323 INTRODUCTION

Political Law
People v. Perfecto, 43 PHIL 887
Facts:
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, editor of the newspaper La Nacion published an article stipulating
that the investigation of the Senate on oil companies is a mere comedy and that there was
official concealment; Senators benefited from electoral robbery.
An information was filed against Perfecto on the basis of article 256 of the Penal Code.
Perfecto said that the Philippine Libel Law, repealed the said provision (defendant not
liable under the new law) and such was abrogated completely by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines

Issue: Whether article 256 is in the nature of a municipal law or political law?
Held:
Acquittal; It is a political law.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory, the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
Political law - That branch of public law which deals with the organization ,and
operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the
State with the inhabitants of its territory
All laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character and
Constitution of the new government are at once displaced.

Macariola v. Asuncion, AM No. 133-J, May 31 1982

FACTS:
Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife sold a portion of lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife
Spouses Asuncion conveyed their respective shares and interest in the lot to "The Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc."
o At the time of said sale, the stockholders of the corporation were Judge Asuncion
his latter's wife
Macariola charged respondent Judge Asuncion with "acts unbecoming a judge."
o The complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce which states that judges cannot engage in commerce in any companies
within the limits of their districts.
ISSUE:
Whether said provision is political in nature, thus, was deemed abrogated upon change of
sovereignty
HELD:
YES. Political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations,
administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article
14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law
because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect
to engaging in business
 GENERAL LAW: Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and
later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code
of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change
of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not
with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the laws of
the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the
conqueror, the political laws do not.

Scope of Political Law

Constitutional Law
Administrative Law
Public Corporations/Local Government Code
Law on Public Officers
Election Laws

A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

Constitution
Definition
Classification
Qualities of a Good Written Constitution

Phillipine Constitution
Essential Parts
Interpretation/Construction
Francisco v. House of Representatives GR No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003
FACTS:
President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Davide and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. [Committee on Justice
found it lacking in substance]
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. et. al filed a second impeachment complaint
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional
as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
ISSUE:
Whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule
HELD:
 YES. Well- settled principles of constitutional construction, namely: First, verba leais, i.
e., whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio leqis et anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
Third, ut maais valeat auam pereat. i.e., the Constitution has to be interpreted as a
whole.

IMPERTINENT RULING:
Political questions are those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
The determination of a truly political question: whether there are constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then
our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.
The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the
second impeachment complaint. Any discussion of this would require this Court to make
a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation.

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary GR No. 83896, Feb 22, 1991
FACTS:
- The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) and the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines (AGLP) assail the
constitutionality of EO No. 284 issued by President Aquino, which allows members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and asst. secretaries, to hold other government positions in
addition to their primary positions
- According to CLU, this is violative of Sec 13 Art VII of the Constitution, which prohibits Cabinet
members, among other officials, from holding other public offices or employment during their
term
- The Executive Secretary, as respondent, counters that Sec 7 par. 2, Art IX-B of the Constitution
allows Cabinet members and their USecs and ASecs to hold other government offices if allowed
by law
- The AGLP argues that the Exec Secs position is invalid, as it incorrectly lumped together the
provisions of Sec 13 Art VII and Sec 7 par. 2, Art IX-B

ISSUE: How the said provisions should be constructed relative to each other

HELD:
The Court, in construing a Constitution, should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A
doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
 Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
Since the 1987 Constitution was made primarily to prevent the abuses under the Marcos regime
from happening again, the Court was mindful of the spirit of the prohibition in Sec 13 Art VII
that is, to prevent abuses by unscrupulous public officials who used their additional positions for
personal enrichment. The Court thus declared EO 284 as null and void.

(Self Executing v. Non Self Executing Provisions)

Gamboa v. Teves, GR No. 176579, June 28, 2011
FACTS:
- Gamboa is a stockholder of PLDT
- Gamboa assails the sale of 111,415 shares of Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation (PTIC) by the government to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, a subsidiary of
First Pacific Investment Corporation (FPIC), a Hong-Kong based corporation
- Accdg to Gamboa, such sale will result in FPIC holding 37 percent of common
shareholdings in PLDT, which if combined with the common shareholdings of Japanese
corporation NTT DoCoMo in PLDT, would result to total foreign common shareholdings
in PLDT of 51.59 percent
- This would be against Section 11, Art XII of the 1987 Constitution, which limits
ownership of public utility franchises to corporations 60 per centum of whose capital is
owned by Filipino citizens
- Finance Secretary Teves, Manuel Pangilinan, et al contend that the term capital in the
aforesaid provision refers all forms of shares, whether voting or non-voting; and that the
provision in Sec 11 Art XII is non-self-executory, and thus needs an enabling law to
interpret it in full detail

Issue: W/N Sec 11 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing

Held: YES. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained
in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:

Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, GR No. 122156, Feb 3, 1992

FACTS:
GSIS decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of Manila Hotel (MHC)
 Only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm
Pending the declaration of RenongBerhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of
P44.00 per share tendered by RenongBerhad in a letter to GSIS
Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which
GSIS refused to accept.
Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus, contending that
such sale would run contrary to Sec 10 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
HELD:
YES. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Manila Prince Hotel

Constitutional History
Malolos Constitution
Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898
McKinleys Instructions, April 7, 1900
Spooner Amendment, March 2, 1901
Philippine Bill, July 1, 1902
Philippine Autonomy Act, August 29, 1916
Philippine Independence Act (Tydings-McDuffie Act) March 24, 1934
1935 Constitution (Three Amendments)
Japanese Occupation
1973 Constitution
Provisional Freedom Constitution, Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986
1987 Constitution, Feb 2, 1987, De Leon v. Esguerra, Aug 31, 1987
Facts:
Petitioners were elected barangay officials in Taytay, Rizal. On February 8, 1987, then OIC
Governor Esguerra issued a Memoranda replacingpetitioners as barangay officials. Their
contention was that the designation was invalid on the ground that it violated the Barangay
Election Act.
The respondent invoke Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, because according
to them the appointment is with one year from Feb. 25, 1986.
All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of
one year from February 25,1986.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of the Provisional Constitution will apply?
Ruling:
NO.The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the
Provisional Constitution have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution. As such,
respondent could no longer rely on Section 2 Article III of said Constitution. The Memoranda
was declared to be of no legal force and the writ of prohibition enjoining respondents from
proceeding with the take-over was granted.

Important Principles
Separation of Powers Principles
Principle of Checks and Balances
Principle of Comity
Hierarchy of Laws
Power of Judicial Review
Doctrine of Operative Fact
Political Questions Doctrine
Inherent Powers of Government
Immunity from Suit
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
Non-Delegation of Power
Power of Control and Supervision

Preamble

Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the Halls of Justice
Building in Quezon City, AM No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
(Include Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen)

Article I: The National Territory

R.A. 5446 (Sabah)

PD 1596, June 11, 1978 (Kalayaan Island Group)
Reagan v. Commissioner, 30 SCRA 968
People v. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476
R.A. 9522, The New Baselines Law of 2009
Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
Most Rev Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift, GR 206510, Sept 16, 2014
MAIN POINT:
UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights, over: internal waters, territorial sea,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and high seas. It also gives coastal States more or
less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the vessel is located.
Facts:
USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs. Petitioners seek
for an issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers.
Issue and Ruling:
(1) Whether the US may be held liable for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reefs?
(PERTINENT)
YES, under the customary laws of navigation.
When its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067 (law protecting the
Tubbatah) and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit
of UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where
they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latters internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the
oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS. Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea.
(2) Did the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA?
(IMPERTINENT) Pertaining to US Officials
NO. Any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan. However,
since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would require remedial
actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity bars the exercise of jurisdiction
by the court over their persons.
The South China Sea Arbitration: Philippines v. China, July 12, 2016
FACTS:
The Philippines submissions state that the various maritime features relied upon by China to
assert its claims in the South China Sea are not in fact islands and, as such, are not legally
capable of generating maritime zones. Submissions of Philippines:
Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations that do not
generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental shelf, and
are not features that are capable of appropriation by occupation or otherwise;
 Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef) are low-tide elevations that
do not generate entitlement to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf, but their low-water line may be used to determine the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of Namyit and Sin Cowe, respectively, is measured;

RULING:
In accordance with Article 13 and 121 of the Convention, entitlements of a feature to generate
own maritime zones depend on:
1) Objective capacity of a feature in its natural condition;
2) Ability to sustain either a stable community of people or economic activity that is
not dependent on outside resources

Tribunal concludes that both Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are located within 200
nautical miles of the Philippines coast on the island of Palawan and are located in an area
that is not overlapped by the entitlements generated by any maritime feature claimed by China.
It follows, therefore, that, as between the Philippines and China, Mischief Reef and Second
Thomas Shoal form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the
Philippines.

The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the West
Philippine Sea (Justice Carpios Ebook)

Article II: Declaration of Principles and State Policies

Legal Value of Article II

Tondo Medical v. CA, 527 SCRA 746 (2007)
Bases Conversion and Development Authority v. Commission on Audit, 580 SCRA 295

Section 1. Philippines as a Democratic and Republican State

Lawyers League for a Better Philippines. Corazon Aquino, GR 73748, May 22, 1986
Facts:
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.
Subsequently proclamation No. 3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."
Petitioners claim that one of the provisions "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then
asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and definiteness as
to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon Aquino and Vice-President
Salvador Laurel and the elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President
Arturo M. Tolentino.
This vagueness raises the question of legitimacy of the incumbent President and Vice-
President.
Issue: Whether the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate?
Ruling: Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The court further argues that; the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in
effective control of the entire country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and
law a de jure government; and the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
new government.

In re Letter of Associate Justice Puno, 210 SCRA 588

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 PHIL 113 (1945)
ACCFA v. CUGCO, 30 SCRA 649 (1969)
PHHC v Court of Industrial Relations, 150 SCRA 296
Spouses Fontanilla v. Hon. Maliaman, GR Nos. 55963, February 27, 1991
Shipside Inc v. CA, GR 143377, Feb 20, 2001 (edited)
Facts:
This case involves 4 parcels of land which OCT was given to Rafael Galvez. Galvez,
subsequently transferred the ownership to other persons including the petitioner.
While the title was with the petitioner, a cancellation for the title of the land was brought
to the court which was granted. But the judgment was not enforced.
25 years later, the Philippine government represented by the OSG files with the court for
the revival of judgment. And argues that in actions involving the state, prescription does
not apply.
Shipside filed a motion to dismiss because the Phil Govt is not the real party-in-
interest because the real property is already under the ownership of BCDA
Issue: Whether BCDA is an agency of the government?
Ruling:
NO. The Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), created under R.A. 7227,
performs functions which are basically proprietary in nature.
BCDA, although performing functions aimed at promoting public interest and public
welfare, are not invested with government attributes. Thus, BCDA is not a mere agency
of the Government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions

PVTA (Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration) v. CIR, GR L-32052, July 25, 1975
Facts:
Private respondents filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship,
the overtime services in excess of the regular 8 eight hours a day rendered by them, and
the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act
No. 444.
Petitioner PVTA would predicate its plea for the reversal of the order complained of on
the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is
exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Issue: Whether PVTA is exercising governmental functions?
Ruling: NO. While, to repeat, its submission as to the governmental character of its operation is
to be given credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is devoid of
jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that the
Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to it.

People v. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)

Rosas v. Montor GR 204105, October 14, 2015
2 Iranian Nationals arrived in the Philippines and stayed in Cebu before proceeding to
Japan.
They were denied entry in Japan and was sent back to the Philippines due to fraudulent
passports and lack of visa.
Rosas, the Senior Immigration Officer, issued an exclusion order against the two.
Montor, an employee, filed a complaint in the OMB stating that the petitioner
anomalously handled the case by not charging deportation, considering that the aliens
were potential threats to our national interest.

ISSUE:WON petitioner's act of releasing and excluding the two Iranian nationals without
initiating any case for violation of immigration laws is valid.
RULING: NO. Petitioner had the duty under the law to oversee the filing of criminal actions and
deportation proceedings against the 2 and not merely excluding them. Every sovereign power has
the inherent power to deport aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper
for its self-preservation or public interest. In the Philippines, aliens may be expelled or deported
from the Philippines on grounds and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the PIA of
1940, as amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
Exclusion: when an alien is excluded he is immediately sent back to the country where he came
from on the same vessel which transported him
Deportation: is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.

People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil 887

The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando Guerrero,
discovered that the documents regarding the testimony of the witnesses in an
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office.
Then, the day following the convening of Senate, the newspaper La Nacion edited by
herein respondent Gregorio Perfecto published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
provision that punishes those who insults the Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in force and can be
applied in the case at bar?
RULING: The Supreme Court held that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by
the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were representative of the King. With
the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the
Philippines. It was no sense a continuation of the old laws. No longer is there a Minister of the
Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only in
bated breath.

Vilas v. City of Manila, 229 US 345

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183,
petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City.
After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to
him by the city.
The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of
the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the
theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

ISSUE: Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the
City of Manila to its creditor?
RULING: No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the
municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a
legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property
rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the
governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended.
Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still
liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856

Anastacio Laurel v. Eriberto Misa (GR L-409, January 30 1947)
FACTS:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel based on the theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason Art 114,RPC
o He contends that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended, and that
o (2) there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic (Japanese de facto government)
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner-Laurels conviction of treason is correct notwithstanding his defense
of suspended sovereignty of the Commonwealth and temporary allegiance to the
Japanese forces
RULING:
 YES, an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may also
commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort
o The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or
severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or
sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier
The subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied
by the military forces of the enemy during a war, "although the former is in fact
prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the "rules of international
law of our times"
o Sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either subsisting or eliminated and
replaced
o Sovereignty per se wasnt suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty
that was suspended
o THERE IS NO SUSPENDED SOVEREIGNTY because sovereignty resides in
the people
The change of the form of government from Commonwealth (US) to Republican
(Philippines) does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
committed during the Commonwealth
This is because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people

Section 2. Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Article 2, UN Charter
Doctrine of Incorporation
Doctrine of Transformation
Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195
JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366, October 25, 1983
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)
Bayan v. Zamora, GR 138570, October 10, 2000
Lim v. Executive Secretary, GR 151445, April 11, 2002
Mijares v. Ranada, GR 139325, April 12, 2005
Shangri-La v. Developers, GR 159938, March 31, 2006
Pharmaceutical v. DOH, GR 173034, October 9, 2007
SOJ v. Lantion, GR 139465 *In the Philippines, statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
conflict with the Constitution.
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Ralph Lantion (RTC-Manila), Mark Jimenez (GR 139465, January
18 2000)
BACKGROUND:
January 1977 then-President Marcos issued PD 1069 or the Philippine Extradition Law
Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes
in a Foreign Country
November 1994 then-DOJ Secretary Drilon signed in Manila the RP-US Extradition
Treaty which was later ratified by the Philippine Senate
FACTS:
 Sometime in June 1999, the DOJ received a Note Verbale from the US-DOJ requesting
the extradition of private respondent-Jimenez to the US for allegedly committing the
following:
o Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
o Attempt to evade or defeat tax
o Fraud by wire, radio, or television
o False statement or entries
o Election contributions in name of another
As such, an evaluation of the request was conducted by the DOJ but pending such,
Jimenez requested a copy of the request and the suspension of the evaluation
o DOJ denied Jimenez request stating that the extradition request contained
confidential info which the US District Courts do not allow to be disclosed
This prompted Jimenez to file action before the RTC-Manila to compel DOJ to give him
a copy of the extradition request, to suspend any evaluation thereof, and to stop any
attempt to file an extradition petition before any local courts
o The RTC ruled in favor of Jimenez hence this petition by DOJ
ISSUE:
Whether Jimenez is entitled to his request (in accordance with his due process rights)
without the Philippines violating its treaty obligation under the RP-US Extradition Treaty
RULING:
NOT REALLY because there seems to be a void in the RP-US Extradition Treaty as
regards requests similar to the one made by Jimenez
o This is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same
o HOWEVER, it must be noted that in States where the Constitution is the highest
law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties
may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the Constitution

Philip Morris v. CA, GR 91332, July 16, 1993*While international law is made part of the law of
the land, it does not imply primacy of international law over national law.

Vinuya v. ES, GR 162230

FACTS:

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, established for the purpose of providing
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World
War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took
the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippines is under an international obligation of espousing petitioners claims

RULING:

NO, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners claims against Japan. The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail
in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the
rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights
are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort
to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress.
All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and ergaomnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators
of international crimes is an ergaomnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

Saguisag v. ES, GR 212426

FACTS:
The petitions before this Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the U.S.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that the
instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of
PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to
use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within
the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
 activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may
be agreed upon by the parties.

ISSUE 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. Petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that
would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present
petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

ISSUE 2: Whether the President's role in foreign affairs is limited

RULING:
YES. The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that
the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the
integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-
determination. In specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least
shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war.
Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters
set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws
Under international law, EDCA does not provide a legal basis for a justified attack on the
Philippines. In the first place, international law disallows any attack on the Agreed
Locations simply because of the presence of U.S. personnel.
o International humanitarian law standards prevent participants in an armed conflict
from targeting non-participants. There is ample legal protection for the
Philippines under international law that would ensure its territorial integrity and
national security in the event an Agreed Location is subjected to attack. As EDCA
stands, it does not create the situation so feared by petitioners - one in which the
Philippines, while not participating in an armed conflict, would be legitimately
targeted by an enemy of the U.S

NOTES:
Executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly
allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.
Treaties are considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts
of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive
actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as
being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or
treaty takes precedence over one that is prior.
An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent
with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international
agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.

Bayan v. DND Sec. Gazmin, GR 212444

*Note: This case is consolidated with Vinuya case, thus, the 2 cases have same facts/ruling.
Bayan vs. DND Sec. Gazmin
FACTS:
The petitions before this Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the U.S.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S., claiming that the
instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.
Under the EDCA, the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of
PH territory, which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to
use the Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within
the Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as may
be agreed upon by the parties.

ISSUE 1: W/N the petitions as citizens suit satisfy the requirements of legal standing in
assailing the constitutionality of EDCA
No. Petitioners failed to make any specific assertion of a particular public right that
would be violated by the enforcement of EDCA. For their failure to do so, the present
petitions cannot be considered by the Court as citizens suits that would justify a
disregard of the aforementioned requirements.

ISSUE 2: Whether the President's role in foreign affairs is limited

RULING:
YES. The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that
the Chief Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the
integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-
determination. In specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least
shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war.
Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign
relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters
set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws
The President carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign
relations. The President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential
information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly
brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-
sensitive military intelligence data.

Section 3. Civilian Supremacy and AFP Role

Alih v. Castro, GR 69401, June 23, 1987
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000)
Kulayan v. Tan, 675 SCRA 482

Section 4. Duty of Government to the People

People v. TranquilinoLagman, GR L-458927
People v. Primitivo De Sosa, GR L-45893, July 13, 1938
Facts:
The appellants TranquilinoLagman and Primitivo De Sosa were charged with violation of Section 60 of
Commonwealth Act No. 01 also known as the National Defense Law for Filipinos having been reached the age of
twenty (20) years of age in 1936, appellants wilfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military service of the
said year, notwithstanding the fact they had been required by law to register. The CFI of Bataan sentenced each of
the appellants one (1) month and one (1) day of imprisonment.

Issue: WON Commonwealth Act No. 01 aka. National Defense Law is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No. The Constitutionality of the National Defense law is upheld.The National Defense Law, in so far as it
establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in
faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through
an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the
Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:

SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfilment of this duty all
citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.

PD No. 1706, The National Service Law, Aug 8, 1980

Section 5. Maintenance of Peace and Order

Section 6. Separation of Church and State

United Church of Christ in the Philippines v. Bradford United Church of Christ, 674 S 92
FACTS:

Bradford United Church of Christ Inc. (BUCCI) disaffiliated itself from UCCP and filed its

Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws before the SEC which provided for and

effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. SEC approved it on July 1993. UCCP filed a

complaint for rejection of decision, alleging that separate incorporation and registration

of BUCCI is not allowed under the UCCP Constitution and By-laws because only the

local church has the authority to do so. SEC en banc dismissed UCCP's petition and

defended the right of BUCCI to disassociate itself from UCCP in recognition of its

constitutional freedom to associate and disassociate. On appeal, CA affirmed previous

decision of SEC en banc. Before this court, UCCP maintains that it has the sole power

to decide whether BUCCI could disaffiliate from it as this involves a purely ecclesiastical

affair.
ISSUE:

WON the determination of the validity of disaffiliation of respondents is purely an

ecclesiastical affair.

HELD:

No. The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair. An ecclesiastical affair is one that

concerns doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and

enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the

government of the membership, and the power of excluding from such associations

those deemed unworthy of membership.

UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchises,

are subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.

902-A provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control

over all corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise

jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and corporate.

BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses the

freedom to determine its steps.

Section 7. Independent Foreign Policy
Lim v. Executive Secretary, GR 151445, April 11, 2002
Saguisag v. ES, GR 212426
Facts:
EDCA (Enhanced Defense Coopration Agreement) is an executive agreement that gives US
troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in the Philippine military bases and allows
the US troop to build facilities to store fuel and equipment in the US military base. It was signed
against the backdrop of the Philippines maritime dispute over China over West Philippine Sea.

The US Embassy and the DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirmed all the necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April 2014. President
Benigno Noynoy Aquino III ratified the same in June 2014. It was not submitted to the
Congress. The Senate did not concur.

Petitions for certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the unconstitutionality of of
the executive agreement. Petitioners now contend that it should have concurred by the Senate as
it is not an executive agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a
strong sense that in order EDCA to be valid and binding, it must be first be transmitted to the
Senate for deliberation and concurrence.

Issue:
WON EDCA is an executive agreement or a treaty?

Ruling:
EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate. EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. An executive agreement remains consistent with the
existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement. The President may enter into an
executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, if:
(a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of the military bases, troops, facilities; or
(b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty

Bayan v. DND Sec. Gazmin, GR 212444

FACTS:
The petitions before this Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America (U.S.).
EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities within
certain "Agreed Locations" in the country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the
executive's understanding that to do so was no longer necessary.
Two petitions for certiorari were thereafter filed before us assailing the constitutionality
of EDCA. They primarily argue that it should have been in the form of a treaty concurred
in by the Senate, not an executive agreement.
Petitioners are hailing this Court's power of judicial review in order to strike down EDCA
for violating the Constitution. They stress that our fundamental law is explicit in
 prohibiting the presence of foreign military forces in the country, except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate.

ISSUE:

Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities/ Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as with
existing laws and treaties

HELD: The President may generally enter into executive agreements subject to limitations
defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the
Senate.

The President's duty to execute the laws and protect the Philippines is inextricably
interwoven with his foreign affairs powers, such that he must resolve issues imbued with
both concerns to the full extent of his powers, subject only to the limits supplied by law.

We have in laid down the power of presidential initiatives in respect of foreign affairs(Vinuya v.
Romulo)

In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally
accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay,
validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial
repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with
equally undesirable consequences(Bavan v. Executive Secretary) and (Pimentel v. Executive
Secretary)

The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.

Note that the provision "shall not be allowed" is a negative injunction. This wording signifies
that the President is not authorized by law to allow foreign military bases, troops, or facilities to
enter the Philippines, except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate. Hence, the
constitutionally restricted authority pertains to the entry of the bases, troops, or facilities, and
not to the activities to be done after entry.

It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are
thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and
Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity througha treaty.

Section 8. Freedom from Nuclear Weapons

Bayan v. Zamora, GR 138570, October 10, 2000
Lim v. Executive Secretary
Section 9. Social Order

Section 10. Social Justice

Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726
National Traffic Commission (NTC) issued a resolution recommending the Director of Public
Works and Secretary of PublicWorksand Communication:
1. that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along: (for a period of 1 year)
a. Rosario Street to DasmariasStreet (7:30am-12:30pm and 1:30pm-5:30pm)
b. Rizal Avenue toEchague Street (7am-11pm)
2. adoption of the measure proposed in the aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads
The Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues and Ruling:
(1) Whether the promulgated rules and regulations pursuant to the provisions of CA 548
constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?NO.
The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the
National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare.
The state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because
society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over
liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact
that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.
(2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people? NO.
SOCIAL JUSTICE is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
 State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated.
SOCIAL JUSTICE
- means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of saluspopuliestsuprema,lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally
and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest
number.

Section 11. Personal Dignity and Human Rights

Section 12. Family Life; Mother; Unborn

Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973)
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390 (1922)
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 262 US 510 (1925)
Wisconsin v. Yoder 40 LW 4476 (1972)
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629 (1968)
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014: The RH Law does not violate the right of an
unborn child as guaranteed in S12, A2. The question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided without proper hearing and evidence. The framers of the
Constitution intended conception as fertilization and protection is given upon fertilization.
Not all contraceptives are ban. Only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum are prohibited.
The intent of the framers was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure that would allow
abortion. The IRR redefinition of abortifacient in S4a of the RH Law is violative of S12, A2. S7
of the RH Law which excludes parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage is anti-family and is violative of S12, A2.

- Imbong, along with a slew of pro-life and religious groups, assail the constitutionality of RA
10354 the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act, known colloquially as the RH
Law on the premise that the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
- They also assail the RH Law on the following points:
o It violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products they
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems
 o It violates the right to religious freedom it is contended that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate
ensuring religious freedom

ISSUES: 1. W/N the RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn (PERTINENT)
2. W/N the RH Law violates the right to religious freedom (IMPERTINENT)

HELD:
1. NO. The RH Law effectively draws a line between contraceptives and abortifacients. The framers
of the Constitution intended conception to refer to fertilization.Protection is thus given upon
fertilization. The difference between allowable contraceptives and abortifacients is that
allowable contraceptives merely prevent the meeting of the sperm and the egg. Abortifacients, on
the other hand, destroy the fertilized ovum, or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted
into the uterine wall. The RH Law does not allow the use of abortifacients, only allowable
contraceptives that prevent implantation. This is consistent with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, which was to prevent Congress from passing a law that would legalize abortion.
a. However, the redefinition of contraceptives provided for in Sec 3.01(a) of the IRR of the
RH Law was deemed unconstitutional, as it defines abortifacients as drugs, devices, or
products that PRIMARILY induce abortion. The insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will
pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of
the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Sec 12 Art II of the Constitution.
Such definition appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an
"abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion orthe prevention of the implantation
of the fertilized ovum. For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would
permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their
fail-safe mechanism.
b. Likewise, the provision in Sec 7 of the RH Law, where minor who already have had (a)
child(ren) or a miscarriage do not have to secure parental consent before undergoing a
reproductive health procedure was deemed unconstitutional in that it was anti-family,
thus against the provisions regarding the family and the right of parents to exercise
parental control over their minor children enshrined in Sec 12 Art II of the Constitution
2. YES, but only when the healthcare provider is a conscientious objector to his/her obligations
under the RH Law. Thus, a healthcare provider who cites religious freedom and objects to
his/her obligations under the RH Law may not be compelled to give a patient information
relating to modern reproductive health products, methods, services, and procedures. The Court
cited the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality espoused in the case of Estrada v. Escritor, where a
court interpreter was adjudged to not have been engaged in immoral conduct when she
cohabited with a man not her husband, due to her religious beliefs.

Orceo v. COMELEC, GR 190779, March 26, 2010

- Atty. Reynante B. Orceo assails the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 8714, which includes
airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the coverage of the Gun Ban implemented during the
election period in 2010
- Orceo claims to be a real party-in-interest, because he had been playing airsoft since 2000 (Kits
note: SERIOUSLY?! @_@)
 - Orceo claims, among others, that such ban on airsoft guns runs contrary to Sec 12 Art II of the
1987 Constitution, which recognizes the sanctity of family life and protects and strengthens the
family as a basic autonomous social institution (Kits note: THIS IS SERIOUSLY NOT A
JOKE. @_@)
- Orceo asserts the following:
o asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members
o families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights
o they are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities
o these liberties cannot be abridged by the COMELEC
- Comelec argues that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, and they may be abridged to some
extent to serve appropriate and important interests

ISSUE: W/N the Comelec ban against airsoft guns during election season infringes upon the State policy
of protecting and promoting family interests

HELD: NO. The abovementioned State Policies do not directly uphold a licensees absolute right to
possess or carry an airsoft gun under any circumstance. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the gun ban does
not reflect capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of Comelec. On the contrary, the
Court recognizes that some freedoms and rights given by the Constitution and by law may be abridged to
serve overarching public interest.

Section 13. Vital Role of Youth

Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 252

- Atty. Humberto Basco et al seek the annulment of the charter of Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), contained in PD 1869
- According to Basco et al, the creation of PAGCOR is contrary to morals and the equal
protection clause in the Constitution, because it allows the conduction of state-sanctioned
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are not allowed, along with other innately
immoral acts such as prostitution and drug-trafficking
- Further, Basco et al posit that the gambling objective of PD 1869 runs contrary to Sec
13 Art II of the Constitution, which calls for the promotion of the moral well-being of the
youth

ISSUE: W/N the establishment of PAGCOR runs afoul of the State policy of promoting the
moral well-being of the youth

HELD: THE COURT DID NOT RULE DIRECTLY ON THIS ISSUE. The Court merely said
that Sec 13 Art II of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision, being a mere statement of
State policy. Being non-self-executing, a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and
effectuate said policy. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN?As to whether PD 1869 is a wise legislation
considering the issues of morality, youth, and educational valuesis for Congress to determine.

It also said that every law carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. Absent a showing of
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, the assailed law remains valid. Basco et al
failed to overcome this presumption in the instant case.
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, GR 177131, June 7, 2011
Facts:
COA issued a resolution, stating that BSP is a public corporation created by Commonwealth Act
No. 111. Hence, it is a GOCC subject to COAs jurisdiction for audit. This is also based on the
ruling in BSP v. NLRC. BSP argued that the ruling in BSP v. NLRC is for the determination of
NLRCs jurisdiction and not the COA and that the governance of BSP is private.
Issue:
Is BSP a public corporation?
Ruling:
YES. The purpose of the creation of BSP is to implement a State Policy declared in Article II,
Section 13. Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in
pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of public corporations.

Section 14. Role of Women and Equality of Men and Women

Section 15. Right to Health

Imbong v. Ochoa: The RH Law does not violate S15. It does not do away with RA 4729
(Regulation of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices) and RA 5921 (Regulation of Pharmacy) laws
that prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without prescription,
Facts:
According to the petitioners, the use of oral contraceptives increases womens risk of developing
breast and cervical cancer. If the RH Law is to really protect and empower women, it should be
implemented in a manner that does not put the health of women at risk or impair their right to
health.
Issue:
Does the RH Law violate the Right to Health?
Ruling:
NO. RH Law simply guarantees access to contraceptives which are medically-safe, non-aborti-
facient, legal and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA.

Section 16. Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology

Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
C&M Timber v. Alcala, GR 111088, June 13, 1997
LLDA v. CA, 231 SCRA 292 (1994) and 251 SCRA 42 (1995)
MMDA v. Residents of Manila Bay, GR No. 171947, December 18, 2008
Boracay Foundation Inc v. Province of Aklan, 674 SCRA 555
FACTS:
 This case involves the reclamation project of the respondent Provincial Government of Aklan
located at Caticlan Aklan
Petitioner opposed the reclamation project since based on the opinion of an expert, a full
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study is required to assess the reclamation projects
likelihood of rendering critical and lasting effect on Boracay considering the proximity in
distance, geographical location, current and wind direction, and many other environmental
considerations in the area.
o Petitioner claims that any project involving Boracay requires a full EIA since it is an ECA
(environmentally critical area).
Petitioner noted that respondent Province failed to comply with certain mandatory provisions of
the Local Government Code, particularly, those requiring the project proponent to conduct
consultations with stakeholders.
o Petitioner complains that respondent Province applied for an ECC only for Phase 1
hence, unlawfully evading the requirements
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus
Issue:
Is the issuance of TEPO proper?
Ruling:
YES. It is the policy of the State to attain and maintain a rational and orderly balance
between socio-economic growth and environmental protection.

Paje v. Casino, GR 207267, Feb 3, 2015

Facts:
The DENR, issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired
power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan
against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground
that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented
and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or
relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the
ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in
invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity
of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of
kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.
Issue: Whether the issuance of ECC is a violation to the constitutional right to a balanced and
helpful ecology vested by the constitution?
Ruling: NO. A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in
the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must
also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under
the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the
proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

Internation Service v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, GR 209271 and GR 209430

Facts:
A memorandum of undertaking was executed between International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the Philippines
Los Banos Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in
pursuance of a collaborative research and development project on eggplants that are
resistant to the fruit and shoot borer.
NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was conducted
from 2007 to 2009 stating that all the biosafety measures have been complied with with
no untoward incident that has occurred. Hence, the Field testing commenced.
On April, 2012, Greenpeace et al. filed a petition for a writ of Kalikasan and a writ of
continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of TEPO alleging that BT talong field
trials violate their constitutional right to balanced and a healthful ecology.
Issue: Whether their right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated?
Ruling: YES. There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs into the
environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually
the health of our people once the Bteggplants are consumed as food. The more prudent course is
to immediately enjoin the Bttalong field trials and approval for its propagation or
commercialization until the said government offices shall have performed their respective
mandates to implement the NBF.
Further the court argues that, In this case we recognize the public right of citizens to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. To exist from the inception of mankind and it is
an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such right carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Section 17. Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports
Guingona v. Carague
Facts:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the
DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising
the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
 Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education, the Constitution mandates to
assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
Issue: Whether it is violative of the constitution?
Ruling: No. While it is true that the Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as
to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt. It is not only a matter of honor and
to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is
at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.

Philconsa v. Enriquez: S5, Art14 which provides for the highest budgetary priority to education
is merely directory.

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the
president involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994.
The pertinent part of the GAA is the appropriation of P86,323,438,000.00for debt
service, while it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education
Culture and Sports.
Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA
of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 93-94) because under the Constitution it should be education that is
entitled to the highest funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which
provides:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.
ISSUE: WON the appropriation of the budget for education should be given higher importance.
RULING: Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory. As aptly observed
by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the
facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount
of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate
according highest priority to education.
In the fulfilment of the cited provision, it cannot deprive the Congress the power to respond to
the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
 1. Section 18. Labor Protection
JMM Promotion v. CA, GR 120095, Aug 5, 1996

The deployment of female entertainers to Japan was controlled by the government

through Department Order No. 3, wherein said entertainers were required an Artist
Record Book as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for
overseas employment.
Petitioners contends that overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of
the Constitution and avers that the alleged deprivation thereof through the onerous
requirement of an ARB violates due process and constitutes an invalid exercise of police
power.

ISSUE: WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.
RULING: The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government
enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order,
particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women
was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.

PASE v. Drilon

DOLE enacted Department Order No 1, outlining guidelines of temporary suspension

deployment of female domestic workers.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, engaged in the recruitment of overseas
workers assailed the validity of the said order.
They contend that this is discriminatory against female domestic workers and does not
apply to all Filipino workers but to domestic helpers only.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO No 1 violates equal protection on the ground of sexual

discrimination?
RULING: Petition dismissed. The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our
female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The same cannot be said of our male
workers. It is the avowed objective of DO No 1 to enhance the protection for Filipino female
overseas workers this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina
workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare. The
Court finds the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers.
That it does not apply to all Filipina workers is not an argument for unconstitutionality.

Section 19. Self-Reliant and Independent National Economy

Garcia v. BOI, 191 SCRA 288 (1990)
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)
Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. PCA, GR 110526, Feb 10, 1998
Pharmaceuticals v. Duque, Oct 9, 2007: Free enterprise does not call for the removal of
protective regulations.

Section 20. Role of Private Sector

Marine Radio v. Reyes, 191 SCRA 205
Boracay Foundation v. Province of Aklan
FACTS:
This case involves the reclamation project of the respondent Provincial Government of Aklan
located at Caticlan Aklan
Petitioner opposed the reclamation project since based on the opinion of an expert, a full
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study is required to assess the reclamation projects
likelihood of rendering critical and lasting effect on Boracay considering the proximity in
distance, geographical location, current and wind direction, and many other environmental
considerations in the area.
o Petitioner claims that any project involving Boracay requires a full EIA since it is an ECA
(environmentally critical area).
Petitioner noted that respondent Province failed to comply with certain mandatory provisions of
the Local Government Code, particularly, those requiring the project proponent to conduct
consultations with stakeholders.
o Petitioner complains that respondent Province applied for an ECC only for Phase 1
hence, unlawfully evading the requirements
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus
ISSUE:

RULING:
Respondent Province of Aklan must secure approvals from local government units and hold
proper consultations with non-governmental organizations and other stakeholders and sectors
concerned as required by Local Government Code.
The parties are evidently in accord in seeking to uphold the mandate found in Article
II, Declaration of Principles and State Policies, of the 1987 Constitution: SECTION 20. The State
recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.
To achieve the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development
and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development, we must
adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all the
sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors.

Section 21. Promotion of Comprehensive Rural and Agrarian Policy

Gamboa v. Teves, June 28, 2011 Dissent of J Abad *S21 is not self-executing
Facts:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares
involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific. Thus, First Pacifics common shareholdings in
PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner contends that it
violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of public utility, stated in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the
capital of a public utility to not more than 40%.Issue:
ISSUE:
Whether Section 21 of Art II is self executing
Ruling:
NO. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was provided by the Congress as
supplementary and enabling legislation.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if it fixes the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed such that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. On the other hand, if the provision needs a
supplementary or enabling legislation, it is merely a declaration of policy and principle
which is not self-executing
The constitutional limit on foreign ownership in public utilities under Section 11, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution is not a self-executing provision and requires an
implementing legislation for its enforcement

Section 22. Promotion of Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities

Section 23. Community-Based Private Organizations

Section 24. Vital Role of Communications

PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717

Section 25. Local Economy

Rodolfo Navarro v. Executive Secretary Ermita, GR 180050, April 12, 2011

Navarro et al, as taxpayers, filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court to declare as
unconstitutional Republic Act 9355, which created the Province of Dinagat Islands. According to them,
the province did not meet the requirements of the Local Government Code, Republic Act 7160 in terms
of population and territory. Whereas RA 7610 mandates that a province to be created should have a
population of at least 250,000, the Province of Dinagat, as of the 2000 NSO Census only had 106,591;
whereas the law requires a new province to have at least 2,000 square kilometres of contiguous area,
the new province will only have a land area of 802.12 square kilometres. Further, the act of creating the
province was allegedly an act of gerrymandering.

In their defense, the respondents posited that the law is constitutional. Dinagat as a new province
complied with the requirements of Republic Act 7160 in terms of population and land area. Most
notably, it is supposedly exempt from the land area requirement because it is composed of several
islands, which exception is provided for under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
7160.

ISSUE: W/N the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands complied with the requisites of the law
HELD: YES. The IRR of the LGC provides that component cities and municipalities which consist of
islands are exempt from the land area requirement for the creation of a new province. This is consistent
with Sec 25 Art II of the Constitution, which ensures the autonomy of local governments. The liberal
construction of the land area requirement for the creation of a new province allows island-municipalities
to become more self-reliant, progressive, and grant access to basic services to its constituents. To treat
them the same way as provinces with a contiguous land mass would be unfair, as island-municipalities are
separated by bodies of water, thus making the provision of services to political constituents difficult and
burdensome. This unfair treatment defeats the purpose of local autonomy and decentralization espoused
in the Constitution.

Belgica v. ES, 2013 *With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate project on his own. Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to
intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF
Article and similar forms are deemed unconstitutional.
Facts:

The concept of Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork
Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in allocatinginfrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc. and scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs,
IT development for the members of the legislative.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system, as it makes equal
the unequal

Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on local autonomy.

Ruling:
The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own
programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly
on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that
a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

Section 26. Equal Access to Political Opportunities and Political Dynasties

Pamatong v. COMELEC, 427 SCRA 96 (2004)
Belgica v. ES *It was not demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System can propagate political
dynasties.
Facts:

The concept of Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the
members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork
Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in allocatinginfrastructure projects like
roads, buildings, schools, etc. and scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs,
IT development for the members of the legislative.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system, as it makes equal
the unequal

Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on local autonomy.

Ruling:
The 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own
programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly
on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that
a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on
claim it as his own.
This is an instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a
national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its
good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

Section 27. Honesty and Integrity in Public Service

Section 28. Full Public Disclosure

Neri v. Senate, GR 180643, March 25, 2008

Facts:
DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ZTE for
the supply and sevices for the National Broadband Network Project in the amount of 16
Billion Pesos to be funded by Peoples Republic of China. The Senate passed various
resolutions relative to the National Broadband Network Project.
Sometime in Septemeber 2007, Jose De Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push through the NBN project
by NEDA.
Neri is the head of NEDA. He was inveted to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He
appeared in one hearing and he was interrogated by the Senate Blue Ribbon. He admitted
that COMELEC Abalos bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN
deal. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Arroyo about the bribe and he
was instructed by the President not to accept the bribe.
Neri was then asked further on what they have discussed about the NBN project, Neri-
petitioner refused to answer the following questions:
a. WON President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project;
b. WON she directed him to prioritize it;
c. WON she directed him to approve;
Neri invoked executive privilege and later on refused to attend the other hearings. He
was cited in contempt of the respondent Senate Committee and an order of his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Issue:
a. Will the claim on executive privilege in this case violate the Section 28, Article 2 of the
1987 Constitution?
b. Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

Ruling:

a. No.

In the Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential
communications privilege.28 In United States v. Nixon,29 the U.S. Court recognized a great
public interest in preserving "the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the
President's performance of his official duties." It thus considered presidential communications
as "presumptively privileged." Apparently, the presumption is founded on the "President's
generalized interest in confidentiality." The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the
candor of presidential advisors and to provide "the President and those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and
to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately."

In In Re: Sealed Case,30 the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2)
kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other
is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to "communications, documents or
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the
President believes should remain confidential." The latter includes 'advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated."

Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications

privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process
privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second on
common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-
decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones31 As a consequence, congressional or
judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater
scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.

b. Yes. The communications are covered by executive privilege.

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains
important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26
hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested
his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those
covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Garcia v. Teves

BriccioPollo v. Karina Constantino-David, Oct 18, 2011

Facts:
This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was
charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal
files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.

Petitioner is a former supervising personnel specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV
and also the Officer-in-charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD)
under the MamamayanMuna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007, an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David stating that petitioner has been lawyering and
extending help to many who has pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background on IT
and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back
up all the files in the computers found in the (PALD) and Legal Divisions.
The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein and were turned over to Chairperson David.
The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs office for Legal Affairs. It was
found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes contained filed copied from petitioners
computer, were draft pleadings or letter in connection with administrative cases in the
CSC and other tribunals.
 Chairperson issued the Show-Cause Order requiring petitioner to submit his explanation
or counter-affidavit within five (5) days from notice. Petitioner denied the allegations.
Petitioner Accused CSC officials for they unlawfully copied and printed his personal files
in his computer without his consent which violated his right to privacy.

Issue: WON CSC has violated petitioners right to privacy?

Ruling:
No. Under Section 28, Article 2 Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. The CSC had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and
that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer, and the CSC may monitor the use of the
computer resources using both automated or human means.

Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual Garcia III v. Senate Impeachment Court, Feb 9, 2012
FACTS:
Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed before
the Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was
sought to stop the Senate, sitting as impeachment court, from further implementing
the Subpoena Ad TestificandumetDucesTecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it issued
against the Branch Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch. The subpoena assailed by
petitioners covers the foreign currency denominated accounts allegedly owned by the
impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona of the Philippine Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should the TRO be issued to the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing
the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?
HELD: YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated
accounts of CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief
Justice is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign
Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality
of foreign currency deposits:

xxx xxx xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency
deposits, that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan
v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the
applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case
of Government Service Insurance System v. 15thDivision of the Court of Appeals, the Court also held
that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No. 1405. xxx.

In Re: Production of Court Records, Feb 14, 2012

In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and
employees as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for
the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012

Facts:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the prosecution Panel
manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses which included
Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on matters
internal to the Court and almost a thousand documents

Letters were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records, and the issuance of
certified true copies of the rollosand the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberationsof various
cases decided by the SC for purposes of the Impeachment Complaint. Subpoena Ad
TestificandumetDucesTecumAnd Subpoena Ad Testificandum were also issued against Clerks of
Court of the SC.

Issue: Whether or not Court Records are considered Confidential or privileged.

Held:
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of
(1) the result of the raffle of cases,
(2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Courts session,
(3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before
it.

Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about
information they acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication,
such as information on how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the
justices used in decision-making, because the end-result would be the disclosure of
confidential information that could subject them to criminal prosecution.Such act violates
judicial privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
constitutional mandate of adjudication.

Article VI: The Legislative Department

Section 1. Legislative Power; Non-Delegation

Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 PHIL 328 (1957)
Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 PHIL 660 (1918-1919)
People v. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)
Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. v. Drilon, 176 SCRA 24 (1989)
Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703
Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)
Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan, 309 SCRA 661
People v. Vera, 65 PHIL 56 (1937-1938)
Solicitor General v. MMA, 204 SCRA 837 (1991)
AbakadaGuro Party List v. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251
United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1
Employers Confederation v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, GR No. 9619
People v. Rosenthal, 68 PHIL 328
Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 1
Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659
United States v. Panlilio, 28 PHIL 608
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, 567 SCRA 354
Gerochi v. DENR, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007
PSL Inc., v. LLDA 608 SCRA 442
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Carbonilla v. Board of Airlines Representatives, 657 SCRA 775

Section 2. Senate Composition

Section 3. Qualifications of Senator

Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, March 8, 2016

Section 4. Senator: Term of Office; Voluntary Renunciation

Section 5. Composition of the House of Representatives; Apportionment; Party List

Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)
Mariano v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)
Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008
Aquino III v. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 17, 2010
Aldaba v. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Ocampo v. HRET, GR No. 158466, June 15, 2004

Party List
Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698 (2001)
VC Cadangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244 (2000)
Partido v. COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006
Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
AtongPaglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
PGBI v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8,2010
ANAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens v. COMELEC, G.R. 206844-45, July 23, 2013
Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7,2010
ABC v. COMELEC, GR. No. 193256, March 22, 2011
AbangLingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013
Cocofed-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026,
August 6, 2013
Milagros Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010

Section 6. Qualifications of Representatives

Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400 (1995)
Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)
Domino v. COMELEC, GR 134015 (July 19, 1999)
Maquera v. Borra, 15 SCRA 7
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008

Section 7. Term of Representatives

Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR 147387 (Dec. 10, 2003)
Quinto v. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009

Section 8.Regular Elections

Codilla v. De Venecia GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002

Section 9. Special Elections

Tolentino v. COMELEC, GR 148334, January 21, 2004

Section 10. Salaries

Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

Section 11. Privilege from Arrest; Parliamentary Freedom of Speech

People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966)
Antonino v. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70
Pobre v. Defensor Santiago, AC No. 7399, August 25, 2009

Section 12. Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests

Section 13. Prohibitions on Members of Congress

Liban v. Gordon, GR No. 175352, July 15, 2009

Section 14. Prohibitions Related to the Practice of Profession

Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31

Section 15. Regular Session; Special Session

Section 16. Officers of Congress; Quorom; Discipline; Journal/Records

(par. 1) Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, GR 134577 November 18, 1998
(par. 1) Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 PHIL 17 (1949)
(par. 2) People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689
(par. 3) Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997)
(par. 3) Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 PHIL 863 (1960)
(par. 3) Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636
(par. 4) US v. Pons, 34 PHIL 729 (1916)
(par. 4) Casco Phil Commercial Co. v. Giminez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)
(par. 4) Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974)
(par. 4) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703
(par. 4) AbakadaGuro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
Pimentel v. Senate Committeee of the Whole, 644 SCRA 741

Section 17. Electoral Tribunal

Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 PHIL 134 (1936)
Vera v. Avelino, 77 PHIL 192 (1946)
Chavez v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 315 (1992)
Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400 (1995)
Abbas v. SET, 166 SCRA 651 (1988)
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991)
Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990)
Arroyo v. HRET, 246 SCRA 384 (1995)
Pimentel v. HRET, GR 141489 May 29, 2002
Aggabao v. COMELEC, GR No. 163756, January 26, 2005
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, GR No. 178831, April 2009
Banat v. COMELEC, GR No. 177508, August 7, 2009
Drilon, et al v. Speaker, GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009
Guerrero v. COMELEC, GR No. 137004, July 26, 2000G
Garcia v. HRET, GR No. 134792, August 12, 1999
Lazatin v. HET, GR No. 84297, December 8, 1988

Section 18. Commission on Appointments

Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989)
Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 (1990)
Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992); MR, 219 SCRA 326 (1993)
Drilon, et al v. Speaker, GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009

Section 19. Constitutions of the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments

Section 20. Records and Books of Accounts

Section 21. Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767
Standard Charter v. Senate, GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007
Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 PHIL 25 (1990)
Sabio v. Gordon, 504 SCRA 704 October 17, 2006
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Majaducon, GR 136760 July 29, 2003
Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1, GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Neri v. Senate, 549 SCRA 771
Neri v. Senate, 564 SCRA 152
Garcillano v. House of Representatives, GR No. 170338, December 23, 2008
Negros O II Elec. Coop v. Sangguniang Panlungsod, 155 SCRA 421 (1991)

Section 22. Appearance of Heads of Departments in Congress

Section 23. Declaration of a State of War; Emergency Powers

Section 24. Bills Originating in the House of Representatives

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)
Alvarez v. Guingona, GR No. 118303, January 31, 1996
Guingona Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991)

Section 25. Limits on Power to Appropriate

(par. 2) Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975)
Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)
DPWH v. Quirino, GR No. 183444, October 12, 2011
(par. 5) Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)
(par. 5) Sanchez v. COA, 552 SCRA 471
(par. 5) Goh v. COMELEC GR No. 212584, November 25, 2014

Section 26. Subject and Title of Bills; Three Readings

(par. 1) Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962)
(par. 1) Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965)
(par. 1) Insular Lumber Company v. CTA, 104 SCRA 710 (1981)
(par. 1) Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993)
Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172 (1968)
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987)
(par. 2) Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)
Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994)
Banat v. COMELEC, GR No. 177508, August 7, 2009
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Section 27. Passage of bills; Item Veto

CIR v. CTA, 185 SCRA 329 (1990)
Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 (1964)
(par. 2) Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990)
(par. 2) Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)
(par. 2) Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986)

Section 28. Power of Taxation; Limitations; Exemptions

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc, 164 SCRA 27
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 27
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR 101273, July 3, 1992
CIR v. Santos, GR No. 119252, August 18, 1997
Southern Cross v. Philippine Cement GR No. 158540, July 8, 2004
(par. 3) Abra Valley College v. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988)
Lladoc v. CIR, 14 SCRA 292
Central Mindanao University v. DAR, GR 100091, October 22, 1992
Commissioner v. CA, GR 124043, October 14, 1998
John Hay v. Lim, GR 19775, October 24, 2003
Systems Plus Computer College v. Caloocan City, GR No. 146382, August 7, 2003
Lung Center v. Quezon City, GR No. 144104, June 29, 2004
Planters Products Inc v. Fertiphil Corp, GR No. 166006, March 14, 2008

Section 29. Fiscal Powers of Congress; Limitations; Special Funds

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 PHIL. 331, 1960-61
Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221, 1991
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626, 1988
Araullo v. Aquino III, GR No. 209287 (2014)

Section 30. Appelate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA, 237 SCRA 519, 1994

Section 32. Initiative and Referendum

Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279, 1994

Article VII: Executive Department

Section 1. Executive Power; Privileges; Immunities

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 1989; MR, 178 SCRA, 1989
FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to
return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue
travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING: The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of
the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.

Laurel v. Garcia 187 SCRA 797, 1990

FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi
property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government through a reparation
contract. It consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As
intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and
Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
RULING: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or
her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the
Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real
property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and
civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a
policy determination where both the President and Congress must concur.

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001
FACTS: It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious
allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made. Subsequently, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post.
Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends.
ISSUE: WoN the former President enjoys immunity from suit.
RULING: The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-
sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not
acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 186450, December 13, 2011

FACTS: Sometime in September of 2008, James M. Balao, a graduate of the University of the
Philippines-Baguio, a founder of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of non-
government organizations working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region,
was abducted by unidentified men in la Trinidad, Benguet. Jamess siblings filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of James
Balao with an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the immediate issuance of the writ of Amparo.
Officials of the Military, the Defense Department, the Executive Secretary and the President of
the Philippines were included as respondents. The following day, October 9, 2008, the Writ of
Amparo was issued directing respondents to file their verified return together with their
supporting affidavit within five days from receipt of the writ. In their return, the respondents
contended that the petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rules on the Writ of Amparo
that claims must be established by substantial evidence. They also moved to have President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo dropped as a party on account of Presidential immunity. In its
decision, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Amparo ordering the respondents to (a)
disclose where James Balao is detained or confined, (b) to release James Balao considering his
unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm
upon his person.
ISSUE: WON the President would be under Presidential immunity.
RULING: President Arroyos inclusion as party-respondent, the Supreme Court stated that the
RTC clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an
Amparo proceeding. As president, then President Arroyo enjoyed immunity from suit at the time
the petition for a writ of Amparo was filed and moreover, the petition did not allege what
specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights.

Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 191805, November 15, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military
tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to
confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et
al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued
in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Issue:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential
immunity from suit
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is
responsible or accountable for his abduction.
Held:
 1. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal
liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity
from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent
of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his
term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents
the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for
reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such
immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

2. Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the

"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This
development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the
application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature.
Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings
seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine
whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in
order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes
this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility
but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the
aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a
preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by
the appropriate government agency.

Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of
command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability
within these foregoing definitions.

3. Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

4. No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo
Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge
of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had
been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting
these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the
perpetrators. While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced
disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute
responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.
Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her
responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to
show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or
that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, 1988

FACTS:

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for libel by the
president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others.

Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her
immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.
However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself to be placed under the
courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering
the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for
herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit?
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders
time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an
accused like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus,
if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the Presidents
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

WHEREFORE finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

on the part of the public respondents, the court resolved to DISMISS the petitions.

Senate v. Ermita, G.R. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: The committee of the Senate issued invitations to the executive department and military
officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project,
and on the issues of wire-tapping of the President and electoral fraud. However, most the
resource speakers were not able to make it due to prior commitments. The President then issued
E.O 464 which states that all heads of the executive branch shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of the Congress. Because of this, Ermita sent a
letter to the Senate President informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons from the
executive department would not be able to attend the hearing without the consent of the
president.

ISSUE: Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464

RULING: Yes. Since the Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive
branch, it would be inconsistent to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on the executive operations, although there
are exemptions to the power of inquiry which fall under the rubric of executive privilege. The
executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. Executive privilege per
se is not meant to cover up embarrassing information. It is a relative concept, the validity of its
assertion to a great extent depends upon the political situation of the country.

Akbayan v. Aquino, G.R. 170516, July 16 2008

Facts: This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President
with Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading,
trade in services, investment, etc.
Prior to Presidents signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners non-government organizations,
Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers sought via petition for mandamus and prohibition to
obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA,
but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the negotiation
is completed.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception
to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
ISSUE: WON the diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive priviliege?

HELD: YES.

Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in
which it is made.

In the present case, the ground for respondents claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz:

x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic character
and under negotiation and review. In this case, the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been
categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior
Undersecretary.

The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by
the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public concern and
policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege.At the timewhen the
Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they are still now
and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the status and
nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with
existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a sufficient showing of
need only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure
sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages
in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional
adjudication involving fundamental
Thus, we hold that the balance in this case tilts in favor of executive privilege.
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
historic confidentiality would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that
matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing
to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an
area of greater national interest.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.
To recapitulate, petitioners demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has
become moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11,
2006. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents claim of executive privilege being
valid.

Neri v. Senate, G.R. 180643, March 25, 2008; MR, Sept. 4, 2008

FACTS: This is in relation to the NBN-ZTE scandal that erupted during the time of Pres. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before three Senate committees
and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project
(NBN) a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications to Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Neri disclosed that then Comelec Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President
Arroyo and Neris discussions relating to the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege." Neri refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether
or not she directed him to approve it.

Neri was once again invited by the Senate to testify, but Exec. Sec. Ermita asked the Senate to
dispense with Neris testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The Senate refused. Neri,
failing to appear before the Senate in subsequent hearings,was then cited in contempt.
Issue: W/N the contempt citing against Neri was proper considering his invocation of executive
privilege

Held: NO. The type of executive privilege exercised here was presidential communication
privilege. Presidential communication is presumptively privileged, but subject to rebuttal. In
other words, whoever seeks to challenge this privilege must show valid reasons related to public
good. In this case, the Supreme Court came to the decision that the Senate failed to show a valid
reason to controvert the privilege.

In short, communications between the President and his/her operationally-proximate advisers

are presumed to be privileged and the one challenging it must show why it should not be
considered to be so.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government, G.R. No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008
Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The
authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued
on February 28, 2001.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-
AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

Issue: May executive privilege be invoked by the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Hermogenes
Esperon to withhold information on the MOA-AD from the public?

Held: NO. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege it is not tenable under the premises. The
argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3s explicit provisions on continuing
consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the
exercise of the publics right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the
government proffers its definite propositions. It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant
advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.

In any case, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified
disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD.

Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506

FACTS:

President Ramos vetoed some of the provisions in RA 7663 (the General Appropriations Act of
1994), of which issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.

PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the
Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of the Special provision of Art
XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer
and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the
GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
debt services.

Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against
the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl
Highway Authority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is constitutional and valid?

HELD:

1. Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o
vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are germane to & have direct
relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.

2. Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of income &
creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State
Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely
acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

3. Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance
of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing
the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road
maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.

4. Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of Congress
required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking
an admin.action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate
law. VETO VALID.

5. Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to augment pension
funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such
power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed.VETO VALID.

6. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special fund for the
compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior approval. It is also an
amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot
be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.

Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

Facts: Hubert Webb was one of the accused in the high-profile case Vizconde massacre.
Preliminary investigation was provided by NBI and the case was raffled to Judge Zosimo
Escano who inhibited himself from the case for being employed with NBI before. His pair
Judge Escano issued warrant of arrest to defendants. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274,
presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest. Webb and the
others voluntarily surrendered. They files before the court petition of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus. They contend that (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with homicide;
(3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative
when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.
Issue: Whether or not the attendant publicity deprived Webb and the others of their right
to fair trial?
Decision: Petition dismissed. to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of
petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for
these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed
of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience
in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be
blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no
indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record
evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the
investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no
instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel
on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity.

Senate v. Ermita, GR No. 169777, April 20, 2006 SEE PREVIOUS

Neri v. Senate, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008, September 4, 2008 SEE PREVIOUS

Section 2. Qualifications
Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
FACTS:
 The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential
candidate to hold the highest office of the land.
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP);
In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be Fernando Jr., or Ronald Allan Poe, his date of
birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila;
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner, filed a case to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or
to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject;
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of
an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertionsfirst, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
respondent.
Documents presented by petitioner:
1. certificate of birth of FPJ
2. certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage
against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley
3. English translation of the affidavit aforesaid
4. a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the
National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered
the Philippines before 1907, among others.
Documents presented by FPJ:
1. a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley,
2. a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World
War II.

ISSUE: Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for
the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

HELD:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

The term natural-born citizens, is defined to include those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship.

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of
the 1935 Constitution.

Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines.

Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947),
jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established
direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the
father of Allan F. Poe.

While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino (grandfather), a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954.

The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestizo Espaol mother, Marta Reyes.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could
be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the
death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that (BEST EVIDENCE RULE)

Original document must be produced; exceptions.When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

xxx x xx x xx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public
office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents

Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos,
Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude,
or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was
also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and
Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to
1902.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the
child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the
child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner,
the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document

The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not
have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations.
 The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of
filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document
was the signature of Allan F. Poe found

What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state
interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was
not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither
justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as
so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also
deliberate and willful.

Poe-Llamanzares v.COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968;
Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo ).
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a.
Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her
adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City;
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter
with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she
received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila;
Mary Grace married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City.
Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back
to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony;
She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for
good.
 On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225
In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she
renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on,
she stopped using her American passport.
She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in
want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate
for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of
candidates?

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the
COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among
them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole
jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members,
whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for
the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack
of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be
contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: WON Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen?

Held:Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies
one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features
are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of
her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept
the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine
the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: WON Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement?

Held: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus
revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006
when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases
which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a
permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May
24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to
her citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that
a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency

Section 3. Vice President

Section 4. Election and Canvass

Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS:
Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer
from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the
subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used
and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a
supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into
law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as
herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political.

ISSUE: Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-
President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by
Congress?

HELD: It violates.

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to
canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners
for the said positions.
 The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as
part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes
and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the
entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president,
vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of
a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not
taken place in a particular country or countries, xxxxx
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4: The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly
certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two
or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates which
gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for president and vice-president.

Lopez v. Senate and House, GR No. 163556, June 8, 2004

- Rep. Ruy Elias Lopez filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify
Sec VIII, Rule 13 of the Rules of the Joint Session of Congress
- Said rule created a Joint Committee that would be in charge of preliminary canvass of
votes for the President and Vice-Presidential elections in 2004
- Accdg to Lopez, the creation of the Joint Canvassing Committee constitutes grave abuse
and deprives him and other member of Congress of their Congressional prerogatives
ISSUE: W/N the creation of the Joint Canvassing Committee constitutes grave abuse on the part
of both houses of Congress

HELD: NO. Sec 4 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that Congress has the
power to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of certificates. Thus, the creation of the Joint
Canvassing Committee is well within the powers granted to Congress by the Constitution with
regard to canvassing. Further, the judiciary has no power to review the internal proceedings of
Congress absent a clear violation of the Constitution, which has not been shown in this case.

Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee, June 22, 2004

- Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr., assails the validity of the existence of the Joint Congressional
Committee, which sought to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass and preliminary canvass of the votes cast for President and Vice-President during the
2004 National Elections
- Accdg to Pimentel, Congress had already adjourned sine die on June 11, 2004, and since the Joint
Canvassing Committee was constituted after this date, its acts were without any effect, as starting
June 11, 2004 the Twelfth Congress had already passed out of legal existence
- Pimentel uses as basis for his position Sec 15 Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution, which states that
Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days
as it may determine

Issue: W/N the Joint Canvassing Committees existence is null and void

Held: NO. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of
Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the
opening of its next regular session.
The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-
President cannot adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For
only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership
may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.

Macalintal v. PET, GR No. 191618, November 23, 2010

Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Macalintal argues that Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII
of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET.

The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the
grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or
Vice-President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not PET is constitutional.
Held: YES. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of
Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power
granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary
implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary
to carry it into effect.

Although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof.
The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision.

Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

- Ronald Allan Poe, aka Fernando Poe, Jr., filed a protest with the PET, alleging that he
was cheated in the Presidential Election of 2004, where he lost to Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo
- During the pendency of the protest, FPJ died of cardio-pulmonary arrest
- His widow, Jesusa Sonora Poe (Susan Roces) filed a Petition/Motion to Intervene as a
Substitute for Deceased Protestant
- Accdg to Roces, the death of the protestant does not constitute a ground for the dismissal
of the protestor or oust the tribunal of its jurisdiction
- Roces acknowledged that she cannot succeed FPJ as President should he be declared the
true winner of the elections, but stressed that she wanted to intervene to find out the true
will of the electorate, as a service to the Filipino people
- Arroyo countered that the PET rules provided that only the second or third-placed
candidate in the Presidential election may file a protest

ISSUE: W/N Roces may be allowed to substitute for her late husband as protestant

HELD: NO. The PET has no rules regarding intervention or substitution, but it allows for the
analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court and decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Electoral Tribunals, pursuant to its rule-making power under Sec 4 Art VII of the 1987
Constitution:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.

In this vein, the PET adopted Rule 3 Sec 16 of the Rules of Court, where substitution by a legal
representative is allowed, but only when the legal representative is a real party-in-interest.
Applying said rule to an election contest, the PET said that a public office is personal to the
public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death.

Roces petition for intervention was thus denied. The protest was also dismissed for failure of a
real party-in-interest to sustain the protest within the allowed time.
Legarda v. De Castro, PET Case No. 003, March 31, 2005

- Loren Legarda filed an election protest, alleging that the results of the Vice-Presidential election
in 2004 did not accurately reflect the will of the electorate, and that her opponent, Noli de Castro,
had been holding the position of Vice-President without basis
- The Supreme Court, sitting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, confirmed its jurisdiction over
the protest and ordered concerned officials to undertake measures for the protection and
preservation of the ballots and election documents
- De Castro assailed the authority of the PET to re-canvass the election returns and to correct
manifest errors in the election returns and certificates of canvass, arguing that these were
ministerial functions which ought to be performed by a canvassing body

ISSUE: W/N the PET may re-canvass election returns and correct manifest errors in election returns

HELD: YES. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is expressly
vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct
manifest errors in the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass. Likewise, although Rule 61 of the
PET Rules only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing therein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or
including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making power under Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution.

Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996

DOCTRINE: Executive Department - The President - Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath -
Election Contest- Miriam abandoned her electoral protest case when she ran and took
office as Senator after the 1995 elections. Consequently, the case has become moot and
academic.

FACTS:
o Protestant Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Miriam) ran for President in the 1992 elections
and lost against Fidel V. Ramos (Ramos).
o Miriam prayed that the revision of ballots1 in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas be
dispensed with and the revision process in the pilot areas be deemed completed.
o The Supreme Court deferred its action on that motion and required Miriam and Ramos
(protestee) to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether or not the
case has been rendered moot and academic by the election of Miriam as a Senator
in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995.
o Miriam's side: NO. They should decide on the election contest because:
Election contest confirms the true choice of the electorate.
The case at hand is imbued with public interest.
It is only moot if the term of office has expired.
Her election as Senator and assumption of office does not mean she abandoned
the protest.
The Court has abandoned the view that just because a case has been declared
moot, it should be dismissed.

1Basically means that in an electoral protest, the protestant is entitled for a "review" of ballots to determine whether or not s/he has
a chance of winning based on 20% of the findings of said revision. It also means that they will be segregated into contested and
uncontested ballots.
 Miriam referred to 3 cases to bolster her arguments:
1. Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the death of the protestee did not
stop the proceedings in the protest filed against him. A protest survives
the death of the protestee, and must be prosecuted to final judgment.
2. Lomugdang vs. Javier- If the protest succeeds and the protestee is
unseated = NOT a ground for dismissal of the protest.
3. De Castro vs. Ginete- Just because a losing candidate concedes to the
winner, it doesn't mean that the losing candidate is barred from
questioning the validity of the election of the winner.
4. (Cited by the SC in line with Miriam's cases) Moraleja vs. Relova- The acceptance
by the protestee of an appointment to another position is NOT a ground
for dismissal of the protest.
o SC's rebuttal to Miriam:
The cases she cited does not concur with the case at hand. These are the
differences:
1. Sibulo vda. de De Mesa vs. Mencias - the protestee had been proclaimed
as the winner and assumed office, and then DIED when the election
protest was ongoing.
2. Lomugdang vs. Javier- the protestant DIED during the ongoing protest.
3. De Castro vs. Ginete- the protestant congratulated the protestee after the
protestee won.
4. Moraleja vs. Relova-the election protest survived the protestant's
acceptance of TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT during the ongoing election
protest.
o Ramos' side: NO. There is strong legal basis for the PET to rule that Miriam is deemed
to have abandoned the protest because of the ruling in Dimaporo vs. Mitra. They
should decide on the election contest because:
Public interest requires that the protest must be resolved because a) it involves a
matter of paramount and grave public interest, and b) the protest was filed in bad
faith.
A resolution of the case would confirm his victory in the 1992 Presidential
elections and prove that Miriam's protest is unfounded.
Resolving the case would establish guiding and controlling principles or doctrines
with respect to presidential election protest cases, thereby educating the bench
and the bar and prevent the indiscriminate filing of baseless protest cases.
o SC's rebuttal to Ramos:
SC doesn't accept his view that just because Miriam filed her certificate of
candidacy, Miriam forfeited her claim to the office of the President.
Dimaporo case does not apply to Miriam.
There is no logic to Ramos' reasoning that the case should be resolved becaue
of bad faith. Also, there is no reason to proceed with the case just to establish
guidelines regarding election protests involving the office of the President or the
Vice-President.

ISSUE, HELD AND RATIO DECIDENDI:

1) WON this case has been rendered moot by the election of Miriam as a Senator in the
May 1995 election and her assumption of office on June 30, 1995?
YES.
Miriam ran for Senator in the 1995 elections without any qualification, condition
 or reservation. This means that her running was not conditional based on any
circumstances (e.g. her pending presidential election protest) and that she was
fully prepared to enter into a political contract with the electorate to serve as a
Senator.
SC cited the case of Moraleja (see case 4 in the cases cited above), saying she
abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved
in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate". In short, in assuming the
office of Senator, Miriam abandoned and withdrew her protest.
The Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal cite 5 instances in dismissing an
electoral protest. The SC reasoned that if you can dismiss a protest on
TECHNICAL grounds (like the Rules), it can also be dismissed for a stronger
reason (Miriam running and winning as Senator) if it became moot due to Miriam
abandoning the protest (which the SC implies she did when she ran for Senator).
ALSO, the SC says that since Miriam decided to waive her revision of the
remaining ballots from over 4,000 precincts in pilot areas, the SC resolved to: A)
Order the revision of the remaining ballot boxes
B) Require Miriam to inform the Tribunal within 10 days if, in the completion of
the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she would present evidence
regarding the revision.
Regarding B, Miriam has not informed the PET about presenting evidence. The
SC took it as an indication that she no longer intended to do so.
SC also said that revision of ballots is NOT a resolution of the said protest.
Hence, a dismissal of the protest is inevitable.

RULING: The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (a.k.a. the SC) resolved to:

DISMISS the election protest because it has been rendered MOOT and ACADEMIC by
the abandonment/withdrawal of Miriam as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator;
DISMISS, as a consequence, Ramos' counter-protest;
GRANT Miriam's Motion to dispense with the revision of ballots and other election
documents in the remaining precincts of the pilot areas.

Section 5. Oath

Section 6. Official Residence; Salary

Section 7. Vacancy at the Beginning of the Term of the Presidency

Section 8. Vacancy During the Term of the Presidency

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356 SCRA 108, 2001
Facts:
Estrada was elected as president. He was investigated for graft and corruption and was linked to
a hidden account of Jose Velarde (payoff from jueteng). Impeachment proceedings were
instituted, where he pleaded not guilty. He then called for a snap presidential election, which
according to the court means that he constructively resigned his post. SC declared that the seat
of presidency was vacant, and Arroyo took her oath for the presidency. Estrada express his
doubts on Arroyos proclamation but express that he would give up his office to avoid being an
obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
Issue:
Is there a constructive resignation made?
Ruling:
YES. Elements of valid resignation, are: (present when President Estrada left the Palace)
(a) an intent to resign
(b) acts of relinquishment.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his
leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final statement:
(1) He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President
(2) He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process
(3) He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(4) He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;
(5) He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity

Lozano, et al v. Macapagal-Arroyo, February 6, 2001

FACTS:
Before us are four Petitions pertaining to the oath-taking of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo as President of the Philippines.

In GR No. 146528, the Petition asks the Court to enjoin Joseph Ejercito Estrada "from exercising
the powers and authority of the President under the Constitution" and "to yield the Presidency to
his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo."

In GR No. 146549, petitioner prays that the Court declare that "the occupation of the Office of
[the President] of the Philippines by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is constitutional
and legal with the full support of the Filipino people and other foreign countries.

In GR No. 146579, the Petition asks the Court to issue a "definitive ruling on whether or not
Joseph Estrada is still the President" and, hence. "exempt from all criminal suits."

In GR No. 146631, the Petition prays "that the proclamation and oath-taking of Madame Arroyo
. . . be declared null and void . . ." or that she be "declared acting President and President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, President-on-leave . . ."

RULING: All four Petitions are plainly without merit.

First, the four Petitions are essentially for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has
no original jurisdiction. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, this special civil action falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and is not within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme court.

Although the Petition in GR No.146528 labels itself as a "Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus," it fails to allege, much less show, lack or excess of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of
jurisdiction on the part of "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions," which Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires to
be alleged and proven before the extra-ordinary writ of prohibition may be issued. Neither have
petitioners sufficiently alleged, much less shown, that respondent or anyone else "unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty," to entitle them
to the writ of mandamus. In any case, petitioners themselves admit that their plea is really one
for declaratory relief, (par. 6.1. of Petition) and that they "fully understand the well-settled
doctrine that this Honorable Court is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain cases for declaratory
relief."

Second, petitioners have no legal standing to file the suits. They have now shown any direct and
personal injury as a result of President Arroyos oath-taking. Specifically, Petitioner Lozanos
alleged interest as a taxpayer is far too detached from the ultimate objective of his Petition:
nullify the oath-taking of Arroyo and declare Estrada as "President-on-leave." The other
petitioners have not even alleged, not to say shown, any prima facie legal interest to qualify them
as proper parties. Kibitzers, however well-meaning, have no locus standi.

Clearly, the herein Petitions have miserably failed to present justiciable controversies brought by
the proper parties to deserve further considerations by this Court.

Section 9. Vacancy in the Vice Presidency

Section 10. Vacancies in Both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency

Section 11. Incapacity of the President

Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452, 2001; MR, 356, SCRA 108, 2001
Issue:
Whether Arroyo is only an acting President.
Ruling:
NO. Both houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress
has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he
cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable
to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo
is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.

Facts: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also
caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing
of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny
Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate
and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding
officer. Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other
bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.
Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office to
avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang
Palace.

Issue: Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
Ruling: The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo
presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned
by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the
old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government
exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was
affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal
and not political.

Section 12. Serious Illness of the President

Section 13. Prohibitions

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, 1991
Facts:
President Aquino issued EO 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions. This EO was assailed by CLU because according to them it adds exceptions to Sec 13,
Article 7 of the Constitution, and that the only exception to the said provision are those provided
by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether EO 248 is violative of the constitution?
Ruling:
YES. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself. EO 284 allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354, 1989

Facts:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the PCGG, for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and
position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation
(DITC).
An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the said
violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.
An information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family
corporation of which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings
conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the
constitution.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid
since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed
against him.

Issue: Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Ruling: YES. The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the
application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business
which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the
DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure,
...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.

Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993

Facts:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of RA 7227 Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of
the SBMAprovided that for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City
(Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority.
Petitioners argue that no elective official shall be eligible to be appointed to another
public office during his term.

Issue: Whether section 13 of RA 7227 is unconstitutional?

Ruling: YES. The constitution prohibits a public officer to hold multiple functions since they are
accorded with a public office. As incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA
official are not necessarily null and void.

Bitonio v. COA, G.R. no. 147392, March 12, 2004

FACTS:
In 1994, petitioner Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the
Department of Labor and Employment. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA
Board, he was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to
1997. After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the
payment of per diems to Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring unconstitutional
the holding of other offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and assistants in addition to
their primary office and the receipt of compensation.
ISSUE:
Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his
attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary
of Labor
RULING:
Yes, the petitioner is not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA. As the
Undersecretary himself admitted, he has no separate or special appointment for such
position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his
additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who
sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court cannot
allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA
Board to have a better right as his principal.
Public Interest Group v. Elma, GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006
FACTS:
Respondent Elma was appointed as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was
appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second
appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners sought to have both appointments declared as unconstitutional since Elma was
holding incompatible offices.
ISSUE:
May the Presidential Legal Counsel be made PCGG Chairman?
RULING:
NO. Since the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel has the duty of giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and
agencies and to review investigations involving other presidential appointees, he may not
occupy a position in any of the offices whose performance he must review. Such would
involve incompatible positions. Thus he cannot be PCGG Chairman and Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel at the same time since the PCGG answers to the President.
The prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to
respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary,
undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section
13, Article VII is applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed
concurrently to the offices of the PCGG Chairman and CPLC because neither office was
occupied by him in an ex-officio capacity, and the primary functions of one office do not
require an appointment to the other post. Moreover, even if the appointments in question
are not covered by Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments
are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and
elective officials, due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices
of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.

Espiritu v. Del Rosario, GR. No. 204964, 738 SCRA 464, 2014
FACTS:
Del Rosario filed an application for exemption with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
seeking to exempt his lots from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
Del Rosario argue that the decision of.then Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite was void
since he had been appointed to the Securities and Exchange Commission two months
prior to the rendering of the decision. Thus, he has already lost his authority as Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs when he rendered the said decision since he is
constitutionally prohibited from holding two offices during his tenure.
RULING:
Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite's
decision is presumed valid, effective,
and binding

Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution states:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet; and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

It is alleged that Gaite was appointed Commissioner to the Securities and Exchange Commission
on March 16, 2009.[40] This, however, is not conclusive since no evidence was presented as to
when he accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, or assumed the position.

Assuming that Gaite's appointment became effective on March 16, 2009, he can be considered
a de facto officer at the time he rendered the decision

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face.

Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to
the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed
to be valid, binding, and effective.

With Gaite being a public officer, his acts also enjoy the presumption of regularity, thus: The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity
or failure to perform a duty.

Respondent has not presented evidence showing that the decision was rendered ultra vires,
other than her allegation that Gaite had already been appointed to another office.

Section 14. Appointments of Acting President

Section 15. Prohibited Appointments

In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta, AM No. 98-5-01-SC, Nov. 9, 1998
Facts: Appointments were signed by His Excellency the President under the date of March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial
Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively. The
appointments were received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998. The referral was
made in view of the serious constitutional issue concerning said appointments arising from the
pertinent antecedents.
Appointments to fill vacancies in the Supreme court during the period mentioned in the provision
just quoted could seemingly be justified by another provision of the same Constitution. Section
4(1) of Article VIII which states:
"SEC 4 (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. ***. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof."
Issue: Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary in
the interest of public service.
Ruling: Section 4(1), Article VIII is a general provision while Section 15, Article VII is a
particular one; that is to say, normally, when there are no presidential elections, Section 4(1),
Article VIII shall apply: vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days; but when
there are presidential elections, the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the
President shall not make any appointments.

The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution the
President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in
the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.

The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is
a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court Resolved to DECLARE VOID the
appointments signed by His Excellency the President under date of March 30, 1998

De la Rama v. CA, G.R. No. 131136, Feb. 28, 2001

CASE MAIN POINT:
Prohibition on midnight appointments only extends to the President, not local elective officials
(ARTICLE 7, SECTION 15: PROHIBITION ON MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS)

FACTS: De Rama, mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, assails 14 appointments made by his predecessor
Abeja. Initially, he cited the appointments as midnight appointments and violative of the
constitutional prohibition on such matters. His assailment was denied by the CSC and was lifted
to the Court of Appeals where it was similarly dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by the previous mayor are violative on the
prohibition of midnight appointments

HELD: No, the appointments made by then-mayor Abeja are NOT violative on prohibition of
midnight appointments.

Citing Section 15 of Article 7 of the Constitution is wrong as mentioned in the CSC

resolution since the prohibition created there only pertains to presidential appointments, not local
appointments made by local elective officials

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010 and May 1, 2010
FACTS:
Seven days After 2010 Presidential Election, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno had his compulsory
Retirement by May 17, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many
legal dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting
President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. But
under Section 4 (1), Article III judicial Department of the Constitution, which provides that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, from a
"list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy." This
provision sin in contrast with the provision mentioned above.
The question now arises whether the incumbent president has the right to appoint the next chief
Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno. The JBC has unanimously agreed in their
meeting on January 18, 2011, to start the process of the filling the Vacant position of the Retired
Chief Justice. Judicial Bar Council has published the said announcement in the Daily inquirer
and Philippine Star news papers on January 20, 2010. Despite of the issues JBC has decided to
proceed to the next step of the process by announcing the names of the following Associate
Justices: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales,
Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval
and inviting the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not
later than February 22, 2010, to the Following Candidates. The announcement was printed at
Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star on February 13, 2010.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 15, Article VII apply to appointments in the Supreme Court or to the
Judiciary.
RULING:
No. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary the Constitutional
Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in
the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from
the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the
President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no
discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the
90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the
JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and
illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment. The
duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day
period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list
to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions
for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees
for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there
must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. The distinction between a ministerial and
discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.
Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 20337, June 16, 2015

The court ruled that Executive Order No. 2 in its entirety is constitutional, especially as to its
definition of midnight appointments and its recall, revocation and withdrawal of midnight
appointments.
It said the appointment to a government post is a process that takes several steps to complete and
any valid appointment, including one made under the exception in Article VII, section 15 of the
1987 Constitution, must consist of the president signing an appointee's appointment paper to a
vacant office and its official issuance and acceptance by the appointee evidenced by his or her
oath of office or assumption of duties.
"[F]or purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off date for valid appointments
and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the reference date for midnight appointments," the SC
said.
Exceptions to the ban on midnight appointments only refer to "temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety," but the high court said "[n]one of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall
under this exception."
While the appointment letters of petitioners were able to beat the March 10, 2010 cut-off date,
they took their oaths of office and assumed their post beyond March 10.
Section 16. Power to Appoint; Commission on Appointments
Government v. Springer 50 PHILS 259, 1927
FACTS:
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine
Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: The voting power shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested
the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized
that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the
government (President at that time was considered the head of state but does not manage
government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House
Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the
House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still
elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo
warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the
validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

Issue:
Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the
Board Members of NCC.
Held:
E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially
executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by
Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and
the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers.
The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the
legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the
appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within the legislative branch this
exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.

Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999

FACTS: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of
Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado
Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was
appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez
refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the
duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the
appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation
of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9,
Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that all provincial and
city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of
the Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the
President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit.
RULING: The recommendation here is nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres.,
being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the
action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and
in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. As the power to
appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he
may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among
those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

Flores v. Drilon, 223 SCRA 568, 1993

FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which
directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the SBMAprovided
that for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be
appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.
ISSUE: Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING: YES. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is
precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective
official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect
his constitutents.

Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 1260, 1989 (Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Jovito Salonga (GR
86439, April 13 1989)
FACTS:
This case is an offshoot of Sarmiento v. Mison although different in the position subject
of dispute
o In here, petitioner Bautista was appointed as Chairman of the CHR by then-
President Aquino
o As such, she accepted the post, took her oath before Justice Fernan and performed
the functions of her office
Later, she was asked to submit herself to confirmation proceedings before the CA which
she refused to acknowledged causing the disapproval of her ad interim appointment
o In fact, an Acting Chairman was appointed by Aquino in her place which was
submitted to CA for confirmation
ISSUE:
Whether the CHR Chairmanship post requires CA confirmation
RULING:
NO, the CHR Chairmanship post is not among the appointees requiring CA confirmation
 The subsequent act of appointing an Acting Chairman and submitting such appointment
for CA confirmation is deemed unconstitutional
o When the appointment is one that the Constitution mandates is for the President to
make without the participation of the CA, the executive's voluntary act of
submitting such appointment to the CA and the latter's act of confirming or
rejecting the same, are done without or in excess of jurisdiction

Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, 1987 (Ulpiano Sarmiento, Juanito Arcilla v. Salvador
Mison (Customs Commissioner), Guillermo Carague (DBM Secretary) (GR 79974,
December 17, 1987)
FACTS:
Petitioners (as taxpayers, lawyers & Constitutional law professors) question the
appointment of Mison as Customs Commissioner and seek to prevent DBM Secretary
Carague to release Misons salary
o They argue that Misons appointment to his post was without confirmation from
the Commission on Appointments (CA)
ISSUE:
Whether the post of Customs Commissioner require CA confirmation
RULING:
NO, the position is one which belongs to the 2nd class of presidential appointees, that is,
appointed by the President but does not require CA confirmation
This method was adopted as a middle ground between the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
where presidential appointees were all subject to CA confirmation (1935) or none at all
(1973), respectively
o As a result of this innovation in the 1987 Constitution, there are officers whose
appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even
if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose
appointments have to be confirmed by the CA (e.g. BSP Governor)

4 GROUPS OF OFFICERS WHOM THE PRESIDENT SHALL APPOINT

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
o CA confirmation NECESSARY
o Initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments, the President appoints
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone
o NO CONFIRMATION necessary

Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, 1989 (Teresita Quintos-Deles,

et al v. Commission on Appointments (GR 83216, September 4, 1989)
FACTS:
Deles was appointed by then-President Aquino as sectoral representative for women in
Congress where several Congressmen opposed arguing that her appointment required CA
confirmation
o The President knew of this dispute and instead submitted Deles appointment for
CA confirmation
Deles refused to submit to the CA stating that her post as sectoral representative does not
require CA confirmation hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether sectoral representatives in Congress appointed therein by the President require
CA confirmation
RULING:
YES, sectoral representatives in Congress are among the "other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first
sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to CA confirmation
HOWEVER, not all officers whose appointment is vested in the President by the
Constitution require CA confirmation
o SC Justices and judges, and the Ombudsman are presidential appointees mandated
by the Constitution but does not require CA confirmation

Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, 1992

FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715
provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the CoA.
Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the
Chairman and the Commissioners respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not
submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.
Calderon questioned the appointment saying that without the confirmation by the CoA,
such an appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an
encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the
Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned
in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments
extended by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by
the CoA.

HELD: The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for
the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional
Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution:

1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential

appointees mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral
representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional commissions of Audit, Civil
Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights).

Manalo v. Sistoza, GR No. 107369, August 11, 1999

FACTS:

This case questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments
issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the
Philippine National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief Superintendent and
Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation under Section16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act
6975 otherwise known as the Local Government Act of 1990.

Section 26 of Republic Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government
states that:

The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the senior officers down
to the rank of the chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointmentsxxxxx

Section 31 of the same Act states:

Director General - Appointed by the President from among the senior officers down to the rank of
chief superintendent in the service, subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointmentsxxx

Petitioner, Jesulito Sistoza question the constitutionality and legality of the appointments
issued by former Pres. Corazon Aquino to the respondent senior officers of the PNP who
were promoted to the rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their
appointments submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
 The said police officers took their Oath of Offices and assumed their respective positions.
Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
The petitioner brought before this petition for prohibition, as a tax payer suit to the SC to
assail the legality of subject appointment and disbursement thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of the senior officers of the PNP is valid even without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: The SC held that the appointments are valid. The court has the inherent authority to
determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit alienated by the
fundamental law. When it does the courts will not hesitate to strike down such
unconstitutionality.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

(the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution)

The appointments of respondent officers, who are not within the first category, need not be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson,
Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

It is petitioners submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officers whose rank is equal to that of
colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct
from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted Republic Act6975
which states in part:

No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Thereunder, the police force is
different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not
similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents
of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first
category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Angelina G. Matibag was appointed as Acting Director of COMELECs Educational
and Information Department (EID) by COMELEC en banc, Chairperson Demetriou, and
Commissioner Javier.
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Alfredo L.
Benipayo as Chairman of the Commission on Elections; and Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 8, 2008.
On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments expiring on February 2,
2008 Respondents took their oaths of office for a second time. The Office of the President
transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act on their
appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Arroyo renewed again the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, et al. to the same positions. The Office of the President
submitted their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on Appointments. They took
their oaths of office anew.
Petitioner was later reappointed to the Law Department by the Chairman Benipayo. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the
Law Department but was denied. Hence, she appealed the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc and filed an administrative case on Benipayo.
During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
reappointment and the right to remain in office of respondents as ad interim appointees is
unconstitutional because the respondent contends, the subsequent requirement which was the
approval of the Commission on Appointments of their reappointment by the president is lacking.

Issue: Whether the ad interim appointments issued by the President violates Section 16, Article VII.

Ruling: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it
is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess
of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

Rufino v. Endriga, 496 SCRA 13

FACTS:
Two groups of appointed members of the Board of Trustees of CCP are contesting each
others appointment. The Endriga group, sitting as current members, was appointed by then-
President Ramos and is assailing the appointment of the Rufino group, replacing all 7 members
of the Endriga group, by then-President Estrada.
Endriga group avers that the appointment into the Board of the Rufino group transgressed
PD 15 creation of Board of Trustees of CCP. As stated in PD 15, specifically Section 6,
appointment into the Board shall only be made by a majority vote of the trustees; presidential
appointments can only be made when the Board is entirely vacant to uphold the CCPs charter of
independence from pressure or politics.
Meanwhile, Rufino group stands by their appointment since the provision on
appointments stated in Section 6, PD 15 is violative of Section 16, Article 7 of the Constitution.
The Board cannot invoke the charter of autonomy to extend to appointment of its members.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments made by trustees of their fellow
members is constitutional

HELD:
No, PD 15, Section 6 allowing appointments of members by the trustees themselves is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Appointing authority may be given to other officials than the President provided the
appointment is in a rank lower than the appointing official.

While it is stated that appointing powers may be delegated by the President, such power
is limited in scope to include only ranks lower than the appointing authority.
In the case, an appointment of a member made by a fellow member transgresses Article
7, Section 16 (1) since both positions are equal in nature. CCP cannot invoke autonomy
prescribed in its charter as an exemption from the limitation of delegative appointing power
because such invocation puts CCP outside the control of the President.

Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, GR No. 164978, October 13, 2005

FACTS:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective
departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel
together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al.
Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the
Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should
be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is
empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an
acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president
to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad
interimappointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.
HELD: Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the
safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary
designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial
appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad
interim appointments this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice
is the presidents to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can
trust. She cannot be constrained to choose the undersecretary. She has the option to
choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and
confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose
on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session.
Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. That person may or may not be the
permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed outsiders, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that
the president may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.
Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011
Facts:

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress.
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials.
o RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the
ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
o RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001.
o RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.
But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular
elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country. The law as well granted the President the power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
Issue:

Whether the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as an
interim measure unconstitutional

Ruling:

No, RA No. 10153 is a law that is not violative of the Constitution

Sec. 16, Art. VII classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint.
These are:

o First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers
and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution;
o Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
o Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
o Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone
What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials
duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This
power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term
ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
Besides, RA No. 10153 provides only for synchronization of elections

Section 17. Power of Control

Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano 21 SCRA 395, 1967
Facts:
Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Tamlangon, Bansalan, Province of Davao.
Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a of the above public land to plaintiff.
the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as
pasture land and declared agricultural land.
Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the
released area.
plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released
area. This was protested by Jose Pao and his nineteen companions upon the averment
that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
 The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision
giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of
Jose Pao and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on appeal by Jose Pao for himself
and his companions held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the President" decided the controversy,
modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, declared that:
o it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless
farmers to be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;
o directed that the controverted land should be allocated to actual occupants,
without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of
surveying this portion
Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying
that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.
Plaintiff asserts Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141, which states that decisions of the
Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
o This statute, according to plaintiff, is controlling not only upon courts but also
upon the President.

ISSUE: Whether the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision
of the Director of Lands?
RULING:
No, Acts of Executive Secretary acting by authority of the President are those of
President himself
The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President.
The Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has
an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
Where the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of
the President. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts.
Only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do
so. Therefore, unless the action taken is disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully
assailed.

Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr 197 SCRA 771

FACTS:
In this petition, Maceda questioned several Resolutions and Orders of the Office of the President
and Dept. of Finance to issue refunds for tax exemptions claimed by NPC. These tax refunds
were the result of several Resolutions of the FIRB that restored NPCs tax exemptions after
several laws withdrew the same. The SC denied the petition on the grounds that the law granted
the NPC exemption from all forms of taxes, even indirect ones, and that there was a valid
delegation of power to the FIRB to restore exemptions.
W/N the powers conferred upon the FIRB (restoration of exemption) by EO 93
constitute undue delegation of legislative power and is therefore unconstitutional
(NO)
RATIO
E.O. No. 93 is complete in itself and constitutes a valid delegation of legislative power to
the FIRB. Under Sec. 3, it states that:
o Sec. 3. In the discharge of its authority hereunder the Fiscal Incentives Review
Board shall take into account any or all of the following considerations:
a) the effect on relative price levels;
b) relative contribution of the beneficiary to the revenue generation effort;
c) nature of the activity the beneficiary is engaged; and
d) in general, the greater national interest to be served.
The standards of the delegated power are clearly provided for.
The legislative authority could not or is not expected to state all the detailed situations
wherein the tax exemption privileges of persons or entities would be restored. The task
may be assigned to an administrative body like the FIRB.
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that delegation of legislative power has become
the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of
modern life and many technical fields of governmental functions as in matters pertaining
to tax exemptions.
The maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare, has
been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of subordinate legislation. Accordingly,
with the growing complexities of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislative,
and toward the approval of the practice by the Courts. (People v. Rosenthal)
The FIRB Resolutions restoring NPC its tax exemptions (which included indirect taxes)
are therefore valid.

Roque v. Director of Lands, L-25373, July 1, 1976

Facts:
Roque, petitioner, questions the decision of the Assistant Exec. Sec. of the President for
maintaining the decision of the Director of Lands and overruling the Secretary of Agricultural
and Natural Resources. The petitioner claims that the Asst. Exec. Sec. of the President acted with
grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the Asst. Exec. Sec. acted on grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
No. The Assistant Executive Secretary only acted on the Presidents behalf. In a ruling by
Justice Laurel in the aforecited Villena decision, it states that:

all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive

Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he
act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, performed and Promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive."

Ang-Angco v. Castillo 9 SCRA 619, 1963

FACTS:

The Pepsi-Cola Co. requested for the withdrawal of Pepsi-Cola concentrates which were
not covered by any Central Bank release certificate. It counsels approached Collector of Customs
Ang-Angco to secure the immediate release of the concentrates, but advised the counsel to
secure the release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office.
The Non-Dollar Import Office wrote a letter to Ang-Angco which stated that his office
had no objection to the release of the concentrates but could not take action on the request as it
was not in their jurisdiction. Ang-Angco telephoned the Secretary of Finance who expressed his
approval of the release on the basis of said certificate.
Collector Ang-Angco finally released the concentrates. When Commissioner of Customs
learned of the release he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang-
Angco. For three years Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his office.
Then, Executive Secretary Castillo, by the authority of the President, rendered his
judgment against the petitioner.
Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention the action taken
by Secretary Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his right to
have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service
Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the request for
reconsideration. Not satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a memorandum to
President Garcia reiterating once more the same grounds on which he predicated his request for
reconsideration. Again Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the appeal,
asserting that the President virtue of his power of control over all executive departments can take
direct action and dispose of the administrative case in question

ISSUE:

Whether Exec. Sec. Castillo in acting by authority of the President, violated the guaranty in
which the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide
administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service, deprived him of his
right of appeal

RULING:

The action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the
President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the
same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.

Under Section 16(1) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil
Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all officers
and employees in the classified service. The only limitation to this power is that the decision of
the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals, whose decision in
such cases shall be final.

Moreover, Civil Service Law of 1959 does not provide for any appeal to the President,
nor is he given the power to review the decision in administrative cases motu proprio

NAMARCO v. Arca 29 SCRA 648, 1969

Facts:
The general manager issued Administrative Order No. 137 holding Arive guilty of the charges
and dismissing him from the service. Arive appealed from the decision of NAMARCO to the
president. Then the Executive Secretary Diaz presumably acting for the president , handed down
a decision setting aside Resolution No. 584-60 of the NAMARCO and reinstating Arive to his
former position. NAMARCO contended that the office of the President had no jurisdiction to
review any decision of NAMARCO BOARD of its subordinate employees.
Issue: Whether or not the President had the authority to reverse the decisions of the NAMARCO
board.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the president has the authority to reverse the decision of the NAMARCO
board. The president not only exercises supervision but also control over all GOCCs including
NAMARCO. Hence, he may review, revise, alter or nullify the decision or action of the board.

Drilon v. Lim 235 SCRA 135, 1994

FACTS: Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, pursuant to the authority granted upon him by
Section 187 of the LGC and upon appeal of concerned parties, declared the Manila Revenue
Code null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of local
tax ordinances and for containing provisions contrary to law and public policy. Upon appeal to
the RTC, the trial judge reversed the order of petitioner and, in addition, declared Section 187 of
the LGC unconstitutional as it gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control over local
governments in violation of the principle of local autonomy mandated by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Does Section 187 of the LGC give the Secretary of Justice the power of control?
RULING: No. The Supreme Court said that the provision only gave the Secretary of Justice the
power to supervise, not control, in that the Secretary of Justice could only determine the
constitutionality or legality of the local tax ordinance and revoke them on such grounds. The
provision did not empower the Secretary to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the
LGU. The Secretary was not authorized by Section 187 to determine whether the law was wise
or reasonable or otherwise a generally bad law.

Joson v. Torres 290 SCRA 279, 1998

FACTS: This is a case that involves the validity of the suspension of Eduardo Joson, Governor
of the province of Nueva Ecija under. On September 12, 1996, petitioner is said to belligerently
barged into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with armed men and uttered
threatening words to the members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod members. Respondents
alleged that the Governor was concern about a legislative measure regarding the loan of P150M
from PNB. Thus, private respondents send a letter to the President regarding the incident and
requesting for the suspension of the Governor for threathening their lives and safety. President
assigned Sec. Barbers to settle the controversy. In the process, for failure of the Governor to
submit an answer to the complaint, he was in default and with the Resolution dated January 8,
1998, petitioner was suspended for six (6)months. Petitioner now questions as to the validity of
the resolution praying that as an elective official and not appointed, he cannot be covered by
such resolution or the control power of the president.

ISSUE: Was the resolution valid? Is this covered by the Presidents Power of Control?

RULING: The SC held that the resolution was null and void. The petitioner is an elected official
and not appointed by the Executive Department and therefore not covered by the Presidents
power of control to deal with the case at bar. The law provides that for disciplinary actions
involving elected official should be covered by the Local Government code and the code
provides that such case should be investigated and decided by the Civil Service Law and results
to be provided to the Civil Service Commission for the proper sanctions after due investigation.

Dadole v. COA, GR No. 125350, Dec. 3, 2002

Facts: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision and resolution,
dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the respondent Commission on
Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the monthly
additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City.

Issue: Whether or not Local Budget Circular 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the
supervisory powers of the President?

Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that:

 2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local
Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national
government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional
allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and
cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions:

a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs;

b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A.
6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget;
c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should
be satisfied and/or complied with; and
d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with
R.A. 7160.3" (italics supplied)

Ruling: We rule in favor of the petitioner judges. By constitutional fiat, local government units
are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised
within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold
or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the
President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she
finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory
powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot
interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the
parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of
his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of
a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and
separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations.

DENR v. DENR Employees, GR No. 149724, Aug. 19, 2003

CASE MAIN POINT:

Actions of the DENR Secretary in his capacity as executive department head is presumed as acts
of the President
FACTS:
DENR Employees of DENR R-XII are assailing the transfer of DENR R-XII Regional
Office from Cotabato City to Koronadal.
The transfer is supported by DENR AO No 99-14 Providing for the Redefinition of
Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Offices. Said order
was issued by the DENR Secretary pursuant to EO 192 (1987) issued to reorganize DENR.
However, the transfer was prevented by the RTC of Cotabato for lack of legal basis and
was further prevented on appeal for procedural flaws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer of the Regional Office ordered by the Secretary of DENR has
legal basis and within his authority

HELD:
Yes, the transfer ordered by the DENR Secretary has legal basis and within his authority.
 With regards to legal basis, the Admin Order issued for the transfer has its basis in EO
192 which effectively reorganized DENR. Admin Order 99-14 was executed within the limits of
said Executive Order and thus granting the transfer sufficient legal basis
In addition, the Court invoked the doctrine of qualified political agency to justify that the
transfer ordered by the DENR Secretary is within his authority. The Secretary, as appointed
executive department head, is an alter-ego and political agent of the President.
The doctrine purports that with a single executive branch, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department. Moreover, the heads of
executive departments are assistants and agents of the President and the actions of these
secretaries are deemed to be the acts of the President unless disapproved or reprobated by the
President.

Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710

FACTS:

Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958.
In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and
had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz.
Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a
committee to investigate the matter.
After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then
issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the
president has no jurisdiction to remove him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed
considering that he is an appointee of the president.

HELD: Yes. The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the
Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee
who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No.
2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after
due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint .

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the
power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such
can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to
them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our
Constitution which says that the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department.

Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA, GR No. 167324, July 17, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects the
reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of its
legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having been
issued in excess of the Presidents authority;
[Executive Order No. 102 entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health]: which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH
refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider
of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic
services to local government units;
Executive Order No. 102 was enacted pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160), which provided for the devolution to the local
government units of basic services and facilities, as well as specific health-related
functions and responsibilities;
The Court of Appeals decreed that the President was empowered to issue Executive
Order No. 102, in accordance with Section 17 Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: WON EO No. 102 is unconstitutional?

HELD: No.

This Court has already ruled in a number of cases that the President may, by executive
or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the
Executive Department. This is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other
statutes.
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, clearly states: [T]he president shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter
10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987 reads:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office - The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the
following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing consolidating or merging units thereof
or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from
other Departments or Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from
other Departments or agencies.

In Domingo v. Zamora,2 this Court explained the rationale behind the Presidents
continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the
President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. To remain effective and efficient, it must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief
Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies.

The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists of the Office
of the President Proper and the agencies under it. The agencies under the Office of the
President are identified in Section 23, Chapter 8, Title II of the Administrative Code:

Sec. 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President.The agencies under the
Office of the President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the
President, those under the supervision and control of the President, those under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President, those attached to it for policy
and program coordination, and those that are not placed by law or order creating them
under any specific department. (Emphasis provided.)

Section 2(4) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code defines the term
agency of the government as follows:

Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

Furthermore, the DOH is among the cabinet-level departments enumerated under Book
IV of the Administrative Code, mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work
 of the President.3 Indubitably, the DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and
control of the President and, thus, part of the Office of the President. Consequently,
Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code, granting the President the
continued authority to reorganize the Office of the President, extends to the DOH.

Again, in the year when Executive Order No. 102 was issued, The General
Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1999 (Republic Act No. 8745) conceded to the
President the power to make any changes in any of the key positions and organizational
units in the executive department thus:

Clearly, Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President
to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive
Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the Presidents constitutional power of control over the
executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code,
recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.

Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 160093, July 31, 2007

FACTS:
Then President Joseph E. Estrada issued E.O. No. 102 otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, and Sections 78 and 80 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8522,
also known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1998. E.O. No. 102 provided for
structural changes and redirected the functions and operations of the Department of
Health.
Petitioner Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(MEWAP) is a union of affected employees in the Malaria Control Service of the
Department of Health.
Secretary of Health issued Department Memorandum No. 157, pursuant to E.O. 102,
which provides:
All personnel are hereby directed to report to their new assignments on or before 2
October 2000 pending processing of new appointments, required clearances and other
pertinent documents.
Transfer or movement of personnel, properties, records and documents to appropriate
office/unit and device other necessary means to minimize disruption of office functions
and delivery of health services.
Petitioners question the authority of the President to reorganize a department, bureau or
office in the executive department.

ISSUES:
Whether Sections 78 and 80 of the General Provision of Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise
known as the General Appropriation[s] Act of 1998[,] empower former President Joseph E.
Estrada to reorganize structurally and functionally the Department of Health.

Whether the President has authority under Section 17, Article VIII of the Constitution to effect a
reorganization of a department under the executive branch.

HELD:

The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health
under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control
under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:

Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we held that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel,

consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It
alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control,
authority and responsibility between them. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged
with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may
include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws, viz.:

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.

The President's power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers
under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization
powers to implement reorganization measures, viz.:

SEC. 20. Residual Powers. - Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise
such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President
in accordance with law

It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus
and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two
decrees [is] unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." So far, there is yet no law
amending or repealing said decrees.

The pertinent provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1772, clearly support the President's continuing power to reorganize the executive branch

Orosa v. Roa, GR No. 14047, July 14, 2006

FACTS:
petitioner, a dentist by profession, filed with the Pasig City Prosecution Office a
complaint-affidavit charging respondent Alberto C. Roa, likewise a dentist, with the
crime of libel;
stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions against Dr. Orosa" written
by respondent and published in the March-April 1996 issue of the Dental Trading Post, a
bi-monthly publication of the Dental Exchange Co., Inc. In gist, the article delved into the
possibility of a father, who happened to be an examiner in a licensure examination for
dentistry where his sons were examinees, manipulating the examinations or the results
thereof to enable his children to top the same;
In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged that the article in question is defamatory as it
besmirched his honor and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board
examinations held in May 1994;
Respondent denied the accusation, claiming that the article constitutes a "fair and
accurate report on a matter of both public and social concern." He averred that the article
in question was not written with malice but with a sincere desire to contribute to the
improvement of the integrity of professional examinations;
Pasig City Prosecutor dismissed the case;
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo issued a Resolution (Zuo Resolution), setting
aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing the latter to file an Information for
libel against respondent.
Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas reversed the Zuo Resolution
petitioner went to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 432 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure;
The Pasig City Prosecution Office and the Department of Justice are not among the
quasi-judicial agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or resolutions
are subject to review by the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court in its Resolution En Banc dated April 8, 1997, approving the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure in Bar Matter No. 803, did not include final orders or
resolutions issued by these agencies as appealable under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals
is therefore not at liberty to supply the omissions in the Rule, that would constitute an
encroachment on the rule making power of the Supreme Court

ISSUE: whether or not a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor
to withdraw an information in a criminal case.
HELD: Petitioner's above posture, while valid to a point, will not carry the day for him.

It is petitioner's thesis that Rule 43 was intended to apply to all quasi-judicial agencies exercising
quasi-judicial functions. Upon this premise, petitioner submits that resolutions of the DOJ in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions are properly appealable to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43, adding that the quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under said Rule are not
exclusive.

There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is
deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power of control lodged in the President
over executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even Congress
cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter,
modify, nullify, or set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line
agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.

Being thus under the control of the President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his
decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse from the decision of the Secretary
of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts.

Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate; subject to defined
exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to
exhaust administrative remedies.

Notably, Section 1, supra, of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the agencies named
therein, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be
taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.

Phillips Seafood v. BOI, GR No. 175787, February 4, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged

in the export of processed crabmeat and other seafood products.
Petitioner used to supply semi-processed raw materials to Phillips Seafood (Phils.), Inc.
(PSPI), an affiliate corporation also engaged in the export of seafood products, before the
latters closure due to financial difficulties.
On 04 May 2000, petitioner filed with respondent BOI an application for an ITH for
taxable year 1999 under Certificate of Registration;
BOI informed petitioner that the ITH previously granted would be applicable only to the
period from 13 August 1999 to 21 October 1999 or before petitioners transfer to a "not
less-developed area."14 Petitioner wrote respondent BOI requesting for a reconsideration
of its decision.
 BOI denied its motion for reconsideration. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Office of
the President, which dismissed petitioners appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in
a Decision dated 22 September 2004. The Office of the President likewise denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration in an Order dated 14 March 2005.
On 05 April 2005, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals,
questioning the dismissal of its appeal before the Office of the President. The petition
argued that the executive power of control over the acts of officials under the Office of the
President is superior to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over decisions
of quasi-judicial agencies under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
In the main, petitioner argues that the review by the Office of the President of the
decisions of respondent BOI must be allowed; otherwise, the Presidents constitutional
power to review the decisions of department secretaries will be rendered illusory if said
decisions may be reviewed only by the Court of Appeals.
Art. 36. Appeal from Boards Decision. Any order or decision of the Board shall be
final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation. Within the said period of
thirty (30) days, said order or decision may be appealed to the Office of the President
E.O. No. 226 apparently allows two avenues of appeal from an action or decision of the
BOI. One mode is to elevate an appeal to the Office of the President when the action or
decision pertains to either of these two instances: first, in the decisions of the BOI over
controversies concerning the implementation of the relevant provisions of E.O No. 226
that may arise between registered enterprises or investors and government agencies under
Article 7; and second, in an action of the BOI over applications for registration under the
investment priorities plan under Article 36.
Another mode of review is to elevate the matter directly to judicial tribunals. For
instance, under Article 50, E.O. No. 226, a party adversely affected by the issuance of a
license to do business in favor of an alien or a foreign firm may file with the proper
Regional Trial Court an action to cancel said license. Then, there is Article 82, E.O. No.
226, which, in its broad phraseology, authorizes the direct appeal to the Supreme Court
from any order or decision of respondent BOI "involving the provisions of E.O. No.
226."

ISSUE: WON the executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries must not be
rendered illusory by rules of procedure?

HELD: Petitioner should have immediately elevated to the Court of Appeals the denial by
respondent BOI of its application for an ITH; Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, a
recourse that is not sanctioned by either the Rules of Civil Procedure or by the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.

Petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of E.O. No. 226 to justify its appeal to the Office of the
President. Article 36, along with Article 7, which allows recourse to the Office of the President,
applies to specific instances, namely, controversies between a registered enterprise and a
government agency and decisions concerning the registration of an enterprise, respectively.
Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. This enumeration is exclusive so that other controversies
outside of its purview, including petitioners entitlement to an ITH, can invoke only the appellate
judicial relief provided under Article 82. In the instant case, the denial of petitioners application
for an ITH is not within the cases where the law expressly provides for appellate recourse to the
Office of the President. That being the case, petitioner should have elevated its appeal to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43.

Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI, appeal to the Office of the
President should be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of the President to review acts
of department secretaries will be rendered illusory by mere rules of procedure.

The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down in Section
17, Article VIIof the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the "power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch
of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not
the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law,
or by judicial decisions.33 All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.
Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rule-making
power.

Biraogo v. Truth Commission, GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010

- Louis Biraogo seeks to invalidate Executive Order No. 1 promulgated by President Benigno
Aquino III and signed by Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
- EO No. 1 created the Philippine Truth Commission, which sought to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by public officers and employees during the administration of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
- Biraogo, and a number of Congressmen in a separate petition, assailed the constitutionality of EO
No. 1 in that it was, according to them, beyond the powers of the President to create the
Philippine Truth Commission, because it usurped the power of Congress to create public offices,
and supplanted the power of the Ombudsman and the DOJ
- Accdg to Biraogo, the PTC was a public office and not merely an adjunct of the Office of the
President, and its creation is therefore violative of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
- Biraogo et al also assailed the constitutionality of the PTC in that it allegedly violated the Equal
Protection clause by targeting only officials of the Arroyo administration

ISSUE: Does the President have the power to create ad hoc offices such as the PTC?

HELD: YES. The creation of the PTC through EO No. 1 was completely within the power of control
granted to the President by Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the President is necessarily
vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws
are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department or interfere with the discretion of his officials.
The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his
power to discipline subordinates, his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes and in
order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the creation of the PTC was unconstitutional for violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution, as it targeted only officials of the Arroyo
administration, to the exclusion of others.

Banda v. Executive Secretary Ermita, G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010

- President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 378, which removed the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Printing Office (NPO) over the printing service requirements of government
offices and instrumentalities
- Pursuant to EO 378, government offices are allowed to source their printing service requirements
from private service providers through competitive bidding
- Banda et al, who were employees of the NPO, assailed the constitutionality of EO 378,
contending that since the NPO was created through EO 285, which was issued by President
Corazon Aquino when she still exercised legislative powers, it is beyond the executive powers of
President Arroyo to amend EO 285 through executive issuance

ISSUE: W/N President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo may validly amend the jurisdiction of the NPO through
an Executive Order

HELD: YES. The President has the power of control, granted by Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The power of control necessarily includes the power of the President to reorganize the offices and
agencies in the executive department in line with her constitutionally-granted power of control and by
virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Prospero Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, G.R. No. 196425,
July 24, 2012

- In 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued EO No. 13, which abolished the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and transferred its powers to the Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(IAD-ODESLA)
- In 2011, then-Finance Secretary Cesar Purisima filed with the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit against Prospero Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local
Water Utilities Administration, and other members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, for
the purchase of the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
- Pichay then received an Order signed by Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa requiring
him and his co-respondents to submit their written explanations under oath
- Pichay filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court against the
IAD-ODESLA, on the ground that EO 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of
Congress to create a public office

ISSUE: W/N Pichay is correct in asseverating that EO 13 is unconstitutional

HELD: NO. The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-
finding investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over
the Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws by Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution.
The IAD-ODESLA is not a quasi-judicial body, but merely a fact-finding body. Thus, its creation is
not a usurpation of judicial power nor the power to create to create a public office, which is reserved
to the legislature.

Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, 2015

- Rep. Risa Hontiveros assails the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation
Agreement (ASTOA) signed by DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, which allowed
Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO) to take over the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC) in performing the operations and maintenance of Stage 1 of the
South Metro Manila Skyway
- According to Hontiveros, PD 1113 and PD 1894, which granted to PNCC the right to
construct, maintain, and operate the Metro Manila Skyways, contained a provision which
required presidential approval for any transfer of rights under the franchise granted to the
PNCC
- Therefore, the ASTOA was without legal effect, as it was DOTC Secretary Mendoza and
not then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who signed the agreement, in violation of
the presidential approval requirement in PD 1113 and PD 1894

ISSUE: W/N the ASTOA was valid considering it was signed by Sec Mendoza and not by the
President

HELD: YES. The acts of the DOTC Secretary in the ordinary course of the performance of his
duties are the acts of the President. Thus, the power of control exercised by the President
pursuant to Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution may be exercised by his alter-egos.

DatuZaldyUyAmpatuan v, Hon. Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2012

- On Nov 24 2009, the day after the gruesome Maguindanao Massacre, during which 57
men and women, including journalists, were killed, then-President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1946, which place the provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City under a State of Emergency
- Three days later, President Arroyo issued Administrative Order 273, delegating
supervision of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao from the Office of the
President to the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
- Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan and several ARMM officials filed a petition for prohibition
under Rule 65, claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached upon the autonomy of
the ARMM
- Ampatuan et al also argued that the President gave the DILG Secretary the power to
exercise not merely administrative supervision but control over the ARMM since the
DILG Sec had the power to suspend ARMM officials and replace them

ISSUE: Did the President invalidly give control powers to the DILG Secretary pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1946?
HELD: NO. The DILG did not take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct
governmental powers over the region. The President merely delegated through AO 273 her
supervisory powers over the ARMM. This was valid because the DILG Secretary was her alter-
ego, and this is consistent with the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. Likewise, the
delegation was consistent with Sec 17 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, where the President is
authorized to ensured that the laws be faithfully executed.

Province v. COA, G.R. 182573, September 28, 2010.

Facts:
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution allocating P4M of its
retained earnings for health care benefits. SP entered into a contract with PhilamCare for a Group
Health Care (P3.7M).
Provincial Auditor issued a Notice suspending the payment of premium due to lack of approval
from the President as required by AO 103. President Estrada directed COA to lift suspension but
only for P100k. Auditor ignored the directive and issue a Notice of Suspension. This was
affirmed by the COA because of AO 103.
Issue:
Whether the Presidents approval is necessary for LGU to appropriate funds for health care
services.
Ruling:
NO. The requirement then of prior approval from the President under Administrative
Order No. 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned
and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. Nowhere the AO indicates that the
prohibition also applies to LGUs. In other words, AO 103 must be observed by government
offices under the Presidents control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII. Being an LGU,
petitioner is merely under the Presidents general supervision.

Section 18. Presidents Powers as Commander in Chief

Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448
Facts:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of
8 people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Marcos urged that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize
political power.
Issue:
Whether the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension belongs to
the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.
Ruling:
YES, the President has authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. However, it is subject to judicial
review.
2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to
the writ:
1. there must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger
2. public safety must require the suspension of the privilege.
President has 3 courses of action:
1. to call out the armed forces
2. to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
3. to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law
In this case, he had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh

Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590

Facts:
Petitoners seek for damages, alleging that Maj. Gen. Ver through Task Force Makabansa (TFM
of the AFP, ordered illegal searches and seizures and other violation of rights to conduct
preemptive strikes against knoen communist-terrorist underground houses in view of increasing
reports about plans to sow disturbances in Manila. A Motion to Dismiss was filed on the ground
that the writ of habeas corpus was suspended.
Issue:
Whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights.
Ruling:
NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners
right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

NOTE: The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus had later been lifted by President Aquino.

IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000

Facts:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
then President Estrada directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each
other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP for a temporary
period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to
assist the PNP in law enforcement.
Issue:
Whether the President can call the armed forces based on his factual determination.
Ruling:
YES. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is something that is for the
President to decide. He has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which
may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the State. In the exercise of
the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations
to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.

Lacson v. Perez, GR 147780-81, 147799 and 1477810, May 10, 2001

Facts:
President Arroyo declared a STATE OF REBELLION due to EDSA III and ordered the AFP
and PNP to suppress the rebellion in NCR. Petitioner contends that the declaration of a state of
rebellion is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment on the
domain of judiciarys prerogative to determine and evaluate what took place in EDSA II.
Issue:
Whether the President factual determination may be subjected to judicial review.
Ruling:
YES. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is something that is for the President
to decide. Although the court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of this power, on the basis of its power to determine grave abuse of
discretion, this is no longer feasible when the proclamation has already been lifted.

Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 159085, February 3, 2004

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed with
ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati, demanding the
resignation of the President, the Defense Secretary, and the PNP Chief. Later that day, the
President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 both declaring a state of
rebellion and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion. The Oakwood occupation ended in
the evening after negotiations. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration
of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003. During that time, several search and
recovery operations were conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation calling the state of rebellion is constitutional
RULING: Yes. Section 18, Article 7 of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, a sequence of graduated powers which are: the calling out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. This, however,
does not prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. As a conclusion, the Court
finds that the declaration is devoid of any legal significance and that the declaration is deemed
not written. Furthermore, as long as the state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, it is only a mere declaration that cannot violate constitutionally protected rights.

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 2006

FACTS:

These 7 consolidated petitions question the validity of PP 1017 (declaring a state of national emergency)
and General Order No. 5 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the cases are pending,
President Arroyo issued PP 1021, declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist,
thereby, in effect, lifting PP 1017.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 arrogated upon the President the power to enact laws and
decrees
* If so, whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional

HELD:

Take-Care Power

This refers to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, based on Sec. 17,
Art. VII: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among
others, execute its laws. In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country, including
the Philippine National Police under the Department of Interior and Local Government.

The specific portion of PP 1017 questioned is the enabling clause: to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chap. 2, Book III of E.O. 292. President Arroyos
ordinance power is limited to those issuances mentioned in the foregoing provision. She cannot issue
decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973
Constitution.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the
authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.
Sec. 1, Art. VI categorically states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.

But can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to
enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations,
laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce
laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

David v. Ermita, GR No. 171409, May 3, 2006

Gudani v. Senga, GR No. 170165, April 15, 2006
Ampatuan v. Puno, 651 SCRA 228
Vinuya v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230 (2014)

Section 19. Executive Clemency

Cristobal v. Labrador, 71 PHIL 34
Llamas v. Orbos 202 SCRA 844, 1991
People v. Salle 250 SCRA 581, 1995
Drilon v. CA, 202 SCRA 378, 1991
Torres v. Gonzales 152 SCRA 272, 1987
Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190, 1989
Sabello v. Department of Education, GR No. 87687, December 26, 1989
People v. Salle, Jr GR No. 103567, December 4, 1995
Garcia v. COA, 226 SCRA 356, 1993
Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice, GR No. 132601, Jan 19, 1999
Risos-Vidal v. Comelec, GR No. 206666, 747 SCRA 210, Jan. 21, 2015

Section 20. Foreign Loans

Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia, GR 106064, October 13, 2005

Section 21. Foreign Relations: Senate Concurrence in International Agreements

USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer, 105 PHIL 1030, 1959
World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
Bayan v. Executive Secretary Zamora, 343 SCRA 449, 2000
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, 2005
Lim v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 151445, April 11, 2002
Secretary of Justice v. Judge Lantion, GR No. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244
Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426
Bayan v. Department of National Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, G.R. No. 212444

Article VIII: Judicial Department

Section 1. Judicial Power

Santiago v. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (2970)
Noblejas v. Teehankee, 23 SCRA 405
Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Company, 57 PHIL 600
Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio, 33 SCRA 494
In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989); MR, 178 SCRA 760 (1989)
US v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974)
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001); MR, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997)
Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC, GR No. 159139, January 13, 2004
Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, GR No. 166886, July 30, 2008
Villarosa v. HRET, GR No. 144129, September 14, 2000
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 162230, April 28, 2010
Garcia v. Board of Investments, GR No. 92024, November 9, 1990
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, GR No. 132601, January 19, 1999
Torrecampo v. MWSS, 649 SCRA 482
Liban v. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244
Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, GR No. 171101, November 22, 2011
Sana v. CESB, GR No. 192926, November 15, 2011
Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690
Madrigal v. DOJ GR No. 168903, 726 SCRA 544, June 18, 2014

Section 2. Role of Congress

Mantruste Systems v. CA, 179 SCRA 136 (1989)
Malaga v. Penachos, 213 SCRA 516 (1992)
Lupangco v. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)

Section 3. Fiscal Autonomy

Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 SCRA 429 (1950)
Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)

Section 4. Composition; En Banc and Division Cases

Fortich v. Corona, 312 SCRA 751 (1999)
People v. Dy, GR 115236-37, Jan. 16, 2003
People v. Ebio, GR 147750, Sept. 29, 2004
Firestone Ceramics v. CA, GR No. 127245, June 28, 2000

Section 5. Powers of the Supreme Court

Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

Judicial Review
Lina v. Purisma, 82 SCRA 344 (1978)
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 PHIL 139 (1936)
Macasiano v. NHA, 224 SCRA 236 (1993)
Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 678 (1972)
PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 PHIL 806 (1955)
Gonzales v. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624 (1975)
Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993)
Kilosbayan v. Morato, 246 SCRA (1995)
Anti Graft League of the Philippines, 260 SCRA 250 (1996)
Telecom v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)
Bayan v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 138570, October 10, 2000
Automotive Industry Workers v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005
White Light Corp v. City of Manila, GR No. 122846, January 20, 2009
Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR No. 140835, August 14, 2000
Sandoval v. PAGCOR, GR No. 138982, November 29, 2000
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
IBP v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000)
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44
De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971)
David v. Arroyo, 489 SCRA 162
People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 540
Mariano Jr. v. COMELEC, GR No. 118577, March 7, 1995
Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, GR No. 102782, December 11, 1991
Kalipunan ng DamayangMahihirap v. Jessie Robredo, GR No. 200903, 730 SCRA 322, July 22,
2014
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. v. Hon. Robredo GR No. 195390, December 10, 2014
UDK-15143, January 21, 2015
Republic of the Philippines v. Transunion Corporation, G.R. No. 191590, 2014,

Administration of Justice; Rule-Making

PNB v. Asuncion, 60 SCRA 321
Santero v. CFI Cavite, 153 SCRA 728
Damasco v. Lagui, 166 SCRA 214
People v. Lacson, 400 SCRA 262
St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494
People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970)
In Re Cunanan, 94 PHIL 534 (1953-1954)
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, January 19, 1999
Bustos v. Lucero, 81 PHIL 648 (1948)
In Re Admission to the Bar: Argosino Bar Matter 712, 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
Fabian v. Desierto, GR 129742, September 16, 1998
In Re: De Vera (2003)
Baguio Markets Vendor v. Judge, GR No. 165922, February 26, 2010
Republic v. Gingoyon, GR No. 166429, February 1, 2006
Maniago v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 104392, February 20, 1996.
Javellana v. DILG, GR No. 102549, August 10, 1992
Bar Matter No. 1222, February 4, 2004
Garrido v. Garrido, AC No. 6593, February 4, 2010
In re Letter of the UP Law Faculty, 644 SCRA 543
Section 6. Supervision of Courts
Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 (1993)
Caoibes v. Ombudsman, GR 132177, July 19, 2001
Escalona v. Padillo, AM P-10-2785, September 21, 2010

Section 7. Qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court; Lower Courts

In re JBC v. Judge Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
Kilosbayan v. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007
Topacio v. Ong, GR No. 179895, December 15, 2008

Section 8. Judicial and Bar Council; Membership

Section 9. Appointments of Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of Lower Courts

Section 10. Fixed Salary

Nitafan v. CIR, 152 SCRA 284 (1987)

Section 11. Security of Tenure; Power to Discipline

Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 PHIL 297 (1948)
De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)
People v. Gacott, 246 SCRA 52 (1995)

Section 12. Prohibition to Be Designated to Any Agency Performing Quasi-Judicial or

Administrative Functions
In re Judge Manzano, 166 SCRA 246

Section 13. Conclusions of the Supreme Court How Reached?

Consing v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78272, August 29, 1989

Section 14. Contents of Decision; Petition for Review; Motion for Reconsideration
People v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541 (1988)
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
People v. Bravo, 227 SCRA 285 (1993)
Hernandez v. CA, 208 SCRA 429 (1993)
Nicos v. CA, 206 SCRA 127 (1992)
Borromeo v. CA, 186 SCRA 1 (1990)
Francisco v. Pernskul, 173 SCRA 324 (1989)
Velarde v. Social Justice Society, GR 159357, April 28, 2004

Section 15. Period for Making Decisions

Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan AM No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28,
2001
Edano v. Asdala, AM No. RTJ-06-2007, December 6, 2010
Sesbreno v. CA, GR No. 161390, April 16, 2008

Section 16. Submission of Annual Report

Article IX: Constitutional Commissions

A. Common Provisions

Section 1. Independent Commissions

Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003
Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, GR No. 159940, February 16, 2005

Section 2. Prohibition on Members

Section 3. Salary

Section 4. Power to Appoint

Section 5. Fiscal Autonomy

CSC v. DBM, 482 SCRA 233

Section 6. Promulgation of Rules

Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 10, 2003

Section 7. Decisions of the Commissions

Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25
Saligumba v. CA, 117 SCRA 669
Cua v. COMELEC, 156 SCRA 582 (1987)
Estrella v. COMELEC, GR No. 160465, May 27, 2004
Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445 (1990)
Ambil v. COMELEC, 344 SCRA 358 [2000]
Mateo v. CA, GR No. 113219, August 14, 1995
Reyes v. Regional Trial Court, GR No. 108886, May 5, 1995
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 611
Aguilar v. COMELEC, GR No. 185140, June 30, 2009
Garces v. CA, GR. No. 114 795, July 17, 1996
Dumayas v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 141952-53, April 29, 2001
The Law Firm of LaguesmaMagsalinConsulta and Gastardo v. COA GR No. 185544, 2015

Section 8. Other Functions

B. Civil Service Commission

Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term

Gaminde v. COA 347 SCRA 655 (2000)
Mathay Jr. v. CA, GR No. 124374, December 15, 1999

Section 2. Scope
Paragraph 1
EIIB v. CA, GR No. 129133, Nov. 25, 1998
NASECO v. NLRC, GR No. 100947, May 31, 1993
MWSS v. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602
Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. NLRC and Odin Security Agency, GR No.
94825, September 4, 1992
PAGCOR v. CA, GR No. 93396, September 30, 1991
Agyao v. CSC, 639 SCRA 781
Funa v. Duque III, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014
Barcelona v. LIM, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014

Paragraph 2
De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 PHIL 289
Santiago Jr. v. CSC, GR No. 81467, October 27, 1989
Central Bank v. CSC, GR No. 80455-56, April 10, 1989
CSC v. Salas, 274 SCRA 414
CSC v. Javier, 546 SCRA 485
Grino v. CSC, 194 SCRA 458

Paragraph 3
Briones v. Osmena, 104 PHIL 588
Abakada Group Party List v. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251
CSC v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160
PCSO Board of Directors v. Lapid, 648 SCRA 546

Classifications and Appointments

CSC v. PAGCOR, GR No. 123708, June 1997
Samson v. CA, 145 SCRA 654 (1986)
Achacoso v. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235 (1991)
Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 (1990)
Luego v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 (1986)
Santiago v. CSC, 178 SCRA 733 (1989)
Astraguillo v. Manglapus, 190 SCRA 280 (1990)
Aquino v. CSC, GR No. 92403, April 22, 1992
Lampinid v. CSC, GR No. 96298, May 14, 1991
Nazareno, et al v. City of Dumaguete, GR No. 181559, October 2, 2009
CSC v. Cortes, GR No. 200103, 723 SCRA 629 (2014)

Security of Tenure and Abolition of Office

Canonizado v. Aguirre, GR No. 133132, Jan. 25, 2000
Secretary Gloria v. CA, GR No. 119903, August 14, 2000
Yenko and Mayor Estrada v. Gungon, GR No. 165450, August 13, 2009
Buklod v. Executive Secretary, GR Nos. 142801-02, July 10, 2001
Dimayuga v. Benedicto II, GR No. 144153, Jan. 16, 2002
Miranda v. Carreon, GR No. 143540, April 11, 2003
Hernandez v. Villegas, 14 SCRA 544 (1965)
Briones v. Osmena, 104 Phil 588 (1958)
Mayor v. Macaraig, 194 SCRA 672 (1991)
Roque v. Ericta, 53 SCRA 156
Mama, Jr. v Court of Appeals, GR No. 86517, April 30, 1991
UP Board of Regents v. Rasul, GR No. 91551, August 16, 1991
Kawaning EIIB v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 142801, July 10, 2001
A.M. No. 2008-23-SC, November 10, 2014

Partisan Political Activity; Self-Organization; Temporary Employees

People v. De Venecia, 14 SCRA 864 (1965)
SSS Employees v. CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
Jacinto v. CA, 281 SCRA 557 (1997)
Gloria v. CA, 338 SCRA 5 (2000)
Seneres v. COMELEC, GR No. 178678, April 16, 2009

Right to Organize
Social Security System v. CA, GR No. 85279, July 28, 1989
Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Secretary of Education, GR No. 95445, August 6,
1991

Section 3. Purpose of a Civil Service System

Lazo v. CSC, 236 SCRA 469
LRTA v. Aurora Salvana, GR No. 192074, 726 SCRA 141

Section 4. Oath or Affirmation

Section 5. Standardization of Compensation

Section 6. Prohibition of Appointment of Lame Ducks

People v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 164185, July 23, 2008

Section 7. Prohibitions; Appointments; Office; Employment

Flores v. Drilon 223 SCRA 568 (1993)
In re Eduardo Escala, 653 SCRA 141

Sec. 8 Prohibitions; Compensation; Foreign Gift/Office/Title

Peralta v. Mathay 38 SCRA 296 (1971)
Santos v. CA GR No. 139792, Nov. 22, 2000
Cabili v. CSC, GR No. 156503, June 22, 2006
Benguet State University v. Colting, GR No. 169637, June 8, 2007
Herrera, et al v. NPC, GR No. 166570, December 18, 2009

C. Commission on Elections

Section 1. Composition; Qualifications; Term

Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991)
Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358 (1990)
Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49
Hayudini v. Comelec, GR No. 207900, 723 SCRA 223, April 22, 2014
Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207851, July 8, 2014
Timbol v. Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015
Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014

Section 2. Powers and Functions

Pangilinan v. COMELEC, 228 SCRA 36
Flores v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484 (1990)
Galido v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78 (1991)
People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788 (1990)
Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (1987)
Tan v. COMELEC, GR No. 112093, Oct. 4, 1994
Kilosbayan v. COMELEC, GR No. 128054, Oct. 16, 1997
Alvarez v. COMELEC, GR No. 142527, March 1, 2001
Carlos v. Judge Angeles, GR No. 142907, November 29, 2000
Buac v. COMELEC, GR No. 155855, Jan. 26, 2004
LDP v. COMELEC, GR No. 161265, Feb. 24, 2004
Atienza v. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010
Antonio v. COMELEC, GR No. 135869, September 22, 1999
Aggabao v. COMELEC, GR NO. 163756, January 26, 2005
Flores v. COMELEC, GR No. 89604, April 20, 1990
Alunan III v. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997
Taule v. Secretary Santos, GR No. 90336, August 12, 1991
Baytan v. COMELEC, GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003
Balindong v. COMELEC, GR No. 1539991, October 16, 2003
Aguilar v. COMELEC, GR No. 185140, June 30, 2009
People v. Honorable Delgado, GR No. 93419, September 18, 1990
Banat v. COMELEC, GR No. 177508, August 7, 2009
People v. Judge Inting, GR No. 88919, July 25, 1990
Ejercito v. Hon. Comelec, GR No. 212398, 742 SCRA 210, Nov. 25 2014
Cerafica v. COMELEC GR No. 205136, December 02, 2014
Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014
Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, 2014

Section 3. Decisions
Sarmiento v. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307
Salazar Jr. v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 433 (1990)
Baytan v. COMELEC, GR No. 153954 , Feb. 4, 2003
Balindong v. COMELEC, GR Nos. 153991-2, Oct. 16, 2003
Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771, May 6, 2010
Alvarez v. COMELEC, GR No. 142527, March 1, 2001
Villarosa v. COMELEC GR No. 212953, August 05, 2014

Section 4. Supervision/Regulation of Public Utilities, Media Grants, Privileges

Unido v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, GR No. 119654, May 22, 1995
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, GR No. 133486, Jan. 28, 2000
SWS v. COMELEC, GR No. 147571, May 5, 2001

Section 5. Favorable Recommendation for Pardon, Amnesty, Parole or Suspension of Sentence

Section 6. Free and Open Party System

Liberal Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 191771, May 6, 2010

Section 7. No Block-Voting

Section 8. Prohibition on Political Parties

Section 9. Election Period

Section 10. No Harassment and Discrimination

Section 11. Funds

D. Commission of Audit
Section 1. Qualifications; Term
Mison v. COA, 187 SCRA 445

Section 2. General Function; Powers

Philippine Operations, Inc. v. Auditor General, 94 PHIL 868
Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, 495 SCRA 601
Ramos v. Aquino, 39 SCRA 236
Blue Bar Coconut Philippines v. Tantuico, 163 SCRA 716
NHA v. COA, 226 SCRA 55
Dingcong v. Guingona, 162 SCRA 782 (1988)
Danville Maritime v. COA, 175 SCRA 701 (1989)
Mamaril v. Domingo, 227 SCRA 206 (1993)
Sambeli v. Province of Isabela, GR No. 92279, June 18, 1992
Osmena v. COA, GR No. 98355, March 2, 1994
Bustamante v. COA, GR No. 103309, Nov. 27, 1992
Caltex v. COA, 208 SCRA 726 (1992)
Polloso v. Gangan, 335 SCRA 750 (2000)
DBP v. COA, 231 SCRA 202
Strategic Alliance v. Radstock Securities, GR No. 178158, December 4, 2009
Uy, et al v. COA, GR No. 130685, March 21, 2000
Davao City Water District v. CSC and COA, GR No. 95237, September 13, 1991
Parreno v. COA, GR No. 162224, June 7, 2007
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, 651 SCRA 146
Espinas v. COA, GR No. 198271, 720 SCRA 302, April 1, 2014
Maritime Industry Authority v. COA GR No. 185812, January 13, 2015
The Law Firm of LaguesmaMagsalinConsulta and Gastardo v. COA GR No. 185544, 2015
Maritime Industry Authority v. COA, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015

Section 3. COA Jurisdiction

Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) v. COA, G.R. No. 209219, 2014

Section 4. Annual Report to the President and to Congress

Article X. Local Government

Section 1. Territorial and Political Subdivisions of the Philippines

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 79956, January 26, 1990

Section 2. Local Autonomy

Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al, GR No. 80391, February 28, 1989
San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994
Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec. 11, 2003
Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City, GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004
City of General Santos v. COA, GR No. 199439 (2014)

Section 3. Local Government Code

Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993)
Malonzo v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 380 (1997)
OSG v. CA, Gr No. 199027 , 725 SCRA 469, 2014
Umali v. Comelec, GR NO. 203974 (2014)
Kasamaka-Canlubang, Inc. v. Laguna Estate Development Corp, GR No. 200491 (2014)
Holy Trinity Realty & Development Corp v. Dela Cruz, GR No. 200454 (2014)

Section 4. Supervision by the President

Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271
Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279
Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994)
Province of Negros v. COA, GR No. 182574, September 28, 2010
Gov. Villafuerte, Jr. v. Hon. Robredo GR No. 195390, December 10, 2014

Section 5. Power of Taxation by Local Government

LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805
Lina v. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 (2001)
Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16, 2008
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium, GR No. 154993, October 25, 2005
Philippine Petroleum v. Municipality of Pililla, GR No. 90773, June 3, 1991
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003
Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna, GR No. 131359, May 5, 1999
Batangas Power v. Batangas City, GR No. 152675, April 28, 2004
Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR No. 155491, September 16, 2008
City of Manila v. Judge Colet, GR No. 12005, 2014

Section 6. Share in National Taxes

Pimentel v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000)
Province of Batangas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 152774, May 27, 2004
Alternative Center v. Zamora, GR No. 144256, June 8, 2005
League of Cities v. COMELEC August 24, 2010

Section 7. Equitable Share in the National Wealth

Section 8. Term of Local Officials

Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157
Lozanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July 28, 1999
Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR No. 147927, February 4, 2002
Socrates v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)
Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003
David v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90 (1997)
Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50
Ong v. Alegre, GR No. 163295, January 23, 2006
Dizon v. COMELEC, GR No. 182088, January 30, 2009
Alboin v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009
David v. COMELEC, GR No. 127116, April 8, 1997
Naval v. COMELEC GR No. 207851, July 08, 2014

Section 9. Sectoral Representatives

Supangan Jr. v. Santos, GR No. 84662, August 24, 1990

Section 10. Creation, Abolition, Change of Boundaries

Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, GR 176951, Nov. 29, 2008
Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700
Camid v. Office of the President, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005
Navarro v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010

Section 11. Metropolitan Political Subdivisions

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association Assoc., GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000
MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005
Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853

Section 12. Highly Urbanized Cities, Component Cities

Abella v. COMELEC, GR No. 100710, September 3, 1991

Section 13. Local Government Units Grouping Themselves

Section 14. Regional Development Councils and Other Similar Bodies

Section 15. Autonomous Regions

Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Section 16. General Supervision of the President

Section 17. Powers Not Vested to the ARMM

Sections 18 and19. Organic Act for Autonomous Regions

Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)
Ordillos v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)
Badua v. CBA, 194 SCRA 101 (1991)
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 82217, Jan. 29, 1990
Pandi v. CA, GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002
Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Section 20. Legislative Powers of the Autonomous Regions

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines Peace Panel, 568 SCRA 492

Section 21. Preservation of Peace and Order

Article XI. Accountability of Public Officers

Section 1. Public Office

Bornasal, Jr. v. Montes, 280 SCRA 181 (1997)
Eijansantos v. Special Presidential Task Force 156, G.R. No. 203696, 2014
Development Bank of the Philippines v. COA, G.R. No. 202733, 2014
A.M. No. 2010-21-SC, September 30, 2014
Office of the Ombudsman v. De, G.R. No. 205433, 2015
Republic of the Philippines v. Arias, G.R. No. 188909, September 17, 2014
Office of the Ombudsman v. Bueno, G.R. No. 191712, 2014
CSC v. Arandia, G.R. No. 199549, April 7, 2014
A.M. No. P-15-3296,February 17, 2015
CSC v. Andal, A.M. No. SB-12-19-P, November 18, 2014
Velasco v. Obispo, A.M. No. P-13-3160, November 10, 2014,
CSC v. Pagaduan, et al., G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014
CSC v. Vergel De Rios, G.R. No. 203536, February 04, 2015
LAGOC vs. MALAGA, G.R. No. 184785, July 9, 2014
OMBUDSMAN vs. CABEROY, G.R. No. 188066
CSC v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014

Section 2. Officers Subject to Removal by Impeachment

Section 3. Procedure for Impeachment

In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)
Romulo v. Yniguez, 141 SCRA 260 (1986)
Francisco v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44
Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452 (2001); MR, 356 SCRA 108 (2001)
Gutierrez v. Committee on Justice, 643 SCRA 198

Section 4. Sandiganbayan
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 (1984)
Defensor-Santiago, 356 SCRA 636 (2001)
Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 58327, March 22, 1991
Azarcon v. Sandiganbanyan, GR No. 116033, February 26, 1997

Section 5. Ombudsman
Carandang v. Desierto, 639 SCRA 293
Lacson v. ES, 649 SCRA 142
People v. Morales, 649 SCRA 182
Quarto v. Marcelo, 658 SCRA 580
Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015
Office of the Ombudsman v. CA and Binay, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

Section 6. Appointments
Ombudsman v. CSC, GR No. 162215, July 20, 2007
Laud v. People, et al., G.R. No. 199032,November 19, 2014
Sabijon v. De Juan, A.M. No. P-14-3281, 2015
Casimiro v. Rigor, G.R. No. 206661, 2014
Airlift Asia Customs Brokerage, Inc. v. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. 183664, 2014
Buena, Jr v. Benito, G.R. No. 181760, October 14, 2014

Section 7. Tanodbayan as Special Prosecutor

Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 843 (1988)
Acop v. Ombudsman, GR No. 120422, September 27, 1995
Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545
Almonte v. Vasquez, GR No. 95367, May 22, 1995
Buenasada v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645
Macalino v. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452
BIR v. Ombudsman, GR No. 115103, April 11, 2002
Laurel v. Desierto, GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Azarcon v. Guerrero, GR No. 121017, Feb 17, 1997
Azarcon v. Guerrero , GR No. 116033, Feb 26, 1997

Section 8. Qualifications
Argel v. Gov. Singson, G.R. No. 202970, 2015

Section 9. Appointments

Section 10. Rank

Section 11. Term

Section 12. Prompt Action on Complaints

Laurel v. Desierto, GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995)
Roxas v. Vasquez, 358 SCRA 636 (2001)
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 105965, March 20, 2001

Section 13. Powers; Functions; Duties

Khan, Jr. v. Ombudsman, GR No. 125296, July 20, 2006
Ombudsman v. Estandarte, GR No. 168670, April 13, 2007
Ombudsman v. Lucero, November 24, 2006
Ombudsman v. CA, GR No. 169079, July 17, 2007
Sangguniang Barangay v. Punong Barangay, GR No. 170626, March 3, 2008
Perez v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 166062, September 26, 2006
Buencamino v. CA, GR No. 175895, April 4, 2007
Medina v. COA, GR No. 176478, February 4, 2008
Villas Nor v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 180700, March 4, 2008
Honasan II v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors GR No. 159747, April 13, 2004
Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, GR No. 172700, July 23, 2010
Garcia v. Miro, GR No. 148944, Feb 5, 2003
Rare v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 108431, July 14, 2000
Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo GR No. 173277, February 25, 2015

Section 14. Fiscal Autonomy

Section 15. Right to Recover Properties Unlawfully Acquired

Section 16. Loan, Guaranty or Other Form of Financial Accommodation

Section 17. Declaration of Assets and Liabilities

Section 18. Allegiance of Public Officers

Caasi v. CA, 191 SCRA 229 (1990)

Article XII. National Economy and Patrimony

Section 1. Threefold Goal of the National Economy

Section 2. Regalian Doctrine

Lee Hong Kok v. David, 48 SCRA 372
Carino v. Insurer Government, 41 PHIL 935
Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, 347 SCRA 128 (2000)
Sta. Rosa Mining v. Leido, 156 SCRA 1 (1987)
San Miguel Corporation v. CA, 185 SCRA 722 (1990)
Almeda v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 85322, April 30, 1991
Director of Lands v. Kalahi Investments, Inc, GR No. 48066, January 31, 1989
Republic v. Enciso, GR No. 160145, November 11, 2005
Chavez v. PEA, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990)
Miners Association v. Factoran, 240 SCRA 100 (1995)
Republic v. Rosemoor, GR No. 149927, March 30, 2004
La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Assn. v. DENR, GR127872, Jan 27, 2004, MR GR 127882, Dec. 1, 2004
Philippine Geothermal v. Napocor, GR No. 144302, May 27, 2004
JG Summit v. CA, GR No. 124293, January 31, 2005
Republic v. Domingo Espinosa, G.R. No. 176885, July 5, 2010
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015
Spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic, G.R. No.173423, March 5, 2014
Gaerlan v. Republic, G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014
Peza v. Carantes, G.R. 181274, June 23, 2010

Section 3. Lands of the Public Domain

Director of Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296 (1990)
Republic v. CA, 160 SCRA 228 (1988)
Apex Mining v. Southeast Mindanao Gold, Inc, GR No. 152613, June 23, 2006
Dir. of Lands v. IAC, 146 SCRA 509 (1986)
Ten Forty Realty v. Lorenzana, GR No. 151212, Sept. 10, 2003
Chavez v. PEA, GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002

Section 4. Specific Limits of Forest Lands and National Parks

La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Assn. v. DENR, GR127872, Jan 27, 2004, MR GR 127882, Dec. 1, 2004

Section 5. Ancestral Lands and Domain

Cruz v. Sec. of DENR, 347 SCRA 128 (2000)

Section 6. Common Good

Telecom v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)

Section 7. Private Lands

Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567
Zaragosa v. CA, GR No. 106401, September 29, 2000
Ramirez v. Vda. De Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704 (1982)
Halili v. CA, 287 SCRA 465 (1998)
Lee v. Republic, 366 SCRA (2001)
Frenzel v. Catito, GR No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Mulller v. Muller, GR No. 149615, August 29, 2006
Matthews v. Taylor Spouses, GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009
Hulst v. PR Builders, GR No. 156364, September 25, 2008

Section 8. Exception for Former Filipino Citizens

Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567 (1994)
Section 9. Independent Economic and Planning Agency

Section 10. Filipinization

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)
Army and Navy Club v. CA, 271 SCRA 36 (1997)
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Section 11. Public Utilities

Bagatsing v. Committee, 246 SCRA 344 (1995)
Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 36 (1997)
Tatad v. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436 (1995)
Telecom v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998)
JG Summit Holdings v. CA, 345 SCRA 143 (2000)
Associated Communications v. NTC, GR No. 144109, February 17, 2003
Eastern Telecom v. Telecom Technologies, GR No. 135992, July 23, 2004
Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690
PAGCOR v. BIR, 645 SCRA 338
Hontiveros-Baraquel v. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, 2015

Section 12. Filipino First Policy

Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Section 13. Trade Policy

Section 14. Development and Practice of Professions

Section 15. Agency to Promote Cooperatives

Section 16. Corporations

NDC v. PVB, 192 SCRA 257 (1990)

Section 17. Temporary Take-Over

Agan v. PIATCO, 420 SCRA 575
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 2006

Section 18. Nationalization

Republic v. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620 (1968)
PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 (1990)

Section 19. Monopolies and Combinations

Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, GR No. 113079, April 20, 2001
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 132451, December 17, 1999
Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 281 SCRA 330
Eastern Assurance v. LTFRB, GR No. 149717, Oct. 7, 2003
Avon v. Luna, GR No. 153674, December 20, 2006
Section 21. Foreign Loans

Section 22. Acts Inimical to the National Interest

Artcile XVI. General Provisions

Section 1. Flag of the Philippines

Section 2. Name, National Anthem or a National Seal

Section 3. Immunity From Suit

Republic v. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 (1987)
Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil 819 (1947-1948)
NAC v. Teodoro, 91 Phil 203 (1952)
Mobil Philippines v. Customs Arrastre, 18 SCRA 120 (1966)
PNR v. IAC, 217 SCRA 401 (1993)
Ministerio v. CFI, 40 SCRA 464 (1971)
Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme, 195 SCRA 692
Lansang v. CA, GR No. 102667
Traders Royal Bank v. IAC, 192 SCRA 305 (1990)
Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124 (1993)
DA v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693 (1993)
EPG Construction v. Vigilar, GR No. 131544, March 16, 2001
Philrock v. Board of Liquidators, 180 SCRA 171 (1989)
Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, GR 154705, June 26, 2003
Shell Philippines v. Jalos, GR No. 179918, September 8, 2010
Vigilar v. Aquino, 639 SCRA 772
ATO v. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36
Heirs of Diosdado Mendoza v. DPWH, GR No. 203834, 729 SCRA 654, July 9, 2014
Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation v.Toll Regulatory General Considerations
Board, G.R. No. 167290, November 26, 2014

Section 4. AFP

Section 5. AFP Requirement and Goals

Section 6. Police Force

Quilonia v. The General Court Martial GR No. 9660, March 4, 1992
Carpio v. Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290 (1992)
Department of Budget v. Manilas Finest, GR No. 169466, May 9, 2007
Mendoza v. PNP, GR No. 139658, June 21, 2005

Section 7. War Veterans

Section 8. Pensions and Benefits for Retirees

Section 9. Protection of Consumers from Trade Malpractices

Section 10. Development of Filipino Capability and Communication Structures

Section 11. Ownership and Management: Mass Media and Advertising

Section 12. Consultative Body for Indigenous Cultural Communities

Article XVII. Amendments or Revisions

Section 1. Amendment or Revision

RA 6132, Constitutional Convention Act of 1970
Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28 (1970) * Constituent v. Legislative Power
Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160 *distinction between Amendment and Revision

Section 2. Initiative
RA No. 6735, An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997); MR (1997)
Lambino v. COMELEC, 505 SCRA 160 (2006) *SC declared RA 6735 as sufficient and
adequate for a peoples initiative, effectively abandoning the ruling in Defensor-Santiago v.
COMELEC.

Section 3. Constitutional Convention

RA 6132, Constitutional Convention Act of 1970
Tolentino v. COMELEC, GR L-34150, October 16, 1971

Section 4. Ratification
Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971)
Javellana v. ES, GR L-36142, March 31, 1973

Article XVIII Transitory Provisions

Section 26. Ill-Gotten Wealth; Sequestration/Freeze Orders

Cojuangco v. Roxas, 195 SCRA 797 (1991)

Section 27. Effectivity

De Leon v. Esquerra, 152 SCRA 602 (1987)