee. The Peruvian Government disputed this qualification and refused to grant a 
safe­conduct.   A   diplomatic   correspondence   ensued   which   terminated   in   the 
signature, in Lima, on August 31st, 1949, of an Act by which the two Governments 
agreed to submit the case to the International Court of Justice. 

The decision of the ICJ was against Colombia:

Finally, as regarded American international law, Colombia had not proved the 
existence, either regionally or locally, of a constant and uniform practice of unilateral 
qualification as a right of the State of refuge and an obligation upon the territorial 
State.   The   facts   submitted   to   the   Court   disclosed   too   much   contradiction   and 
fluctuation to make it possible to discern therein a usage peculiar to Latin America 
and accepted as law. 

It   therefore   followed   that   Colombia,   as   the   State   granting   asylum,   was   not 
competent to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and definitive decision 
binding on Peru. 

Uniformity and generality of practice need not be complete, but it must be

substantial. In Nicaragua v. United States (ICJ Reports 1986), the Court said that
the practice need not be "in absolute conformity” with the purported customary rule.
It said:

In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient 
that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that 
instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been 
treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.

Opinio juris

Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to
determine why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do
because they consider it obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of
courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is
what makes practice an international rule. Without it, practice is not law. . Even
humanitarian consideration by itself does not constitute opinio juris. As the
Nicaragua case again put it:

for   a   new   customary   rule   to   be   formed,   not   only   must   the   acts   concerned 
‘amount to a settled practice,” but they must be accompanied by the opinio juris sive  

9
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

necessitatis.  Either the States taking such action or other States in a position to react 
to   it,  must   have   behaved   so   that   their   conduct   is   “evidence   of   a   belief   that   this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”  The 
need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the 
very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.

Would dissenting states be bound by custom? Yes, unless they had consistently
objected to it while the custom was merely in the process of formation. The authority
that is usually used for this is the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries4 case where the ICJ
said that a coastline delimitation rule put forward by England "would appear to be
inapplicable as against Norway, in as much as she has always opposed any attempt to
apply it to the Norwegian coast." Dissent, however, protects only the dissenter and
does not apply to other states. Moreover, a state joining the international law system
for the first time after a practice has become law is bound by such practice.

It should be noted that it is also possible for customary law to develop which will
bind only several states, or even only two states. But the party claiming it must prove
that it is also binding on the other party. In the Asylum case, this was not proved.
But this was proved in the case of Right of Passage over Indian Territory (ICJ
Reports 1960) where the right of Portugal to pass through Indian territory was
recognized.

It is possible that after a practice has been accepted as law, contrary practice
might arise. What effect would such contrary practice have? In Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (Merits)5 the opinion was expressed that such contrary practice can
cast doubt on the alleged law. It noted "great uncertainty as to the existing
customary law on account of the conflicting and discordant practice of States." It
concluded that the uncertainty had "an unsettling effect on the crystallization of a still
evolving customary law on the subject , , ," It might be added that, over time, if the
contrary practice should gain general acceptance, it might instead become the law.

Having said all of the above, what are the acceptable evidence of state practice?
Various forms of evidence may point to state practice. These can be treaties,
diplomatic correspondence, statements of national leaders and political advisers, as
well as the conduct of states. By themselves, however, they do not constitute
customary law unless characterized by opinio juris.

The existence of opinio juris is a matter of proof. The burden of proving its
existence falls on the state claiming it. In Nicaragua v. United States where one of
the issues was whether the prohibition of the use of force was customary law, the ICJ
said:

It considers that this opinio juris may be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of 
the   Parties   and   of   States   towards   certain   General   Assembly   resolutions,   and 
particularly   resolution   2625   (XXV)   entitled   "Declaration   on   Principles   of 
4
  [1951] ICJ Rep.
5
  [1974] ICJ Rep.
10
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co­operation among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". Consent to such resolutions is 
one of the forms of expression of an opinio juris  with regard to the principle of non­
use of force, regarded as a principle of customary international law, independently 
of the provisions, especially those of an institutional kind, to which it is subject on 
the treaty­law plane of the Charter.

"Instant custom"

Is there such a thing as "instant custom?" Quite obviously, what is referred to as

"instant custom" is not the product of constant and prolonged practice. Rather it
comes about as a spontaneous activity of a great number of states supporting a
specific line of action. In the aftermath of the attack on the Word Trade Center in
New York, a coalition of forces arose in a matter of months supportive of the action
taken by the United States against Osama Bin Laden. At least one writer6 has
suggested that this united action may have given birth to instant customary law
classifying the attack as an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN Charter
justifying collective self-defense. What was peculiar about this collective action was
that the object of defense was not an attack from a state but from a non-state
organization.

Treaties.

Another important source are treaties or international agreements, whether

bilateral or multilateral. Treaties determine the rights and duties of states just as
individual rights are determined by contracts Their binding force comes from the
voluntary decision of sovereign states to obligate themselves to a mode of behavior.

While treaties are generally binding only on the parties, the number of the
contracting parties and the generality of the acceptance of the rules created by the
treaty can have the effect of creating a universal law in much the same way that
general practice suffices to create customary law.7

The question is sometimes asked whether treaties are law or are merely
obligations which the law says must be carried out. On the basis of this question, a
distinction is made between "contract treaties" or "law making treaties." The
distinction, perhaps, is not very useful because all treaties must be observed by the
parties under the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

Treaties and custom

Whether or not treaties override custom depends on the intention of the parties.
If the treaty is intended to be declaratory of customary law, it may be seen as
evidence of customary law.
6
  Antonio Cassese,  Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International  
Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L  L, NO. 5.
7
 More will be said about treaties in Chapter III.
11
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

Normally, treaties and custom can be complementary. As seen, for instance, in

Nicaragua v. United States, adherence to treaties can be indicative also of adherence
to practice as opinio juris. What happens, however, when treaty and custom
contradict each other? Different situations may have different solutions.

If a treaty comes later than a particular custom, as between the parties to the
treaty, the treaty should prevail. A treaty manifests a deliberate choice of the parties
and the principle of pacta sunt servanda should be followed. Thus, for instance, in
the Wimbledon Case (PCIJ 1923) , although the PCIJ recognized that customary
international law prohibited belligerents from ferrying armaments through a neutral
state, the Court said that Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles opened the Kiel
Canal to passage "to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with
Germany on terms of entire equality." The Kiel Canal cut through Germany linking
the Baltic and North Sea. The Court said:

The Court considers that the terms of Article 380 are categorical and give rise to 
no   doubt.     It   follows   that   the   canal   has   ceased   to   be   an   internal   and   national 
navigable waterway, the use of which by the vessels of states  other than the riparian 
state   is   left   entirely   to   the   discretion   of   that   state,   and   that   it   has   become   an 
international waterway intended to provide under treaty guarantee easier access to 
the Baltic for the benefit of all nations of the word. . .

However, if a later treaty is contrary to a customary rule that has the status of jus
cogens, custom will prevail. This is because of Article 53 of the Vienna Convention
on the law of Treaties:

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory 
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present  Convention, a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by 
the   international   community   of   States   as   a   whole   as   a   norm   from   which   no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character. 

In a situation, where custom develops after a treaty, the rule is not clear. The
logical rule perhaps should be that the later custom, being the expression of a later
will, should prevail. But such an approach would militate against the certainty of
treaties. In practice, however, an attempt is made to keep the treaty alive by efforts at
reconciling a treaty with the developing custom.. An example given of this
reconciliation is the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case (1979). The issue was the
applicability of the equidistance principle in the delimitation of the continental
shelves of the United Kingdom and France. The Court said:

Article   6   .   .   .   does   not   formulate   the   equidistance   principle   and   "special 

circumstances" as two separate rules.  The rule there stated in each of the two cases 
is a single one, a combined equidistance­special circumstances rule. . . .

The   Court   does   not   overlook   that   under   Article   6   the   equidistance   principle 
ultimately possesses an obligatory force which it does not have in the same measure 
12
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

under   the   rules   of   customary   law,   for   Article   6   makes   the   application   of   the 
equidistance principle a matter of treaty obligation for Parties to the Convention. But 
the combined character  of the  equidistance­special circumstances rule means that 
the obligation to apply  the equidistance principle  is always one qualified   by the 
condition "unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances. . . .

Treaties will be treated in greater detail in Chapter 3.

General principles of law recognized by civilized nations

The third source cited by the Statute are "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations." This is also referred to by the Restatement as
"general principles of law recognized by or common to the world's major legal
systems." This has reference not to principles of international law but to principles of
municipal law common to the legal systems of the world. They may, in a sense, be
said to belong to no particular system of law but are evidence rather of the
fundamental unity of law. Most of these principles, however, have either become
part of customary law or have been incorporated into conventional international law.

It is worth noting that the Restatement avoids the language "civilized nations." Its
colonial connotation is now unacceptable in the international community.

The Restatement refers to them as "supplementary rules of international law."

These may be found in "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations" which the Statute refers to as "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law."

An example would be the 1928 Chorzow Factory case8 where the Permanent
Court declared that "it is a general conception of law that every violation of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation." Another example would be
the affirmation that private rights acquired under one regime does not cease upon the
change of government. The principle of estoppel is yet another example. Other
examples can be given.

The affirmation of general principles of law found in domestic systems as a

source of international law makes up for the fact that there is no international
legislative system. The insertion of this provision in Article 38(1) thus plugs some of
the gaps in the existing international law system. Barcelona Traction Case (ICJ
1964) adverted to this purpose when it said:

If the Court were to decide the case in disregard of the relevant institutions of 
municipal   law,   it   would   without   justification,   invite   serious   legal   difficulties.     It 
would lose  touch with reality  . . .   It is to rules generally  accepted by  municipal 
systems . . ., and not to the municipal law of a particular State, that international law 
refers.

8
 P.C.I.J, Ser. A, no. 9.
13
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

More will be said in Chapter 4 on the relation between international law and
municipal law.

Judicial decisions.

Article 38 of the Statute directs the Court to apply judicial decisions as subsidiary
means for the determination of the rules of law. But this is made subject to Article
59 which says that “the decisions of the court have no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Hence, such decisions do not
constitute stare decisis. However, the decisions of the ICJ are not only regarded as
highly persuasive in international law circles; they have also contributed to the
formulation of principles that have become international law. Later in this book it
will be seen that the ICJ is the source of principles recognizing the international
personality of international organizations, the doctrine on "genuine link" between a
person and a state for purposes of jurisdiction, and the straight baseline method in
drawing baselines for archipelagos. Similarly, arbitral decisions have been
instrumental on the formation of international law principles

The teachings of highly qualified writers and “Publicists.”

In many cases of first impression, the only authorities that can be cited are
writers. The extent to which they are referred to depends on the tradition of the court
or of individual judges. In common law jurisdictions, there is reluctance to use them,
more so in the US than in Britain. In civil law jurisdictions, there is more ready
reference to writers. The ICJ is generally reluctant to refer to writers but they are
often taken into consideration.

“Publicists” are institutions which write on international law. They also play a
role. The more significant ones are: The International Law Commission, an organ of
the U.N.; the Institut de Droit International, the International Law Association, a
multinational body; the (Revised) Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States; and the annual publication of the Hague Academy of International
Law. It should be noted, however, that these institutions are generally government
sponsored; hence they bear within themselves a potential for national bias.

Equity

The Permanent Court of Justice had occasion to use equity as a source of law in
the case of Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium).
Netherlands had complained that certain canals constructed by Belgium were in
violation of an agreement in that the construction would alter the water level and rate
of flow of the Meuse River. The Court rejected the Netherlands claim and a Belgian
counter-claim based on the construction of a lock by the Netherlands at an earlier
time. Judge Hudson, in an individual concurring opinion said:

It would  seem to be  an important  principle  of equity  that where  two  parties 

have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in 

14
 The Sources of Internatinal Law

a continuing  non­performance  of that  obligation  should not  be  permitted  to take 

advantage of a similar non­performance of that obligation by the other party.  The 
principle finds expression in the so­called maxims of equity which exercised great 
influence   in   the   creative   period   of   the   development   of  the  Anglo­American  law. 
Some   of  these   maxims   are,   “Equality  is   equity”;   “He  who   seeks   equity   must   do 
equity”.   It is in line with such maxims that “a court of   equity refuses relief to a 
plaintiff  whose  conduct  in  regard to the  subject­matter  of the  litigation  has  been 
improper”.      Halsbury’s  Laws  of England  (2nd  ed.,  1934),  p. 87.    A  very  similar 
principle was received into Roman Law.  The obligations of a vendor and a vendee 
being concurrent, “neither could compel the other to perform unless he had done, or 
tendered, his own part”.

Judge Hudson justified his use of equity thus:

The Court has not been expressly authorized by its Statute to apply equity as 
distinguished   from   law.     Nor,   indeed,   does   the   Statute   expressly   direct   its 
application of international law, though as has been said on several occasions the 
Court  is “a tribunal  of international  law”.    Series A, No. 7, p. 19; Series A, Nos. 
20/21, p. 124.  Article 38 of the Statute expressly directs the application of “general 
principles   of  law  recognized   by   civilized  nations”,   and   in   more  than   one  nation 
principles   of   equity   have   an   established   place   in   the   legal   system.     The   Court’s 
recognition of equity as a part of international law is in no way restricted by the 
special power conferred upon it “to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree 
thereto”.  [Citations omitted.]  It must be concluded, therefore, that under Article 38 
of the Statute, if not independently of that Article, the Court has some freedom to 
consider principles of equity as part of the international law which it must apply.

Equity, when accepted, is an instrument whereby conventional or customary law

may be supplemented or modified in order to achieve justice. It has both a
procedural and substantive aspect. Procedurally, it means a mandate given to a judge
to exercise discretion in order to achieve a determination that is more equitable and
fair. Different kinds of equity are distinguished: intra legem (within the law), that is,
the law is adapted to the facts of the case; praeter legem (beyond the law), that is, it
is used to fill the gaps within the law; and contra legem (against the law). that is, a
refusal to apply the law which is seen as unjust. Obviously this can be an area of
great controversy.

Other supplementary evidence

UN Resolutions.

Declarations of legal principles and Resolutions by the United Nations are

generally considered merely recommendatory. But if they are supported by all the
states, they are an expression of opinio juris communis. But a growing number of
weaker nations, who have a very substantial vote, feel that U. N. Resolutions should
have the force of law. Resolutions can also be a reflection of what has become
customary law.

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 The Sources of Internatinal Law

"Soft Law"

Not included among the sources is what a growing literature refers to as "soft
law." Others prefer to call this category "non-treaty agreements." They are
international agreements not concluded as treaties and therefore not covered by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Other sources of soft law are administrative rules which guide the practice of
states in relation to international organizations. These are mostly administrative
procedures that are carried out with varying degrees of consistency and uniformity
that may eventually ripen into customary law or become formalized later on in
treaties.

Soft law plays an important role in international relations because often states
prefer non-treaty obligations as a simpler and more flexible foundation for their
future relations. The difference lies mainly in the wish of the parties to model their
relationship in a way that excludes the application of treaty or customary law on the
consequences of a breach of obligations.

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