9.tolentino V Sec Finance 235 Scra 630

630 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. Secretary of
Finance
G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994.
*
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,vs. THE SECRETARY OF

FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.
G.R. No. 115525. August 25, 1994.
*
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as

Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of Finance;
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 115543. August 25, 1994.
*
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,

petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 631
1994
Finance
G.R. No. 115544. August 25, 1994.*
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.;
KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE
JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA,
petitioners, vs. HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE
OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754. August 25, 1994.*
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.,
(CREBA), petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781. August 25, 1994.*
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME
CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO, EPHRAIM
TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE
TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO, RAOUL V.
VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), FREEDOM FROM DEBT
COALITION, INC., PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY, INC., and
WIGBERTO TAADA, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 115852. August 25, 1994.*
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.
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632 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
G.R. No. 115873. August 25, 1994.*
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. HON.
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931. August 25, 1994.*
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE BOOKSELLERS, petitioners, vs. HON.
ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON.
LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner
of Customs, respondents.
Constitutional Law;Statutes; Taxation; Origin of revenue bills; A bill originating

in the House of Representatives may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate
that the result may be a rewriting of the whole; As a result of the Senate action, a
distinct bill may be produced and to insist that a revenue statute must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur
with amendments but also to propose amendments.Petitioners contention is
that Republic Act No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact
the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In
this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, 24 was adopted from
the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the verb shall
originate is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word exclusively and
the phrase as on other bills in the American version is omitted. This means,
according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic
Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197. This argument will not bear
analysis. To begin with, it is not the lawbut the revenue billwhich is required
by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be
discussed later. At this point, what is important to
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25, 1994 33
Finance
note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To
insist that a revenue statuteand not only the bill which initiated the legislative
process culminating in the enactment of the lawmust substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with
amendments but also topropose amendments. It would be to violate the coequality
of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House
superior to the Senate.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, not in any
particular chamber.The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the
Senates power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the
Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of
the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are
dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not
in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a
Senate and a House of Represen-tatives. The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power
is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive
power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of
the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative
power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has
never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of
Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Same;There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving the House Bill up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version
following the enacting clause and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of
its own on the same subject matter.It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was
passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129)
earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into
consideration in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the
Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own
version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an
amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of
its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the
same subject.
Same; Same; Same; Same;The Constitution simply means that the initiative for
filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application
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6 SUPREME COURT
34 REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
must come from the House of Representatives and that it does not prohibit the
filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from
the House.Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby
made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the
filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from
the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of
the House bill.
Same; Same; Presidential certification on urgency of a bill dispenses with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days.
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc. in Art. VI,
26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill
has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final
form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the
unless clause must be read in relation to the except clause, because the two are
really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the except clause as
simply dispensing with the second requirement in the unless clause (i.e.,printing
and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of
grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the except clause: the necessity
of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a
public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by
presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use
in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with
the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the
third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency
requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under
the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the
convening of Congress in emergency session.
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25, 1994 35
Finance
Same; Same; Judicial Review; While the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law is subject to
judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard, the factual
basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.It is nonetheless
urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no
emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a growing budget deficit not
being an unusual condition in this country. It is noteworthy that no member of the
Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To
the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24,
1994, the Senate accepted the Presidents certification. Should such certifi-cation be
now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that,
because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day,
the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital
piece of legislation? The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII, 18, or the existence
of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of
bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure
that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a
different standard of review.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; A third version of the bill may
result from the conference committee, which is considered an amendment in the
nature of a substitute, the only requirement being that the third version be germane
to the subject of the House and Senate bills.As to the possibility of an entirely new
bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained: Under
congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make
any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which
both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a
difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal
originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause
and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are
now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a
new bill . . . . The result is a third version, which is considered an amendment in
the nature of a substitute, the only requirement for
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6 SUPREME COURT
Finance
which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and
Senate bills.
Same; Same; Same; The report of the conference committee needs the approval of
both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department.
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference
committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either
in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment
consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several
provisions, collectively considered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute,
so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses
of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that
in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus
without any basis.
Same; Same; Same;Separation of Powers; It is common place in Congress that
conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not
been committed to the committee, and if a change is desired in the practice, it must
be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house.To be sure, nothing in the
Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But
Rule XLIV, 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that If there is no
Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of
the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jeffersons Manual. The following is then quoted from the Jeffersons
Manual: The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences
committed to them . . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even
though germane to a question in issue. Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in
case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice.
The Jeffersons Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in
Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though
germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by
Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in
these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jeffersons Manual must be
considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in
the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI,
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Finance
16(3) of the Constitution provides that Each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings . . . .
Same; Same; Same; Same;Bill-Drafting; The use of brackets and capital letters
to indicate changes is a standard practice in bill-drafting; The Supreme Courts
concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of
laws, not the enforcement of internal Rules of Congress since parliamentary rules
are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.This
observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were
likewise disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report
because the Report did not contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of
changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure. The Report used brackets and
capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting.
We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the
Rules of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled,
parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts
have no concern. Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned,
we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.
Same; Same; Same; Same;The three-reading requirement refers only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference
committee report.Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to
bills introduced for the first timein either house of Congress, not to the conference
committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give members
of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed
in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first
reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate
committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630)
which it had prepared by taking into consideration the House bill; that for its part
the Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise
version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the
House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We
cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully
informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee
usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact
and in law.
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Finance
Same; Same; Same; Same;Enrolled Bill Doctrine; An enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.Whatever doubts
there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in
its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a
bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even
claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite
votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute
had been smuggled in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look
behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government. There is no reason
now to depart from this rule.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; While the enrolled bill rule is not absolute,
the Supreme Court should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the
bill where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared.
No claim is here made that the enrolled bill rule is absolute. In fact in one case we
went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact
that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted
a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider. But where allegations that the constitutional procedures
for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another
allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into
a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be
to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.
Same; Same; Titles of Bills; The constitutional requirement that every bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its
title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the
people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding
it.The question is whether this amendment of 103 of the NIRC is fairly
embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein
of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the
title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one
way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions
granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be
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Finance
mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to 103 of the NIRC, in which it is
specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete
index of its content. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is
intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the
people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it.
If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been
withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same
reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event
somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716
is not any more general than the title of PALs own franchise under P.D. No. 1590,
and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption.
Same; Same; Same; The trend is to construe the constitutional requirement in
such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary
legislation.The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in
such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary
legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of
the statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed.
Same; Same; Public Utilities; Franchises; The grant of a franchise for the
operation of a public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress
when the common good so requires.In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act
No. 7716 expressly amends PALs franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting
from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PALs exemption under P.D. No. 1590.
This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution,
which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is
subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so
requires.
Same; Taxation;Expanded Value Added Tax Law; Bill of Rights; Freedom of
Expression; Even with due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a
democratic society, the press is not immune from general regulation by the State.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the
area of press freedom. The PPIs claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the
law abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its high estate and its
importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general
regulation by the State.
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6 SUPREME COURT
Finance
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Equal Protection Clause; The VAT law would
perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege
withdrawn had been that granted to the press.What it contends is that by
withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions
involving printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No.
7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the
class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast
media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are
unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less any
censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-
added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less
targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption
previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved
in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have
been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT
system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if
the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Same; There is a reasonable basis for the
classification and different treatment between print media and broadcast media.
Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast
media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving
printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast
media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Freedom of Religion; The Free Exercise of Religion
Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the
sale of religious materials by a religious organization.What has been said above
also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of
printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their
printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For
as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.
Board of Equalization, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit
imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials
by a religious organization.
Same; Same; Same; Same;The VAT registration fee is a mere administrative fee,
one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.In
this case, the fee in 107, although a
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fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for
the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration
requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a
record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT
pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services
rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on
the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Due Process; Hierarchy of Values; When freedom of
the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect
and when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers judgment that commands
respect.There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates
the guarantees of freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible chilling effect
which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and the need
to assure that the channels of communication are open and operating importunately
demand the exercise of this Courts power of review. There is, however, no
justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that
taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners right to due process and
the equal protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been
cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: [W]hen
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum
of respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers judgment that commands
respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of
constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
values within the due process clause.
Same; Same; Same; The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of all or
none in choosing the subject of taxation.On the other hand, the CUPs contention
that Congress withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing
cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric
cooperatives, not only goes against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives
as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such cooperatives the
equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not
required to adhere to a policy of all or none in choosing the subject of taxation.
Same; Same; Same;Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce
since what Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to evolve a progressive
system of taxation.Indeed, regressivity
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is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by
the Constitution to do is to evolve a progressive system of taxation. This is a
directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of
laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic
and political inequalities (Art. XIII, 1), or for the promotion of the right to quality
education (Art. XIV, 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.
Same; Same; Same;Contract Clause; Contracts;Not only are existing laws read
into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate
of the legal order.Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the
contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real
estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would
violate the constitutional provision that No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot,
through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing
power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of
sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order.
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance
of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good
order of society.
Same; Same; Same; Same;Same; Contract Clause is not a limitation on the
power of taxation save only where a tax exemption was granted for a valid
consideration.In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a
limitation on the exercise of the States power of taxation save only where a tax
exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in
G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its
position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be
made by a general, but only by a specific, law.
Same; Judicial Review;Public actions by non-Hohfeldian or ideological
plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the
Constitution; There must be before the Court a fully developed factual record that
alone can impart to its adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that decision-
making is informed and well-grounded.The substantive issues raised in some of
the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of a
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concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private
cases; that public actions by non-Hohfeldian or ideological plaintiffs are now
cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; that
under Art. VIII, 1, 2 the Court has a special function of vindicating
constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have
before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to our
adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that decision-making is informed and
well grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or
even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being
asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in
these casesto sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.
Same; Same; The duty of the Court to exercise its power of judicial review must
still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy; That the other
departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is
not an independent ground for exercising the Courts power.It does not add
anything, therefore, to invoke this duty to justify this Courts intervention in what
is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be
performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, 5(2) clearly
defines our jurisdiction in terms of cases, and nothing but cases. That the other
departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is
not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential
limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only
result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are
called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may
appear to be the opinion of the day.
NARVASA, C.J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Statutes; Origin of Revenue Bills; Origination should have

no reference to time of conception but to the affirmative act which effectively puts the
bicameral legislative procedure in motion, i.e., the transmission by one chamber to
the other of a bill for its adoption, and it may be that in the Senate, revenue or tax
measures are discussed, even drafted, before a similar activity takes place in the
House.Exclusive origination, I submit, should have no reference to time of
conception. As a practical matter, origination should refer to the affirmative act
which effectively puts the bicameral legislative procedure in motion, i.e., the
transmission by one chamber to the other of a bill for its adoption. This is the
purposeful act which sets the legislative machinery in operation
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to effectively lead to the enactment of a statute. Until this transmission takes
place, the formulation and discussions, or the reading for three or more times of
proposed measures in either chamber, would be meaningless in the context of the
activity leading towards concrete legislation. Unless transmitted to the other
chamber, a bill prepared by either house cannot possibly become law. In other
words, the first affirmative, efficacious step, the operative act as it were, leading to
actual enactment of a statute, is the transmission of a bill from one house to the
other for action by the latter. This is the origination that is spoken of in the
Constitution in its Article VI, Section 24, in reference to appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bills, etc. It may be that in the Senate, revenue or tax measures are discussed,
even drafted, and this before a similar activity takes place in the House. This is of
no moment, so long as those measures or bills remain in the Senate and are not sent
over to the House. There is no origination of revenue or tax measures by the Senate
in this case. However, once the House completes the drawing up of a similar tax
measure in accordance with the prescribed procedure, even if this is done
subsequent to the Senates own measureindeed, even if this be inspired by
information that a measure of the same nature or on the same subject has been
formulated in the Senateand after third reading transmits its bill to the Senate,
there is origination by (or in) the House within the contemplation of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Supreme Court;Petitioners may not, by raising
what are concededly novel and weighty constitutional questions, compel the Supreme
Court to assume the role of a trier of facts.The Court will reject a case where the
legal issues raised, whatever they may be, depend for their resolution on still
unsettled questions of fact. Petitioners may not, by raising what are concededly
novel and weighty constitutional questions, compel the Court to assume the role of a
trier of facts. It is on the contrary their obligation, before raising those questions to
this Court, to see to it that all issues of fact are settled in accordance with the
procedures laid down by law for proof of facts. Failing this, petitioners would have
only themselves to blame for a peremptory dismissal.
Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Separation of Powers; There is no proof
worthy of the name of any facts to justify the reexamination and, possibly, disregard,
of the enrolled bill theory.I would myself consider the enrolled bill theory as
laying down a presumption of so strong a character as to be well nigh absolute or
conclusive, fully in accord with the familiar and fundamental philosophy of
separation of powers. The result, as far as I am concerned, is to make discussion of
the enrolled bill principle purely academic; for as already
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pointed out, there is no proof worthy of the name of any facts to justify its
reexamination and, possibly, disregard.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; Both chambers of Congress
entrust the function of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference
committee with full awareness, and tacit consent, that new provisions may be
included even if not within the disagreeing provisions.The fact is that conference
committees only take up bills which have already been freely and fully discussed in
both chambers of the legislature, but as to which there is need of reconciliation in
view of disagreeing provisions between them; and both chambers entrust the
function of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference committee with
full awareness, and tacit consent, that conformably with established practice
unquestioningly observed over many years, new provisions may be included even if
not within the disagreeing provisions but of which, together with other changes,
they will be given detailed and sufficiently explicit information prior to voting on
the conference committee version.
Same; Same; Same; It is an unacceptable theorization that when the BCC report
and its proposed bill were submitted to the Senate and the House, and the members
thereof did not bother to read, or what is worse, having read did not understand,
what was before them.In any case, all the changes and revisions, and deletions,
made by the conference committee were all subsequently considered by and
approved by both the Senate and the House, meeting and voting separately. It is an
unacceptable theorization, to repeat, that when the BCC report and its proposed bill
were submitted to the Senate and the House, and the members thereof did not
bother to read, or what is worse, having read did not understand, what was before
them, or did not realize that there were new provisions in the reconciled version
unrelated to any disagreeing provisions, or that said new provisions or revisions
were effectively concealed from them. Moreover, it certainly was entirely within the
power and prerogative of either legislative chamber to reject the BCC bill and
require the organization of a new bicameral conference committee. That this option
was not exercised by either house only proves that the BCC measure was found to
be acceptable as in fact it was approved and adopted by both chambers.
CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Judicial Review; Where a specific procedure is fixed by the

Constitution itself, it should not suffice for Congress to simply say that the rules have
been observed and flatly consider the
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matter closed.I am persuaded even now that where a specific procedure is
fixed by the Constitution itself, it should not suffice for Congress to simply say that
the rules have been observed and flatly consider the matter closed. It does not have
to be as final as that. I would imagine that the judiciary, and particularly this
Court, should be able to verify that statement and determine for itself, through the
exercise of its own powers, if the Constitution has, indeed, been obeyed. In fact, the
Court has already said that the question of whether certain procedural rules have
been followed is justiciable rather than political because what is involved is
the legality and not the wisdom of the act in question. So we ruled in Sanidad v.
Commission on Elections (73 SCRA 333) on the amendment of the Constitution; in
Daza v. Singson (180 SCRA 496) on the composition of the Commission on
Appointments; and in the earlier case of Taada v. Cuenco (100 SCRA 1101) on the
organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, among several other cases. By the
same token, the ascertainment of whether a bill underwent the obligatory three
readings in both Houses of Congres should not be considered an invasion of the
territory of the legislature as this would not involve an inquiry into its discretion in
approving the measure but only themanner in which the measure was enacted.
Same; Expanded VAT Law; Bicameral Conference Committee; The resultant
enrolled bill did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.The two
bills were separately introduced in their respective Chambers. Both retained their
independent existence until they reached the bicameral conference committee
where they were consolidated. It was this consolidated measure that was finally
passed by Congress and submitted to the President of the Philippines for his
approval. House Bill No. 11197 originated in the House of Representatives but this
was not the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7716. The measure that was
signed into law by President Ramos was the consolidation of that bill and another
bill, viz., Senate Bill No. 1630, which was introduced in the Senate. The resultant
enrolled bill thus did not originateexclusively in the House of Representatives. The
enrolled bill itself says that part of it (and it does not matter to what extent)
originated in the Senate.
Same; Same; Same; The participation of the Senate was not in proposing or
concurring with amendments but in originating its own Senate bill which was not
embodied in but merged with the House bill.It would have been different if the
only participation of the Senate was in the amendment of the measure that was
originally proposed in the House of Representatives. But this was not the case. The
participation of the Senate was not in proposing or concurring with
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amendments that would have been incorporated in House Bill No. 11197. Its
participation was inoriginating its own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was not
embodied in but merged with House Bill No. 11197. Senate Bill No. 1630 was not
even an amendment by substitution, assuming this was permissible. To substitute
means to take the place of; to put or use in place of another. Senate Bill No. 1630
did not, upon its approval, replace (and thus eliminate) House Bill No. 11197. Both
bills retained their separate identities until they were joined or united into what
became the enrolled bill and ultimately R.A. No. 7716.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Statutes; Origin of Revenue Bills; The approval by the

Senate of Senate Bill No. 1630, after it had considered House Bill No. 11197, may be
taken as an amendment by substitution by the Senate not only of Senate Bill No.
1129 but of House Bill No. 11197 as well.Since the Senate is, under the above-
quoted constitutional provision, empowered to concur with a revenue measure
exclusively originating from the House, or to propose amendments thereto, to the
extent of proposing amendments by SUBSTITUTION to the House measure, the
approval by the Senate of Senate Bill No. 1630, after it had considered House Bill
No. 11197, may be taken, in my view, as an AMENDMENT BY SUBSTITUTION by
the Senate not only of Senate Bill No. 1129 but of House Bill No. 11197 as well
which, it must be remembered, originated exclusively from the House.
Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Presidential Certification of Bills; A
becoming respect for a co-equal and coordinate department of government points that
weight and credibility be given to such Presidential judgment.We have here then a
situation where the President did certify to the necessity of Senate Bill No. 1630s
immediate enactment to meet an emergency and the Senate responded accordingly.
While I would be the last to say that this Court cannot review the exercise of such
power by the President in appropriate cases ripe for judicial review, I am not
prepared however to say that the President gravely abused his discretion in the
exercise of such power as to require that this Court overturn his action. We have
been shown no fact or circumstance which would impugn the judgment of the
President, concurred in by the Senate, that there was an emergency that required
the immediate enactment of Senate Bill No. 1630. On the other hand, a becoming
respect for a co-equal and coordinate department of government points that weight
and credibility be given to such Presidential judgment.
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Same; Bill of Rights;Freedom of Expression; R.A. 7716 in imposing a value-
added tax on circulation income of newspapers and similar publications and on
income derived from publishing advertisements in newspapers violates Sec. 4, Art III
of the Constitution.Rep. Act No. 7716 in imposing a value-added tax on circulation
income of newspapers and similar publications and on income derived from
publishing advertisements in newspapers, to my mind, violates Sec. 4, Art. III of the
Constitution. Indeed, even the Executive Department has tried to cure this defect
by the issuance of BIR Regulation No. 11-94precluding implementation of the tax in
this area. It should be clear, however, that the BIR regulation cannot amend the
law (Rep. Act No. 7716). Only legislation (as distinguished from administration
regulation) can amend an existing law.
Same; Same; Freedom of Religion; The imposition of the VAT on the sale and
distribution of religious articles must be struck down for being contrary to Sec. 5,
Art. III of the Constitution.Similarly, the imposition of the VAT on the sale and
distribution of religious articles must be struck down for being contrary to Sec. 5,
Art. III of the Constitution which provides: Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
Same; Same; Taxation;The inherent power of the State to tax, which is vested in
the legislature, includes the power to determine whom or what to tax, as well as how
much to tax.CREBA which specifically assails the 10% value-added tax on the
gross selling price of real properties, fails to distinguish between a sale of real
properties primarily held for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary
course of trade or business and isolated sales by individual real property owners
(Sec. 103[s]). That those engaged in the business of real estate development realize
great profits is of common knowledge and need not be discussed at length here. The
qualification in the law that the 10% VAT covers only sales of real property
primarily held for sale to customers, i.e. for trade or business thus takes into
consideration a taxpayers capacity to pay. There is no showing that the consequent
distinction in real estate sales is arbitrary and in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. The inherent power to tax of the State, which is vested in
the legislature, includes the power to determine whom or what to tax, as well as
how much to tax. In the absence of a clear showing that the tax violates the due
process and equal protection
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clauses of the Constitution, this Court, in keeping with the doctrine of
separation of powers, has to defer to the discretion and judgment of Congress on
this point.
Same; Same; Franchises; R.A. 7716 can be considered a special law amending PALs
franchise.There can be no dispute, in my mind, that the clear intent of Congress
was to modify PALs franchise with respect to the taxes it has to pay. To this extent,
Rep. Act No. 7716 can be considered as a special lawamending PALs franchise and
its tax liability thereunder. That Rep. Act No. 7716 imposes the value-added taxes
on other subjects does not make it a general law which cannot amend PD No. 1590.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; It is not believed

that judicial tyranny is envisioned, let alone institutionalized, by the people in the
1987 Constitution.I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly
provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the Court may now at
good liberty intrude, in the guise of the peoples imprimatur, into every affair of
government. What significance can still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and
widely acclaimed principle of separation of powers, if at every turn the Court allows
itself to pass upon, at will, the disposition of a co-equal, independent and coordinate
branch in our system of government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties
that such an undue interference can lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines
in our jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity not timidity, of
stability rather than quiescence. It has never occurred to me, and neither do I
believe it has been intended, that judicial tyranny is envisioned, let alone
institutionalized, by our people in the 1987 Constitution. The test of tyranny is not
solely on how it is wielded but on how, in the first place, it can be capable of being
exercised. It is time that any such perception of judicial omnipotence is corrected.
REGALADO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Expanded VAT Law; The Senate clearly and deliberately

violated the requirements of the Constitution not only in the origination of the bill
but in the very enactment of R.A. 7716.This writer consequently agrees with the
clearly tenable proposition of petitioners that when the Senate passed and approved
S.B. No. 1630, had it certified by the Chief Executive, and thereafter caused its
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consideration by the bicameral conference committee in total substitution of
H.B. No. 11197, it clearly and deliberately violated the requirements of the
Constitution not only in the origination of the bill but in the very enactment of
Republic Act No. 7716. Contrarily, the shifting sands of inconsistency in the
arguments adduced for respondents betray such lack of intellectual rectitude as to
give the impression of being mere rhetorics in defense of the indefensible.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Expanded VAT Law; R.A. 7716 did not originate exclusively
in the House.Since R.A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it mustoriginate
exclusively in the Housenot in the Senate. As correctly asserted by petitioner
Tolentino, on the face of the enrolled copy of R.A. No. 7716, it is a
CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND SENATE BILL NO. 1630.
In short, it is an illicit marriage of a bill which originated in the House and a bill
which originated in the Senate. Therefore, R.A. No. 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House.
Same; Same; Origin of Revenue Bills; The Senate cannot amend by substitution
with an entirely new bill of its own any bill covered by Section 24 of Article VI which
the House transmitted to it because such substitution would indirectly violate
Section 24.Since the origination is not exclusively vested in the House of
Representatives of the United States, the Senates authority to propose or concur
with amendments is necessarily broader. That broader authority is further
confirmed by the phrase as on other Bills, i.e., its power to propose or concur with
amendments thereon is the same as in ordinary bills. The absence of this phrase in
our Constitution was clearly intended to restrict or limit the Philippine Senates
power to propose or concur with amendments. In the light of the exclusivity of
origination and the absence of the phrase as on other Bills, the Philippine Senate
cannot amend by substitution with an entirely new bill of its own any bill covered
by Section 24 of Article VI which the House of Representatives transmitted to it
because such substitution would indirectly violate Section 24.
Same; Same; Same;Presidential Certification of Bills; The only revenue bill
which could be properly certified on permissible constitutional grounds is the bill
that was introduced in the House.I submit, however, that the Presidential
certification is void ab initio not necessarily for the reason adduced by petitioner
Kilosbayan, Inc., but because it was addressed to the Senate for a bill which is
prohibited from originating therein. The only bill which could be properly certified
on permissible
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constitutional grounds even if it had already been transmitted to the Senate is
HB No. 11197. As earlier observed, this was not so certified, although HB No. 9210
(one of those consolidated into HB No. 11197) was certified on 1 June 1993. Also,
the certification of SB No. 1630 cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be
extended to HB No. 11197 because SB No. 1630 did not substitute HB No. 11197
but SB No. 1129. Considering that the certification of SB No. 1630 is void, its
approval on second and third readings in one day violated Section 26(2), Article VI
of the Constitution.
Same; Statutes;Bicameral Conference Committee; The duty of the BCC is limited
to the reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or the resolution of differences or
inconsistencies of the bills from both Houses of Congress.Even
grantingarguendo that both HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 had been validly
approved by both chambers of Congress and validly referred to the bicameral
conference committee, the latter had very limited authority thereon. It was created
in view of the disagreeing provisions of the two bills. Its duty was limited to the
reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or the resolution of differences or
inconsistencies. The committee recognized that limited authority in the opening
paragraph of its Report when it said: The Conference Committee on the
disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197 x x x and Senate Bill No. 1630 x x x.
Under such limited authority, it could only either (a) restore, wholly or partly, the
specific provisions of HB No. 11197 amended by SB No. 1630, (b) sustain, wholly or
partly, the Senates amendments, or (c) by way of a compromise, to agree that
neither provisions in HB No. 11197 amended by the Senate nor the latters
amendments thereto be carried into the final form of the former.
Same; Same; Same;Doctrine of Ratification; The doctrine of ratification may
apply to minor procedural flaws or tolerable breaches of the parameters of the
bicameral conference committees limited powers but never to violations of the
Constitution.I cannot agree with the suggestion that since both the Senate and
the House had approved the bicameral conference committee report and the bill
proposed by it in substitution of HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630, whatever
infirmities may have been committed by it were cured by ratification. This doctrine
of ratification may apply to minor procedural flaws or tolerable breaches of the
parameters of the bicameral conference committees limited powers but never to
violations of the Constitution. Congress is not above the Constitution. In the instant
case, since SB No. 1630 was introduced in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, was passed in the Senate in violation of the three readings rule, and
was not transmitted to the House for the completion of the constitutional
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process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise passed by the Senate
on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor the House could validly
approve the bicameral conference committee report and the proposed bill.
Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; Invocation of the enrolled bill doctrine
is misplaced.The majority opinion, however, invokes the enrolled bill doctrine and
wants this Court to desist from looking behind the copy of the assailed measure as
certified by the Senate President and the Speaker of the House. I respectfully
submit that the invocation is misplaced. First, as to the issue of origination, the
certification in this case explicitly states that R.A. No. 7716 is a consolidation of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. This is conclusive evidence that the
measure did not originate exclusively in the House. Second, the enrolled bill
doctrine is of American origin, and unquestioned fealty to it may no longer be
justified in view of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Section 1, Article
VIII of our Constitution. Third, even under the regime of the 1935 Constitution
which did not contain the above provision, this Court, through Mr. Chief Justice
Makalintal, inAstorga vs. Villegas, declared that it cannot be truly said
that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vitohas laid to rest the question of whether the enrolled bill
doctrine or the journal entry rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. Fourth,
even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has been substantially
undercut. This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
dissenting opinion, citingSutherland, Statutory Construction.
ROMERO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Expanded VAT Law;Bicameral Conference Committee; A

bicameral conference committee is a creature, not of the Constitution, but of the
legislative body under its power to determine rules of its proceeding.As aconference
committee has been defined: . . . unlike the joint committee is two committees, one
appointed by each house. It is normally appointed for a specific bill and its function
is to gain accord between the two houses either by the recession of one house from
its bill or its amendments or by the further amendment of the existing legislation or
by the substitution of an entirely new bill. Obviously the conference committee is
always a special committee and normally includes the member who introduced the
bill and the chairman of the committee which considered it together with such other
representatives of the house as seem expedient. (Horack, Cases and Materials on
Legislation [1940] 220. See also Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ
864 [1952]; Steiner, The Congressional Conference
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Committee [U of Ill. Press, 1951]). From the foregoing definition, it is clear
that a bicameral conference committee is a creature, not of the Constitution, but of
the legislative body under its power to determine rules of its proceedings under
Article VI, Sec. 16 (3) of the Constitution. Thus, it draws its life and vitality from
the rules governing its creation.
Same; Same; Same; The Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded the power
and authority granted in the Rules of its creation.Even a cursory perusal of the
above outline will convince one that, indeed, the Bicameral Conference Committee
(henceforth to be referred to as BICAM) exceeded the power and authority granted
in the Rules of its creation. Both Senate and House Rules limit the task of the
Conference Committee in almost identical language to the settlement of differences
in the provisions or amendments to any bill or joint resolution. If it means anything
at all, it is that there are provisions in subject bill, to start with, which differ and,
therefore, need reconciliation. Nowhere in the Rules is it authorized to initiate or
propose completely new matter. Although under certain rules on legislative
procedure, like those inJeffersons Manual, a conference committee may
introduce germane matters in a particular bill, such matters should be circumsribed
by the committees sole authority and function to reconcile differences.
Same; Same; Same;Insertion of new matter on the part of the Bicameral
Conference Committee is an ultra vires act which makes the same void.
Parenthetically, in the Senate and in the House, a matter is germane to a
particular bill if there is a common tie between said matter and the provisions
which tend to promote the object and purpose of the bill it seeks to amend. If it
introduces a new subject matter not within the purview of the bill, then it is not
germane to the bill. The test is whether or not the change represented an
amendment or extension of the basic purpose of the original, or the introduction of
an entirely new and different subject matter. In the BICAM, however, the germane
subject matter must be within the ambit of the disagreement between the two
Houses. If the germane subject is not covered by the disagreement but it is
reflected in the final version of the bill as reported by the Conference Committee or,
if what appears to be a germane matter in the sense that it is relevant or closely
allied with the purpose of the bill, was not the subject of a disagreement between
the Senate and the House, it should be deemed an extraneous matter or even a
rider which should never be considered legally passed for not having undergone
the three-day reading requirement. Insertion of new matter on the part of the
BICAM is, therefore, an ulta vires act which makes the same void.
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BELLOSILLO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Origin of Revenue Bills;Statutory Construction; The

provision in the Constitution requiring that all revenue bills shall originate
exclusively from the Lower House is mandatory.Verily, the provision in our
Constitution requiring that all revenue bills shall originate exclusively from the
Lower House is mandatory. The word exclusively is an exclusive word, which is
indicative of an intent that the provision is mandatory. Hence, all American
authorities expounding on the meaning and application of Sec. 7, par. (1), Art. I, of
the U.S. Constitution cannot be used in the interpretation of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our
1987 Constitution which has a distinct feature of exclusiveness all its own. Thus,
when our Constitution absolutely requiresas it is mandatorythat a particular
bill should exclusively emanate from the Lower House, there is no alternative to the
requirement that the bill to become valid law must originate exclusively from that
House.
Same; Same; Same; It is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as
mandatory, and not to leave any discretion to the will of the legislature to obey or
disregard them.In the interpretation of constitutions, questions frequently arise
as to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The courts usually
hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the
tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are not said to be
mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as
mandatory, and not to leave any discretion to the will of the legislature to obey or
disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed
unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely
directory. So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms
of the organic law that it has even been said that neither by the courts nor by any
other department of the government may any provision of the Constitution be
regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone of its provisions should be
treated as imperative and mandatory, without reference to the rules and
distinguishing between the directory and the mandatory statutes.
Same; Same; A Senate amendment by substitution simply means that the bill
did not in effect originate from the lower chamber but from the upper chamber,
disguising itself as a mere amendment of the House version.In fine, in the cases
cited which were lifted from American authorities, it appears that the revenue bills
in question actually originated from the House of Representatives and were
amended by the Senate only after they were transmitted to it. Perhaps, if the
factual
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circumstances in those cases were exactly the same as the ones at bench, then
the subject revenue or tariff bill may be upheld in this jurisdiction on the principle
of substantial compliance, as they were in the United States, except possibly in
instances where the House bill undergoes what is now referred to as amendment
by substitutionn, for that would be in derogation of our Constitution which vests
solely in the House of Representatives the power to initiate revenue bills. A Senate
amendment by substitution simply means that the bill in question did not in effect
originate from the lower chamber but from the upper chamber and now disguises
itself as a mere amendment of the House version.
Same; Judicial Review;Courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon
the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the
judgment of the judicial tribunals.The rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case
to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in
accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of
the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute
transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the
duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shirk
from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing;
and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitutionn.
Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the
courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action
might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial
tribunals.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law;Bicameral Conference Committee; Ex Post Veto

Power; There is absolutely no legal warrant for the bold submission that a Bicameral
Conference Committee possesses the power to add or delete provisions in bills already
approved on third reading by both Houses or an ex post veto power.There is
absolutely no legal warrant for the bold submission that a Bicameral Conference
Committee possesses the power to add/delete provisions in bills already approved on
third reading by both Houses or an ex post veto power. To support this postulate
that can enfeeble Congress itself, respondents cite no constitutional provision, no
law, not even any rule or regulation. Worse,
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6 SUPREME COURT
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their stance is categorically repudiated by the rules of both the Senate and the
House of Representatives which define with precision the parameters of power of a
Bicameral Conference Committee.
Same; Same; Same; The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can
wield ex post veto power wages war against our settled ideals of representative
democracy.But the thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can wield ex
postveto power does not only contravene the rules of both the Senate and the House.
It wages war againt our settled ideals of representative democracy. For the
inevitable, catastrophic effect of the thesis is to install a Bicameral Conference
Committee as the Third Chamber of our Congress, similarly vested with the power
to make laws but with the dissimilaritythat its laws are not the subject of a free and
full discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant power, a Bicameral
Conference Com-mittee acting as a Third Chamber will be a constitutional
monstrosity.
Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; The enrolled bill theory is a historical relic that
should not continuously rule us from the fossilized past.Respondents seek
sanctuary in the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to bar any judicial inquiry on
whether Congress observed our constitutional procedure in the passage of R.A. No.
7716. The enrolled bill theory is a historical relic that should not continuously rule
us from the fossilized past. It should be immediately emphasized that the enrolled
bill theory originated in England where there is no written constitution and where
Parliament is supreme. In this jurisdiction, we have a written constitution and the
legislature is a body of limited powers. Likewise, it must be pointed out that
starting from the decade of the 40s, even American courts have veered away from
the regidity and unrealism of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill.
Same; Same; The previous rulings of the Supreme Court on the conclusiveness of
an enrolled bill are no longer good law.I am not unaware that this Court has
subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill as enunciated in the 1947 lead
case ofMabanag v. Lopez Vito, and reiterated in subsequent cases. With due respect,
I submit that these rulings are no longer good law. Suffice to state that section 313
of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our
statute books. It has long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also relied
on jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are under severe
criticisms by modern scholars. Hence, even in the United States the conclusiveness
of an enrolled bill has been junked by most of the States.
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ORIGINAL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Arturo M. Tolentinofor and in his behalf.
Donna Celeste D. Feliciano and Juan T. David for petitioners inG.R.
No. 115525.
Roco, Bunag,Kapunan, Migallos and Jardeleza for petitioner R.S.
Roco.
Villaraza and Cruzfor petitioners in G.R. No. 115544.
Carlos A. Ranesesand Manuel M. Serranofor petitioner in G.R. No.
115754.
Salonga, Hernandez & Allado for Freedom From Debts Coalition,
Inc. & Phil. Bible Society.
Estelito P. Mendozafor petitioner in G.R. No. 115852.
Panganiban,Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Officesfor
petitioners in G.R. No. 115873.
R.B. Rodriguez & Associates for petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
Rene A.V. Saguisagfor MABINI.
MENDOZA, J.:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of

goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of
goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts
from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized
in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:
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I. Procedural Issues:
1. A.Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution?
2. B.Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?
3. C.What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
II. Substantive Issues:
1. A.Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?
1. 1. 1
2. 2. 4
3. 3. 5
4. 4. 10
1. B.Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?
1. 1.Art. VI, 28(1)
2. 2.Art. VI, 28(3)
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will
presently be explained not all of these questions are judicially cognizable,
because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing and,
therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government
are equally charged with the enforcement of the Constitution, especially
the provisions relating to them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or
the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution
because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of
Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply
consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference
Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The
following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the
proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this
manner, it did
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1994
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not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby
become a law:
Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall
be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31,
1993, several bills were introduced in the House of Representatives
1
seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue

Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to
the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval
a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO
WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING
FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108
AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238
OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting
November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the
House of Representatives after third and final reading.
________________
1 H. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100. (Respondents
Consolidated Memorandum, Annexes 3-12).
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It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that
body to its Committee on Ways and Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report
recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO
FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND
REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 AND 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted in substitution of Senate
Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No.
11197.
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No.
1630). It finished debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on
March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by
the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to
a conference committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21
and 25, 1994), recommended that House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation
with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached
copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
The Conference Committee bill, entitled AN ACT RESTRUCTURING
THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE
AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, was thereafter approved by
the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May
2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the
Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No.
7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two
newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect,
although
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its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for
the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced on July
1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of
11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30,
1994.
First. Petitioners contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art.
VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this
connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, 24 was adopted
from the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the
2
verb shall originate is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the

word exclusively and the phrase as on other bills in the American
version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as
having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the
essence of H. No. 11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law
but the revenue billwhich is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize
this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The
possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed
later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statuteand not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the lawmust substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur
with amendments but also topropose amendments.It would be to violate
the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in
fact make the House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senates
power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate
________________
2 U.S. CONST., Art. 1, 7, cl. 1: All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other
bills.
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for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and thereby 3
equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the
powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the
legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any
particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. The exercise of the treaty-
4
ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of

a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for
comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the
basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The
possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has never been thought of
5
as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

In the United States, the validity of a provision ( 37) imposing an ad
valorem tax based on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had
inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim that the
provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in
contravention of Art. I, 7 of the U.S. Constitution. Nor is the power to
6
amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating

from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of
bills following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In
1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting clause of a
tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House
subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added
847 amendments to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of
1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an
extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff
bill of 1922. Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments,
7
the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required by the Constitution to originate in the House.
________________
3 Art. VII, 21.

4 Art. VI, 1.
5 U.S. CONST., Art. II, 2, cl. 2.
6 Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 309, 58 L. Ed. 117 (1914).
7 F.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 309, n.
2 (1945).
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1994
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It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of
H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that
what the Senate did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into
consideration in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference
between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and
then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would
seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the
other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject
matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that theinitiative for
filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to
the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are
elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the
national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed
over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House passed
H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not
appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had
received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation
in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on
February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were
simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the
House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July
22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129
was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those
earlier bills.
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Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the
Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument of
petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third
8
readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was
because on February 24, 1994 and again on March 22, 1994, the
9 10
President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential

certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc. in
Art. VI, 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has
been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.
In other words, the unless clause must be read in relation to the
except clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same
sentence. To construe the except clause as simply dispensing with the
second requirement in the unless clause (i.e.,printing and distribution
three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of
grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the except clause: the
necessity of securing
_______________
8 Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly require that bills must pass three
readings in each House, this was clearly implied from its Art. VI, 21(2) so that the two
Houses by their rules prescribed three readings for the passage of bills. Later the
requirement was expressly provided in the 1973 Constitution from which Art. VI, 26(2)
was taken. Art. VIII, 19(2) of the 1973 document provided: No bill shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to the Members three days before its passage, except when the
Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas andnays entered in the Journal.
9 Respondents Consolidated Reply, Annex 14.
10 Memorandum of Petitioner Arturo M. Tolentino, Supplement C.
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1994
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the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a
public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is
dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so
negligible as to be of any use in insuring imme-diate enactment. It may
well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and
distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would
insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring
the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under
the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of
the convening of Congress in emergency session. 11
That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of

three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be
dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For
example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in
consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was
passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on
the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the
President as urgent. 12
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential

certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the
bill and its distribution three days before its passage but
________________
11 Art. VII, 10 provides: The Congress shall, at ten oclock in the morning of the third
day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling
for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than
forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such
special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
Appro-priations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations
and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this
Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.
12 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SIXTH CONGRESS,
FOURTH SESSION 398-399 (1968).
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not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was
invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the
certification of a growing budget deficit not being an unusual condition
in this country.
It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the
reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing
S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate
accepted the Presidents certification. Should such certification be now
reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that,
because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the
same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for
the study of a vital piece of legislation?
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII, 18, or the
existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of
extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, 23(2), is subject to
judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But
the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing
away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly
considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different
standard of review.
Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified
S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what
the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the House, the
President likewise certified H. No. 9210 then pending in the House.
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act
No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference Committee prepared by
consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the
Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the
House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were
surreptitiously inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of
the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the
Committee met behind closed doors. We are not told, however, whether
the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often mark the
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proceedings of conference committees.
Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the
Conference Committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to
reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors,
with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be
made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister
motive attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of their secret
meetings on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete
remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes
by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the
stenographers own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes
characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in
recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.
In any event, in the United States conference committees had been
customarily held in executive sessions with only the conferees and their
staffs in attendance. Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted
13
requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chambers

conferees may vote in public to close the meetings. 14
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference

Committee, it has been explained:
Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to
make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to
which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a
difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal
originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause
and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are
now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a
new bill . . . . 15
________________
13 Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ 864-865 (1952).

14 CONG. QUARTERLY 65 (1983); M. JEWELL, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 169 (1986); LEES AND SHAW, COMMITTEES IN
LEGISLATURES 163 (1979).
15 W. KEEFE AND M. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 149 (1985).
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The result is a third version, which is considered an amendment in the
nature of a substitute, the only requirement for which being that the
third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills. 16
Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a

conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision
that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the 17
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions,

there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively
considered as an amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as
such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of
both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative
department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted
as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. 18
________________
16 W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND POLICY PROCESS 214

(1984).
17 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, Nov. 11, 1993.
18 The charge is an old one. In the United States, the same charge, including claims that
important provisions were being surreptitiously added in the committee, was made in the
1940s. But no satisfactory alternative to the conference committee has been devised. And
today, given the bicameral nature of the U.S. Congress, the charge is no longer heard.
Compare the following from a 1945 comment: As a devise for oiling the machinery of
legislation, committees of conference are, under American conditions, useful, if not
indispensable. Nevertheless, they have shortcomings. Without exception, they work behind
closed doors, hold no hearings, and give their proceedings no publicity. Doubtless it would
be difficult for them to make headway if they did otherwise. Nevertheless, in view of the
power which they wield, strong objection can be, and is, raised. For, while the committees
are supposed to deal only with actual differences between the houses and to stay well
within the bounds set by the extreme positions which the houses have taken, they often
work into measures, as reported, provisions of their own devising, even going so far as to
rewrite whole sections with the sole purpose of incorporating the views which the majority
members happen to hold. . . . In practice, this often results in the adoption of important
provisions, more or less surreptitiously added, without consideration by either housein
other words, legislation nominally by Congress but
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Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate
and the House of Representatives a conference committee can only act on
the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary
to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in
the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of
this contention:
Rules of the Senate
Rule XII:
26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives
on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a
conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days after their
composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in
accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall
be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been
filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to
the Members.
(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives
Rule XIV:
85. Conference Committee Reports.In the event that the House does not agree
with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or
________________
actually by conference committee. Any remedy found will probably take the form of reducing the need
for using conference committees at all; and the principal suggestion to that end is that bills and
resolutions be referred, not, as now, to separate committees of the two houses, but to joint committees,
which not only would hold single sets of hearings, but might deliberate and report back bills to the two
houses in such agreed form that further significant differences would not be likely to develop.
Arrangements of this nature yield excellent results in the legislature of Massachusetts. But there are
obstacles to adoption of the plan for Congress, not the least of them being a natural aversion of House
members to joint committees in which senators seem likely to dominate; and, as indicated below, the
outlook for the reform is problematical. F.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, supra note 7 at 310-311.
670
670 SUPREME COURT
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joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of both
Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order,
except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is
dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed by the
conferees.Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes in or amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are
distributed to the Members:Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session
period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above
provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
(Emphasis added)
To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a

consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, 112 of the Rules
of the Senate is cited to the effect that If there is no Rule applicable to a
specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the
Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jeffersons Manual. The following is then quoted from the
Jeffersons Manual:
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed
to them . . . and may not include subjects not within disagreements, even though
germane to a question in issue.
Note that, according to Rule XLIX, 112, in case there is no specific rule
applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jeffersons
Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress
that conference committee reports include new matters which, though
germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was
admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during
the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the
Jeffersons Manual must be considered to have been modified by the
legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought
in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional
provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, 16(3)
of the Constitution provides that Each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings . . . .
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This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two
chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of the Conference
Committee Report because the Report did not contain a detailed and
sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject
measure. The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the
changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in
using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the
Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have
already ruled, parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their
observance the courts have no concern. Our concern is with the
19
procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As

far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they have
been faithfully observed in these cases.
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committees Report in
these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two houses.
If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house
may seek modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill,
therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a take it or
leave it basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both
houses, another conference committee must be appointed. But then again
the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly
satisfying to both houses.
Art. VI, 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills
introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the
conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings
is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid
that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in
the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a
committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report
out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had
prepared by taking into consideration the House bill; that for its part the
Conference Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a
_________________
19 Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871 (1960).
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672 SUPREME COURT
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compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was
thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after
appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of
fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of
the bill. The allegation that the Conference Committee usurped the
legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and
in law.
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest 20
firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not
only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a
proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite
votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a
21
statute had been smuggled in the printing of the bill have moved or
22
persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the

government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the enrolled bill rule is absolute. In fact in
one case we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
23
determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by

the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself,
who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his
signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage
of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation
that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted provisions into a
bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind
the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such
cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of
our government.
________________
20 E.g., Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947); Casco (Phil.) Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA
347 (1963); Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
21 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,supra note 20.
22 Morales v. Subido, supranote 20.
23 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
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Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716
is made by the Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 11582,
namely, that it violates Art. VI, 26(1) which provides that Every bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. It is contended that neither H. No. 11197
nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions
from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the
Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without
reflecting this fact in its title.
The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND
FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is 103, which originally

read:
103. Exempt transactions.The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL
because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from the
payment of all other taxes . . . now or in the near future, in consideration
of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of
2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, 103 of the
NIRC now provides:
103. Exempt transactions.The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
....
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted
under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
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674 SUPREME COURT
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The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL,
as far as the VAT is concerned.
The question is whether this amendment of 103 of the NIRC is fairly
embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is
made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends.
We think it is, since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to
expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by
withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D.
No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to 103 of the
NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title
of a bill should be a complete index of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended
to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the
people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard
regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its
exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title
but perhaps for the same reason other statutes, although published, pass
unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence.
Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the
title of PALs own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no mention is
made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:
AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO
ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN AIRTRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE
PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.
The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in

such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of
necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the
general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the
general subject thus expressed. 24
________________
24 See, e.g., Alalayan v. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172 (1968); Cordero v.
Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962);Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941).
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It is further contended that amendment of petitioners franchise may only
be made by special law, in view of 24 of P.D. No. 1590 which provides:
This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified,
amended, or repealed expressly by a special law or decree that shall specifically
modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.
This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the

franchise by mere implication resulting from the enactment of a later
inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a franchise is a
contract which can be altered only by consent of the parties. Thus
inManila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, it was held that an Act of the U.S.
25
Congress, which provided for the payment of tax on certain goods and
articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the franchise of
plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes except those mentioned in its
franchise. It was held that a special law cannot be amended by a general
law.
In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends
PALs franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of
exemptions from the VAT PALs exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is
within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution,
which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public
utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the
common good so requires.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom
The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a
nonprofit organization of newspaper publishers established for the
improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other hand,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a
nonprofit organization engaged in the
_______________
25 40 Phil. 224 (1919).

676
676 SUPREME COURT
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printing and distribution of bibles and other religious articles. Both
petitioners claim violations of their rights under 4 and 5 of the Bill of
Rights as a result of the enactment of the VAT Law.
The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption
previously granted to the press under 103 (f) of the NIRC. Although the
exemption was subsequently restored by administrative regulation with
respect to the circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim
because of the possibility that the exemption may still be removed by mere
revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other
hand, the PBS goes so far as to question the Secretarys power to grant
exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to
grant tax exemption because this is vested in Congress and requires for its
exercise the vote of a majority of all its members and (2) the Secretarys
26
duty is to execute the law. 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions
exempted from VAT. Among the transactions previously granted
exemption were:
(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine,
review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for
subscription and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of
advertisements.
Republic Act No. 7716 amended 103 by deleting (f) with the result that
print media became subject to the VAT with respect to all aspects of their
operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of the Secretary of
Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No.
11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the circulation income of print
media pursuant to 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
guaranteeing against abridgment of freedom of the press, among others.
The exemption of circulation income has left income from advertisements
still subject to the VAT.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption
granted is beyond the authority of the Secretary of Finance to
________________
26 Art. VI, 28(4) provides: No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 677
1994
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give, in view of PPIs contention that even with the exemption of the
circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional
abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT on the
gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition
of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on the assumption that no
exemption has effectively been granted to print media transactions, we
find no violation of press freedom in these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its
faceoperates in the area of press freedom. The PPIs claim is simply
that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with
due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic
society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the
State. It has been held:
The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws.
He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others. He must
answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court . . . . Like others, he
must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business . . . . 27
The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously
granted to print media transactions involving printing, publication,
importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out
the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass
media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast
media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but
we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law,
much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now
required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is
being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only
because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law.
The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other
transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as
part of the
_______________
27 Associated Press v. NLRB,301 U.S. 103, 132, 81 L.Ed. 953, 961 (1937).
678
678 SUPREME COURT
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scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law
would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the
only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is
not the case.
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by
the PPI in support of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716 subjects the
press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory
purpose was clear either from the background of the law or from its
operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., the law 28
imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived from

advertisements only on newspapers which had a circulation of more than
20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the volume of
advertisement alone but was measured by the extent of its circulation as
well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana,
leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than
20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious
competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known
that the thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and
the Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana responded by taxing what
Long described as the lying newspapers by imposing on them a tax on
lying. The effect of the tax was to curtail both their revenue and their
circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was a deliberate
and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional
guaranties. The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the
29
power to tax is the power to destroy.

In the other case invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have
30
been singled out because everything was exempt from the use tax on ink
and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods
in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on
the privilege of using, storing or consuming in that state tangible
personal
_______________
28 297 U.S. 233, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936).

29 297 U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 669.
30 Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 75 L.Ed.2d
295 (1983).
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 679
1994
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property by eliminating the residents incentive to get goods from outside
states where the sales tax might be lower. TheMinnesota Star Tribunewas
exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971, however, the state
legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the use tax on the cost
of paper and ink used for publication. The law was held to have singled out
the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the use tax since
the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the use tax was laid on
an intermediate transaction rather than the ultimate retail sale.
Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and
it failed to do so. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be
discriminatory because the legislature, by again amending the law so as to
exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used, further narrowed the
coverage of the tax so that only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all
and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax. The discriminatory
31
purpose was thus very clear.

More recently, inArkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, it was held
32
that a law which taxed general interest magazines but not newspapers
and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory
because while the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a
small group within the press. What is more, by differentiating on the basis
of contents (i.e.,between general interest and special interests such as
religion or sports) the law became entirely incompatible with the First
Amendments guarantee of freedom of the press.
These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential
treatment of the press creates risks of suppression of expression. In
contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods
and services. The argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print
media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000,
the law discriminates is 33
________________
31 460 U.S. at 591, 75 L.Ed.2d at 308-9 (1983).

32 481 U.S. 221, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987).
33 103(t) of the NIRC exempts from the VAT Sale or lease of goods or properties or the
performance of services other than the transactions mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs, the gross annual sales and/or receipts [of which] do not exceed the amount
prescribed in regulations to be promulgated by the President upon the recommendation
680
680 SUPREME COURT
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without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject
to tax has been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation
does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. Nor is impermissible
motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are
treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving
printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of
broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.
The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that
owners of newspapers are immune from any forms of ordinary taxation.
The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid because it was
one single in kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the
freedom of the press. On the other hand, Minneapolis Staracknowledged
34
that The First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press
[and that] the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers
to generally applicable economic regulations without creating
constitutional problems. 35
What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS
that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or importation
of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication,
likewise violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held inJimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization, the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit
36
imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious
materials by a religious organization.
This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the
law, although of general applicability, nonetheless is
37
_________________
by the Secretary of Finance which shall not be less than Four hundred eighty thousand
pesos (P480,000.00) or more than Seven hundred twenty thousand pesos (P720,000.00)
subject to tax under Section 112 of this Code.
34 297 U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 668.
35 460 U.S. at 581, 75 L.Ed.2d at 302.
36 493 U.S. 378, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990).
37 107 of the NIRC provides: Any person subject to a value added tax under Sections
100 and 102 of this Code shall register with the appropriate Revenue District Officer and
pay an annual registration
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invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its
essential freedom. The case of American Bible Society v. City of Manila is 38
cited by both the PBS and the PPI in support of their contention that the
law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of the
City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on those engaged in the
business of general merchandise, could not be applied to the appellants
sale of bibles and other religious literature. This Court relied on Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in
39
amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when
applied to a religious sect, was actually being imposed as a condition for
the exercise of the sects right under the Constitution. For that reason, it
was held, the license fee restrains in advance those constitutional
liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their
exercise. 40
But, in this case, the fee in 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is
not imposed for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of
defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement is a
central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax
credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays
an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services
rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not
imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
________________
fee in the amount of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for every separate or distinct
establishment or place of business and every year thereafter on or before the last day of
January. Any person just commencing a business subject to the value-added tax must pay
the fee before engaging therein . . .
38 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
39 319 U.S. 105, 113, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943).
40 319 U.S. at 114, 87 L.Ed. 1292 at 1298. For the same reason, in People v. Korins, 385
N.Y.S. 2d 474 (1976) a decision of the city court of Utica, Oneida County held that to apply
an ordinance requiring a business license to be obtained before a person could sell
newspapers in the streets would be to impose a prior restraint on press freedom because a
newspaper is not in the same category as pineapple or a soap powder or a pair of shoes
whose sale may be conditioned on the possession of a business license.
682
682 SUPREME COURT
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For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on
the ground that it offends the free speech, press and freedom of religion
guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the same reasons,
we find the claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association
(PEPA) inG.R. No. 115931 that the increase in the price of books and other
educational materials as a result of the VAT would violate the
constitutional mandate to the government to give priority to education,
science and technology (Art. II, 17) to be untenable.
B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and
Impairment of Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates
the guarantees of freedom of speech, press and religion. The possible
chilling effect which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind
and conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication
are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of this Courts
power of review.
There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the
law also violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it
denies petitioners right to due process and the equal protection of the
laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by
an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: [W]hen freedom of the
mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of
respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers judgment that
commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it
does set up a hierarchy of values within the due process clause. 41
Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for
judicial intervention less evident and underscores the essential nature of
petitioners attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due
process and equal protection and
________________
41 P.A. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT II (1950), quoted

in Ermita, Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v. City Mayor, 21 SCRA 449, 459
(1967).
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impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the
law. For the fact is that there have even been no notices of assessments
issued to petitioners and no determinations at the administrative levels of
their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable
us to reach sound judgment regarding so fundamental questions as those
raised in these suits.
Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and
that it violates the requirement that The rule of taxation shall be uniform
and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of
taxation. Petitioners inG.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled
42
VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and Exports by

Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that VAT payment by
low-income households will be a higher proportion of their incomes (and
expenditures) than payments by higher-income households. That is, the
VAT will be regressive. Petitioners contend that as a result of the uniform
10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who are in the higher-
income bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has
been reduced, while basic commodities, which before were taxed at rates
ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the
opposite claim is pressed by respondents that in fact it distributes the tax
burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those
which are within the reach of higher-income groups, even as the law
exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and
properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-
income groups. These include real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or
privilege to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels,
restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other
hand, small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than
P500,000, are exempted. This,
_________________
42 Art. VI, 28(1). Related to this argument is the claim that Republic Act No. 7716
likewise infringes the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Bill of Rights, Art.
III, 1(1).
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according to respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some
30,000 business establishments. On the other hand, an occasional
paper of the Center for Research and Communication cites a NEDA study
43
that the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution and
that while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is only P301
or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is
P8,340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these
arguments, any discussion whether the VAT is regressive in the sense that
it will hit the poor and middle-income group in society harder than it will
the rich, as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in
G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the other hand, the
CUPs contention that Congress withdrawal of exemption of producers
cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while
maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against
the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social
justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such cooperatives the equal
protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not
required to adhere to a policy of all or none in choosing the subject of
taxation. 44
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders

Association (CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will reduce
the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any more concrete.
It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine
Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will drive
some of its members out of circulation because their profits from
advertisements will not be enough to pay for their tax liability, while
purporting to be based on the financial statements of the newspapers in
question, still falls short of the establishment of facts by evidence so
necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and
confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce.
What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to
_______________
43 Neri, In Support of the Expanded Value-Added Tax, (CRC Economic Policy Papers
No. 5 1994) pp. 3-4.
44 Cf. Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955).
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evolve a progressive system of taxation. This is a directive to Congress,
just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the
enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and
political inequalities (Art. XIII, 1), or for the promotion of the right to
quality education (Art. XIV, 1). These provisions are put in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights.
At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran should have laid to rest
45
the questions now raised against the VAT. There similar arguments made
against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were held to be
hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court
found to be hearsay and [without] evidentiary value. As Republic Act No.
7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system and its coverage as
provided in the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and
wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.
Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the
contention of CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and
leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the
effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that No
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. It is enough to
say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic
discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not
only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as
between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign
power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order.
The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society. 46
In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on

the exercise of the States power of taxation save
_________________
45 Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA
371.
46 Cf. Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22 SCRA 135 (1968).
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only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid
consideration. Such is not the case of PAL inG.R. No. 115852, and we do
47
not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed

above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a
general, but only by a specific, law.
The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in
abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of a concrete record. We
accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that public
actions by non-Hohfeldian or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable
48
provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; that

under Art. VIII, 1, 2 the Court has a special function of vindicating
constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do
not have before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that
alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that 49
decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we do not

have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions
for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to do what the
Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these cases
to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.
________________
47 See E. M. FERNANDO,THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 560-561 (2d

Ed., 1977).
48 The term is Professor Jaffes (JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
(1965) adopted by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-120,
L.Ed.2d 947, 973 (1968) to distinguish between the personal and proprietary interest of
traditional plaintiffs and the public interest of a citizen suing in a public action. The term
was mentioned by some members of this Court in the Lotto case (Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona,G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994).
49 Compare Justice Laurel: Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties,
and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158
(1936).
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We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so
muchpower as it is dutyimposed on this Court by the Constitution and
that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to
look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. Art.
VIII, 1, 2 is cited in support of this view:
Judicial power includes theduty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
To view the judicial power of review as a dutyis nothing new. Chief Justice
Marshall said so in 1803, to justify the assertion of this power inMarbury
v. Madison:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on
the operation of each. 50
Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral

Commission:
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims
of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 51
This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several cases of 52
this Court following Angara.

_______________
50 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60(1803) (emphasis added).

51 Supra note 49 (emphasis added).
52 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 94 (1937); Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1061-2
(1957); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1, 7-8 (1961).
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It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this duty to justify this
Courts intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for
adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a
concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, 5(2) clearly defines our
jurisdiction in terms of cases, and nothing but cases. That the other
departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of
discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power.
Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy
requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority
as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is
judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the
opinion of the day.
____________________________________
In the preceding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the

validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as
this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:
1. (1)That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been

complied with by Congress in the enactment of the statute;
2. (2)That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the
enactment of statutesbeyond those prescribed by the
Constitutionhave been observed is precluded by the principle of
separation of powers;
3. (3)That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the
press, nor interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to
any of the parties the right to an education; and
4. (4)That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record,
claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and
that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause
are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of prospective
relief by writ of prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

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Bidin, Quiasonand Kapunan, JJ.,concur.
Narvasa (C.J.) andMelo, J., Concur inseparate opinions.
Cruz, Padilla andVitug, JJ., See separate opinions.
Feliciano, J., I join in both the majority opinion by Mendoza, J.and
the concurring opinion of Narvasa, C.J.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosilloand Puno,
JJ., Seedissenting opinions.
SEPARATE OPINION
NARVASA, C.J.:
I fully concur with the conclusions set forth in the scholarly opinion of my
learned colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. I write this separate
opinion to express my own views relative to the procedural issues raised
by the various petitions and dealt with by some other Members of the
Court in their separate opinions.
By their very nature, it would seem, discussions of constitutional issues
prove fertile ground for a not uncommon phenomenon: debate marked by
passionate partisanship amounting sometimes to impatience with adverse
views, an eagerness on the part of the proponents on each side to assume
the role of, or be perceived as, staunch defenders of constitutional
principles, manifesting itself in flights of rhetoric, even hyperbole. The
peril in this, obviously, is a diminution of objectivitythat quality which,
on the part of those charged with the duty and authority of interpreting
the fundamental law, is of the essence of their great function. For the
Court, more perhaps than for any other person or group, it is necessary to
maintain that desirable objectivity. It must make certain that on this as
on any other occasion, the judicial function is meticulously performed, the
facts ascertained as comprehensively and as accurately as possible, all the
issues particularly identified, all the arguments clearly understood; else, it
may itself be accused, by its own members or by others, of a lack of
adherence to, or a careless observance of, its own procedures, the
signatures of its individual members on its enrolled verdicts
notwithstanding.
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In the matter now before the Court, and whatever reservations some
people may entertain about their intellectual limitations or moral
scruples, I cannot bring myself to accept the thesis which necessarily
implies that the members of our august Congress, in enacting the
expanded VAT law, exposed their ignorance, or indifference to the
observance, of the rules of procedure set down by the Constitution or by
their respective chambers, or what is worse, deliberately ignored those
rules for some yet undiscovered purpose nefarious in nature, or at least
some purpose other than the public weal; or that a few of their fellows,
acting as a bicameral conference committee, by devious schemes and
cunning maneuvers, and in conspiracy with officials of the Executive
Department and others, succeeded in pulling the wool over the eyes of all
their other colleagues and foisting on them a bill containing provisions
that neither chamber of our bicameral legislature conceived or
contemplated. This is the thesis that the petitioners would have this Court
approve. It is a thesis I consider bereft of any factual or logical foundation.
Other than the bare declarations of some of the petitioners, or
arguments from the use and import of the language employed in the
relevant documents and records, there is no evidence before the Court
adequate to support a finding that the legislators concerned, whether of
the upper or lower chamber, acted otherwise than in good faith, in the
honest discharge of their functions, in the sincere belief that the
established procedures were being regularly observed or, at least, that
there occurred no serious or fatal deviation therefrom. There is no
evidence on which reasonably to rest a conclusion that any executive or
other official took part in or unduly influenced the proceedings before the
bicameral conference committee, or that the members of the latter were
motivated by a desire to surreptitiously introduce improper revisions in
the bills which they were required to reconcile, or that after agreement
had been reached on the mode and manner of reconciliation of the
disagreeing provisions, had resorted to stratagems or employed under-
handed ploys to ensure their approval and adoption by either House.
Neither is there any proof that in voting on the Bicameral Conference
Committee (BCC) version of the reconciled bills, the members of the
Senate and the House did so in ignorance of, or without understanding,
the contents thereof or the bills therein reconciled.
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Also unacceptable is the theory that since the Constitution requires
appropriation and revenue bills to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, it is improper if not unconstitutional for the Senate to
formulate, or even think about formulating, its own draft of this type of
measure in anticipation of receipt of one transmitted by the lower
Chamber. This is specially cogent as regards much-publicized suggestions
for legislation (like the expanded VAT Law) emanating from one or more
legislators, or from the Executive Department, or the private sector, etc.
which understandably could be expected to forthwith generate much
Congressional cogitation.
Exclusive origination, I submit, should have no reference to time of
conception. As a practical matter, origination should refer to the
affirmative act which effectively puts the bicameral legislative procedure
in motion, i.e.,the transmission by one chamber to the other of a bill for its
adoption. This is the purposeful act which sets the legislative machinery in
operation to effectively lead to the enactment of a statute. Until this
transmission takes place, the formulation and discussions, or the reading
for three or more times of proposed measures in either chamber, would be
meaningless in the context of the activity leading towards concrete
legislation. Unless transmitted to the other chamber, a bill prepared by
either house cannot possibly become law. In other words, the first
affirmative, efficacious step, the operative act as it were, leading to actual
enactment of a statute, is the transmission of a bill from one house to the
other for action by the latter. This is the origination that is spoken of in
the Constitution in its Article VI, Section 24, in reference to appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bills, etc.
It may be that in the Senate, revenue or tax measures are discussed,
even drafted, and this before a similar activity takes place in the House.
This is of no moment, so long as those measures or bills remain in the
Senate and are not sent over to the House. There is noorigination of
revenue or tax measures by the Senate in this case. However, once the
House completes the drawing up of a similar tax measure in accordance
with the prescribed procedure, even if this is done subsequent to the
Senates own measureindeed, even if this be inspired by information
that a measure of the same nature or on the same subject has been
formulated in the Senateand after third
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reading transmits its bill to the Senate, there isorigination by (or in) the
House within the contemplation of the Constitution.
So it is entirely possible, as intimated, that in expectation of the receipt
of a revenue or tax bill from the House of Representatives, the Senate
commences deliberations on its own concept of such a legislative measure.
This, possibly to save time, so that when the House bill reaches it, its
thoughts and views on the matter are already formed and even reduced to
writing in the form of a draft statute. This should not be thought illegal, as
interdicted by the Constitution. What the Constitution prohibits is for the
Senate to begin the legislative processfirst, by sending its own revenue bill
to the House of Representatives for its consideration and action. This is
the initiation that is prohibited to the Senate.
But petitioners claim that this last was what in fact happened, that the
bill that went through the legislative mill and was finally approved as R.A.
No. 7716, was the Senate version, SB 1630. This is disputed by the
respondents. They claim it was House Bill 11197 that, after being
transmitted to the Senate, was referred after first reading to its
Committee on Ways and Means; was reported out by said Committee;
underwent second and third readings, was sent to the bicameral
conference committee and then, after appropriate proceedings therein
culminating in extensive amendments thereof, was finally approved by
both Houses and became the Expanded VAT Law.
On whose side does the truth lie? If it is not possible to make that
determination from the pleadings and records before this Court, shall it
require evidence to be presented? No, on both law and principle. The Court
will reject a case where the legal issues raised, whatever they may be,
depend for their resolution on still unsettled questions of fact. Petitioners
may not, by raising what are concededly novel and weighty constitutional
questions, compel the Court to assume the role of a trier of facts. It is on
the contrary their obligation, before raising those questions to this Court,
to see to it that all issues of fact are settled in accordance with the
procedures laid down by law for proof of facts. Failing this, petitioners
would have only themselves to blame for a peremptory dismissal.
Now, what is really proven about what happened to HB 11197 after it
was transmitted to the Senate? It seems to be admitted on
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all sides that after going through first reading, HB 11197 was referred to
the Committee on Ways and Means chaired by Senator Ernesto Herrera.
It is however surmised that after this initial step, HB 11197 was never
afterwards deliberated on in the Senate, that it was there given nothing
more than a passing glance, and that it never went through a proper
second and third reading. There is no competent proof to substantiate this
claim. What is certain is that on February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee
on Ways and Means submitted its Report (No. 349) stating that HB 11197
was considered,and recommending that SB 1630 be approved in
substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No.
734 and H.B. No. 11197. This Report made known to the Senate, and
1
clearly indicates, that H.B. No. 11197 was indeed deliberated on by the
Committee; in truth, as Senator Herrera pointed out, the BCC later
agreed to adopt (a broader coverage of the VAT) which is closely adhering
to the Senate version ** ** with some new provisions or amendments.
The plain implication is that the Senate Committee had indeed discussed
HB 11197 in comparison with the inconsistent parts of SB 1129 and
afterwards proposed amendments to the former in the form of a new bill
(No. 1630) more closely akin to the Senate bill (No. 1129).
And it is as reasonable to suppose as not that later, during the second
and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senators, assembled as a body,
had before them copies of HB 11197 and SB 1129, as well as of the
Committees new SB 1630 that had been recommended for their
approval, or at the very least were otherwise perfectly aware that they
were considering the particular provisions of these bills. That there was
such a deliberation in the Senate on HB 11197 in light of inconsistent
portions of SB 1630, may further be necessarily inferred from the request,
made by the Senate on the same day, March 24, 1994, for the convocation
of a bicameral conference committee to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of said bill (SB 1630) and House Bill No. 11197, a
________________
1 Resolution Urging the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to
Exempt Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an Incentive
to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies Whenever they Feature an All-
Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses.
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request that could not have been made had not the Senators more or less
closely examined the provisions of HB 11197 and compared them with
those of the counterpart Senate measures.
Were the proceedings before the bicameral conference committee fatally
flawed? The affirmative is suggested because the committee allegedly
overlooked or ignored the fact that SB 1630 could not validly originate in
the Senate, and that HB 11197 and SB 1630 never properly passed both
chambers. The untenability of these contentions has already been
demonstrated. Now, demonstration of the indefensibility of other
arguments purporting to establish the impropriety of the BCC proceedings
will be attempted.
There is the argument, for instance, that the conference committee
never used HB 11197 even as frame of reference because it does not
appear that the suggestion therefor (made by House Panel Chairman
Exequiel Javier at the bicameral conference committees meeting on April
19, 1994, with the concurrence of Senator Maceda) was ever resolved, the
minutes being regrettably vague as to what occurred after that suggestion
was made. It is, however, as reasonable to assume that it was, as it was
not, given the vagueness of the minutes already alluded to. In fact, a
reading of the BCC Report persuasively demonstrates that HB 11197 was
not only utilized as a frame of reference but actually discussed and
deliberated on.
Said BCC Report pertinently states: 2
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197,
entitled:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO
AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238
OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113SD AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL
OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
________________
2 Italics supplied.
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and Senate Bill No. 1630 entitled:
AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115, 117 AND 121 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND
238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114, 116, 119 AND 120 OF
TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
having met, after full and free conference, has agreed to recommend and do
hereby recommend to their respective Houses thatHouse Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the
attached copy of the bill asreconciled and approved by the conferees.
Approved.
The Report, it will be noted, explicitly adverts to House Bill No. 11197, it
being in fact mentioned ahead of Senate Bill No. 1630; graphically shows
the very close identity of the subjects of both bills (indicated in their
respective titles); and clearly says that the committee met in full and free
conference on the disagreeing provisions of both bills (obviously in an
effort to reconcile them); and that reconciliation of said disagreeing
provisions had been effected, the BCC having agreed that House Bill No.
11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in
accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by
the conferees.
It may be concluded, in other words, that, conformably to the procedure
provided in the Constitution with which all the Members of the bicameral
conference committee cannot but be presumed to be familiar, and no proof
to the contrary having been adduced on the point, it was the original bill
(HB 11197) which said body had considered and deliberated on in detail,
reconciled or harmonized with SB 1630, and used as basis for drawing up
the amended version eventually reported out and submitted to both
houses of Congress.
It is further contended that the BCC was created and convoked
prematurely, that SB 1630 should first have been sent to the House of
Representatives for concurrence. It is maintained, in
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other words, that the latter chamber should have refused the Senate
request for a bicameral conference committee to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of both bills, and should have required that SB 1630 be first
transmitted to it. This, seemingly, is nit-picking given the urgency of the
proposed legislation as certified by the President (to both houses, in fact).
Time was of the essence, according to the Presidents best judgmentas
regards which absolutely no one in either chamber of Congress took
exception, general acceptance being on the contrary otherwise
manifestedand that judgment the Court will not now question. In light
of that urgency, what was so vital or indispensable about such a
transmittal that its absence would invalidate all else that had been done
towards enactment of the law, completely escapes me, specially
considering that the House had immediately acceded without demur to the
request for convocation of the conference committee.
What has just been said should dispose of the argument that the
statement in the enrolled bill, that This Act which is a consolidation of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by the
House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994 and May 2,
1994, necessarily signifies that there were two (2) bills separately
introduced, retaining their independent existence until they reached the
bicameral conference committee where they were consolidated, and
therefore, the VAT law did not originate exclusively in the House having
originated in part in the Senate as SB 1630, which bill was not embodied
in but merely merged with HB 11197, retaining its separate identity until
it was joined by the BCC with the house measure. The more logical, and
fairer, course is to construe the expression, consolidation of House Bill
No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 in the context of accompanying and
contemporaneous statements, i.e.: (a) the declaration in the BCC
Report, supra, that the committee met to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the two bills, and after full and free conference on the
matter, agreed and so recommended that House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with
the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees;
and (b) the averment of Senator Herrera, in the Report of the Ways and
Means Committee, supra, that the committee had actually considered
(discussed)
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HB No. 11197 and taken it into consideration in recommending that its
own version of the measure (SB 1630) be the one approved.
That the Senate might have drawn up its own version of the expanded
VAT bill, contemporaneously with or even before the House did, is of no
moment. It bears repeating in this connection that no VAT bill
ever originated in the Senate; neither its SB 1129 or SB 1630 or any of its
drafts was ever officially transmitted to the House as an initiating bill
which, as already pointed out, is what the Constitution forbids; it was HB
11197 that was first sent to the Senate, underwent first reading, was
referred to Committee on Ways and Means and there discussed in relation
to and in comparison with the counterpart Senate version or versionsthe
mere formulation of which was, as also already discussed, not prohibited
to itand afterwards considered by the Senate itself, also in connection
with SB 1630, on second and third readings. HB 11197 was in the truest
sense, the originating bill.
An issue has also arisen respecting the so-called enrolled bill doctrine
which, it is said, whatever sacrosanct status it might originally have
enjoyed, is now in bad odor with modern scholars on account of its imputed
rigidity and unrealism; it being also submitted that the ruling
in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1) and the cases reaffirming it, is no
longer good law, it being based on a provision of the Code of Civil
Procedure long since stricken from the statute books.
3
I would myself consider the enrolled bill theory as laying down a

presumption of so strong a character as to be well nigh absolute or
conclusive, fully in accord with the familiar and fundamental philosophy of
separation of powers. The result, as far as I am concerned, is to make
discussion of the enrolled bill principle purely academic; for as already
pointed out, there is no proof worthy of the name of any facts to justify its
reexamination and, possibly, disregard.
The other question is, what is the nature of the power given to a
bicameral conference committee of reconciling differences
_________________
3 Giving conclusive character to copies of Acts of the Philippine Commission which

have been signed by its presiding officers and secretaries.
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between, or disagreeing provisions in, a bill originating from the House
in relation to amendments proposed by the Senatewhether as regards
some or all of its provisions? Is the mode of reconciliation, subject to fixed
procedure and guidelines? What exactly can the committee do, or not do?
Can it only clarify or revise provisions found in either Senate or House
bill? Is it forbidden to propose additional or new provisions, even on
matters necessarily or reasonably connected with or germane to items in
the bills being reconciled?
In answer, it is postulated that the reconciliation function is quite
limited. In these cases, the conference committee should have confined
itself to reconciliation of differences or inconsistencies only by (a) restoring
provisions of HB 11197 eliminated by SB 1630, or (b) sustaining wholly or
partly the Senate amendments, or (c) as a compromise, agreeing that
neither provisions nor amendments be carried into the final form of HB
11197 for submission to both chambers of the legislature.
The trouble is, it is theorized, the committee incorporated activities or
transactions which were not within the contemplation of both bills; it
made additions and deletions which did not enjoy the enlightenment of
initial committee studies; it exercised what is known as an ex post veto
power granted to it by no law, rule or regulation, a power that in truth is
denied to it by the rules of both the Senate and the House. In
substantiation, the Senate rule is cited, similar to that of the House,
providing that differences shall be settled by a conference committee
whose report shall contain detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of
the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, ** (to be) signed by
the conferees; as well as the Jeffersons Manual, adopted by the Senate
as supplement to its own rules, directing that the managers of the
conference must confine themselves to differences submitted to them; they
may not include subjects not within the disagreements even though
germane to a question in issue.
It is significant that the limiting proviso in the relevant rules has been
construed and applied as directory, not mandatory. During the oral
argument, counsel for petitioners admitted that the practice for decades
has been for bicameral conference committees to include such provisions in
the reconciled bill as they believed to be germane or necessary and
acceptable to both
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chambers, even if not within any of the disagreeing provisions, and the
reconciled bills, containing such provisions had invariably been approved
and adopted by both houses of Congress. It is a practice, they say, that
should be stopped. But it is a practice that establishes in no uncertain
manner the prevailing concept in both houses of Congress of the
permissible and acceptable modes of reconciliation that their conference
committees may adopt, one whose undesirability is not all that patent if
not, indeed, incapable of unquestionable demonstration. The fact is that
conference committees only take up bills which have already been freely
and fully discussed in both chambers of the legislature, but as to which
there is need of reconciliation in view of disagreeing provisions between
them; and both chambers entrust the function of reconciling the bills to
their delegates at a conference committee with full awareness, and tacit
consent, that conformably with established practice unquestioningly
observed over many years, new provisions may be included even if not
within the disagreeing provisions but of which, together with other
changes, they will be given detailed and sufficiently explicit information
prior to voting on the conference committee version.
In any event, a fairly recent decision written for the Court by Senior
Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz, promulgated on November 11, 1993
(G.R. No. 105371, The Philippine Judges Association, etc., et al. v. Hon.
Pete Prado, etc., et al.), should leave no doubt of the continuing vitality of
the enrolled bill doctrine and give an insight into the nature of the
reconciling function of bicameral conference committees. In that case, a
bilateral conference committee was constituted and met to reconcile
Senate Bill No. 720 and House Bill No. 4200. It adopted a reconciled
measure that was submitted to and approved by both chambers of
Congress and ultimately signed into law by the President, as R.A. No.
7354. A provision in this statute (removing the franking privilege from the
courts, among others) was assailed as being an invalid amendment
because it was not included in the original version of either the senate or
the house bill and hence had generated no disagreement between them
which had to be reconciled. The Court held:
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While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to
this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies,Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1987 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill

in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon
V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by
both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by
President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers
of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez (7 SCRA 347) laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary
(except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill) (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil. 1). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. v. Pons(34 Phil.
729), where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Applying
these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners
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charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance
with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at
the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Withal, an analysis of the changes made by the conference committee in

HB 11197 and SB 1630 by way of reconciling their disagreeing
provisions,assailed by petitioners as unauthorized or incongruous
reveals that many of the changes related to actual disagreeing
provisions, and that those that might perhaps be considered as entirely
new are nevertheless necessarily or logically connected with or germane to
particular matters in the bills being reconciled.
For instance, the change made by the bicameral conference committee
(BCC) concerning amendments to Section 99 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC)the addition of lessors of goods or properties and
importers of goodsis really a reconciliation of disagreeing provisions, for
while HB 11197 mentions as among those subject to tax, one who sells,
barters, or exchanges goods or properties and any person who leases
personal properties, SB 1630 does not. The change also merely clarifies
the provision by providing that the contemplated taxpayers includes
importers. The revision as regards the amendment to Section 100, NIRC,
is also simple reconciliation, being nothing more than the adoption by the
BCC of the provision in HB 11197 governing the sale of gold to Bangko
Sentral, in contrast to SB 1630 containing no such provision. Similarly,
only simple reconciliation was involved as regards approval by the BCC of
a provision declaring as not exempt, the sale of real properties primarily
held for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of trade
or business, which provision is found in HB 11197 but not in SB 1630; as
regards the adoption by the BCC of a provision on life insurance business,
contained in SB 1630 but not found in HB 11197; as regards adoption by
the BCC of the provision in SB 1630 for deferment of tax on certain goods
and services for no longer than 3 years, as to which there was no
counterpart provision in SB 11197; and as regards the fixing of a
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period for the adoption of implementing rules, a period being prescribed in
SB 1630 and none in HB 11197.
In respect of other revisions, it would seem that questions logically
arose in the course of the discussion of specific disagreeing provisions to
which answers were given which, because believed acceptable to both
houses of Congress, were placed in the BCC draft. For example, during
consideration ofradio and television time(Sec. 100, NIRC) dealt with in
both House and Senate bills, the question apparently came up, the
relevance of which is apparent on its face, relative to satellite transmission
and cable television time. Hence, a provision in the BCC bill on the matter.
Again, while deliberating on the definition of goods or properties in
relation to the provision subjecting sales thereof to tax, a question
apparently arose, logically relevant, about real properties intended to be
sold by a person in economic difficulties, or because he wishes to buy a car,
i.e., not as part of a business, the BCC evidently resolved to clarify the
matter by excluding from the tax, real properties held primarily for sale to
customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business. And in the
course of consideration of the term, sale or exchange of services (Sec. 102,
NIRC), the inquiry most probably was posed as to whether the term
should be understood as including other services: e.g., services of lessors of
property whether real or personal, of warehousemen, of keepers of
resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts, or of common carriers, etc., and
presumably the BCC resolved to clarify the matter by including the
services just mentioned. Surely, changes of this nature are obviously to be
expected in proceedings before bicameral conference committees and may
even be considered grist for their mill, given the history of such BCCs and
their general practice here and abroad.
In any case, all the changes and revisions, and deletions, made by the
conference committee were all subsequently considered by and approved
by both the Senate and the House, meeting and voting separately. It is an
unacceptable theorization, to repeat, that when the BCC report and its
proposed bill were submitted to the Senate and the House, the members
thereof did not bother to read, or what is worse, having read did not
understand, what was before them, or did not realize that there were new
provisions in the reconciled version unrelated to any disagreeing
provisions, or that said new provisions or revisions were effectively
concealed
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from them.
Moreover, it certainly was entirely within the power and prerogative of
either legislative chamber to reject the BCC bill and require the
organization of a new bicameral conference committee. That this option
was not exercised by either house only proves that the BCC measure was
found to be acceptable as in fact it was approved and adopted by both
chambers.
I vote to DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
It is a curious and almost incredible fact that at the hearing of these cases
on July 7, 1994, the lawyers who argued for the petitionerstwo of them
former presidents of the Senate and the third also a member of that
bodyall asked this Court to look into the internal operations of their
Chamber and correct the irregularities they claimed had been committed
there as well as in the House of Representatives and in the bicameral
conference committee.
While a member of the legislature would normally resist such
intervention and invoke the doctrine of separation of powers to protect
Congress from what he would call judicial intrusion, these counsel
practically implored the Court to examine the questioned proceedings and
to this end go beyond the journals of each House, scrutinize the minutes of
the committee, and investigate all other matters relating to the passage of
the bill (or bills) that eventually became R.A. No. 7716.
In effect, the petitioners would have us disregard the time-honored
inhibitions laid down by the Court upon itself in the landmark case of U.S.
v. Pons (34 Phil. 725), where it refused to consider extraneous evidence to
disprove the recitals in the journals of the Philippine Legislature that it
had adjournedsine die at midnight of February 28, 1914. Although it was
generally known then that the special session had actually exceeded the
deadline fixed by the Governor-General in his proclamation, the Court
chose to be guided solely by the legislative journals, holding significantly
as follows:
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* * * From their very nature and object, the records of the legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine Legis-lature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and
independent department of the Govern-ment, and to interfere with the legitimate
powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the
public knows that the Assemblys clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at
midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending
matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable
the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the fixed time by the
Governors proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation
of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here
suggested, the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the
probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or
absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.
* * * The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February
28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go
beyond the journals.
As one who has always respected the rationale of the separation of powers,
I realize only too well the serious implications of the relaxation of the
doctrine except only for the weightiest of reasons. The lowering of the
barriers now dividing the three major branches of the government could
lead to invidious incursions by one department into the exclusive domains
of the other departments to the detriment of the proper discharge of the
functions assigned to each of them by the Constitution.
Still, while acknowledging the value of tradition and the reasons for
judicial non-interference announced in Pons, I am not disinclined to take a
second look at the ruling from a more pragmatic viewpoint and to tear
down, if we must, the iron curtain it has hung, perhaps improvidently,
around the proceedings of the legislature.
I am persuaded even now that where a specific procedure is fixed by the
Constitution itself, it should not suffice for Congress to simply say that the
rules have been observed and flatly consider the matter closed. It does not
have to be as final as that.
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I would imagine that the judiciary, and particularly this Court, should be
able to verify that statement and determine for itself, through the exercise
of its own powers, if the Constitution has, indeed, been obeyed.
In fact, the Court has already said that the question of whether certain
procedural rules have been followed is justiciable rather than political
because what is involved is the legalityand not the wisdom of the act in
question. So we ruled in Sanidad v. Commission on Elections(73 SCRA
333) on the amendment of the Constitution; in Daza v. Singson (180 SCRA
496) on the composition of the Commission on Appointments; and in the
earlier case of Taada v. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051) on the organization of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, among several other cases.
By the same token, the ascertainment of whether a bill underwent the
obligatory three readings in both Houses of Congress should not be
considered an invasion of the territory of the legislature as this would not
involve an inquiry into its discretion in approving the measure but only
the manner in which the measure was enacted.
These views may upset the conservatives among us who are most
comfortable when they allow themselves to be petrified by precedents
instead of venturing into uncharted waters. To be sure, there is much to be
said of the wisdom of the past expressed by vanished judges talking to the
future. Via trita est tuttisima. Except when there is a need to revise them
because of an altered situation or an emergent idea, precedents should tell
us that, indeed, the trodden path is the safest path.
It could be that the altered situation has arrived to welcome the
emergent idea. The jurisdiction of this Court has been expanded by the
Constitution, to possibly include the review the petitioners would have us
make of the congressional proceedings being questioned. Perhaps it is also
time to declare that the activities of Congress can no longer be smoke-
screened in the inviolate recitals of its journals to prevent examination of
its sacrosanct records in the name of the separation of powers.
But then again, perhaps all this is not yet necessary at this time and all
these observations are but wishful musings for a more activist judiciary.
For I find that this is not even necessary, at least for me, to leave the
trodden path in the search for new
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adventures in the byways of the law. The answer we seek, as I see it, is not
far afield. It seems to me that it can be found through a study of the
enrolled bill alone and that we do not have to go beyond that measure to
ascertain if R.A. No. 7716 has been validly enacted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in case of conflict between the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals, it is the former that should
prevail except only as to matters that the Constitution requires to be
entered in the journals. (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1). These are
the yeas andnays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the
request of at least one-fifth of the members of the House (Constitution,
Art. VI, Sec. 16 [4]), the objections of the President to a vetoed bill or item
(Ibid,Sec. 27 [1]), and the names of the members voting for or against the
overriding of his veto (Id.Section 27 [1]). The origin of a bill is not
specifically required by the Constitution to be entered in the journals.
Hence, on this particular matter, it is the recitals in the enrolled bill and
not in the journals that must control.
Article VI, Section 24, of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
The enrolled bill submitted to and later approved by the President of the
Philippines as R.A. No. 7716 was signed by the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. It carried the following
certification over the signatures of the Secretary of the Senate and the
Acting Secretary of the House of Representatives:
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630
was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27,
1994, and May 2, 1994.
Let us turn to Webster for the meaning of certain words:

To originate is to bring into being; to create something (original); to
invent; begin; start. The word exclusively means excluding all others
and is derived from the word exclusive, meaning not shared or divided;
sole; single. Applying these
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meanings, I would read Section 24 as saying that the bills mentioned
therein must be brought into being, or created, or invented, or begun or
started, only or singly or by no other body than the House of
Representatives.
According to the certification, R.A. No . 7716 is a consolidation of
House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. Again giving the words
used their natural and ordinary sense conformably to an accepted canon of
construction, I would read the word consolidation as a combination or
merger and derived from the word consolidate, meaning to combine
into one; merge; unite.
The two bills were separately introduced in their respective Chambers.
Both retained their independent existence until they reached the
bicameral conference committee where they were consolidated. It was this
consolidated measure that was finally passed by Congress and submitted
to the President of the Philippines for his approval.
House Bill No. 11197 originated in the House of Representatives but
this was not the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7716. The measure
that was signed into law by President Ramos was the consolidation of that
bill and another bill, viz.,Senate Bill No. 1630, which was introduced in
the Senate. The resultant enrolled bill thus did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives. The enrolled bill itself says that part of it
(and it does not matter to what extent) originated in the Senate.
It would have been different if the only participation of the Senate was
in the amendment of the measure that was originally proposed in the
House of Representatives. But this was not the case. The participation of
the Senate was not in proposing or concurring with amendments that
would have been incorporated in House Bill No. 11197. Its participation
was inoriginating its own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was not embodied in
but merged with House Bill No. 11197.
Senate Bill No. 1630 was not even an amendment by substitution,
assuming this was permissible. To substitute means to take the place of;
to put or use in place of another. Senate Bill No. 1630 did not, upon its
approval, replace (and thus eliminate) House Bill No. 11197. Both bills
retained their separate identities until they were joined or united into
what became the enrolled bill and ultimately R.A. No. 7716.
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The certification in the enrolled bill says it all. It is clear that R.A. No.
7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
To go back to my earlier observations, this conclusion does not require
the reversal ofU.S. vs. Pons and an inquiry by this Court into the
proceedings of the legislature beyond the recitals of its journals. All we
need to do is consider the certification in the enrolled bill and, without
entering the precincts of Congress, declare that by its own admission it
has, indeed, not complied with the Constitution.
While this Court respects the prerogatives of the other departments, it
will not hesitate to rise to its higher duty to require from them, if they go
astray, full and strict compliance with the fundamental law. Our fidelity to
it must be total. There is no loftier principle in our democracy than the
supremacy of the Constitution, to which all must submit.
I vote to invalidate R.A. No. 7716 for violation of Article VI, Sec. 24, of
the Constitution.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
The original VAT law and the expanded VAT law
In Kapatiran v. Tan, where the ponente was the writer of this Separate
1
Opinion, aunanimous Supreme Court en banc upheld the validity of the

original VAT law (Executive Order No. 273, approved on 25 July 1987). It
will, in my view, be pointless at this time to re-open arguments advanced
in said case as to why said VAT law was invalid, and it will be equally
redundant to re-state the principles laid down by the Court in the same
case affirming the validity of the VAT law as a tax measure. And yet, the
same arguments are, in effect, marshalled against the merits and
substance of the expanded VAT law (Rep. Act No. 7716, approved on 5
May 1994). The same Supreme Court decision should
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1 G.R. No. 81311, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 371.
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therefore dispose, in the main, of such arguments, for the expanded VAT
law is predicated basically on the same principles as the original VAT law,
except that now the tax base of the VAT imposition has been expanded or
broadened.
It only needs to be statedwhat actually should be obviousthat a tax
measure, like the expanded VAT law (Republic Act No. 7716), is enacted
by Congress and approved by the President in the exercise of the States
power to tax, which is an attribute of sovereignty. And while the power to
tax, if exercised without limit, is a power to destroy, and should, therefore,
not be allowed in such form, it has to be equally recognized that the power
to tax is an essential right of government. Without taxes, basic services to
the people can come to a halt; economic progress will be stunted, and, in
the long run, the people will suffer the pains of stagnation and
retrogression.
Consequently, upon careful deliberation, I have no difficulty in reaching
the conclusion that the expanded VAT law comes within thelegitimate
power of the state to tax. And as I had occasion to previously state:
Constitutional Law, to begin with, is concerned with power not political
convenience, wisdom, exigency, or even necessity. Neither the Executive nor the
Legislative (Commission on Appointments) can create power where the Constitution
confers none. 2
Likewise, in the first VAT case, I said:

In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued
application of the VAT are prejudicial to the general welfare or the interests of the
majority of the people, they should seek recourse and relief from the political
branches of the government. The Court, following the time-honored doctrine of
separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President (and
Congress) as to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the adoption of the VAT. 3
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2 Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160.
3 Kapatiran, supra at 385.
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This Court should not, as a rule, concern itself with questions of policy,
much less, economic policy. That is better left to the two (2) political
branches of government. That the expanded VAT law is unwise, unpopular
and even anti-poor, among other things said against it, are arguments and
considerations within the realm of policy-debate, which only Congress and
the Executive have the authority to decisively confront, alleviate, remedy
and resolve.
II
The procedure followed in the approval of Rep. Act No. 7716 Petitioners
however posit that the present case raises a far-reaching constitutional
question which the Court is duty-bound to decide under its expanded
jurisdiction in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners more specifically
4
question and impugn themanner by which the expanded VAT law (Rep.
Act No. 7716) was approved by Congress. They contend that it was
approved in violation of the Constitution from which fact it follows, as a
consequence, that the law is null and void. Main reliance of the petitioners
in their assault is Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bill of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
amendments.
While it should be admitted at the outset that there was no rigorous and
strict adherence to the literal command of the above provision, it may
however be said, after careful reflection, that there was substantial
compliance with the provision.
There is no question that House Bill No. 11197 expanding the VAT law
originated from the House of Representatives. It is undeniably a House
measure. On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 1129, also expanding the
VAT law, originated from the Senate. It
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4 Sec. 1, Art. VIII.
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is undeniably a Senate measure which, in point of time, actually antedated
House Bill No. 11197.
But it is of record that when House Bill No. 11197 was, after approval
by the House, sent to the Senate, it was referred to, and considered by the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means (after first reading) together with
Senate Bill No. 1129, and the Committee came out with Senate Bill No.
1630 in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 but after expressly taking into
consideration House Bill No. 11197.
Since the Senate is, under the above-quoted constitutional provision,
empowered to concur with a revenue measure exclusively originating from
the House, or to propose amendments thereto, to the extent of proposing
amendments by SUBSTITUTION to the House measure, the approval by
the Senate of Senate Bill No. 1630, after it had considered House Bill No.
11197, may be taken, in my view, as an AMENDMENT BY
SUBSTITUTION by the Senate not only of Senate Bill No. 1129 but of
House Bill No. 11197 as well which, it must be remembered, originated
exclusively from the House.
But then, in recognition of the fact that House Bill No. 11197 which
originated exclusively from the House and Senate Bill No. 1630 contained
conflicting provisions, both bills (House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No.
1630) were referred to the Bicameral Conference Committee for joint
consideration with a view to reconciling their conflicting provisions.
The Conference Committee came out eventually with a Conference
Committee Bill which was submitted to both chambers of Congress (the
Senate and the House). The Conference Committee reported out a bill
consolidating provisions in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630.
What transpired in both chambers after the Conference Committee Report
was submitted to them is not clear from the records in this case. What is
clear however is that both chambers voted separately on the bill reported
out by the Conference Committee and both chambers approved the bill of
the Conference Committee.
To me then, what should really be important is that both chambers of
Congress approved the bill reported out by the Conference Committee. In
my considered view, the act of both chambers of Congress in approving the
Conference Committee bill, should put an end to any inquiry by this Court
as to how the
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bill came about. What is more, such separate approvals CURED whatever
constitutional infirmities may have arisen in the procedures leading to
such approvals. For, if such infirmities were serious enough to impugn the
very validity of the measure itself, there would have been an objection or
objections from members of both chambers to the approval. The Court has
been shown no such objection on record in both chambers.
Petitioners contend that there were violations of Sec. 26 paragraph 2,
Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
SEC. 26. x x x
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
in that, when Senate Bill No. 1630 (the Senate counterpart of House Bill
No. 11197) was approved by the Senate, after it had been reported out by
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, the bill went through second
and third readings on the same day (not separate days) and printed copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed to the members of the Senate
at least three (3) days before its passage by the Senate. But we are told by
the respondents that the reason for this short cut was that the President
had certified to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment to meet an
emergencya certification that, by leave of the same constitutional
provision, dispensed with the second and third readings on separate days
and the printed form at least three (3) days before its passage.
We have here then a situation where the President did certify to the
necessity of Senate Bill No. 1630s immediate enactment to meet an
emergency and the Senate responded accordingly. While I would be the
last to say that this Court cannot review the exercise of such power by the
President in appropriate cases ripe for judicial review, I am not prepared
however to say that the President gravely abused his discretion in the
exercise of such power as to require that this Court overturn his action.
We have
713
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been shown no fact or circumstance which would impugn the judgment of
the President, concurred in by the Senate, that there was an emergency
that required the immediate enactment of Senate Bill No. 1630. On the
other hand, a becoming respect for a co-equal and coordinate department
of government points that weight and credibility be given to such
Presidential judgment.
The authority or power of the Conference Committee to make insertions
in and deletions from the bills referred to it, namely, House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630 is likewise assailed by petitioners. Again, what
appears important here is that both chambers approved and ratified the
bill as reported out by the Conference Committee (with the reported
insertions and deletions). This is perhaps attributable to the known
legislative practice of allowing a Conference Committee to make insertions
in and deletions from bills referred to it for consideration, as long as they
are germane to the subject matter of the bills under consideration.
Besides, when the Conference Committee made the insertions and
deletions complained of by petitioners, was it not actually performing the
task assigned to it of reconciling conflicting provisions in House Bill No.
11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630?
This Court impliedly if not expressly recognized the fact of such
legislative practice inPhilippine Judges Association, etc. vs. Hon. Peter
Prado, etc.. In said case, we stated thus:
5
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives,
requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both
Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an
amendment.
These arguments are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to
this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise differences
_______________
5 G.R. No. 103371, 11 November 1993.

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714 SUPREME COURT
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between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the
rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies,Legislative Law and Process: In A
Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in

question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was
then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
It would seem that if corrective measures are in order to clip the powers of
the Conference Committee, the remedy should come from either or both
chambers of Congress, not from this Court, under the time-honored
doctrine of separation of powers.
Finally, as certified by the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives
This Act (Rep. Act No. 7716) is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate
Bill No. 1630 (w)as finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate
on April 27, 1994 and May 2, 1994 respectively.
Under the long-accepted doctrine of the enrolled bill, the Court in

deference to a co-equal and coordinate branch of government is held to a
recognition of Rep. Act No. 7716 as a law validly enacted by Congress and,
thereafter, approved by the President on 5 May 1994. Again, we quote
from our recent decision in Philippine Judges Association, supra:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the
certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez6
_______________
6 7 SCRA 347.
715
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 715
1994
Finance
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme
7
Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we
8
explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners charges
that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
III
Press Freedom and Religious Freedom and Rep. Act No. 7716
The validity of the passage of Rep. Act No. 7716 notwithstanding, certain
provisions of the law have to be examined separately and carefully.
Rep. Act No. 7716 in imposing a value-added tax on circulation income
of newspapers and similar publications and on income derived from
publishing advertisements in newspapers, to my mind, violates Sec. 4,
9
Art. III of the Constitution. Indeed, even the Executive Department has
tried to cure this defect by the issuance of BIR Regulation No. 11-
94precluding implementation of the tax in this area. It should be clear,
however, that the BIR
_______________
7 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.

8 34 Phil. 729.
9 Executive Order No. 273, in Sec. 103 (f), had exempted this kind of income from the
VAT. Rep. Act. No. 7716 removed the exemption.
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716 SUPREME COURT
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regulation cannot amend the law (Rep. Act No. 7716). Only legislation (as
distinguished from administration regulation) can amend an existing law.
Freedom of the press was virtually unknown in the Philippines before
1900. In fact, a prime cause of the revolution against Spain at the turn of
the 19th century was the repression of the freedom of speech and
expression and of the press. No less than our national hero, Dr. Jose P.
Rizal, in Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos(The Philippines a Century
Hence) describing the reformssine quibus non which the Filipinos were
insisting upon, stated: The minister x x x who wants his reforms to be
reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free x x x. 10
Press freedom in the Philippines has met repressions, most notable of

which was the closure of almost all forms of existing mass media upon the
imposition of martial law on 21 September 1972.
Section 4, Art. III of the Constitution maybe traced to the United States
Federal Constitution. The guarantee of freedom of expression was planted
in the Philippines by President McKinley in the Magna Carta of
Philippine Liberty, Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission on 7
April 1900.
The present constitutional provision which reads:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
is essentially the same as that guaranteed in the U.S. Federal

Constitution, for which reason, American case law giving judicial
expression as to its meaning is highly persuasive in the Philippines.
The plain words of the provision reveal the clear intention that no prior
restraint can be imposed on the exercise of free speech and expression if
they are to remain effective and meaningful.
The U.S. Supreme Court in the leading case of Grosjean v. American
Press Co., Inc. declared a statute imposing a gross
11
________________
10 United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731.

11 297 U.S. 233.
717
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 717
1994
Finance
receipts license tax of 2% on circulation and advertising income of
newspaper publishers as constituting a prior restraint which is contrary to
the guarantee of freedom of the press.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
12
Any system of prior restraint of expression comes to this Court bearing a

heavy presumption against its constitutionality. In this jurisdiction, prior
restraint on the exercise of free expression can be justified only on the
ground that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil which
the State has the right to prevent. 13
In the present case, the tax imposed on circulation and advertising

income of newspaper publishers is in the nature of a prior restraint on
circulation and free expression and, absent a clear showing that the
requisite for prior restraint is present, the constitutional flaw in the law is
at once apparent and should not be allowed to proliferate.
Similarly, the imposition of the VAT on the sale and distribution of
religious articles must be struck down for being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. III
of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
That such a tax on the sale and distribution of religious articles is

unconstitutional, has been long settled in American Bible Society,supra.
Insofar, therefore, as Rep. Act No. 7716 imposes a value-added tax on
the exercise of the above-discussed two (2) basic constitutional rights, Rep.
Act No. 7716 should be declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and
effect.
IV
Petitions of CREBA and PAL and Rep. Act No. 7716
_______________
12 372 U.S. 58.

13 American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386.
718
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The Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. (CREBA) filed
its own petition (GR No. 11574) arguing that the provisions of Rep. Act No.
7716 imposing a 10% value-added tax on the gross selling price or gross
value in money of every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties
(Section 2) and a 10% value-added tax on gross receipts derived from the
sale or exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties
(Section 3), violate the equal protection, due process and non-impairment
provisions of the Constitution as well as the rule that taxation should be
uniform, equitable and progressive.
The issue of whether or not the value-added tax is uniform, equitable
and progressive has been settled in Kapatiran.
CREBA which specifically assails the 10% value-added tax on the gross
selling price of real properties, fails to distinguish between a sale of real
properties primarily held for sale to customers or held for lease in the
ordinary course of trade or business and isolated sales by individual real
property owners (Sec. 103[s]). That those engaged in the business of real
estate development realize great profits is of common knowledge and need
not be discussed at length here. The qualification in the law that the 10%
VAT covers only sales of real property primarily held for sale to customers,
i.e. for trade or business thus takes into consideration a taxpayers
capacity to pay. There is no showing that the consequent distinction in
real estate sales is arbitrary and in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. The inherent power to tax of the State, which is vested
in the legislature, includes the power to determine whom or what to tax,
as well as how much to tax. In the absence of a clear showing that the tax
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution,
this Court, in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, has to
defer to the discretion and judgment of Congress on this point.
Philippine Airlines (PAL) in a separate petition (G.R. No. 115852)
claims that its franchise under PD No. 1590 which makes it liable for a
franchise tax of only 2% of gross revenues in lieu of all the other fees and
charges of any kind, nature or description, imposed, levied, established,
assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial, or national
authority or government agency, now or in the future, cannot be amended
by Rep. Act No. 7716 as to make it (PAL) liable for a 10% value-added tax
719
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 719
1994
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on revenues, because Sec. 24 of PD No. 1590 provides that PALs franchise
can only be amended, modified or repealed by a special law specifically for
that purpose.
The validity of PALs above argument can be tested by ascertaining the
true intention of Congress in enacting Rep. Act No. 7716. Sec. 4 thereof
dealing with Exempt Transactions states:
Section 103. Exempt Transactions.The following shall be exempt from the value-
added tax:
xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws,except those granted under
Presidential Decrees No. 66 , 529, 972, 1491, 1590, x x x (emphasis supplied)
The repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 7716 further reads:

Sec. 20. Repealing clauses.The provisions of any special law relative to the rate of
franchise taxes are hereby expressly repealed.
xxx
All other laws, orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly
(emphasis supplied)
There can be no dispute, in my mind, that the clear intent of Congress was
to modify PALs franchise with respect to the taxes it has to pay. To this
extent, Rep. Act No. 7716 can be considered as a special law amending
PALs franchise and its tax liability thereunder. That Rep. Act No. 7716
imposes the value-added taxes on other subjects does not make it a
general law which cannot amend PD No. 1590.
To sum up: it is my considered view that Rep. Act No. 7716 (the
expanded value-added tax) is a valid law, viewed from both substantive
and procedural standards, except only insofar as it violates Secs. 4 and 5,
Art. III of the Constitution (the guarantees of freedom of expression and
the free exercise of religion). To that extent, it is, in its present form,
unconstitutional.
I, therefore, vote to DISMISS the petitions, subject to the above
qualification.
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720 SUPREME COURT
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SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
Lest we be lost by a quagmire of trifles, the real threshold and prejudicial

issue, to my mind, is whether or not this Court is ready to assume and to
take upon itself with an overriding authority the awesome responsibility of
overseeing the entire bureaucracy. Far from it, ours is merely to construe
and to apply the law regardless of its wisdom and salutariness, and to
strike it down only when it clearly disregards constitutional proscriptions.
It is what the fundamental law mandates, and it is what the Court must
do.
I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly provocative as
it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the Court may now at good
liberty intrude, in the guise of the peoples imprimatur, into every affair of
government. What significance can still then remain, I ask, of the time
honored and widely acclaimed principle of separation of powers, if at every
turn the Court allows itself to pass upon, at will, the disposition of a co-
equal, independent and coordinate branch in our system of government. I
dread to think of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue
interference can lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our
jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity not timidity, of
stability rather than quiescence.
It has never occurred to me, and neither do I believe it has been
intended, that judicial tyranny is envisioned, let alone institutionalized, by
our people in the 1987 Constitution. The test of tyranny is not solely on
how it is wielded but on how, in the first place, it can be capable of being
exercised. It is time that any such perception of judicial omnipotence is
corrected.
Against all that has been said, I see, in actuality in these cases at
bench, neither a constitutional infringement of substance, judging from
precedents already laid down by this Court in previous cases, nor a
justiciability even now of the issues raised, more than an attempt to sadly
highlight the perceived short comings in the procedural enactment of laws,
a matter which is internal to Congress and an area that is best left to its
own basic concern. The fact of the matter is that the legislative enactment,
721
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 721
1994
Finance
in its final form, has received the ultimate approval of both houses of
Congress. The finest rhetoric, indeed fashionable in the early part of this
closing century, would still be a poor substitute for tangibility. I join,
nonetheless, some of my colleagues in respectfully inviting the kind
attention of the honorable members of our Congress in the suggested
circumspect observance of their own rules.
A final remark. I should like to make it clear that this opinion does not
necessarily foreclose the right, peculiar to any taxpayer adversely affected,
to pursue at the proper time, in appropriate proceedings, and in
proper fora, the specific remedies prescribed therefor by the National
Internal Revenue Code, Republic Act 1125, and other laws, as well as
rules of procedure, such as may be pertinent. Some petitions filed with this
Court are, in essence, although styled differently, in the nature of
declaratory relief over which this Court is bereft of original jurisdiction.
All considered, I, therefore, join my colleagues who are voting for the
dismissal of the petitions.
DISSENTING OPINION
REGALADO, J.:
It would seem like an inconceivable irony that Republic Act No. 7716
which, so respondents claim, was conceived by the collective wisdom of a
bicameral Congress and crafted with sedulous care by two branches of
government should now be embroiled in challenges to its validity for
having been enacted in disregard of mandatory prescriptions of the
Constitution itself. Indeed, such impugnment by petitioners goes beyond
merely the procedural flaws in the parturition of the law. Creating and
regulating as it does definite rights to property, but with its own passage
having been violative of explicit provisions of the organic law, even
without going into the intrinsic merits of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7716 its substantive invalidity ispro facto necessarily entailed.
How it was legislated into its present statutory existence is not in
serious dispute and need not detain us except for a recital of some salient
and relevant facts. The House of Representatives
722
722 SUPREME COURT
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passed House Bill No. 11197 on third reading on November 17, 1993 and,
1
the following day, it transmitted the same to the Senate for concurrence.
On its part, the Senate approved Senate Bill No. 1630 on second and third
readings on March 24, 1994. It is important to note in this regard that on
March 22, 1994, said S.B. No. 1630 had been certified by President Fidel
V. Ramos for immediate enactment to meet a public emergency, that is, a
growing budgetary deficit. There was no such certification for H.B. No.
11197 although it was the initiating revenue bill.
It is, therefore, not only a curious fact but, more importantly, aninvalid
procedure since that Presidential certification was erroneously made for
and confined to S.B. No. 1630 which was indisputably a tax bill and, under
the Constitution, could not validly originate in the Senate. Whatever is
claimed in favor of S.B. No. 1630 under the blessings of that certification,
such as its alleged exemption from the three separate readings
requirement, is accordingly negated and rendered inutile by
theinefficacious nature of said certification as it could lawfully have been
issued only for a revenue measure originatingexclusively from the lower
House. To hold otherwise would be to validate a Presidential certification
of a bill initiated in the Senate despite the Constitutional prohibition
against its originating therefrom.
Equally of serious significance is the fact that S.B. No. 1630 was
reported out in Committee Report No. 349 submitted to the Senate on
February 7, 1994 and approved by that body in substitution of S.B. No.
1129, while merely taking into consideration P.S. No. 734 and H.B. No.
11197. S.B. No. 1630, therefore, was never filed in substitution of either
2
P.S. No. 734 or, more emphatically, of H.B. No. 11197 as these two
legislative issuances were merely taken account of, at the most, as
referential bases or materials.
This is not a play on misdirection for, in the first instance, the
respondents assure us that H.B. No. 11197 was actually the sole
_______________
1 In substitution of H.B. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and
10100 which were filed over the period from July 22, 1992 to August 3, 1993.
2 P.S. Res. No. 734 had earlier been filed in the Senate on September 10, 1992, while S.B.
No. 1129 was filed on March 1, 1993.
723
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 723
1994
Finance
source of and started the whole legislative process which culminated in
Republic Act No. 7716. The participation of the Senate in enacting S.B.
No. 1630 was, it is claimed, justified as it was merely in pursuance of its
power to concur in or propose amendments to H.B. No. 11197. Citing the
83-year old case ofFlint vs. Stone Tracy Co., it is blithely announced that
3
such power to amend includes an amendment by substitution, that is, even

to the extent of substituting the entire H.B. No. 11197 by an altogether
completely new measure of Senate provenance. Ergo, so the justification
goes, the Senate acted perfectly in accordance with its amending power
under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution since it merely proposed
amendments through a bill allegedly prepared in advance.
This is a mode of argumentation which, by reason of factual inaccuracy
and logical implausibility, both astounds and confounds. For, it is of
official record that S.B. No. 1630 was filed, certified and enacted in
substitution ofS.B. No. 1129 which in itself was likewise in derogation of
the Constitutional prohibition against such initiation of a tax bill in the
Senate. In any event, S.B. No. 1630 was neither intended as a bill to be
adopted by the Senate nor to be referred to the bicameral conference
committee as a substitute for H.B. No. 11197. These indelible facts
appearing in official documents cannot be erased by any amount of
strained convolutions or incredible pretensions that S.B. No. 1630 was
supposedly enacted in anticipation of H.B. No. 11197.
On that score alone, the invocation by the Solicitor General of the hoary
concept of amendment by substitution falls flat on its face. Worse, his
concomitant citation ofFlint to recover from that prone position only
succeeded in turning the same postulation over, this time supinely flat on
its back. As elsewhere noted by some colleagues, which I will just refer to
briefly to avoid duplication, respondents initially sought sanctuary in that
doctrine supposedly laid down in Flint, thus: It has, in fact, been held
that the substitution of an entirely new measurefor the one originally
proposed can be supported as a valid amendment. (Emphasis supplied.)
4
During the interpellation by the writer at

_______________
3 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389 (1911).

4 Consolidated Comment, 36-37.
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724 SUPREME COURT
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the oral argument held in these cases, the attention of the Solicitor
General was called to the fact that the amendment inFlint consisted only
of asingle item, that is, the substitution of a corporate tax for an
inheritance tax proposed in a general revenue bill; and that the text of the
decision therein nowhere contained the supposed doctrines he quoted and
ascribed to the court, as those were merely summations of arguments of
counsel therein. It is indeed a source of disappointment for us, but an
admission of desperation on his part, that, instead of making a
clarification or a defense of his contention, the Solicitor General merely
reproduced all over again the same quotations as they appeared in his
5
original consolidated comment, without venturing any explanation or

justification.
The aforestated dissemblance, thus unmasked, has further undesirable
implications on the contentions advanced by respondents in their defense.
For, even indulging respondents ex gratia argumenti in their pretension
that S.B. No. 1630 substituted or replaced H.B. No. 11197, aside from
muddling the issue of the true origination of the disputed law, this would
further enmesh respondents in a hopeless contradiction.
In a publication authorized by the Senate and from which the Solicitor
General has liberally quoted, it is reported as an accepted rule therein
that (a)n amendment by substitution when approved takes the place of
the principal bill. C.R. March 19, 1963, p. 943. Stated elsewise, the
6
principal bill is supplanted and goes out of actuality. Applied to the

present situation, and following respondents submission that H.B. No.
11197 had been substituted or replaced in its entirety, then in law it had
no further existence for purposes of the subsequent stages of legislation
except, possibly, for referential data.
Now, the enrolled bill thereafter submitted to the President of the
Philippines, signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, carried this solemn certification over the
signatures of the respective secretaries of
________________
5 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 56-57.

6 Orquiola, H. M., Annotated Rules of the Senate and Procedure, Precedents and
Practices of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines since 1946, 1991 Ed., 108.
725
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 725
1994
Finance
both chambers: This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No.
11197and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994, and May 2, 1994.
(Italics mine.) In reliance thereon, the Chief Executive signed the same
into law as Republic Act No. 7716.
The confusion to which the writer has already confessed is now
compounded by that official text of the aforequoted certification which
speaks, and this cannot be a mere lapsus calami, of
twoindependent and existingbills (one of them being H.B. No. 11197) which
were consolidated to produce the enrolled bill. In parliamentary usage, to
consolidate two bills, is to unite them into one and which, in the case at
7
bar, necessarily assumes that H.B. No. 11197 never became legally
inexistent. But did not the Solicitor General, under the theory of
amendment by substi-tution of the entire H.B. No. 11197 by S.B. No. 1630,
thereby premise the same upon the replacement, hence the total
elimination from the legislative process, of H.B. 11197?
It results, therefore, that to prove compliance with the requirement for
the exclusive origination of H.B. No. 11197, two alternative but
inconsistent theories had to be espoused and defended by respondents
counsel. To justify the introduction and passage of S.B. No. 1630 in the
Senate, it was supposedly enacted only as an amendment by substitution,
hence on that theory H.B. No. 11197 had to be considered as displaced and
terminated from its role or existence. Yet, likewise for the same purpose
but this time on the theory of origination by consolidation, H.B. No. 11197
had to be resuscitated so it could be united or merged with S.B. No. 1630.
This latter alternative theory, unfortunately, also exacerbates the
constitutional defect for then it is an admission of a dual origination of the
two tax bills, each respectively initiated in and coming from the lower and
upper chambers of Congress.
Parenthetically, it was also this writer who pointedly brought this
baffling situation to the attention of the Solicitor General during the
aforesaid oral argument, to the extent of reading aloud the certification in
full. We had hoped thereby to be clarified on these vital issue in
respondents projected memo-
_______________
7 Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1951), 381, citing Fairview vs. Durham, 45 Iowa 56.
726
726 SUPREME COURT
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randum, but we have not been favored with an explanation unraveling
this dilemma. Verily, by passing sub silentio on these intriguing
submissions, respondents have wreaked havoc on both logic and law just
to gloss over their non-compliance with the Constitutional mandate for
exclusive origination of a revenue bill. The procedure required therefor, we
emphatically add, can be satisfied only by complete and strict compliance
since this is laid down by the Constitution itself and not by a mere statute.
This writer consequently agrees with the clearly tenable proposition of
petitioners that when the Senate passed and approved S.B. No. 1630, had
it certified by the Chief Executive, and thereafter caused its consideration
by the bicameral conference committee in total substitution of H.B. No.
11197, it clearly and deliberately violated the requirements of the
Constitution not only in the origination of the bill but in the very
enactment of Republic Act No. 7716. Contrarily, the shifting sands of
inconsistency in the arguments adduced for respondents betray such lack
of intellectual rectitude as to give the impression of being mere rhetorics
in defense of the indefensible.
We are told, however, that by our discoursing on the foregoing issues we
are intruding into non-justiciable areas long declared verbotenby such
time-honored doctrines as those on political questions, the enrolled bill
theory and the respect due to two co-equal and coordinate branches of
Government, all derived from the separation of powers inherent in
republicanism. We appreciate the lectures, but we are not exactly unaware
of the teachings in U.S. vs. Pons, Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, Casco Philippine
8 9
Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, etc., et al., Morales vs. Subido,
10
etc., and Philippine Judges Association, etc., et al. vs. Prado, etc., et al., on
11 12
the one hand, and Taada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al., Sanidad, et al. vs.
13
Commission on Elections, et al., and 14
________________
8 34 Phil. 729 (1916).

9 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
10 L-17931, February 28, 1963,7 SCRA 347.
11 L-29658, February 27, 1969,27 SCRA 131.
12 G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.
13 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
14 L-46640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333.
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Daza vs. Singson, et al., on the other, to know which would be applicable
15
to the present controversy and which should be rejected.

But, first, a positionalexordium. The writer of this opinion would be
among the first to acknowledge and enjoin not only courtesy to, but respect
for, the official acts of the Executive and Legislative departments, but only
so long as the same are in accordance with or are defensible under the
fundamental charter and the statutory law. He would readily be numbered
in the ranks of those who would preach a reasoned sermon on the
separation of powers, but with the qualification that the same are not
contained in tripartite compartments separated by imper-meable
membranes. He also ascribes to the general validity of American
constitutional doctrines as a matter of historical and legal necessity, but
not to the extent of being oblivious to political changes or unmindful of the
fallacy of undue generalization arising from myopic disregard of the
factual setting of each particular case.
These ruminations have likewise been articulated and dissected by my
colleagues, hence it is felt that the only issue which must be set aright in
this dissenting opinion is the so-called enrolled bill doctrine to which we
are urged to cling with reptilian tenacity. It will be preliminarily noted
that the official certification appearing right on the face of Republic Act
No. 7716 would even render unnecessary any further judicial inquiry into
the proceedings which transpired in the two legislative chambers and, on a
parody of tricameralism, in the bicameral conference committee. Moreover,
we have the excellent dissertations of some of my colleagues on these
matters, but respondents insist en contra that the congressional
proceedings cannot properly be inquired into by this Court. Such objection
confirms a suppressive pattern aimed at sacrificing the rule of law to the
fiat of expediency.
Respondents thus emplaced on their battlements the pronouncement of
this Court in the aforecited case of Philippine Judges Association vs.
Prado. Their reliance thereon falls into the same error committed by their
16
seeking refuge in theFlint case, ante., which, as has earlier been
demonstrated (aside from
________________
15 G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.

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the quotational misrepresentation), could not be on par with the factual
situation in the present case. Flint, to repeat, involved a mere amendment
on a single legislative item, that is, substituting the proposal therein of an
inheritance tax by one on corporate tax. Now, in their submission based
onPhilippine Judges Association, respondents studiously avoid mention of
the fact that the questioned insertion referred likewise to a single item,
that is, the repeal of the franking privilege theretofore granted to the
judiciary. That both cases cannot be equated with those at bar, considering
the multitude of items challenged and the plethora of constitutional
violations involved, is too obvious to belabor. Legal advocacy and judicial
adjudication must have a becoming sense of qualitative proportion, instead
of lapsing into the discredited and maligned practice of yielding blind
adherence to precedents.
The writer unqualifiedly affirms his respect for valid official acts of the
two branches of government and eschews any unnecessary intrusion into
their operational management and internal affairs. These, without doubt,
are matters traditionally protected by the republican principle of
separation of powers. Where, however, there is an overriding necessity for
judicial intervention in light of the pervasive magnitude of the problems
presented and the gravity of the constitutional violations alleged, but this
Court cannot perform its constitutional duty expressed in Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution unless it makes the inescapable inquiry,
then the confluence of such factors should compel an exception to the rule
as an ultimate recourse. The cases now before us present both the
inevitable challenge and the inescapable exigency for judicial review. For
the Court to now shirk its bounden duty would not only project it as a
citadel of the timorous and the slothful, but could even undermine
itsraison detre as the highest and ultimate tribunal.
Hence, this dissenting opinion has touched on events behind and which
transpired prior to the presentation of the enrolled bill for approval into
law. The details of that law which resulted from the legislative action
followed by both houses of Congress, the substantive validity of whose
provisions and the procedural validity of which legislative process are here
challenged as unconstitutional, have been graphically presented by
petitioners and admirably explained in the respective opinions of my
brethren. The writer concurs in the conclusions drawn therefrom and
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 729
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rejects the contention that we have unjustifiably breached the dike of the
enrolled bill doctrine.
Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of
validity originally attributed to that doctrine has long been revisited and
qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the competency of judicial inquiry,
it has been held that (u)nder the enrolled bill rule by which an enrolled
bill is sole expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its
existence and valid enactment, it is nevertheless competent for courts to
inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of which
journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the
evidence. 17
In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida
18
declared:
(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative
officers and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this
presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from the legislative journals
that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative officers,
contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held
spurious and not a part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of
Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they control,
and against such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.
More enlightening andapropos to the present controversy is the decision
promulgated on May 13, 1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D &
W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., pertinent excerpts
19
wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder:

_______________
17 Brailsford vs. Walker, 31 S.E. 2d 385, 387, 388, 205 S.C. 228.
18 110 So. 343, 346.
19 602 South Western Reporter, 2d Series, 402-425, jointly deciding Carrollton Wholesale
Tobaccos, Inc. et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., and Bluegrass Provisions Co., Inc., et
al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al.
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x x x In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long
line of decisions of this court which created and nurtured the so-called enrolled bill
doctrine.
xxx
[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the
legislature must follow before a bill can be considered for final passage. x x x.
xxx
x x x Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may
not look behind such a bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to
determine if there are any defects.
xxx
x x x In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the
bill was properly enrolled and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind
the law to determine the propriety of its enactment, the court enunciated three
reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was reluctant to
scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second,
reasons of convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to
preserve its records and anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court
ruled otherwise. Third, the court acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of
the General Assembly and expressed a preference for accepting the final bill as
enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the legislature. x x x.
xxx
Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial
whim. There are four historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a
record and, as such, was not subject to attack at common law. (2) Since the
legislature is one of the three branches of government, the courts, being coequal,
must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the rule
was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that
a balancing of equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy.
(4) There were theories of convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court
in Lafferty.
The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however, and it has not been
without its critics. From an examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize
the criticisms as follows: (1) Artificial presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are
not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the present case) produces results which
do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The rule is conducive to
fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic record-keeping devices now used by legislatures
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 731
1994
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remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary
obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy for a wrong
committed by any branch of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.
[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The maxim is Stare decisis et non quieta movere, which simply suggests
that we stand by precedents and not disturb settled points of law. Yet, this rule is
not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation of error or logic. As
we stated inDaniels Admr v. Hoofnel,287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941)
(citations omitted):
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the extent
of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation of the law or
the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether there is clear
error and urgent reasons for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to go from one
doubtful rule to another, and whether or not the evils of the principle that has been
followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from a change.
Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or

upon sound logic, or is unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should
be discarded, and with it the rule it supports.
[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of theLafferty decision, the poor
record-keeping of the legislature, has disappeared.Modern equipment and
technology are the rule in record-keeping by our General Assembly. Tape recorders,
electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording equipment, printing presses,
computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts and fears as
to the ability of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible
records.
It is also apparent that the convenience rule is not appropriate in todays
modern and developing judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and
complexity of lawsuits may increase is not persuasive if one is mindful that the
overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth and see that justice
is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit
and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.
Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of
government requires that we shut our eyes to constitutional failings and other
errors of our coparceners in government. We simply do not agree. Section 26 of the
Kentucky Constitution provides that any
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732 SUPREME COURT
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law contrary to the constitution is void. The proper exercise of judicial authority
requires us to recognize any law which is unconstitutional and to declare it
void. Without belaboring the point, we believe that under section 228 of the
Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth. We are sworn to see that violations of the constitutionby any
person, corporation, state agency or branch of governmentare brought to light and
corrected. To countenance an artificial rule of law that silences our voices when
confronted with violations of our constitution is not acceptable to this court.
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland
describes as the extrinsic evidence rule. x x x. Under this approach there is aprima
facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, butsuch presumption may be
overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that
constitutional requirements have not been met.
We therefore overruleLafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-
called enrolled bill doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive
presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. x x x (Emphases mine.)
Undeniably, the value-added tax system may have its own merits to
commend its continued adoption, and the proposed widening of its base
could achieve laudable governmental objectives if properly formulated and
conscientiously implemented. We would like to believe, however, that ours
is not only an enlightened democracy nurtured by a policy of transparency
but one where the edicts of the fundamental law are sacrosanct for all,
barring none. While the realization of the lofty ends of this administration
should indeed be the devout wish of all, likewise barring none, it can never
be justified by methods which, even if unintended, are suggestive of
Machiavellism.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the instant petitions and to invalidate
Republic Act No. 7716 for having been enacted in violation of Section 24,
Article VI of the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The legislative history of R.A. No. 7716, as highlighted in the Consolidated

Memorandum for the public respondents submitted
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 733
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by the Office of the Solicitor General, demonstrates beyond doubt that it
was passed in violation or deliberate disregard of mandatory provisions of
the Constitution and of the rules of both chambers of Congress relating to
the enactment of bills.
I therefore vote to strike down R.A. No. 7716 as unconstitutional and as
having been enacted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Constitution provides for a bicameral Congress. Therefore, no bill
can be enacted into law unless it is approved by both chambersthe
Senate and the House of Representatives (hereinafter House). Otherwise
stated, each chamber may propose and approve a bill, but until it is
submitted to the other chamber and passed by the latter, it cannot be
submitted to the President for its approval into law.
Paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The three readings refer to the three readings in both chambers.

There are, however, bills which must originate exclusively in the House.
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution enumerates them:
SEC. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
amendments.
Websters Third New International Dictionary defines originate as follows:

1
vt 1: to cause the beginning of: give rise to: INITIATE . . . 2. to start (a person or
thing) on a course of journey . . . vi:to take or have
________________
1 1971 ed., 1592.
734
734 SUPREME COURT
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origin: be derived: ARISE, BEGIN, START . . .
Blacks Law Dictionary defines the wordexclusively in this wise:

2
Apart from all others; only; solely; substantially all or for the greater part. To the
exclusion of all others; without admission of others to participation; in a manner to
exclude.
In City Mayor vs. The Chief of Philippine Constabulary, this Court said: 3
The term exclusive in its usual and generally accepted sense, means possessed to
the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone, not including, admitting
or pertaining to another or others, undivided, sole. (15 Words and Phrases, p. 510,
citing Mitchel v. Tulsa Water, Light, Heat and Power Co., 95 P. 961, 21 Okl. 243;
and p. 513, citingCommonwealth v. Superintendent of House of Correction, 64 Pa.
Super. 613, 615).
Indisputably then, only the House can cause the beginning or initiate the
passage of any appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, any bill increasing the
public debt, any bill of local application, or any private bill. The Senate can
only propose or concur with amendments.
Under the Rules of the Senate, the first reading is the reading of the
title of the bill and its referral to the corresponding committee; the second
reading consists of the reading of the bill in the form recommended by the
corresponding committee; and the third reading is the reading of the bill in
the form it will be after approval on second reading. During the second
4
reading, the following takes place:
1. (1)Second reading of the bill;

2. (2)Sponsorship by the Committee Chairman or any member
designated by the corresponding committee;
_______________
2 Sixth Edition (1990), 565, citing Standard Oil Co. of Texas vs. State, Tex. Civ. App., 142
S.W.2d 519, 521, 522, 523.
3 21 SCRA 665, 673 [1967].
4 Sections 52 and 53, Rule XXIII.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 735
1994
Finance
1. (3)If a debate ensues, turns for and against the bill shall be taken
alternately;
2. (4)The sponsor of the bill closes the debate;
3. (5)After the close of the debate, the period of amendments follows;
4. (6)Then, after the period of amendments is closed, the voting on the
bill on second reading. 5
After approval on second reading, printed copies thereof in its final form
shall be distributed to the Members of the Senate at least three days prior
to the third reading, except in cases of certified bills. At the third reading,
the final vote shall be taken and the yeas and nays shall be entered in the
Journal. 6
Under the Rules of the House, the first reading of a bill consists of a
reading of the number, title, and author followed by the referral to the
appropriate committees; the second reading consists of the reading in full
7
of the bill with the amendments proposed by the committee, if any; and the 8
third reading is the reading of the bill in the form as approved on second
reading and takes place only after printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to the Members at least three days before, unless
the bill is certified. At the second reading, the following takes place:
9
1. (1)Reading of the bill;

2. (2)Sponsorship;
3. (3)Debates;
4. (4)Period of Amendments; and
5. (5)Voting on Second Reading. 10
At the third reading, the votes shall be taken immediately and

the yeasand nays entered in the Journal. 11
_______________
5 Section 57, Rule XXV.

6 Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution; paragraph (7), Section 57, Rule XXV.
7 Section 69, Rule XIV.
8 Section 77, Id.
9 Section 82, Rule XIV.
10 Sections 77-81, Id.
11 Section 82, Id., in relation to Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution.
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736 SUPREME COURT
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Clearly, whether in the Senate or in the House, every bill must pass the
three readings on separate days, except when the bill is certified.
Amendments to the bill on third reading are constitutionally prohibited. 12
After its passage by one chamber, the bill should then be transmitted to
the other chamber for its concurrence. Section 83, Rule XIV of the Rules of
the House expressly provides:
SEC. 83. Transmittal to Senate.The Secretary General, without need of express
order, shall transmit to the Senate for its concurrence all the bills and joint or
concurrent resolutions approved by the House or the amendments of the House to
the bills or resolutions of the Senate, as the case may be. If the measures approved
without amendments are bills or resolutions of the Senate, or if amendments of the
Senate to bills of the House are accepted, he shall forthwith notify the Senate of the
action taken.
Simplified, this rule means that:
1. 1.As to a bill originating in the House:
1. (a)Upon its approval by the House, the bill shall be transmitted to

the Senate;
2. (b)The Senate may approve it with or without amendments;
3. (c)The Senate returns the bill to the House;
4. (d)The House may accept the Senate amendments; if it does not, the
Secretary General shall notify the Senate of that action. As
hereinafter be shown, a request for conference shall then be in
order.
1. 2.As to bills originating in the Senate:
1. (a)Upon its approval by the Senate, the bill shall be transmitted to

the House;
2. (b)The House may approve it with or without amendments;
3. (c)The House then returns it to the Senate, informing it of the action
taken;
4. (d)The Senate may accept the House amendments; if it does not, it
shall notify the House and make a request for conference.
The transmitted bill shall then pass three readings in the other chamber
on separate days. Section 84, Rule XIV of the
________________
12 Section 26(2), Article VI, Constitution.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 737
1994
Finance
Rules of the House states:
SEC. 84. Bills from the Senate.The bills, resolutions and communications of the
Senate shall be referred to the corresponding committee in the same manner as
bills presented by Members of the House.
and Section 51, Rule XXIII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
SEC. 51. Prior to their final approval, bills and joint resolutions shall be read at
least three times.
It is only when the period of disagreement is reached, i.e., amendments

proposed by one chamber to a bill originating from the other are not
accepted by the latter, that a request for conference is made or is in order.
The request for conference is specifically covered by Section 26, Rule XII of
the Rules of the Senate which reads:
SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall
be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten
days after its composition.
and Section 85, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House which reads:
SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.In the event that the House does not
agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the
differences may be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.
The foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of both

chambers of Congress are mandatory.
In his Treatise On The Constitutional Limitations, more particularly
13
on enactment of bills, Cooley states:

_________________
13 Volume I, Eight Edition, Chapter VI, 267. See Miller vs. Mardo, 2 SCRA
898 [1961];Everlasting Pictures, Inc. vs. Fuentes, 3 SCRA 539 [1961].
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Where, for an instance, the legislative power is to be exercised by two houses, and
by settled and well-understood parliamentary law these two houses are to hold
separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a
proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other, the
constitution, in providing for two houses, has evidently spoken in reference to this
settled custom, incorporating it as a rule of constitutional interpretation; so that it
would require no prohibitory clause to forbid the two houses from combining in one,
and jointly enacting laws by the vote of a majority of all. All those rules which are of
the essentials of law-making must be observed and followed; and it is only the
customary rules of order and routine, such as in every deliberative body are always
understood to be under its control, and subject to constant change at its will, that
the constitution can be understood to have left as matters of discretion, to be
established, modified, or abolished by the bodies for whose government in non-
essential matters they exist.
In respect of appropriation, revenue, or tariff bills, bills increasing the

public debt, bills of local application, or private bills, the return thereof to
the House after the Senate shall have proposed or concurred with
amendments for the former either to accept or reject the amendments
would not only be in conformity with the foregoing rules but is also
implicit from Section 24 of Article VI.
With the foregoing as our guiding light, I shall now show the violations
of the Constitution and of the Rules of the Senate and of the House in the
passage of R.A. No. 7716.
VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 24, ARTICLE VI OF THE
CONSTITUTION:
First violation.Since R.A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it
mustoriginate exclusively in the Housenot in the Senate. As correctly
asserted by petitioner Tolentino, on the face of the enrolled copy of R.A.
No. 7716, it is a CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND
SENATE BILL NO. 1630. In short, it is an illicit marriage of a bill which
originated in the House and a bill which originated in the Senate.
Therefore, R.A. No. 7716did not originate exclusively in the House.
The only bill which could serve as a valid basis for R.A. No. 7716 is
House Bill (HB) No. 11197. This bill, which is the substitute bill
recommended by the House Committee on Ways
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and Means in substitution of House Bills Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033,
8086,9030, 9210, 9397, 10012, and 10100, and covered by its Committee
Report No. 367, was approved on third reading by the House on 17
14
November 1993. Interestingly, HB No. 9210, which was filed by

15 16
Representative Exequiel B. Javier on 19 May 1993, was certified by the

President in his letter to Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. of 1 June 1993. Yet, 17
HB No. 11197, which substituted HB No. 9210 and the others abovestated,
was not. Its certification seemed to have been entirely forgotten.
On 18 November 1993, the Secretary-General of the House, pursuant to
Section 83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, transmitted to the
President of the Senate HB No. 11197 and requested the concurrence of
the Senate therewith. 18
However, HB No. 11197 had passed only its first reading in the Senate
by its referral to its Committee on Ways and Means. That Committee
never deliberated on HB No. 11197 as it should have. It acted only on
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1129 introduced by Senator Ernesto F. Herrera on 1
19
March 1993. It then prepared and proposed SB No. 1630, and in its
Committee Report No. 349 which was submitted to the Senate on 7
20
February 1994, it recommended that SB No. 1630 be approved in

21
substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197. It must be carefully noted that SB No. 1630 was
22
proposed and submitted for approval by the Senatein SUBSTITUTION of

SB No. 1129, and not HB No. 11197. Obviously, the principal measure
which the Committee deliberated
________________
14 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annexes 2 to 12, inclusive.

15 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, 18.
16 Id., Annex 9.
17 Id., Annex 1.
18 Id., 18.
19 Id., Annex 15. EntitledAn Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax (VAT) System By
Expanding Its Tax Base, Amending Sections 103, 113, 114 of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as Amended.
20 Id., Annex 17.
21 Id., 20.
22 Emphasis supplied.
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740 SUPREME COURT
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on and acted upon was SB No. 1129 and not HB No. 11197. The latter,
instead of being the only measure to be taken up, deliberated upon, and
reported back to the Senate for its consideration on second reading and,
eventually, on third reading, was, at the most, merely given by the
Committee a passing glance.
This specific unequivocal action of the Senate Committee on Ways and
Means, i.e.,proposing and recommending approval of SB No. 1630 as a
substitute for or in substitution of SB No. 1129 demolishes at once the
thesis of the Solicitor General that:
Assuming that SB 1630 is distinct from HB 11197, amendment by substitution is
within the purview of Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
because, according to him, (a) Section 68, Rule XXIX of the Rules of the
Senate authorizes an amendment by substitution and the only condition
required is that the text thereof is submitted in writing; and (b) [I]n Flint
vs. Stone Tracy Co. (220 U.S. 107) the United States Supreme Court,
interpreting the provision in the United States Constitution similar to
Section 24, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, stated that the power
of the Senate to amend a revenue bill includes substitution of an entirely
new measure for the one originally proposed by the House of
Representatives. 23
This thesis is utterly without merit. In the first place, it reads into the
Committee Report something which it had not contemplated, that is, to
propose SB No. 1630 in substitution of HB No. 11197; or speculates that
the Committee may have committed an error in stating that it is SB No.
1129, and not HB No. 11197, which is to be substituted by SB No. 1630.
Either, of course, is unwarranted because the words of the Report,
solemnly signed by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman (who dissented), seven
members, and three ex-officio members, leave no room for doubt that
24
although SB No. 1129, P.S. Res No. 734, and HB No. 11197 were referred
to and considered by the Committee, it had prepared the attached SB No.
1630 which it recommends for approvalin
________________

24 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex 17. Two signed with
reservations and four signed subject to amendments.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 741
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substitution of S.B. No. 11197, taking into consideration P.S. No. 734 and
H.B. No. 11197 with Senators Herrera, Angara, Romulo, Sotto, Ople and
Shahani as authors. To do as suggested would be to substitute the
judgment of the Committee with another that is completely inconsistent
with it, or, simply, to capriciously ignore the facts.
In the second place, the Office of the Solicitor General intentionally
made it appear, to mislead rather than to persuade us, that in Flint vs.
Stone Tracy Co. the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, as quoted by it in the
25
Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, as follows: 26
The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is not
confined to the elimination of provisions contained in the original act, but embraces
as well the addition of such provisions thereto as may render the original act
satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It has, in fact, been held
that the substitution of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed can
be supported as a valid amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
It is contended in the first place that this section of the act is unconstitutional,
because it is a revenue measure, and originated in the Senate in violation of section
7 of article 1 of the Constitution, providing that all bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with the amendments, as on other bills.
The first part is not a statement of the Court, but a summary of the
arguments of counsel in one of the companion cases (No. 425, entitled,Gay
vs. Baltic Mining Co.). The second part is the second paragraph of the
opinion of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Day. The misrepresentation
that the first part is a statement of the Court is highly contemptuous. To
show such deliberate misrepresentation, it is well to quote what actually
are found in 55 L.Ed. 408, 410, to wit:
Messrs. Charles A. Snow and Joseph H. Knight filed a brief for appellees in No.
425:
_______________
25 And companion cases, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L.Ed. 389 [1911].

26 Page 56.
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x x x
The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is not
confined to the elimination of provisions contained in the original act, but embraces
as well the addition of such provisions thereto as may render the original act
satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It has, in fact, been held
that the substitution of an entirely new measure for the one originally proposed can
be supported as a valid amendment.
Brake v. Collison, 122 Fed. 722.
Mr. James L. Quackenbush filed a statement for appellees in No. 442.
Solicitor General Lehmann (by special leave) argued the cause for the United
States on reargument.
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:
These cases involve the constitutional validity of 38 of the act of Congress approved
August 5, 1909, known as the corporation tax law. 36 Stat. at L. 11, 112-117, chap. 6, U.S.
Comp. Stat. Supp. 1909, pp. 659, 844-849.
It is contended in the first place that this section of the act is unconstitutional, because
it is a revenue measure, and originated in the Senate in violation of 7 of article 1 of the
Constitution, providing that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with the amendments, as on other
bills. The history of the act is contained in the governments brief, and is accepted as
correct, no objection being made to its accuracy.
This statement shows that the tariff bill of which the section under consideration is a
part, originated in the House of Representatives, and was there a general bill for the
collection of revenue. As originally introduced, it contained a plan of inheritance taxation.
In the Senate the proposed tax was removed from the bill, and the corporation tax, in a
measure, substituted therefor. The bill having properly originated in the House, we
perceive no reason in the constitutional provision relied upon why it may not be amended in
the Senate in the manner which it was in this case. The amendment was germane to the
subject-matter of the bill, and not beyond the power of the Senate to propose. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x
As shown above, the underlined portions were deliberately omitted in the

quotation made by the Office of the Solicitor General.
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In the third place, a Senate amendment by substitution with an entirely
new bill of a bill, which under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution
can only originate exclusively in the House, is not authorized by said
Section 24. Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. cannot be invoked in favor of such a
view. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado during the oral
arguments of these cases and during the initial deliberations thereon by
the Court, Flint involves a Senate amendment to a revenue bill which,
under the United States Constitution, should originate from the House of
Representatives. The amendment consisted of the substitution of a
corporation tax in lieu of the plan of inheritance taxation contained in a
general bill for the collection of revenue as it came from the House of
Representatives where the bill originated. The constitutional provision in
question is Section 7, Article I of the United States Constitution which
reads:
Section 7. Bills and Resolutions.All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with
Amendments, as on other Bills.
This provision, contrary to the misleading claim of the Solicitor General, is

not similar to Section 24, Article VI of our Constitution, which for easy
comparison is hereunder quoted again:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Note that in the former the word exclusivelydoes not appear. And, in the
latter, the phrase as on other Bills, which is found in the former, does
not appear. These are very significant in determining the authority of the
upper chamber over the bills enumerated in Section 24. Since the
origination is not exclusively vested in the House of Representatives of the
United States, the Senates authority to propose or concur with
amendments is necessarily broader. That broader authority is further
confirmed by the phrase as on other Bills, i.e., its power to propose or
concur with amendments thereon is the same as in ordinary bills. The
absence of this phrase in our Constitution was clearly intended to restrict
or limit the Philippine Senates power to
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propose or concur with amendments. In the light of the exclusivity of
origination and the absence of the phrase as on other Bills, the
Philippine Senate cannot amend by substitution with an entirely new bill
of its own any bill covered by Section 24 of Article VI which the House of
Representatives transmitted to it because such substitution would
indirectly violate Section 24.
These obvious substantive differences between Section 7, Article I of the
U.S. Constitution and Section 24, Article VI of our Constitution are
enough reasons why this Court should neither allow itself to be misled
byFlint vs. Stone nor be awed by Rainey vs. United States and the opinion
27
of Messrs. Ogg and Ray which the majority cites to support the view that
28
the power of the U.S. Senate to amend a revenue measure is
unlimited.Rainey concerns the Tariff Act of 1909 of the United States of
America and specifically involved was its Section 37 which was an
amendment introduced by the U.S. Senate. It was claimed by the
petitioners that the said section is a revenue measure which should
originate in the House of Representatives. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, adopted and approved the finding of the court a quo that:
the section in question is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in the
Senate, and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was
proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which
originated in the House. That is sufficient.
Messrs. Ogg and Ray, who are professorsemeritus of political science,

based their statement not even on a case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court but on their perception of what Section 7, Article I of the U.S.
Constitution permits. In the tenth edition (1951) of their work, they state:
Any bill may make its first appearance in either house, except only that bills for
raising revenue are required by the constitution to originate in the House of
Representatives. Indeed, through its right to amend revenue bills, even to the
extent of substituting new ones, the
________________
27 232 U.S. 309, 58 L ed. 117 [1914].

28 Introduction to American Government, 309, n. 2 [1945].
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 745
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Finance
Senate may, in effect, originate them also. 29
Their in effect conclusion is, of course, logically correct because the

word exclusivelydoes not appear in said Section 7, Article I of the U.S.
Constitution.
Neither can I find myself in agreement with the view of the majority
that the Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House so
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
House bill, thereby stating, in effect, that S.B. No. 1129 was such an
anticipatory substitute bill, which, nevertheless, does not seem to have
been considered by the Senate except only after its receipt of H.B. No.
11197 on 23 November 1993 when the process of legislation in respect of it
began with a referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means.
Firstly, to say that the Constitution does not prohibit it is to render
meaningless Section 24 of Article VI or to sanction its blatant disregard
through the simple expedient of filing in the Senate of a so-called
anticipatory substitute bill. Secondly, it suggests that S.B. No. 1129 was
filed as an anticipatory measure to substitute for H.B. No. 11197. This is a
speculation which even the author of S.B. No. 1129 may not have indulged
in. S.B. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate by Senator Herrera on 1 March
1993. H.B. No. 11197 was approved by the House on third reading only on
17 November 1993. Frankly, I cannot believe that Senator Herrera was
able to prophesy that the House would pass any VAT bill, much less to
know its provisions. That it does not seem that the Senate even
considered the latter not until after its receipt of H.B. No. 11197 is
another speculation. As stated earlier, S.B. No. 1129 was filed in the
Senate on 1 March 1993, while H.B. No. 11197 was transmitted to the
Senate only on 18 November 1993. There is no evidence on record to show
that both were referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means at
the same time. Finally, in respect of H.B. No. 11197, its legislative process
did not begin with its referral to the Senates Ways and Means Committee.
It begin upon its filing, as a Committee Bill of the House Committee on
Ways and Means, in the House.
_______________
29 At 317.
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Second violation.Since SB No. 1129 is a revenue measure, it could not
even be validly introduced or initiated in the Senate. It follows too, that
the Senate cannot validly act thereon.
Third violation.Since SB No. 1129 could not have been validly
introduced in the Senate and could not have been validly acted on by the
Senate, then it cannot be substituted by another revenue measure, SB No.
1630, which the Senate Committee on Ways and Means introduced in
substitution of SB No. 1129. The filing or introduction in the Senate of SB
No. 1630 also violated Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 26(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE
CONSTITUTION:
First violation.The Senate, despite its lack of constitutional authority to
consider SB No. 1630 or SB No. 1129 which the former substituted, opened
deliberations on second reading of SB No. 1630 on 8 February 1994. On 24
March 1994, the Senate approved it onsecond reading and onthird
reading. That approval on the same day violated Section 26(2), Article VI
30
of the Constitution. The justification therefor was that on 24 February

1994 the President certified to the necessity of the enactment of SB No.
1630 . . . to meet a public emergency. 31
I submit, however, that the Presidential certification is void ab

initio not necessarily for the reason adduced by petitioner Kilosbayan,
Inc., but because it was addressed to the Senate for a bill which is
prohibited from originating therein. The only bill which could be properly
certified on permissible constitutional grounds even if it had already been
transmitted to the Senate is HB No. 11197. As earlier observed, this was
not so certified, although HB No. 9210 (one of those consolidated into HB
No. 11197) was certified on 1 June 1993. 32
Also, the certification of SB No. 1630 cannot, by any stretch of the

imagination, be extended to HB No. 11197 because SB No. 1630 did not
substitute HB No. 11197 but SB No. 1129.
_______________

31 Id., Annex 14.
32 Id., Annex 1.
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Considering that the certification of SB No. 1630 is void, its approval on
second and third readings in one day violated Section 26(2), Article VI of
the Constitution.
Second violation.It further appears that on 24 June 1994, after the
approval of SB No. 1630, the Secretary of the Senate, upon directive of the
Senate President, formally notified the House Speaker of the Senates
approval thereof and its request for a bicameral conference in view of the
disagreeing provisions of said bill and House Bill No. 11197.33
It must be stressed again that HB No. 11197 was never submitted for or
acted on second and third readings in the Senate, and SB No. 1630 was
never sent to the House for its concurrence. Elsewise stated, both were
only half-way through the legislative mill. Their submission to a
conference committee was not only anomalously premature, but violative
of the constitutional rule on three readings.
The suggestion that SB No. 1630 was not required to be submitted to
the House for otherwise the procedure would be endless, is unacceptable
for, firstly, it violates Section 26, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate and
Section 85, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, and, secondly, it is never
endless. If the chamber of origin refuses to accept the amendments of the
other chamber, the request for conference shall be made.
VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF BOTH CHAMBERS; GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The erroneous referral to the conference committee needs further
discussion. Since S.B. No. 1630 was not a substitute bill for H.B. No.
11197 but for S.B. No. 1129, it (S.B. No. 1630) remained a bill which
originated in the Senate. Even assuming arguendothat it could be validly
initiated in the Senate, it should have been first transmitted to the House
where it would undergo three readings. On the other hand, since HB No.
11197 was never acted upon by the Senate on second and third readings,
no differences or inconsistencies could as yet arise so as to warrant a
request for a conference. It should be noted that under Section
_______________
33 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex 18.
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83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, it is only when the Senate shall
have approved with amendments HB No. 11197 and the House declines to
accept the amendments after having been notified thereof that the request
for a conference may be made by the House, not by the Senate. Conversely,
the Senates request for a conference would only be proper if, following the
transmittal of SB No. 1630 to the House, it was approved by the latter
with amendments but the Senate rejected the amendments.
Indisputably then, when the request for a bicameral conference was
made by the Senate, SB No. 1630 was not yet transmitted to the House for
consideration on three readings and HB No. 11197 was still in the Senate
awaiting consideration on second and third readings. Their referral to the
bicameral conference committee was palpably premature and, in so doing,
both the Senate and the House acted without authority or with grave
abuse of discretion. Nothing, and absolutely nothing, could have been
validly acted upon by the bicameral conference committee.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.
Serious irregularities amounting to lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion were committed by the bicameral conference committee.
First, it assumed, and took for granted that SB No. 1630 could validly
originate in the Senate. This assumption is erroneous.
Second, it assumed that HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 had properly
passed both chambers of Congress and were properly and regularly
submitted to it. As earlier discussed, the assumption is unfounded in fact.
Third, per the bicameral conference committees proceedings of 19 April
1994, Representative Exequiel Javier, Chairman of the panel from the
House, initially suggested that HB No. 11197 should be the frame of
reference, because it is a revenue measure, to which Senator Ernesto
Maceda concurred. However, after an incompletely recorded reaction of
Senator Ernesto Herrera, Chairman of the Senate panel, Representative
Javier seemed to agree that all amendments will be coming from the
Senate. The issue of what should be the frame of reference does not
appear to have been resolved. These facts are recorded
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Finance
in this wise, as quoted in the Consolidated Memorandum for
Respondents:34
Yes. Thats true for every

revenue measure. Theres no
other way.The House Bill has
got to be the base. Of course,
for the record, we know that this
is an administration; this is
certified by the President and I
was about to put into the
recordsas I am saying now that
your problem about the impact
on prices on the people was
already decided when the
President and the administration
sent this to us and certified it.
They have already gotten over
that political implication of this
bill and the economic impact on
prices.
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
First of all, what would be the
basis, no, or framework para
huwag naman mawala yung
personality namin dito sa
bicameral, no, because the bill
originates from the House
because this is a revenue bill, so
we would just want to ask,we
make the House Bill as the
frame of reference, and then
everything will just be inserted?
HON. MACEDA.
CHAIRMAN HERRERA.
Yung concern mo about the bill
as the reference in this
discussion is something that we
can just . . .
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
We will just . . . all the
amendments will be coming
Yes. Thats true for every
revenue measure. Theres no
other way.The House Bill has
got to be the base. Of course,
for the record, we know that this
is an administration; this is
certified by the President and I
was about to put into the
recordsas I am saying now that
your problem about the impact
on prices on the people was
already decided when the
President and the administration
sent this to us and certified it.
They have already gotten over
that political implication of this
bill and the economic impact on
prices.
from the Senate.
(BICAMERAL CONFERENCE
ON MAJOR DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN HB NO. 11197 AND
SB NO. 1630 [Cte. on Ways &
Means] APRIL 19, 1994, II-6 and
II-7; italics supplied)
These exchanges would suggest that Representative Javier had wanted
HB No. 11197 to be the principal measure on which reconciliation of the
differences should be based. However, since the Senate did not act on this
Bill on second and third readings because its Committee on Ways and
Means did not deliberate on it but instead proposed SB No. 1630 in
substitution of SB No. 1129, the suggestion has no factual basis. Then,
when finally he agreed that all amendments will be coming from the
Senate, he
_______________
34 Page 22.
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750 SUPREME COURT
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in fact withdrew the former suggestion and agreed that SB No. 1630,
which is the Senate version of the Value Added Tax (VAT) measure,
should be the frame of reference. But then SB No. 1630 was never
transmitted to the House for the latters concurrence. Hence, it cannot
serve as the frame of reference or as the basis for deliberation. The
posture taken by Representative Javier also indicates that SB No. 1630
should be taken as the amendment to HB No. 11197. This, too, is
unfounded because SB No. 1630 was not proposed in substitution of HB
No. 11197.
Since SB No. 1630 did not pass three readings in the House and HB No.
11197 did not pass second and third readings in the Senate, it logically
follows that no disagreeing provisions had as yet arisen. The bicameral
conference committee erroneously assumed the contrary.
Even grantingarguendo that both HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630 had
been validly approved by both chambers of Congress and validly referred
to the bicameral conference committee, the latter had very limited
authority thereon. It was created in view of the disagreeing provisions of
the two bills. Its duty was limited to the reconciliation of disagreeing
35
provisions or the resolution of differences or inconsistencies. The

committee recognized that limited authority in the opening paragraph of
its Report when it said:
36
The Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197 x
x x and Senate Bill No. 1630 x x x.
Under such limited authority, it could only either (a) restore, wholly or
partly, the specific provisions of HB No. 11197 amended by SB No. 1630,
(b) sustain, wholly or partly, the Senates amendments, or (c) by way of a
compromise, to agree that neither provisions in HB No. 11197 amended by
the Senate nor the latters amendments thereto be carried into the final
form of the former.
But as pointed out by petitioners Senator Raul Roco and Kilosbayan,
Inc., the bicameral conference committee not only
_______________
35 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, Annex 18.

36 Id., Annex, 19.
751
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 751
1994
Finance
struck out non-disagreeing provisions of HB No. 11197 and SB No.
1630, i.e., provisions where both bills are in full agreement; it added more
activities or transactions to be covered by VAT, which were not within the
contemplation of both bills. Since both HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630
were still half-cooked in the legislative vat, and were not ready for referral
to a conference, the bicameral conference committee clearly acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it consolidated both
into one bill which became R.A. No. 7716.
APPROVAL BY BOTH CHAMBERS OF CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE REPORT AND PROPOSED BILL DID NOT CURE
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.
I cannot agree with the suggestion that since both the Senate and the
House had approved the bicameral conference committee report and the
bill proposed by it in substitution of HB No. 11197 and SB No. 1630,
whatever infirmities may have been committed by it were cured by
ratification. This doctrine of ratification may apply to minor procedural
flaws or tolerable breaches of the parameters of the bicameral conference
committees limited powers but never to violations of the Constitution.
Congress is not above the Constitution. In the instant case, since SB No.
1630 was introduced in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, was passed in the Senate in violation of the three readings
rule, and was not transmitted to the House for the completion of the
constitutional process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise
passed by the Senate on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor
the House could validly approve the bicameral conference committee
report and the proposed bill.
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that for non-
compliance with mandatory provisions of the Constitution and of the Rules
of the Senate and of the House on the enactment of laws, R.A. No. 7716 is
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. A discussion then of the
intrinsic validity of some of its provisions would be unnecessary.
The majority opinion, however, invokes the enrolled bill doctrine and
wants this Court to desist from looking behind the copy of the assailed
measure as certified by the Senate President and the
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752 SUPREME COURT
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Speaker of the House. I respectfully submit that the invocation is
misplaced. First, as to the issue of origination, the certification in this case
explicitly states that R.A. No. 7716 is a consolidation of House Bill No.
11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. This is conclusive evidence that the
measure did not originate exclusively in the House. Second, the enrolled
bill doctrine is of American origin, and unquestioned fealty to it may no
longer be justified in view of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under
37
Section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution which now expressly grants

authority to this Court to:
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Third, even under the regime of the 1935 Constitution which did not
contain the above provision, this Court, through Mr. Chief Justice
Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas, declared that it cannot be truly said
38
that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito has laid to rest the question of whether the
39
enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should be adhered to in this
jurisdiction, and stated:
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the
certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication.
The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses,
and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval of Congress and
not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935)
Constitution says that [e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes
law, be presented to the President. In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court
of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the
_______________
37 ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., 226; Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA
496 [1989];Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377[1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA
452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos,202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Com- mittee,203
SCRA 767 [1991]; Oposa vs. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [1993].
38 56 SCRA 714, 719, 723 [1974].
39 78 Phil. 1 [1947].
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 753
1994
Finance
State Constitution, said that the same makes it clear that the indispensable step in
the passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not
attested by the presiding officer, other proof that it has passed both houses will
satisfy the constitutional requirement.
Fourth, even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has been
substantially undercut. This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion, citing Sutherland, Statutory
Construction.
Last, the pleadings of the parties have established beyond doubt that
HB No. 11197 was not acted on second and third readings in the Senate
and SB No. 1630, which was approved by the Senate on second and third
readings in substitution of SB No. 1129, was nevertransmitted to the
House for its passage. Otherwise stated, they were only passed in their
respective chamber of origin but not in the other. In no way can each
become a law under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of the
Constitution. For the Court to close its eyes to this fact because of the
enrolled bill doctrine is to shirk its duty to hold inviolate what is decreed
by the Constitution. 40
I vote then to GRANT these petitions and to declare R.A. No. 7716 as
unconstitutional.
DISSENTING OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
Few issues brought before this Court for resolution have roiled the
citizenry as much as the instant case brought by nine petitioners which
challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 (to be referred to
herein as the Expanded Value Added Tax or EVAT law to distinguish it
from Executive Order No. 273 which is the VAT law proper) that was
enacted on May 5, 1994. A visceral issue, it has galvanized the populace
into mass action and strident protest even as the EVAT proponents have
taken to podia and media in apost facto information campaign.
________________
40 Mutuc vs. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228 [1970].
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The Court is confronted here with an atypical case. Not only is it a vatful
of seething controversy but some unlikely petitioners invoke unorthodox
remedies. Three Senator-petitioners would nullify a statute that bore the
indispensable stamp of approval of their own Chamber with two of them
publicly repudiating what they had earlier endorsed. With two former
colleagues, one of them an erstwhile Senate President, making common
cause with them, they would stay the implementation by the Executive
Department of a law which they themselves have initiated. They address a
prayer to a co-equal Department to probe their official acts for any
procedural irregularities they have themselves committed lest the effects
of these aberrations inflict such damage or irreparable loss as would bring
down the wrath of the people on their heads.
To the extent that they perceive that a vital cog in the internal
machinery of the Legislature has malfunctioned from having operated in
blatant violation of the enabling Rules they have themselves laid down,
they would now plead that this other Branch of Government step in,
invoking the exercise of what is at once a delicate and awesome power.
Undoubtedly, the case at bench is as much a test for the Legislature as it
is for the Judiciary.
A backward glance on the Value Added Tax (VAT) is in order at this
point.
The first codification of the countrys internal revenue laws was effected
with the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 466, commonly known as
the National Internal Revenue Code which was approved on June 15,
1939 and took effect on July 1, 1939, although the provisions on the
income tax were made retroactive to January 1, 1939.
Since 1939 when the turnover tax was replaced by the manufacturers
sales tax, the Tax Code had provided for a single-stage value-added tax on
original sales by manufacturers, producers and importers computed on the
cost deduction method and later, on the basis of the tax credit method.
The turnover tax was re-introduced in 1985 by Presidential Decree No.
1991 (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2006). 1
_______________
1 Vitug, Jose C.,COMPENDIUM OF TAX LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, Third Revised

Edition, 1993 at 201.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 755
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In 1986, a tax reform package was approved by the Aquino Cabinet. It
contained twenty-nine measures, one of which proposed the adoption of
the VAT, as well as the simplification of the sales tax structure and the
abolition of the turnover tax.
Up until 1987, the system of taxing goods consisted of (a) an excise tax
on certain selected articles (b) fixed and percentage taxes on original and
subsequent sales, on importations and on milled articles and (c) mining
taxes on mineral products. Services were subjected to percentage taxes
based mainly on gross receipts. 2
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law

Executive Order No. 273 which adopted the VAT. From the former single-
stage value-added tax, it introduced the multi-stage VAT system where
the value-added tax is imposed on the sale of and distribution process
culminating in sale, to the final consumer. Generally described, the
taxpayer (the seller) determines his tax liability by computing the tax on
the gross selling price or gross receipt (output tax) and subtracting or
crediting the earlier VAT on the purchase or importation of goods or on the
sale of service (input tax) against the tax due on his own sale.
3
On January 1, 1988, implementing rules and regulations for the VAT

were promulgated. President Aquino then issued Proclamation No. 219 on
February 12, 1988 urging the public and private sectors to join the
nationwide consumers education campaign for VAT.
Soon after the implementation of Executive Order No. 273, its
constitutionality was assailed before this Court in the case of Kapatiran
ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc., et al. v. Tan. The 4
four petitioners sought to nullify the VAT law for being unconstitutional
in that its enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the President;
that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the
due process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987
_______________
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 L-81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 with Justice Teodoro R. Padilla as ponente.
756
756 SUPREME COURT
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Finance
Constitution. In dismissing the consolidated petitions, this Court stated:
5
The Court, following the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers cannot

substitute its judgment for that of the President as to the wisdom, justice and
advisability of the VAT. The Court can only look into and determine whether or not
Executive Order No. 273 was enacted and made effective as law, in the manner
required by and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was not
issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and,
in this regard, the Court finds no reason to impede its application or continued
implementation. 6
Although declared constitutional, the VAT law was sought to be amended

from 1992 on by a series of bills filed in both Houses of Congress. In
chronological sequence, these were:
HB/SB No. Date Filed in
Congress
HB No. 253 July 22, 1992
HB No. 771 August 10,
1992
HB No. September 9,
2450 1992
Senate Res. September 10,
No. 734 7
1992
HB No. February 3,
7033 1993
SB No. March 1, 1993
1129 8
HB No. March 9, 1993

8086
HB No. May 11, 1993
9030
_______________
5 Ibid at 378.
6 Ibid at 385.
7 Senate Resolution No. 734 filed on September 10, 1992 was entitled Resolution Urging
the House Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to Exempt Local Movie
Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an Incentive to the Production of
Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies, Whenever They Feature an All-Filipino Cast of
Actors and Actresses.
8 SB No. 1129 sought to include under the VAT Law such items as lease of real
properties, excluding agricultural lands and residential properties with monthly rentals of
less than P10,000.00; hotels; restaurants, eating places, caterers; services by persons in the
exercise of their professions; actors, actresses, talents, singers and professional athletes;
and lawyers, accountants, doctors and other professionals registered with the Philippine
Regulatory Commission.
757
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Finance
HB No. 9210 May 19,
9
1993
HB No. 9297 May 25,
1993
HB No. July 28,
10012 1993
HB No. August 3,
10100 1993
HB No. November
11197 in 5, 1993
substitution
of HB Nos.
253, 771,
2450, 7033,
8086, 9030,
9210, 9297,
10012 and
10100 10
We now trace the course taken by H.B. No. 11197 and S.B. No. 1129.
HB/SB No.
HB No. 11197 was November
approved in the Lower 11, 1993
House on second
reading
HB No. 11197 was November
approved in the Lower 17, 1993
House on third reading
and voted upon with November
114 Yeas and 12 Nays 18, 1993
HB No. 11197 was February
transmitted to the 7, 1994
Senate Senate
Committee on Ways
and Means submitted
Com. Report No. 349
recommending for
approval SB No. 1630
in substitution of SB
No. 1129, taking into
consideration PS Res.
No. 734 and HB No.
11197 11
_______________
9 On June 1, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos certified for immediate enactment House
Bill No. 9210 entitled An Act Amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, to meet a public emergency.
10 House Bill No. 11197 is entitled An Act Restructuring the Value-Added Tax (VAT)
System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance Its Administration, Amending for these
Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112, 115
and 116 of Title V, and 236, 237, and 238 of Title IX and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of
Title V, all of the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended.
11 Senate Bill No. 1630 is entitled An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax (VAT)
System to Widen its Tax Base and Enhance Its Administration, Amending for these
Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108 and 110 of Title IV, 112 of Title V,
and 236, 237 and 238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113, 114 and 116 of Title V, all of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as Amended, and for other Purposes.
758
758 SUPREME
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ANNOTATED
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Certification March 22,
by President 1994
Fidel V.
Ramos of
Senate Bill
No. 1630 for
immediate
enactment to
meet a public
emergency
SB No. 1630 March 24,
was approved 1994
by the Senate
on second
and third
readings and
subsequently
voted upon
with 13 yeas,
none against
and one
abstention
Transmittal March 24,
by the Senate 1994
to the Lower
House of a
request for a
conference in
view of
disagreeing
provisions of
SB No. 1630
and HB No.
11197
The April 13, 19,
Bicameral 20, 21, 25
Conference
Committee
conducted
various
meetings to
reconcile the
proposals on
the VAT
The House April 27, 1994
agreed on the
Conference
Committee
Report
The Senate May 2, 1994
agreed on the
Conference
Committee
Report
The President May 5, 1994
signed
Republic Act
No. 7716
The
Expanded
VAT Law 12
Republic Act May 12, 1994

No. 7716 was
published in
two
newspapers
of general
circulation
Republic Act May 28, 1994
No. 7716
became
effective
Republic Act No. 7716 merely expanded the base of the VAT law even as
the tax retained its multi-stage character.
At the oral hearing held on July 7, 1994, this Court delimited
petitioners arguments to the following issues culled from their respective
petitions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Article VI, Section 24, of the
Constitution? 13
________________
12 Republic Act No. 7716 is entitled An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax (VAT)
System, Widening Its Tax Base And Enhancing Its Administration, And For These
Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant Provisions Of The National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.
13 Article VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and
759
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 759
1994
Finance
Does it violate Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2, of the Constitution? 14
What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference

Committee?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Does the law violate the following provisions in Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the Constitution:
1. 1.Section 1 15
2. 2.Section 4 16
3. 3.Section 5 17
4. 4.Section 10 18
_______________
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.
14 Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2: No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
president certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas andnays entered in the
Journal.
15 Article III, Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
16 Article III, Section 4: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
17 Article III, Section 5: No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
18 Article III, Section 10: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
760
760 SUPREME COURT
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Finance
Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?
1. 1.Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1 19
2. 2.Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3 20
As a result of the unedifying experience of the past where the Court had
the propensity to steer clear of questions it perceived to be political in
nature, the present Constitution, in contrast, has explicitly expanded
judicial power to include the duty of the courts, especially the Supreme
Court, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. I submit that under this
21
explicit mandate, the Court is empowered to rule upon acts of other

Government entities for the purpose of determining whether there may
have been, in fact, irregularities committed tantamount to violation of the
Constitution, which case would clearly constitute a grave abuse of
discretion on their part.
In the words of the sponsor of the above-quoted Article of the
Constitution on the Judiciary, the former Chief Justice Roberto R.
Concepcion, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or
not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute
an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment
on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that
the courts cannot hereafter exhibit its wonted reticence
_______________
19 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
20 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3: Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages
or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
21 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
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1994
Finance
by claiming that such matters constitute a political question. 22
In the instant petitions, this Court is called upon, not so much to

exercise its traditional power of judicial review as to determine whether or
not there has indeed been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Legislature amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Where there are grounds to resolve a case without touching on its
constitutionality, the Court will do so with utmost alacrity in due
deference to the doctrine of separation of powers anchored on the respect
that must be accorded to the other branches of government which are
coordinate, coequal and, as far as practicable, independent of one another.
Once it is palpable that the constitutional issue is unavoidable, then it
is time to assume jurisdiction, provided that the following requisites for a
judicial inquiry are met: that there must be an actual and appropriate
case; a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity and the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself, the
same being thelis mota of the case. 23
Having assured ourselves that the above-cited requisites are present in

the instant petitions, we proceed to take them up.
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 24
Some petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 as
being in violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution which
provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
_______________
22 Volume One, CONCOM RECORD, p. 436.

23 Luz Farms v. The Hon. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
86889, December 4, 1990, 192 SCRA 51; Dumlao, et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
762
762 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
In G.R. Nos. 115455 and 115781, petitioners argue:
1. (a)The bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. The Senate, after
receiving H.B. No. 11197, submitted its own bill, S.B. No. 1630, and
proceeded to vote and approve the same after second and third
readings.
2. (b)The Senate exceeded its authority to propose or concur with
amendments when it submitted its own bill, S.B. No. 1630,
recommending its approval in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking
into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197.
3. (c)H.B. No. 11197 was not deliberated upon by the Senate. Neither
was it voted upon by the Senate on second and third readings, as
what was voted upon was S.B. No. 1630.
Article VI, Section 24 is taken word for word from Article VI, Section 18 of
the 1935 Constitution which was, in turn, patterned after Article I, Section
7 (1) of the Constitution of the United States, which states:
All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.
The historical precedent for requiring revenue bills to originate in

Congress is explained in the U.S. case of Morgan v. Murray: 24
The constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives stemmed from a remedial outgrowth of the historic
conflict between Parliament (i.e., Commons) and the Crown, whose ability to
dominate the monarchially appointive and hereditary Lords was patent. See 1
Story, Constitution, S 875 et seq., 5th Ed.; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp.
267, 268, 8th Ed., 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, S 806, 3d Ed. There was a
measure of like justification for the insertion of the provision of articles I, S 7, cl. 1,
of the Federal Constitution. At that time (1787) and thereafter until the adoption
(in 1913) of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct election of
senators, the members of the United States Senate were elected for each state by
the joint vote of both houses of the Legislature of the respective states, and hence,
were removed from the people. x x x
________________
24 328 P. 2d 644 (1958).
763
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 763
1994
Finance
The legislative authority under the 1935 Constitution being unicameral, in
the form of the National Assembly, it served no purpose to include the
subject provision in the draft submitted by the 1934 Constitutional
Convention to the Filipino people for ratification.
In 1940, however, the Constitution was amended to establish a
bicameral Congress of the Philippines composed of a House of
Representatives and a Senate.
In the wake of the creation of a new legislative machinery, new
provisions were enacted regarding the law-making power of Congress. The
National Assembly explained how the final formulation of the subject
provision came about:
The concurrence of both houses would be necessary to the enactment of a law.
However, all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing an increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills,should originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, although the Senate could propose or
concur with amendments.
In one of the first drafts of the amendments, it was proposed to give both houses
equal powers in lawmaking. There was, however, much opposition on the part of
several members of the Assembly. In another draft, the following provision, more
restrictive than the present provision in the amendment, was proposed and for
sometime was seriously considered:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the
Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon, the
bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for
corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to finally act on any such
bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the next regular sessions of
the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members
of the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be
submitted to the president for corresponding action.
However, the special committee voted finally to report the present amending
provision as it is now worded; and in that form it was approved by the National
Assembly with the approval of Resolution No.
764
764 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
38 and later of Resolution No. 73. (Italics supplied)
25
Thus, the present Constitution is identically worded as its 1935 precursor:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shalloriginate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments. (Italics supplied)
That all revenue bills, such as Republic Act No. 7716, should originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives logically flows from the more
representative and broadly-based character of this Chamber.
It is said that the House of Representatives being the more popular
branch of the legislature, being closer to the people, and having more
frequent contacts with them than the Senate, should have the privilege of
taking the initiative in the proposals of revenue and tax projects, the
disposal of the peoples money, and the contracting of public indebtedness.
These powers of initiative in the raising and spending of public funds
enable the House of Representatives not only to implement but even to
determine the fiscal policies of the government. They place on its
shoulders much of the responsibility of solving the financial problems of
the government, which are so closely related to the economic life of the
country, and of deciding on the proper distribution of revenues for such
uses as may best advance public interests. 26
The popular nature of the Lower House has been more pronounced with
the inclusion of Presidentially-appointed sectoral representatives, as
provided in Article VI, Section 5(2), of the Constitution, thus: The party-
list representatives shall constitute twentyper centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by
________________
25 Aruego, Jose M.,PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION,

University Publishing Co., 1950, pp. 65-66.
26 Sinco, Vicente G.,PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, Eleventh Edition, p. 196.
765
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 765
1994
Finance
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.(Italics supplied)
This novel provision which was implemented in the Batasang
Pambansa during the martial law regime was eventually incorporated in
27
the present Constitution in order to give those from

_______________
27 Remarks of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum: At a time when we did not have a

lawmaking body after martial law was declared, there were tripartite conferences called by
the President for the purpose of acting as a recommendatory body regarding settlement of
labor and management disputes. During the said conferences, labor had shown that it can
act with maturity. As a result, in 1976, an amendment was introduced in the Constitution
providing for sectoral representation. In the Constitution that was approved, the number of
sectors was not indicated. However, in the Election Code of 1978, it provided for three
sectors; namely, industrial labor, agricultural labor and the youth. The agricultural labor
was given four seats; two for Luzon, one for the Visayas and one for Mindanao. The same is
true with the industrial labor sector. As far as the youth are concerned, they were also
given four seats: two for Luzon, one for Mindanao and one for the Visayas, with the
condition that there will be an additional two at large. And so, the youth had six
representatives plus four from the agricultural labor sector and four from the industrial
labor sectorwe had 14 seats.
In 1981, the Constitution was again amended. In the course of the amendment, the labor
representatives in the Batasang Pambansa proposed that sectoral representation be
included as a permanent addition to the lawmaking body.
Again, in that Constitution which was approved in 1981, the number and the name of
the sectors were not indicated. However, in the Election Code that was approved before the
1984 election, there was really a definition of who will constitute the sectors and how they
will be appointed. Let me quote from that law that was passed in 1984. Under Section 27 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the scope of the sectors has been defined as follows:
The agricultural labor sector covers all persons who personally and physically till the
land as their principal occupation. It includes agricultural tenants and lessees, rural
workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators, settlers and small fishermen.
The industrial labor sector includes all nonagricultural workers and employees.
766
766 SUPREME COURT
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Finance
the marginalized and often deprived sector, an opportunity to have their
voices heard in the halls of the Legislature, thus giving substance and
meaning to the concept of people empowerment.
That the Congressmen indeed have access to, and consult their
constituencies has been demonstrated often enough by the fact that even
after a House bill has been transmitted to the Senate for concurrence,
some Congressmen have been known to express their desire to change
their earlier official position or reverse themselves after having heard
their constituents adverse reactions to their representations.
In trying to determine whether the mandate of the Constitution with
regard to the initiation of revenue bills has been preserved inviolate, we
have recourse to the tried and tested method of definition of terms. The
term originate is defined by Websters New International Dictionary (3rd
Edition, 1986) as follows: v.i., to come into being; begin; to start.
On the other hand, the word exclusively is defined by the same
Websters Dictionary as in an exclusive manner; to the exclusion of all
others; only; as, it is his, exclusively. Blacks Law Dictionary has this
definition: apart from all others; only; solely; substantially all or for the
greater part. To the exclusion of all others; without admission of others to
participation; in a manner to exclude. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. State,
Tex. Civ. App., 142 S.W. 2d 519, 521, 522, 523.
This Court had occasion to define the term exclusive as follows:
. . . In its usual and generally accepted sense, the term means possessed to the
exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone; not including, admitting or
pertaining to another or others; undivided, sole. 28
When this writer, during the oral argument of July 7, 1994, asked the
petitioner in G.R. No. 115455 whether he considers the
________________
The youth sector embraces persons not more than twenty-five years of age. (Volume
Two, CONCOM RECORD, p. 564).
28 City Mayor, et al. v. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Col. Nicanor Garcia, L-
20346, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 673.
767
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 767
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word exclusively to be synonymous with solely, he replied in the
affirmative. 29
A careful examination of the legislative history traced earlier in this

decision shows that the original VAT law, Executive Order No. 273, was
sought to be amended by ten House bills which finally culminated in
House Bill No. 11197, as well as two Senate bills. It is to be noted that the
first House Bill No. 253 was filed on July 22, 1992, and two other House
bills followed in quick succession on August 10 and September 9, 1992
before a Senate Resolution, namely, Senate Res. No. 734, was filed on
September 10, 1992 and much later, a Senate Bill proper, viz., Senate Bill
No. 1129 on March 1, 1993. Undoubtedly, therefore, these bills originated
or had their start in the House and before any Senate bill amending the
VAT law was filed. In point of time and venue, the conclusion is
ineluctable that Republic Act No. 7716, which is indisputably a revenue
measure, originated in the House of Representatives in the form of House
Bill No. 253, the first EVAT bill.
Additionally, the content and substance of the ten amendatory House
Bills filed over the roughly one-year period from July 1992 to August 1993
reenforce the position that these revenue bills, pertaining as they do, to
Executive Order No. 273, the prevailing VAT law, originated in the Lower
House.
________________
29 Transcript of the Stenographic Notes (TSN) on the Hearing Had on Thursday, July 7,
1994, pp. 18-19: JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH P. ROMERO:
QMr. Counsel, may I interrupt at this stage?
When you say that according to the Constitution such Revenue Bills should originate exclusively
from the House. In this instance, did it not originally originate exclusively from the House?
The word used was not solely; if there were Bills later also introduced, let us say in the
Senate, but the House Bill came ahead.
So, are you using the two (2) words originate exclusively and solely synonymously?
SENATOR TOLENTINO:
AThe verb originate remains the same, Your Honor, but the word exclusively, as I said,
means solely. x x x
768
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House Bill Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and
10100 were intended to restructure the VAT system by exempting or
imposing the tax on certain items or otherwise introducing reforms in the
mechanics of implementation. Of these, House Bill No. 9210 was favored
30
with a Presidential certification on the need for its immediate enactment

to meet a public emergency. Easily the most comprehensive, it noted that
the revenue performance of the VAT, being far from satisfactory since the
collections have always fallen short of projections, the system is rendered
inefficient, inequitable and less comprehensive. Hence, the Bill proposed
several amendments designed to widen the tax base of the VAT and
enhance its administration. 31
That House Bill No. 11197 being a revenue bill, originated from the
Lower House was acknowledged, in fact was virtually taken for granted,
by the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate. Consequently, at the April 19, 1994
meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee, the Members agreed to
make the House Bill as the frame of reference or base of the
discussions of the Bicameral Conference Committee with the
amendments or insertions to emanate from the Senate. 32
________________
30 H.B. 771exempting the sale of copra from VAT coverage; H.B. 2450exempting the
lessors or distributors of cinematographic films from paying the VAT; H.B. 7033
amending Sec. 103 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by EO 273; H.B.
8086exempting packaging materials of export products from the VAT; H.B. 9030
amending Sec. 120 of the NIRC, as renumbered by EO 273; H.B. 9210amending Title IV
and Sections 237 and 238 of the NIRC; H.B. 9297restructuring the VAT system by
expanding its tax base, and amending Sections 99, 100 (A), 102 (A), 103, 113, 114, 115 and
116 of the NIRC; H.B. 10012reducing the rate of VAT imposed on sale and importation of
goods, and sale of services; H.B. 10100amending certain provisions of the NIRC on VAT.
31 Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9210.
32 Excerpts from the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee:
CHAIRMAN Javier. First of all, what would be the basis, no, or framework para huwag
naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no, because the bill originates
from the House because this is a revenue bill, so we would just want to ask,we make the
House Bill as the frame of reference, and then
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As to whether the bills originated exclusively in the Lower House is
altogether a different matter. Obviously, bills amendatory of VAT did not
originate solely in the House to the exclusion of all others for there were
P.S. Res. No. 734 filed in the Senate on September 10, 1992 followed by
Senate Bill No. 1129 which was filed on March 1, 1993. About a year later,
this was substituted by Senate Bill No. 1630 that eventually became the
EVAT law, namely, Republic Act No. 7716.
Adverting to the passage of the amendatory VAT bills in the Lower
House, it is to be noted that House Bill No. 11197 which substituted all
the prior bills introduced in said House complied with the required
readings, that is, the first reading consisting of the reading of the title and
referral to the appropriate Committee, approval on second reading on
November 11, 1993 and on third reading on November 17, 1993 before
being finally transmitted to the Senate. In the Senate, its identity was
preserved and its provisions were taken into consideration when the
Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted Com. Report No. 349
which recommended for approval S.B. No 1630 in substitution of S.B. No.
1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197. At
this stage, the subject bill may be considered to have passed first reading
in the Senate with the submission of said Committee Report No. 349 by
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to which it had been referred
earlier. What
_______________
everything will just be inserted?
HON. MACEDA. Yes, Thats true for every revenue measure. Theres no other
way. The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record, we know that this is
an administration bill; this is certified by the president and I was about to put into the
records as I am saying now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people
was already decided when the President and the administration sent this to us and
certified it. They have already gotten over that political implication of this bill and the
economic impact on prices.
CHAIRMAN HERRERA.Yung concern mo about the bill as the reference in this
discussion is something that we can just. . . .
CHAIRMAN JAVIER. We will just . . . all the amendments will be coming from the
Senate.
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remained, therefore, was no longer House Bill No. 11197 but Senate Bill
No. 1630. Thence, the Senate, instead of transmitting the bill to the Lower
House for its concurrence and amendments, if any, took a shortcut,
bypassed the Lower House and instead, approved Senate Bill No. 1630 on
both second and third readings on the same day, March 24, 1994.
The first irregularity, that is, the failure to return Senate Bill No. 1630
to the Lower House for its approval is fatal inasmuch as the other
chamber of legislature was not afforded the opportunity to deliberate and
make known its views. It is no idle dictum that no less than the
Constitution ordains: The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives... (Italics supplied)
33
It is to be pointed out too, that inasmuch as Senate Bill No. 1630 which
had taken into consideration House Bill No. 11197 was not returned to
the Lower House for deliberation, the latter Chamber had no opportunity
at all to express its views thereon or to introduce any amendment. The
customary practice is, after the Senate has considered the Lower House
Bill, it returns the same to the House of origin with its amendments. In
the event that there may be any differences between the two, the same
shall then be referred to a Conference Committee composed of members
from both Chambers which shall then proceed to reconcile said differences.
In the instant case, the Senate transmitted to the Lower House on
March 24, 1994, a letter informing the latter that it had passed S. No.
1630 entitled . . . (and) in view of the disagreeing provisions of said bill
and House Bill No. 11197, entitled . . . the Senate requests a conference . .
. This, in spite of the fact that Com. Report No. 349 of the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means had already recommended for approval on
February 7, 1994 S.B. No. 1630 . . . taking into consideration H.B. No.
11197. Clearly, the Conference Committee could only have acted upon
Senate Bill No. 1630, for House Bill No. 11197 had already been fused into
the former.
At the oral hearing of July 7, 1994, petitioner in G.R. No. 115455
admitted, in response to this writers query, that he had
_______________
33 Article VI, Section 1.
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attempted to rectify some of the perceived irregularities by presenting a
motion in the Senate to recall the bill from the Conference Committee so
that it could revert to the period of amendment, but he was outvoted, in
fact slaughtered. 34
In accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives and the

Senate, Republic Act No. 7716 was duly authenticated after it was signed
by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives followed by the certifications of the Secretary of the
Senate and the Acting Secretary General of the House of
Representatives. With the signature of
35
________________
34 Transcript of the Stenographic Notes (TSN) on the Hearing Had on Thursday, July 7,
1994, pp. 45-46:
Justice Romero: Q: Mr. Counsel, is it not a fact that in the Bicameral Conference
Committee, you presented a Motion to return the Bill as it was to the Lower House with
also your proposal that this be referred to a Referendum for the entire nation to vote
upon, then Senator Wigberto Taada amended your Motion and convinced you to drop
that portion about referral to a Referendum and you agreed.
So that Motion of yours to return to the House was the one voted upon by the
Bicameral Conference Committee and it lost.
What can you say to that?
Senator Tolentino: A: No, No, if Your Honor please. My Motion was voted upon by the
Senate itself because I presented that said motion in order to recall the Bill from the
Bicameral Conference Committee so that the Senate could go back to the period of
amendment and see if we could amend the House Bill itself, but that was defeated. So, it
became academic. Thus, what we did we proceeded with the procedure already being
followed by the Senate.
I thought, as a matter of fact, that was the one way of correcting this procedural
error, but I was only one (1), or two (2), or three (3) of us only, then we were defeated in the
voting, if Your Honor please.
Justice Romero: Q: You mean you were outvoted?
Senator Tolentino: A: Yes, Your Honor; we were actually slaughtered in the voting, so
to speak, if Your Honor please.
35 The certification states: This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and
Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on
April 7, 1994 and May 2, 1994, respectively.
772
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President Fidel V. Ramos under the words Approved: 5 May 1994, it was
finally promulgated.
Its legislative journey ended, Republic Act No. 7716 attained the status
of an enrolled bill which is defined as one which has been duly introduced,
finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each,
approved by the governor (or president) and filed by the secretary of
state. 36
Stated differently:
It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
president, that a bill, thus attested, has received in due form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to
the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented
to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the
public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve
a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United
States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting
and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal
and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. 37
The enrolled bill assumes importance when there is some variance

between what actually transpired in the halls of Congress, as reflected in
its journals, and as shown in the text of the law as finally enacted. But
suppose the journals of either or both Houses fail to disclose that the law
was passed in accordance with what was certified to by their respective
presiding officers and the President. Or that certain constitutional
requirements regarding its passage were not observed, as in the instant
case.
_______________
36 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 5th Ed. (1979).

37 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 36 L ed. 294.
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Which shall prevail: the journal or the enrolled bill?
A word on the journal.
The journal is the official record of the acts of a legislative body. It
should be a true record of the proceedings arranged in chronological order.
It should be a record of what is done rather than what is said. The journal
should be a clear, concise, unembellished statement of all proposals made
and all actions taken complying with all requirements of constitutions,
statutes, charters or rules concerning what is to be recorded and how it is
to be recorded. 38
Article VI, Section 16 (4) of the Constitution ordains:

Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings. (Italics supplied)
The rationale behind the above provision and of the journal entry rule is
as follows:
It is apparent that the object of this provision is to make the legislature show what
it has done, leaving nothing whatever to implication. And, when the legislature says
what it has done, with regard to the passage of any bill, it negatives the idea that it
has done anything else in regard thereto. Silence proves nothing where one is
commanded to speak. . . . Our constitution commands certain things to be done in
regard to the passage of a bill, and says that no bill shall become a law unless these
things are done. It seems a travesty upon our supreme law to say that it guaranties
to the people the right to have their laws made in this manner only, and that there
is no way of enforcing this right, or for the court to say that this is law when the
constitution says it is not law. There is one safe course which is in harmony with
the constitution, and that is to adhere to the rule that the legislature must show, as
commanded by the constitution, that it has done everything required by the
constitution to be done in the serious and important matter of making laws. This is
the rule of evidence
_______________
38 Mason, Paul, MASONs MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE, 1953.
774
774 SUPREME COURT
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provided by the constitution. It is not presumptuous in the courts, nor disrespectful
to the legislature, to judge the acts of the legislature by its own evidence.
39
Confronted with a discrepancy between the journal proceedings and the
law as duly enacted, courts have indulged in different theories. The
enrolled bill and journal entry rules, being rooted deep in the
Parliamentary practices of England where there is no written constitution,
and then transplanted to the United States, it may be instructive to
examine which rule prevails in the latter country through which, by a
process of legislative osmosis, we adopted them in turn.
There seems to be three distinct and different rules as applicable to the enrolled
bill recognized by the various courts of this country. The first of these rules appears
to be that the enrolled bill is the ultimate proof and exclusive and conclusive
evidence that the bill passed the legislature in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. Such has been the holding in California, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas,
Washington, New Mexico, Mississippi, Indiana, South Dakota, and may be some
others.
The second of the rules seems to be that the enrolled bill is a verity and resort
cannot be had to the journals of the Legislature to show that the constitutional
mandates were not complied with by the Legislature, except as to those provisions
of the Constitu-tion, compliance with which is expressly required to be shown on the
journal. This rule has been adopted in South Carolina, Montana, Oklahoma, Utah,
Ohio, New Jersey, United States Supreme Court, and others.
The third of the rules seems to be that the enrolled bill raises only a prima facie
presumption that the mandatory provisions of the Constitution have been complied
with and that resort may be had to the journals to refute that presumption, and if
the constitutional provision is one, compliance with which is expressly required by
the Constitution to be shown on the journals, then the mere silence of the journals
to show a compliance therewith will refute the presumption. This rule has been
adopted in Illinois, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, Idaho,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Arizona, Oregon, New Jersey, Colorado, and others. 40
_______________
39 Cohn v. Kingsley, 49 P. 985 (1897).

40 Smith v. Thompson, 258 N.W. 190.
775
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 775
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In the 1980 case of D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue,the
Supreme Court of Kentucky which had subscribed in the past to the first
of the three theories, made the pronouncement that it had shifted its stand
and would henceforth adopt the third. It justified its changed stance, thus:
We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland
describes as the extrinsic evidence rule . . . . Under this approach there is a prima
facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but such presumption may be over-
come by clear satisfactory and convincing evidence establishing that constitutional
requirements have not been met. 41
What rule, if any, has been adopted in this jurisdiction?

Advocates of the journal entry rule cite the 1916 decision in U.S. v.
Pons where this Court placed reliance on the legislative journals to
42
determine whether Act No. 2381 was passed on February 28, 1914 which
is what appears in the Journal, or on March 1, 1914 which was closer to
the truth. The confusion was caused by the adjournment sine die at
midnight of February 28, 1914 of the Philippine Commission.
A close examination of the decision reveals that the Court did not apply
the journal entry rule vis-a-vis the enrolled bill rule but the former as
against what are behind the legislative journals.
Passing over the question of whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published by
authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was passed, we will
inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. 43
It is to be noted from the above that the Court passed over the probative
value to be accorded to the enrolled bill. Opting for the journals, the Court
proceeded to explain:
________________
41 602 S.W. 2d 420 (1980).

42 34 Phil. 729 (1916).
43 Ibid at 733.
776
776 SUPREME COURT
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From their very nature and object, the records of the Legislature are as important
as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said clear and explicit, would be
to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and
functions of the Legislature.
44
Following the courts in the United States since the Constitution of the
Philippine Government is modeled after that of the Federal Government,
the Court did not hesitate to follow the courts in said country, i.e., to
consider the journals decisive of the point at issue. Thus: The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals. 45
The Court made a categorical stand for the enrolled bill rule for the
first time in the 1947 case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where it held that an
46
enrolled bill imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. This
Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the fact
that the vote of three-fourths of the Members of the Congress (as required
by the Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments)
was not actually obtained on account of the suspension of some members
of the House of Representatives and the Senate. In this connection, the
Court invoked the enrolled bill rule in this wise: If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a
duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the enrolled
bill rule born of that respect. 47
Mindful that the U.S. Supreme Court is on the side of those who favor
the rule and for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed
policy of our law making body (i.e., Sec. 313 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210), the Court said that duly
certified copies shall be conclusive proof of
_______________
44 Ibid at 733-734.
45 Ibid at 735.
46 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
47 Ibid at 3.
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1994
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the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof. Without
pulling the legal underpinnings from U.S. v. Pons, it justified its position
by saying that if the Court at the time looked into the journals, in all
probability, those were the documents offered in evidence and that even
if both the journals and authenticated copy of the Act had been presented,
the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not
imply rejection of the enrolled theory; for as already stated, the due
enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
Section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. Three Justices voiced their
48
dissent from the majority decision.

Again, the Court made its position plain in the 1963 case of Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez when a unanimous Court ruled
49
that: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of
the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there
has been any mistake in the printing of a bill before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation not by judicial decree. According to
Websters New 20th Century Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1983, the word tenor
means, among others, the general drift of something spoken or written;
intent, purport, substance.
Thus, the Court upheld the respondent Auditor Generals interpretation
that Republic Act No. 2609 really exempted from the margin fee on foreign
exchange transactions urea formaldehyde as found in the law and
not urea and formaldehydewhich petitioner insisted were the words
contained in the bill and were so intended by Congress.
In 1969, the Court similarly placed the weight of its authority behind
the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. In denying the motion for
reconsideration, the Court ruled in Morales v. Subido that the enrolled
Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as
officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. x x x Expressed
elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell
Holmes but of a
_______________
48 Ibid at 18.
49 117 Phil. 363 (1963).
778
778 SUPREME COURT
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Sherlock Holmes. The alleged omission of a phrase in the final Act was
50
made, not at any stage of the legislative proceedings, but only in the
course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading
thereof.
But the Court did include a caveat that qualified the absoluteness of the
enrolled bill rule stating:
By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding
that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are
certain matters which the Constitution (Art. VI, secs. 10 [4], 20 [1], and 21 [1])
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the
validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered
on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide (Cf. e.g., Wilkes Country
Commrs. v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 [1900]). All we hold is that with respect to matters
not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy. 51
More recently, in the 1993 case of Philippine Judges Association v.

Prado, this Court, in ruling on the unconstitutionality of Section 35 of
52
Republic Act No. 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the entire
hierarchy of courts, did not so much adhere to the enrolled bill rule alone
as to both enrolled bill and legislative journals. Through Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, we stated: Both the enrolled bill and the legislative
journals certify that the measure was duly enacted, i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we
owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
Aware of the shifting sands on which the validity and continuing
relevance of the enrolled bill theory rests, I have taken pains to trace the
history of its applicability in this jurisdiction, as influenced in varying
degrees by different Federal rulings.
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the
procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House Bill No.
11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
_______________
50 136 Phil. 405, 409 (1969).

51 Ibid at 412.
52 G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 779
1994
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reading and printing requirements which were exempted by the
Presidential certification, may no longer be impugned, having been
saved by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent
reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but
only with respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the
enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printing
errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially
alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural
legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily
mastered. Procedural disputes are over factswhether or not the bill had
enough votes, or three readings, or whatevernot over the meaning of the
constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a
court to rule on the facts. The argument is also made that legislatures
would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure. 53
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive

changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through
Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares and altering
the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith.
EXTENT OF THE POWER OF THE BICAMERAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE
One of the issues raised in these petitions, especially in G.R. Nos. 115781,
115543 and 115754, respectively, is whether or not
Congress violated Section 26, par. 2, Article VI (of the 1987 Constitution) when it
approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report which embodied, in violation
of Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate, a radically altered tax measure containing
provisions not reported out or discussed in either House as well as provisions on
which
_______________
53 Davies, Jack, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, 2nd ed., 1986.
780
780 SUPREME COURT
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there was no disagreement between the House and the Senate and, worse,
provisions contrary to what the House and the Senate had approved after three
separate readings. 54
and
By adding or deleting provisions, when there was no conflicting provisions between
the House and Senate versions, the BICAM acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with
such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to loss of jurisdiction. x x x In adding to
the bill and thus subjecting to VAT, real properties, media and cooperatives despite
the contrary decision of both Houses, the BICAM exceeded its jurisdiction or acted
with such abuse of discretion as to amount to loss of jurisdiction .... 55
I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the

Constitution which provides that (j)udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. We are also guided
by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedures of
its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 56
A conference committee has been defined:

. . . unlike the joint committee is two committees, one appointed by each house. It is
normally appointed for a specific bill and its function is to gain accord between the
two houses either by the recession of one house from its bill or its amendments or by
the further amendment of the existing legislation or by the substitution of an
entirely new bill. Obviously, the conference committee is always a special committee
and normally includes the member who introduced the bill and the chairman of the
committee which considered it together with such other representatives of the
houses as seem expedient. (Horack, Cases and Materials on Legislation [1940] 220.
See also Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ 864 [1952]; Steiner, The
Congressional Conference Committee [U of Ill. Press, 1951]). 57
________________
54 Petition in G.R. No. 115781, p. 18.

55 Petition in G.R. No. 115543, pp. 2-3.
56 Davies, Jack, supra at 90.
57 Sutherland, J.G.,STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Vol. I, 4th ed., pp.
293-294.
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From the foregoing definition, it is clear that a bicameral conference
committee is a creature, not of the Constitution, but of the legislative body
under its power to determine rules of its proceedings under Article VI, Sec.
16 (3) of the Constitution. Thus, it draws its life and vitality from the rules
governing its creation. The why, when, how and wherefore of its
operations, in other words, the parameters within which it is to function,
are to be found in Section 26, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate and
Section 85 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, respectively,
which provide:
Rule XII, Rules of the Senate
SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall
be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten
days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in
accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 8 of Rule III.
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and
shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been
filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to
the Members.
Rules of the House of Representatives

SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.In the event that the House does not
agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the
differences may be settled by conference committee of both Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order,
except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or the House is
dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall contain a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are
distributed to the Members:Provided, That in the last fifteen days of each session
period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as above
provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.
782
782 SUPREME COURT
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Under these Rules, a bicameral conference committee comes into being
only when there are disagreements and differences between the Senate
and the House with regard to certain provisions of a particular legislative
act which have to be reconciled.
Jeffersons Manual,which, according to Section 112, Rule XLIX of the
Senate Rules, supplements it, states that a conference committee is
usually called on the occasion of amendments between the Houses and
in all cases of difference of opinion between the two Houses on matters
pending between them. It further states:
58
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed

to them, and may not include subjects not within the disagreements, even though
germane to a question in issue. But they may perfect amendments committed to them
if they do not in so doing go beyond the differences. x x x Managers may not change
the text to which both Houses have agreed. (Italics supplied.)
59
Masons Manual of Legislative Procedureswhich is also considered as

controlling authority for any situation not covered by a specific legislative
rule, states that either House may request a conference with the other on
60
any matter of difference or dispute between them and that in such a

request, the subject of the conference should always be stated. 61
In the Philippines, as in the United States, the Conference Committee

exercises such a wide range of authority that they virtually constitute a
third House in the Legislature. As admitted by the Solicitor General, It
was the practice in past Congresses for Conference Committees to insert in
bills approved by the two Houses new provisions that were not originally
contemplated by them. 62
In Legislative Procedure, Robert Luce gives a graphic description of the

milieu and the circumstances which have conspired to
________________
58 Page 261.
59 Page 268.
60 Davies, supra, at 65.
61 Sec. 764, p. 541.
62 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, p. 71.
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transform an initially innocuous mechanism designed to facilitate
legislative action into an all-powerful Frankenstein that brooks no
challenge to its authority even from its own members.
Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees must be
accepted without amendment or else rejectedin toto. The impulse is to get done with
the matters and so the motion to accept has undue advantage, for some members
are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable provisions rather than prolong
controversy. This is the more likely if the report comes in the rush of business
toward the end of a session, when to seek further conference might result in the loss
of the measure altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk of such a
result following the rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to
secure a second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal
chance to develop more strength.
xxx xxx xxx
Entangled in a network of rule and custom, the Representative who resents and
would resist this theft of his rights, finds himself helpless. Rarely can he vote,
rarely can he voice his mind, in the matter of any fraction of the bill. Usually he
cannot even record himself as protesting against some one feature while accepting
the measure as whole. Worst of all, he cannot by argument or suggested change, try
to improve what the other branch has done.
This means more than the subversion of individual rights. It means to a degree
the abandonment of whatever advantage the bicameral system may have.By so
much it in effect transfers the lawmaking power to a small group of members who
work out in private a decision that almost always prevails. What is worse, these men
are not chosen in a way to ensure the wisest choice. It has become the practice to
name as conferees the ranking members of the committee, so that the accident of
seniority determines. Exceptions are made, but in general it is not a question of who
are most competent to serve. Chance governs, sometimes giving way to favor, rarely
to merit.
xxx xxx xxx
Speaking broadly, the system of legislating by conference committee is
unscientific and therefore defective. Usually it forfeits the benefit of scrutiny and
judgment by all the wisdom available. Uncontrolled, it is inferior to that process by
which every amendment is secured independent discussion and vote. x x x. (Italics
63
supplied)
________________
63 Pages 404-405 and 407.
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Not surprisingly has it been said: Conference Committee action is the
most undemocratic procedure in the legislative process; it is an
appropriate target for legislative critics. 64
In the case at bench, petitioners insist that the Conference Committee
to which Senate Bill No. 1630 and House Bill No. 11197 were referred for
the purpose of harmonizing their differences, overreached themselves in
not confining their reconciliation function to those areas of disagreement
in the two bills but actually making surreptitious insertions and
deletions which amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
At this point, it becomes imperative to focus on the errant provisions
which found their way into Republic Act No. 7716. Below is a breakdown
to facilitate understanding the grounds for petitioners objections:
INSERTIONS MADE BY BICAMERAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE (BICAM) TO SENATE BILL (SB) NO. 1630 AND
HOUSE BILL (HB) NO. 11197
1. 1.Sec. 99 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
1. (1)Under the HB, this section includes any person who, in the course
of trade or business, sells, barters or exchanges goods OR
PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES PERSONAL
PROPERTIES.
2. (2)The SB completely changed the said section and defined a number
of words and phrases. Also, Section 99-A was added which included
one who sells, exchanges, barters PROPERTIES and one who
imports PROPERTIES.
3. (3)The BICAM version makes LESSORS of goods OR PROPERTIES
and importers of goods LIABLE to VAT (subject of petition in G.R.
No. 115754).
1. 2.Section 100 (VAT on Sale of Goods)
The term goods or properties includes the following, which were not
found in either the HB or the SB:
________________
64 Davies, supra, at 81.
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In addition to radio and
television time; SATELLITE
TRANSMISSION AND
CABLE TELEVISION
TIME.
The term Other similar
properties was deleted,
which was present in the HB
and the SB.
Real properties held
primarily for sale to
customers or held for lease in
the ordinary course or
business were included,
which was neither in the HB
nor the SB (subject of
petition in G.R. No. 115754).
3. Section 102
On what are included in the term sale or exchange of services, as to

make them subject to VAT, the BICAM included/inserted the following
(not found in either House or Senate Bills):
1. 1.Services of lessors of property, whether personal or real (subject of

petition in G.R. No. 115754);
2. 2.Warehousing services;
3. 3.Keepers of resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts;
4. 4.Common carriers by land, air and sea;
5. 5.Services of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph;
6. 6.Radio and television broadcasting;
7. 7.All other franchise grantees except those under Section 117 of this
Code (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115852);
8. 8.Services of surety, fidelity, indemnity, and bonding com-panies;
9. 9.Also inserted by the BICAM (on page 8 thereof) is the lease or use
of or the right to use of satellite transmission and cable television
time.
1. 4.Section 103 (Exempt Transactions)

The BICAM deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its inclusion in
both the House and Senate Bills. Therefore, under Republic Act No. 7716,
the printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper,
magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at regular intervals with
fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is not devoted principally
to the publication of advertisements is subject to VAT (subject of petition
in G.R. No. 115931 and G.R. No. 115544).
The HB and SB did not touch Subsection (g) but it was amended by the
BICAM by changing the word TEN to FIVE.
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Thus, importation of vessels with tonnage of more than five thousand tons
is VAT exempt.
Subsection L, which was identical in the HB and the SB that stated that
medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services were exempted from the
VAT was amended by the BICAM by adding the qualifying phrase:
EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS, thus subjecting
doctors, dentists and veterinarians to the VAT.
Subsection U which exempts from VAT transactions which are exempt
under special laws, was amended by the BICAM by adding the phrase:
EXCEPT THOSE GRANTED UNDER PD Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, AND
1590, AND NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES UNDER RA 6938 (subject
of petition in G.R. No. 115873), not found in either the HB or the SB,
resulting in the inclusion of all cooperatives to the VAT, except non-
electric cooperatives.
The sale of real properties was included in the exempt transactions
under the House Bill, but the BICAM qualified this with the provision:
(S) SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES NOT PRIMARILY HELD FOR SALE TO
CUSTOMERS OR HELD FOR LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE
OR BUSINESS OR REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR LOW-COST AND
SOCIALIZED HOUSING AS DEFINED BY RA NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING ACT OF 1992 AND OTHER
RELATED LAWS. (subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754)
The BICAM also exempted the sale of properties, the receipts of which are
not less than P480,000.00 or more than P720,000.00. Under the SB, no
amount was given, but in the HB it was stated that receipts from the sale
of properties not less than P350,000.00 nor more than P600,000.00 were
exempt.
It did not include, as VAT exempt, the sale or transfer of securities, as
defined in the Revised Securities Act (BP 178) which was contained in
both Senate and House Bills.
1. 5.Section 104
Not included in the HB or the SB is the phrase INCLUDING

PACKAGING MATERIALS which was inserted by the BICAM
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1994
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in Section 104 (A) (1) (B), thus excluding from creditable input tax
packaging materials and the phrase ON WHICH A VALUE-ADDED TAX
HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PAID in Section 104 (A) (2).
1. 6.Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT
registration fee but this was increased by BICAM to P1,000.00.
1. 7.Section 112
Regarding a person whose sales or receipts are exempt under Section 103
(w), the BICAM inserted the phrase: THREE PERCENT UPON THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS
THEREAFTER, although the SB and the HB provide only three percent
of his gross quarterly sales.
1. 8.Section 115
The BICAM adopted the HB version which subjects common carriers by
land, air or water for the transport of passengers to 3% of their gross
quarterly sales, which is not found in the SB.
1. 9.Section 117
The BICAM amended this section by subjecting franchises on electric, gas

and water utilities to a tax of two percent (2%) on gross receipts derived x
x x, although neither the HB nor the SB has a similar provision.
1. 10.Section 17 (d)
1. (a)The BICAM defers for only 2 years the VAT on services of actors
and actresses, although the SB defers it for 3 years.
2. (b)The BICAM uses the word EXCLUDE in the section on
deferment of VAT collection on certain goods and services. The HB
does not contain any counterpart provision and SB only allows
deferment for no longer than 3 years.
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1. 11.Section 18 on the Tax Administration Development Fund is an

entirely new provision not contained in the House/Senate Bills. This
fund is supposed to ensure effective implementation of Republic Act
No. 7716.
2. 12.Section 19
No period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and

regulations is found in the HB or the SB but BICAM provided within 90
days which found its way in Republic Act No. 7716.
Even a cursory perusal of the above outline will convince one that,
indeed, the Bicameral Conference Committee (henceforth to be referred to
as BICAM) exceeded the power and authority granted in the Rules of its
creation. Both Senate and House Rules limit the task of the Conference
Committee in almost identical language to the settlement of differences in
the provisions or amendments to any bill or joint resolution. If it means
anything at all, it is that there are provisions in subject bill, to start with,
which differ and, therefore, need reconciliation. Nowhere in the Rules is it
authorized to initiate or propose completely new matter. Although under
certain rules on legislative procedure, like those in Jeffersons Manual, a
conference committee may introducegermane matters in a particular bill,
such matters should be circumscribed by the committees sole authority
and function to reconcile differences.
Parenthetically, in the Senate and in the House, a matter is germane
to a particular bill if there is a common tie between said matter and the
provisions which tend to promote the object and purpose of the bill it seeks
to amend. If it introduces a new subject matter not within the purview of
the bill, then it is not germane to the bill. The test is whether or not the
65
change represented an amendment or extension of the basic purpose of the

original, or the introduction of an entirely new and different subject
matter. 66
________________
65 See: 18 Words and Phrases 482 citing Kennedy v. Truss, Del. Super., 13 A. 2nd 431,
435, 1 Terry 424 (1940).
66 United States Gypsum Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 110 N.W. 2d 698, 71, 363, Mich.
548 (1961).
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In the BICAM, however, the germane subject matter must be within the
ambit of the disagreement between the two Houses. If the germane
subject is not covered by the disagreement but it is reflected in the final
version of the bill as reported by the Conference Committee or, if what
appears to be a germane matter in the sense that it is relevant or
closely allied with the purpose of the bill, was not the subject of a
67
disagreement between the Senate and the House, it should be deemed an

extraneous matter or even a rider which should never be considered
legally passed for not having undergone the three-day reading
requirement. Insertion of new matter on the part of the BICAM is,
therefore, an ultra vires act which makes the same void.
The determination of what is germane and what is not may appear to
be a difficult task but the Congress, having been confronted with the
problem before, resolved it in accordance with the rules. In that case, the
Congress approved a Conference Committees insertion of new provisions
that were not contemplated in any of the provisions in question between
the Houses simply because of the provision inJeffersons Manual that
conferees may report matters which aregermane modifications of subjects
in disagreementbetween the Houses and the committee. In other words, 68
the matter was germane to the points of disagreement between the House
and the Senate.
As regards inserted amendments in the BICAM, therefore, the task of
determining what is germane to a bill is simplified, thus: If the
amendments are not circumscribed by the subjects of disagreement
between the two Houses, then they are not germane to the purpose of the
bill.
In the instant case before us, the insertions and deletions made do not
merely spell an effort at settling conflicting provisions but have materially
altered the bill, thus giving rise to the instant petitions on the part of
those who were caught unawares by the legislative legerdemain that took
place. Going by the definition of the word amendment in Blacks Law
Dictionary,
_________________
67 BLACKs DICTIONARY, 6th ed., p. 687 citing State ex. rel. Riley v. District Court of
Second Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County, 103 Mont. 576, 64 P. 2d 115, 119 (1937).
68 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 3, 1952, p. 885 cited in Orquiola, Annotated Rules
of the Senate, 1991 ed., pp. 40-41.
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790 SUPREME COURT
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5th Ed., 1979, which means to change or modify for the better; to alter by
modification, deletion, or addition, said insertions and deletions
constitute amendments. Consequently, these violated Article VI, Section
26 (2) which provides inter alia:Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed . . . This proscription is intended to
subject all bills and their amendments to intensive deliberation by the
legislators and the ample ventilation of issues to afford the public an
opportunity to express their opinions or objections issues to afford the
public an opportunity to express their opinions or objections thereon. The
same rationale underlies the three-reading requirement to the end that no
surpises may be sprung on an unsuspecting citizenry.
Provisions of the now you see it, now you dont variety, meaning those
which were either in the House and/or Senate versions but simply
disappeared or were bracketed out of existence in the BICAM Report,
were eventually incorporated in Republic Act No. 7716. Worse, some
goods, properties or services which were not covered by the two versions
and, therefore, were never intended to be so covered, suddenly found their
way into the same Report. No advance notice of such insertions prepared
the rest of the legislators, much less the public who could be adversely
affected, so that they could be given the opportunity to express their views
thereon. Well has the final BICAM report been described, therefore, as an
instance of taxation without representation.
That the conferees or delegates in the BICAM representing the two
Chambers could not possibly be charged with bad faith or sinister motives
or, at the very least, unseemly behavior, is of no moment. The stark fact is
that items not previously subjected to the VAT now fell under its coverage
without interested sectors or parties having been afforded the opportunity
to be heard thereon. This is not to say that the Conference Committee
Report should have undergone the three readings required in Article VI,
Section 26(2), for this clearly refers only to bills which, after having been
initially filed in either House, negotiated the labyrinthine passage therein
until its approval. The composition of the BICAM including as it usually
does, the Chairman of the appropriate Committee, the sponsor of the bill
and other interested members ensures an informed discussion, at least
with respect to the disagreeing provisions. The same does not obtain as
regards completely new
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matter which suddenly spring on the legislative horizon.
It has been pointed out that such extraneous matters notwithstanding,
all Congressmen and Senators were given the opportunity to approve or
turn down the Committee Report in toto, thus curing whatever defect or
irregularity it bore. Earlier in this opinion, I explained that the source of
the acknowledged power of this ad hoccommittee stems from the precise
fact that, the meetings, being scheduled take it or leave it basis. It has
not been uncommon for legislators who, for one reason or another have
been frustrated in their attempt to pass a pet bill in their own chamber, to
work for its passage in the BICAM where it may enjoy a more hospitable
reception and faster approval. In the instant case, had there been full,
open and unfettered discussion on the bills during the Committee sessions,
there would not have been as much vociferous objections on this score.
Unfortunately, however, the Committee held two of the five sessions
behind closed doors, sansstenographers, record-takers and interested
observers. To that extent, the proceedings were shrouded in mystery and
the publics right to information on matters of public concern as enshrined
in Article III, Section 7 and the governments policy of transparency in
69
transactions involving public interest in Article II, Section 28 of the

Constitution are undermined.
70
Moreover, that which is void ab initio such as the objectionable

provisions in the Conference Committee Report, cannot be cured or
ratified. For all intents and purposes, these never existed. Quae ab initio
non valent, ex post facto convalescere non possunt. Things that are invalid
from the beginning are not made valid by a subsequent act.
________________
69 Article III, Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
70 Article II, Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
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Should this argument be unacceptable, the enrolled bill doctrine, in turn,
is invoked to support the proposition that the certification by the presiding
officers of Congress, together with the signature of the President, bars
further judicial inquiry into the validity of the law. I reiterate my
submission that the enrolled bill ruling may be applicable but only with
respect to questions pertaining to the procedural enactment, engrossment,
printing, the insertion or deletion of a word or phrase here and there, but
would draw a dividing line with respect to substantial substantive
changes, such as those introduced by the BICAM herein.
We have before us then the spectacle of a body created by the two
Houses of Congress for the very limited purpose of settling disagreements
in provisions between bills emanating therefrom, exercising the plenary
legislative powers of the parent chambers but holding itself exempt from
the mandatory constitutional requirements that are the hallmarks of
legislation under the aegis of a democratic political system. From the
initial filing, through the three readings which entail detailed debates and
discussions in Committee and plenary sessions, and on to the transmittal
to the other House in a repetition of the entire process to ensure
exhaustive deliberationsall these have been skipped over. In the
proverbial twinkling of an eye, provisions that probably may not have seen
the light of day had they but run their full course through the legislative
mill, sprang into existence and emerged full-blown laws.
Yet our Constitution vests the legislative power in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives
. . . . and not in any special, standing or super committee of its own
71
creation, no matter that these have been described, accurately enough, as

the eye, the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the house.
Firstly, that usage or custom has sanctioned this abbreviated, if
questionable, procedure does not warrant its being legitimized and
perpetuated any longer.Consuetudo, contra rationem introducta, potius
usurpatio quam consuetudo appellari debet. A custom against reason is
rather an usurpation. In the hierarchy
_______________
71 Article VI, Section 1.

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of sources of legislative procedure, constitutional rules, statutory
provisions and adopted rules (as for example, the Senate and House
Rules), rank highest, certainly much ahead of customs and usages.
Secondly, is this Court to assume the role of passive spectator or
indulgent third party, timorous about exercising its power or more
importantly, performing its duty, of making a judicial determination on
the issue of whether there has been grave abuse of discretion by the other
branches or instrumentalities of government, where the same is properly
invoked? The time is past when the Court was not loathe to raise the
bogeyman of the political question to avert a head-on collision with either
the Executive or Legislative Departments. Even the separation of powers
doctrine was burnished to a bright sheen as often as it was invoked to
keep the judiciary within bounds. No longer does this condition obtain.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution partly quoted in this paragraph
has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry. This Court can now safely
fulfill its mandate of delimiting the powers of co-equal departments like
the Congress, its officers or its committees which may have no
compunctions about exercising legislative powers in full.
Thirdly, dare we close our eyes to the presumptuous assumption by a
runaway committee of its progenitors legislative powers in derogation of
the rights of the people, in the process, subverting the democratic
principles we all are sworn to uphold, when a proper case is made out for
our intervention? The answers to the above queries are self-evident.
I call to mind this exhortation: We are sworn to see that violations of
the constitutionby any person, corporation, state agency or branch of
governmentare brought to light and corrected. To countenance an
artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with
violations of our Constitution is not acceptable to this Court.
72
I am not unaware that a rather recent decision of ours brushed aside an

argument that a provision in subject law regarding the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court itself, not having
been included in the original version
_______________
72 D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, supra.
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794 SUPREME COURT
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of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200 but only in the Conference
Committee Report, was violative of Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution. Likewise, that said Section 35, never having been a subject
of disagreement between both Houses, could not have been validly added
as an amendment before the Conference Committee.
The majority opinion in said case explained:
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described
thus:
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected
results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic
of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81). (Italics supplied)
73
At the risk of being repetitious, I wish to point out that the general rule, as
quoted above, is: Even where the conference committee is not by rule
limited in its jurisdiction,legislative custom severely limits the freedom
with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference
bill. What follows, that is, occasionally a conference committee produces
unexpected results, results beyond its mandate . . . is the exception. Then
it concludes with a declaration that: This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee. Are we about to reinstall
another institution that smacks of authoritarianism which, after our past
experience, has become anathema to the Filipino people?
The ruling above can hardly be cited in support of the proposition that a
provision in a BICAM report which was not
________________
73 The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pete Prado,G.R. No. 105371, November 11,
1993, 227 SCRA 703, 709.
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the subject of differences between the House and Senate versions of a bill
cannot be nullified. It submits that such is not authorized in our Basic
Law. Moreover, this decision concerns merely one provision whereas the
BICAM Report that culminated in the EVAT law has a wider scope as it,
in fact, expanded the base of the original VAT law by imposing the tax on
several items which were not so covered prior to the EVAT.
One other flaw in most BICAM Reports, not excluding this one under
scrutiny, is that, hastily drawn up, it often fails to conform to the Senate
and House Rules requiring no less than a detailed and sufficiently
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject
measure. The Report of the committee, as may be gleaned from the
preceding pages, was no more than the final version of the bill as passed
by the BICAM. The amendments or subjects of dissension, as well as the
reconciliation made by the committee, are not even pointed out, much less
explained therein.
It may be argued that legislative rules of procedure may properly be
suspended, modified, revoked or waived at will by the legislators
themselves. This principle, however, does not come into play in
74
interpreting what the record of the proceedings shows was, or was not,
done. It is rather designed to test the validity of legislative action where
the record shows a final action in violation or disregard of legislative
rules. Utilizing the Senate and the House Rules as both guidelines and
75
yardstick, the BICAM here obviously did not adhere to the rule on what
the Report should contain.
Given all these irregularities that have apparently been engrafted into
the BICAM system, and which have been tolerated, if not accorded
outright acceptance by everyone involved in or conversant with, the
institution, it may be asked: Why not leave well enough alone?
_________________
74 In Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, (109 Phil. 863 [1960]), the Court held that parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and they may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Hence, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken
by a deliberative body when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.
75 State v. Essling, 128 N.W. 2d 307, 316 (1964).
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That these practices have remained unchallenged in the past does not
justify our closing our eyes and turning a deaf ear to them. Writ large is
the spectacle of a mechanism ensconced in the very heart of the peoples
legislative halls, that now stands indicted with the charge of arrogating
legislative powers unto itself through the use of dubious shortcuts. Here,
for the people to judge, is the mother of all shortcuts.
In the petitions at bench, we are confronted with the enactment of a tax
law which was designed to broaden the tax base. It is rote learning for any
law student that as an attribute of sovereignty, the power to tax is the
strongest of all the powers of government. Admittedly, for all its
76
plenitude, the power to tax is not unconfined. There are

restrictions. Were there none, then the oft-quoted 1803 dictum of Chief
77
Justice Marshall that the power to tax involves the power to

destroy would be a truism. Happily, we can concur with, and the people
78
can find comfort in, the reassuring words of Mr. Justice Holmes: The
power to tax is not the power to destroywhile this Court sits. 79
Manakanak, mayrong dumudulg dito sa Ktaastaasang Hukuman

na may kamangha-manghng hinang. Angkp na halimbaw ay ang mga
petisyng iniharp ngayn sa amin.
Ang iln sa kanil ay mga Senadr na nais mapawalng bis ang isng
bats ukol sa buws na ipinas mismo nil. Diuman it ay hind
tumalima sa mga itinatadhana ng Sligang Bats. Bukd sa rito, tutol sil
sa mga bagong talat na isiningit ng Bicameral Conference Committee
na nagdagdg ng mga bagong bagay bagay at serbisyo na papatawan ng
buws. Ayon sa kanil, ginampann ng komitng iyn ang gawain na
nauukol sa bung Kongreso. Kung kayt ang nararapat na mangyari ay
ihatol ng Ktaastaasang Hukuman na malabis na pagsasamantala sa
sariling pagpapasiy ang ginaw ng Kongreso.
Bagamt bantult kamng makialm sa isng kapanty na sangy ng
Pamahalan, hind naman nararapat na kam ay
________________
76 Sarasola v. Trinidad, 40 Phil. 252, 262 (1919).

77 Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, L-59431, July 25, 1984, 130 SCRA 654, 660.
78 McCullock v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316.
79 Quoted in Graves. v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 490.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 797
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tumanggng gampann ang tungkulin na iniatas sa amin ng Saligang
Batas. Lalut-lal nang ang bats na kinauukulan ay maaaring
makapinsal sa nakararami sa sambayann.
Sa ganang akin, itong batas na inihaharap sa amin ngayn, ay totong
labg sa Saligang Bats, samakatuwd ay walng bis. Ngunit it ay
nauukol lamang sa mga katiwalin na may kinalaman sa paran ng
pagpapasabats nit. Hind namin patakarn ang makialm o humadlng
sa itinakdng gawain ng Saligang Bats sa Pangul at sa Kongreso. Ang
dalawng sangy na iyn ng Pamahalan ang higt na maalam ukol sa
kung ang anumng panukalang bats ay nararapat, kanais-nais o
magagampann; kung kayt hind kam nararapat na maghatol o
magpapasiy sa mga bagay na iyn. Ang makapapataw ng angkop na
lunas sa larangan na iyn ay ang mismong mga kinatawn ng
sambayann sa Kongreso.
Faced with this challenge of protecting the rights of the people by
striking down a law that I submit is unconstitutional and in the process,
checking the wonted excesses of the Bicameral Conference Committee
system, I see in this case a suitable vehicle to discharge the Courts
Constitutional mandate and duty of declaring that there has indeed been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the Legislature.
Republic Act No. 7716, being unconstitutional and void, I find no
necessity to rule on the substantive issues as dealt with in the majority
opinion as they have been rendered mootand academic. These issues
pertain to the intrinsic merits of the law. It is axiomatic that the wisdom,
desirability and advisability of enacting certain laws lie, not within the
province of the Judiciary but that of the political departments, the
Executive and the Legislative. The relief sought by petitioners from what
they perceive to be the harsh and onerous effect of the EVAT on the people
is within their reach. For Congress, of which Senator-petitioners are a
part, can furnish the solution by either repealing or amending the subject
law.
For the foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
798
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DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
With a consensus already reached after due deliberations, silence perhaps

should be the better part of discretion, except to vote. The different views
and opinions expressed are so persuasive and convincing; they are more
than enough to sway the pendulum for or against the subject petitions.
The penetrating and scholarly dissertations of my brethren should
dispense with further arguments which may only confound and confuse
even the most learned of men.
But there is a crucial point, a constitutional issue which, I submit, has
been belittled, treated lightly, if not almost considered insignificant and
purposeless. It is elementary, as much as it is fundamental. I am referring
to the word exclusively appearing in Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987
Constitution. This is regrettable, to say the least, as it involves a
constitutional mandate which, wittingly or unwittingly, has been cast
aside as trivial and meaningless.
A comparison of the particular provision on the enactment of revenue
bills in the U.S. Constitution with its counterpart in the Philippine
Constitution will help explain my position.
Under the U.S. Constitution, [a]ll bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments as on other bills (Sec. 7, par. [1], Art. I). In
contrast, our 1987 Constitution reads: All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments
(Sec. 24, Art. VI; italics supplied).
As may be gleaned from the pertinent provision of our Constitution, all
revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution does not use
the word exclusively; it merely says, [a]ll bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 799
1994
Finance
Representatives.
Since the term exclusively has already been adequately defined in the
various opinions, as to which there seems to be no dispute, I shall no
longer offer my own definition.
Verily, the provision in our Constitution requiring that all revenue bills
shall originate exclusively from the Lower House is mandatory. The word
exclusively is an exclusive word, which is indicative of an intent that
the provision is mandatory. Hence, all American authorities expounding
1
on the meaning and application of Sec. 7, par. (1), Art. I, of the U.S.
Constitution cannot be used in the interpretation of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our
1987 Constitution which has a distinct feature of exclusiveness all its
own. Thus, when our Constitution absolutely requiresas it is
mandatorythat a particular bill should exclusively emanate from the
Lower House, there is no alternative to the requirement that the bill to
become valid law must originate exclusively from that House.
In the interpretation of constitutions, questions frequently arise as to
whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The courts usually
hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in
view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions which are
not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard
constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any discretion to
the will of the legislature to obey or disregard them. This presumption as
to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably
manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. So strong
is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the
organic law that it has even been said that neither by the courts nor by
any other department of the government may any provision of the
Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone
of its provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without
reference to the rules and distinguishing between the directory and the
mandatory statutes. 2
The framers of our 1987 Constitution could not have used the term
exclusively if they only meant to replicate and adopt in
_______________
1 See McGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 821 (1954).

2 See Taada v. Cuenco , 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
800
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toto the U.S. version. By inserting exclusively in Sec. 24, Art. VI of our
Constitution, their message is clear: they wanted it different, strong,
stringent. There must be a compelling reason for the inclusion of the word
exclusively, which cannot be an act of retrogression but progression, an
improvement on its precursor. Thus,exclusively must be given its true
meaning, its purpose observed and virtue recognized, for it could not have
been conceived to be of minor consequence. That construction is to be
sought which gives effect to the whole of the statuteits every word.Ut
magis valeat quam pereat.
Consequently, any reference to American authorities, decisions and
opinions, however wisely and delicately put, can only mislead in the
interpretation of our own Constitution. To refer to them in defending the
constitutionality of R.A. 7716, subject of the present petitions, is to argue
on a false premise, i.e., that Sec. 24, Art. VI of our 1987 Constitution is, or
means exactly, the same as Sec. 7, par. (1), Art. I of the U.S. Constitution,
which is not correct. Hence, only a wrong conclusion can be drawn from a
wrong premise.
For example, it is argued that in the United States, from where our own
legislature is patterned, the Senate can practically substitute its own tax
measure for that of the Lower House. Thus, according to the Majority,
citing an American case, the validity of Sec. 37 which the Senate had
inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909 by imposing an ad valorem tax based on
the weight of vessels, was upheld against the claim that the revenue bill
originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, Sec. 7, of the U.S.
Constitution. In an effort to be more convincing, the Majority even quotes
3
the footnote in Introduction to American Government by F.A. Ogg and P.O.

Raywhich reads
Thus in 1883 the upper house struck out everything after the enacting clause of a
tariff bill and wrote its own measure, which the House eventually felt obliged to
accept. It likewise added 847 amendments to the Payne-Aldrich tariff act of 1909,
dictated the schedules of the emergency tariff act of 1921, rewrote an extensive tax
revision bill in the same year, and recast most of the permanent tariff
________________
3 See Majority Opinion, p. 15, citing Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S., 309, 58 Law Ed. 617.
801
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 801
1994
Finance
bill of 1922 4
which in fact suggests, very clearly, that the subject revenue bill actually
originated from the Lower House and was only amended, perhaps
considerably, by the Senate after it was passed by the former and
transmitted to the latter.
In the cases cited, where the statutes passed by the U.S. Congress were
upheld, the revenue bills did not actually originate from the Senate but, in
fact, from the Lower House. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Chief Justice White in Rainey v. United
States upheld the revenue bill passed by Congress and adopted the ruling
5
of the lower court that

x x x the section in question is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating in
the Senate and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the section was
proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising revenue which
originated in the House. That is sufficient.
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., on which the Solicitor General heavily leans in his
6
Consolidated Comment as well as in his Memorandum, does not support

the thesis of the Majority since the subject bill therein actually originated
from the Lower House and not from the Senate, and the amendment
merely covered a certain provision in the House bill.
In fine, in the cases cited which were lifted from American authorities,
it appears that the revenue bills in question actually originated from the
House of Representatives and were amended by the Senate only after they
were transmitted to it. Perhaps, if the factual circumstances in those cases
were exactly the same as the ones at bench, then the subject revenue or
tariff bill may be upheld in this jurisdiction on the principle of substantial
compliance, as they were in the United States, except possibly in instances
where the House bill undergoes what is now referred to as amendment by
substitution, for that would be in derogation
_______________
4 Id., citing F.A. Ogg and P.O. Ray, Introduction to American Government, 302, n. 2
(1945).
5 See Note 3.
6 22 U.S. 107.
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802 SUPREME COURT
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of our Constitution which vests solely in the House of Representatives the
power to initiate revenue bills. A Senate amendment by substitution
simply means that the bill in question did not in effect originate from the
lower chamber but from the upper chamber and now disguises itself as a
mere amendment of the House version.
It is also theorized that in the U.S., amendment by substitution is
recognized. That may be true. But the process may be validly effective only
under the U.S. Constitution. The cases before us present a totally different
factual backdrop. Several months before the Lower House could even pass
HB No. 11197, P.S. Res. No. 734 and SB No. 1129 had already been filed
in the Senate. Worse, the Senate subsequently approved SB No. 1630 in
substitution of SB No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734
and HB No. 11197, and not HB No. 11197 itself as amended. Here, the
Senate could not have proposed or concurred with amendments because
there was nothing to concur with or amend except its own bill. It must be
stressed that the process of concurring or amending presupposes that
there exists a bill upon which concurrence may be based or amendments
introduced. The Senate should have reported out HB No. 11197, as
amended, even if in the amendment it took into consideration SB No.
1630. It should not have submitted to the Bicameral Conference
Committee SB No. 1630 which, admittedly, did not
originate exclusivelyfrom the Lower House.
But even assuming that in our jurisdiction a revenue bill of the Lower
House may be amended by substitution by the Senatealthough I am not
prepared to accept it in view of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our Constitutionstill
R.A. 7716 could not have been the result of amendment by substitution
since the Senate had no House bill to speak of that it could amend when
the Senate started deliberating on its own version.
Be that as it may, I cannot rest easy on the proposition that a
constitutional mandate calling for the exclusive power and prerogative of
the House of Representatives may just be discarded and ignored by the
Senate. Since the Constitution is for the observance of allthe judiciary as
well as the other departments of governmentand the judges are sworn to
support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard
its commands. And it is not fair and just to impute to them undue
interference if
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 803
1994
Finance
they look into the validity of legislative enactments to determine whether
the fundamental law has been faithfully observed in the process. It is their
duty to give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all
constitutional provisions irrespective of their opinion as to the wisdom of
such provisions.
The rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law
unconstitutional cannot be declined and must be performed in accordance
with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of
the enactment is directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a
statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional
because they cannot shirk from it without violating their oaths of office.
This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental
law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice
Marshal said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law,
the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any
other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the
question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the
courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that
action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of
the judicial tribunals. 7
It is my submission that the power and authority to originate revenue

bills under our Constitution is vestedexclusively in the House of
Representatives. Its members being more numerous than those of the
Senate, elected more frequently, and more directly represent the people,
are therefore considered better aware of the economic life of their
individual constituencies. It is just proper that revenue bills
originate exclusivelyfrom them.
In this regard, we do not have to devote much time delving into
American decisions and opinions and invoke them in the interpretation of
our own Constitution which is different from the American version,
particularly on the enactment of revenue bills. We have our own
Constitution couched in a language our own legislators thought best.
Insofar as revenue bills are concerned, our Constitution is not American; it
is distinctively
_______________
7 11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-13, 713-715.
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Filipino. And no amplitude of legerdemain can detract from our
constitutional requirement that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
although the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
In this milieu, I am left no option but to vote to grant the petitions and
strike down R.A. 7716 as unconstitutional.
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners plead that we affirm the self-evident proposition that they who
make law should not break the law. There are many evils whose
elimination can be trusted to time. The evil of lawlessness in lawmaking
cannot. It must be slain on sight for it subverts the sovereignty of the
people.
First, a fast snapshot of the facts. On November 17, 1993, the House of
Representatives passed on third reading House Bill (H.B.) No. 11197
entitled An Act Restructuring the Value Added Tax (VAT) System to
Widen its Tax Base and Enhance its Administration, Amending for These
Purposes Sections 99, 100, 102 to 108 and 110 of Title V and 236, 237 and
238 of Title IX, and Repealing Sections 113 and 114 of Title V, all of the
National Internal Revenue Code as Amended. The vote was 114 Yeas and
12 Nays. The next day, November 18, 1993, H.B. No. 11197 was
transmitted to the Senate for its concurrence by the Hon. Camilo L. Sabio,
Secretary General of the House of Representatives.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means
submitted Senate Bill (S.B.) No. 1630, recommending its approval in
substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129 taking into consideration P.S. Res. No.
734 and House Bill No. 11197. On March 24, 1994, S.B. No. 1630 was
approved on second and third readings. On the same day, the Senate, thru
Secretary Edgardo E. Tumangan, requested the House for a conference in
view of the disagreeing provisions of S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. It
designated the following as members of its Committee: Senators Ernesto
F. Herrera, Leticia R. Shahani, Alberto S. Romulo, John H. Osmea,
Ernesto M. Maceda, Blas F. Ople, Francisco S.
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 805
1994
Finance
Tatad, Rodolfo G. Biazon, and Wigberto S. Taada. On the part of the
House, the members of the Committee were: Congressmen Exequiel B.
Javier, James L. Chiongbian, Renato V. Diaz, Arnulfo P. Fuentebella,
Mariano M. Tajon, Gregorio Andolong, Thelma Almario, and Catalino
Figueroa. After five (5) meetings,1 the Bicameral Conference Committee
submitted its Report to the Senate and the House stating:
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
The Conference Committee on the disagreeing provisions of House Bill No. 11197,
entitled:
AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238
OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED
and Senate Bill No. 1630 entitled:
FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108 AND
110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115, 117 AND 121 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238
OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114, 116, 119 AND 120 OF
TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
having met, after full and free conference, has agreed to recommend and do
hereby recommend to their respective Houses that House Bill No. 11197, in
consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the
attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
Approved.
_______________
1 April 13, 19, 20, 21, and 25, 1994.
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The Report was approved by the House on April 27, 1994. The Senate
approved it on May 2, 1994. On May 5, 1994, the President signed the bill
into law as R.A. No. 7716.
There is no question that the Bicameral Conference Committee did
more than reconcile differences between House Bill No. 11197 and Senate
Bill No. 1630. In several instances, it either added new provisions or
deleted provisions already approved in House Bill No. 11197 and Senate
Bill No. 1630. These insertions/dele-tions numbering twenty four (24) are
specified in detail by petitioner Tolentino as follows: 2
SOME SALIENT POINTS ON THE (AMENDMENTS TO THE VAT LAW [EO

273]) SHOWING ADDITIONS/INSERTIONS MADE BY BICAMERAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE TO SB 1630 & HB 11197
I On Sec. 99 of the NIRC
H.B. 11197 amends this section by including, as liable to VAT, any person who in
the course of trade of business, sells, barters, or exchanges goods or PROPERTIES
and any person who LEASES PERSONAL PROPERTIES.
Senate Bill 1630 deleted Sec. 99 to give way for a new Section 99DEFINITION
OF TERMSwhere eleven (11) terms were defined. A new Section, Section 99-A
was incorporated which included as subject to VAT, one who sells, exchanges,
barters PROPERTIES and one who imports PROPERTIES.
The BCC version (R.A. 7716) makes LESSORS of goods OR PROPERTIES and
importers of goods LIABLE to VAT.
II On Section 100 (VAT on sale of goods)
A. The H.B., S.B., and the BCC (R.A. 7716) all included sale of PROPERTIES as
subject to VAT.
The term GOODS or PROPERTIES includes the following:
HB (pls. refer SB (pls. BCC
to Sec. 2) refer to (RA
Sec. 7716
1(4) (Sec. 2)
1. Right or the 1. The 1. The
privilege to use same same
patent,
copyright, de
________________
2 See also Annex A, Memorandum of Petitioner Kilosbayan in G.R. No. 115781; also the
Petition in G.R. No. 115543, pp. 2-3.
807
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 1994 807
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
sign, or
model, plan,
secret
formula or
process,
goodwill
trademark,
tradebrand
or other like
property or
right.
2. Right or 2. 2. The same
the The
privilege to same
use in the
Philippines
of any
industrial,
commercial,
or scientific
equipment.
3. Right or 3. 3. The same
the The
privilege to same
use motion
picture
films, films,
tapes and
discs.
4. Radio 4. 4. In addition to
and The radio and
Television Sametelevision time the
time following were
included:
SATELLITE
TRANSMISSION
and CABLE
TELEVISION
TIME
5. Other 5. 5. Other similar
Similar The properties was
properties Samedeleted
6. 6. 6. Real properties
held primarily for
sale to customers
or held for lease
in the ordinary
course or business
1. B.The HB and the BCC Bills has each a provision which includes THE SALE
OF GOLD TO BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS as falling under the
term Export Sales, hence subject to 0% VAT. The Senate Bill does not
contain such provision (See Section 102-A thereof).
III. On Section 102
This section was amended to include as subject to a 10% VAT the gross receipts
derived from THE SALE OR EXCHANGE OF SERVICES, INCLUDING THE USE
OR LEASE OF PROPERTIES.
The SB, HB, and BCC have the same provisions on this.
However, on what are included in the term SALE OR EXCHANGE OF
SERVICES, the BCC included/inserted the following (not found in either the House
or Senate Bills):
1. 1.Services of lessors of property WHETHER PERSONAL OR REAL; (See

BCC Report/Bill p. 7)
2. 2.WAREHOUSING SERVICES (Ibid.,)
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808 SUPREME COURT
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1. 3.Keepers of RESTHOUSES, PENSION HOUSES, INNS, RESORTS (Ibid.,)

2. 4.Common carriers by LAND, AIR AND SEA (Ibid.,)
3. 5.SERVICES OF FRANCHISE GRANTEES OF TELEPHONE AND
TELEGRAPH;
4. 6.RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING
5. 7.ALL OTHER FRANCHISE GRANTEES EXCEPT THOSE UNDER
SECTION 117 OF THIS CODE
6. 8.SERVICES OF SURETY, FIDELITY, INDEMNITY, AND BONDING
COMPANIES.
7. 9.Also inserted by the BCC (on page B thereof) is the LEASE OR USE OF OR
THE RIGHT TO USE OF SATTELITE TRANSMISSION AND CABLE
TELEVISION TIME
IV. On Section 103 (Exempt Transactions)
The BCC deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its retention in both the
House and Senate Bills, thus under RA 7716, the printing, publication, importation
or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at
regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is not
devoted principally to the publication of advertisements is subject to VAT.
Subsection (g) was amended by the BCC (both Senate and House Bills did not) by
changing the word TEN to FIVE, thus: Importation of passenger and/or cargo
vessel of more than five thousand ton to ocean going, including engine and spare
parts of said vessel to be used by the importer himself as operator thereof. In short,
importation of vessels with tonnage of more than 5 thousand is VAT exempt.
Subsection L, was amended by the BCC by adding the qualifying phrase:
EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS.
Subsection U which exempts from VAT Transactions which are exempt under
special laws, was amended by BCC by adding the phrase: EXCEPT THOSE
GRANTED UNDER PD Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, and 1590, and NON-ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES under RA 6938. This is the reason why cooperatives are now
subject to VAT.
While the SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES was included in the exempt
transactions under the House Bill, the BCC made a qualification by stating:
(S) SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES NOT PRIMARILY HELD FOR SALE TO CUSTOMERS
OR HELD FOR LEASE IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE OR BUSINESS OR
REAL PROPERTY UTILIZED FOR LOW-COST AND SOCIALIZED HOUSING AS
DEFINED BY R.A. NO. 7279 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
AND
809
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 809
1994
Finance
HOUSING ACT OF 1992 AND OTHER RELATED LAWS.
Under the Senate Bill, the sale of real property utilized for low-cost and socialized housing
as defined by RA 7279, is one of the exempt transactions.
Under the House Bill, also exempt from VAT, is the SALE OF PROPERTIES OTHER
THAN THE TRANSACTIONS MENTIONED IN THE FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS WITH
A GROSS ANNUAL SALES AND/OR RECEIPTS OF WHICH DOES NOT EXCEED THE
AMOUNT PRESCRIBED IN THE REGULATIONS TO BE PROMULGATED BY THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE WHICH SHALL NOT BE LESS THAN P350,000.00 OR
HIGHER THAN P600,000.00 x x x Under the Senate Bill, the amount is P240,000.00. The
BCC agreed at the amount of not less than P480,000.00 or more than P720,000.00
SUBJECT TO TAX UNDER SEC. 112 OF THIS CODE.
The BCC did not include, as VAT exempt, the sale or transfer of securities as defined in
the Revised Securities Act (BP 178) which was contained in both Senate and House Bills.
V On Section 104
The phrase INCLUDING PACKAGING MATERIALS was included by the BCC

on Section 104 (A) (1) (B), and the phrase ON WHICH A VALUE-ADDED TAX HAS
BEEN ACTUALLY on Section 104 (A) (2). These phrases are not contained in either
House and Senate Bills.
VI On Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT
registration fee. The BCC provides for P1,000.00 VAT fee.
VII On Section 112

While both the Senate and House Bills provide that a person whose sales or
receipts and are exempt under Section 103[w] of the Code, and who are not VAT
registered shall pay a tax equivalent to THREE (3) PERCENT of his gross quarterly
sales or receipts, the BCC inserted the phrase: THREE PERCENT UPON THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS
THEREAFTER.
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VIII On Section 115
Sec. 17 of SB 1630, Sec. 12 of House Bill 11197 amends this Section by clarifying
that common carriers by land, air or water FOR THE TRANSPORT OF
PASSENGERS are subject to Percentage Tax equivalent to 3% of their quarterly
gross sales.
The BCC adopted this and the House Bills provision that the GROSS
RECEIPTS OF COMMON CARRIERS DERIVED FROM THEIR INCOMING AND
OUTGOING FREIGHT SHALL NOT BE SUBJECTED TO THE LOCAL TAXES
IMPOSED UNDER RA 7160. The Senate Bill has no similar provision.
IX On Section 117
This Section has not been touched by either Senate and House Bills. But the
BCC amended it by subjecting franchises on ELECTRIC, GAS and WATER
UTILITIES A TAX OF TWO PERCENT (2%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS DERIVED x x
x.
X On Section 121
The BCC adopted the Senate Bills amendment to this section by subjecting to
5% premium tax on life insurance business. The House Bill does not contain this
provision.
XI Others
1. A)The House Bill does not contain any provision on the deferment of VAT
collection on Certain Goods and Services as does the Senate Bill (Section 19,
SB 1630). But although the Senate Bill authorizes the deferment on certain
goods and services for no longer than 3 years, there is no specific provision
that authorizes the President to EXCLUDE from VAT any of these. The
BCC uses the word EXCLUDE.
2. B)Moreover, the Senate Bill defers the VAT on services of actors and
actresses etc. for 3 years but the BCC defers it for only 2 years.
3. C)Section 18 of the BCC Bill (RA 7716) is an entirely new provision not
contained in the House/Senate Bills.
4. D)The period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations is within 60 days under SB 1630; No specific period under the
House Bill, within 90 days under RA 7716 (BCC).
5. E)The House Bill provides for a general repealing clause i.e., all inconsistent
laws etc. are repealed. Section 16 of the Senate Bill expressly repeals
Sections 113, 114, 116, 119 and 120 of the code. The same Senate Bill
however contains a general repealing clause in Sec. 21
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VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 811
1994
Finance
1. thereof.
RA 7716 (BCCs Bill) expressly repeals Sections 113, 114 and 116 of the NIRC;
Article 39 (c) (d) and (e) of EO 226 and provides the repeal of Sec. 119 and 120 of the
NIRC upon the expiration of two (2) years unless otherwise excluded by the
President.
The charge that the Bicameral Conference Committee added new

provisions in the bills of the two chambers is hardly disputed by
respondents. Instead, respondents justify them. According to respondents:
(1) the Bicameral Conference Committee has an ex postveto power or a
veto after the fact of approval of the bill by both Houses; (2) the bill
prepared by the Bicameral Conference Committee, with its additions and
deletions, was anyway approved by both Houses; (3) it was the practice in
past Congresses for conference committees to insert in bills approved by
the two Houses new provisions that were not originally contemplated by
them; and (4) the enrolled bill doctrine precludes inquiry into the
regularity of the proceedings that led to the enactment of R.A. 7716.
With due respect, I reject these contentions which will cave in on closer
examination.
First. There is absolutely no legal warrant for the bold submission that
a Bicameral Conference Committee possesses the power to add/delete
provisions in bills already approved on third reading by both Houses or
an ex post veto power. To support this postulate that can enfeeble
Congress itself, respondents cite no constitutional provision, no law, not
even any rule or regulation. Worse, their stance is categorically
3
repudiated by the rules of both the Senate and the House of

Representatives which define with precision the parameters of power of a
Bicameral Conference Committee.
Thus, Section 209, Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on
the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a
conference committee of both Houses
_______________
3 See p. 66 of the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents where they refer to certain statements
from Canlan, Weightson and Beam but without citing their specific book or article.
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which shall meet within ten days after their composition.
explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and
shall be signed by the conferees. (Emphasis supplied)
The counterpart rule of the House of Representatives is cast in near

identical language. Section 85 of the Rules of the House of Representatives
pertinently provides:
In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to
any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by a conference committee
of both chambers.
x x x. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the
changes in or amendments to the subject measure. (Emphasis supplied)
The Jeffersons Manual has been adopted as a supplement to our

4
parliamentary rules and practice. Section 456 of Jeffersons Manual

similarly confines the powers of a conference committee, viz: 5
The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences

committed to them . . . and may not include subjects not within the disagreements,
even though germane to a question in issue.
This rule of antiquity has been honed and honored in practice by the
Congress of the United States. Thus, it is chronicled by Floyd Biddick,
Parliamentarian Emeritus of the United States Senate, viz: 6
Committees of conference are appointed for the sole purpose of compromising and
adjusting the differing and conflicting opinions of the two Houses and the
committees of conference alone can grant
________________
4 See Rule 49 of the Rules of the Senate.

5 See p. 22, Memorandum of Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 citing Jeffersons Manual and Rules of the
House of Representatives, by Lewis Deschler, Parliamentarian, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, p.
264.
6 Ibid, citing Riddick, Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, US Senate, 1981, US Government
Printing Office, pp. 383-384.
813
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 813
1994
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compromises and modify propositions of either Houses within the limits of the
disagreement. Conferees are limited to the consideration of differences between the
two Houses.
Conferees shall not insert in their report matters not committed to them by either
House, nor shall they strike from the bill matters agreed to by both Houses. No
matter on which there is nothing in either the Senate or House passed versions of a
bill may be included in the conference report and actions to the contrary would
subject the report to a point of order. (Emphasis ours)
In fine, there is neither a sound nor a syllable in the Rules of the Senate
and the House of Representatives to support the thesis of the respondents
that a bicameral conference committee is clothed with an ex post veto
power.
But the thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can wield ex
post veto power does not only contravene the rules of both the Senate and
the House. It wages war against our settled ideals of representative
democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of the thesis is to install
a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third Chamber of our
Congress, similarlyvested with the power to make laws but with
thedissimilarity that its laws are not the subject of a free and full
discussion of both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant power, a
Bicameral Conference Committee acting as a Third Chamber will be a
constitutional monstrosity.
It needs no omniscience to perceive that our Constitution did not
provide for a Congress composed of three chambers. On the contrary,
section 1, Article VI of the Constitution provides in clear and certain
language: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines whichshall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives
. . . . Note that in vesting legislative power exclusively to the Senate and
the House, the Constitution used the word shall. Its command for a
Congress of two houses is mandatory. It is not mandatory sometimes.
In vesting legislative power to the Senate, the Constitution means the
Senate . . . composed of twenty-four Senators x x x elected at large by the
qualified voters of the Philippines . . . . Similarly, when the Constitution
7
vested the legislative power to

________________
7 Section 2, Article VI.
814
814 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
the House, it means the House . . . composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members x x x who shall be elected from legislative
districts x x x and those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. The Constitution thus, did not vest on a Bicameral
8
Conference Committee with an ad hocmembership the power to legislate

for it exclusively vested legislative power to the Senate and the House as
co-equal bodies. To be sure, the Constitution does not mention the
Bicameral Conference Committees of Congress. No constitutional status is
accorded to them. They are not even statutory creations. They owe their
existence from the internal rules of the two Houses of Congress. Yet,
respondents peddle the disconcerting idea that they should be recognized
as a Third Chamber of Congress and with ex post veto power at that.
The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can exercise law
making power withex post veto power is freighted with mischief. Law
making his a power that can be used for good or for ill, hence, our
Constitution carefully laid out a plan and a procedure for its exercise.
Firstly, it vouchsafed that the power to make laws should be exercised by
no other body except the Senate and the House. It ought to be indubitable
that what is contemplated is the Senate acting as a full Senate and the
House acting as a full House. It is only when the Senate and the House act
as whole bodies that they truly represent the people. And it is only when
they represent the people that they can legitimately pass laws. Laws that
are not enacted by the peoples rightful representatives subvert the
peoples sovereignty. Bicameral Conference Committees, with their ad
hoccharacter and limited membership, cannot pass laws for they do not
represent the people. The Constitution does not allow the tyranny of the
majority. Yet, the respondents will impose the worst kind of tyrannythe
tyranny of the minority over the majority. Secondly, the Constitution
delineated in deft strokes the steps to be followed in making laws. The
overriding purpose of these procedural rules is to assure that only bills
that successfully survive the searching scrutiny of the proper committees
of Congress and the full and
________________
8 Section 5(1), Article VI.
815
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 815
1994
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unfettered deliberations of both Houses can become laws. For this reason,
a bill has to undergo three (3) mandatory separate readings in each House.
In the case at bench, the additions and deletions made by the Bicameral
Conference Committee did not enjoy the enlightened studies of
appropriate committees. It is meet to note that the complexities of modern
day legislations have made our committee system a significant part of the
legislative process. Thomas Reed called the committee system as the eye,
the ear, the hand, and very often the brain of the house. President
Woodrow Wilson of the United States once referred to the government of
the United States as a government by the Chairmen of the Standing
Committees of Congress . . . . Neither did these additions and deletions of
9
the Bicameral Conference Committee pass through the coils of collective

deliberation of the members of the two Houses acting separately. Due to
this shortcircuiting of the constitutional procedure of making laws,
confusion shrouds the enactment of R.A. No. 7716. Who inserted the
additions and deletions remains a mystery. Why they were inserted is a
riddle. To use a Churchillian phrase, lawmaking should not be a riddle
wrapped in an enigma. It cannot be, for Article II, section 28 of the
Constitution mandates the State to adopt and implement a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. The
Constitution could not have contemplated a Congress of invisible and
unaccountable John and Mary Does. A law whose rationale is a riddle and
whose authorship is obscure cannot bind the people.
All these notwithstanding, respondents resort to the legal cosmetology
that these additions and deletions should govern the people as laws
because the Bicameral Conference Committee Report was anyway
submitted to and approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The submission may have some merit with respect to
provisions agreed upon by the Committee in the process of reconciling
conflicts between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. In these instances,
the conflicting provisions had been previously screened by the proper
committees, deliberated upon by both Houses and approved by them. It is,
however, a different matter with respect to additions and deletions
________________
9 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I, p. 151.

816
816 SUPREME COURT
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which were entirely new and which were made not to reconcile
inconsistencies between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. The members
of the Bicameral Conference Committee did not have any authority to add
new provisions or delete provisions already approved by both Houses as it
was not necessary to discharge their limited task of reconciling differences
in bills. At that late stage of law making, the Conference Committee
cannot add/ delete provisions which can become laws without undergoing
the study and deliberation of both chambers given to bills on 1st, 2nd, and
3rd readings. Even the Senate and the House cannot enact a law which
will not undergo these mandatory three (3) readings required by the
Constitution. If the Senate and the House cannot enact such a law, neither
can the lesser Bicameral Conference Committee.
Moreover, the so-called choice given to the members of both Houses to
either approve or disapprove the said additions and deletions is more of an
optical illusion. These additions and deletions are not submitted
separately for approval. They are tucked to the entire bill. The vote is on
the bill as a package, i.e., together with the insertions and deletions. And
the vote is either aye or nay, without any further debate and
deliberation. Quite often, legislators vote yes because they approve of the
bill as a whole although they may object to its amendments by the
Conference Committee. This lack of real choice is well observed by Robert
Luce: 10
Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees must be
accepted without amendment or else rejectedin toto. The impulse is to get done with
the matter and so the motion to accept has undue advantage, for some members are
sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable provisions rather than prolong controversy.
This is the more likely if the report comes in the rush of business toward the end of
a session, when to seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure
altogether. At any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following
the rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to secure a second
conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal chance to develop
more strength.
________________
10 Legislative Procedure, 1922 ed., Riverside Press, p. 404.
817
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 817
1994
Finance
In a similar vein, Prof. Jack Davies commented that conference reports
are returned to assembly and Senate on a take-it or leave-it-basis, and the
bodies are generally placed in the position that to leave-it is a practical
impossibility. Thus, he concludes that conference committee action is the
11
most undemocratic procedure in the legislative process. 12
The respondents also contend that the additions and deletions made by
the Bicameral Conference Committee were in accord with legislative
customs and usages. The argument does not persuade for it
misappreciates the value of customs and usages in the hierarchy of sources
of legislative rules of procedure. To be sure, every legislative assembly has
the inherent right to promulgate its own internal rules. In our jurisdiction,
Article VI, section 16(3) of the Constitution provides that Each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings x x x. But it is hornbook law
that the sources of Rules of Procedure are many and hierarchical in
character. Mason laid them down as follows: 13
x x x
1.Rules of Procedure are derived from several sources. The principal sources
are as follows:
1. a.Constitutional rules.
2. b.Statutory rules or charter provisions.
3. c.Adopted rules.
4. d.Judicial decisions.
5. e.Adopted parliamentary authority.
6. f.Parliamentary law.
7. g.Customs and usages.
1. 2.The rules from the different sources take precedence in the order listed
aboveexcept that judicial decisions, since they are interpretations of rules
from one of the other sources, take the same precedence as the source
interpreted. Thus, for example, an interpretation of a constitutional
provision takes precedence over a statute.
2. 3.Whenever there is conflict between rules from these sources the rule from the
source listed earlier prevails over the rule from the source
_______________
11 Legislative Law and Process in a Nut Shell, West Publishing Co., 1986 ed., p. 81.
12 Ibid.
13 Manual of Legislative Procedure for Legislative and other Governmental Bodies, McGraw Hill Co.,
Inc., 1953 ed., pp. 32-33.
818
818 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
1. listed, later. Thus, where the Constitution requires three readings of bills,
this provision controls over any provision of statute, adopted rules, adopted
manual, or of parliamentary law, and a rule of parliamentary law controls
over a local usage but must give way to any rule from a higher source of
authority. (Emphasis ours)
As discussed above, the unauthorized additions and deletions made by the

Bicameral Conference Committee violated the procedure fixed by the
Constitution in the making of laws. It is reasonless for respondents
therefore to justify these insertions as sanctioned by customs and usages.
Finally, respondents seek sanctuary in the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill to bar any judicial inquiry on whether Congress observed our
constitutional procedure in the passage of R.A. No. 7716. The enrolled bill
theory is a historical relic that should not continuously rule us from the
fossilized past. It should be immediately emphasized that the enrolled bill
theory originated in England where there is no written constitution and
where Parliament is supreme. In this jurisdiction, we have a written
14
constitution and the legislature is a body of limited powers. Likewise, it

must be pointed out that starting from the decade of the 40s, even
American courts have veered away from the rigidity and unrealism of the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill. Prof. Sutherland observed: 15
x x x.
Where the failure of constitutional compliance in the enactment of statutes is not
discoverable from the face of the act itself but may be demonstrated by recourse to
the legislative journals, debates, committee reports or papers of the governor, courts
have used several conflicting theories with which to dispose of the issue. They have
held: (1) that the enrolled bill is conclusive and like the sheriffs return cannot be
attacked; (2) that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only in case the
legislative journal shows affirmative contradiction of the constitutional requirement
will the bill be held invalid, (3) that although the enrolled bill isprima facie correct,
evidence from the journals, or other extrinsic sources is admissible to strike the bill
down; (4) that the legislative journal is conclusive and the enrolled bill is valid only
if it
_______________
14 82 CJS 136.
15 Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I., p. 223.
819
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 819
1994
Finance
accords with the recital in the journal and the constitutional procedure.
Various jurisdictions have adopted these alternative approaches in view of

strong dissent and dissatisfaction against the philosophical underpinnings
of the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill. Prof. Sutherland further observed:
x x x Numerous reasons have been given for this rule. Traditionally, an enrolled
bill was a record and as such was not subject to attack at common law. Likewise,
the rule of conclusiveness was similar to the common law rule of the inviolability of
the sheriffs return. Indeed, they had the same origin, that is, the sheriff was an
officer of the king and likewise the parliamentary act was a regal act and no official
might dispute the kings word. Transposed to our democratic system of government,
courts held that as the legislature was an official branch of government the court
must indulge every presumption that the legislative act was valid. The doctrine of
separation of powers was advanced as a strong reason why the court should treat
the acts of a co-ordinate branch of government with the same respect as it treats the
action of its own officers; indeed, it was thought that it was entitled to even greater
respect, else the court might be in the position of reviewing the work of a supposedly
equal branch of government. When these arguments failed, as they frequently did,
the doctrine of convenience was advanced, that is, that it was not only an undue
burden upon the legislature to preserve its records to meet the attack of persons not
affected by the procedure of enactment, but also that it unnecessarily complicated
litigation and confused the trial of substantive issues.
Although many of these arguments are persuasive and are indeed the basis for
the rule in many states today, they are not invulnerable to attack. The rule most
relied onthe sheriffs return or sworn official ruledid not in civil litigation
deprive the injured party of an action, for always he could sue the sheriff upon his
official bond. Likewise, although collateral attack was not permitted, direct attack
permitted raising the issue of fraud, and at a later date attack in equity was also
available; and that the evidence of the sheriff was not of unusual weight was
demonstrated by the fact that in an action against the sheriff no presumption of its
authenticity prevailed.
The argument that the enrolled bill is a record and therefore unimpeachable is
likewise misleading, for the correction of records is a matter of established judicial
procedure. Apparently, the justification is either the historical one that the kings
word could not be questioned or the separation of powers principle that one branch
of the government must treat as valid the acts of another.
820
820 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
Persuasive as these arguments are, the tendency today is to avoid reaching results by
artificial presumptions and thus it would seem desirable to insist that the enrolled
bill stand or fall on the basis of the relevant evidence which may be submitted for or
against it. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, as far back as the 1940s, Prof. Sutherland confirmed that x x x the
tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive
presumption rule and the adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima
facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any authoritative
source of information. 16
I am not unaware that this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness

of an enrolled bill as enunciated in the 1947 lead case of Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito, and reiterated in subsequent cases. 17
With due respect, I submit that these rulings are no longer good law.
Part of the ratiocination in Mabanag states:
x x x.
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our law
making body, we choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: Official documents may be
proved as follows: * * * (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress,
by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
________________
16 Op. cit., pp. 224-225 citingBarndall Refining v. Welsh, 64 S.D. 647, 269 N.W. 853, 859
[1936]. Jones, Constitutional Provisions Regulating the Mechanics of Enactment in
Iowa (1935), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 79, Charlton, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative
Procedure (1936), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 538; Note (1936) 21 Iowa Law Rev. 573.
17 See Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. Rep. 1 [1947]; Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez,L-17931, February 28, 1963;Morales v. Subido, No. L-29658, February 27,
1969, 27 SCRA 131;Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November 11, 1993.
821
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 821
1994
Finance
Suffice to state that section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure as
amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our statute books. It has long
been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanagalso relied on jurisprudence
and authorities in the United States which are under severe criticisms by
modern scholars. Hence, even in the United States the conclusiveness of
an enrolled bill has been junked by most of the States. It is also true that
as late as last year, in the case of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado,
op. cit., this Court still relied on the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill as it
refused to invalidate a provision of law on the ground that it was merely
inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses. Prado, however, is distinguishable. InPrado, the alleged insertion
of the second paragraph of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing the
franking privilege of the judiciary does not appear to be an uncontested
fact. In the case at bench, the numerous additions/deletions made by the
Bicameral Conference Committee as detailed by petitioners Tolentino and
Salonga are not disputed by the respondents. In Prado,the Court was not
also confronted with the argument that it can no longer rely on the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill in light of the new provision in the
Constitution defining judicial power. More specifically, section 1 of Article
VIII now provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision

in the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the reach of
judicial power as follows: 18
_______________
18 Record, Constitutional Commission, Vol. I, p. 436; see also, Bernas, The Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines. A Commentary, 1988 ed., p. 255.
822
822 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
x x x.
x x x In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1,which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute political question.(Emphasis ours)
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is

not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government
despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators
being elected by the people. It is, however, theorized that this provision is
nothing new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the significant changes
19
made in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we

discovered during martial law. One of the areas radically changed by the
framers of the 1987 Constitution is the imbalance of power between and
among the three great branches of our governmentthe Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the independence of
courts. Thus, it further protected the security of tenure of the members of
the Judiciary by providing No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members. It 20
also guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary. 21
More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the

Judicial and Bar Council which was tasked with
_______________
19 Citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 L. ed [1803].

20 Article VIII, section 2.
823
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 823
1994
Finance
screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of
22
confirming appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from

Congress. The President was likewise given a specific time to fill up
23
vacancies in the judiciaryninety (90) days from the occurrence of the

vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the
24
submission of the list of recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in

case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further insulate appointments in
25
the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was given the
power to appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. And to make the separation of the judiciary
26
from the other branches of government more watertight, it prohibited

members of the judiciary to be . . . designated to any agency performing
quasi judicial or administrative functions. While the Constitution
27
strengthened the sinews of the Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of

the two other branches of government, especially the Executive. Notable of
the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The
exercise of this power is now subject to revocation by Congress. Likewise,
the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power may be
reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.28
The provision defining judicial power as including the duty of the

courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the
powers of this Courtvis-a-vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught
us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
_______________

24 Article VIII, section 4(1).
28 Article VII, section 18.
824
824 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS ANNOTATED
Finance
abuses in government. As sharply stressed by petitioner Salonga, this
provision is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. It is
thus crystal clear that unlike other Supreme Courts, this Court has been
mandated by our new Constitution to be a more active agent in annulling
acts of grave abuse of discretion committed by a branch of government or
any of its officials. This new role, however, will not compel the Court,
appropriately defined by Prof. A. Bickel as the least dangerous branch of
government, to assume imperial powers and run roughshod over the
principle of separation of power for that is judicial tyranny by any
language. But while respecting the essentials of the principle of separation
of power, the Court is not to be restricted by its non-essentials. Applied to
the case at bench, by voiding R.A. No. 7716 on the ground that its
enactment violated the procedure imposed by the Constitution in
lawmaking, the Court is not by any means wrecking the wall separating
the powers between the legislature and the judiciary. For in so doing, the
Court is not engaging in lawmaking which is the essence of legislative
power. But the Courts interposition of power should not be defeated by
the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. A resort to this fiction will result in
the enactment of laws not properly deliberated upon and passed by
Congress. Certainly, the enrolled bill theory was not conceived to cover up
violations of the constitutional procedure in law making, a procedure
intended to assure the passage of good laws. The conclusiveness of the
enrolled bill can, therefore, be disregarded for it is not necessary to
preserve the principle of separation of powers.
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by initially
determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a
shift in stressthis Court is mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do.
The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past
that petrifies the present.
825
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 825
1994
Finance
I vote to declare R.A. No. 7716 unconstitutional.
Petitions dismissed.
Notes.Despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when
confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law
or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at
this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its
conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies
that cannot influence its decisions. (Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990])
We start with the established principle that the exclusive nature of any
public franchise is not favored. We may interpret in favor of exclusiveness
only when the statute grants it in express, clear, and unmistakable terms.
In all grants by the government to private corporations, the interpretation
of rights, privileges, or franchises is taken against the grantee. Whatever
is not clearly and expressly granted is withheld. (Alger Electric, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 37 [1985])
o0o

9.tolentino V Sec Finance 235 Scra 630

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630 SUPREME COURT

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,vs. THE SECRETARY OF

JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as

RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Constitutional Law;Statutes; Taxation; Origin of revenue bills; A bill originating

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

NARVASA, C.J., Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Statutes; Origin of Revenue Bills; Origination should have

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

CRUZ, J., Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Judicial Review; Where a specific procedure is fixed by the

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Statutes; Origin of Revenue Bills; The approval by the

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Judicial Review; Separation of Powers; It is not believed

REGALADO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Expanded VAT Law; The Senate clearly and deliberately

DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

ROMERO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Expanded VAT Law;Bicameral Conference Committee; A

BELLOSILLO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Origin of Revenue Bills;Statutory Construction; The

VOL. 235, AUGUST 6

PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law;Bicameral Conference Committee; Ex Post Veto

ORIGINAL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of

II. Substantive Issues:

seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue

verb shall originate is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the

ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of

as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating

3 Art. VII, 21.

President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential

requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chambers

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference

13 Zinn, Conference Procedure in Congress, 38 ABAJ 864-865 (1952).

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a

committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions,

16 W. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND POLICY PROCESS 214

Rules of the House of Representatives

To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a

procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As

19 Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871 (1960).

persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the

determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by

Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is 103, which originally

The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in

This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the

25 40 Phil. 224 (1919).

The PPI does not dispute this point, either.