YOKOHAMA TIRE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.

YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION

G.R. No. 159553 December 10, 2007
Facts: Yokohama Employees Union (Union) filed a petition for certification election among the
rank-and-file employees of Yokohama. The results are as follows:
13
YOKOHAMA EMPLOYEES UNION 1
11
NO UNION - 7
SPOILED - 2
25
0
VOTES CHALLENGED BY
[YOKOHAMA] 78
VOTES CHALLENGED BY [UNION] 73
15
TOTAL CHALLENGED VOTES
1
40
TOTAL VOTES CAST
1

Yokohama challenged 78 votes cast by dismissed employees while Union challenged 68 votes
cast by newly regularized rank-and-file employees and another five (5) votes by alleged
supervisor-trainees.

Issue: Whether it is proper to appreciate the votes of the dismissed employees?

Law Applicable: Section 2, Rule XII, Book V of the Labor Code

Case History:
On January 21, 2002, the Med-Arbiter resolved the parties protests appreciating
the 65 votes of dismissed employees to be suspended until the final disposition of their
complaint and including the 68 newly-regularized rank-and-file employees.
On May 22, 2002, the DOLE Acting Secretary partially granted the appeal as follows
votes of dismissed employees who ntested their dismissal shall be appreciated and the 68)
newly regularized rank-and-file employees shall be excluded
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the DOLE Acting Secretary
Yokohama appealed to the Supreme Court.

Ruling:
Yes. Section 2, Rule XII, the rule in force during the November 23, 2001 certification
election clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously allows dismissed employees to vote during
the certification election if the case they filed contesting their dismissal is still pending at the
time of the election. Hence, no reversible error on the part of DOLE Acting Secretary and the
Court of Appeals in ordering the appreciation of the votes of the dismissed employees.
Opinion:
The Court is correct. When the law
LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED, Petitioner, v. KILUSANG
MANGGAGAWA NG LEGENDA (KML-INDEPENDENT), Respondent.

FACTS:

KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga, a
Petition for Certification Election. LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is
not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and
supervisory employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. KML argued that even if
41 of its members are indeed supervisory employees and therefore excluded from its
membership, the certification election could still proceed because the required number of the
total rank and file employees necessary for certification purposes is still sustained. KML also
claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union could not be collaterally attacked in the certification
election proceedings but only through a separate and independent action for cancellation of
union registration.

ISSUE: Whether the legal personality of KML can be collaterally attacked in a petition for
certification election proceeding?
Law Applicable: Section 5, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V
Case History:
On June 6, 2001, KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando,
Pampanga, a Petition for Certification Election
On September 20, 2001, the Med-Arbiter rendered judgment dismissing for lack of merit the
petition for certification election
On May 22, 2002, the Office of the Secretary of DOLE rendered its
Decision[6] granting KMLs appeal thereby reversing and setting aside the Med-
Arbiters Decision.
LEGEND filed its Motion for Reconsideration August 20, 2002, the Office of the
Secretary of DOLE denied LEGENDs motion for reconsideration.

HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious.

LABOR LAW: Certification election

However, a certification election may still be conducted during the pendency of the cancellation
proceedings. This is because at the time the petition for certification was filed, the petitioning
union is presumed to possess the legal personality to file the same. There is therefore no basis for
LEGENDs assertion that the cancellation of KMLs certificate of registration should retroact to
the time of its issuance or that it effectively nullified all of KMLs activities, including its filing
of the petition for certification election and its demand to collectively bargain. Also, the
legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for
certification election proceeding.

G.R. No. 169717 : March 16, 2011

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS

IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER),
ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO Union President, Petitioner, v. CHARTER CHEMICAL
AND COATING CORPORATION, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO,J.:

FACTS:

Samahang Manggagawasa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for

Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a petition for certification election among the
regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent
company) with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE. Respondent company opposedon
the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of failure to
comply with the documentation requirements set by law the charter certificate was not executed
under oath, and the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union. The Med-Arbiter
dismissed the petition. The DOLE, on appeal, granted the petition for certification election but
the CA reversed the DOLE decision. The appellate court gave credence to the findings of the
Med-Arbiter.

Petitioner union claims that the litigation of the issue as to its legal personality to file the subject
petition for certification election is barred by the Decision of the DOLE. In this decision, the
DOLE ruled that petitioner union complied with all the documentation requirements and that
there was no independent evidence presented to prove an illegal mixture of supervisory and rank-
and-file employees in petitioner union. After the promulgation of this Decision, respondent
company did not move for reconsideration, thus, this issue must be deemed settled.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner union has legal personality to file for a petition for
certification election.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is

LABOR LAW

The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor organization provided
that it complies with the requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of supervisory
employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization.

Petitioner unions charter certificate need not be executed under oath. Consequently, it validly
acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter
certificate,(2) the names of its officers, their addresses, and its principal office,and (3) its
constitution and by-laws the last two requirements having been executed under oath by the
proper union officials as borne out by the records.
SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
SUPERVISORS and EXEMPT UNION
G.R. No. 146206 August 1, 2011
FACTS:
DOLE-NCR conducted pre-election conferences. However, there was a discrepancy in the list of
eligible voters. Petitioner submitted a list of 23 employees for the San Fernando plant and 33 for
the Cabuyao plant, while respondent listed 60 and 82, respectively.
The Med-Arbiter issued an order directing the Election Officer to proceed with the conduct of
Certification Election.
On the date of the election, petitioner filed the Omnibus Objections and Challenge to
Voters, questioning the eligibility to vote by some of its employees on the grounds that some
employees do not belong to the bargaining unit which respondent seeks to represent or that there
is no existence of employer-employee relationship with petitioner. Specifically, it argued that
certain employees should not be allowed to vote as they are: (1) confidential employees; (2)
employees assigned to the live chicken operations, which are not covered by the bargaining unit;
(3) employees whose job grade is level 4, but are performing managerial work and scheduled to
be promoted; (4) employees who belong to the Barrio Ugong plant; (5) non-SMFI employees;
and (6) employees who are members of other unions.
The CE was conducted. Based on the results, Med-Arbiter issued an order stating respondent is
certified to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisors and exempt employees of
petitioner's Magnolia Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis.
Petitioner contends that identifying the specific employees who can participate in the
certification election, the supervisors (levels 1 to 4) and exempt employees of San
Miguel Poultry Products Plants in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis, the CA erred in expanding
the scope of the bargaining unit so as to include employees who do not belong to or who are not
based in its Cabuyao or San Fernando plants. It also alleges that the employees of the Cabuyao,
San Fernando, and Otis plants of petitioners predecessor, San Miguel Corporation, were
engaged in "dressed" chicken processing, like handling and packaging of chicken meat, while the
new bargaining unit, includes employees engaged in "live" chicken operations, such as those
who breed chicks and grow chickens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct.
HELD:
No.
Employees of San Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San
Fernando, and Otis constitute a single bargaining unit, which is not contrary to the one-company,
one-union policy.
An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of
all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve
the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the
law.
Under the "community or mutuality of interests" test, It held that while the existence of a
bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the appropriate
bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The
test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an
asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination
which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. There
may be differences as to the nature of their individual assignments, but the distinctions are not
enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
Applying the ruling to the present case, SC affirms the finding of the CA that there should be
only one bargaining unit for the employees in Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis of Magnolia
Poultry Products Plant involved in "dressed" chicken processing and Magnolia Poultry Farms
engaged in "live" chicken operations. Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working
conditions, location of work, mode of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect
or impede their commonality of interest. Although they seem separate and distinct from each
other, the specific tasks of each division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of
interests which warrants the formation of a single bargaining unit.
It bears stressing that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers; hence, an
employer lacks the personality to dispute the same. The general rule is that an employer has no
standing to question the process of certification election, since this is the sole concern of the
workers.[37] Law and policy demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification
elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous
influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its loyalty
to the employees alone and to no other. [38] The only exception is where the employer itself has to
file the petition pursuant to Article 258 [39] of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain
collectively.[40]
ABBOTT LABORATORIES, PHILIPPINES, CECILLE A. TERRIBLE, EDWIN D.
FEIST, MARIA OLIVIA T. YABUTMISA, TERESITA C. BERNARDO, AND ALLAN G.
ALMAZAR, Petitioners, v. PEARLIE ANN F. ALCARAZ, Respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused the publication in a major broadsheet
newspaper of its need for a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. Alcaraz - who was then a
Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager at Aventis Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated
(another pharmaceutical company like Abbott) showed interest and submitted her application.

In Abbotts offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary basis.
Later that day, she accepted the said offer and received an electronic mail (e-mail) from Abbotts
Recruitment Officer, petitioner Teresita C. Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the same. Attached
to Bernardos e-mail were Abbotts organizational chart and a job description of Alcarazs work.

During Alcarazs pre-employment orientation, petitioner Allan G. Almazar (Almazar), Hospiras

Country Transition Manager, briefed her on her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs
Manager. Petitioner Kelly Walsh (Walsh), Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance Drug
Safety of Hospira, will be her immediate supervisor. Petitioner Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa
(Misa), Abbotts Human Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an
explanation of the procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary employees.

During the course of her employment, Alcaraz noticed that some of the staff had disciplinary
problems. Thus, she would reprimand them for their unprofessional behavior such as non-
observance of the dress code, moonlighting, and disrespect of Abbott officers. However, Alcarazs
method of management was considered by Walsh to be "too strict."

Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh and Terrible, Abbotts former HR Director, where she
was informed that she failed to meet the regularization standards for the position of Regulatory
Affairs Manager. Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo personally handed to Alcaraz a letter stating that
her services had been terminated effective May 19, 2005. The letter detailed the reasons for
Alcarazs termination. Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment and
thus, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against Abbott and its officers, namely,
Misa, Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist. She claimed that she should have already
been considered as a regular and not a probationary employee given Abbotts failure to inform her
of the reasonable standards for her regularization upon her engagement as required under Article
295of the Labor Code.

LA dismissed Alcarazs complaint for lack of merit. The LA rejected Alcarazs argument that she
was not informed of the reasonable standards to qualify as a regular employee. The NLRC
reversed the findings of the LA and ruled that there was no evidence showing that Alcaraz had
been apprised of her probationary status and the requirements which she should have complied
with in order to be a regular employee. On appeal, CA affirmed the NLRC decision. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alcaraz was illegally dismissed

HELD:

The probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of the engagement.

A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases
of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes of termination, an additional
ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary employee may
also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. Thus, the
services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any
of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.

A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied with the
above-stated requirements. This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that Abbott clearly
conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to,
during the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of her employment. On this score,
the Court finds it apt to detail not only the incidents which point out to the efforts made by
Abbott but also those circumstances which would show that Alcaraz was well-apprised of her
employers expectations that would, in turn, determine her regularization.

Abbott caused the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory
Affairs Manager, indicating therein the job description for as well as the duties and
responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position. In Abbotts December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it
was stated that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary status. On the day Alcaraz
accepted Abbotts employment offer, Bernardo sent her copies of Abbotts organizational structure
and her job description through e-mail. Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment
orientation where Almazar informed her that she had to implement Abbotts Code of Conduct and
office policies on human resources and finance and that she would be reporting directly to Walsh.
Alcaraz received copies of Abbotts Code of Conduct and Performance Modules from Misa who
explained to her the procedure for evaluating the performance of probationary employees; she
was further notified that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of its employees.

Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be doubted that
Alcaraz was well-aware that her regularization would depend on her ability and capacity to fulfill
the requirements of her position as Regulatory Affairs Manager and that her failure to perform
such would give Abbott a valid cause to terminate her probationary employment.

An employer who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid
procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages.

Despite the existence of a sufficient ground to terminate Alcarazs employment and Abbotts
compliance with the Labor Code termination procedure, it is readily apparent that Abbott
breached its contractual obligation to Alcaraz when it failed to abide by its own procedure in
evaluating the performance of a probationary employee.

Records show that Abbotts PPSE procedure mandates, inter alia, that the job performance of a
probationary employee should be formally reviewed and discussed with the employee at least
twice: first on the third month and second on the fifth month from the date of employment.
Abbott is also required to come up with a Performance Improvement Plan during the third month
review to bridge the gap between the employees performance and the standards set, if any. In
addition, a signed copy of the PPSE form should be submitted to Abbotts HRD as the same
would serve as basis for recommending the confirmation or termination of the probationary
employment.

In this case, it is apparent that Abbott failed to follow the above-stated procedure in evaluating
Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcarazs PPSE form was
submitted to the HRD. It was not even shown that a PPSE form was completed to formally
assess her performance. Neither was the performance evaluation discussed with her during the
third and fifth months of her employment. Nor did Abbott come up with the necessary
Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcarazs performance with the set company
standards.

In this light, while there lies due cause to terminate Alcarazs probationary employment for her
failure to meet the standards required for her regularization, and while it must be further pointed
out that Abbott had satisfied its statutory duty to serve a written notice of termination, the fact
that it violated its own company procedure renders the termination of Alcarazs employment
procedurally infirm, warranting the payment of nominal damages. A further exposition is
apropos.
HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL, Petitioner, v. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in
her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, and
PINAG-ISANG TINIG AT LAKAS NG ANAKPAWIS HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (HCCS-TELU-PIGLAS),
Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

On May 31, 2002, a petition for certification election was filed by private respondent Pinag-
Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis Holy Child Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor
Union (HCCS-TELUPIGLAS). In its Comment and Position Paper, petitioner raised that the
members of the union are a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees as
three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor, and eleven (11) are
coordinators. It is likewise a mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel. It insisted that, for
not being in accord with Article 245 of the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate
labor organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election, as held in
Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union and
in Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment.

The med arbiter denied the petition for certification election on the ground that the bargaining
unit is inappropriate. Private respondent appealed to the SOLE and the latter reversed the ruling
of the med arbiter and ordered two certification elections, one among teaching personnel and
another for non- teaching personnel. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA with
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The CA dismissed the
petition and ruled that the vice-principals, coordinators and department heads are not managerial
nor supervisory employees. Anent the alleged mixture of teaching and non-teaching personnel,
the CA agreed with petitioner that the nature of the formers work does not coincide with that of
the latter.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition before
the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in allowing the conduct of certification election

HELD:

Labor Law

When the issue of the effect of mingling was brought to the fore in Toyota, the Court, citing
Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, it was held:

Clearly, based on this provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a
legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-
and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of
collective bargaining.

In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for certification election was one
for supervisory employees, but in which the membership included rank-and-file employees, the
Court reiterated that such labor organization had no legal right to file a certification election to
represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file
employees among its members.

It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved in Toyota and
Dunlop were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15, 1995, respectively; hence, the 1989
Rules was applied in both cases.

But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further amended by
Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended Omnibus Rules).

Then came Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-
PTGWO in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the legitimacy of a labor
organization and its right to file a petition for certification election. This time, given the altered
legal milieu, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted to its
pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the
effects thereof.

Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the
rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and
rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the
grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

In San Miguel Corp. (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue Packing Products Plants-
San Miguel Packaging Products-San Miguel Corp. Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW, the
Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter
to provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said
local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to its individual members.

More to the point is Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, the Court therein
reiterated its ruling in Tagaytay Highlands that the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees
is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of
the Labor Code.

All said, while the latest issuance is R.A. No. 9481, the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules, as
interpreted by the Court in Tagaytay Highlands, San Miguel and Air Philippines, had already set
the tone for it. Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of the law and
the rules.

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an
employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the unions certificate of
registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended.To reiterate, private respondent,
having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired
juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally.

On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited
to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of
the law."

Petitioner appears to have confused the concepts of membership in a bargaining unit and
membership in a union. In emphasizing the phrase "to the exclusion of academic employees"
stated in U.P. v. Ferrer-Calleja, petitioner believed that the petitioning union could not admit
academic employees of the university to its membership. But such was not the intention of the
Supreme Court.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented by a petitioning union. Such

employees need not be members of a union seeking the conduct of a certification election. A
union certified as an exclusive bargaining agent represents not only its members but also other
employees who are not union members.

In the same manner, the teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner school must form
separate bargaining units. Thus, the order for the conduct of two separate certification elections,
one involving teaching personnel and the other involving non-teaching personnel. It should be
stressed that in the subject petition, private respondent union sought the conduct of a certification
election among all the rank-and-file personnel of petitioner school. Since the decision of the
Supreme Court in the U.P. case prohibits us from commingling teaching and non-teaching
personnel in one bargaining unit, they have to be separated into two separate bargaining units
with two separate certification elections to determine whether the employees in the respective
bargaining units desired to be represented by private respondent.
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC)

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents filed a petition for certification of pre-election with the DOLE. The Med-Arbiter
approved the pre-election. However, the certification election was delayed, but pushed through
nonetheless. Petitioner filed for cancellation of the certification due to the failure of respondent
to submit its financial statements to the Bureau of Labor Relations. The Med-Arbiter still ruled in
favor of respondents. Petitioner appealed the decision to the regional director of the DOLE. The
Regional director still rendered a decision in favor of respondents, which prompted petitioners to
appeal the decision to the director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. The director of the BLR
inhibited from the issue, as he was previously the counsel of respondents. The Secretary of Labor
resolved the issue in the stead of the BLR director. She ruled in favor of respondents. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but was turned down. Petitioner then
filed for certiorari, challenging the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary. An appeal from the
decision of the Regional Director is supposed to be under the jurisdiction of the BLR. Also,
petitioner claims to have been deprived of due process as it was not informed of the inhibition of
the BLR director.

ISSUES: Whether or not the ruling of the secretary of labor was valid.
Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of due process.

HELD:

Labor Law

It is without question that the appeal from the decision of the regional office is within the
jurisdiction of the BLR. Given the circumstances, the BLR director inhibited himself. Petitioner
insists that the case should have gone to the subordinates of the BLR director. However, this
happens in cases where the director is incapacitated. This does not obtain as the director merely
inhibited himself. On the other hand, the Secretary of DOLE has powers of supervision and
control over the BLR. As such, it may validly step into the shoes of the BLR director and resolve
the issue.

G.R. No. 172666 : December 7, 2011

PICOP RESOURCES, INCORPORATED (PRI), Represented in this Petition by MR.

WILFREDO D. FUENTES, in his capacity as Senior Vice-President and Resident Manager,
Petitioner, v. RICARDO DEQUILLA, ELMO PABILANDO, CESAR ATIENZA and
ANICETO ORBETA, JR., and NAMAPRI-SPFI, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

The late Atty. Fuentes advised the PICOP management to terminate about 800 employees due to
acts of disloyalty, specifically, for allegedly campaigning, supporting and signing a petition for
the certification of a rival union, the Federation of Free Workers Union(FFW) before the 60-day
"freedom period" and during the effectivity of the CBA. Such acts of disloyalty were construed
to be a valid cause for termination under the terms and conditions of the CBA.

PICOP served a notice of termination due to acts of disloyalty to 31 of the 46 employees. Private
respondents were among the 31 employees dismissed from employment by PICOP. Enraged at
what management did to them, private respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC Regional
Arbitration for Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal Dismissal with money claims, damages and
attorneys fees. LA rendered a decision declaring as illegal the termination of the private
respondents.

PICOP elevated the LA decision to the NLRC but its appeal was dismissed. Upon the denial of
their motion for reconsideration, the private respondents brought the case to the CA. CA
rendered the subject decision reversing and setting aside the NLRC resolution and reinstating the
Decision of the LA.

The CA ruled, among others, that although private respondents signed an authorization for the
filing of the petition for certification election of a rival union, PICOP Democratic Trade
Unionist-Federation of Free Workers (FFW), such act was not a sufficient ground to terminate
the employment of private respondents.

PICOP basically argues that Article 253 of the Labor Code applies in this case. Article 253 of the
Labor Code provides that the terms and conditions of a CBA remain in full force and effect even
beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA has yet been reached. It claims that the private
respondents violated this provision when they campaigned for, supported and signed FFWs
petition for certification election on March 19 and 20, 2000, before the onset of the freedom
period. It further argues that private respondents were not denied due process when they were
terminated. Finally, it claims that the decision of the NLRC on the issues raised was not without
merit. Even assuming that it erred in its judgment on the legal issues raised, its error is not
equivalent to an abuse of discretion that should fall within the ambit of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not an existing CBA can be given its full force and effect in all its terms and
conditions including its union security clause, even beyond the 5-year period when no new CBA
has yet been entered into?

HELD:Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

LABOR LAW

There is no question that in the CBA entered into by the parties, there is a union security clause.
The clause imposes upon the workers the obligation to join and maintain membership in the
companys recognized union as a condition for employment.

"Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends "closed shop," "union
shop," "maintenance of membership," or any other form of agreement which imposes upon
employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting
employment.

There is no dispute that private respondents were members of NAMAPRI-SPFL who were
terminated by PICOP due to alleged acts of disloyalty. It is basic in labor jurisprudence that the
burden of proof rests upon management to show that the dismissal of its worker was based on a
just cause. When an employer exercises its power to terminate an employee by enforcing the
union security clause, it needs to determine and prove the following:
(1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from
the union.

Considering the peculiar circumstances, the Court is of the view that the acts of private
respondents are not enough proof of a violation of the Union Security Clause which would
warrant their dismissal. PICOP failed to show in detail how private respondents campaigned and
supported FFW. Their mere act of signing an authorization for a petition for certification election
before the freedom period does not necessarily demonstrate union disloyalty. It is far from being
within the definition of "acts of disloyalty" as PICOP would want the Court to believe. The act of
"signing an authorization for a petition for certification election" is not disloyalty to the union per
se considering that the petition for certification election itself was filed during the freedom
period which started on March 22, 2000.