Preliminary Matters Cases

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169004

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

-versus- VELASCO, JR.,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,* and
ABAD, JJ.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION) and ROLANDOPLAZA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 15, 2010
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DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse and
set aside the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case,
with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount
of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo
in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by
reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate
intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances
of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued
an Order dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on April
19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction,
without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees
enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying
a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the
felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to
office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan, claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of
R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a)
(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. 3019,
R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public
office.
In his Comment dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended,
it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the
rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction
only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the
accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of
P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a
public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over
him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante is a case with
uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were
both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that,
respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza
failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al. as a
background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D.
No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. x x x .
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed
on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier
mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action,
not at the time of the commission of the offense. The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A. 8249,
where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense: x x x.
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in
the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions
of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and
higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent
and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a)
(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which
the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan
and Amante, that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration
provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in

subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but
also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This
Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an
offense committed in relation to his office. Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al.., where the
crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of
the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, where the public official was charged with grave threats, this
Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a
public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration.
Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge
of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25,
1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal
mayor when he attended said public hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by
complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality,
during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office.
If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private
complainant might have said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent
Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation
to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend
the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then
there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a
distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public
officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation
to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the principle
laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is
that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if the offense
cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x.
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may show
that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification
as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted
in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics
supplied.)
With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, the issue as to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,

-versus- CHICO-NAZARIO,
Acting Chairperson,**
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
DIVISION) and VICTORIA AMANTE, Promulgated:
Respondents. August 25, 2009
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DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Victoria Amante for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of Cebu at the time pertinent to this
case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in
order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19,
1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995,
Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash
advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an
investigation report to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent
Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines. Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a
Resolution recommending the filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable
cause to indict respondent Amante.
On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89
of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused VICTORIA
AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and
committing the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the
total amount of SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she
received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law,
with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of P71,095.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.Thereafter, Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO
DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding in so far that respondent Amante
had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not
included as the same liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was
occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall
have original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
The OSP filed its Opposition dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim of settlement of the cash
advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for
reinvestigation. As to the assailed jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over
respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain
and unambiguous that it did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against Amante, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A

SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION
TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019, RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN
CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner disputes the former's appreciation of
this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan. According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine
the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the
offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, which was
made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.
Respondent Amante, in her Comment dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the law was phrased in Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several
exceptions to the general rule, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of
Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction
only over cases where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official
below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and
if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must
occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The
same respondent proceeded to cite a decision of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only
by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished
by, any act or omission of the parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
In its Reply dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of
P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in
relation to office under Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et al. wherein this Court
ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is intimately connected with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
The petition is meritorious.

The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background, this Court had thoroughly
discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al., thus:
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.
No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D.
No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further
modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary
Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 which took effect
on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown
in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The
exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public officials or employees in
relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense
applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall
govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

higher;
of higher rank;

foundations;

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of
exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that
they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and
other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air
force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and
provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of specifically including the
public officials therein mentioned, obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan. Obviously, the Court was referring to cases
involving violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code
only because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, so that when they
are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27', provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction
would fall under the Sandiganbayan. When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D.
No. 1606 as amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must belong to
grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original jurisdiction over him. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary grade '26'. Her
office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of
the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended. This being the case, the principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated,
the charge must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those enumerated public
officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid
section, the general qualification that accused must be a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a
requirement before this Court could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office
with salary grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan.Central to the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the
case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan where this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606,
as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade. According to petitioner,
the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section
4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.
1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is true in light of the facts contained in the said
case. In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was
charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court
concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved
are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public
officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said
other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or
employee's office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he not held the
aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office. Thus, in the case of Lacson
v. Executive Secretary, where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayansjurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those public
officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it
held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing and
that accuseds violent act was precipitated by complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to
his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant
might have said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante for
violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall
under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the application of
the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to
distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one
hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said
reasoning is misleading because a distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public
office is essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is
enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the
meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term
offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario[90
Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613
(1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to
the accuseds office if the offense cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x. In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public office is not
an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective offices and
was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any qualification as to the public
officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to
those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan
for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan
ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions 1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying
petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is
known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. 2 On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of
the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). 3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill
De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana
for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. 7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that
the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of
FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353
dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was subsequently
encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and
despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused
to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,
Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X,
Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer
since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed
that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of
Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or
that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing
the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out
during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the
general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office,
petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of
public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the offense
of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express
provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27"
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in
the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university,
such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of
the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the university such general
ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to
fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its
discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in
the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to those
of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board,
accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former President
Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on
the merits of this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 17 The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated
February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE
CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION." 19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to
quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. 20Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a
motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final
judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer,
go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an
order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a judgment
of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be
unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is
made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy
of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the
respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted
the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double
jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss
the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court. 24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. 25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition
for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim
twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. 28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The Sandiganbayan was created
by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest
norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall
serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. 29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27"
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of
senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in
the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and
over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry
with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not
yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A.
No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A.
No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private individuals.
We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation
with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation
shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation"
shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to
intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in
Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay
hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is to be taken into view. 35 In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself. 36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est
ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one
of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as
the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt
to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office
of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the
President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item
Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of the
Courts ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the
latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a
joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered
the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be
taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent. This
is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We
ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. 39The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers.
Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to
hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by
virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for
special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am.
Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer." 42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise
bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has
jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner
falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law. 44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-
stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. 46 At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. 48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental
function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and technical
training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation created for profit. 50
The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the
offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution
issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of
the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. 51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on this
ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner
insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case. 54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation
from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum, unveils the
misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of
the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos
in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from that with
which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be
characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor
and honesty before the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 158187. February 11, 2005]
MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-owned or controlled corporations
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner
Marilyn C. Geduspan assumes a negative view in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Office of
the Special Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared by the respondent court.
In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of a temporary
restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul and set aside the resolutions dated January 31, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the respondent
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division. These resolutions denied her motion to quash and motion for reconsideration, respectively.
On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was
filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth)
Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., respectively. The
information read:
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at Bacolod City, province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a public
officer, being the Regional Manager/Director, of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office No. VI, Iloilo City, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with DR. EVANGELINE C.
FARAHMAND, a private individual and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc., Mandalangan,
Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
release the claims for payments of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with Philippine Health Insurance Corp., prior to January
1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and 64/100 (P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to
Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite clear provision in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed on November 27, 1999,
involving the sale of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that the possession, operation and
management of the said hospital will be turned over by West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective January 1, 2000, thus all
collectibles or accounts receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due to West Negros College, Inc., thus accused
MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc.,
Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein represented by accused DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West
Negros College, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified
under salary grade 26.
In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion to quash. The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth). However, her appointment paper and notice of salary adjustment show that she was appointed as Department
Manager A of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a government owned and
controlled corporation created under RA 7875, otherwise known as the National Health Insurance Act of 1995.
Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. She cites
paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758); specifically
including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
The petition lacks merit.

The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying the position of
Regional Director but that of Department Manager A, hence, paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of RA 8249 are not applicable.
It is petitioners appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification of her position, that is,
Department Manager A of Philhealth.
Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of Philhealth. She, however, contends that the position of
Department Manager A is classified under salary grade 26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of respondent court. She is at present
assigned at the Philhealth Regional Office VI as Regional Director/Manager.
Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order on the alleged disregard by respondent court of
the decision of this Court in RamonCuyco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco was the Regional Director of the
Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992 his position of
Regional Director of LTO was classified as Director II with salary grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over his person.
In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of the commission of the offense and
that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g), Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade Grade
27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) xxx xxx xxx
(f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Underscoring supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the first part of the abovequoted
provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof specifically includes
other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual charged together
with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of
respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the
law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c)and (e) is a public official
or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the
office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a government-owned and controlled
corporation. The position of manager is one of those mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she
was charged was committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

-versus- VELASCO, JR.,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,* and
ABAD, JJ.
DIVISION) and ROLANDOPLAZA, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 15, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's resolution is a petition[1] dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to reverse
and set aside the Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts follow.
Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to this case,
with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in the amount
of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00) . The Information reads:
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
and committing the offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo
in the total amount of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by
reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate
intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances
of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss [3] dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the latter
issued an Order[4] dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition[5] to the Motion to
Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution[6] on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and employees
enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying
a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the
felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to
office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the Sandiganbayans appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan,[7] claiming that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of
R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation
to public office.
In his Comment[8] dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the general rule are
provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original
jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where
the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to
(g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general
rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
jurisdiction over him must apply.
In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante[9] is a case with
uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were
both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only difference is that,
respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza
failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.[10] as a
background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. [11]
No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[12]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. x x x .
Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended
on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed
on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier
mentioned case,
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action,
not at the time of the commission of the offense.[13] The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as R. A.
8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense: x x x.[14]
Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in
the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions
of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

higher;
of higher rank;


foundations;

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said
offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and
below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and
higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent
and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[15]
Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent Plaza, a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding[16] case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4
(a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and
which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v.
Sandiganbayan and Amante,[17] that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of
the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense
charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly
discussed:
x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in

subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but
also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in
scope but are limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This
Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office
and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for an
offense committed in relation to his office.[18]Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,[19] where
the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:
The phrase other offenses or felonies is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said
paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of
the offender that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. x x x
Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,[20] where the public official was charged with grave threats, this
Court ruled:
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during a
public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioners administration.
Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge
of petitioners official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25,
1997 resolution wherein it held that the accused was performing his official duty as municipal
mayor when he attended said public hearing and that accuseds violent act was precipitated by
complainants criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief executive of the municipality,
during the latters privilege speech. It was his response to private complainants attack to his office.
If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private
complainant might have said during said privilege speech. Thus, based on the allegations in the
information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent
Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation
to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend
the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then
there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public
officials and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a
distinction apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in
Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public
officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation
to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and
reach of the term offense committed in relation to [an accuseds] office by referring to the principle
laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is
that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accuseds office if the offense
cannot exist without the office such that the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x.
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may show
that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accuseds] respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of
their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x[21]
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification
as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those
specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted
in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[22] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.[23] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained
philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics
supplied.)[24]
With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,[25] the issue as to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20687 April 30, 1966
MAXIMINO VALDEPEAS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Jose F. Aquirre for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General A. A. Narra and Solicitor O. R. Ramirez for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by petitioner Maximino Valdepeas from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent, and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from three (3)
months and twenty-five (25) days of arresto mayor to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional,
with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify Ester Ulsano in the sum of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The only question raised by petitioner is whether "the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the trial court, dated June
30, 1960, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense of abduction with
consent".
The pertinent facts are: On January 25, 1956, Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother, Consuelo Ulsano, filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Piat, Cagayan, a criminal complaint, 1 duly subscribed and sworn to by both, charging petitioner Maximino Valdepeas
with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After due preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by
Valdepeas, the justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the court of first
instance of Cagayan2 in which the corresponding information for forcible abduction with rape3 was filed.4 In due course, said court of
first instance rendered judgment5 finding petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly. 6
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals7 modified the decision of the court of first instance, convicted him of abduction with
consent and meted out to him the penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision.1wph1.t
A motion for reconsideration and new trial having been filed by petitioner contesting the finding, made by the Court of Appeals, to the
effect that complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of the occurrence, said Court 8 granted the motion, set aside its
aforementioned decision and remanded the case to the court a quo for the reception of additional evidence on said issue. After a retrial,
the court of first instance rendered another decision, 9 reiterating said finding of the Court of Appeals, as well as its judgment 10 of
conviction for abduction with consent and the penalty imposed therein. Petitioner appealed again to the Court of
Appeals 11 which 12affirmed that of the court of first instance 13 with costs against the petitioner. Again petitioner filed 14 a motion for
reconsideration based, for the first time, upon the ground that "the lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over
the subject matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with consent." Upon denial of the motion, 15 petitioner
interposed the present appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner's theory is that no complaint for abduction with consent has been filed by either Ester Ulsano or her mother, Consuelo Ulsano,
and that, accordingly, the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent and had,
therefore, no authority to convict him of said crime. We find no merit in this pretense.
Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. 16 In the case at bar, it is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. Indeed, although brought before the bar of justice as early as January 25, 1956, first, before the then justice
of the peace court of Piat, then before the court of first instance of Cagayan, later before the Court of Appeals, thereafter back before
said court of first instance, and then, again, before the Court of Appeals, never, within the period of six (6) years that had transpired
until the Court of Appeals, rendered its last decision, 17 had he questioned the judicial authority of any of these three (3) courts over his
person. He is deemed, therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence,
to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by him before
said courts particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that
he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.
Upon the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action in this lease the crime of abduction with
consent is and may be conferred only by law; 18 that jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may
not be conferred thereto by the parties involve in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be
convicted of abduction with consent. 19 It is true that, pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
. . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed
by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned
by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
The provision does not determine, however, the jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein enumerated. It could not affect said
jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with the
definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a
condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been
imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial." 20
In the case at bar, the offended woman and her mother have negated such preference by filing the complaint adverted to above and
going through the trials and tribulations concomitant with the proceedings in this case, before several courts, for the last ten (10) years.
Petitioner says that the complaint was for forcible abduction, not abduction with consent; but, as already adverted to, the latter is
included in the former. Referring particularly to the spirit of said provision of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, we believe that the
assent of Ester Ulsano and her mother to undergo the scandal of a public trial for forcible abduction necessarily connotes, also, their
willingness to face the scandal attendant to a public trial for abduction with consent.
The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged,
according to him, in the complaint filed herein, 21 namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18
years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor ... 17 years of age ...",
and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.
As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code, 22as an essential
ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of
abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation, 23 because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the
outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." 24
The complaint in the case at bar 25 alleges, not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously" took her "by force and violence ... against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother" from
their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force,
intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, and, hence,
single, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin, 26 apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation, 27 for, as Chief
Justice Moran has aptly put it, the presumption of innocence includes, also, that of morality and decency, and, as a consequence, of
chastity. 28
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepeas. It is so ordered.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,

vs.
HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and
JOSE ANADILLA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order * of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, 10th Judicial District, Branch I,
dated 20 March 1974, dismissing motu proprio Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled "People of the Philippines, Complainant versus
Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, Accused," as well as of the order dated 22 April 1974 of the same court denying
the motion for reconsideration of said earlier order.
The facts are not disputed.
On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private
respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set
on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet
been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the
same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974.
On 20 March 1974, the court a quo issued the now assailed order which reads:
Considering that the offended party, Jose Dadis is no longer interested in the further prosecution of this case and
there being no objection on the part of the accused Ariston Anadilla, Rafael Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, this case is
hereby DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
Consequently, the order of arrest issued by this Court against the accused Rafael Anadilla dated March 11, 1974, is
hereby ordered lifted and has no force and effect.
The bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled.
In the case of Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla, the Provincial Warden is hereby ordered to release said accused
from their detention immediately upon receipt of this order.
SO ORDERED. 1
The affidavit of desistance, relied upon by the aforequoted order, was executed by the offended party on 20 March 1974 and
subscribed and sworn to before the branch Clerk of Court Atty. R.B. Torrecampo. It alleged, among others, that:
That he was the complainant in Criminal Case No. L-244, entitled, People vs. Ariston Anadilla, et al., for Attempted
Homicide, which case is pending before the first branch of this Court; that he is no longer interested in the further
prosecution of this case and that he has already forgiven the accused for their acts; that his material witnesses could
no longer be contacted and that without their testimonies, the guilt of the accused cannot be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and that in view of these circumstances, he requests the Prosecuting Fiscal for the dismissal of
the said case. 2
The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo in an order dated 22 April
1974. 3 This petition was thereupon filed before this Court.
The issue in this petition is whether the courta a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by
the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal.
The issue presented is not novel. In Crespo v. Mogul, 4 promulgated on 30 June 1987, the Court had occasion to state the rule in
regard to the respective powers of the prosecuting fiscal and the court, after the complaint or information has been filed in court. In said
case, the issue raised was whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial of the case on the merits.
In the Crespo case, an information for Estafa had already been filed by the Assistant Fiscal before the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City. Arraignment of the accused and trial of the case were, however, deferred because of a pending appeal by the
accused/respondent to the Secretary of Justice. Reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, the Undersecretary of
Justice directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Upon such instructions, the
Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. On a
certiorari recourse to the Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed. Review of the Court of Appeals decision was then sought by the
accused with this Court, raising the issue previously stated herein, Resolving, the Court held:
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over
the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself
to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn,
as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should
the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be
secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court
for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in court or not [sic], once the case had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of
the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or
the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court
he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." (Emphasis supplied). 5
In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of
filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of desistance manifested that
his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
The prosecuting fiscal in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case, obviously believed that despite such
manifestation of the complainant, he (fiscal) could prove the prosecution's case.
To avoid similar situations, the Court takes the view that, while the Crespo doctrine has settled that the trial court is the sole judge on
whether a criminal case should be dismissed (after the complaint or information has been filed in court), still, any move on the part of
the complainant or offended party to dismiss the criminal case, even if without objection of the accused, should first be referred to the
prosecuting fiscal for his own view on the matter. He is, after all, in control of the prosecution of the case and he may have his own
reasons why the case should not be dismissed. It is only after hearing the prosecuting fiscal's view that the Court should exercise its
exclusive authority to continue or dismiss the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without costs. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28949 June 23, 1969
JIBIN ARULA, petitioner,

vs.
Brigadier General ROMEO C. ESPINO, Members of the General Court-Martial, namely, CANDIDO B. GAVINO, President,
CRISOGONO T. MAKILAN, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, SEGUNDINO S. QUINTANS, PEDRO FERNANDEZ,
JOSE APOLINARIO, AVELINO MENEZ, EFRAIN MACLANG, and MABINI BERNABE, LAW Member, respondents.
Gregorio M. Familar for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Col. Manuel V. Reyes (AFP Judge Advocate General),
Col. Primitivo D. Chingcuangco (AFP Deputy Judge Advocate General), Lt. Col. Pedro Malit, Captain Ciriaco P. Cruz of the AFP, and
Amelito Mutuc for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
I. Preliminary Statement
The present original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction seeks the annulment of Special
Order 208 1 (issued on April 6, 1968 by the respondent Brigadier General Romeo C. Espino as commanding general of the Philippine
Army), which special order convenes a general court-martial and appoints the members thereof, and to prohibit permanently the said
court-martial, composed of the other respondents, from taking cognizance of and proceeding with the trial of the case before it with
respect to the shooting and wounding of the petitioner Jibin Arula. The petition was filed with this Court on April 25, 1968, 2 and given
due course the following day, April 26. We issued a temporary restraining order on the same day, April 26, "effective immediately and
until further orders from this Court," and set the "hearing on the injunction and merits" for May 6.
On May 4 the respondent filed their answer (with opposition to the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction). On this day also, Capt.
Alberto Soteco, MSgt. Benjamin Munar, Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara, thru counsel filed a motion to intervene; Attorneys
Jesus G. Barrera, J. Antonio Araneta and Crispin Baizas of the Citizens' Legal Assistance Committee of the Philippine Bar Association
moved for leave to appear as amici curiae.
At the hearing of the case on May 6, in Baguio City, Atty. Gregorio M. Familar argued for the petitioner, Solicitor General Antonio
Barredo argued for the respondents. 3 The petitioner was given 5 days to submit a memorandum of additional facts and additional
arguments. The respondents were granted leave to submit an answer thereto, and allowed to present within 3 days the affidavit of Capt.
Ruperto I. Amistoso. The motion to intervene was likewise granted, and the intervenors were given 5 days to file the necessary
pleadings.
On May 7 this Court gave leave to Attys. Barrera, Araneta and Baizas to appear as amici curiae, granting them 10 days from notice
within which to submit their memorandum. On the same day the Solicitor General submitted the affidavit of Capt. Amistoso, in
compliance with this Court's May 6 resolution.1awphil.nt
On May 11 the petitioner filed an amended petition; on May 22 the intervenor filed an answer with counter petition for preliminary
injunction; and on May 27 the respondents submitted their answer to the amended petition. On June 18 the amici curiae filed their
memorandum, making common cause with the petitioner.
This case was reheard on August 26. The petitioner thereafter, on September 19, filed his memorandum of authorities and exhibits.
The intervenors filed their reply memorandum of authorities and exhibits on October 23. And on November 12 the Solicitor General
filed the respondents' reply to the petitioner's memorandum of authorities and exhibits.
II. Facts
Shorn of trivia and minutiae, the uncontroverted facts converge in sharp focus.
The petitioner Arula was on December 17, 1967 recruited by one Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo of the Armed Forces of the Philippines at
Simunul, Sulu, to undergo training. On the following January 3, he, together with other recruits, was taken to Corregidor island. On
March 18 a shooting incident occurred at Corregidor, resulting in, among other things, the infliction of serious physical injuries upon the
petitioner. Despite his wounds he succeeded in fleeing Corregidor, and on March 23, he filed, a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of
Cavite City for frustrated murder against Capt. Alberto Soteco, Benjamin Munar alias Lt. Baqui, Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, Eugenio
Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara, 4 and nine others. Acting on the criminal complaint, the city fiscal on March 29 sent subpoenas to the
persons above enumerated, advising them that the preliminary investigation was set for April 3 at 9: 00 o'clock in the morning, and
requiring them to appear at his office on the same date and time.
On April 2 the petitioner sent a letter to the commanding officer of the Philippine Army, informing the latter that he was "not filing any
charges" with the military authorities against the army personnel responsible for his injuries, for the reason that he had "already filed the
corresponding criminal complaint" with the city fiscal of Cavite City. On the following day, April 3, the date set for the preliminary
investigation, army lawyers headed by Capt. Jose Magsanoc appeared on behalf of the respondents and requested for transfer of the
preliminary investigation which, as a result of such request, was reset for April 16.
Meanwhile, the respondent General Espino directed Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos of his command to conduct a pre-trial investigation of
the Corregidor incident to pinpoint responsibility therefor. As early as March 22, however, all of the army personnel, except two,
supposedly involved in the hapless incident had already been placed under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits. (These last
two were subsequently, on April 16, placed under technical arrest.)
On April 6 Capt. Pontejos, as pre-trial investigator, submitted his written report, which contained the substance of the declarations of
Andrew Gruber, Colonel Wilfredo E. Encarnacion, Trainee Capt. Rosauro Novesteras, Lt. Tomas Rainilo of the Special Forces Training
Unit (provisional), 2nd Class Trainee Wilfredo Pahayhay, Trainee Dugasan Ahid and 2nd Lt. Antonio Santos. Appended thereto was an
array of documents.
Recommended for trial by general court-martial are Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Major Abdul Latif Martelino, Capt. Cirilo Oropesa,
Capt. Teodoro R. Facelo, Capt. Ruperto E. Amistoso, Capt. Alberto G. Soteco, 1st Lt. Eduardo B. Batalla, 2nd Lt. Rolando Abadilla,
MSgt. Benjamin C. Munar, MSgt. Federico Ilangilang, MSgt. Cesar Calinawagan, TSgt. Timoteo C. Malubay, TSgt. Pedro Banigued,
SSgt. Narciso T. Dabbay, Cpl. Rolando Buenaventura, Cpl. Felix Lauzon, Cpl. Evaristo Ruiz, Cpl. Orlando Decena, Cpl. Francisco
Grinn, Cpl. Agustin Dagdag, Cpl. Alfredo F. Forfieda and Pfc. Wilfredo Latonero.
On April 14, Capt. Pontejos submitted a supplemental report, recommending trial by general court-martial of Capt. Solferino
Titong alias Capt. Mike, trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey and trainee Eugenio Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara.
On the same day (April 6) that Capt. Pontejos submitted his pre-trial investigation report, the respondent General Espino issued
Special Order 208, appointing a General court-martial, composed of the other respondents, to try the case against the army personnel
involved in the Corregidor incident, intervenors herein being among them. Charges and specifications for violations of articles of war
94 and 97 5 were filed with the general court-martial; additional charges and specifications were subsequently filed and renumbered.
At the hearing by the general court-martial on April 16, the petitioner Arula adduced testimony to prove specification 1, charge 1
(violation of the 94th article of war) which directly and squarely pertains to the shooting and wounding of the said petitioner.
On April 19 the Armed Forces lawyers moved to dismiss the complaint filed with the city fiscal of Cavite upon the ground that the civil
courts had lost jurisdiction over the case because a court-martial had been convened.
It is here pertinent to note that on March 21 President Ferdinand Marcos (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered an investigation of the
reported killings of commando trainees on Corregidor Island, and, on the following day, March 22, directed the creation of a court-
martial to try whomsoever might be responsible for the reported killings. (See the March 22 and 23, 1968 issues of the Manila Times,
Philippines Herald and Manila Daily Bulletin.) So that before the petitioner Arula filed his criminal complaint (on March 23) with the city
fiscal of Cavite, the President had already ordered an investigation of the Corregidor incident and the convening of a court-martial
relative thereto.
III. Issues
The petitioner poses as the dominant issue the jurisdiction of the general court-martial to take cognizance of charge 1, specification 1
for frustrated murder involving the petitioner's injuries. More specifically he avers that; .
1. the offense was committed outside a military reservation because Corregidor where the offense was committed had been
declared by President Ramon Magsaysay as a "national shrine";
2. he, the petitioner, is a civilian, not subject to military law because he had never enlisted in the Army nor had he been
formally inducted therein; and
3. the Court of First Instance of Cavite has already taken cognizance of the case, to the exclusion of the general court-martial.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the general court-martial has jurisdiction over the offense committed against the
petitioner, to the exclusion of the Cavite CFI, because:
1. the petitioner, like all the persons accused before the general court-martial, is subject to military law:
2. the offense (shooting and wounding of the petitioner) was committed inside a military reservation by persons subject to
military law; and
3. the general court-martial acquired jurisdiction over the case ahead of any civil court with concurrent jurisdiction.
At the threshold, the respondents traverse the petitioner's legal personality to bring and maintain the present action. 6
On their part, the intervenors refuted point by point the arguments advanced by the petitioner in his amended petition. Upon the other
hand, the amici curiae, as stated earlier, made common cause with the petitioner.
On the basis of the pleadings of all the parties, the following issues are joined: (1) Does the petitioner have legal personality to institute
and maintain the present action for certiorari and prohibition to stop the general court-martial from proceeding with the hearing of the
case insofar as it concerns the injuries inflicted upon him? (2) In the affirmative, does the general court-martial have jurisdiction over
the case? This in turn depends on the resolution of the sub-issues of (a) whether the petitioner is a person subject to military law; (b) if
he is not, whether Corregidor is a military reservation; and (c) whether the filing by the petitioner of a criminal complaint (involving the
same offense) with the city fiscal of Cavite City forthwith invested the Court of First Instance of Cavite jurisdiction to try the case to the
exclusion of the general court-martial.
IV. Discussion
Of basic and immediate involvement is article of war 94 of Commonwealth Act 408, as amended by Republic Act 242, which provides
in full as follows:
Various Crimes. Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal
ordinance which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or
under municipal ordinances, (A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B) outside any such
reservation when the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) in a person subject to
military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct, Provided, That, in time of peace officers and enlisted men of the
Philippine Constabulary shall not be triable by courts-martial for any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal
ordinances committed under this article. In imposing the penalties for such offenses falling within this article, the penalties for
such offenses provided in the penal laws of the Philippines or such municipal ordinances shall be taken into consideration.
The parties are agreed on the purview and meaning of this article. It places persons subject to military law 7 under the jurisdiction of
courts-martial, concurrent with the jurisdiction of the proper civil courts, when they commit any felony, crime, breach of law or violation
of municipal ordinance which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or
under municipal ordinances, (a) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (b) outside any such reservation when
the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one) is a person subject to military law. Whenever
persons subject to military law commit offenses punishable under article of war 94 outside a military reservation and the offended party
(or any one of the offended parties it there be more than one) is not a person subject to military law, they fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of civil courts. This article of war removes officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary entirely from the
jurisdiction of courts-martial when they commit offenses under this article in time of peace, notwithstanding that the said offenses are
committed within military reservations; or outside such reservations and the offended party (and each one of the offended parties if
there be more than one is a person subject to military law.
Nor is it disputed that the crime of frustrated murder, the offense imputed to the military personnel accused before the general court-
martial, is embraced within the purview of article of war 94. That the said accused are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and are not officers or enlisted men of the Philippine Constabulary, is likewise conceded.
The divergence of opinion is to whether Corregidor was, on March 18, 1968 (the date when the offense was allegedly committed), a
military reservation, and, if it was not, as to whether the petitioner was at that time a person subject to military law.
1. On May 31, 1948 President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 69 8 (hereinafter referred to as P-69) declaring "Corregidor,
including the adjacent islands and detached rocks surrounding the same," a military reservation and placing it under the direct
supervision and control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The petitioner's insistence that Corregidor is no longer a military
reservation is anchored on Executive Order No. 58 9(hereinafter referred to as EO 58) issued on August 16, 1954 by President Ramon
Magsaysay, which declared "all battlefield areas in Corregidor and Bataan province" as national shrines and "except such portions as
may be temporarily needed for the storage of ammunition or deemed absolutely essential for safeguarding the national security,"
opening them "to the public, accessible as tourist resorts and attractions, as scenes of popular pilgrimages and as recreational
centers," from which the petitioner argues that Corregidor is no longer a military reservation because it has been converted into a
national shrine and made accessible to the public.
For several cogent reasons, it is our view that this argument is devoid of merit.
In the first place, EO 58 does not expressly repeal P-69. From the terms contained within the four corners of the later presidential
decree cannot be inferred or implied a repeal of the former presidential act. It cannot, therefore, be safely said that implied repeal of P-
69 was intended. Well-entrenched is the rule that implied repeals are not favored (Camacho vs. ClR, 80 Phil. 848; Visayan Electric Co.
vs. David, 94 Phil. 969; North Camarines Lumber Co., Inc. vs. David, 51 OG 1860, Manila Electric Co. vs. City of Manila, 98 Phil. 951;
Manila Letter Carriers Association vs. Auditor General, 57 OG 9027).
In the second place, there is nothing in the language of EO 58 from which it can be reasonably inferred that the declaration of certain
areas in Corregidor island as battlefield areas or as national shrines necessarily divests such areas or the entire island of Corregidor
itself of their character as a military reservation and national defense zone. Even if an area were actually declared as a "national
shrine" or "battlefield area" or "historic site" by the National Shrines Commission, its character as part of a national defense zone or
military reservation would not thereby be abated or impaired. A military reservation or national defense zone under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 321 10 can concurrently be used and developed as a national shrine without excluding it from the operation of the
said Act. This Act makes the entry of a private person into a national defense zone subject to regulations prescribed by the President,
thereby not precluding the possibility that civilians may be permitted to enter and remain in a proclaimed national defense zone under
appropriate regulations. Paragraph 1 of EO 58 declares that even portions of battlefield areas declared as national shrines are not to
be opened to the public as tourist resorts or recreational centers if they are deemed "absolutely essential for safeguarding the national
security."
In the third place, if the President had intended to repeal P-69, he would have done so in an unequivocal manner. If he had intended to
remove certain portions of Corregidor island from the ambit of P-69, he would have expressly withdrawn such portions, describing them
by specific metes and bounds. This is the uniform pattern of presidential orders modifying the extent of an area previously reserved for
a certain public purpose. A typical example is Proclamation No. 208 dated May 28, 1967 (63 OG No. 31, 6614) wherein President
Ferdinand E. Marcos excluded from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 dated July 12, 1957 (which had established the Fort
Bonifacio military reservation) a certain portion of the land embraced therein situated in Taguig, Rizal, and reserved the same for
national shrine purposes under the administration of the National Shrines Commission, subject to private rights, if any, and to future
survey.
In the fourth place, admitting in gratia argumenti that the declaration of a certain area as a battlefield area under EO 58 would have the
effect of removing it from the Operation of P-69, the fact remains that the Corregidor airstrip, where the shooting and wounding of the
petitioner allegedly took place, has not been actually delimited and officially declared as a national shrine. In its overall context as well
as in its specific phraseology, EO 58 affects and opens to the public only those areas of Corregidor island to be selected, declared,
delimited and developed as historic sites by the National Shrines Commission. This official act of the National Shrines Commission is
the operative act that can give to any portion of Corregidor island the status of a "national shrine," or "battlefield area" or "historic site."
There is no showing that the airstrip in Corregidor has been officially declared by the National Shrines Commission a national shrine,
battlefield area, or historic site.
The duty of the Commission to recondition the airstrip in Corregidor (paragraph 6, EO 58) does not, in fact and in law, make the said
air-strip itself a "battlefield area" or "historic site" within the contemplation of EO 58. Clearly, the airstrip and resthouses mentioned are
only service facilities to promote tourism.
To buttress his claim that Corregidor island, in its entirety, is a battlefield area, the petitioner invokes Executive Order No. 123 dated
March 15, 1968, which, amending EO 58, authorizes the National Shrines Commission, with the prior approval of the President, "to
enter into any contract for the conversion of areas within national shrines into tourist spots and to lease such areas to any citizen or
citizens of the Philippines, or any corporation 60% of the capital stock of which belongs to Filipino citizens." In the absence, however, of
the delimitation and marking of the historical sites or battlefield areas and pending the conversion of portions thereof into tourist spots
(disposable for lease to private parties), the status and identity of the entire Corregidor island as a national defense zone remain
unchanged.
With some vehemence, the petitioner presses the contention that "the entire island of Corregidor, including the airstrip, was a battlefield
from the time it was first bombed on December 29, 1941, until its surrender on May 6, 1942." To unmask the emptiness of this
conclusion, we have only to recall the requirement of EO 58 that the "Commission shall immediately proceed to determine the historic
areas [battlefield areas in Corregidor Island and Bataan province] to be preserved, developed and beautified for the purposes of this
order, establish the boundaries thereof and mark them out properly" (par. 4). Such requirement of delimitation would indeed be an
absolute superfluity insofar as Corregidor is concerned if this island in its entirety were in fact and in design a battlefield area within the
purview of EO 58.
In sum and substance, we do not discern any incompatibility or repugnance between P-69 and EO 58 as would warrant the suggestion
that the former has given way to the latter, or that the latter, in legal effect, has obliterated the former.
2. We now proceed to assess the claim of the petitioner that the general court-martial is barred from asserting and exercising
jurisdiction because the Court of First Instance of Cavite a court of concurrent jurisdiction first acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Let us initially examine the relevant facts.
On March 23 the petitioner filed a criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City for frustrated homicide against those accused
before the general court-martial.
On March 29, the city fiscal of Cavite City sent subpoenas to the aforesaid accused, advising them that the preliminary investigation
would be conducted on April 3 at 9:00 a.m.
On April 2 the petitioner wrote to the Commanding Officer, Philippine Army, Fort Bonifacio, Rizal, informing the latter that he was not
filing charges with the military authorities against those responsible for his injuries, because he had already filed the corresponding
criminal complaint with the city fiscal of Cavite City.
On April 3 Army lawyers appeared before the city fiscal of Cavite City on behalf of those army personnel involved in the shooting and
wounding of the petitioner and requested for transfer of the preliminary investigation which was, accordingly, reset for April 16.
On April 19 the same Army lawyers moved to dismiss Arula's complaint upon the ground that the civil courts had lost jurisdiction
because a court-martial had already been convened. This motion was rejected by the city fiscal.
This was the status of the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the city fiscal of Cavite City when the present petition was
instituted by him. This status has remained static and at present obtains.
On the other hand, the pertinent proceedings had by and before the military authorities may be summarized as follows:
On March 21 the President of the Philippines (as Commander-in-Chief) ordered a full investigation of the Corregidor incident, and, on
the following day, March 22, directed the creation of a court-martial to try all officers and enlisted men responsible for any crime or
crimes committed in connection with the said incident.
On March 27 Major Eduardo Martelino, et al., were placed under technical arrest and restricted to camp limits.
On April 6 Capt. Alfredo O. Pontejos, pre-trial investigator, submitted his pre-trial report recommending trial by general court-martial of
Major Eduardo Martelino, et al. Acting on this recommendation, General Espino, by Special Order 208, appointed a general court-
martial to try the case against the said Major Eduardo Martelino, et al., for violation of the 94th and 97th articles of war, and forthwith
the corresponding charges and specifications were filed.
On April 14 the pre-trial investigator, Capt. Pontejos, submitted a supplemental report recommending trial by general court-martial of
Capt. Solferino Titong alias Capt. Mike, trainee Reynaldo Munar alias Lt. Rey, and trainee Eugenie Alcantara alias Lt. Alcantara.
On April 16, the general court-martial "reconvened." 11 The first prosecution witness to testify on this day was the petitioner himself. The
court-martial then adjourned to meet again on April 19, 1968.
This was the status of the case before the general court-martial when the present action was commenced.
Does our jurisprudence yield any rule of thumb by which we may conclusively resolve the issue generated by the above two sets of
facts? It does.
Although for infractions of the general penal laws, military courts and civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the rule enunciated
in Crisologo vs. People of the Philippines 12 accords to the court first acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused by the filing of
charges and having him in custody the preferential right to proceed with the trial. Thus
As to the claim that the Military Court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known is the rule that when several courts have
concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense, the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of
the others. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall have first been obtained by the
court in which the first charge was filed (22 C.J.S., pp. 186-187). The record in the present case shows that the information for
treason in the People's Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but petitioner had not yet been arrested or brought into the custody
of the Court the warrant of arrest had not been issued when the indictment for the same offense was filed in the military
court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited, mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that court
priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that the court where the information is filed has
custody or jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. (Emphasis supplied)
The salutary rule expounded in Crisologo was explicitly affirmed in Quirico Alimajen vs. Pascual Valera, et al., L-13722, February 29,
1960. Speaking for the Court, Justice J.B.L., Reyes unequivocally restated the rule in the following words:
While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction
thereon, is a matter of procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by the appellant, the moment such choice has been
exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is filed
with the court having jurisdiction over the same and said court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; from
which time the right and power of the court to try the accused attaches (see People vs. Blanco, 47 Off. Gaz No. 7, 3425;
Crisologo vs. People, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1021). (Emphasis supplied).
A thoroughgoing review of American jurisprudence has failed to yield a contrary doctrine. The doctrine restated and re-affirmed in
countless decisions of the Federal and States courts in the United States is the same: jurisdiction to try a particular criminal case is
vested in a court only when the appropriate charge is filed with it AND when jurisdiction of the person is acquired by it through the
arrest of the party charged or by his voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.
The record in the present case discloses that on April 6 and thereafter, charges and specifications were preferred against Major
Eduardo Martelino and several others including the accused Soteco, Benjamin Munar, Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio Alcantara for
violations of the 94th article of war. An order for their arrest and/or custody was issued (annex 13). Reynaldo Munar and Eugenio
Alcantara were subsequently, that is, on April 16, placed under technical arrest (annex 14). On the other hand, no indictment has yet
been filed with the CFI of Cavite on the basis of the complaint lodged by the petitioner with the City Fiscal's Office of Cavite City (see
annexes B and C), the same being merely in the preliminary investigation phase. The mere filing of a complaint with the prosecuting
fiscal cannot have parity with the filing of such complaint with the court. And even if there could be such parity, the criterion laid down
in Crisologo is not the mere filing of the complaint or information but the actual taking into custody of the accused under the process of
one court or the other.
Evidently, the general court-martial has acquired jurisdiction, which it acquired exclusively as against the CFI of Cavite, not only as to
the element of precedence in the filing of the charges, but also because it first acquired custody or jurisdiction of the persons of the
accused. Court-martial jurisdiction over the accused having properly attached, such military jurisdiction continues throughout all phases
of the proceedings, including appellate review and execution of the sentence. 13
In the deliberations of this Court on this case, it was suggested that the rule clearly delineated in Crisologo and explicitly affirmed
in Alimajen should be abandoned in the resolution of the present case, because once Arula filed his complaint with the city fiscal of
Cavite, the military, as a matter of "comity" and "public policy," should have yielded jurisdiction to the civil courts. This suggestion, to
our mind, completely ignores, among other things of fundamental import which we need not dwell on here, the overriding consideration
that the military should be accorded, and is entitled to, priority in disciplining its own members.
It was also suggested that this Court adopt a rule which would vest jurisdiction to try a criminal case in a civil court once a complaint
has been filed with the proper city or provincial fiscal. This suggestion is, in our view, unacceptable because it would be productive of
absurd results which would obtain even among civil courts themselves in situations of conflict of jurisdiction, that is, as between one
civil court and another civil court having concurrent jurisdiction over the same offense.
Juan de la Cruz kidnaps a woman in Manila and takes her by motor vehicle to Pangasinan, passing the provinces of Rizal, Bulacan,
Pampanga and Tarlac. In Pangasinan he slays her. Meanwhile, her relatives learn of the kidnapping, and forthwith file a complaint for
kidnapping against Juan de la Cruz with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan. Shortly after the killing which takes place two days after the
filing of the complaint by her relatives with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan files an information for
kidnapping with murder against Juan de la Cruz, who is thereafter arrested by virtue of forcible process issued by the court of first
instance of Pangasinan. It is true that under these circumstances the courts of first instance of Manila, Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga,
Tarlac and Pangasinan have concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of kidnapping with murder because this felony is a continuing one.
But can it be logically argued, can the proposition be reasonably sustained, that because the relatives of the victim had filed with the
provincial fiscal of Bulacan a complaint for kidnapping, before the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan filed the information for kidnapping
with murder with the CFI of Pangasinan, the latter court could not validly acquire jurisdiction, and the CFI of Bulacan, by the mere filing
of a complaint by the victim's relatives with the provincial fiscal of Bulacan, has thereby preempted jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
CFI of Pangasinan?
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the
following requisites concur: (1) the offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense must have
been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged with the offense must have been brought into its forum for
trial, forcibly by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court. In the case at bar, while the first two requisites are
indispensably present with respect to the Court of First Instance of Cavite, the third requisite has not even become viable, because no
information has been filed with the court, nor have the accused persons been brought under its jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, all
these three requisites obtained, by the latest, as of April 16 in respect to the general court-martial. The charges and specifications were
before that day forwarded to the court-martial for trial; all the accused as of that day were already under technical arrest and restricted
to camp limits; the offense is one that is cognizable by the court-martial under the authority of article of war 94; the offense was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court-martial.
3. The petitioner insists nevertheless that the respondent General Espino acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion "in hastily constituting and convening a general court-martial to try the case involving Arula, without the same being
thoroughly investigated by the pre-trial investigator, resulting in the filing of charges against persons without prima facie evidence in
violation of the Constitution, existing laws, and Art. 71 14 of the Articles of War." The petitioner has not at all elaborated on this
contention, although apparently on the basis of this bare accusation, his counsel, in the oral argument had on May 6, expressed in no
uncertain terms his apprehension that the trial by the court-martial will be in the language of those who are not disinclined to be
mundane one big, thorough "whitewash."
We are not impressed by this contention.
It is our view that the respondent Espino acted well within the periphery of his authority as commanding general of the Philippine Army
in constituting and convening the general court-martial in question. In issuing Special Order 208 for the purpose of constituting and
convening the general court-martial, the respondent Espino was guided by the report and recommendation of Capt. Pontejos, the pre-
trial investigating officer. In his report of April 6 (annex 6) Capt. Pontejos gave the abstract of the declarations made by several persons
concerning the Corregidor incident. The said report was accomplished pursuant to the provisions of article of war 71. And so was his
supplemental report of April 14 (annex 7).
Moreover, it would appear that the persons who should be most concerned in questioning the absence of a pretrial investigation, or the
unseemly haste with which it was conducted, are those accused before the court-martial and this not one of the 23 accused has
done.
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a
court-martial. In Humphrey vs. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure required by Article 70 15can property be construed as an
indispensible pre-requesiteto exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction. The Article does serve important functions in
the administration of the court-martial procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such
that a defendant could object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the court-martial could itself
postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a
court-martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded
that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall short
of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-martial
is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of the Army did hold that where there had been no
pre-trial investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly repudiated in later
holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in no way affect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's interpretation was
pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the
language here under consideration. (Emphasis supplied)..
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pre-trial investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether
irregular; but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction. 16 Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal
procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but
merely to the regularity of the proceedings. 17
Likewise, the respondent Espino's authority, as commanding general of the Philippine Army, to refer military charges against members
of his command for trial by general court-martial cannot legally be assailed. Under article of war 8, 18 as implemented by the Manual for
Courts-Martial (PA) and Executive Order 493, series 1952, 19 the commanding officer of a major command or task force is empowered
to appoint general courts-martial.
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to
prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by
him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. 20 "Even an abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari." 21
The speedy referral by the appointing authority, herein respondent Espino, of the case to a general court-martial for trial is not
jurisdictional error. (See Flackman v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 871). Speedy trial is a fundamental right accorded by the Constitution (Art. III,
Sec. 1[17]), the Rules of Court (Rule 115, Sec. 7[h]) and article of war 71 to an accused in all criminal prosecutions.
This right to a speedy trial is given greater emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. In Ex parte Milligan (4 Wall [71
US] 1), the Supreme Court of the United States observed that the discipline necessary to the efficiency of the Army required swifter
modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts.
In the military, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to an accused by article of war 71 which requires that when a person subject to
military law is placed in arrest or confinement, immediate steps shall be taken to try the person accused or to dismiss the charge and
release him. This article further requires that, if practicable, the general court-martial charges shall be forwarded to the appointing
authority within eight days after the accused is arrested or confined; if the same is not practicable, he shall report to the superior
authority the reasons for delay.
The importance of the right to speedy trial is underscored by the fact that an officer who is guilty of negligence or omission resulting in
unnecessary delay may be held accountable therefor under article of war 71 (Reyes v. Crisologo, 75 Phil. 225).
The apprehension, heretofore adverted to, expressed by the counsel for the petitioner at the hearing on May 6 that the rights of the
petitioner will not be fully vindicated should be dismissed as purely speculative. Such thinking at this stage has no basis in law and
in fact. Moreover, it is well-settled that mere apprehension or fear entertained by an individual cannot serve as the basis of injunctive
relief. 22 The presumption that official duty will be regularly performed by officers sworn to uphold the Constitution and the law cannot be
overthrown by the mere articulation of misgivings to the contrary.
We thus ineluctably reach the following conclusions: (1) the airstrip on Corregidor island where the shooting and wounding of the
petitioner Arula allegedly took place has not been removed from the ambit of Proclamation No. 69, series of 1948, and is therefore to
be properly considered a part of the military reservation that is Corregidor island; (2) because the prime imputed to the accused, who
are persons subject to military law, was committed in a military reservation, the general court-martial has jurisdiction concurrent with the
Court of First Instance of Cavite to try the offense; and (3) the general court-martial having taken jurisdiction ahead of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, must be deemed to have acquired jurisdiction to the exclusion of the latter court.
With the view that we take of this case, resolving the issue of whether the petitioner Arula is a person subject to military law would be at
best a purposeless exercise in exegesis if not altogether an exercise in futility.
Although it would appear that in the above disquisition we have assumed the existence of legal standing on the part of the petitioner to
bring and maintain the present action we must hasten, without equivocation, to state that we have so assumed, but only ad hoc, that is,
solely for the purposes of the present case. We do not here resolve the general abstract issue of whether a complaining witness in any
or every criminal prosecution has legal standing to question the jurisdiction of the court trying the case. Happily, in upholding the
jurisdiction of the general court-martial to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in the context of the environmental
circumstances of the case at bar, we have not been pressed by any compelling need to do so.
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, and the restraining order issued by this Court on April 26, 1968 is hereby lifted. No
costs.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6410 November 24, 1954
JUAN Y. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE EUSEBIO F. RAMOS, ETC., respondent.
Onofre M. Mendoza for petitioner.
Eusebio F. Ramos in his own behalf.
JUGO, J.:
The petitioner, Juan Y Beltran, was charged before the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro with the crime of malversation of
public funds, alleged in the information to have been committed in the municipality of San Jose, province of Occidental Mindoro, on or
about July 6, and 12, 1951. The trial commenced in all the municipalities of San Jose, Mamburao, and Lubang all of Occidental
Mindoro, on or about July 6, and 12, 1951. The trial commenced in the municipalities of San Jose, Mamburao, and Lubang, all of
Occidental Mindoro. The continuation of the trial was transferred to the municipality of Calapan, province of Oriental Mindoro. The
defendant Beltran, herein petitioner, objected to the continuation of the trial in Calapan on the ground that it is outside of the territorial
boundaries of the province of Occidental Mindoro where the crime was committed. The trial court overruled the objection and ordered
the trial to proceed in Calapan. The petitioner filed in this Court a petition for a writ of prohibition to enjoin the trial court from continuing
the trial in Calapan.
The respondent contends that the provinces of Occidental and Oriental Mindoro constitute the Eight Judicial District under the
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act NO. 296). There being no separate court for the province of Occidental Mindoro, it
is claimed that the judge of the district may hold his sessions in either of the two provinces. This contention is untenable in the present
case for the reason that the Rules of Court expressly provide that a criminal case should be instituted and tried in the municipality or
province where the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients took place. This is fundamental principle, the purpose
being not to compel the defendant to move to, and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed,
as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place. Although the judge of a
district may hold the trial in any particular case subject to the specific provisions, or section 14 (a), Rule 106, in order not to violate the
Rules of Court and disregard the fundamental rights of the accused. Sometimes a judicial district includes provinces far distant from
each other. Under the theory of the respondent, the accused may be subjected to the great inconvenience of going to a far distant
province with all his witnesses to attend the trial there. This is prohibited by the Rules of Court as being unfair to the defendant.
There is no contradiction between the Judiciary Act and Rule 106, section 14 (a). They should, therefore, be enforced together
harmoniously.
In view of the foregoing, the respondent judge is enjoined from continuing the trial of the above-mentioned case in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, without pronouncement to costs. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
YUSUKE FUKUZUME,* G.R. No. 143647
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, Chairman,**
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,*** JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 11, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay
private complainant the sum of P424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[2]
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires. [3] Sometime in
July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate,[4] who was the vice-president of Manila Electric Company, went to the house of
herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in Paraaque.[5] Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that
Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires.[6] Fukuzume
confirmed this information and told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR).[7]Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from
Fukuzume.[8] The initial agreed purchase price was P200,000.00.[9] Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various dates which
eventually totaled P290,000.00, broken down as follows: P50,000.00, given on July 12, 1991; P20,000.00, given on July 22,
1991; P50,000.00, given on October 14, 1991; and, P170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.[10] Fukuzume admitted that he received
the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount of P290,000.00.[11] To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being
sold are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and that Furukawas authorized representatives are
allowed to withdraw and dispose of said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December
27, 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez. [12]At the time that
Fukuzume gave Yu the second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be given as gifts to some of the
people in NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and, in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one for P100,000.00 and the other
for P34,000.00.[13] However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored on the ground that the account from which the
checks should have been drawn is already closed.[14]Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the checks
bounced.[15] Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable
him to retrieve the aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR. [16] On January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter of even date, signed by
the Director of the Overseas Operation and Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of
excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their depots in Tanay and Bulacan. [17] Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to
accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.[18] When Yu arrived at the
NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found. [19] Hence, Yu proceeded to show the documents of
authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa
dated January 17, 1992.[20] NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications dated December 17, 1991 and December 27,
1991 claiming that these are spurious as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR as of
December 1991.[21] Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from
the latter the refund of the money he paid him. [22] Fukuzume promised to return Yus money.[23] When Fukuzume failed to comply with
his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand letter asking for the refund of P424,000.00 plus loss of profits.[24] Subsequently, Yu filed a
complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). [25]
In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as
follows:
That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false
representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co.
Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor
and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce
and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and
delivered the total amount of P424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with
his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness
and abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite
repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier
Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount of P424,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[26]
Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty. [27] Trial ensued.
In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for
twenty (20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount
of P424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of demand until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the CA.
On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the
penalty imposed, thus:
although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it
failed to determine the minimum penalty for the offense committed (prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period but imposed in the maximum period), hence, the penalty is modified to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.[29]
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the aforementioned modification in the prison term
of appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[30]
Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS
JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH
THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF THE FRAUD.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
HAD BEEN NOVATED AND CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP, THEREBY
EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY THEREOF, IF ANY. [31]
We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense
charged. The CA ruled:
The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court). Although the false representation and
verbal contract of sale of the aluminum scrap wires took place at appellants residence in Paraaque, appellant and
private complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment of P50,000.00 for said transaction was made at the
Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp. 15, 68). Hence, an element of the crime that the offended party was
induced to part with his money because of the false pretense occurred within the jurisdiction of the lower court giving
it jurisdiction over the instant case.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April 19, 1994 [32] and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was
subscribed on July 20, 1994.[33]
With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged
therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree
with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to
Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque. Yu testified thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused in this case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came to know the accused?
A I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.
Q And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you know?
A Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap wires.
ATTY. N. SERING
Your Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to the question.
COURT
Please wait until the answer is completed.

Q Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?
A He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A That was in 1991, sir.

COURT
When?
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Your Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his memorandum.
A July 12, 1991, sir.
Q And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?
A We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some amount of money.
Q Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the accused in this case the amount of money?
A In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to that effect.
Q Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on that
particular date?
A Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I am going to give money in payment of
the aluminum scrap wires coming from Furukawa Eletric Company.
Q How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the accused?
A Our first agreement was for P200,000.
Q Where is that aluminum scrap located?
A The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of the National Power Corporation but
according to Mr. Fukuzume it belongs to Furukawa Electric Company.
Q In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the accused the amount of P50,000?
ATTY. N. SERING
Objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
The complainant testified he gave P50,000. I am asking how much the complainant gave to the accused on
that particular date.
A On July 12, I gave him P50,000 on that date.
Q Not P200,000?
A No, sir.[34]
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony
commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost
invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[35]
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or
transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental
Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. [36] Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals,[37] we held in
the fairly recent case of Macasaet vs. People[38] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. [39](Emphasis supplied)
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take
jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment. [40]
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged
with estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that
is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. [41]

The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by
Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to corroborate Yus sworn statement or
to prove that any of the above-enumerated elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution failed to
establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22,
1991, P50,000.00 on October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof to show
that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is
authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established
that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of
Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a
representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to
buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage.
Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was
consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters house in Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires,
Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an
unspecified date, he received P50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we cannot rely on this affidavit for
the reason that it forms part of the records of the preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is settled
that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the
case in the RTC.[42] In People vs. Crispin,[43] this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary
investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the
record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take
judicial notice of the same.[44] Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzumes affidavit, the same may not be
considered part of the records, much less evidence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or
that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction.
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. [45]Moreover, jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since
such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law.[46]While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy,[47] wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be
barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the
general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary
to consider the other issues raised in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 21888
are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-
083 is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution2dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were
charged with the crime of libel committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty,
integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring
and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to
wit:
MEET DR. PORTIGO,

COMPANY PHYSICIAN
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a
company to serve its employees.
However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about
their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health problems of
employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about
Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her
under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an operation.
Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo
also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own
without his nod as he had one to recommend.
Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again
complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out
her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.
Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made
the referral frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal state.
The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the company physician.
My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise
touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But,
sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to
act like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much
lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too
greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the
expensive yet unhealthy practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic)
than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula
while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence
located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a
physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and
therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision6 finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both
accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and
punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.7
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order 8 dated February 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE "LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING AND
INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO
BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE
NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.9
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist,
portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose
the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's
outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be
lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public
good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual
malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters of
public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the columnists exclusive views;
and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held
responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every
indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon by
the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on
records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if
properly considered, may alter the result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in
court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the
offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply
filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction
over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since
such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form
prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred
by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule
are not present in the instant criminal case. 11
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People12 that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is
so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of
written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however,
That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is
printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is
printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is
printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province
where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may
be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. 15
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous
article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the
province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty,
integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring
and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN...."
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish
that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the
Information of which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating
with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent
of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines,
and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as
Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17
the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with
Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word "published" is utilized in the precise context of noting that the
defendants "cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila." The Information states that the
libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to
situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was
in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that
while leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not
mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu.1avvphi1
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in general
circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general
circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal
case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a
consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.18
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was "published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines," the Court did not consider
the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege
the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City,"
such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the
offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the Information for libel alleged that the "offended party was the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community," the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to
establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than
temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must
abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential:
The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite
time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually
residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It
is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a
place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business
does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence
there for purposes of venue.21
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and
the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.22 Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that
the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, G.R. No. 170122
Petitioner,
- versus -
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 171381

- versus -
Present:
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF

THE PHILIPPINES, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
Respondents. CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 12, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with
application for injunctive relief.In the first petition for mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to
nullify and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order,[1] as reiterated in another Order dated August 26, 2005, both issued by the
Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit
for forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and her immediate family. The second petition for
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171381, seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture
case involving the same parties but for different properties.
The Facts
To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP 143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen.
Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA)
1379,[3] filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed
as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No. 0196,
this time to recover funds and properties amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the
Fourth Division of the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be also referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil
Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias and three others with
violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at
PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The
plunder charge, as the parties pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of
detention. Per the Sheriffs Return[4] dated November 2, 2005, the summons were duly served on respondent
Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29, 2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance
which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the SBs lack of jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture.The OMB countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in
default. To the OMBs motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested that they
have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari,docketed as G.R. No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB
issued in which case the SB should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution[5] of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss; declared the same motion
as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in
default.
Another resolution[6] denied the Garcias motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer, and set a date
for the ex-parte presentation of the Republics evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005, pursuant to the prohibited
pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I
with the plunder case which were respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such
consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249.[7]
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the forfeiture case is not the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia,
the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture
case; and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements.
By Order[8] of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having been declared in
default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her first special civil action for
mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion x
x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and August 26 2005 that merely Noted without action,
hence refused to resolve petitioners motion to dismiss and/or toquash by virtue of petitioners prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4thDivision could not have acquired
jurisdiction over petitioners, [and her childrens] x x x persons, much less make them become the true
parties-litigants, contestants or legal adversaries in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioners [and her childrens] x x x persons, they could not possibly be declared in
default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from challenging the [SB]
4th Divisions lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime,
even after final judgment. In the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings
before the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioners motion for reconsideration of the first
challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised therein had already been passed upon by [the SB
4th Divisions] resolution of May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied upon by
petitioner in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely different, separate
and distinct from the grounds set forth in petitioners manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated
April 15, 2005 that was denied by it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture
I upon the filing of the main plunder case against petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the
subject properties in forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder
law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA, any penal conviction
for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of
forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements,
and to avoid possible conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction.[9] (Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were taken after the petition for Forfeiture II
was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return of July 13, 2005, the
sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in
turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the
other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: Im receiving
the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the above-
named (sic).
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of counsel, filed a motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof
which is now covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for alternative service of summons. The
motion for alternative service would be repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioners motion to dismiss and/or to
quash and the Republics motion for alternative service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioners motion for partial reconsideration. [10]
From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court viathe instant petition for certiorari, docketed
as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24, 2006 denying petitioners
motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on petitioner, the [SB] ought to have dismissed
forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction over petitioners person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates the automatic forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the [SB] Fourth Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly repealed by the plunder law (RA No.
7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is imperative that the matter of forfeiture be
exclusively tried in the main plunder case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting
decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction. [11] (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No. 171381 were consolidated.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the question of jurisdiction and may thusly be
couched into whether the Fourth Division of the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitionerand her three sons for that
matterconsidering that, first, vis--vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and 0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been
ineffectively or improperly served and, second, that the plunder caseCrim. Case No. 28107has already been filed and pending with
another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb
the Forfeiture Cases in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are
now covered or included in the plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder
case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4 th Division of its
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so
petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case dispositions.Prescinding from these premises,
petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to dismiss the two
forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on the foregoing ground.
Petitioners contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of her pleadings, let it be stated at the
outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said
so in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan[12] involving no less than petitioners husband questioning certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB
of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases
are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20,
2005 Resolution,[13] the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired
properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a public officer or employee [acquires] during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x
x.[14] Such amount of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.[15] Thus if the
respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property
in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become property of the State. [16] x x x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only the jurisdiction over cases involving ill-
gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his immediate family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 3 [17] the filing of
forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal proceedings. The Court, in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,[18] interpreted this provision as empowering the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent civil
actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the Former Is Civil in Nature while the Latter Is
Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and
different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the
forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of
the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec. 4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth]. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by
preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the
properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the respondent
public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth.[19]
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioners thesis on possible double jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of
conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense,[20] suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379
are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a criminal
offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for
plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings between the plunder case and the subject
forfeiture cases, petitioners apprehension about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft court on
the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division where the plunder case
is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture
case. They refer to a situation where this Courts Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case
while the Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to a conflict. After all,
forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and circumstances separate and distinct from that in
the forfeiture case. Between the two (2) cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established
and the issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not have a bearing on the
other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the forfeiture of the subject
properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not
recovered by the forfeiture case and vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder and
the petition for forfeiture cover the same set of properties. [21]
RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379
Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing Forfeitures I and II with her assertion that
RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a
penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of
his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand,
RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an amount of
property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover
the properties which were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and all efforts should be exerted to
harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be
harmonized. The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over
the Persons of Petitioner and Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her
children due to a defective substituted service of summons. There is merit in petitioners contention.
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the requirements of a valid substituted
service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at
the defendants residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of
summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a
person.[22]
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores
Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed
that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at
the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,[23] we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time.Reasonable time being so
much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party. [24] Moreover, we
indicated therein that the sheriff must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at least two (2) different
dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at defendants house or residence; or on a
competent person in charge of defendants office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was made on petitioner and her
children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid
substituted service of summons.Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly complied with as the substituted service was
made not at petitioners house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of
suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendants,
however, admits of exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative
relief.[25] In the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning improper service of summons since the
improvident service of summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary appearance in
the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture
hearings. We cannot subscribe to the Republics views.
Special Appearance to Question a Courts Jurisdiction
Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.(Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other
grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearancethe first
sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which
case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she voluntarily appeared without
qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit
answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial
reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special appearance with the
purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her three children.Petitioner asserts therein that
SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident
substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed her
motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22,
2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her
stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the
foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear before the
SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals[26]applies to the instant case. Said case elucidates the current
view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to
dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction
over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB to cure the defective
substituted services of summons.They are, therefore, not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor
are they deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of
summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in
the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus,
the order declaring them in default must be set aside and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the
forfeiture case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons or alias summons on the petitioner
and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division
has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita D. Garcia and her three children.The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction
over their persons. No costs. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G. R. No. 156747. February 23, 2005]
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision[1] dated 22 March
2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22067 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alfie
Lorenzo, et al.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The information, which was raffled off to Branch 93 of said court, reads:
The undersigned accuses ALFIE LORENZO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., ROGER B. PARAJES and JORDAN
CASTILLO, of the crime of LIBEL, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused ALFIE LORENZO, columnist, ALLEN
MACASAET, publisher, NICOLAS QUIJANO JR., managing editor, ROGER B. PARAJES, editor, respectively of Abante a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines, and JORDAN CASTILLO, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with evident intent of exposing JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD, a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD to public hatred,
dishonor, discredit and contempt and ridicule, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and maliciously write, publish,
exhibit and circulate and/or cause to be written, published, exhibited and circulated in the aforesaid newspaper, in its issue of July 13,
1996 an article which reads as follows:
Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na baluktot at
binaluktot pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto Natividad
siya? Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon. Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan dahil nga sa
amoy-pawis siya pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang nang punas sa katawan niya ng T-shirt niyang
siya ring isusuot niya pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang
rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya ang
kaldero para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa
kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng utang
na loob na kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang klaseng tao,
pero sana naman ay makunsensya ka, Pare!
Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si
Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga
inimbento mo. Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba, dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming binubuyo
na sabihin kay Tito Alfie na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga
ni Tito Alfie dahil sa masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento mo lang ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo
para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie, ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya kuno
Liberty Boys!
thereby publicly imputing a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or an act, omission, condition, status or circumstance and causing in
view of their publication, discredit and contempt upon the person of said JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD
a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice. [2]
In an Order dated 16 July 1997, Judge Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City, set the
arraignment of the petitioners on 27 August 1997.[3]
On 22 August 1997, petitioners filed before the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings
dated 21 August 1997 claiming that they intended to elevate the adverse Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. Despite this motion, the scheduled arraignment of petitioners pushed through on 27
August 1997. During said proceeding, petitioners Lorenzo and Quijano, Jr., together with their co-accused Parajes and Castillo, refused
to enter any plea and so the trial court ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered into the records on their behalf. [4] As for petitioner
Macasaet, his arraignment was rescheduled to 20 October 1997 due to his failure to attend the previously calendared arraignment.
On 12 September 1997, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent
was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of
the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense [5] (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, on 23 September 1997, the trial court received by way of registered mail, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and to Withdraw Plea dated 3 September 1997.[6] Petitioners argued therein that the trial court committed grave error when it denied
the petitioners Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and/or Defer Proceedings and continued with the scheduled arraignment on 27
August 1997. According to petitioners and their co-accused, by the trial judges denial of their Urgent Motion to Defer Arraignment
and/or Defer Proceedings, he had effectively denied them their right to obtain relief from the Department of Justice. Moreover, banking
on the case of Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals,[7] the petitioners and their fellow accused contended that since they had already
manifested their intention to file a petition for review of the Resolution of the city prosecutor of Quezon City before the DOJ, it was
premature for the trial court to deny their urgent motion of 21 August 1997. Finally, petitioners and their co-accused claimed that
regardless of the outcome of their petition for review before the DOJ, the withdrawal of their not guilty pleas is in order as they planned
to move for the quashal of the information against them.
In an Order dated 26 September 1997,[8] Judge Bruselas, Jr., ruled that with the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, the court considers
the accused to have abandoned their Motion for Reconsideration and to Withdraw Plea and sees no further need to act on the same.
In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss dated 23 September 1997, [9] the public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City,
had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private respondent (private complainant below)
was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio,
Marikina, Metro Manila, as shown in his Reply-Affidavit of 11 October 1996 filed during the preliminary investigation of the case.
For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the affidavit
purportedly executed by private respondent as it is axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to a consideration of the
information as filed with the court, and no other. Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by private respondent and the
information filed before the court state that private respondents residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the case is warranted for
the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information. [10]
On 16 October 1997, petitioners and their fellow accused filed a Supplemental Reply [11] attaching thereto certifications issued by
Jimmy Ong and Pablito C. Antonio, barangay captains of Barangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina City,
respectively. The pertinent portion of the barangay certification[12]issued by Barangay Captain Ong states:
This is to certify that this office has no record on file nor with the list of registered voters of this barangay regarding a certain person by
the name of one MR. JOSELITO TRINIDAD.
This further certifies that our BSDOs (have) been looking for said person seeking information regarding his whereabouts but to no avail.
On the other hand, the certification[13] issued by Barangay Captain Antonio, reads in part:
This is to certify that JOSELITO TRINIDAD of legal age, single/married/separate/widow/widower, a resident of Karen Street, Sto. Nio,
Marikina City is a bonafide member of this barangay.
...
This is being issued upon request of the above-named person for IDENTIFICATION.
During the hearing on 20 October 1997, the trial court received and marked in evidence the two barangay certifications. Also
marked for evidence were page 4 of the information stating the address of private respondent to be in Marikina City and the editorial
box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F BF
Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts., Intramuros, Manila. The prosecution was then given five (5) days within which to
submit its comment to the evidence submitted by the petitioners and their fellow accused.
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,[14] private respondent contended that the certification issued by the barangay captain
of Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City;
that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid payment of local taxes; and
that there is no showing that a census was conducted among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein.
As regards the certification issued by the barangay chairman of Sto. Nio, Marikina City, private respondent argued that it is of
judicial notice that barangay and city records are not regularly updated to reflect the transfer of residence of their constituents and that
a perusal of said certification reveals that the barangay captain did not personally know him (private respondent). Finally, private
respondent claimed that his receipt of the copy of petitioners Appeal to the DOJ, which was sent to his alleged address in Sikatuna
Village, Quezon City, proved that he did, in fact, reside at said place.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction. [15] The court a quo noted
that although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted for its
consideration indicated otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly indicated that the purported libelous article was printed and
first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters to support its conclusion that, indeed,
jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the address of private respondent appeared to be the one
in Marikina City although right below it was a handwritten notation stating 131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC; b) the
two barangay certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and Affidavit-Complaint
attached to the information wherein the given address of private respondent was Marikina City.
On 03 December 1997, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration[16]insisting that at the time the alleged libelous article
was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina City
at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he understood the term address to mean the place where he
originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon City as his actual
residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante.
On 22 January 1998, private respondent filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration to which he attached an affidavit
executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, where private
respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997. She also stated in her affidavit that she was not aware of any inquiry
conducted by the barangay officials of Barangay Malaya regarding the residency of private respondent in their locality.
Through an Order dated 12 February 1998, the trial court denied private respondents motion for reconsideration, ruling thus:
[Del Rosarios] affidavit appears to have been executed only on 19 January 1998 to which fact the court can only chuckle and observe
that evidently said affidavit is in the nature of a curative evidence, the weight and sufficiency of which is highly suspect. [17]
Undaunted, the public and the private prosecutors filed a notice of appeal before the court a quo.[18] In the Decision now assailed
before us, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts conclusion and ordered the remand of the case to the court a
quo for further proceedings. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated November 24, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in
Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903, dismissing the case filed against herein accused-appellees on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered remanding the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.[19]
The Court of Appeals held that jurisprudentially, it is settled that the residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or abode and for the purpose of determining venue, actual residence is a persons place of abode and
not necessarily his legal residence or domicile.[20] In this case, the defect appearing on the original complaint wherein the residence of
private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City was subsequently cured by his supplemental-affidavit submitted during the
preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the amendment was made during the preliminary investigation phase of this case,
the same could be done as a matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court. [21]
As for the barangay certifications issued by the barangay chairmen of Barangay Malaya and Barangay Sto. Nio, the Court of
Appeals ruled that they had no probative value ratiocinating in the following manner:
. . . With respect to the requirement of residence in the place where one is to vote, residence can mean either domicile or temporary
residence (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution A Primer, 3rd Ed., p. 209). Therefore, one who is a resident of Quezon City can be a voter of
Marikina if the latter is his domicile. Conversely, a person domiciled in Marikina can vote in Quezon City if he resides in the latter. It is
just a matter of choice on the part of the voter. Thus, logic does not support the supposition that one who is not a registered voter of a
place is also not a resident theref. Furthermore, the right to vote has the corollary right of not exercising it. Therefore, one need not
even be a registered voter at all. The same principle applies to the certification issued by the barangay in Marikina. [22]
The appellate court likewise gave weight to the affidavit executed by Del Rosario and observed that petitioners failed to controvert
the same.
The petitioners thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
promulgated on 6 January 2003.[23]
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDADS PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A CRIMINAL
CASE.[24]
Petitioners insist that the evidence presented before the trial court irrefutably established the fact that private respondent was not
a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous publication saw print. According to them, the information dated 10 July 1997
filed before the RTC of Quezon City indicated private respondents address to be in Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina City.
Further supporting this claim were the affidavit-complaint[25] and the memorandum for preliminary investigation[26] where references
were explicitly made to said address. Thus, petitioners are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the supplemental
affidavit executed by private respondent claiming that its execution amounted to nothing more than a mere afterthought.
In addition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it took into account the affidavit executed by Del Rosario. They
insist that its belated submission before the trial court and the prosecutions failure to present the affiant to testify as regards the
veracity of her statements undermined the evidentiary value of her affidavit. More, as the affidavit was not formally offered as evidence,
it was only proper that the trial court disregarded the same in dismissing the case.
Finally, petitioners contend that private respondent did not have the requisite personality to appeal from the decision of the trial
court as it is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which is authorized by law to institute appeal of criminal cases. Thus, the
Court of Appeals made a mistake in holding that -
While it is true that only the OSG can file an appeal representing the government in a criminal proceeding, the private complainant
nevertheless may appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case. The case at bar was dismissed due to the alleged improper laying of
venue resulting in the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and not based on the merits of the case. It cannot therefore be argued
that private complainants appeal pertains to the merits of the criminal case as what happened in accused-appellees cited case in the
motion to strike, VicentePalu-ay vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 112995, July 30, 1998). Needless to say, the private complainant has
an interest in the civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case which he had the right to protect. In the interest of justice and fair play,
therefore, the Brief filed by private complainant in the present case should be treated as pertaining only to the civil aspect of the case.[27]
In his Comment/Opposition dated 25 April 2003,[28] private respondent reiterated his position that the RTC of Quezon City had
jurisdiction over this libel case. According to him, the affidavit executed by Del Rosario, the alleged owner of the house he leased in
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, established, beyond doubt, that he resided in said place during the time the claimed defamatory article
appeared on the pages of Abante. In addition, he draws attention to the fact that petitioners and their co-accused furnished him a copy
of the petition for review, filed before the DOJ, at the aforementioned address in Quezon City.
Anent the affidavit of Del Rosario, private respondent maintains that the prosecution exerted efforts to present the affiant before
the trial court. Unfortunately, Del Rosario was out of town when she was supposed to be presented and so the public and the private
prosecutors decided to submit for resolution their motion for reconsideration sans the affiants testimony. Citing the case of Joseph
Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, et al.,[29] private respondent avers that this Court had previously admitted the affidavits of
witnesses who were not presented during the trial phase of a case.
As regards the petitioners contention that he (private respondent) did not have the personality to bring this case to the appellate
level, private respondent contends that the proper party to file the Notice of Appeal before the trial court is the public prosecutor as
what happened in this case.
On its part, the OSG filed its Comment dated 07 July 2003 [30] wherein it prayed for the dismissal of this petition based on the
following: First, as the petition is concerned with the determination of the residence of private respondent at the time of the publication
of the alleged libelous article, Rule 45 should be unavailing to the petitioners because this remedy only deals with questions of law.
Second, venue was properly laid in this case as private respondents residency in Quezon City during the time material to this
case was sufficiently established. The OSG claims that the errors appearing in the memorandum for preliminary investigation and in
the affidavit complaint with regard to private respondents residence were corrected through the supplemental affidavit private
respondent executed during the preliminary investigation before the Quezon City prosecutors office.
Third, the OSG takes the view that the public prosecutor was the proper party to file the notice of appeal before the trial court
since its (OSGs) office is only authorized to bring or defend actions on appeal on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Honorable Court of the Court of Appeals.
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same.
Jurisdiction has been defined as the power conferred by law upon a judge or court to try a case the cognizance of which belongs
to them exclusively[31] and it constitutes the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. [32] The term derives its origin from two Latin
words jus meaning law and the other, dicere meaning to declare.[33]The term has also been variably explained to be the power of a
court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind of case before it, the power of
a court to adjudicate a case when the proper parties are before it, and the power of a court to make the particular decision it is asked to
render.[34]
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed determines
not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[35] In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines,[36] this Court had the occasion to expound on this principle, thus:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,
the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. [37]
The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of
said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363. It provides:
Art. 360. Persons responsible. - . . .
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That
where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense,
the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed
and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed
and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published.
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[38] we summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where
he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. [39]
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he
could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at
the time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly
insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating Quezon City at the beginning of the
information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC
Quezon City was invoked either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time
the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the
absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the information
filed before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutors failure to properly lay the basis for invoking
the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case.
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in
the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or information should
contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private individual
and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was printed and first
published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and
first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action. [40]
Anent private respondent and OSGs contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of
this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a
court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information. [41] In resolving a motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.[42] The
exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash [43] such as when the
ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused. [44] In these instances, it is
incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present case
obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals likewise put premium on the affidavit executed by Del Rosario which was attached
to private respondents supplemental motion for reconsideration. According to the appellate court, said document supports private
(respondents) claim that indeed, he was a resident of Quezon City at the time the alleged libelous article was published. [45] The
pertinent provision of the Rules of Court, under Rule 10, Section 6 thereof, states:
Sec. 6. Supplemental Pleadings. - Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just,
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of
the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting
the supplemental pleading.
By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the principal
pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the
admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held that its
admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court. [46]
Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading should
deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A reading of the
supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which transpired after he
filed his original motion for reconsideration. The fact that he attached thereto the affidavit of his alleged lessor fails to persuade us into
giving to said supplemental motion the same evidentiary value as did the Court of Appeals. For one, private respondent did not even
bother to explain the reason behind the belated submission of Del Rosarios affidavit nor did he claim that he exerted earnest efforts to
file it much earlier in the proceedings. He must, therefore, bear the consequences of his own lethargy.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of
appeal before the trial court. Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said notice in its capacity as the sole
representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases. [47]
Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to represent the government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative
Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the
Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts.[48]
The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence?
Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that (i)n appeals by notice of appeal,
the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of
the other parties.[49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial courts jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of
course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him. [50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz
Regalado
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected
their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not
do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the expiration of the period to do
so for all the parties.[51]
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before
the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect an
appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two incidents when
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 22 March 2002 and Resolution dated 6 January 2003 of the Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the 24 November 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
Quezon City, dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-97-71903 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139180. July 31, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO RIVERA, accused- appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a review pursuant to Rule 122, 10 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure of the decision,[1] dated June 22, 1999, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-appellant Rolando Rivera guilty of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of death and to pay the offended party, Erlanie Rivera, the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The information against accused-appellant charged
That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay Santiago, municipality of Lubao, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of violence, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge [of] his 13
year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latters will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
When the information was read to him in the local dialect (Pampango) during his arraignment on September 30, 1997, accused-
appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,[3] whereupon trial was held.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Erlanie Rivera, her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and Dr. Demetria Barin,
who conducted the physical examination of complainant.
Complainant Erlanie Rivera testified that sometime in March 1997, her younger sister, Zaira, [4] was taken by their parents to the
Escolastica Romero Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga. Complainants mother stayed with her sister in the hospital, but her father,
herein accused-appellant, went back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11 oclock in the evening of the same day,
complainant was awakened as accused-appellant started kissing her and fondling her breasts. Complainant tried to resist by kicking
and pushing accused-appellant, but her efforts were to no avail. Accused-appellant removed her shorts and panty, touched her private
parts, and then had sexual intercourse with her. After he was through with her, accused-appellant told complainant not to tell anyone
what had happened or he would kill complainants mother and sister. Hence, when her mother came home the following day, Erlanie
did not tell her what had happened because she was afraid of accused-appellant.
On April 9, 1997, however, Erlanie, in the presence of her mother, told her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her grandmother,
Maxima Payumo, that she had been raped by accused-appellant. For this reason, she was referred to Dr. Barin for physical
examination. She also executed a sworn statement before the police of Lubao, Pampanga. [5]
Erlanie testified that she became pregnant as a result of the rape committed against her by accused-appellant, but the pregnancy
was aborted.[6] On cross-examination, she said she was 13 years old at the time of her testimony, the second child in the family. She
said that her parents were not on good terms with each other and that she knew that her father had a mistress. Atty. Mangalindan, then
defense counsel, questioned Erlanie about other supposed acts of molestation committed by accused-appellant against her previous to
the rape subject of the present case, but, upon objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the question on the ground that it
concerned matters not covered by her direct examination. [7]
Erlanie testified that her mother, grandmother, aunt, and a certain Nora Baluyut were present when she made her sworn
statement before the police. She said that her father raped her only once, sometime in March 1997. She could not remember the exact
date when she was raped by accused-appellant, but she did remember that the same took place in March as her sister, Zaira, was
hospitalized at the time. When the rape occurred, her younger brother and sister were in their house asleep. She did not tell her mother
after the latter had returned home that she had been raped by accused-appellant because she was afraid of her father who had
threatened her. After the rape, accused-appellant would only come home on Sundays.[8]
Questioned further on cross-examination, Erlanie said that she gave her sworn statement before the police and that her answers
to questions asked during her direct examination were freely given without coaching by anyone. She could understand Tagalog, the
language used in her sworn statement. She told the court that she struggled against accused-appellant, kicking and pushing him, but
she was overpowered by her father. At that time, Erlanies younger sister, Corazon, was lying beside her, but Erlanie did not shout even
when her father succeeded in penetrating her. Erlanie could not remember how long the sexual act took place, but she felt something
like urine come out of her fathers penis after he was finished with her.Erlanie testified that she was 12 years old when she was raped
by her father.[9]
On re-direct examination, when asked about the discrepancy between her testimony that her mother returned home only the day
after the rape and her statement in her affidavit that accused-appellant slept beside her mother after the rape, Erlanie replied that she
made a mistake as the incident narrated in her affidavit referred to a different occasion when no rape was committed against her by
accused-appellant.[10]
The next witness for the prosecution was Marietta Pagtalunan, complainants aunt and the sister of complainants mother,
Evangeline. Marietta corroborated Erlanies testimony that the latter told her sometime in April 1997 that she had been raped by
accused-appellant. Marietta said she took complainant to Dr. Barin, who examined complainant. [11]
Dr. Demetria Barin was Chief Physician of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital. Her findings are as follows:
P.E. FINDINGS:
- No signs of external Physical Injuries
I.E. FINDINGS:
HYMEN - healed laceration at 3:00 oclock
VAGINA - Admits one finger with ease two fingers with difficulty
UTERUS - not enlarged
LMP - March 3, 1997
Pregnancy Test (+)[12]
Dr. Barin testified that on April 10, 1997, she examined complainant Erlanie Rivera and found that the victim had an injury in the
hymen at the 3 oclock position which could possibly have been caused by the insertion of a hard object, such as a male organ. Dr.
Barin testified that complainant Erlanie went back to see her on May 2, 1997 because she suffered from vaginal bleeding indicative of a
threatened abortion. She said that she found that complainant was then pregnant. Upon examination of the patient at that time, Dr.
Barin found that abortion had not yet taken place and prescribed medicines for the complainant. Erlanie was subjected to another
pregnancy test on May 13, 1997, but the result was negative. Dr. Barin stated that the vaginal bleeding suffered by complainant could
have caused the abortion of the fetus.[13]
Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence. Accused-appellant, his sister, Concepcion Sayo, and Natividad Pinlac, Records
Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital, were presented as witnesses.
Accused-appellant denied that he raped Erlanie Rivera. He alleged that the rape charge was filed against him because his wife,
Evangeline, had a paramour and resented him because he hurt her. He explained that he saw his wife talking with another man in their
house and beat her up on April 1, 1997 because he heard that she had a lover. He also said that his wife was angry with him because
he had a mistress who stayed in their house for three weeks. He further stated that his wifes relatives were likewise angry with him
because he caused the lot owned by his father-in-law in Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga to be registered in his name. He said that he was
compelled to sign a waiver of his rights over the land owned by his parents-in-law.[14] The defense presented a letter to accused-
appellant written by his wife, who was asking him to sign a document so that she could attend to it before he got out of prison. [15]
The defense also offered as evidence a document, designated as Waiver of Rights, [16]signed by accused-appellant, in which he
acknowledged that he was a tenant of a parcel of land and that he waived and voluntarily surrendered his right over the said
landholding to the SMPCI, recommending that a certain Ponciano Miguel be given the land to work on the same. The document was
identified by accused-appellant in open court. He said that Ponciano Miguel was a first cousin of his wife and that he signed the
document because his wifes relatives promised him that he would get out of prison after signing the document. [17]
Another witness for the defense was Concepcion Sayo, accused-appellants sister, who testified that in March 1997, accused-
appellant lived with her family in Malawak, Bustos, Bulacan, to help her husband operate a fishpond. She said that accused-appellant
stayed in their house during the entire month of March, except in March 19, 1997 when he stayed with their sister, Perla, in Tibagan,
Bustos, Bulacan.[18]
The last defense witness was Natividad Pinlac, Records Officer of the Escolastica Romero District Hospital, who identified [19] a
certification, dated April 29, 1999, in which it was stated that Zaira Rivera was confined at that hospital from March 1 to March 2,
1997.[20]
On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, the court finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged. For having violated
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, with the attendant circumstances that the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is the father of the victim and absent any circumstance that could mitigate the commission
thereof, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection.
In line with established jurisprudence, said accused is also ordered to indemnify the offended party Erlanie Rivera in the sum
of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[21]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:

1. The lower court failed to observe the constitutional right of the Accused-Appellant to due process and right to counsel;
2. The lower court failed to consider the evidence of the Accused-Appellant.[22]
I. Accused-appellant invokes his right to due process of law. He claims that he was denied the same because: (a) the trial judge
disallowed his lawyer from cross-examining Erlanie Rivera concerning the latters sworn statements on the ground of irrelevance and
immateriality; (b) the trial court denied the motion made by accused-appellants counsel de oficio to postpone the cross-examination of
Dr. Barin, the examining physician, because of which the said counsel consequently waived the cross-examination of Dr. Barin; (c) the
judge propounded numerous questions to accused-appellant during his cross-examination by the prosecutor; and (d) the trial courts
decision was promulgated just one day after accused-appellant submitted his memorandum.
Procedural due process simply means that a person must be heard before he is condemned. The due process requirement is a
part of a persons basic rights, not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. [23] Considering both the
evidence and the law applicable to this case, we hold that accused-appellant has been accorded his right to due process.
A. One basis for accused-appellants contention that he was denied due process is the refusal of the trial judge to allow Atty.
Mangalindans questions concerning the other alleged acts of molestation committed by accused-appellant against
complainant. Accused-appellant argues that no legal ground exists for the trial courts ruling.
The transcript of stenographic notes concerning this incident shows the following:
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q You mentioned in your testimony that you were molested by your father since 1996.
COURT:
Are you referring to a chain of events because police station you are referring is something there are two places this girl testified
that she was raped, you referred to us Acts of Lasciviousness and she did not testified about that, that is another case with
another Court, we are only trying here a rape case that is only they you never mention. Only on the matters that she testified
(sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
But this is also related to the rape case your Honor because I will confront it with another form of a question.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Q Prior to this incident, were you molested by your father?
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
Immaterial, your Honor, whatever acts w[ere] done by the accused is not a subject of the case at bar.
COURT:
Let us confine [questioning] to the complaint at bar which is a rape case.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
This is related to the incident because we are here your Honor to prove, we are trying to discredit her testimony. We will just direct
our question touching on the direct examination.
COURT:
Only on the matters that she only testified that is only thing you can cross-examine. Only matters testified which is only a rape case
let us not dwell the Court knows there are other cases Acts of Lasciviousness pending in the lower Court at the proper Court
otherwise if I will allow you to ask questions on other matters specially I know you are pinpointing the Acts of Lasciviousness
you are prolonging this case here (sic).
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
I am trying to discredit the witness as one where the credibility as witness here your Honor is very important. I stated before our
main cross-examination is the accused is not a plan in such case, although I do sympathize (sic). We would like to propound
question that will discredit her as witness and a complainant not with her testimony alone. Our center of cross-examination is
to discredit her as complaining witness that is why our question may not be limited to be accepted under the rule of cross-
examination your Honor the cross-examination your Honor the cross-examiner is not limited on the direct-testimony of the
witness but he can propound questions which may petition or destroy the credibility of the witness that is our view point (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
We cannot dispute the right of accused to discredit or to adopt our credibility of our witness, but it should be done in the proper way,
not to ask immaterial questions which are not related.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
The rule for cross-examination insofar as to destroy the credibility of the witness is not only limited to what the Honorable Fiscal we
came approach of so many cross-examinations goes allow your Honor under the rules of Court insofar as this case is related
to the present case we are trying, this is very related because even the witness I have transcript in my hand, testified not only
the rape case your Honor she had testified by direct-examination the preparatory acts before the testimony of rape that she
was been molested early, finger of the father, this were testified through by the witness, it is here direct-testimony it is not
limited (sic).
PROSECUTOR SANTOS:
Prior to this incident were you molested by your father, obviously your Honor the question is not relevant.
ATTY. MANGALINDAN:
Your Honor please Im very disagreeable (sic), I have not with me the transcript but I have read that you [can] ask questions
concerning the rape case.
COURT:
A question referring to events prior to the complaint at bar. [24]
The trial court later issued an order, dated December 9, 1997, the pertinent parts of which provided:
After private complainant testified on direct-examination, counsel for accused attempted to cross-examine her on matters relevant to
the complaint for Acts of Lasciviousness which was objected to by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Arturo G. Santos on the ground that
private complainant did not testify on that matter but limited her testimony on the rape case only.Counsel for the accused argued that
although that is correct nonetheless because [of] the sworn statement executed by private complainant identified by said witness in her
direct examination and marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution, he is at liberty to cross-examine the witness on all matters stated in her
sworn statement including that portion touching on the acts of lasciviousness subject matter of another case before another court.
The Court sustained the objection. Section 6, Rule 132, Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to
test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the
issue.
The witness testified only on the rape case. She did not testify anything about acts of lasciviousness committed upon her person. She
may not therefore be questioned on this matter because it is not connected with her direct testimony or has any bearing upon the
issue.To allow adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the acts of lasciviousness which is pending trial in another court and
which the witness did not testify is improper.
Questions concerning acts of lasciviousness will not in any way test the accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias or
the reverse. On the contrary such questions, if allowed, will unduly burden the court with immaterial testimonies. [25]
In another order, dated January 13, 1998, the trial court gave accused-appellants counsel 20 days within which to elevate its
ruling to the appellate court.[26] The records reveal, however, that no such petition was filed by Atty. Mangalindan as regards this
particular matter.
The question, therefore, is whether the trial court correctly disallowed accused-appellants counsel from questioning complainant
as regards the other supposed acts of lasciviousness contained in her sworn statement. On this point, Rule 132, 6 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence provides:
Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in
the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom
from interest, bias or the reverse and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused
shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states
that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.[27] The
cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which
rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which
create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the
witnesses against him.[28]
The right of the accused to cross-examine a witness is, however, not without limits but is subject to the rules on the admissibility
and relevance of evidence. Thus, in People v. Zheng Bai Hui,[29] this Court upheld the ruling of the trial judge disallowing the questions
propounded by the accuseds counsel on the ability of the arresting officer to distinguish between tawas and shabu without a laboratory
examination, the academic degree of his training instructor, and the officers authorship of books on drug identity and analysis for being
irrelevant, improper, and impertinent.
In this case, accused-appellants counsel argued that his questions to Erlanie on the other acts of lasciviousness supposedly
committed by accused-appellant against her were for the purpose of testing her credibility. There was, however, no showing on his part
how these questions had any bearing on complainants credibility or on the truth of her claims. One is led to suspect that the purpose of
these questions was to confuse complainant into committing mistakes in her answers during cross-examination that accused-
appellants counsel could later use to possibly put complainants credibility, not to mention her character, in question.
Accused-appellant insists that his counsel should have been allowed to ask questions in relation to the sworn statement executed
by complainant. He cites Rule 132, 17 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which provides that:
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject matter
may be inquired into by the other.
Neither can this rule be invoked to justify the questioning of complainant which the trial court did not allow. As the above provision
states, this rule applies to parts of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record which is given in evidence.
Indeed, the records show that after Erlanie had finished with her direct examination on November 25, 1997, the trial judge granted
the motion made by Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, accused-appellants private counsel, to postpone Erlanie Riveras cross-examination to
allow him time to secure copies of the transcript of stenographic notes of Erlanies testimony and thus enable him to fully question
complainant.[30] Erlanie was first cross-examined on December 2, 1997, but several postponements, namely, on January 13,
1998,[31] February 10, 1998,[32] March 12, 1998,[33] March 31, 1998,[34] April 7, 1998,[35] May 12, 1998,[36] May 26, 1998,[37] May 28,
1998,[38] and June 11, 1998,[39] on Erlanies cross-examination took place because of the failure of Atty. Mangalindan to appear on the
said trial dates. Erlanies cross-examination was continued on July 14, 1998 and July 23, 1998. Her cross-examination by accused-
appellants counsel was thorough and covered various subjects, such as the nature of the relationship between her parents, who were
present during the execution of her sworn statement, whether the same had been executed by her voluntarily, the date when she was
raped by accused-appellant the reason for her delay in reporting the rape committed by accused-appellant, her understanding of
Tagalog, who were with her in the house at the time of the rape, the details surrounding the rape committed against her, and her age. It
is evident that accused-appellant and his counsel were given ample opportunity to conduct the cross-examination of Erlanie Rivera in
order to test her truthfulness.
B. The record shows that because accused-appellants private counsel was not present when Dr. Barin testified, Atty. Eddie Bansil
was appointed by the trial court as accused-appellants counsel de oficio for that particular hearing. Atty. Bansil moved for the
postponement of the witness cross-examination, but the trial court denied his request because, on the one hand, accused-appellant
was a detention prisoner and Dr. Barin was a very busy person, while, on the other hand, Atty. Bansil had heard the testimony of the
said witness.Atty. Bansil then decided not to cross-examine Dr. Barin.[40]
Accused-appellant now contends that the trial judge denied the motion of Atty. Bansil for postponement because he was biased
against him. Accused-appellant claims that the counsel de oficio was not familiar with the facts of his case and was thus in no position
to cross-examine Dr. Barin.
While the Constitution recognizes the accuseds right to competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his option to
secure the services of a private counsel is not absolute. For considering the States and the offended partys right to speedy and
adequate justice, the court may restrict the accuseds option to retain a private counsel if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot
afford, or if the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid reason.[41]
The trial court appointed Atty. Bansil a counsel de oficio to represent accused-appellant on October 6, 1998 because his regular
counsel, Atty. Anselmo Mangalindan, was absent without any explanation. Atty. Mangalindan had previously been granted several
postponements. As this Court ruled in another case:
. . . Courts are not required to wait indefinitely the pleasure and convenience of the accused as they are also mandated to promote the
speedy and orderly administration of justice. Nor should they countenance such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public policy
requires that the trial continue as scheduled, considering that appellant was adequately represented by counsels who were not shown
to be negligent, incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him. [42]
Atty. Bansil was present and heard the testimony of Dr. Barin, the prosecution witness, on that day. Dr. Barins testimony on direct
examination was simple, containing primarily a discussion of her findings on the hymenal laceration sustained by complainant. Her
testimony did not require considerable study and extraordinary preparation on the part of defense counsel for the purpose of cross-
examination. It seems Atty. Bansil no longer found it necessary to cross-examine Dr. Barin.
Moreover, beyond stating that Dr. Barin was a vital witness, accused-appellant has not indicated what questions his counsel
wanted to ask from Dr. Barin. It may well be that these questions do not exist at all and that the importance given by accused-appellant
to counsel de oficios failure to cross-examine the witness is exaggerated. Indeed, a medical examination of the victim, together with the
medical certificate, is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element of rape. [43] The primordial issue in this case remains to
be whether the complainants testimony, not Dr. Barins, established beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape.
C. Accused-appellant likewise points to the trial judges questions propounded to him during his cross-examination as an
indication of the latters partiality for the prosecution.
We find no merit in this contention. Where the trial court is judge both of the law and of the facts, it is oftentimes necessary in the
due and faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge to re-examine a witness so that his judgment, when rendered, may rest
upon a full and clear understanding of the facts. [44] Our reading of the transcript of stenographic notes in this case shows that the trial
judge merely wanted to clarify certain points relating to the defense of accused-appellant and not to establish his guilt. It is a judges
prerogative to ask questions to ferret out the truth.[45] It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveals certain truths
which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.[46] As this Court held:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at
the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or
that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions
to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of
both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a
result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the outcome. In the
exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability
or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though
that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. . . [47]
D. We also find no merit in accused-appellants argument that he was denied due process considering the speed with which the
trial court rendered judgment against him, which judgment was promulgated one day after he filed his memorandum.
The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on which it is based. It discusses in full the
courts findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. What
we said in the analogous case of People v. Mercado[48] applies to this case:
. . . A review of the trial courts decision shows that its findings were based on the records of this case and the transcripts of
stenographic notes during the trial. The speed with which the trial court disposed of the case cannot thus be attributed to the injudicious
performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a
mark of diligence and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his decision has
arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants memorandum and the promulgation of the decision was sufficient
time to consider their arguments and to incorporate these in the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly
administration of justice in favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision
with due dispatch. . .
II. Coming now to the merits of this case, we find that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-
appellant. In reviewing rape cases, we have been guided by the following principles: (a) An accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult
to prove, and even more difficult to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [49]
A. Well-settled is the rule that the lone testimony of a rape victim, by itself, is sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found
to be credible. It has likewise been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped she says in effect all that is
necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility the accused can be convicted on
the basis thereof. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of
the accused is the complainants testimony. [50]
Considering complainants tender age, her shy demeanor, and manner of testifying in court, the trial court found Erlanies
testimony to be straightforward, natural, and convincing and accorded the same full faith and credit. [51]
Complainant told the court how she was awakened because accused-appellant kissed her and fondled her breasts. She narrated
that she tried to resist accused-appellants advances by pushing and kicking him, but the latter succeeded in ravishing her. She told of
how her father threatened to kill her mother and her siblings if she reported the incident. Despite the lengthy cross-examination of
accused-appellants counsel, she remained firm and steadfast in her story of how she was raped by her father. Her narration not only
rings true and sincere but is consistent and unshaken on its material points. Complainants testimony is fully corroborated by the
medical findings of Dr. Barin who examined complainant shortly after she had been raped. She found complainant to have suffered a
hymenal laceration at the 3 oclock position which could have been caused by the penetration of a hard object, such as a male organ.
Complainants failure to remember the date of the commission of the rape cannot be taken against her. The exact date when
complainant was sexually abused is not an essential element of the crime of rape. [52] Nor does the fact that complainant was sleeping
beside her sister when the rape occurred detract from her credibility. The possibility of rape is not negated by the fact that the presence
of even the whole family of the accused inside the same room produced the possibility of discovery. For rape to be committed, it is not
necessary for the place to be ideal, for rapists respect neither time nor place for carrying out their evil designs. [53]
In sum, accused-appellant failed to show any reason why this Court should disbelieve complainants testimony. Indeed, the gravity
of filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It is against human
experience for a girl to fabricate a story which would drag herself and her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless it is the truth. More so
when her charge could mean the execution of her own father, as in this case.[54]
Accused-appellants counsel on cross-examination made much of the discrepancy between complainants sworn statement where
she stated that accused-appellant slept beside her mother after the rape[55] and her testimony that her mother returned home from the
hospital only the day after the rape took place.[56] It must be pointed out, however, that discrepancies between a witness affidavit and
his testimony in open court does not necessarily impair his credibility. Affidavits, which are taken ex parte, are often incomplete or
inaccurate for lack of or absence of searching inquiries by the investigating officer. [57]
Moreover, whether accused-appellant slept alone or with complainants mother after committing the rape of complainant is of no
moment as it is a minor point that does not reflect on the commission of the crime itself. The rule is that discrepancies and
inconsistencies on minor matters neither impair the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness
honesty. Such inconsistencies may in fact strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the witness as they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.[58]
Accused-appellant contends that complainant could not have been raped on March 1 or 2, 1997, the dates when her sister Zaira
was hospitalized, because she had her last menstrual period on March 3, 1998 and thus she could not have gotten pregnant as a result
of the rape.He argues that a woman who had her monthly period cannot be impregnated as a result ofsexual intercourse five days
before or five days after her last menstruation. [59]
Accused-appellant does not, however, cite any legal or medical authority for his thesis, except what he claims to be common
knowledge. On the other hand, we have previously held that it is hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization inasmuch as more than
two weeks is considered to be the life span of the spermatozoa in the vaginal canal.[60] Hence, even granting that complainant could not
have been impregnated by accused-appellant during the period alleged by him, it remains possible for complainant to have gotten
pregnant afterwards. More importantly, it must be emphasized that pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape and is, therefore,
totally immaterial to the question of accused-appellants guilt.[61] In other words, accused-appellant being the cause of complainants
pregnancy is a non-issue in the prosecution of the crime of rape. What should not be lost sight of is the fact that complainants
testimony constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her without her consent, and
such fully established the crime of rape.
B. Accused-appellant imputes ill motive on the part of complainants mother and her relatives for bringing charges against him. He
claims that complainants mother resented the fact that he used to beat her up out of jealousy and that he had several paramours in the
past.He further asserts that his wifes relatives were angry with him because of the land which he caused to be registered in his name to
the prejudice of the latter.
This allegation is without merit. Accused-appellant makes it appear that complainants mother was responsible for the filing of this
case against him. This is not so. For that matter, his wife did not testify against him. It was his daughter, complainant, alone who
denounced him in court.
Accused-appellants claim that the motivation for the filing of this case was the animosity of his wifes relatives towards him caused
by his land-grabbing of their land is likewise without any basis. It may be that his wifes relatives took advantage of his incarceration and
made him sign his waiver of rights over the land. [62] But this does not necessarily mean they conspired to persecute him. It is
noteworthy that accused-appellant never claimed that the document which he signed (Exh. 3) existed before the filing of the criminal
complaint against him or that his wifes relatives fabricated the charge against him because of his failure to sign the same.
Indeed, what accused-appellants defense cannot explain is the hymenal laceration sustained by complainant or the steadfastness
she has exhibited in pursuing the charge against her own father. It is doubtful that complainant would let herself be embroiled in a petty
family dispute in exchange for her honor and dignity. We cannot believe that a young girl, like complainant, would invent a sordid tale of
sexual abuse by accused-appellant unless it was the truth.[63] Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive
why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, her testimony is trustworthy.[64]
Accused-appellant also raises the defense of denial and alibi. But the bare denial of accused-appellant cannot overcome the
positive declarations of complainant. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, constitutes negative self-serving
evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters.[65]
Accused-appellants sister, Concepcion Sayo, testified that accused-appellant lived with her family in Bulacan at the time of the
rape. No other witness not related to accused-appellant, however, was called to corroborate her claim. We have already held that the
defense of alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons. It is not
improbable that these witnesses would freely perjure themselves for the sake of their loved ones. [66] Accused-appellants defense thus
fails to convince this Court.
C. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we think that the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court is erroneous. It is
settled that to justify the imposition of the death penalty, both the relationship of the victim and her age must be alleged and
proved.[67] Thus, in People v. Javier,[68] where the victim was alleged to be 16 years old at the time of the commission of the rapes, it
was held:
. . . Although the victims age was not contested by the defense, proof of age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case
considering that the victims age which was then 16 years old is just two years less than the majority age of 18. In this age of
modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year old girl and an 18-year old one insofar as physical features and attributes
are concerned. A physically developed 16-year old lass may be mistaken for an 18-year old young woman, in the same manner that a
frail and young-looking 18-year old lady may pass as a 16-year old minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent proof of the actual
age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to
fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Republic Act No. 7659. In a criminal prosecution especially of cases involving the
extreme penalty of death, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every factnecessary to constitute the crime with which an
accused is charged must be established by the prosecution in order for said penalty to be upheld.
A duly certified certificate of live birth showing complainants age, or some other official document on record, such as a school
record, has been recognized as competent evidence.[69]
In this case, although complainants minority has been alleged in the information, no independent evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove the same. Complainant did not even state her age at the time of the rape during direct examination; it was only
during her cross-examination when she stated that she was 12 years old at the time she was raped by her father. [70]
Nor was her birth certificate or baptismal certificate or any school record presented by the prosecution to prove the age of Erlanie
at the time of the rape. Not even her mother, whose testimony could have been sufficient to prove the age of complainant, [71] testified in
this case. What was relied upon by the trial court was that fact that the age of the victim was undisputed by the defense. [72] It also took
judicial notice of the victims minority on account of her appearance.[73]
We do not agree with this conclusion. The trial court can only take judicial notice of the victims minority when the latter is, for
example, 10 years old or below. Otherwise, the prosecution has the burden of proving the victims age at the time of the rape and the
absence of denial on the part of accused-appellant does not excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. [74] In a similar
case, People v. Tundag,[75] in which the trial court took judicial notice of the minority of the victim who was alleged to be 13 years
old, we ruled:
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts
can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or
in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for
the purpose.
The prosecution having failed to present evidence as to complainants age, accused-appellant can be convicted only of simple
rape, for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Consequently, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 made by the trial court cannot be sustained. Such amount
can only be awarded if the crime of rape was effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the applicable amendatory laws.[76] Accordingly, the civil indemnity awarded to complainant must be reduced
to P50,000.00 in consonance with current rulings.[77]
The award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to complainant is correct.Moral damages is awarded in rape cases
without need of showing that the victim suffered from mental, physical, and psychological trauma as these are too obvious to require
recital by the victim during trial.[78]
In addition to the damages given by the trial court, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should likewise be awarded
in favor of complainant. Accused-appellant being the father of complainant, such relationship can be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance warranting the award of exemplary damages. In rapes committed by fathers against their daughters, such
award may be imposed to serve as a deterrent to other parents similarly disposed to commit the same crime.[79]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Guagua, Pampanga, finding accused-appellant guilty of the
crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to
pay complainant Erlanie Rivera the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, G.R. No. 184800

VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO PERECHE,
SR., Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
149, and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Promulgated:
Respondents. May 5, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (public respondent) Order[1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the Amended
Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008 denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (in
particular, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), [4] a
criminal complaint,[5] before the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano, Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio,
Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter Suchianco, who
are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI (collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of
the website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) a wholly owned
subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) who had
previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after
PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPIs refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum
by which the planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under
the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a blogspot[6] under the website
address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e-group[7] atno2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easily
accessible to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to October
2, 2005, he was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the accused]
containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly,
Malayan.[8] He cited an article which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng
negotiation because it was done prematurely since we had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is
that Yuchengcos benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat pagtiwalaan
ang mga Yuchengcos.
LETS MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT, BSP AND AMLC AND
WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso, RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances
and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin
sa lahat ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga nanonood
lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only after knowing that there was a
negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD
SUCCESSFULLY LULL USAND THE NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x [9](emphasis in the
original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,[10] the Makati City Prosecutors Office, finding probable cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen
(13) separate Informations[11] charging them with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents
Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another together
with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of
attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co.
Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose
exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the
complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and
injurious and defamatory article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong
pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted in www.pepcoalition.com is

attached as Annex F of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above defamatory article are known to
the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-cited website and that the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in question was posted and
published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the complainant before the public.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutors Resolution by a petition for review to the Secretary of Justice
who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007,[13] reversed the finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the
Informations for libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of internet libel was non-existent, hence, the accused
could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC. [14]
Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public respondent, a Motion to Quash [16] the
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in
the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally
defective for failure to designate the offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial
courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the
alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause existed, quashed the Information,
citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in
Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in
Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information, [20]insisting that the Information sufficiently conferred
jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III v. Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that
the libelous publication was printed and first published in the appropriate venue. And it pointed out that Malayan has an office
in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover, the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it
merely needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecutions motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia, that since venue is jurisdictional in
criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by
amendment.[22]
By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecutions motion for reconsideration and accordingly
ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue.
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20, 2007, [24] the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents
Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general
circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the
honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco
Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant
to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati City,
an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by the private complainant in
Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information[25] which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction upon the public
respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first published by the accused in Makati; and the
prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found the Amended Information to be
sufficient in form.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied by the public respondent by Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008,
they filed the present petition for Certiorari and Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE

DEFICIENT; and
3. NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CURING
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL.[27]
With the filing of Gimenezs Comment[28] to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of
courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondents admission of
the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts, [29] as a rule, requires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. [30] A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC and those against the latter
should be filed in the Court of Appeals.[31] The rule is not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but
purely legal questions.[32]
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority, by way of exception, in
order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel
under Article 360 of the RPC whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of the
requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of
any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall
be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of
the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that
Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v. Sayo[35] which laid out the rules on venue in
libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate our
earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint
or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party
was a public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible,
the place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That
allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first published
is used as the basis of the venue of the action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two
places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of
the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. In other
words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in Makati becomes pronounced upon an
examination of the rationale for the amendment to Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[36] explained the nature of
these changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for criminal libel, following the
amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions for written defamations
is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was
written, printed or composed. Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct
the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction
where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v.
Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by
laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V.
Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan
(Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil. 933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue
of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing
the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965,
pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the
venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The
disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or
possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue
in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or
serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the
internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating
his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that
the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that
would ensue in situations where the websites author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel
anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as amended, are unduly oppressive, the
Courts pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule providing that a
private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of printing and first publication, or at the
complainants place of residence. We would also have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule
in Agbayani, such as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a radical
action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are hardly onerous, especially as
they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in
which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter
was printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended
Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and the Joint Resolution of August 12,
2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
ANGELITO P. MAGNO, G.R. No. 171542

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ
MAE GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO
CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, Promulgated:
DONATO ENABE and ALFIE
FERNANDEZ,
Respondents. April 6, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the reversal of the Amended Decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 2005[2] in People of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, Presiding Judge,
RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et al. (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its Resolution dated February 6, 2006[3]denying
respondents motion for reconsideration.[4] The assailed rulings denied the petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and upheld the ruling[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. DU-10123.[6]
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder against
several accused, including Magno, who were public officers working under the National Bureau of Investigation. [7]
During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there
as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman. [8] The oral objection was reduced to
writing on July 21, 2003 when Magno filed an opposition[9] before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing the provisions of
Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.[10]
The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment, [11] while the accused submitted their joint opposition. [12] The respondents likewise
submitted their comments to the opposition of the other co-accused.[13]
On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that the Ombudsman is proper, legal and authorized entity to prosecute this
case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those authorized under R.A. 6770. [14]
In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the Order, which the RTC later denied in its October 1,
2003 Order.[15]
Proceedings before the CA
On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy, filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA.[16] They contended that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting the appearance of
Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the private offended parties, as the Rules of Court expressly provides that a private offended party may
intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of offenses. [17]
Magno, in his comment[18] filed on December 15, 2003, insisted that what he questioned before the RTC was the appearance and
authority of the private prosecutor to prosecute the case in behalf of the Ombudsman. [19] He stressed that while the Office of the
Ombudsman can designate prosecutors to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing or
authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals, state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not extend to
private practitioners/private prosecutors.[20] He further stressed that while the Order of the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman
is the proper legal and authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect the right to intervene personally, as the Office of the
Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private respondents in prosecuting the civil aspect of the case. [21]
On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in the case, but
only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is concerned.[22]
The respondents moved for the reconsideration[23] of the CA decision. On September 26, 2005, the CA amended its decision, [24] ruling
that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to intervene in the prosecution of the offense
charged in collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case. [25]
Failing to obtain a reconsideration[26] of the amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to this Court through the
present petition for review on certiorari[27] filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the power to hear and decide that
question is with the Sandiganbayan.[28] To support this contention, Magno invokes Engr. Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I.
Mapayo, etc., et al.[29] where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions for certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.[30]
Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the private prosecutor cannot be allowed to intervene
for the respondents as it would violate Section 31 of RA No. 6770. [31] Section 31 limits the Ombudsmans prerogative to designate
prosecutors to fiscals, state prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman to deputize
private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman. [32]
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, submitted its memorandum on February 8,
2008. Substantively, the Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.
The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. [33] Section 31
merely allows the Ombudsman to designate and deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution in certain cases. [34] The Ombudsman opines that the two
provisions of law are not diametrically opposed nor in conflict, [35] as a private prosecutor may appear for the private offended
complainants in the prosecution of an offense independent of the exclusive right of the Ombudsman to deputize. [36] The Ombudsman,
however, did not address the contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTCs
decision not to allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the
Ombudsman
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from
the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had theretofore been filed
separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise
the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by RTCs in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.
We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.[37] In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, claiming that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion for not dismissing the information for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The CA
refused to take cognizance of the case, holding that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
petition.Recognizing the amendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975,[38] we sustained the CAs position since Section 4 of PD
No. 1606 has expanded the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to include petitions for mandamus, prohibition,certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. [39]
In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by Magno. While it is true that the
interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have filed
the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public
officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation. [40]
The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, we overrule the September 26,
2005 Amended Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of Magnos motions for reconsideration.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and

the CAs judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by law, [41] and any judgment, order or
resolution issued without it is void[42] and cannot be given any effect.[43] This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for
the first time on appeal or even after final judgment. [44]
We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al., [45] as follows:
Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties action or conduct. Estoppel
generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v.
NLRC, we declared that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be
interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment.Such is understandable, as this kind
of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or
conveniently set aside.
We note that Magno had already raised in his supplemental motion for reconsideration before the CA [46] the ground of lack of
jurisdiction before the CAs Decision became final. The CA did not even consider this submission, choosing instead to brush it aside for
its alleged failure to raise new or substantial grounds for reconsideration. [47] Clearly, however, its lack of jurisdiction is a new and
substantial argument that the CA should have passed upon.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to

cure the jurisdictional defect of its petition before the CA
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case

since Magno raised the issue of jurisdiction before the CAs decision became final. Further, even if the issue had been raised only on
appeal to this Court, the CAs lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured. In Machado,[48] citing People of the Philippines v. Rosalina
Casiano,[49] we held:
In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether
the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon
the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by
estoppel. However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioners petition for review on certiorari, and DECLARE the Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79809, promulgated on September 26, 2005, as well as its Resolution of February 6, 2006, NULL AND
VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. The respondents are hereby given fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision
within which to seek recourse from the Sandiganbayan. No costs. SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117970. July 28, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ULYSSES M. CAWALING, ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, RICARDO DE LOS
SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the victim, he bears the burden of establishing the presence of any
circumstance like self-defense, performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double jeopardy, which may relieve him of responsibility,
or which may mitigate his criminal liability. [1] If he fails to discharge this burden, his conviction becomes inevitable. In this Decision, we
also reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over informations for murder
committed by public officers, including a town mayor; (2) the assessment of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies deserve great respect; (3) the equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming; (4)
alibi cannot be believed in the face of credible testimony identifying the appellants; and (5) conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial
evidence.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision[2] dated October 21, 1994, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in
Criminal Case No. OD-269.Convicted of murder were former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto
Tumbagahan,[3] Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo.
Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an administrative case[4] had been filed before the National
Police Commission, in which Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and
Andres Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan[5] with the killing of his brother Ronie[6] Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, Adjudication Board
No. 14[7]rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and ordered
their dismissal from the service with prejudice. [8] On June 26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution,[9] dismissing the respondents motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Odiongan, Romblon,[10] an Information for murder[11] against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose,
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot RONIE ILISAN, with the use of
firearms, inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death.
Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the assistance of their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and
Juanito Dimaano, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 15, 1988; [12] while Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio
Q. Mayor, entered a plea of not guilty on March 16, 1988. [13]
After due trial,[14] the court a quo[15] rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1994, [16] the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO DELOS
SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER under
the Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties of the law.
The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay Nelson Elisan the sum of P6,000.00 as actual damages and the heirs of the
deceased Ronie Elisan the sums of P116,666.66 by way of lost earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED CANCELLED and all said accused are ORDERED immediately confined in jail.
The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3 empty shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh. G); and the slug of bullet (Exh. H) are
confiscated in favor of the government.
After the judgment has become final, the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this Court, is ordered to deliver and deposit the
foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and H, inclusive, to the Provincial Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly receipted. Thereafter,
the receipt must be attached to the record of the case and shall form part of the record.
The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their favor to its full extent pursuant to Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS who is at large is ORDERED ARCHIVED pending his arrest.[17]
Hence, this appeal.[18]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The trial court gives this summary of the facts as viewed by the prosecution witnesses:
The killing occurred on December 4, 1982 at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at the ricefield of Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon when
the bright moon was already above the sea at an angle of about 45 degrees, or if it was daytime, it was about 9:00 oclock in the
morning (Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, on direct examination, tsn, Jan. 17, 1989, p. 5, and on cross examination, tsn, April 18, 1989, p.
22).
On December 4, 1982, about 8:00 oclock or 8:30 oclock in the evening, Vicente Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the victim,
were drinking tuba at C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon.When they stood up to
go home, Luz Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told them not to go out because the accused were watching them outside about
three (3) meters from the restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them upon their request and they went out and walked towards
home. About a hundred meters from the restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor Cawaling, the four (4) policemen, namely,
Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas, the mayors brother-in-
law, flashlighted them and Diosdado Venus ran going back. The two (2) brothers also ran towards home to the house of their elder
sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo blocked them on the gate of the fence of their
sisters house. Ronie Elisan ran towards the ricefield. The accused were chasing them.Vicente Elisan saw his brother Ronie f[a]ll down
on the ricefield while he ran towards the bushes and la[y] on the ground. Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling and raising his two (2)
hands. All the six (6) accused approached him with their flashlights and shot him. Ronie fell down about twenty (20) meters from the
bushes where Vicente Elisan hid behind the coconut tree. Co-accused Cawaling said []you left him, he is already dead.[] Mayor
Cawaling was armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both with armalites, Ernesto Tumbagahan
and Ricardo delos Santos were both with .38 caliber and so with civilian Alex Batuigas. They left towards the house of Mayor
Cawaling. After they were gone, Vicente Elisan ran towards the house of his older brother Nelson Elisan. Upon seeing him, Vicente told
Nelson that Ronie was already dead. Nelson said nothing. While they were there, elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, who was
crying came. She said: Manong, patay ron si Ronie. (Brother, Ronie is already dead). Nelson said []do not be noisy; they might come
back and kill all of us.[] Imelda stopped crying.
After a while, brothers Nelson and Vicente Elisan went to the house of barangay captain Aldolfo Tumbagahon. The three (3) went to
the townhall and called the police but there was none there. Going to the house of the Chief of Police Oscar Montero, they were told by
his wife that Commander Montero was in the house of Mayor Cawaling. They proceeded to the place where Ronie Elisan was
shot. The cadaver was brought to the house of Nelson Elisan. Vicente Elisan found an empty shell of a .45 caliber about three (3) arms
length from the body of the victim. They surrendered it to the Napolcom.[19]
Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the gunshot wounds of the victim as follows:
Gunshot Wounds:
1. Shoulder:
Gun shot wound x inch in diameter shoulder right 2 inches from the neck with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound.
2. Right Axilla:
Gun shot wound x inch in diameter, 2 inches below the right nipple with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound.
3. Left Axilla:
Exit of the gun shot wound from the right axilla, measuring x inch with edges everted, one inch below the axilla and one inch below the
level of the nipple.
4. Back:
Gun shot wound measuring x inch, along the vertebral column, right at the level of the 10th ribs with contussion [sic]collar.
5. Leg, Left:
Gun shot wound measuring x anterior aspect upper third leg with contussion [sic] collar, with the exit x posterior aspect upper third leg,
left.[20]
Based on the death certificate (Exhibit E) issued by Dr. Flores, Ronie Ilisan died of severe hemorrhage and gun shot wo[unds].[21]
Version of the Defense
Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page Brief,[22] presented his own narration of the incident as follows:
At around 7:00 in the evening of December 4, 1982, Ulysses Cawaling, then the mayor of the [M]unicipality of San Jose in the
[P]rovince of Romblon, arrived aboard a hired motorized boat from Manila in the seashore of San Jose. From the seashore, he
immediately proceeded to his home. At around 7:30 in the evening, Cawaling went to the municipal hall to check on administrative
matters that piled up in the course of his trip to Manila. He also went inside the police station (located inside the municipal building) to
be apprised of any developments, after which he went out and joined Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo who were standing near the
flagpole in front of the municipal building. The three engaged in a conversation. Cawaling learned that the two police officers were the
ones assigned for patrol/alert for that night. The three of them went inside the INP office and there Cawaling informed the two
policemen that he received information from reliable persons that certain persons were plotting to kill him and a member of the towns
police force. It is to be noted that this occurred at the height of the communist insurgency and political violence in the countryside in the
early 80s. Hence, such information was taken very seriously, having been relayed by sources independent of each other.
Cawaling, as town chief then empowered with supervisory authority over the local police, accompanied Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc.
Cajilo in conducting patrol and surveillance operations around the small municipality. He usually did this as routine since Romblon was
then plagued with political assassinations and armed conflict. On their way to the seashore, they passed by C & J-4 Kitchenette, and
chanced upon Ronnie Ilisan and his brother Vicente Ilisan drinking liquor and discussing in very loud voices. They stopped right in the
front of the restaurant and there they heard Ronnie Ilisan state in a every loud voice that he will kill a person that night. Inside the
restaurant, without the knowledge then of Cawaling and the two police officers, witness Gil Palacio, who was buying cigarettes and Luz
Venus, the cook/server of the restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan, very drunk, brandishing in the air a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver
with a protruding screw.
Initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisans statement as just another hollow swagger of an intoxicated person (salitang lasing), Cawaling and the
two policemen proceeded on their way. After the patrol, they returned to the municipal building and stationed themselves in front. At
around 8:30 in the evening, Ronnie Elisan passed by the municipal hall walking towards the direction of the house of Nelson Ilisan,
another brother, and shouted the challenge, gawas ang maisog, meaning THOSE WHO ARE BRAVE, COME OUT. Cawaling and the
two police officers again brushed aside [the] challenge as just another foolish drunken revelry [o]n the part of Ronnie Ilisan, a well-
known troublemaker in the small municipality.
A few moments later, after Ronie Ilisan had passed by, they distinctly heard a gunshot and hysterical female voices shouting, pulis,
tabang meaning POLICE! HELP! four times. Impelled by the call of duty, Cawaling and the two policemen immediately ran in the
direction of the gunshot and the desperate female voices until they reached the house of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose Street. At this point,
they saw Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38 caliber revolver. They also saw Vicente Ilisan, Francisco Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife of Nelson
and Delma Ilisan, the wife of Vicente, the latter two being the same persons who cried pulis, tabang four times. Cawaling then told
Ronnie to surrender his gun but the latter responded by pointing the gun at Cawaling and pulling the trigger.
At the precise moment that the gun fired, Cawaling warned the two policemen to drop to the ground by shouting dapa. Fortunately,
Cawaling was not hit. Ronnie Ilisan then turned around and ran towards the church. The two policemen gave chase.Cawaling, still
shaken and trembling after the mischance was initially left behind but followed shortly. When Ronnie Ilisan reached the church, he
turned around and again fired at the pursuing Pfc. Cajilo. Fortunately, the gun misfired. When they finally reached the ricefield, Pfc.
Cajilo fired two (2) warning shots in the air for Ronnie to surrender. Ronnie responded by firing once again at Pfc. Tumbagahan but
failed to hit the latter. At that instance, Pfc. Cajilo counter-fired at Ronnie Ilisan hitting him. Pfc. Tumbagahan also fired his weapon in
the heat of exchange and also hit Ronnie Ilisan. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Ronnie Ilisan later on succumbed.
Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in the hand of the dead Ronnie Ilisan and gave it to Pfc. Cajilo. The three, Cawaling, who
subsequently caught up with them after the incident, and the two police officers, then proceeded to the police station located in the
municipal building to formally report the incident in their station blotter. [23]
The Brief for All of the Accused-Appellants filed by Atty. Napoleon U. Galit andthe Brief for Appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and
Hilario Cajilo submitted by Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez merely repeated the facts as narrated by the trial court.
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible, the court a quoconvicted the appellants. The killing was qualified
to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that there was a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number and armed with guns. It further
ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed treachery, as it ratiocinated:
Certain cases, an authority wrote, involving the killing of helpless victim by assailants superior to them in arms or numbers, or victims
who were overpowered before being killed, were decided on the theory that the killing was treacherous, when perhaps the correct
qualifying circumstance would be abuse of superiority. In these cases the attack was not sudden nor unexpected and the element of
surprise was lacking. (Id., I Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the instant case, we earlier ruled that the qualifying treachery should be
considered as an exception to the general rule on treachery because it was not present at the inception of the attack. The killing was
not sudden nor unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking. It is for this reason that we hold that alevosia should be deemed
absorbed or included in abuse of superiority.Even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that it should be the other way around, the situation
will not be of help, penaltywise, to the accused. [24]
The defenses raised by the appellants were dismissed and their witnesses declared unworthy of belief for the following reasons:
1. It was highly improbable that Defense Witness Tesnado would not tell his wife (Dory) and Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapao about the
incident he had allegedly witnessed; more so when Sacapao was the victims first cousin.
2. The spot report prepared by Station Commander Oscar M. Montero, the testimonies of Cajilo and Tumbagahan and the medical
findings of Dr. Flores contradicted one another on the following details: the caliber of the gun used in shooting the victim, the wounds
inflicted and the whereabouts of Cawaling during the shoot-out.
3. Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could have immediately disarmed the victim at the initial encounter. The court could not
understand why the victim was able to fire his gun, run, then stop and again fire his gun, without being caught.
4. The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses prevails over the alibi posed by De los Santos and Fontamillas, a
defense that was not corroborated by any other witness.
5. The .38 caliber revolver, allegedly owned by the victim, was in fact owned and used by Alex Batuigas.
6. The defense presented a photo and a sketch to prove that Imelda Ilisan Tumabagahan had an obstructed view of the killing. The trial
court ruled that such evidence was misleading, because the window, from where said witness allegedly saw the incident, was at the
eastern side of her house, and thus afforded a clear view of the incident, while the window referred to by the defense was at the
southern portion.
7. The questioned testimonies of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan and Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., though not formally offered
as evidence, may be admitted because of the failure of the defense to object thereto at the time they were called to testify.
8. The defense failed to prove that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant.
9. Appellants had a motive to kill the victim. Nelson Ilisan testified that his brother Ronie (the victim) had witnessed Bonifacio
Buenaventura (a former chief commander of the San Jose Police Force) kill a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling, who was
Buenaventuras first cousin, wanted Ronie dead, because the latter had not followed his instruction to leave town to prevent him from
testifying in said case.
Assignment of Errors
The appellants, through their common counsel, Atty. Napoleon Galit, assign the following errors to the lower court:
1. The trial court gravely erred in sustaining prosecutors theory of conspiracy and thus renders nugatory or has totally forgotten that
policemen when in actual call of duty normally operate in group but not necessarily in conspiracy.
2. The trial court gravely erred in believing the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling was one of the
alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the deceased Ronnie Elisan.
3. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense of accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling that he has nothing to do with the
shooting incident except to shout to arrest the accused[,] which prompted his co-accused policemen to chase the accused and sho[o]t
him when he resisted, after he fired at Mayor Cawaling.
4. The trial court gravely erred in not giving weight to accused-appellant policemen[s] testimonies which carry the presumption of
regularity.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting all the accused-appellants by applying the equipoise rule thereby resulting [i]n
reasonable doubts on the guilt.[25]
In their joint brief,[26] Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo cite these other errors:
1. The trial court gravely erred in relying on the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario
Cajilo were alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the victim, Ronie Ilisan.
2. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense that herein accused-appellants merely did a lawful duty when the shooting
incident happened which led to the death of Ronnie Ilisan.
3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellants by applying the equipoise rule, thereby resulting in
reasonable doubt on their guilt.
4. Prescinding from the foregoing, herein accused-appellants do press and hold, that the lower court committed grave, serious
and reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia).
5. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in convicting both accused-appellants of murder, instead merely of
homicide, defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code.
6. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength.
7. The consummated crime being merely homicide, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered to lower
the penalty of homicide.
8. The lower court committed error in not considering double jeopardy.
9. The lower court committed error in not dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.[27]
Appellant Cawaling imputes these additional errors to the court a quo:
1. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellant, Ulysses M. Cawaling, considering that he had no part in the
killing and the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
2. The trial court gravely erred in not finding the shooting incident a result of hot pursuit and shoot-out between the deceased Ronnie
Ilisan and the police officers in the performance of their duty and self-defense, and in sustaining the prosecutions conspiracy theory;
3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting Accused-Appellant Ulysses M. Cawaling considering that there was blatant absence of
due process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial. [28]
This Courts Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so ruling, we will resolve the following issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2)
double jeopardy, (3) credibility of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, (4) self-defense, (5) performance of lawful duty, (6) alibi,
(7) conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise, (9) qualifying circumstances, (10) damages and (11) attending circumstances as they affect the
penalty.
We shall address the first two issues as important preliminary questions and discuss the merits of the remaining ones, which we
have culled from the errors cited by the appellants in their aforementioned briefs.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They insist
that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were public
officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.
We do not agree.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once
the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such
proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the case
at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending
before its enactment.[29]
The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended; [30] and PD 1850, as amended by PD 1952 and BP 129.
Section 4 of PD 1606[31] reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

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(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
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However, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees placing the members of the Integrated National
Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section 1 of PD 1952,[32] amending Section 1 of PD 1850, reads:
SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding -- (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by
the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408,
as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subjects to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of
War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of
War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial
authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as
amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be
exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law:
PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY TIME
BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail
guards.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129, the relevant portion of
which is quoted hereunder:
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. -- Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. [33]
In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur
before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000).[34] Sanchez vs. Demetriou[35] clarified that murder or homicide may be
committed both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said crime, viz.:
The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into
the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other
words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or
public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime.
Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who committed
the crime in relation to their office.The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As
clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al.,[36] [I]n the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case does not
involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the present
case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986]Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is
thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and
employees in relation to their offices.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. [37] In the absence of any allegation that the offense
was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional trial
court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. [38]
Second Issue:
Double Jeopardy
In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right against double jeopardy. They argue that the
first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which was
allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted. [39] We are not persuaded.
There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and, (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first.And the first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.[40]
For a better appreciation of appellants argument, we must consider PD 39 [41] and its implementing rules,[42] which prescribe the
procedure before a military commission. A summary preliminary investigation shall be conducted before trial for the purpose of
determining whether there is prima facie evidence to pursue trial before a military commission. The investigation report shall contain a
summary of the evidence, the acts constituting the offense or offenses committed, and the findings and recommendations of the
investigating officer. Thereafter, the report shall be forwarded to the judge advocate general, who shall determine for either the defense
secretary or for the AFP chief of staff whether the case shall be referred for trial to a military commission. [43] Where a prima facie case
is found against the accused, formal charges shall be signed by a commissioned officer designated by the judge advocate
general.[44] The accused shall then be arraigned, during which the charge and specification shall be read and the accused shall enter
his plea.[45] After hearings, a record of the trial shall be forwarded to the AFP chief of staff for proper action. [46]
In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged,
arraigned and acquitted in a military commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely
offered as evidence certain disposition forms [47] and a letter,[48] dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants
Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed. [49] No charge sheet and record of arraignment and trial
were presented to establish the first jeopardy.
As pointed out by the solicitor general, appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate Generals
Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered. [50]
Third Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses
As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise materially
affect the disposition of the case.[51] This rule, however, does not apply when the judge who penned the decision was not the same one
who had heard the prosecution witnesses testify, [52] as in the present case. Nonetheless, we have carefully perused and considered the
voluminous records of this case, and we find no reason to alter the findings of the court a quo in regard to the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
Vicente Ilisan, the victims brother, narrated before the trial court the circumstances relevant to the crime:
Q. In the evening of December 4, 1982, at about 8:00 or 8:30, where were you?
A. I was inside the restaurant of Andres Fontamillas.
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Q. What were you doing there?
A. I was drinking tuba.
Q. When you were about to finish drinking tuba, what did you do?
A. I stood up preparing to go home.
Q. Were you able to leave that restaurant actually?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Luz Venus told us not to go out when [I] stood up to go home.
Q. Do you know why you were advise[d] not to go out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because we were being watched by Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo and Alex Bat[ui]gas.
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Q. When you were informed by Luz Venus that you should not go out because Mayor Cawaling and the persons you mentioned
were outside watching for you, what did you do?
A. We did not go out.
Q. Since you remained inside, what did you do?
A. I also viewed thru the window.
Q. Did you see them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far were they from the restaurant?
A. About three meters.
Q. What were they doing outside the restaurant?
A. They were also viewing us.
Q. For how long did they remain there viewing you?
A. Just a short time.
Q. And later on, do you know where did they go? [sic]
A. No, sir. I went out from the restaurant and when I went out, I did not see them anymore.
Q. Before you went out of the restaurant, what did you do?
A. Diosdado Venus accompanied us.
Q. Why did you ask Diosdado Venus to accompany you?
A. Yes, sir. Because we were aware that we were being watched from outside so we asked to be accompanied by Diosdado Venus.
Q. From the restaurant accompanied by Diosdado Venus, what did you do?
A. Towards home.
Q. Were you able to reach home?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why, what happened on the way?
A. Diosdado Venus ran going back because we were lighted by a flashlight.
Q. How many flashlight[s] were trimed [sic] to you?
A. Six.
Q. Did you come to know who trimed [sic] the flashlight towards you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who were they?
A. Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo, Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo delos Santos and Alex Batuigas.
Q. How were you able to recognize them when that was night time?
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.
Q. When Diosdado Venus ran back to his restaurant, what did your brother Ronie Elisan and you do?
A. We also ran towards home.
Q. To whose house?
A. That of my older sister Imelda [E]lisan.
Q. Were you able to reach that house?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why, what happened when you ran away?
A. Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were blocking us on the gate of the fence of my sisters house.
Q. Since your way was blocked, where did Ronie Elisan go?
A. We ran towards the ricefield.
Q. When you ran, what did Mayor Cawaling do?
A. They were chasing us.
Q. What about Alex Batuigas, what did he do?
A. He also followed helping chasing us. [sic]
Q. What about the four policemen, what did they do?
A. The same. They were also chasing us.
Q. About how far is that restaurant [from] the spot where you were first lighted by the flashlight of the accused?
A. About one hundred meters.
Q. Now, according to you, you ran towards the ricefield, what happened while you were running towards the ricefield?
A. I saw my brother fell [sic] down.
Q. Fell down where?
A. On the ricefield.
Q. What about you, where were you when your brother fell down in the ricefield?
A. I ran towards the bushes.
Q. What did you do upon reaching the bushes?
A. I la[y] on the ground with my belly touch[ing] on the ground behind the coconut tree.
Q. When your brother according to you had fallen on the ricefield, what did he do thereafter?
A. He rose up, [raised] his hands and surrender[ed] to them.
Q In rising, what was his position?
A. He was rising like this. (Witness demonstrating by kneeling [and] raising his two hands).
Q. While Ronie Elisan was kneeling and raising both of his hands, what happened?
A. Mayor Cawaling approached him together with the four policemen and his brother-in-law and they shot him.
Q. Do you know what weapon[s] were used in shooting your brother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What weapon were used?
A. The weapon of Mayor Cawaling is .45 caliber and that of Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both armalite and that of
Ernesto Tumbagahan, Alex Batuigas and Ricardo delos Santos were .38 caliber.
Q. How were you able to identify their weapons?
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.
Q. Now, what happened to your brother when he was fired upon by the accused in this case?
A. He fell down.
Q. And how far is that spot where your elder brother had fallen down to the spot where Diosdado Venus left you when he returned
to the restaurant?
A. To my estimate it is about 300 meters.
Q. After your brother had fallen down, what did the accused do?
A. Mayor Cawaling said, []you left him, he is already dead.[]
Q. Where did they go?
A. They went towards the house of Mayor Cawaling. [53]
Imelda Tumbagahan was at home feeding her child when she heard her brother Ronie shouting for help. After getting a flashlight
and looking through the window of her house, she saw Cawaling and Alex Batuigas chasing Ronie who was running towards her
house. Tumbagahan and De los Santos prevented Ronie from entering the fence of her house, as a result of which, her brother ran
towards a rice field nearby. There, on bended knees and with hands raised, Ronie was shot by Cawaling and his men. [54]
Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger brother Ronie shouting for help while being chased by the group of Cawaling. As Cajilo and
Fontamillas blocked Ronie from entering the gate of Imeldas house, the victim ran towards a rice field. Nelson stopped Cawaling and
asked, Nong, basi guinalagas ninyo ang acon hali? (Nong, why do you chase my brother?) But the mayor merely continued chasing
Ronie.Thereafter, Nelson saw his brother, on his knees with both hands raised, shot by appellants. [55]
The three aforementioned witnesses narrated in detail the assault against their brother Ronie and positively identified the
appellants as the perpetrators. The trial court cannot be faulted for relying on their testimonies and accepting them as true, [56]especially
when the defense failed, to prove any ill motive on their part. [57] In addition, family members who have witnessed the killing of their
loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants. [58] Thus, the relationship per se of witnesses with the victim does not
necessarily mean that the former are biased. On the contrary, it is precisely such relationship that would impel them to seek justice and
put the real culprit behind bars, rather than impute the offense to the innocent.[59]
Appellant Cawaling submits that the prosecution witnesses tampered with the evidence by cleaning the cadaver before an
autopsy could be done. Such irregular washing of the cadaver by a close relative of the deceased, who is educated and who
presumably knew perfectly well the need to preserve it in its original state for the medico-legal examination[,] is highly suspicious. It
points to the fact that the relatives of the deceased wanted to hide, or erase something that would bolster and assist the defense (that
is, state of drunkenness, powder burns or lack thereof, indicating the firing of a weapon or the proximity of the weapon used on the
deceased, etc.).[60]
Such contention is unavailing. First, Bebelinia Sacapao merely cleaned the cadaver and made no further
examination. Second, appellants had an opportunity to have the body examined again to determine or prove important matters, such
as whether Ronie was drunk, if he fired a gun, how many and what caliber of guns were used in shooting him; they did not, however,
avail themselves of this opportunity. As public officers, appellants knew that it was within their power to request or secure from the
court, or any other competent authority, an order for another autopsy [61] or any such evidence as may affirm their innocence. Third, their
conviction lies in the strong and convincing testimonial evidence of the prosecution, not in the corroborative testimony of Bebelinia
Sacapao.
Relying on the testimonies of Luz Venus and Gil Palacio, Appellant Cawaling also pointed out that [t]he power of observation of
alleged eyewitness Vicente was severely affected by his intoxication. It may be inferred that an intoxicated persons sense[s] of sight
and hearing and of touch are less acute than those of a sober person and that his observation are inexact as to what actually
occurred.[62]
This argument is not persuasive. The evidence presented fails to show that Vicente was so intoxicated that night as to affect his
powers of observation and retrospection. Defense Witness Palacio merely saw the witness drinking tuba on the night of the
killing.[63] Meanwhile the whole testimony of Luz on the matter mainly reveals that Ronie was the person she was referring to as drunk,
as shown by this portion:[64]
Q When Ronie and Vicente both surnamed Ilisan entered the C & J-4 kitchenette what if any did you observe?
A I saw them so dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila lasing na lasing).
Q Who was lasing na lasing or so dr[u]nk?
A Ronie Ilisan sir.
Granting that Vicente was drunk, the conviction of the appellants is still inevitable in view of the positive declarations of Witnesses
Nelson and Imelda, who unequivocally identified appellants as perpetrators of the senseless killing of their brother Ronie.
Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores, [65] Nelson
Ilisan[66]
and Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr.,[67] for failure of the prosecution to offer them as evidence. In People vs. Java,[68] this
Court ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other
party does not object to its presentation.The Court explained: Section 36 of [Rule 132] requires that an objection in the course of the
oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection
to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. In
the present case, a cursory reading of the stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did not raise any objection
when said witnesses testified on the matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined the witnesses, which
shows that they had waived their objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.
Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling questions the motive of Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano Jr. This contention is likewise bereft of
merit. Unlike judges who are mandated to display cold neutrality in hearing cases, [69] prosecutors are not required to divest themselves
of their personal convictions and refrain from exhibiting partiality. In this case, there is reasonable ground for Prosecutor Victoriano to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused was probably guilty thereof. [70] Under the circumstance, it is his sworn
duty to see that justice is served.[71] Thus, [h]e may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - - indeed, he should do so.But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. [72] Further,
Under the prevailing criminal procedure, the fiscals sphere of action is quite extensive, for he has very direct and active intervention in
the trial, assuming as the Governments representative the defense of society, which has been disturbed by the crime, and taking public
action as though he were the injured party, for the purpose of securing the offenders punishment, whenever the crime has been proved
and the guilt of the accused as the undoubted perpetrator thereof established.[73]
Fourth Issue:
Self-Defense
To escape criminal liability, the appellants also invoke the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of
duty.[74] Allegedly, Ronie was firing his gun and shouting Guwa ang maisog! (Come out who is brave!). Then the mayor and the
policemen arrived at the scene to pacify him. Ronie fired at them, which forced them to chase him and return fire.
We find this scenario bereft of plausibility.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non for the successful invocation of self-defense.[75] As
factually found by the trial court, unlawful aggression did not start with the victim, but rather with the appellants. Cawaling and his men
proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and waited for Ronie to come out.When the victim did, they chased and shot him without giving
him any opportunity to defend himself.
Granting arguendo the veracity of the defenses factual version, it is important to note that appellants admitted that Ronie was
running away from them when they chased and shot him. Thus, unlawful aggression -- assuming it was initially present had ceased,
and the appellants no longer had any right to pursue the offender. Basic is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or
risk to life and limb, there should be a corresponding cessation of hostilities on the part of the person defending himself. [76]
Furthermore, the means employed to ward off the attack was unreasonably excessive. Being armed, the appellants could have
easily ordered the victim to surrender. Even the first shot at his shoulder would have been sufficient to immobilize him, yet they fired a
succession of shots at him while he was in no position to put up a defense.
Jurisprudence teaches that when an accused admits having committed the crime but invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, the burden of proof is reversed and shifted to him. He must then prove the elements of self-defense.[77] It necessarily follows
that he must now rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution; for even if the latter
evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. [78] Thus, appellants must establish with clear
and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor.[79] They failed to do so, and
their conviction thus becomes inevitable.[80]
Fifth Issue:
Lawful Performance of Duties
Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted from the lawful performance of their duties as police officers. However, such
justifying circumstance may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in the performance of a
duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such
duty.[81] These two requisites are wanting in this case.
The appellants, except Mayor Cawaling, were men in uniform who happened to be on duty when they killed Ronie. The victim
was not committing any offense at the time. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a
valid performance of a lawful duty by men who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of the people. As aptly
held in People vs. De la Cruz,[82] Performance of duties does not include murder. That Ronie was a troublemaker in their town is not an
excuse; as the Court declared in the same case of People vs. De la Cruz, Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim.
Sixth Issue:
Alibi
We likewise brush aside the defenses of alibi and denial raised by Appellant De los Santos. Prosecution witnesses positively
identified him and Fontamillas as part of the group which chased and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is elementary that alibi and denial are
outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.[83]
In fact, De los Santos failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime during its commission.[84] The evidence he had presented demonstrated only that, at the time, he was
sleeping in his house, which was near the locus criminis.
Alibi is always considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it is easily fabricated and concocted. [85] It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to prove that he was at another place
when the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.[86] This he failed to prove.
Seventh Issue:
Conspiracy
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do
not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner
of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
intent.[87] It does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal
liability.[88] We concur with the trial courts elucidation:
All of the accused chased the victim and his brother; four (4) of whom blocked their ways, first, to their elder brother Nelson Elisans
house and, second, to their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahons house. Having changed course by proceeding to the ricefield in
their desperate attempt to evade the accused, all the six (6) armed accused continued their pursuit. Their victim, having fallen on the
rice paddy, and rising and kneeling on it with raised hands, all the said accused with their flashlights beamed on their victim, in a united
and concerted manner, shot him. After Ronie Elisan had fallen down, co-accused Mayor Cawaling was even heard as saying (Y)ou left
[sic] him, he is already dead. x x x.[89]
Eighth Issue:
Equipoise Rule
We reject appellants position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case. [90]In People vs. Lagnas,[91] the Court through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado described this rule, as follows:
Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration in view of the preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds
application in this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are guilty. As amplified in the discussion above, the
Court agrees with the trial court that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ninth Issue:
Murder or Homicide?
The Information alleges three qualifying circumstances: treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength. If appreciated, any one of these will qualify the killing to murder. However, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo posit that there
was no treachery, reasoning that Ronie was not an unsuspecting victim, as he had been forewarned by Diosdado Venus of the
presence of the appellants inside the restaurant and there had been a chase prior to the killing.Further, they contend that abuse of
superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery, and that the addition of abuse of superior strength to qualify the case to murder is
nothing more than mere repetition - a legal chicanery, so to say. Similarly, where treachery is not proved, there can be no abuse of
superior strength, vice-versa.[92]
We partly agree.
Treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and methods that tend directly and especially to insure their execution
without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victims might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.[93] While we do not disregard the fact that the
victim, together with his brother Vicente, was able to run towards a rice field, we still believe that treachery attended the killing.
In People vs. Landicho,[94] we ruled that treachery might still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger to his
person, for what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the restaurant. All of them chased the victim and prevented him from seeking
refuge either in the house of his sister Imelda or that of his brother Nelson. All of them carried firearms and flashlights. They fired their
guns at the victim while he was on his knees with arms raised, manifesting his intention not to fight back.
We cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, as we have consistently ruled that it
is deemed absorbed in treachery.[95]
We also affirm the finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident
premeditation. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time,
between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[96] Nothing in the records shows how and when the plan to kill was hatched, or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out.
Tenth Issue:
Damages
The trial court awarded the following: (a) P50,000.00, as civil indemnity; (b) P6,000.00, as actual damages; and (c) P116,666.66,
for lost earnings. In computing the latter, the trial court used the following formula:
Total annual net income = 10% x total annual gross income

= .10 x P25,000.00
= P2,500.00
xxx xxx xxx
Loss of earning capacity of Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (90-20) x P2,500.00 = P116,666.66.[97]
Consistent with jurisprudence, we affirm the ruling of the trial court awarding the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs
of the victim.[98]
We cannot do the same to the award of actual damages and lost earnings, however. The award of actual damages has no basis,
as no receipts were presented to substantiate the expenses allegedly incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be established by
credible evidence before actual damages may be awarded. [99]Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity, which
should be computed as follows:[100]
2/3 x [80 - age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been received as
support by heirs]
As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had been earning an average of P100 daily or P3,000 monthly.[101] From this
monthly income must be deducted the reasonable amount of P1,000 representing the living and other necessary expenses of the
deceased. Hence, the lost earnings of the deceased should be computed as follows:
= 2/3 x [80 - 22] x [P24,000]

= 2/3 x [58] x [P24,000]
= 2[P 1,392,000]
3
= P2,784,000
3
= P928,000.
Eleventh Issue:
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code, [102] the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death.In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan argue for the imposition of the lower penalty of reclusion
temporal, contending that their filing of bail bonds/property bonds, before the order for their arrest was issued, should be treated as
voluntary surrender.[103]
We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it has no factual basis. The warrant for the arrest of herein appellants was
issued on August 18, 1987,[104] but appellants counsel filed the Urgent Motion for Bail only thereafter, on September 2, 1987. [105] In the
second place, appellants failed to prove the requisites for voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.[106] The
records reveal that a warrant of arrest was actually served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo [107] on September 2, 1987 and that they were in
fact detained.[108]
In view of the absence of any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1)
the award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED, and (2) the award for loss of earning capacity is INCREASEDto P928,000. Costs
against appellant. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-75079 January 26, 1989
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial) Court of Manila and the COUNTRY
BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside the orders of denial issued by the
respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in
Criminal Case No. L-83-22252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on
the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject matter is purely civil in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance
business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement,
the petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal
office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a
shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.
which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26, 1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this
order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional trial Court of
Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in
Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the fact that private respondent
separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject
transaction complained of is not proper for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being
interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order
rendered (See. 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go to trial and if the
decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment (Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant
or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the
court of proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be prosecuted and the court before which it
must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966 cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the
court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the
punishment provided for by law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal
cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the findings the court may make after the trial
(People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth under the laws of the
Philippine with principal address at 9th floor, G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in
the following manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance agent of said
corporation, among whose duties were to remit collections due from customers thereat and to
account for and turn over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately upon demand, collected and
received the amount of P368,850.00 representing payments of insurance premiums from
customers, but herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from complying with her
aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so and with intent to defraud, absconded with the
whole amount thereby misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P358,850.00
to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation in the amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of
Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential
elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private
respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she
collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state that evidentiary facts on this point
have still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for
further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103276. April 11, 1996]
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO SERVE THE END OF JUSTICE. - The
power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice
require it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned
in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an
attorney de officio to represent the accused in trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered
into by both the prosecution and the defense. Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this prerogative been invoked to relax
even procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal. Let us not forget that
the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive
and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do
in this case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICABLE IN CASE A PARTY WAS PENALIZED DUE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF HIS COUNSEL. - Petitioners
present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he is
just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has
already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while
available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that
petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why this Court had,
on many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general
rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and
entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT TRIER OF FACTS. - The receipts and other documents constituting his evidence which he failed to
present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for the general rule is that
we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation, petitioners documentary
evidences prima facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness Angeles testimony, indicating that official
training programs were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent entirely for
those programs.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Zambrano, Gruba & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
The Court in its June 16, 1994 En Banc Resolution[1] denied with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Courts April
12, 1994 Decision[2]affirming his conviction by the Sandiganbayan[3] of violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act[4] for his alleged failure to account for P200,000.00 received for certain official training programs of the Department of
Agriculture. Entry of judgment was ordered to be made in due course. [5] Six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9) years
and one (1) day as maximum in jail await petitioner.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioners guilt was duly established by 1) lone prosecution witness Josephine
Angeles[6] testimony that no such training programs were held at the designated places, [7] and 2) petitioners failure to present a single
receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from his former lawyers insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence
despite prior leave for that purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan.
To avert his looming imprisonment and with full awareness that he has nothing in our Rules of Court to rely on, petitioner takes a
novel recourse by filing the instant Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate First Motion For Reconsideration In The Light Of The Present
Developments And To Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set Aside Conviction.[8] This was filed on petitioners behalf by a
new counsel, as shown by the Entry of Appearance and Motion For Leave To Submit Attached Omnibus Motion filed on June 27,
1994[9] after petitioners former lawyers withdrew their appearance. [10]
In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be relieved from what he considers as the serious and costly mistake
of his former lawyers[11] in demurring to the prosecution evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of which deprived him of
presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary evidence that would have completely belied the accusation against
him. Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of expenses and receipts [12] in support of the liquidation voucher
(Exhibit E) showing due disbursement of the P200,000.00 received for training programs actually conducted - the original records of
which are all along kept in the Records Section of the Bureau of Plant Industry as per letter of the Bureau Director Emillano P.
Gianzon[13] and which are readily available. Petitioner now appeals to the Courts sense ofjustice and equity that these documents be
summoned and appreciated by the Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan after remanding the case thereto, if only to give him the final
chance to prove his innocence.
When required by the Court to comment on the Omnibus Motion, [14] the Solicitor General, representing respondents, was granted
no less than eight (8) extensions to do so, [15] the last one with warning that no further extension will be given. None was filed. Instead,
the Solicitor General filed a ninth (9th) motion for extension which was denied considering the warning contained in the eighth (8th)
extension.[16] The tenth (10th) motion for extension was merely noted by the Court. [17] Thereafter, the Court in a Resolution dated
August 15, 1995 required the Solicitor Generals Office to 1) SHOW CAUSE why it should not be disciplinarily dealt with for its repeated
failure to file comment and 2) file its comment, both within ten (10) days from notice. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor Generals
Office filed its Comment and Explanation. The Court accepted such Explanation, noted the Comment filed and required petitioner to file
a Reply thereto within ten (10) days from notice in a Resolution dated October 10, 1995. A Reply was thus filed by petitioner in due
time.
The Solicitor Generals Office advances the following arguments in its Comment:
1. Petitioners Omnibus Motion is violative of the Courts adopted policy on second motions for reconsideration as expressed in a
Resolution dated April 7, 1988 stating that:
Where the Court has resolved to deny a motion for reconsideration and decrees the denial to be final, no motion for leave to file second
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
2. Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his former lawyers, assuming that the latter indeed committed one.
3. Even granting the petitioner is not bound by his former lawyers mistake, the documentary evidence petitioner now attempts to
present would nonetheless not cast at all a reasonable doubt on his guilt for violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to
warrant a reversal of his conviction by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners Reply, on the other hand, contains the following counter-arguments:
1. The Omnibus Motion is not violative of the prohibition on second motions for reconsideration since such motion does not seek
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration but for leave to vacate the first Motion For Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1994 and in
its stead to admit the Omnibus Motion containing the petitioners documentary evidence and arguments. Thus, petitioners Motion to
vacate the first motion for reconsideration is but necessary to his defense that he should be excused from the mistake of his former
lawyers.
2. Adherence to the general rule that the client is bound by his counsels mistake is to deprive petitioner of his liberty through a
technicality.
3. The pieces of evidence petitioner is now presenting for appreciation either by this Court or the Sandiganbayan will, contrary to
the OSGs claim, disprove his guilt of the charge levelled against him.
After carefully considering anew petitioners plight and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.
The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of
justice require it, cannot be questioned.[18] In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not
mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness,[19] negligence or incompetency of counsel,[20] improvident plea of
guilty,[21] disqualification of an attorney de oficio to represent the accused in trial court,[22] and where a judgment was rendered on a
stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense. [23] Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this
prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to
appeal. Take for instance the relatively recent case of PNB, et al. v. CA, et al.[24] where the Court once again extended this liberality of
allowing an appeal filed beyond the reglementary 15-day period. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Melo, while dissenting
therein,[25] nonetheless made this crucial observation:
The majority opinion, with due respect would suspend the rule - actually the law - for what it says are petitioners detailed demonstration
of the merits of the appeal without, however, delving on such so-called merits. The simple merits of ones case, lost through neglect, to
my mind should not automatically call for the suspension of applicable rules, laws, or jurisprudence. At the very least, before this may
be done transcendental matters, surely, life, liberty, or the security of the State, should be at risk, but obviously, not simple matters
which can be reduced to pesos and centavos. (Italics supplied)
Clearly, when transcendental matters like life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed
more generously.
Petitioners present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake
here. And he is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting
on what has already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the
while available for presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity demand that
petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why this Court had, on
many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. [26] To cling to the general rule
in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust
his innocence to his previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his evidence which he failed to
present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for the general rule is that we
are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation, petitioners documentary evidences prima facie appear strong
when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness Angeles testimony, indicating that official training programs were indeed actually
conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent entirely for those programs. In this connection, the Court
in US v. Dungca,[27] had occasion to state that:
xxx, the rigor of the rule might in an exceptional case be relaxed, this would be done only under very exceptional circumstances, and in
cases where a review of the whole record taken together with the evidence improvidently omitted would clearly justify the conclusion
that the omission had resulted in the conviction of one innocent of the crime charged.(Italics supplied)
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality.[28]This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive
and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in
this case. And this is not without additional basis. For in Ronquillo v. Marasigan,[29] the Court held that:
The fact that the decision x x x has become final, does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof because even with the
finality of judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the instant case, it may be modified or altered to harmonize
the same with justice and the facts. (Italics supplied)
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the
hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that
when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then, technicalities,
in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, should give way to the realities of the situation. [30] And the grim reality petitioner will
surely face, if we do not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and misery of
incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after all. More so, considering that petitioners record as public servant
remained unscathed until his prosecution. Indeed, while guilt shall not escape, innocence should not suffer. [31]
In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to
render justice where justice is due - to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he
is charged. To borrow Justice Padilla s words in People v. CA, et al.,[32] (where substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein
accuseds appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of appeal and his subsequent escape from confinement) that if only to truly make
the courts really genuine instruments in the administration of justice, the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any
possible miscarriage of justice resulting from petitioners failure to present his crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be
remanded to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence.
WHEREFORE, petitioners Omnibus Motion is GRANTED and the Courts April 12, 1994 Decision and June 16, 1994 Resolution
are hereby RECONSIDERED.Accordingly, let this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of
petitioners evidence. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169004

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

The facts follow.

Thus, the present petition.

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 167304

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

Petitioner raises this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE INVOLVING A

The petition is meritorious.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

Petitioner UP student regent

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

The offense charged was committed

Source of funds is a defense that should

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 158187. February 11, 2005]

xxx xxx xxx

The petition lacks merit.

(a) xxx xxx xxx

Republic of the Philippines

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169004

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

The facts follow.

Thus, the present petition.

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in

Republic of the Philippines

MAXIMINO VALDEPEAS, petitioner,

Jose F. Aquirre for petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-38634 June 20, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,

The facts are not disputed.

xxx xxx xxx