Bijdragen, International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 67(2), 180-194.

doi: 10.2143/BIJ.67.2.2014262 2006 by Bijdragen, International Journal in Philosophy and Theology.

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ON THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION

IN HOBBES' LEVIATHAN*

JIANHONG CHEN

Wee are therefore yet in the dark.

Hobbes

Since the publication of Leviathan in 1651, it has been a controversial topic

whether Hobbes was a sincere Christian or an atheist philosopher. Hobbes
speaks of religion as such and the ecclesiastical institution negatively. On the
other hand, taking a positive attitude toward Christian belief itself, he draws
on key concepts of the Christian doctrine. Receptions of Hobbes' political the-
ory have testified that Hobbes' general concept of religion has incurred much
criticism. Nevertheless, his use of biblical concepts and terms has also induced
many people to regard him as a sincere Christian. A proper understanding of
the issue requires above all an investigation into Hobbes's view of religion.
Hobbes defines religion on the basis of a specific passion or emotion, i.e. fear.
In chapter six of Leviathan, a chapter on various passions and the speeches by
which passions are expressed, Hobbes gives his definition of religion, super-
stition and true religion:

Feare of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed,
RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly such
as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION (Leviathan, 124) 1

' This article is the revised version of a paper presented in the subsection "Hobbes, Spinoza and
Hume on Emotions and Religion" of the International Conference on Religious Emotions: Histori-
cal and Contemporary Perspectives funded by the Research Foundation-Flanders and organised by
the Center for the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Anwerp, Belgium, September 19-21,
2005. I wish to thank Professor William Desmond, Rob Faesen, Edwin Curley, and Dr Guanmin
Cheng for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like
to express my gratitude to Michael Funk Deckard for his encouraging comments on the article and
for his editorial help and advice.
1 References to Hobbes' Leviathan are to the Penguin edition (edited with an introduction by C.

B. Macpherson, London: Penguin Books, 1968), unless otherwise stated as "Leviathan-Curley" as in

two cases below where I quote the Hackett edition (edited with an introduction by Edwin Curley, Indi-
anapolis: Hackett, 1994), which includes selected variants from the 1668 Latin edition of Leviathan.
Jianhong Chen 181

In what follows this paper tends to provide an analysis of Hobbes' view of reli-
gion. First, it will analyse the legal point of view by which Hobbes distin-
guishes religion from superstition. Secondly, the two elements, i.e. fear and
power, by which religion is defined in Hobbes will be examined. Thirdly, it
explores what Hobbes means by true religion. Fourthly, after dealing with
Hobbes' rational theology, it will raise questions about discrepancies and con-
tradictions involved in Hobbes' definition of religion and true religion. Fifthly
and finally, drawing on the double teaching theory and taking the purpose of
Hobbes' political theory into account, it comes to the conclusion that being well
aware of the worth of the double doctrine, Hobbes nevertheless publicises the
esoteric philosophic teaching in accordance with the purpose of his political
philosophy, i.e. with the pursuit of a rational and free world state.

Religion and Superstition

It is not difficult to observe that in the passage quoted above both religion and
superstition, defined as fear of power invisible, are not distinguished from each
other at the psychological or emotional level. Religion is defined either as fear
of power invisible feigned by the mind, or as fear of power invisible imagined
from tales publicly allowed. Superstition is defined in contradistinction to the
second sense of religion. It is thus by the consideration of the public status
that superstition is distinguished from religion.
Hobbes' definition of religion seems to carry certain ambiguity, which may
give rise to differing readings, depending on which word is considered as qual-
ified by the phrase "publiquely allowed". The first understanding is that the
phrase qualifies the word "fear". Yet fear as passion or emotion can hardly be
seen as either publicly allowed or not allowed. The second understanding is that
"publiquely allowed" qualifies the word "power". In this reading, religion is
understood as fear of power invisible that is publicly allowed, be it feigned by
the mind or imagined from tales. Consequently, superstition is to be under-
stood as fear of power invisible that is publicly not allowed, whether feigned
by the mind or imagined from tales. Structurally speaking, this understanding
seems perfect. Nevertheless, it is incorrect. The third and genuine understand-
ing is that the phrase simply qualifies the word "tales". 2 In this understand-
ing, religion is defined either as fear of power invisible feigned by the mind,

2
Cf. Edwin Curley, "'I Durst Not Write so Boldly" or How to Read Hobbes' Theological-Polit-
ical Treatise', in Hobbes e Spinoza, edited by Daniela Bostrenghi with an Introduction by Emilia
Giancotti, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1992, 497-593, see especially the third section of the essay.
182 On the Definition of Religions in Hobbes' Leviathan

or as fear of power invisible imagined from tales publicly allowed. Supersti-

tion is accordingly to be understood as fear of power invisible imagined from
tales that are publicly not allowed. Therefore, there is a subtle distinction
between the two perspectives in Hobbes' definition of religion, i.e. between the
private and the public perspective. The genuine understanding indicates most
clearly the two perspectives in question. To a certain extent, it also includes in
itself the second understanding. For from the fact that tales are publicly not
allowed it can be inferred that powers imagined or told in those forbidden tales
or stories are accordingly not allowed.
In A.P. Martinich's discussion on Hobbes' definition of religion and supersti-
tion, special attention is paid to the word "feigned". Martinich suggests that
"feigned" in Hobbes' definition of religion should be understood in a weak
sense as something constructed rather than as something counterfeit. In addition,
he argues that it would be more consistent for Hobbes to define superstition as
religion "feigned by the mind" and to understand the word "feigned" here in
the strong sense as "inventing something with no basis in fact". 3 In making the
distinction between the two meanings of "feigned", Martinich focuses his dis-
cussion on the psychological aspect. Insufficient attention is drawn to the more
obvious and important aspect by which Hobbes distinguishes religion and super-
stition. In fact, Hobbes does not make the distinction between religion and super-
stition in terms of the difference between the weak sense and the strong sense
of the word "feigned", but in terms of the legality of religion and the illegality
of superstition, i.e. in terms of their legal status in the public sphere.
Religion is in Hobbes defmed in two perspectives, or better, in a twofold per-
spective. One perspective is the consideration of the inner or psychological source
of religion. The other concerns the outer or public status of religion. In a certain
sense, the origin of "tales" may be ultimately attributed to the fancy of human
mind, to its psychological source. Still, one has to bear in mind the twofold per-
spective in which religion is defmed. Fear of power invisible feigned by the mind
concerns the source of religion from within. Here at this point, the distinction
between religion and superstition has not yet been made. The distinction comes
into sight only when the psychological or inner element no longer remains psy-
chological, i.e. when it appears in the social life. One perspective relates to the
natural source of religion, and the other to the legal status of religion in a society.
Religion and Superstition are distinguished from each other only in the perspec-
tive of their social and legal status. More precisely, Hobbes defines superstition

3 A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics, Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 5!-52.

Jianhong Chen 183

merely from the legal perspective. Religion is defined according to its psycho-
logical nature and its legal status. From this it can be further inferred that the law
cannot regulate religion as private conviction or as what one fancies in the mind,
whereas as public confession religion must conform to the spirit of the law.
Understood in the second sense, religion is in Hobbes identified as civil religion.
As Hobbes clearly states, "religion is not philosophy, but law" .4
Hobbes conceives of religion as public confession in the same way as he con-
siders miracles. According to Hobbes, every private person has the right to
believe what he believes to be miracles, but in the public sphere miracles are
what the sovereign power declares to be miracles (Leviathan, 478). Similarly,
it falls on the authority of the sovereign power to judge whether opinions and
doctrines would threaten peace, security and order. Therefore, civil authority
is made solely responsible for drawing the legal distinction between religion
and superstition. If the sovereign power, Hobbes writes, "gives away the gov-
ernment of doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the fear of spir-
its" (Leviathan, 233, 236, 567). Hobbes is famous for his unambiguous state-
ment that authority, not truth, makes the law. One could say that the same
holds true for religion, if one bears in mind that Hobbes considers religion as
belonging to the law. This fact leads scholars to criticise Hobbes' definition of
religion for its "relativistic" nature. For according to Hobbes' definition, reli-
gion in one place or time may be superstition in another. 5 This is certainly a
fair criticism insofar as Hobbes' state theory is understood as ultimately moti-
vated by the idea of the nation state.

Religion: Fear and Power

Hobbes associates religion with fear on the one hand, and with power on the
other. By fear Hobbes means "aversion, with opinion of Hurt from the object"
(Leviathan, 123). Hobbes stresses that whenever there is human life, there is
fear, desire and sense. For life can "never be without Desire, nor without fear,
no more than without Sense" (Leviathan, 130). On the basis of the definition
of fear, religion can be further analysed as the aversion with opinion of hurt
from power invisible, or the inner motion of retiring from that power.

4
Hobbes, The English Works, Vol. VIT, Aalen: Scientia, 1966, 5; compare Hobbes, Thomas White's
De Mundo Examined, trans. Harold Whitmore Jones, Bradford: Bradford University Press, 1976,307:
"it must not be thought that the articles of faith are [philosophical] problems; they are Jaws ... "
5 A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics, op. cit.,

52-53.
184 On the Definition of Religions in Hobbes' Leviathan

Ultimately, Hobbes reduces fear in general and fear of power invisible in par-
ticular to men's ignorance of the natural causes of things. He sees curiosity,
or love of knowledge of causes, as peculiar to the nature of man (Leviathan,
167 -168). Man is the sole creature capable of reasoning the antecedence and
consequence of an event from observations of past events. Being capable of
reasoning is, however, different from reasoning rightly. Men are inclined to
suppose causes "either such as his own fancy suggests, or trusts to the Author-
ity of other men", when they, especially those who "make little or no inquiry
into the natural causes of things", cannot assure himself of the true causes of
things (Leviathan, 167, 169). Hobbes therefore sees the natural seed of religion
in the ignorance of the natural or true causes of things.
Apart from reason, religion is considered as the other fundamental fact that is
found in no other living creatures than men. By religion and reason man is
distinguished from animals. The two fundamental facts differ from each other
in that religion as inner emotion is connected to what is innate in men, while
the ability to reason is to be acquired by industry. One need not be trained to
be angry, to be pleased or to fear. On the other hand, man is potentially able
to reason, but right reason is to be achieved by industry. For Hobbes reason is
nothing but the reckoning of the consequences of things, the methodical order-
ing of the consequences of names. Knowledge of those consequences is sci-
ence. Both reason and religion are seen as derived from man's curiosity about
causes of things. Hobbes considers religion and science, however, as opposed
to and incompatible with each other in respect of method. As Leo Strauss
points out, religion is for Hobbes the unmethodical search for causes, while sci-
ence is the methodical inquiry into causes of things. According to Strauss,
being critical of religion, Hobbes obviously takes the side of science. 6
Just as fear is traced to aversion, power is related to honour. Hobbes asserts
that men do not use the name of God to conceive of him, but to honour him
(Leviathan, 99, 403). To honour God is to "think as highly of his power and
goodness, as is possible" (Leviathan, 399). Yet, in Hobbes' discussion, power
is actually much more important than goodness. This can be seen in the defi-
nition of religion as fear of power invisible. As Hobbes unambiguously
expresses it, "Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of power" (Leviathan,
156). There is no discussion about the goodness of God. Fear of God is con-
sidered by Hobbes as "the root of honour" and "a confession of his power"
(Leviathan, 402, 404).

6 Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair, New York: Schocken Books,

1982 [1965], 87, 90.

Jianhong Chen 185

Hobbes' definition of religion as fear of power invisible reminds us of the bib-

lical verse in which fear of God is said to be the beginning of wisdom. Hobbes
uses biblical sources to formulate and even to demonstrate his view of religion.
Yet, Hobbes differs from biblical authors by laying stress upon the psychologi-
cal or emotional elements. In addition, what is significant to Hobbes' theology
is the consideration of power. There is no discussion about the righteousness or
goodness of God. More correctly, the righteousness and goodness of God can
only be derived from his omnipotent power. On the other hand, religion is, by
Hobbes as well as by Epicurus, defmed as fear of power invisible; and science
is the only way of freeing men from fear in general and from fear of power invis-
ible in particular. Yet, Hobbes differs from Epicurus too in that while Epicurus
fights against the terror of religion in favour of the contemplative life and the
tranquillity of mind, Hobbes completely denies "such things as perpetual tran-
quillity of mind" (Leviathan, 129-130). For Hobbes, human life consists in noth-
ing but the motion of the body. As Michael Oakeshott puts it, "what distin-
guishes Hobbes from all earlier and most later writers is his premise that a man
is a moving 'body,' that human conduct is inertial, not teleological movement". 7
The preservation of human life, i.e. the preservation of the body, on the one
hand, is thus presupposed to be the summum bonum. In defming religion, Hobbes
draws on the two sources of his definition, namely, the biblical and the Epi-
curean source. On the other hand, he deviates both from the biblical source by
ignoring the consideration of the righteousness of God and from the Epicurean
source by his rejection of the idea of the contemplative or theoretical life. 8

True Religion

True religion is defined as fear of power of invisible truly imagined. It is then

crucial to understanding the meaning of the qualifying clause "when the power
imagined is truly such as we imagine". However, Hobbes' use of the verb
"imagine" creates certain difficulties for a proper understanding of the defin-
ition of true religion. For Hobbes, imagination is nothing but fancy itself, or
"decaying sense" (Leviathan, 88, 89). According to Hobbes, men awake have
two sorts of imagination. One is simple, for it is imagination of the whole
object at once. The other is compounded, for it is imagination of things by
parts at several times. The compounded imagination is considered as nothing

7
Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes and Civil Association, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1975, 79.
8
Cf. Leo Strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion, op. cit., 86-104; Natural Right and History,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953, 169ff.
186 On the Defmition of Religions in Hobbes' Leviathan

but a fiction of mind (Leviathan, 89). In addition, imaginations of men asleep

are merely dreams. Hobbes further reduces such imaginations to the physical
causes. For Hobbes clearly states that, "lying cold breedeth Dreams of fear, and
raiseth the thought and image of some fearfull object" (Leviathan, 91). The
final causes thus boil down to the natural causes. Thus far, it is still difficult
to see any substantial differences between true religion and religion as such,
or between true religion and false religions. Therefore, it is insufficient and
inadequate to define true religion merely in terms of the concept of the truly
imagined powers, because imagination is in Hobbes reduced ultimately to sense
or fancy.
In the Latin edition of Leviathan (1668), the equivalent passage defining reli-
gion, superstition and true religion reads,

Fear of invisible powers, whether those [powers] are feigned or publicly allowed from
tales, is religion; if they are not publicly allowed, superstition. Moreover, when those
powers are really such as we have allowed, true religion9 (Leviathan-Curley, 31 n. 3, ital-
ics added).

Compared with the passage cited in the beginning of this article from the Eng-
lish edition of Leviathan, it is obvious that Hobbes makes no significant changes
here in this passage regarding the definition of religion and superstition. Nev-
ertheless, it is worth noting that this passage suggests that "publicly allowed"
qualifies "powers" rather than "tales". This seems to contradict the genuine
understanding of the English text. 10 Nevertheless, the distinction between the
two senses of religion remains in the passage just quoted. Religion is fear of
invisible powers either feigned or publicly allowed from tales. And the defin-
ition of superstition is made in contradistinction to the second meaning of
religion. The definition oftrue religion is, however, made differently. The most

9 Cf. Hobbes, Opera Latina, Vol. III, ed. William Molesworth, Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1966,45.
The Latin text reads: Metus potentiarum invisibilium, sive fictae illae sint, sive ab historiis acceptae
sint publice, religio est; si publice acceptae non sint, superstitio. Quando autem potentiae illae revera
tales sunt quales accepimus, vera religio.
10
The discrepancy in question may be explained by the fact that due to the weakness of his hand
Hobbes dictated the Latin Leviathan to an amanuensis who has no knowledge of Latin and had it cor-
rected by someone else who understands Latin. It is probable that the amanuensis made a mistake in
taking Hobbes' dictation and it escaped from the notice of the one afterwards correcting the tran-
scription. For this hypothesis, I am indebted to Professor Edwin Curley. I also wish to thank him for
assuring me of the unambiguity of the English text and for drawing my attention to the related sources.
For the composition of the Latin Leviathan, see Thomas Hobbes, The Correspondence, 2 vols., ed.
Noel Malcolm, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, letter 179 (Pieter Blaeu to Hobbes); cf. Malcolm's
'General Introduction', xxiv.
Jianhong Chen 187

significant change is that Hobbes replaces the word "imagine" with the verb
"allow". Still, it is not completely clear what the qualifying phrase of true reli-
gion, i.e. "really such as we have allowed", really means. The word "allowed"
refers us to the same word that just appeared in the definition of religion. Yet,
it remains in question as to in what sense "really ... allowed" can be distin-
guished from "publicly allowed". As discussed above, "publicly allowed" des-
ignates the legal status of religion. The phrase "really ... allowed" appears to
mean the extent to which reason could allow. This meaning will become clear
in the section below dealing with Hobbes' rational theology.
Another similar passage can be found in the third appendix to the Latin edi-
tion of Leviathan. It reads,

Fear of invisible powers, whether those powers are feigned by the person who is afraid,
or conceived from tales publicly allowed, is religion. [Fear of invisible powers] from sto-
ries not publicly allowed [is] superstition. But when the powers which are feared are true
powers, it is true religion 11 (Leviathan-Curley, 542, italics added).

Again, there are no obvious changes regarding the meaning of religion and
superstition. This passage clearly confirms that the phrase "publicly allowed"
qualifies the word "tales" or "stories". Superstition is clearly defined with
reference to "stories not publicly allowed". The definition of true religion,
however, has been further altered. Turning from "powers truly such as we
imagine", the qualifying phrase of true religion, i.e. "powers truly such as we
have allowed", now turns into "true powers". The centre of emphasis obvi-
ously shifts more and more from the subjective to the objective side. The sen-
tence that comes next to the passage just quoted indicates that true powers are
in fact identified as the biblical God. For the meaning of that passage is
assented to by two biblical verses: 1) The fear of the Lord is the beginning of
wisdom; and 2) The fool has said in his heart 'There is no God'. It is per-
spicuous in Hobbes' definition that the monotheistic God, in contradistinction
to the polytheistic gods of the Gentiles, is the true power to be feared, that is,
the object of true religion. True religion is now distinguished from religion as
such for its object being true. It follows that religion can be true religion if and
only if its object is true. This is different from both the legal point of view and
the psychological perspective discussed above.

11 Cf. Hobbes, Opera Latina, Vol. III, op. cit., 563: Tertio, capite sexto versus finem, Timor,

inquit, potentiarum invisibilium, sive potentiae il/ae fictae sint a timente, sive conceptae a fabulis
pub/ice permissis, religio est. A non pub/ice permissis, superstitio est. Quando vero petentiae quae
timentur, verae sunt, vera religio.
188 On the Definition of Religions in Hobbes' Leviathan

Rational Theology

Seeing that true religion is fear of true powers, i.e. fear of God, it is to be
examined how Hobbes precisely understands by God as the true powers. In
order not to complicate the present discussion, we will disregard here the ques-
tion of why Hobbes prefers the plural "powers" to the singular "power" while
identifying "true powers" with one God eternal. In the twelfth chapter of
Leviathan, the chapter on religion, Hobbes clearly distinguishes one God eter-
nal known "by natural cognition" from the gods of the Gentiles merely created
by human fear. According to Hobbes, the gods of the Gentiles were fancied
merely from the ignorance of the true or natural causes of things. In contrast,
the concept of one God eternal is in accordance with natural and rational cog-
nition. The procedure of reasoning is as follows:

From he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and
immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe
profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even
the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a First, and an Eternal cause
of all things (Leviathan, 170).

Therefore, the true God as Hobbes conceives of him is the first mover of all
movement of things, the final or eternal cause of all causes. It is true because it
is not merely imagined or fancied but known to be true in the light of reason. It
is thus clear that by the true God Hobbes means one God eternal as "the cause
of the world" (Leviathan, 401 ). The description of God as the first mover is obvi-
ously reminiscent of the Aristotelian conception of God. One can say that though
Hobbes rejects the fancied gods of the Gentiles, he seems to accept at least the
gentile philosophers' concept of God. Hobbes even further identifies it as the
one God eternal in the biblical sense. If Hobbes is right in attributing the failure
of Catholicism partly to the "bringing of philosophy, and doctrine of Aristotle
into religion, by the schoole-man" (Leviathan, 182), Hobbes seems to have com-
mitted the same mistake, if it is a mistake as Hobbes thinks it is. Whether Hobbes'
identifying the rationally cognised God with the biblical God is sound or not
depends ultimately on how one is to answer the question whether the rationally
cognised God is compatible, not to say identical, with the biblical God.
Hobbes considers science and religion as two different ways of investigation
into the causes of things, one being methodical and the other unmethodical. Leo
Strauss holds the view that the two ways of inquiring into causes are for
Hobbes incompatible. This view is right insofar as it applies only to the aspect
of method by which reason and religion is distinguished from each other.
Jianhong Chen 189

Strauss does not pay much attention, however, to what Hobbes says of true reli-
gion. The highest object of science is for Hobbes identical with that of true reli-
gion. Science and religion thus converge at their highest point in that both
regard one God eternal as their true object. Hobbes attempts to combine reli-
gion and science at their highest point, but only at that highest point. From such
a combination arises certain difficulties or contradictions regarding the defin-
ition of religion and true religion. Two points merit special consideration.
One point has to do with a contradiction between Hobbes' civil religion and his
rational theology. To reveal the problem, it is sufficient to simply quote two dif-
fering opinions of Hobbes. One is about the Hobbesian concept of God, and the
other concerns Hobbes' view of civil religion. According to G.P. Gooch,
"Hobbes's God is a purely intellectual conception, indispensable to the under-
standing of the universe but playing no part in the supreme problem of creating
and maintaining community life". Gooch asserts that Hobbes "was entirely des-
titute of religious sentiment" and viewed religion to be of "a lowly origin"P
On the other hand, Oakeshott contends that Hobbes' civil theology "was not con-
cerned with philosophic speculation or proof, with first causes or the existence
of God, but solely with the popular beliefs involved in a religious cultus" .13 The
two diametrically opposed statements clearly indicate that the rationally consti-
tuted concept of God is incompatible with the religious beliefs of a civil com-
munity. The question hence arises as to how to solve the problem of discrep-
ancy between Hobbes' concept of civil religion and his rational theology.
The other point to be considered concerns a difficulty in Hobbes' definition of
true religion. True religion is true because its object is the true God. The true
God is known through rational investigation into causes. In such an investiga-
tion, even the unknowability or incomprehensibility of God can be said to be
rationally cognised. The truth of this concept of God is hence derived from and
accords with human reasoning or science. It is precisely at this point that the
difficulty of Hobbes' definition of true religion appears. For true religion is in
Hobbes defined as fear of true powers. The true powers hence remain the pow-
ers to be feared. On the other hand, fear ultimately comes from ignorance of
true causes. It is to be cured by right reasoning, by science. If the true God is
the true object of science, then he is not to be feared, because right reasoning
or science is in Hobbes the antidote to fear. Therefore, the question arises here
as to why the rationally cognised true powers are to be feared, if the right way

12
G.P. Gooch, Hobbes, reprinted from the Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. XXV, Fol
croft: Folcroft Library Edition, 1970, 8, 20.
13
Michael Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association, op. cit., 74.
190 On the Definition of Religions in Hobbes' Leviathan

of reasoning can liberate men from fear, which has resulted from ignorance of
true causes.

Related Discussions

Hobbes' definition of religion seems in danger of being ruined by the afore-

mentioned difficulties and contradictions. Some scholars assert that Hobbes
merely uses Christian concepts and doctrines instrumentally in order to sugar-
coat the harshness of his critique of religion and to conceal the atheist nature
of his political thought. Yet, one may object that if Hobbes' appreciation of
Christianity was just instrumental, his art of writing seems to have failed too
easily, for he was even accused by his contemporaries of promulgating athe-
ism. 14 There are other scholars who suggest that the ambiguous and even con-
tradictory statements merely reflect confusions in Hobbes' thought. 15 How-
ever, one may object that if these problems of contradiction are so obvious,
could they have so easily escaped the eyes of so great an author as Hobbes?
On the other hand, if the contradictory statements are indeed arranged on pur-
pose, how are we then to understand that purpose?
Oakeshott once attempted to solve such problems of contradiction in Hobbes'
writings by suggesting that there is an esoteric and an exoteric doctrine in
Hobbes. Of the two doctrines, Oakeshott explains, there is

one for the initiated (those whose heads were strong enough to withstand the giddiness
provoked by his scepticism) and the other for the ordinary man who must be spoken to
in an idiom and a vocabulary he is accustomed to, and to whom novelties (both in respect
of duties and in respect of their grounds) must be made to appear commonplaces. 16

The double doctrine theory succinctly formulated in this passage helps explain
contradictions and discrepancies in Hobbes' writings. If the double teaching
theory holds good, it can be applied to Hobbes' view of religion. What then
should be seen as Hobbes' esoteric doctrine, and what should be considered
as his exoteric doctrine? Apparently, his negative view of religion is more

14
For instance, in the letter to Matthew Wren of 14 October 1651, Henry Hammond asks: "have
you seen Mr Hobbes' Leviathan, a farrago of Christian Atheism?" Cited in Richard Tuck, 'The Civil
Religion of Thomas Hobbes', in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, edited by Nicholas
Phillipson and Quentin Skinner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 122.
15
A.P. Martinich, The Two Gods of Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics, op.
cit., 54-56.
16
Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, new and expanded edition, Indi-
anapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991, 337.
Jianhong Chen 191

likely the esoteric and true teaching, while his positive view of true religion is
the exoteric and public teaching. Still, the double teaching theory Oakeshott
proposes is unable to answer the question as to why Hobbes does not conceal
his negative view of religion more skilfully if it is indeed his esoteric teach-
ing. Moreover, Hobbes expresses his view of religion as such even more clearly
than what he says about true religion. This cannot be answered until the pur-
pose of Hobbes' political theory is made clear.
Oakeshott's view that Hobbes tends "to think with the wise and to speak with the
foolish" 17 perhaps owes its inspiration and direction to Strauss, 18 who was famous
for propounding the idea that great philosophers of the past wrote between the
lines and taught in their writings two doctrines, one being esoteric for the initi-
ated few, the other being exoteric for the unqualified vulgar. 19 The distinction
between the esoteric and the exoteric teaching presupposes that the philosophic
truth should be kept only for the wise and from the vulgar. In view of the gulf
between the wise and the vulgar, between the few and the many, the status of phi-
losophy and philosophers in society is precarious. In Strauss's analysis, the
ancients regarded that gulf as coeval with human life. As long as the gulf sepa-
rating the wise and the vulgar exists, there will be persecution, ranging from the
most cruel type to the mildest form. Strauss argues that the ancients did not believe
that persecution would ever disappear from the surface of the globe, neither were
they convinced that the insurmountable gulf between the wise and the vulgar
should disappear from human society. The moderns deviated from the ancients,
however, by taking a different position and initiating a new strategy. Having expe-
rienced persecution, or seeing that heterodox thinkers of the past suffered from
it, some philosophers of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries sought to
"contribute to the abolition of persecution as such". 20 The moderns were there-
fore more optimistic or bolder in this respect than the timid ancients. Behind this
boldness lies the conviction that it is possible to abolish persecution as such from
human society, that the philosophic truth should accordingly be no longer a preserve

17 See Michael Oakeshott's short Review of Hobbes Studies, The English Historical Review, vol. 82,

No. 322 (Jan. 1967): 123-25, at 124.

18
For a consideration of the similarities between the view of Oakeshott and that of Strauss in this
connection, see Luke O'Sullivan, Oakeshott on History, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003, 226-227.
It may also be relevant to point out that Oakeshott authored a long review essay of Strauss's The Polit-
ical Philosophy of Hobbes (1936), which first appeared in Politica 2 (1936-37): 364-79; the review
essay is reprinted in Hobbes on Civil Association, op. cit., 132-49.
19
Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1988 [1952], especially 7-37; What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies, Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1988 [1959], 221-232.
20 Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, op. cit., 33.
192 On the Definition of Religions in Hobbes' Leviathan

of the few, but be exposed to the entire human race. From this perspective, as
Strauss said as early as the 1930s, modem rationalism is essentially "exoteric",
whereas pre-modem rationalism is essentially "esoteric". This means that the
modem Enlightenment consciously "publicizes its teachings". The modems
would not have done so if they had not been convinced that "suppression of
free inquiry, and of publication of the results of free inquiry, was accidental, an
outcome of the faulty construction of the body politic, and that the kingdom of
general darkness could be replaced by the republic of universal light". 21
Looking forward to a time in which complete freedom of speech is possible,
the modems thus "concealed their views only far enough to protect themselves
as well as possible from persecution; had they been more subtle than that, they
would have defeated their purpose, which was to enlighten an ever-increasing
number of people who were not potential philosophers". Strauss added a foot-
note saying that Hobbes was to him an exemplary illustration of the modems'
break with the ancients. 22

Conclusion

The interpretation inferred from Oakeshott's and Strauss's view of Hobbes can
be brought to bear on the present discussion about the contradictions in
Hobbes' definition of religion. The contradictions can thus be explained partly
by the double teaching theory, partly by the consideration of the intention of
Hobbes' political philosophy. According to the double teaching theory,
Hobbes' use of Christian concepts and ideas is the philosopher' gesture in con-
formity to the Christian belief commonly held by his fellow countrymen. His
use of those concepts and ideas does not necessarily suggest that Hobbes
accepts them in earnest. The rationally cognised God can hardly be identified
as the God worshiped by the ordinary Christian. As Gooch points out, the
purely intellectual God plays no role in community life. The contradiction
between Hobbes' view of civil religion and rational theology leads one to sur-
mise that rational theology may just serve for sugarcoating his harsh critique
of religion in general and Christianity in particular. On the other hand, Hobbes
did not conceal his negative view of religion, because he would otherwise have
defeated the purpose of his political philosophy, i.e. the pursuit of a rational
and civilised society by way of the popular and universal enlightenment.

21
Leo Strauss, Philosophy and Law: Contributions to the Understanding of Maimonides and His
Predecessors, trans. Eve Adler, Albany: SUNY, 1995, 103.
22
Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, op. cit., 33-34, 34 n.l5.
Jianhong Chen 193

Well aware of difficulties involved in that pursuit, Hobbes stressed that in order
to attain such a society, men have to combat the state of nature, a status in
which everyone is supposed to be at war with everyone. Religious wars may
be portrayed as a state of nature, seeing that the modem theory of the state was
proposed with a view to bringing religious wars to an end. In such a theory,
religion as such, fear of power invisible, is regarded as a potential if not lethal
threat to the indivisible authority of the state sovereign, of the power visible,
and hence to the political order, security and peace. Hobbes puts forward his
political theory attempting to unify the spiritual and the worldly power in the
secular sovereign person, as Rousseau acutely observed. 23 Hobbes so attempts
in favour of the political power against the spiritual power. In Hobbes' con-
struction of the state, the inter-state relation remains in the state of nature, for
every state is a sovereign state. In such a context appeared the doctrine of
"whose region, his religion". In this perspective, religion was indeed rela-
tivised, not to say trivialised.
As long as the inter-state relation is in the state of nature, there will be war
between the existing states. As long as there exists the possibility and reality
of war, men are still far from living in the civilised status of which Hobbes con-
ceived of. Seen in this perspective, men still need to combat the state of nature,
in order to attain the civilised status of the world. If Hobbes' political theory
aimed only to promote the idea of the nation state and to establish such states,
it would only intend to free human beings from a state of nature by means of
another state of nature. If Hobbes rested content with recognising the status quo
as sacrosanct, with understanding the fight between men and men, the war
between state and state, as the destiny of human existence, he would hardly be
a political philosopher concerned with a new ordering of human society, a
society based on the claim of man's natural right; he would only drive men
from one state of nature into another state of nature.
As Richard Tuck shrewdly observes, one of Hobbes' general intentions is "to
relieve men of their fear". 24 In keeping with this intention, Hobbes aims above
all to diminish fear of power invisible, to prevent it from interfering with fear
of power visible. 25 In order to achieve this preliminary aim, Hobbes substi-
tutes fear of power visible for fear of power invisible, fear of the temporal

23
J-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, edited and translated
by Victor Gourevitch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 146.
24 Richard Tuck, 'The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes', op. cit., 131-132.
25 David Johnson, 'Hobbes' Mortalism', History of Political Thought, vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter

1989), 660.
194 On the Definition of Religions in Hobbes' Leviathan

death for fear of damnation. According to Hobbes, for fear of violent death in
the state of nature, men agree to transfer their natural right of defending their
lives to a common authority that holds everyman in awe, and at the same time,
protects men from fear of violent death. Yet, as long as the inter-state relation
remains in the state of nature, men are still threatened by fear of violent death.
If the ultimate aim of Hobbes' political teaching is to relieve men of their fear,
then the establishment of the sovereign state can only be an indispensable but
preliminary task. The final aim is the establishment of the Christian common-
wealth in which a universal state and a universal church are united. Richard
Tuck remarkably understands "the liberation of men from fear" as the "point
of the eschatology" in Hobbes' political theory. Furthermore, Tuck sees that
Christianity means for Hobbes "the only religion which did not add to the nat-
ural burden of fear which men carry, and indeed offered them an entirely new
hope- the hope of eternallife". 26 Here Tuck seems to refrain himself, how-
ever, from concluding that Hobbes' renewed version of Christianity is ulti-
mately a Christianity without fear of power invisible, a state without fear of
power visible. Nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that in a recently pub-
lished article Tuck argues that Leviathan is "a utopian work" anticipating a
"universal peace". 27 Hobbes' civilised state is therefore a blessed state suf-
fused with peace and tranquillity. Adumbrated in Dante's ideal of "the tem-
poral monarchy", in which the ultimate end of the entire human race, i.e. the
universal peace, is fulfilled, 28 Hobbes' conception of the civilised state finds
its full-fledged form in Hegel's philosophy of the rational State and Marx's idea
of the classless and free society.

Jianhong Chen (1973) is a doctoral candidate of the Institute of Philosophy at the Catholic Uni-
versity of Leuven. He is currently preparing a dissertation on the dialogue between Carl Schmitt
and Leo Strauss with special attention to their interpretation of Hobbes' political teaching.
Among his publications are "What Is Carl Schmitt's Political Theology?" forthcoming in Inter-
pretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy and a book in Chinese entitled Jerusalem or
Athens? Four Essays on Leo Strauss (Beijing: Huaxia, 2005).
Address: Brusselsestraat 165 I K 112, B-3000 Leuven, Belgium.
E-mail: jianhongchen@ gmail.com

26
Richard Tuck, 'The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes', op. cit., 131, 132.
27 Richard Tuck, 'The Utopianism of Leviathan', in Leviathan after 350 Years, edited by Tom
Sorell and Luc Foisneau, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, 125-138.
28 Dante, 'On Monarchy', in Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, edited by Ralph Lerner

& Muhsin Mahdi, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972 [1963], 418-438.