PRELIMINARIES
The COMELEC took
ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION
ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA
METHOD AND INTERPRETATION
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL REALISM, AND
THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
ROBERT CLINTON (1987)
CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS
TIMOTHY ZICK (2003)
ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION
MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC
TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997)
FROM MCKINLEYS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW
CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
VICENTE MENDOZA
(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER)
MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO
GONZALES V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; November 9, 1967
TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; October 16, 1971
PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; January 22, 1973
JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
; March 31, 1973
SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; October 12, 1976
MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; April 4, 1981
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V
AQUINO
EN BANC; May 22, 1986
FACTS/ISSUES
- Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government.
- Her govt was said to be illegal since it was not established
pursuant to 1973 Consti.
- Proclamation No. 3- Aquino govt is installed through direct
exercise of power of the Filipino people, in defiance of the
provisions of 1973 Consti.
- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss.
- April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that they
would pursue it by extra-judicial methods.
HELD
Petitions have no merit.
(1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of action.
(2) Legitimacy of govt is NOT justiciable, and is a political
question where people are the only judge.
(3) People have already accepted such govt, which is in
effective control of the country, making it a de jure govt.
(4) Community of nations has also accepted it.
(5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law under her
govt.
IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ
;October 24, 1986
DE LEON V ESGUERRA
; August 31, 1987
SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DAVIDE; March 19, 1997
FACTS
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend
the Constitution through a peoples initiative. In his petition, he
wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article 6, Sec 4 of Article 7
and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term limits of all
elective government officials. He asks the COMELEC to assist
them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting
up signature stations all over the country, as required by
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing.
Senator Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the
COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory petition properly
cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam Defensor
Santiago, on the other hand, filed a special civil action for
prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar as the
initiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. She
further alleges that what the petitioners are willing to propose
are not amendments, but revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK
and MABINI filed their motions for intervention, arguing on the
same points.
ISSUES
1. WON the court can take action of this case despite there
being a pending case before the COMELEC
2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for peoples
initiative
3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid
4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition
HELD
1. Yes. Comelecs failure to act on rocos motion to dismiss and
its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable
the instant petition under sec 2 rule 65 of rules of court
- Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari
since delfin didnt come up with the minimum number of
signatures
- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of
transcendental importance.
2. No. The law is inadequate.
- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that
the word Constitution was a delayed afterthought. The word
Constitution was neither germane nor relevant to the said
section. It only proves that it is silent to amendments in the
constitution.
- Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of a
petition for initiative on the constitution.
- Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the
Constitution.
- Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on
initiative and referendum of national and local laws. It failed to
provide for details in implementation of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is
incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and
standard for the delegated power.
3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete, it
does not have the power to prescribe rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also,
comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition. The
delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.
Decision Petition granted
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [concur and dissent]
RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was to
provide for a law for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco)
VITUG
The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since it did
not have the required number of signatures.
FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]
looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law clearly
intends to include amendments to the Constitution.
PANGANIBAN
RA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution
and COMELEC Res. No. 2300, it is sufficient to implement
Constitutional initiatives.
RESOLUTION
; 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC Chief Justice
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
FACTS
- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints
against him until his term is over
- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was
VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both
Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.
- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began;
Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend, publicly accused
Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords.
- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech
entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada of receiving
220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson
from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70
million peson on excise tax still from Gov. Singson
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue
Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint
investigation
- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of
Gov. Singson.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a
pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the
presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for
resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as well.
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD
Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation but Estrada
really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According to
J. Puno: "The heat is on.")
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13,
House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery,
graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable
violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 representatives to
the Senate.
- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial.
Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony
of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI BANK.
Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada
when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents
involving a 500 million pesos investment account with their
bank on Feb 4 2000.
- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas
and when January came, more bombshells were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly
owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who
was facing charges of insider trading.
> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges
ruled against opening the 2 nd envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion
pesos in a secret bank account under the name "Jose
Velarde."
> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"
- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed
Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued
- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide
administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the
Philippines.
> Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press statement
saying that he now leaves Malacaang Palace for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation.
> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the
acting president and said letter was transmitted to former
Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.
- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of
the Presidency. The SC issued a resolution, which confirmed
the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then
present to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to
GMA.
- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House
of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175 experiencing full
support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176
- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming
inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82 confirming GMA's
nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's
support of the new gov't. and also in the same date, Senate
passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is
functus offictio.
- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy
in the Senate.
- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited
themselves from participating in this case as per Saguisag's
motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have
compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless
recused themselves.
ISSUES
1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy
2. WON the petitioner resigned as president
3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as
president
4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming
he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity)
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.
HELD
1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the
change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed
by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente
differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a
revolution, change of presidency was done extra-
constitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the
change was done to an element of the government only and it
was done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold
or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better
understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1,
ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this case so look at
those provisions too.)
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8)
3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and
revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political
one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest
because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a
political question and the Court cannot review Congress'
decision without violating the principle of separation of
powers.)
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys
immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re:
Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from
suit or from being brought to court during his period of his
incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)
5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity.
Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the
respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure 14 th
President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
GONZALES V NARVASA
GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000
FACTS
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR
was created by then President Joseph Estrada on Nov 26,
1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to study and
recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.
> The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before
June 30, 1999. On Feb 19, 1999, the President issued
Executive Order No. 70 which extended the time frame of
the PCCRs work until Dec 31 1999.
> The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the
President on Dec 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the
President on the same day.
- Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed
a petition for prohibition and mandamus, assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds:
> it is a public office which only the legislature can create by
way of law
> by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a
process from which he is totally excluded by the
Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental charter.
- In this regard, Gonzales:
> seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants from acting as such
> seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing
their advice and recommendations
> seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in
audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants
> prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to
furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.
ISSUES
1. WON the case has become moot and academic
2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen
3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer
4. WON the President has power to create positions (70) in the
Office of the President and appoint presidential consultants
(20), advisers (22) and assistants (28)
5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering
Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner with names of
executive officials holding multiple positions in government,
copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of
luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned
over to Malacaang.
HELD
1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents
a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have
become academic or dead. It is beyond the scope of judicial
power to give advisory opinion.
Obiter The case has already become moot and academic as
the PCCR has already ceased to exist. Relief prayed for by
Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to grant and is an
inappropriate remedy as body sought to be enjoined no longer
exists. Any ruling regarding the PCCR would only be in the
nature of an advisory opinion.
2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality
of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
some indefinite way.1
3. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution, the action of which is properly brought only when
there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power.
Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the PCCR,
the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the
President. The appropriations were authorized by the
President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriation
at all since appropriation has been defined as nothing more
than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury. The funds for the
PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to
transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5) Art VI of Constitution.
4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation.
- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as
he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of
1
in Kilosbayan v Morato citing Valmonte v Phil Charity Sweepstakes Office
sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment, and he has
not alleged the necessary facts to enable the Court to
determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest.
5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
- The right to information is a public right, and the requirement
of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner
is a citizen and therefore part of the general public which
possesses the right.
- matters of public concern is a term which embrace(s) a petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue
is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
Decision Petition is dismissed, with the exception that
respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with
information requested.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
(ART I, II, IV, V)
STATE DEFINED
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS
RUEDA
FERNANDO; October 29, 1971
FACTS
- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda,
as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda.
de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P 161,974.95 as deficiency
estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible
personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish
national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931
up to the time of her death in 1955.
- Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that
the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision
denying the claim for tax exemption. However, respondent
denied this request on the grounds that there was no
reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere
principality, not a foreign country.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign
country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign
power which, although not an international person in the sense
of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes
upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing
therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such
taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have
been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the
Section 122 of our Tax Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much
thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an
international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign
country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code
HELD
- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling.
- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required
in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized
sovereign community independent of outside control bound by
ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
through a government functioning under a regime of law.
- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it
viewed as an organized corporate society under a government
with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.
- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a
definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of
its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it
and maintaining its separate international personality.
- State is a territorial society divided into government and
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all
other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power
entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the
conditions of a legal order and to enter into international
relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law
does not exact independence as a condition of statehood.
- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no
doubt that California as a state in the American Union was
lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality.
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the
meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny
principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international
personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt
category.
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates form them.
ART V SUFFRAGE
Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least
18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to
vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement
shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage
Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the
secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled
and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons.
Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and
such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to
protect secrecy of the ballot.
TANADA V ANGARA
PANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997
FACTS
- Petition for Certiorari
- DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he agreed on behalf of
the Philippines
o To submit the WTO agreement to competent
authorities for their approval
o Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions
(Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and expand world
trade and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and
economic policies affecting growth and development.)
- The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits
the Uruguay Round Final Act for their concurrence
- Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he
submits the Uruguay Final Round Act, the Agreement
Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services to the Senate for its concurrence.
- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which expresses
their concurrence in the ratification of the president of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO.
- The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of the
Agreement Establishing the WTO and the agreements and
associated legal instruments of that agreement.
- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other hand,
embodies not only the WTO agreement but also the ministerial
declarations and decisions and the understanding on
commitments in financial services.
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty. They also
claim that since the Senate only concurred with the WTO
agreement and not on all the contents of the Final act, they
impliedly rejected the Final act.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable.
2. WON the parity provisions and national treatment clauses
in the WTO agreement violates Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. 10
and 12 Article 12 of the Constitution (economic
nationalism clauses).
3. WON the WTO agreement unduly limits, restricts and
impairs legislative power of the Congress.
4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedures.
5. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO
agreement and not in the final act implies rejection of the
final act.
HELD
- Petition dismissed.
1. Yes.
- The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government including Congress
2. No
- The declaration of principles are not intended to be
self-executing, rather, they are just aid and guides by the
judiciary in judicial review, and by the legislature in
enacting laws. These broad principles need legislative
enactments to implement them.
- The economic nationalism provisions should be read with
other constitutional mandates, especially Sec 1 and 13 of
Article 12.
- The WTO protects the weak economies. There are specific
provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs, domestic
subsidies and protection from unfair competition which are
intended to help developing economies.
- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control
of the national economy.
- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in
favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any
specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be
pampered with total prescription of foreign competition.
- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of
contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even
future and unknown circumstances.
3. No
- Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to
restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines .
- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the
country.
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the
absoluteness of sovereignty
- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution
- Limitations imposed by the very nature of
membership in the family of nations.
- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations
- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to restrict its
soverign rights under the concept of auto-limitation. (Reagan vs
Commission of Internal Revenue)
- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereignty
is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states
granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
its officials and its citizens.
4. No.
- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent
infringement. It is still on the patent owner to introduce
evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product.
- The new rule should not really present any problem in
changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the
subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar presumption
in cases of infringement of patent design.
- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.
5. No.
- The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty itself.
Rather, it is just a summary of the proceedings. The final act
only required that the senate concur with the WTO agreement,
which they did.
- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as
shown by the members deliberations.
REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FERNANDO; December 27, 1969
FACTS
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
Petitioner: William Reagan civilian employee of an American
corporation providing technical assistance to the United States
Air Force in the Philippines
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
July 7, 1959 Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air Base
April 22, 1960 He imported a tax-free Cadillac with
accessories valued at $6,443.83
July 11, 1960 petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to
sell the car which was granted provided that he sell it to a
member of the US Armed Forces or a US citizen employed in
the Philippine military bases. On the same date, he sold his car
for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson, Jr. of the US Marine Corps.
- As a result of the transaction, respondent, after deducting the
landed cost of the car as well as petitioners personal
exemption, fixed his net taxable income arising from the sale at
P17,912.34 rendering him liable for P2,979.00 income tax.
After paying the sum, petitioner sought a refund claiming that
he was exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the
case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied his petition.
- Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the income
tax. He contends that in legal contemplation the sale was made
outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond its jurisdiction
to tax.
- Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v.
Collector of Internal Revenue: While in army bases or
installations within the Philippines those goods were in
contemplation of law on foreign soil. The court resolved this by
pointing out that the statement was merely obiter dictum in that
case and therefore, cannot be invoked in this case.
ISSUE
WON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territory
HELD
Yes. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by
virtue of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 remain
part of Philippine territory.
- The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Within its
limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount.
Likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.
- Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its consent,
express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign
rights. It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain
portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They
retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not
disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American
armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947.
They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
- Therefore, the Philippines jurisdictional rights over the
bases, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have
been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an
appropriate exemption was provided for.
- Judgment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did not
take part)
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the
refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by
petitioner is affirmed.
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
CORONA; July 15, 2003
b. the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
FACTS treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples
- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
- Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential legitimately acquired property. These treasury notes
Commission on Good Government or PCGG, filed a petition for are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG.
Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by his - Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma. Imelda M
Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13792. Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and Ferdinand R Marcos, Jr. filed
- PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. their answer.
1 issued on February 28, 1986 by then President
Corazon Aquino, and was charged with the task of The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements
assisting the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten - Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and
wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand the Supplemental Agreements dated Dec 28, 1993 were
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman
subordinates and close associates, whether located Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of
in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or the Marcos family
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities - The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to
owned or controlled by them during is administration, identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets
directly or through nominees, by taking undue presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
advantage of their public office and/or using their conditions contained therein.
powers, authority, influence, connections or - It was stated in one of the whereas clauses the fact that
relationship. petitioner Republic obtained a judgment from the Swiss
- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million
the Solicitor General (OSG) sought: belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided
a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 certain conditions are met. The decision of the Swiss
million (estimated to be US$658 million inclusive of Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District
interest as of the time of decision) deposited in Attorney Peter Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic.
escrow3 in the Philippine National Bank (PNB), as ill- Cosandey declared the various deposits in the name of the
gotten wealth. foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they
*The ff account groups, using various foreign be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled
foundations in certain Swiss banks, previously held to restitution.
the funds: - Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve
1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts the General/Supplemental Agreements.
2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-
Spinus- - Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment
Avertina-Foundation accounts and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondents filed their
3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation opposition.
accounts - Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for
4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the
5. Maler Foundation accounts ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement
(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment
- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she
was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise
2 Agreement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor. remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
3
Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the
fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the third party, the money or instrument is said to be in
escrow. (Random House Websters Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996)
The Fund Transfer
- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney
in Zurich, Switzerland an additional request for the immediate
transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB. This was
granted.
- Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed
ruling of District Attorney of Zurich, and funds were remitted to
the Philippines in escrow in 1998.
The Petition for Summary Judgment
- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary
judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million,
based on ff grounds:
a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the
funds are admitted by respondents in their pleadings
and other submissions made in the course of the
proceeding
b. respondents admission made during pre-trial that
they do not have any interest or ownership over the
funds tenders no genuine issue or controversy as to
any material fact in the present action
- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later adopted by
co-respondents Marcos children.
- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was
conducted
- Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for
summary judgment, stating that there is no issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence, and declared the funds,
which were deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth,
forfeited in favor of the State.
- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000;
Marcos children followed.
- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep
19 2000 decision, stating that the evidence offered for
summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in
the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no
legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the
Marcoses of the funds, and thus denied petitioners motion for
summary judgment. Hence, the present petition.
- Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision
on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated
Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions and their
authenticated translations have not been submitted to the
Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a
portion of the Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion
dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that nowhere in the
respondents motions for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and
admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.
- Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should be
denied.
Analysis of Respondents Legitimate Income
- the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91
in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984.
- This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos salary as Senate
President in 1965, (P15,935) and as President from 1966 to
1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 1977-1985 at
P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos salary as Minister of Human
Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year), income from
legal practice (P11,109,836), plus other sources.
- Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely
profitable legal practice before he became President, and that
he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after
- Computations establish the total net worth of spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 to 1984, in the
amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal
practice is valid)
- The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356
million.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner Republics action for certiorari is proper.
2. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which
would either justify or negate summary judgment.
3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for
forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
HELD
1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with
immense public interest, public policy and deep historical
repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the
existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.
Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the
government initiated its search for and reversion of ill-gotten
wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is
long overdue.
2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which
will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to
raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment
Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise
any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Summary
judgment should take place as a matter of right.
- a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking
in substance.
- Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every
allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner
required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure). Their answers include they have no sufficient
knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a
long time ago or the funds were lawfully acquired without
stating the basis of such assertions.
- Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents answer
qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. No. The
Court holds that if an allegation directly and specifically
charges a party with having done, performed or committed a
particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or
commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.
- The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss
bank deposits, not having been specifically denied by
respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted pursuant
to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
a. Propriety of Summary Judgment
- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no
genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The
Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
summary judgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits,
depositions or admissions that the issues are not genuine
but sham or fictitious.
- motion for summary judgment is premised
on the assumption that the issues presented need
not be tried either because these are patently
devoid of substance or that there is no genuine
issue as to any pertinent fact.
- It is a procedural device for the prompt
disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise
only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any
material fact.
b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to
trial and had legally waived right it had to move for
summary judgment.
 - Court rules that petitioner could validly move for
summary judgment any time after the respondents
answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent
stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to
proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving
for summary judgment.
c. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment
was filed on Mar 10 2000, estoppel by laches had
already set in against petitioner.
- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when
government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental
rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes
law or public policy.
- estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier, warranting a
presumption that the person has abandoned his
right or declined to assert it.
- in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches,
respondents must show not only unjustified
inaction but also that some unfair injury to them
might result unless the action is barred.
3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a
property is unlawfully acquired when the amount or value is
manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other
lawful income of the public officer who owns it stands as
proved unless defendant shows, and proves, that these were
lawfully acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of
income.
Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute
presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that
the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had
other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed, and, unless the fact thus
prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it
must stand as proved.
- the Court not only took into consideration that respondents
themselves made admissions in their pleadings and
testimonies, but that petitioner was able to present sworn
statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the
Marcoses participation in the illegal acquisition of funds.
RESOLUTION
CORONA; November 18, 2003
- SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not
raise any new matters for the Court to resolve.
Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a
violation of due process?
- Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect,
hence they are entitled to constitutional safeguards enjoyed by
accused.
- SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and
procedural. There must be a compliance with both substantive
and procedural requirements in order that a particular act may
not be impugned as violative of the due process clause.
- substantive due process refers to intrinsic
validity of a law that interferes with the rights of
a person to his property
- there is no showing that RA 1379 is
unfair, unreasonable or unjust.
Respondents were not deprived of their
property through forfeiture for arbitrary
reasons.
- procedural due process means compliance
with procedures or steps, even periods,
prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the
standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on
the part of those who are called upon to
administer it.
- forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem, thus civil
in nature, contrary to respondents contention that
they are penal in character. The proceedings under
RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of
penalty but merely in the forfeiture in favor of the
State of properties illegally acquired.
- Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property
under RA 1379 may be proven by preponderance
of evidence. The Government is required only to
state the known lawful income of respondents for
the prima facie presumption of illegal provenance
to attach. Petitioner Republic having established
this presumption, burden of proof shifted to
respondents to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully
acquired and that they had other legitimate
sources of income. Respondents failed on this
part.
- essence of due process is found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit ones evidence
in support of his defense
- Respondents were repeatedly accorded full
opportunity to present their case, defenses
and pleadings. They obstinately refused to do
so and have tried to confuse the issues and
the Court and to delay the disposition of the
case
- the people and the State are entitled to favorable
judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to
restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the
rightful owner that is, the Republic of the
Philippines in the shortest possible time.
Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality.
DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
HOLMES; February 23, 1909
FACTS
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet,
contests dismissal of application of registration of their
ancestral land through writ of error.
- Carinos ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated
some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for more than 50
years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land
is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom.
- Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no
document of title was issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901,
plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the lands
were registered to him but it only established possessory title.
- Procedure
- Court - application of land registration granted (March
4, 1904 )
- CFI of Benguet appeal on behalf of Government of the
Philippines and US having taken possession of property for
military and public purposes; application dismissed
- Philippine SC affirmed decision of CFI Benguet
- Federal SC writ of error reviewing judgment of
Philippine SC
- Respondents argue:
 - Given that
- Spain assumed and asserted that they had
title to all the land in the Philippines except to
permit private lands to be acquired
- No prescription against the Spanish Crown
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration
within a limited time to make the title good
- And US succeeded the title of Spain (through
Treaty of Paris)
- Plaintiffs land not registered and he had lost all
rights and a mere trespasser
- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or
military government of the Spanish Crown, so it
is not certain whether registration granted was
under Spanish laws
- Plaintiff argues:
- Argument seems to amount to denial of native
titles throughout an important Island of Luzon
ISSUE
WON Carino owns the land
HELD
Ratio Prescription, mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754
states: Where such possessors shall not be able to produce
title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as a valid title by prescription.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain times
shall be deemed owners; cultivated land 20 years, uncultivated
30 years. Plaintiffs father was owner of land by the very terms
of this decree.
- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights
acquired there by the United States are to be administered for
the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to
this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to
equity in the main.
- Every presumption is and ought to be against the government
in a case like present.
- The reason for taking over the Philippines was different
(compared to occupation of white race against Native
Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the
islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country
for private gain.
- The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law.
Decision REVERSED
- Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be
deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among
whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA
MORAN; November 15, 1947
FACTS
- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from
the Magdalena Estate. Inc
- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.
- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration
but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM) denied on the
ground that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this
jurisdiction.
- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a
consulta.
- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal.
- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a motion
to withdraw the appeal.
- The case was already voted upon and the majority decision
was being prepared.
- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's discretion to
grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been
presented.
- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and
the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.
- While the motion was pending, a new circular of the
Department of Justice (Circular No. 128) dated August 12,
1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to accept for
registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.
- RDM naturally obeyed the circular.
ISSUE
Jurisdiction:
WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal
with the issuance of the said circular of the DOJ
Primary Issue:
WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential
land.
HELD
The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting
a withdrawal of appeal is discretionary upon the Court after the
briefs have been presented.
- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his appeal only
because the constitutional issue should be avoided.
- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the
circumstances, particularly (1) the circular of the Dept. of
Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court
and ordering all registers of deed to accept for registration all
transfers of residential lots to aliens, together with the
circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never
come up again before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal
would be offensive to the opinion reached by a majority of the
members of the Court after long and exhaustive deliberations
on the constitutional question.
- To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is
equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitution, offense
that may be permanent.
- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands. (The votes
were: 8-3)
- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and more
absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO
ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND
INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN
MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
- This provision closes the only remaining avenue through
which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands.
- This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of
Article XIII "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated" and with respect to
public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens.
- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. 1
of Art. XIII.
- It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to
aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Filipino
citizens.
- Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion
withdrawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result to a
permanent offense to the Constitution.
- The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the
Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of
urban or residential lands in the Philippines and as a
consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the
prohibitions since the Constitution became effective are null
and void per se and ab initio.
LEE HONG HOK V DAVID
FERNANDO; December 27, 1972
FACTS
- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK,
petitioners
- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the Director of Lands and Court of Appeals
- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void Davids Torrens
Title (OCT No. 510) because they alleged to own the disputed
lot (226 m2 Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the
Naga Cadastre) through accretion .
- Jun 18, 1958 Director of Lands issued David a sales patent
of the lot
- Aug 26, 1959 Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural
Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-
1209
- Oct 21, 1959 Naga City Register of Deeds issued David
OCT No. 510
ISSUES
1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by
accretion, therefore a private not public - domain (this court
says it does not warrant any further consideration)
2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other
than the government to dispute the validity of a grant (this court
says it does)
3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after
one year should not be recognized (this court says it should
be).
HELD
1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by the
state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty, and dominium is the states capacity to own or
acquire property. Dominium enables the state to provide for the
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure
regalia, in which all lands in Spain and its earlier decrees
were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds
that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cario v Insular
Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lands held
without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the
Spanish state) according as they belong to us, in order that
after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys,
audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public
squares, ways, pastures and commons in those places which
are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and
after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming in them in what they now
have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said
lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we may wish.
In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public
lands constituting the public domain the sole power is vested in
Congress.
The land in question is not private property; the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
have always sustained the public character thereof by virtue of
reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim).
Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for
reconveyance on the ground of fraud committed by
respondents.
There was no fraud; everything was done in the open
notices were published, sale and awarding of land to David
were public official acts of a Government officer.
The disputed lot is a result of reclamation, therefore a
public land.
2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands,
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private parties and not
government officials, and therefore cannot institute for the
nullification of Davids Torrens Title, since they are not the
registered owners of the land and they had not been declared
as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after
claiming it as their private property.
Maninang v Consolacion states that [t]he fact that the grant
was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant
was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the
government may raise, but until it is raised by the government
and set aside, the defendant (in this case, the respondents)
cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question
between the grantee and the government.
Only the government can question the validity of the title
which it gave.
3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during
all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to
the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse
claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the
registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate
certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land
covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of
RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate
certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land is
automatically covered by RA 496 --- RA 496 48 says that
any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title
based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date
of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title
based thereon becomes indefeasible.
In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), [t]he proceedings
under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of
Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both
are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial
proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued
is conclusive and final.
In Cabacug v Lao, a holder of a land acquired under a free
patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force
and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom
it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase
within a period of five years.
Davids application was a renewal of his deceased wifes
application, wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot 2892
since 1938.
The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961
and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed
 GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
FACTS
- Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an impermissible
encroachment by the President on the legislative prerogative
- EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino
people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines to awaken our peoples consciousness in the
nations cultural heritage and encourage its preservation,
promotion and development
- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the funds
administered by the Center as coming from donations and
contributions and not a single centavo raised by taxation
- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of
executive power and that 2) this is supplementary to rather
than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National Commission
on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have the
requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of EO
30 as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from
donations and contributions and not one centavo came from
taxation
- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has standing
2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative
3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot and
academic
HELD
1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standing to
question executive acts that do not involve the use of public
funds
2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to
administer a trust created by an agreement with a foreign
country
3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has
assumed a moot and academic character
Obiter
(1)-The funds administered by the President of the Philippines
came from donations and contributions and not by taxation
-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary
interest
(2) As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman in
domestic and foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate as parens
patriae, the President has authority to implement for the benefit
of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural Center consisting
of private citizens to administer the private contributions and
donations given not only by the US government but also by
private persons
-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may
be concurrently exercised by the President and Congress
Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there was, still
no encroachment and that it is already moot and academic
CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RES
PER CURIAM; 6 December 2000
FACTS
- Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997)
- Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)
-Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by
others, who have continuously lived as organized community
on communally bounded and defined territory;
- Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA)
- Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership,... including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms, and tree lots.
- Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA)
- Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under
a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICC/IP, by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial continuously to the
present... including ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources, and lands no longer
occupied exclusively by ICC but to which they had traditional
access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still
nomadic or shifting cultivators.
- Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and
taxpayers (upon the plea that questions raised are of
"transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION
(directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR;
DENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular 2; DBM
Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and
MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with
his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate)
assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ISSUES
The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules
were questioned -
(1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State's ownership over LANDS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other
natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN
DOCTRINE.
(2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE
LANDOWNERS.
(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the powers
and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary law
applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and lands, violate the DUE PROCESS clause of
the Constitution.
(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order No.1,
which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP
to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program
coordination", is invalid as it infringes upon the President's
power of control over executive departments.
HELD
There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices
were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated
upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the
petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
- Those in favor of dismissing petition:
J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J.
Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza
- Those in favor of granting petition:
J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon
SEPARATE OPINIONS
PUNO [dismiss]
- Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine
Legal System
A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.
B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always
recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always
insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until
he did that the State remained the absolute owner."
C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under the
PLA, "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain
whose title still remained in the government. The Torrens
system requires that the government issue an official certificate
of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner
of such property described. The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible.
D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was
established 1935 Constitution, and it was reiterated in the 1973
and 1987 Consti.
-Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution
(1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP and do
not constitute part of the land of the public domains, as
they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE
(AD/AL) and TORRENS TITLE (AL).
a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never
public. Carino is the only case that specifically and
categorically recognizes native title.
b. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the Land
Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL into public
agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The
necessary implication is that AL is private.
(2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP
to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate such AD.
a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. But
the AD is owned in common by the ICC/IP and not by one
particular person. Communal rights to the land are held not
only by the present possessors but extends to all generations
of the ICC/IP.
b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the same
ICC/IP; in accord with customary laws; and subject to the right
of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if transferred to a
non-member of IP.
c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a
paper title.
(3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as the
right of ICC/IP to develop lands and NR within the AD
does not deprive the State of ownership over the NR,
and of control and supervision in their development and
exploitation.
a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the
Implementing Rules of IPRA included the term "natural
resources" in such rights of ownership which is CONTRARY to
Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.
b. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA is
allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. Managing
and conserving these resources, by their very nature,
necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
c. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may be
harmonized with par.1 and 4, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.
The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity
that owns these resources and who has the power to grant
such preferential rights.
(4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation in the
International Indigenous Movement.
VITUG [grant]
(1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the
ancestral domains, as the notion of community property
involves matters of proprietary interest AND also some forms of
self-governance over the property.
(2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs. Insular
Government cannot override the collective will of the people
expressed in the Constitution.
(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aim is to get
Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with
specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make
them part of the stream of laws." There should be a balancing
of interests between specific need of IP and imperatives of
national interest.
KAPUNAN [dismiss]
~Preliminary issues-
(1) The petition presents an actual controversy.
(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing.
As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the
national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation
of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to
restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
(3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an
improper remedy.
(4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the
hierarchy of courts, (petition should have been filed in the lower
court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in view of the
importance of the issues raised.
~Substantive issues-
(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP over the
ancestral lands and domains are not unconstitutional.
a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands
held in private ownership since time immemorial.
b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain
lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and
existence," shall then be owned by the State.
c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights
of IP to their AL." Framers did not intend Congress to decide
whether AD shall be public or private property, as they have
acknowledged that AD shall be treated as private property.
(2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the
State's ownership over the natural resources within the
ancestral domains.
a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is
definitional and not declarative of a right or title. It does not ipso
facto convert the character of such natural resources as private
property of the IP.
b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native
title to land, has NOT been recognized in the Philippines.
(3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of
natural resources are not unconstitutional.
a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale
utilization of natural resources by its citizens. The State retains
full control over such activities, through the imposition of
requirements and conditions for the exploration, development
and utilization of the NR.
b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IP are duly circumscribed and
are limited:
to manage and conserve NR within territories;
to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of NR;
to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of
NR in the area (refers only to the preliminary activity of
search and prospecting of mineral resources);
to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project that will
affect AD;
to receive just and fair compensation for any damages
sustained by such projects;
to effective measures by the government to prevent
any interference with these rights
c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant of said
priority rights is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent
laws and regulations.
~Corollary issues-
(1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.
a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property
regimes should be protected") belong to those acquired by
individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous. Where the
law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of
members of IP does not mean that the NCIP is incapable, or
will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-
IP.
c. The application of customary law is limited to disputes
concerning property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the AD, where ALL parties involved are
members of IP.
(2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon
the President's power of control over the Executive
Department.
Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was
placed by Congress "under the Office of the President" and as
such, is still subject to the President's power of control and
supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.
MENDOZA [dismiss]
(1) It is not a justiciable controversy.
Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not
involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting balance
of power.
(2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right
and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest. But in this case, what public right is there for
petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them
except in general and in common with other citizens??
PANGANIBAN [grant]
- RA8371 is unconstitutional in that-
A. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership over
"lands of the public domain which are owned by the
State."
B. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee the
"exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources" which should under be the full control and
supervision of the State."
(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the
Constitution. Because of the State's implementation of policies
considered to be for the common good, all those concerned
have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of
ownership.
(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a collective
right, still perpetually withdraws such property from the control
of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the
Republic. Ownership of NR is in ALL the Filipino people.
(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino citizens may
acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land, but
RA8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and
domains. Based on ethnographic surveys, solicitor general
estimates that AD cover 80% of our mineral resources and
between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in
the country.
(4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State may
directly undertake exploration, development and utilization of
NR or it could enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities
at least 60% Filipino-owned (and such agreements shall not
exceed 25 years). RA 8371 relinquishes this power in favor of
ICC/IP and they may even exercise such right without any time
limit.
(5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their AD
and AL but they should not be granted perpetual ownership
and control of the nation's substantial wealth to the exclusion of
other law-abiding Filipino citizens.
SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent
SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO; November 27, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an
American who is a member of the United States Air Force,
applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS
1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for
which she is eminently qualified. She had functioned as a
Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9
level for approximately four years at the time she applied for
the same position in 1976. her application was forwarded to
Anthony Persi, who had some reservations regarding Shaufs
work experience. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel
Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea
Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then
informed by CORRO that an Edward B. Isakson was selected
for the position. Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air
Base on January 1977.
By reason of her non-selection to the position, Loida
Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against
respondents for alleged discrimination against the former by
reason of her nationality and sex. Trial court held in favor of
Shauf, while Court of Appeals reversed decision.
ISSUES
1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing
official functions in accordance with the powers
vested in them under the Philippine American Military
Bases Agreement are immune from suit (even w/o
consent of the State).
2. WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination
against petitioner Shauf.
3. WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory
damages.
HELD
As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti, the
state may not be sued without its consent. This is a generally
accepted principle of International law under Art II, Section 2.
The case at hand may be construed as a suit against the US,
since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US.
However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. Unauthorized acts of government
officials are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials by one whose rights have been invaded by such
offenses, is not a suit against the State covered by the rule of
immunity. The respondents are being sued in their private and
personal capacity. The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice. A public official
may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.

Doctrine Yes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-
Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento.
1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even
without the consent of the State.
2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against
Shauf. Despite Shaufs qualifications, Persi did not
even consider the formers application. Since the
petitioner was able to prove the discrimination in the
non-consideration of her application, the burden
shifted to the respondents. The respondents however
answered with mere denials of the charges.
3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages.
There was no proof that she really was to earn
$39,662 if she was employed at the time. Damages
which are merely possible are speculative.
There must be an actual proof of loss.
WYLIE V RARANG
GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992
FACTS
Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant
administrative officer and commanding officer, respectively, of
the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was
an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as
the merchandise control guard.
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the
Plan of the Day a daily publication that featured among
others, an action line inquiry. On feb.3,1978, an inquiry was
published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/
used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector
and that a certain Auring was, in herself, a disgrace to the
office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said
office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and
Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the
Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology
letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.)
She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and
malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty,
virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of
their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus
immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being
an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved.
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts
were not official acts of the US government, but personal and
tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign
country cant be sued without its consent). Suit against US
Naval Base was dismissed.
ISSUES
1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine
Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune from
suit.
2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while
discharging official functions still covered by the principle of
state immunity from suit?
HELD
1. Yes, they are immune.
Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US
government are immune from suit (but only when they are
acting/ discharging their official functions. this is part of the
second issue)
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be
sued without its consent. But even without this affirmation,
court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation 4. The
doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also
to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed
by them in discharge of their official duties.
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being
sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of States.
Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively
participated in screening the features and articles in the POD
as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S.
officials in the performance of their official functions are
immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may
not be held liable for the questioned publication.
4
principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence
of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically
obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their
personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a
libelous article.
2. No.
Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States
do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official
duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have
acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and
non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by
any other official of the Republic.
Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission,
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated
February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and
reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself
admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article
were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent
because under their direction they issued the publication
without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is
ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious
act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners,
alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages
they caused the private respondent.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO
CRUZ; February 26, 1990
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction to review the decision of the RTC of Angeles City
- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all
involving state immunity.
G.R. No. 76607
- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar sued
officers of the U.S. Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barbering
services in the said base.
- Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area Exchange
(PHAX) and individual petitioners to cancel the award to
defendant Dizon, to conduct rebidding and to allow
respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue
operating concessions pending litigation.
- Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners to
maintain the status quo.
- Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and opposition to the
petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the
action was a suit against the United States, which has
not waived its non-suability, and that as
officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force, defendants
were also immune from suit.
- Trial Court denied the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction as well as the motion to dismiss.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 79470
- Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia,
Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the
U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City. After investigation, the ff: facts were ascertained:
- Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking vegetables served to club customers.
- Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Genove and
referred the case to the Board of Arbitrators, which found
him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
- Defendants, joined by the United States of America,
moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia,
as an officer of the U.S. Air Force, was immune from
suit, and that the suit was in effect against the United
States, which has not given its consent to be sued.
- Said motion was denied.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 80018
- Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp O
Donnel, an extension of Clark Air Base.
- He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
individual petitioners King, Dye and Bostick, officers of the
United States Air Force and special agents of the United States
Air Force Office of Special Operations, for violating R.A. 6425,
or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Bautista was dismissed from employment.
- He then filed a complaint for damages against individual
petitioners.
- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the defendants were acting in their
official capacity when they did the acts complained of
and that the suit was against the United States without
its consent.
- Motion was denied by respondent judge.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the SC.
G.R. No. 80258
- Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for injuries
sustained as a result of the acts of herein petitioners.
- According to plaintiffs (herein respondents), defendants
(herein petitioners) beat them up, handcuffed them and
unleashed dogs on them which bit them and caused them
extensive injuries.
- According to defendants, the plaintiffs were arrested for theft
and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and
resisting arrest.
- The United States of America and the individually
named defendants moved to dismiss the case and
argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the
United States which has not given its consent to be
sued. The defendants also claimed immunity for acts
done by them in the performance of their official
functions.
- Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion
for reconsideration.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction in the SC.
ISSUES
1. WON the cases against the petitioners were suits against
the United States, to which it has not consented
2. WON the individual petitioners may invoke immunity from
suit by mere assertion that the acts were done by them in the
performance of their official functions as officers or agents of
the United States
HELD
1) Ratio If the case involves the state entering into a contract
in the discharge of its commercial, proprietary and private
function, then the state will be deemed to have impliedly
consented to the suit.
Reasoning
- The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent now
expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is
one of the generally accepted principles of international law.
- All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over the other.
- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its
consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it
consents.
- Consent may be express or implied.
- Express-embodied in a general or special law
- Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it commences
litigation
- However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of non-suability
a distinction must be made between contracts entered into in
a states governmental and sovereign capacity or private,
proprietary and commercial capacity
- The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former does not.
* If it is not proven that the acts were done by the individual
petitioners in the performance of their official functions as
officers or agents of the United States, then they may not
invoke immunity form suit.
- The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
- The fact that the acts were done by the individual
petitioners in the performance of their official functions
as officers or agents of the United States is a matter of
evidence, and charges against them may not be dismissed
just by mere assertion. If the individual petitioners are found
liable for personal torts in which the US itself is not involved,
then they alone must satisfy the judgment.
2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases)
G.R. No. 76607
- Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by US are
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The
contracts being decidedly commercial, petitioners cannot plead
any immunity.
- Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 79470
- Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station
partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by
the US government in its proprietary capacity. Petitioners
cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them.
- However, notwithstanding these considerations, complaint in
the court below must still be dismissed. Although suable, the
petitioners are not liable because of the strength of evidence
that they acted properly in terminating Genove for his
disgusting offense.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
G.R. No. 80018
- Individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of
their official functions, and not in their private or unofficial
capacity.
- It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the
United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts
imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to
be sued.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
G.R. No. 80258
- The court hesitates to make a conclusion because the record
is too meager to indicate if the individual petitioners were acting
in the discharge of their official functions, or had actually
exceeded their authority.
- Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have
determined in what capacity the individual petitioners were
acting will the Court determine if the doctrine of state immunity
is applicable.
- Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is directed to
proceed with the hearing and decision.
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC
PUNO; December 15, 1994
FACTS
- Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security
assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG
Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs (1969-
1992); was dismissed on April 27, 1992
- He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and Employment
(March 31, 1992) on the ground that he was illegally
suspended and dismissed; asked for reinstatement
- JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity
from suit as an agency of US; also alleged lack of employer-
employee relp and it has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued
- Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of
jurisdiction
- NLRC reversedJUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued
based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG failed to refute the employer-
employee relp under the control test and 2) it has waived its
right to immunity from suit when it hired Sacramentos services.
- NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. USA (US Govt waived
its immunity from suit by entering into a contract of
stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of local courts)
- JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiters
decision, in saying that JUSMAG waived its immunity from
suit, in finding an employer-employee relp between
JUSMAG and Sacramento, and in considering JUSMAG
estopped from denying that respondent is its employee for
failure to present proof.
ISSUE
Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the RP
(JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from suit?
HELD
Ratio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of
immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity cannot
be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts.
Reasoning
- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was
performing a governmental function on behalf of the US
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit is, in
effect, one against the US and, considering that the US has not
waived or consented to the suit, the complaint cannot prosper.
- Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally
recognized principles of international law that the Phils.
Recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. This is
anchored on the principle of sovereign equality of states (an
equal has no power over an equal).
Discussion
- Historical Background of JUSMAG
- was created pursuant to the Military Assistance
Agreement dated March 21, 1947 between the Philippines
and the US; primary task was to advise and assist the
Philippines on air force, army and naval matters
- in 1991, US manifested its preparedness to provide
funds to cover the salaries of SASP and security guards,
the rent of bldgs, and housing, and cost of utilities
- Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and
JUSMAG-Phils
- Salaries- for security guards and SASP
- SASP are employees of the AFP; under the total
operational control of the Chief JUSMAG-Phils; AFP
to assume the severance/retirement pay liability for
all appointed SASP
- It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of
private respondent, it was performing a governmental
function on behalf of the US. Hence, the suit is, in effect,
one against the US Government.
- In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a universally
accepted principle. Immunity is understood as the
exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial
jurisdiction of another state.
- A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state,
without its consent or waiver. An exception to the
doctrine, however, was recognized in Santos, et al vs.
Santos, et al: the state itself may be sued, even without
its consent, because by entering into a contract, the
sovereign state has descended the level of the citizen and
its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of
entering into such contract.
- it was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry
Lyons vs. USA was decided
- Exception evolved: existence of contract does not, per
se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued
in local courts.
- US vs. Ruiz: ...does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions
- US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: petitioners cannot invoke
the doctrine of state immunity...the reason is that by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in
the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly
divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
- SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently
contended by JUSMAG, thus it is not estopped from
denying employer-employee relationship
Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of NLRC
is reversed and set aside
PNB V CIR
FERNANDO; January 31, 1978

FACTS
- Petitioner PNB received a notice of garnishment which was
served upon its branch on QC by an authorized deputy sheriff
of the court
*** What was sought to be garnished was the money of the
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at the
petitioners branch in QC in order to satisfy the decision of the
respondent court
- PNB filed a motion to quash the notice based on 2 grounds:
1. the appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo as
authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution
was contrary to law
*** PNB contends that the service of notice by the authorized
deputy sheriff of this court contravenes Sec. 11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1055
*** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the Clerk of
this court who is its Ex-officio Sheriff, that has the
authority to serve the notice of garnishment and that the actual
service of the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in
order
2. the funds subject of the character may be public in
character
- COIR denied PNBs motion to quash a notice of garnishment
ISSUE
WON an order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR) denying,
for lack of merit, petitioner PNBs motion to quash a notice of
garnishment6 can be stigmatized as a grave abuse of
discretion.
HELD
No. Theres no grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio
1. RA No. 4201 has already repealed Commonwealth Act No.
103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this Court that is
at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff. Therefore, the Clerk of
this Court has the authority to issue writs of execution and
notices
2. First, the tone in asserting this argument was even
irresolute. And 2nd, the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it to sue and be
5
All writs and processes issued by the court shall be served and executed free of charge by provincial
sheriffs or by any person authorized by this court, in the same manner as writs and processes of Courts of
First Instance
6
Garnishment a legal warning concerning the attachment of property to satisfy a debt
-- also the attachment of such property
sued. The premise that the funds spoken of are public in
character may be accepted in the sense that it was
government-owned. However, it does not follow that they were
exempt from garnishment.
SSS v CA
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983
FACTS
- In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Cancio
Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by the
SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto.
Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal its collateral.
Pursuant to this real estate loan said spouses executed on
March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage
originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which was later
increased to P48,000.00 covering said property.
- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among
others that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken
since October 1967 with the default on the part of the
mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable
on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and all of the
monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the
present date. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged
property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its
issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of
the said mortgaged property. Despite plaintiffs letter to
defendant demanding the latter to withdraw foreclosure and
discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their property
claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of their
monthly amortizations, defendant SSS still went on to publish
second and third publications of foreclosure.
- On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and
attorney's fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and
religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not
defaulted in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment
against defendant SSS. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Courts
decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES
(1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real
estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have
warranted the publications of the notices of as would have
foreclosure
(2) WON the SSS is immune from suit
(3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages.
HELD
(1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence, factual
findings of the lower court are not subject to review by this
Court.
Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this
ratio. Applying the rule, it can be said therefore, that the
findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgage-debtors
have not in fact violated their contract because SSS accepted
their installment payments although given late will not be
disturbed on appeal.
(2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions, by
virtue of the explicit provision of an enabling law, is deemed to
have waived immunity from suit, although it does not thereby
concede its liability.
Reasoning Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by
precedence, citing Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
(110 SCRA 457), which involved the National Power
Corporation as an entity performing governmental functions. In
that case it said, It is sufficient to say that the government has
organized a private corporation, put money in it and has
allowed it to site and be sued in any court under its charter.
The enabling law is R.A. No. 6395. Applying this rule in the
present case, the SSS own organic act specifically provides
that it can sue and be sued in Court, the enabling law being
R.A. 1161 and P.D. 24. Hence, theres a statutory consent by
the SSS to waive right of immunity from suit.
(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be
adjudged against a party which commenced foreclosure
proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the debtor of
his installments.
Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain. While it is
true that the payments of the monthly installments were
previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the
appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-
date and current in the payment of their monthly installments.
Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly
installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly and
without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
(2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
(3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages.
Voting 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
MAKASIAR [dissent]
What was committed in this case was a tortious act (grossly
negligent bordering on malice or bad faith) of the employees
of the SSS in foreclosing the mortgage of the wrong
mortgage-debtor
SSS cannot be held liable for the damages caused by the
tortious acts of its employees in the performance of their
regular functions
SSS as a public instrumentality for social welfare is immune
from suit despite its Charter provision that it can sue and be
sued.
SSS exercises purely governmental functions and cannot be
sued without its consent for the tortious acts of its personnel
COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V
BURGOS
DE CASTRO; March 31, 1980
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
- The facts of the case is as per above except that the
compensation determined is now the issue. The value of the
property was pegged at P 2.37 per square meter based on the
price used in the conveyance of several pieces of property in
the same area at about the same time. However, the court a
quo in determining due compensation, considered the value of
the pesos to the dollar at the time the case was being decided.
So instead of just P14,615.79 the amount awarded became
P49,459.34. (the original amount of 14,615.79 divided by 2 {the
exchange rate at the time of the taking to be P2.00 to US$1.00}
and the product being multiplied by 6.775). Based on this
amount, the court determined interest to be P145,410.44. Total
due from the government, including attorneys fee of ten
percent amounted to P214,356.75.
- Apparently, the court a quo, in revising upward the
compensation, relied on Article 1250 of the New Civil Code
which provides for payment of an obligation in an amount
different from what has been agreed on because of the
supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation.
- The government, through the Solicitor General, appealed the
decision contending that the court a quo erred in applying its
method and violated the high courts order to make as a basis
of compensation the price or the value of the land when it was
taken. The Solicitor General also took issue with the award of
ten percent as attorneys fees as exhorbitant considering that
Amigable only sought P5,000.00.
ISSUES
1. WON the compensation awarded by the court is proper
2. WON the attorneys fees awarded were exorbitant
HELD
1) In a review of the relevant Article of the New Civil Code, the
Court noted that the provision applies only if there was a
contract or agreement. Using the precedent, Velasco vs Manila
Electric (L-19390 December 29, 1971), the court expressed the
view that the taking of private property by the government in
the exercise of its eminent domain does not give rise to a
contractual obligation. Since there is no contract to speak of
because the obligation of the government sought to be
enforced does not originate from contract, then Article 1250
does not apply. The just compensation is the value of the
property at the time it was taken.
- Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of the
land as there was no motion of reconsideration from the
Solicitor General before the decision became final.
2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for P5,000
attorneys fees and hence the amount requested is
reasonable.
Dispositive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the basis of
determining the price of the land. And the price of P2.37 per
square meter or total amount is P14,615.79 plus six percent
per annum interest reckoned from the time the property was
taken to the time the compensation is paid.
GOVERNMENT
UNITED STATES V DORR
LADD; May 19, 1903
FACTS
The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted upon a
complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing,
and circulating a scurrilous libel against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292
of the Commission7. The alleged libel was published as an
editorial in the issue of Manila Freedom of April 6, 1902.
Virulent attacks on the Civil Commission and its members, for
instance the appointment of one Tecson as justice of the peace
and the branding of Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera as a coward
and a rascal, were explicitly raised among others. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUES
1. What is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression
the Insular Government of the Philippines?8
2. Whether the article constitutes an offense under section 8
of Act No. 292?
HELD
1. Ratio The term government as employed in Act No. 292
of the United States Philippine Commission is used in the
abstract sense of the existing political system as distinguished
from the concrete organism of the Government the Houses of
Congress and the Executive.
Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the term
government provided: a. in a general and abstract sense, the
existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or b. the aggregate
of the individuals by whom the Government of the Islands is,
for the time being, administered. The first admissible definition
is derived from the act of (the U.S.) Congress on July 14, 1798,
commonly known as the Sedition Act)9
2. Ratio The publication of an article can not be punished
under Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission
as having seditious tendencies unless it has a tendency to
produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a disposition
to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws.
7
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands , or which
tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or
which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community,
the safety and order of the Government, or who shall unknowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or
both, in the discretion of the court. (Italics mine)
8
N.B. We need to answer this question first in order to be able to resolve the next issue.
9
It is made an offense to write, print, utter, publish or cause to procure to be written, printed, uttered, or
published or to knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false,
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or either House of said
Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to
excite against them or either any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States"
- The publication of an article abusive of the United States
Philippine Commission and its members is not a libel upon the
Government and does not fall within said Act No. 292 of the
United States Philippine Commission.
Reasoning The article in question contains no attack upon the
government system of the U.S., and though grossly abusive as
respects both the Commission as a body and some of its
individual members, it contains no attack upon the
governmental system by which authority of the U.S. is enforced
in these Islands. Furthermore, it is the character of the men
who are intrusted with the administration of the government
that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning
the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private
morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the
article therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent,
constitutes no offense under section 8 of Act No. 292)
Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and the
defendants are acquitted.
TERRITORY
ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with
all the islands and water embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil,
the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form
part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046
An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of
the Philippines
- Approved: 17 June 1961
Whereas clauses
1. The following form part of territorial sea of the Phils:
All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of Paris
(1898), US-Spain treaty (1900), and US-Britain treaty
(1930).
All waters around, between and connecting the various
islands of the archipelago.
All waters beyond outermost islands of archipelago but
within limits of boundaries set forth in such treaties.
2. The baselines from which the territorial sea of Philippines is
determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of
the outermost islands of the archipelago.
Section 1 It defines and describes the baselines for the
territorial sea of the Phils.
Section 2 All waters within the baselines provided in sec1 are
considered inland or internal waters of the Phils.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446
R.A. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical errors in
Section 1 of R.A. 3046 defining the baselines of the territorial
sea of the Philippines. It further says that the definition of the
baselines of the territorial seas of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils.
has acquired dominion and sovereignty. Approved September
18, 1968.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596
June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring
certain area (the Kalayaan Island Group or more commonly
known as the Spratly Islands) as Philippine territory as well as
providing for its Government and Administration.
said area is vital to the security and economic
survival of the Philippines and much of it is part of the
continental margin of the Phil. archipelago
the area does not legally belong to any state or
nation and by reason of history, indispensable need,
effective occupation and control established in
accordance with international law, said area
(including its sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin
and air space) must be deemed to belong to and
subject to the sovereignty of the Phil.
other states claims to some of the area cannot
prevail over the claims of the Philippines on legal,
historical, and equitable grounds
named it Kalayaan and constituted it as a distinct patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
and separate municipality of Palawan
administration and government shall be vested in the
Secretary of National Defense or in other Civil govt.
or AFP officers as may be designated by the Pres.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599
Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other
Purposes
- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a seazone over which a
state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine
resources Wikipedia
- It extends from two hundred nautical miles beyond and from
the baselines from which the territorial sea
- when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries shall
be determined by countries
- What can be exercised in EEZ?
o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and
exploitation, conservation and management of the
natural resources
o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the
establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-
shore terminals, installations and structures, the
preservation of the marine environment, including the
prevention and control of pollution, and scientific
research
o Other rights recognized by international law or state
practice
- It also restricts other countries from exercising the rights
above in our EEZ.
- Recognizes that other countries have EEZs
- The President may authorize a government agency to
promulgate rules for the purposes of this decree
- Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall be
subject to a fine (P2,000-P100,000) or imprisonment (6 mos
10 yrs) or both. Vessels and other equipment or articles used
shall be confiscated.
PEOPLE
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty
God, in order to build a just and humane society and establish
s Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES

Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and
protect the people. The Government may call upon the people
to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens
may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render
personal, military or civil service.
Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful
ART III BILL OF RIGHTS
Sec 2:
Sec 7:
ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Sec 4:
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 2:
ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Sec 25:
TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
VITUG; March 3, 2004
FACTS
- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of President of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP).
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself
to be a natural-born citizen.
- His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or
Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939.
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before
the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners
his mother Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his
father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish national being a son
of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because
FPJ was illegitimate.
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie
Kelley according to an uncertified copy of a
supposed certification of the marriage in July 5,
1936.
- Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F.
Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year after the
birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their
marriage reflected the date of their marriage to
be on September 16, 1940 where Allan was 25,
unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22,
unmarried and American.
- FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather
Lorenzo Pou.
- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate
issued upon his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84
identified him as a Filipino residing in San Carlos,
Pangasinan.
- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was
born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan
showed that his father was an Espaol father and to a
mestiza Espaol mother.
Procedure
- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC,
Fornier presented the following pieces of evidence:
- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
- Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-
Poe attesting that she had filed a bigamy case against
Allan F. Poe because of his relationship with Kelley (in
Spanish)
English translation of (b)
- Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe
- Certification from the director of the Records
Management and Archives Office stating that a Lorenzo
Poe/Pou resided in the Philippines before 1907
- Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the
National Archives stating that there was no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe
- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among
others:
- Certification that there was no available information
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of
births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the
National Archives that there was no available
information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of
Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou,
- Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo
Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley
- Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San
Carlos, Pangasinan stating that the records of the birth
of the said office from 1900 to May 1946 were
destroyed during World War II
- January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition
for lack of merit and Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration
on January 26, 2004. The motion was denied by the
COMELEC en banc on February 6, 2004.
- February 10, 2004 Fornier filed a petition before the
Supreme Court, praying for TRO, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality
and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
- The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. COMELEC
and Velez v. Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and assert that only the Supreme Court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?
2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the
ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?
HELD
1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue
- The COMELECs decision on disqualified cases
involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to
and could be taken cognizance by the Supreme Court.
- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not
include cases directly brought before it questioning the
qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held.
Reasoning
- Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?
- Fornier petition - Yes
- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the
COMELEC, Fornier relied on the following:
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 is false (Omnibus
Election Code, Sec. 78)
- the Commission shall have exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of enduring free, orderly and honest elections
(Sec. 52, same)
- any interested party authorized to file a verified
petition to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of any nuisance candidate (Art. 69,
same)
- Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases
may be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 65). Aside from
that, according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution,
any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof.
- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which
includes the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch of instrumentality of the government. (Art. 8,
Sec. 1, Constitution).
- Tecson petition and Velez petition - No
- The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7,
Sec 4(7) of the Constitution in assailing the
COMELECs jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the
Fornier petition because the Supreme Court sitting en
banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the President
or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
- A contest refers to a post-election scenario. Election
contests are either election protests or a quo warranto
which would have the objective of dislodging the winner
from office. The Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal state:
- Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines. (Rule 12)
- An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election contest or a petition for quo-warranto
against the President or Vice-President. (Rule 13)
- Only the registered candidate for President or
Vice-President who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election
of the President or the Vice-Presidentby filing a
verified petitionwithin 30 days after the
proclamation of the winner. (Rule 14)
- The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President and the Vice President
and not candidates for President or Vice-President.
2. Ratio FPJs citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur, 7 dissent,
1 abstention and 1 separate opinion)
- The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy
should only remain in the sphere of civil law and should
not unduly impinge on the domain of political law.
- The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino regardless of
whether such children are legitimate of illegitimate.
Reasoning
- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the
ground that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born Filipino?
- Concept of citizenship
- Aristotle described a citizen as a man who shared in
the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office and the state would be composed of such
individuals in order to achieve a self-sufficient
existence.
- Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on the
one hand and with concomitant obligations on the other.
- Citizenship underwent changes in the 18 th to 20th
centuries.
- In the 18th century, the concept was civil
citizenship which established the rights necessary
for necessary for individual freedom (eg. Rights to
property, personal liberty and justice)
- In the 19th century, it expanded to include political
citizenship which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power.
- In the 20th century, there was the development of
social citizenship which laid emphasis on the right
of the citizen to economic well-being and social
security.
- Internationalization of citizenship is an ongoing
development.
- Citizenship in the Philippines from the Spanish times to
the present
- During the Spanish period, no such term as Philippine
citizens, only Spanish subjects. In church records,
natives were identified as indios.
- Spanish laws on citizenship included:
- Order de la Regencia of 1841
- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined the
political status of children born in the
Philippines)
- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870
- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not extended
to the Philippines because the colony was to be
governed by special laws.
- According to the Civil Code of Spain, the
following were Spanish citizens:
- Persons born in Spanish territory
- Children of a Spanish father or mother even if
they were born outside Spain
- Foreigners who have obtained naturalization
papers
- Those who, without such papers, may have
become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the
Monarchy
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and
political status of the native inhabitants would be
determined by the US Congress. Spanish subjects and
natives who choose to remain in the territory may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making a declaration of their decision within a year from
the date of the ratification of the treaty. If no such
declaration is made, their allegiance shall be held
renounced and they would have adopted the nationality
of the territory in which they reside.
- Upon ratification of the treaty, the native
inhabitants of the Philippines became Spanish
subjects.
- They did not become American citizens but were
issued passports describing them to be citizens of
the Philippines entitled to protection of the US.
- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 first appearance of
the term citizens of the Philippine islands. A citizen of
the Philippine islands under this Act was:
- An inhabitant of the Philippines and a Spanish
subject on April 11, 1899.
- An inhabitant meant:
- A native born inhabitant
- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain
- An inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on
or before April 11, 1899.
- Controversy as to the citizenship of a child born
between April 11, 1899 and July 1, 1902 as there
was no citizenship law in the Philippines. The
common law principle jus soli (principle of
territoriality) was said to govern those born in the
Philippines during this time.
- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) A native born
inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen
of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if:
- A Spanish subject on April 11, 1899
- Residing in the Philippines on the said date
- Since that date, not a citizen of another country
- 1935 Constitution provided that jus sanguinis (blood
relationship) be the basis for citizenship, as stated in
Sec. 1, Art. 3:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
- Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands
- Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines
- Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law
- 1973 Constitution Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the
1935 Constitution, which, when taken together with the
existing civil law provisions would provide that women
would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and
acquire that of their foreign husbands. This was
deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the
Filipino woman from transmitting her citizenship to her
legitimate children and required illegitimate children of
Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority. The provisions of Sec. 1,
Art. 3 of the 1973 Constitution state that the following
are citizens of the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of
the Philippines
- Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law
- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided
that a female citizen of the Philippines who marries
an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless
by her act or omission she is deemed to have
renounced her citizenship under the law.
- 1987 Constitution aimed to correct the irregular
situation generated by the questionable proviso in the
1935 Constitution which outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that
the following are Filipino citizens:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of
the Philippines
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.
- The Constitution requires that the President of the
Philippines should be, among the many requirements, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2).
- Natural born citizen citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship
- Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo
Pous citizenship and father Allan F. Poes citizenship
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because his
father Lorenzo was also Filipino.
- Conclusions with some degree of certainty to
be drawn from the documents presented:
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and
Bessie Kelley.
- FPJ was born to them on August 20,
1939.
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on September 16,
1940.
- The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo
Pou.
- At the time of his death on September 11,
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
- The public documents submitted are deemed
trustworthy.
- The three documents (birth certificate of
FPJ, marriage certificate of Bessie and
Allan and the death certificate of Lorenzo)
were certified true copies of the originals.
- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3) state
that when the subject of the inquiry is the
content of the document, no evidence shall
be admissible except the original document
itself. One of the exceptions however is
when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public office is recorded in a
public office.
- As public documents, the three
documents are prima facie proof of their
contents as stated in the Rules of Court
(130, Section 44) that the entries in official
records made by a public officer in the
performance of his duty are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. This is
grounded on: of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made. The
 penalty affixed to a breach of that duty.
Routine and disinterested origin of most
such statements. Publicity of the record
which makes more likely the prior exposure
of such errors as might have occurred
- It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pous place
of residence at the time of death was the same
as his residence before death in the absence of
evidence that would attest otherwise. In that
case, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine
Bill effected in 1902. This citizenship would then
extend to his son Allan F. Poe, FPJs father.
- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during
the Spanish colonization period.
- Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in
the Philippines during the crucial period of
1898 to 1902 but there is no existing record
to attest to that claim.
- Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was
out of the country during that same time
period.
- Lorenzos residence at the time of death
was in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- For proof of filiation or paternity, the mandatory
rules of civil law would not apply in this case. The
duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, FPJs maternal aunt and sister of his
mother Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe,
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ
(living with Bessie and the children in one house
as one family) would be accepted.
- Fornier argues that the mandatory rules under
civil rule should apply because FPJ was an
illegitimate son.
- Acknowledgement needed to establish
paternity (eg. Acknowledgement in the birth
certificate by signing name)
- In the FPJ case, there was no signature
of Allan F. Poe in the birth certificate of
FPJ.
- 1950 Civil Code acknowledgement of
illegitimate children of three types which
had to be done during the lifetime of the
presumed parent:
- Voluntary (expressly made in record
birth, will or a statement before the
court in authentic writing)
- Legal (in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who
was recognized as natural)
- Compulsory (demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor
any evidence to prove filiation)
- The Family Code has liberalized the
rules as stated in Articles 172, 173
and 175 and the rules have retroactive
effect (Article 255). These provisions
are there to govern the private and
personal affairs of the family. There is
little indication that this should also
govern his political rights.
- This should be taken in the context of civil law,
being that branch of law which is concerned with
the organization of the family and regulation of
property. The relevance of citizenship is
exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
- The proof of filiation for purposes of
determining citizenship status should be
deemed independent from those prescribed for
civil code purposes. The ordinary rules should
govern.
- DNA testing to prove paternity could also be
resorted to.
- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate
child cannot inherit his fathers citizenship.
- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were
Filipino, Allans citizenship would not have been
transmitted to FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate.
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the
bigamous marriage between his parents Allan and
Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had a
prior existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez.
The Court held that the veracity of this marriage
between Paulita and Allan is doubtful.
- Fornier also contended that even if Allan and
Bessies marriage was not bigamous, FPJ was still
illegitimate because his parents were married after
he was born. Fornier based his arguments on the
cases of Morano v. Vivo, Chiongbian v. de Leon
and Serra v. Republic.
- In the cases cited above, it is important to
note the lis mota in each case. If the
pronouncement of jus sangunis was in the
lis mota, it would constitute doctrine
courtesy of stare decisis. If not, it is mere
obiter dictum.
- In all of the mentioned cases, there was
no jus sanguinis in the lis mota of the
cases. If there was jus sangunis
mentioned, it was mere obiter dictum.
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate child
cannot inherit the fathers citizenship has no
textual basis in the Constitution and violates the
equal protection clause.
- For jurisprudence that regarded an illegitimate
child to inherit the mothers citizenship, it was there
to ensure a Filipino nationality for the child with the
assumption that the mother would gain custody.
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he
was born during that time period and it states that
Filipino citizens include those whose fathers are
citizens of the Philippines.
Decision
1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJs
citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor to hold
that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate
of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to
show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
for dismissing the original petition.
2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for
want of jurisdiction.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
Jurisdiction
- SC is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction
- Tecson and Valdez petitions petitioners cannot
invoke Art VII S4 of the Constitution because the word
contest means that the Court can only be invoked
after the election and proclamation of a President or
Vice President. There can be no contest before a
winner is proclaimed.
- Fornier petition as a review under R64 in relation to
R65 of the RoC, Court has jurisdiction.
- COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that
FPJ deliberately misrepresented that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizan in his CoC
- Certiorari power of the SC to review COMELEC decisions is a
limited power
- Can only reverse or change the COMELEC decision
on the ground that COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion (despotic, arbitrary or capricious)
- The ruling of the COMELEC denying the petition to disqualify
respondent Poe is based on substantial evidence, hence is not
despotic, whimsical or capricious
- Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC misrepresentation
must not only be material but also deliberate and willful
- Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to show that
(1) respondent made misrepresentation in his CoC, (2)
that misrepresentation is material to the position to
which he is candidate and (3) that material
misrepresentation was made deliberately and willfully
- Analysis of petitioners evidence
- Certificate of birth only proved the date of birth of
FPJ, not that he is not a natural-born citizen
- Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging Allan
Poe with bigamy and marriage license of between Allan
Poe and Paulita Gomez, presented thru Dir. Manapat
pulled out because they were fabricated
- Respondent submitted affidavits that show that
the files submitted by the petitioner are fabricated
by Manapats instructions
- Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not be
considered because of technical grounds
- SC ruled that the COMELEC is a quasi-judicial
body and are not bound by the technical rules of
evidence.
- Birth certificate of Allan Poe also fabricated; does
not prove anything besides birth
- Certification of Dir. Manapat that the National Archives
has no record that Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in
the Philippines before 1907 manufactured
- Certification of Estrella Domingo, OIC Archives Div
that the Register of Births that there is no information on
the National Archives on the birth of Allan Poe to the
spouse Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes lack of
information is not proof
- Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has always
conducted himself as Filipino
- For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of
proof, Poe is entitled to an outright dismissal of the
Fornier petition. Poe does not need to present contrary
evidence for the burden of proof is not shifted to him.
- Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction and
the issue of whether respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen
Filipino should now be resolved, the Fornier petition need not
be remanded to the COMELEC for further reception of
evidence
- Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a second
opportunity to prove his case is a palpable error
- In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curae, it
is daylight clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wring
with his facts but also wrong with his law.
- Remand means a new round of litigation in the
COMELEC when its proceedings have long been
closed and terminated; to give another chance to prove
facts which he failed to prove before
- Favors of remand cannot be extended to the litigant
because of political neutrality
- Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding by
judicial legislation, hence, unconstitutional
- Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately made
a material misrepresentation in his CoC when he wrote
that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
- Remanding the case to COMELEC will change the
character of a S78 proceeding (WON FOJ is a natural-
born Filipino citizen will be the main issue and not just
an issue incidental to the issue of material
misrepresentation)
- SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is
something only legislature can change by another law
- Remand will violate respondent Poes right to due process,
hence, unconstitutional
- If case were remanded to the COMELEC, the body is
no longer an impartial tribunal is there are three of the
seven members of the commission that have given firm
view that Poe is not a natural-born Filipino citizen
- Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of whether
respondent Poe is qualified. Delay will also prejudice his
candidacy and will favor his political opponents.
- The right to run for public office includes the right to
equal chance to compete. The right to run is empty if
the chance to win is diminished of denied a candidate.
- To avoid delay, the court should itself decide the issue and
declare respondent Poe as a natural-born citizen on the basis
of the evidence adduced before the COMELEC
- Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in
determining his status as natural-born citizen --- that is the law.
- The law does not make any distinction in applying jus
sanguinis to illegitimate children.
- Morano v Vivo WON the stepson was to file the
natural cerebral house.
- Chiongbian v de Leon a legitimate son whose father
became Filipino because of election to a public office
before the 1935 constitution
- Serra v Republic an illegitimate son of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother
- Paa v Chan Quintin claims that his father is Filipino
because his grandmother is a Filipina. The court ruled
that since there is no proof that his grandmother is
Filipino then his father is not Filipino thereby not making
him Filipino as well. The courts ruling should have
stopped here but the SC followed with an obiter dictum
that even if Quintins father were Filipino, he would not
be Filipino because he was illegitimate.
- The statements on the illegitimate child were
unnecessary and were just obiter dicta and not
ratio decidendi, therefore do not constitute stare
decisis.
- Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if
repeated endlessly.
- Reasons why court should create new doctrine:
- There is no textual foundation
- It violates the equal protection clause
- People v Cayat established the doctrine on
constitutionally allowable distinctions. Such
distinction must be germane to the purpose of the
law.
- Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor The duty of
this Court is to forsake and abandon any doctrine
or rule found to be in violation of the law in force.
- Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere
debemus, especially if the distinction has no
textual
- Merlin Magallona transmissive essence of
citizenship
- To establish that respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen, all
that is needed is proof of his filiation to his father Allan Poe, a
Filipino citizen --- that is the critical fact.
- Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondents father is well
established.
- To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate will
violate our treaty obligation.
Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is
qualified to run for President involves a constitutional issue but
its political tone is no less dominant. The Court is split down
the middle on the citizenship of respondent Poe, an issue of
first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national
and international law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of
the members of this Court, the better policy approach is to let
the people decide who will be the next President. For on
political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign people
will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the
unelected members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of
the people.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434,
161634 and 161824 are DISMISSED.
DAVIDE
FACTS
- January 9, 2004 Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ and
to cancel his certificate of candidacy for the May 10 elections
because of he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen
- January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the case declaring
that its jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election,
returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and
city officials, but not those of national officials like the president.
- but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
citizenship of national officials under sec 78 of OECon
petitions to deny due course or cancel certificates of
candidacy on the ground of false material
representation.
- Findings:
- Fornier evidence is not substantial
- FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material
representation when he stated that he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen
- Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed special civil action of
certiorari under R65 RoC to challenge jurisdiction of
COMELEC over the issue of FPJs citizenship. They claim that
only the Sc has jurisdiction (ArtVII S4, consti)
- January 29, 2004 - Velez filed petition with the ff issues:
- Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitions
to deny due course or cancel certificated of candidacy
of Presidential candidates
- Whether SC has jurisdiction over the petitions of
Tecson, Velez and Fornier
- Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, if hes a
natural-born Filipino citizen
Jurisdiction
- Tecson and Velez petitions
- The provision in the constitution only refers to past-
election remedies, they should have resorted to pre-
election remedies in the OEC which are implemented
by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
- Pre-election remedies are not within the jurisdiction of
the SC
- Under the OEC, COMELEC has original jurisdiction to
determine whether a candidate for an elective office
ineligible for the office for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy because of any of the recognized grounds
for disqualification.
- Fornier petition
- SC has jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-A S7
Consti )
- SC can take cognizance of issue of WON COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in the challenged resolution by
virtue of (ArtVIII S1 Consti)
WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen
Facts:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe were married on 16 September
1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe,
albeit a Spanish subject, was not shown to have declared his
allegiance to Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris and the
Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ratio For the purposes of citizenship, an illegitimate child
whose father is Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of
paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the
citizenship of the father
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen pursuant to Art IV S1 per 3
consti. The provision did not make any distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers.
Petitions are dismissed.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
May court exercise judicial power to disqualify a
candidate before the election?
- Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of the
people to choose their candidates.
Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
- Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this
Court, in his Separate Opinion said, In my view, the issue in
this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the
power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think
that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may
be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a
petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the
appropriate forum.
- Ruling of COMELEC is the same as Mandoza opinion.
- Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed
against the masses, a situation not allowed by the
Constitution. The SC may become like the Iranian Guardian
Council.This Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has the
duty to protect the right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair
election.
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissinG Forniers petition for
disqualification against respondent
- Salcedo v COMELEC the only instance when a petition
raising the qualifications of a registered candidate is before
election (S78 OEC)
- To justify the cancellation of CoC, false representation
mentioned must pertain to material matter
- There must be deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide fact which would render a candidate
ineligible
- Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP where COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in Jan 23 and Feb 6
resolutions holding that considering the evidence presented by
the petitioner is not substantial, we declare that the respondent
did not commit any material misrepresentation when he stated
in his CoC that he is a natural born Filipino citizen
Allegations in the COMELEC petition:
1. Respondent Poe committed false material
representation by stating in his Certificate of
Candidacy that he is a natural born Filipino citizen;
and
2. He knowingly made such false representation.
 - FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are
aliens.
- Director Manapat of the National Archives falsified the
marriage contract of FPJs parents and his fathers birth
certificate.
- Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat . he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove; S1 R131
RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo burden of proof is on the
party asserting the affirmative of an issue
- Fornier failed to prove allegations; writ of certiorari can
only be granted if it can be proven that COMELEC
committed a grave abuse of discretion;
-Grave abuse of discretion capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross that it amounted to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
- We cannot discern from the records any indication that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Forniers
petition. Indeed, his availment of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari is grossly misplaced.
Whether the respondent committed a material and false
representation when he declared in his CoC that he is a
natural-bron Filipino citizen
- COMELEC held that the FPJ did not commit any material
misrepresentation in his CoC because his father is a Filipino by
virtue of jus sanguinis and under the 1935 constitution.
- Valles v COMELEC Philippine law on citizenship adheres to
jus sanguinis
- FPJ is Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father
- Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen
of Spain because his
- Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows that his
parents are citizens of Spain.
- The marriage certificate was shown to have been
falsified.
- Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe is the
father of FPJ
- Allans father, Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject and
an inhabitant of the Philippines on April 11, 1899 when
Spain ceded the Philippines (Treaty of Paris, Phil Bill
1902 and Jones Law)
- In re Bosque expiration of the term of 18 months without
making an express declaration of intention to retain their
Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of the latter and thereby
becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same manner
as the natives of these islands
- Palanca v Republic
- A person, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine
Islands and a naturalized subject of Spain on the 11th
day of April 1899, is a Filipino citizen, by virtue of the
provisions of Sec. 4 of the Act of Congress on 1 July
1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August
1916. Under the Constitution, he is also a citizen of the
Philippines because he was such at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution.
- Constitution did not specify in referring to those whose
fathers are Filipino citizens as to whether this only
applies to legitimate children or not.
- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus ,
especially if the distinction has no textual foundation in
the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even
imposes an injustice on an innocent child. (Fr Bernas)
- To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or
illegitimacy in the status of the child vis--vis the
derivation of his citizenship from the father defeats the
transmissive essence of citizenship in blood
relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona)
In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in rendering its assailed Resolutions dated January
23, 2004 and February 6, 2004.
WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his
ponencia and with Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
Separate Opinion DISMISSING Forniers petition
CARPIO-MORALES
Issues for Resolution:
1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to
pass upon the qualifications of presidential candidates;
2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it issues its Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6,
2004, dismissing the Petition for Disqualification;
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore
qualified to seek election as President.
1) Jurisdiction:
- Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that this
Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to determine
whether FPJ is qualified to be a candidate for
President: paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution:
- The Supreme Court, sitting en banc , shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
- refers to this Courts jurisdiction over electoral
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President, and not to the
qualifications or disqualifications of a
presidential candidate. FPJ is still just a
candidate; petition: premature.
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claim that the
issue of FPJs qualification for the Presidency may
also be brought directly to this Court on the basis of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, specially considering that the instant case is
one of transcendental importance.
- a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is not available where there is
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of lawlike in this case: (to
intervene in the Petition for Disqualification)
- in determining whether procedural rules, such
as standing, should be relaxed on the ground of
transcendental importance, the following
should be considered: the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. Considering
that the substantive issues raised by petitioners
Tecson et al. and Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434
and 161634, respectively, are virtually identical
to those raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R. No.
161824, this Court is not convinced that the
transcendental importance of the issues raised
herein justifies a direct resort to this Court under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or the exercise of
its expanded certiorari jurisdiction under Sec. 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
- Petition in G.R. No. 161824
- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the petition
for Certiorari questioning the Resolutions of Jan. 23,
2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, issued by COMELEC:
Section 7 of Art. IX-A of the Constitution vests this
 Court with the power of review over decisions,
orders, or rulings of the COMELEC.
- COMELECs Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the
Petition for Disqualification Under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
- not really a constitutional question
2) Whether The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Dismissing the Petition for is qualification
for Lack of Merit.
- the COMELEC did indeed act with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing them:
- By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for
Disqualification without stating the factual bases therefore:
- Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides
that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
- By resolving to dismiss the Petition for Disqualification
without ruling categorically on the issue of FPJs
citizenship.
- To justify its evasion of the duty to rule squarely on
the issue of citizenship, the COMELEC relies on this
Courts ruling in Salcedo II v. Commission on
Elections, and held that held that Fornier should have
presented proof of misrepresentation with a
deliberate attempt to mislead on the part of FPJ
confined the issue in the Petition for Disqualification
to whether FPJ must have known or have been
aware of the falsehood as [allegedly] appearing on
his certificate.
- Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the COMELEC
to determine whether FPJ was aware of a false
material representation in his Certificate of
Candidacy without first determining whether such
material representation (in this case, his claim of
natural-born citizenship) was false. The fact alone
that there is a public document ( i.e., his birth
certificate) which FPJ might have relied upon in
averring natural-born citizenship does not
automatically exclude the possibility that (a) there is
other evidence to show that such averment is false,
and (b) that FPJ was aware of such evidence.
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
- Five crucial factual questions
(1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to be a
Filipino citizen at the time of the birth of his son, Allan F.
Poe;
- the evidence presented does not show that
Lorenzo Pou acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue
of the Treaty of Paris or the Organic Acts covering
the Philippine Islands. (no evidence as to his
residence, only prima facie evidence.)
(2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ was
a Filipino at the time of the birth of the latter;
- Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship
independently of his fathers by virtue of jus soli,
Allan F. Poe having been allegedly born in the
Philippines on November 27, 1916.
- even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was born
in the Philippines on November 27, 1916, such fact,
per se, would not suffice to prove that he was a
citizen of the Philippine Islands absent a showing that
he was judicially declared to be a Filipino citizen: In
Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor , this Court ruled that
the principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by
place of birth was never extended or applied in the
Philippine Islands:
(3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child;
- FPJs birth certificate indicates that his parents were
married, and that he is a legitimate child. However,
the Marriage Contract of his putative parents,
Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated
September 16, 1940, thereby indicating that he was
born out of wedlock. Since, in the Marriage Contract,
the two contracting parties, Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, participated in its execution, the entry therein
with respect to the date of their marriage should be
given greater weight than the birth certificate, which
was executed by a physician who had to rely on
hearsay as regards FPJs legitimacy.
- FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an
illegitimate child at birth.
(4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally determined to
be the father of FPJ (Assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe
has been shown to have acquired Philippine citizenship)
- As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the
stipulation by petitioner Fornier, both before the
COMELEC and this Court that Allan F. Poe is indeed
the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of Ruby Kelley
Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy of an affidavit of
Fernando R. Poe for Philippine Army Personnel.
- none of the proofs supplied are sufficient proofs of
filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.
(5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
- Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate,
child of an alien-mother who claims to be an
offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a
natural-born citizen if he was duly acknowledged
by the latter at birth , thus leaving the illegitimate
child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his
citizenship (nothing more to do to acquire citizenship
= natural born).
- no evidence has been submitted to show that Allan
F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son
at birth
- Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was
not acknowledged by his father, the only possible
Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the
inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-
born Philippine citizen.
Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 for being premature,
(2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated January 23, 2004
and February 6, 2004, rendered in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003
NULL AND VOID, and (3) DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.
Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material
representation.
IN RE: CHING
KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999
FACTS
- Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar
- April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps
Tat Ching, Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La
Union. Since birth, Ching has resided in the Phils
- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935
Constitution. Fathers citizenship is followed, with a right
to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- July 1998: Ching, after graduating from St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the 98 Bar
Examinations.
- Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided
he must submit proof of his Phil citizenship
- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter
Cert from COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union also from COMELEC.
- April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching
passed. He was further required to submit more proof of
citizenship.
- July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of
Phil Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance.
- OSG commented that Ching being the legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother and born under the 1935
Consti was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Phil citizenship. If
Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be
beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence
- Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (from
OSG):
1st the mother of the person making the election must be
a Phil citizen
2nd election must be made upon reaching the age of
majority (w/c means a reasonable time interpreted by
the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs, from the Velayo case; in
Cuenco, noted that this pd not inflexible, however, held in
the same case that 7 yrs not reasonable time)
- Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special
circumstances: continuous and uninterrupted say in the
Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and elected public
official
ISSUE
1. WON Ching has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable
time
and if so, WON his citizenship has retroacted to the time he
took the bar.
2. WON Chings special circumstances entitle him to
citizenship
HELD
1. No, Chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege.
Being born in April 1964, he was already 35 yrs old when he
complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625 in June 99. He
was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority.
Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling
statues and jurisprudence compel the Court in its decision.
Also, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election
of Phil citizenship, the latter not being a tedious and
painstaking process.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity
that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. It should be availed of with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude.
2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest
in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down
the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Decision Court denies Vicente D Chings application for
admission to the Philippine Bar
BENGZON III V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001
FACTS
- Constitutional requirement for members of the House of
Representatives: no person shall be a Member of the House
of Representatives unless he is a natural born citizen.
- Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November 5, 1985 he
enlisted in the US Marine Corps without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath of allegiance to
the US and as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship
because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may
lose his citizenship by rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Any
doubts as to his citizenship at the time was settled by his
naturalization as a US citizen on June 5, 1990.
- May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630.
- He was elected as the Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in 1998 and his opponent was Bengson.
- Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with HRET
claiming Cruz, not being a natural-born citizen by the
contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the Consti defines natural-
born citizens as citizens from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship, was not eligible
to be member of the House.
ISSUES
1. WON Cruz, a natural born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship via Repatriation,
so that the question of WON he is eligible to be a member of
the House might be addressed
2. - WON the HRET committed serious erros and grave abuse
of discreation amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling in
favour of Cruz as natural-born citizen
HELD
1. Yes.
Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship
o By birth natural born citizens
o Naturalization Naturalized citizens (those who
become Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under the Commonwealth Act no. 473. To
be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications
- 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of citizens:
o Natural born
o Naturalized
- Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire
it by naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of Congress.
o Naturalization mode for acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
o Repatriation available for those who have lost
their citizenship due to desertion of the armed
forces, service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in WWII, service in the armed forces of
the US at any other time, marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien, and political and economic
necessity. Process: taking an oath of allegiance
to the RP and registering it in the Local Civil
Registrar of the place where the person
concerned resides or last resided.
- Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original
nationality. He will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen because of his repatriation.
Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of taking an
oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said oath with
the Local Civil Registry
- 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for
persons who after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquires it because they are either natural born or
naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for
reacquisition.
- Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce
a natural-born Filipino.
2. No.
Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elction, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House. Courts jurisdiction
is merely to check WON there has been grave abuse; absent
such showing, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power
SEPARATE OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Additional Facts:
- In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of
candidacy for Mayor declaring himself to be a naturalized
Filipino citizen
- Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring himself
as natural-born
- Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of
the phrase from birth in Art IV, Sec 2 of the Consti
- Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite point and
must be continuous, constant and without interruption
- Respondent contends: refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a natural-born
- J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds:
- Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without
performing any acts. To repatriate, Cruz had to perform
certain acts before he could again become a Filipino
citizen. Therefore, he does not reaquire natural-born
citizenship
- The history of the Consti shows that the meaning and
application of the requirement of being natural-born have
become more narrow and qualified over the years, more
stringent; and the decision of HRET in the case at bar
reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the
Consti, a matter which can only be accomplished through
consti amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473
An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of the Citizenship
by Naturalization, and to repeal Acts 2927 and 3448
Sec 1: Title: Revised Naturalization Law Sec 2:
Qualifications: Who may become citizens of the
Philippines by naturalization?
1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the petition
2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUS period of
>10yrs
3. of good moral character
+ believes in principles underlying the Philippine Constitution
(1935 Consti)
+ conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner
during entire period of residence in the Philippines in relation
with constituted government and community with community in
which he is living
4. (must own real estate in the Philippines > P5000) or
Philippine currency or lucrative trade/profession/lawful
occupation
5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any one of the
principal Philippine language
6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any of the
public schools/private schools during the entire period of
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing
of his petition
School: citizenship
- recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines
- teaches Philippine history, government and civics and
prescribes it as part of the school curriculum
Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year
qualification required in Sec2(2) could be reduced to a
continuous 5 years?
1. had honorably held office under the Government of the
Philippines/ under that of any of the provinces, cities,
municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof [aliens,
particularly American citizens, were the ones who were
governing the country prior to the Commonwealth]
2. established new industry/ introduced a useful invention in the
Philippines
3. married to a Filipino woman
4. engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2 yrs
school: public/recognized private school + not established for
exclusive instruction of children of persons of particular
nationality/race
5. born in the Philippines
Sec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons
a. opposed to organized government/affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing organized govt
b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence/personal assault/assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas
c. Polygamists/believers of polygamy
d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)
e. Suffering from mental alienation/incurable contagious
disease
f. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace customs, traditions, and ideals of
Filipinos
g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whom US and the Philippines
are at war during such war
h. Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHER THAN US!]
whose laws dont grant Filipinos right to become naturalized
citizens/subjects
Sec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration that it is
his bona fide intention to become a citizen of the
Philippines
- under oath
- 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine
of the Bureau of Justice
-contents+ name
+ age
+ occupation
+ personal description
+ place of birth
+last foreign residence and allegiance
+date of arrival
+name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to the
Philippines
+place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making
the declaration *to be valid: establish lawful entry for
permanent residence + issued certificate showing date,
place, and manner of arrival
*also state that he had enrolled his minor children in school
(see sec2(6))
*2 pictures of himself
Sec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying after
declaration of intention not required to file declaration of
intention
Sec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed with
competent court
 *a petition in triplicate
contents of petition:
+name and surname
+present and former places of residence
+occupation
+place and date of birth
+status; if married and the father, include name, age,
birthplace and residence of wife and each child
+approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines
+name of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if
remembered)
+declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification
+declaration that he has complied with sec. 5
+declaration of continuous residence in RP from date of filing
petition to admission as RP Citizen
*2 photographs of petitioner
*petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of at least
2 credible persons (see provision for requirements)
Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the petitioner
has resided for at least 1 yr immediately preceding the filing of
the petition
Sec 9. Notification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of court
publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OG and in one of
gen circulation newspapers in the province where petitioner
resides
post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain
name, birthplace and residence of petitioner, date and place of
arrival, names of witnesses, date of hearing the petition)
*hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days from date of last
publication of notice
forward copies of the petition, sentence, naturalization
certificate and pertinent data to Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Justice, Provincial Inspector of the Philippine
Constabulary of the province, and justice of peace of the
municipality where petitioner resides
Sec 10. Hearing of the petition.
*no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election
*public hearing
*Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal appear for
Commonwealth at all proceedings
*upon belief of court of qualifications and non-disqualification
of petitioner, court order proper naturalization certificate in
proper civil registry (required in Sec. 10, Act No. 3753)
Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC
Sec 12: Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization: 30
days after and from date of notice to the parties (in case of
appeal, SC confirmed deci), clerk of court issue naturalization
certificate
contents of certificate of naturalization
*file no. of petition
*number of naturalization certificate
*signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of
the clerk of court
*personal circumstances of the person naturalized
*dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition
*date of decision granting petition
*name of the judge who rendered deci
*photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted petition
*oath declared in open court [refer to the original]
Sec 13. Record Books: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1)
record of petition and declarations of intentions in chronological
order; (2) record of naturalization certificate
Sec 14. Fees.
*P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings +
issuance of certificate)
*P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services
rendered)
sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children
*on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just
married or also naturalized)
*on minor children:
if born in the Philippines: Filipino
if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines during
naturalization of parent: Filipino
if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines
during naturalization of parent: Filipino during
minority, unless resides in the Philippines
permanently and still a minor, then legally
Filipino upon age of majority
if foreign-born after naturalization of parent: Filipino
unless fails to register and take oath 1 yr after
age of majority
Sec 16. Right of widow and children of
petitioners_who_have_died: continue proceedings, same
legal effect
Sec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility: unless
w/ express consent of the National Assembly
Sec 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificates issued
*upon motion made in proper proceedings by Solicitor-
General/representative/proper provincial fiscal
*cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds:
a. naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently/illegally
b. person naturalized establishes permanent residence
outside Philippines w/n 5 yrs after issuance of naturalization
certificate
c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention
d. minor children shown to have failed to graduate from
school in sec 2 (6) through fault of parents either by neglect
to support or by transferring them to another school(s)
e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate
constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship
Sec 19 Penalties for violation of this Act: fine < P5,000.00
or imprisonment< 5 yrs or both, naturalization cancelled
Sec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from
detection/discovery of commission of offense
Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks.
*Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations
*Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of Justice:
naturalization certificate blanks, etc.
Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as
amended by Act No. 3448 [Naturalization Law]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530
An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization
- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship (also
required by previous law, prob. Act 423, below)
- Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after the
publication
- Decisions granting the application become executory only
after 2 years, and
- The Solicitor General or his representative finds that during
the intervening time, applicant has:
NOT left the Philippines
Dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling or
profession
NOT been convicted of any offense or violation of
govt. rules
NOT committed any act prejudicial to the interest of
the nation or contrary to any govt. announced
policies
- After the finding, the order of the court granting citizenship will
be registered and the oath taken by the applicant before he will
be entitled to the privileges of citizenship.
- Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423.
- Approved, June 16, 1950.
 COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine
Citizenship may be lost or reacquired
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost.
(1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support constitution
or laws of foreign country upon +21y.o.: a Filipino may not
divest himself of Philippine citizenship while the RP is at war;
(4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the armed
forces of foreign country: rendering of service to/the
acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of
foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance
incident thereto, with the consent of RP, shall not divest a
Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the ff. is
present:
(a) RP has defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with
the said foreign country; or
(b) said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory w/ consent of RP: Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service/or
acceptance of said commission, & taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign country : &
provided that any Filipino citizen who is rendering service
to/or is commissioned in, the armed forces of foreign
country under (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to
participate nor vote in any election of RP during period of
service to/commission in, the armed forces of said foreign
country. automatically entitled to full enjoyment of civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen upon his discharge;
(5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization;
(6) having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of
the AFP in time of war, unless pardon or granted amnesty; &
(7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
*** Sec 1 amended by RA 106, section 1, approved June 2,
1947
*when dual citizenship was allowed at that time:
acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino citizen from
Iberian/democratic Ibero-American countries/ United Kingdom
if the law of that country grants same privilege to its citizens
agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and foreign
country from which citizenship is acquired.
Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired.
(1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the
disqualification's prescribed in sec 2, Act No. 2927 (repealed
by CA 473 so sec 4)
(2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp:
Provided, woman by sec 1(7) may be repatriated in
accordance with the provisions of this Act after the
termination of the marital status;(see PD 725 for more details)
(3) direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. Apply Act No. 2927 (now CA 473) to
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by naturalization
provided for in the next preceding sec: Provided, qualifications
and special qualifications prescribed in sec 3 & 4 of Act 2927
shall not be required (sorry guys, I cant find a copy of Act 2927
in the net so I dont know what these sections are in CA 473):
further, applicant
(1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before he
applies for naturalization;
(2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable
manner during
+the entire period of his residence in RP
+in his relations with the constituted government
+with the community in which he is living; and
(3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce
absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign
authority/state/sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines (RP) and registration in the proper civil registry.
(used in the Bengzon Case)
Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA 473
YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
PADILLA; January 24, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for Habeas Corpus
- 1971 Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for
5 years & renewed for same period upon presentment before
Portuguese consular officer
- Feb. 10, 1978 He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen
- April 1980 signed commercial documents in Hong Kong
(Companies Registry of Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and he declared
his nationality as Portuguese
- July 21, 1981 He applied & was issued another Portuguese
passport in Tokyo. Passport will expire July 20, 1986.
Procedural Facts:
- July 4, 1988 He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He
was detained because the Commission on Immigration &
Deportation was processing his deportation. CID claims that his
acts are tantamount to an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
- July 20, 1988 oral arguments
- Nov. 10, 1988 SC resolution denied petition for habeas
corpus & resolved issued on jurisdiction of CID over naturalized
Filipino citizen & validity of warrantless arrest & detention. Yu
filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed urgent motion for issuance of
restraining order, denied.
- Dec. 5, 1988 Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for
restraining order.
- Dec. 7, 1988 SC issued TRO. CID ordered to cease &
desist from deporting Yu pending conclusion of hearings before
Board of Special Inquiry of CID.
- Dec. 13, 1988 Respondent commissioner filed motion to lift
TRO saying the commission already issued a summary
judgment of deportation against Yu on Dec. 2, 88.
- Dec. 13, 1988 Yu filed an urgent motion for release from
arbitrary detention. Opposed vigorously to lifting of TRO.
- Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil
citizen. He complied. His reply revealed aforementioned
substantive facts.
ISSUE
WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
HELD
Yes. Motion for release from detention denied. TRO lifted.
Ratio
- Renunciation made known distinctly & explicitly and not left
to interference or implication (BI Commissioners vs. Go
Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition of his Portuguese
citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese
even after he has acquired Filipino citizenship are proof
enough of his renunciation.
- He does not dispute the facts. He was given the opportunity
to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship but he failed.
There is no denial of due process.
- Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But due to
petitioners insistence, SC had to do it.
- Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [concur]
Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his
status as naturalized Filipino by obtaining Portuguese passport.
Passports are generally issued only to nationals. No proof of
Yus unequivocal & deliberate renunciation of Phi. Citizenship
w/ full awareness of its significance & consequences as
provided for in CA No. 63. Commercial documents signed are
not proof enough of renunciation.
FERNAN [dissent]
Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not
enough to reach such decision. Evidence must be clear &
express w/o room for interference or implication. In a
deportation proceeding where alien claims citizenship
w/substantial evidence, hes entitled to have his status
determined by judicial & not an executive tribunal. He deserves
a full-blown trial under more rigid rules of evidence in a court
proceeding. SC is not a trier of facts.
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as important
as denaturalization should be filed & prosecuted in proper trial
court in accordance w/the due process clause. When a person
pleads vigorously that he has not renounced his citizenship, he
should at least be given a full trial where his actions may be
explored & the facts fully ascertained. Dangerous precedent to
allow administrative officials to rule that one has renounced his
citizenship based on informal evidence. Mere use of a foreign
passport is not express renunciation. He may have passport for
other purposes (employment, convenience). Some high govt
officials have done acts w/c are more indicative of express
renunciation than mere use of passport or different citizenship
has been signed. SC is not a trier of facts. Yus morality is
beside the point. He deserves his full day in court.
CORTES [dissent]
CID findings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yus Filipino
citizenship has not been established. Evidence presented were
not authenticated by proper Philippine consul, thus not
substantial and are inadequate.
PEOPLE V AVENGOZA
RELOVA; December 7, 1982
FACTS
- Criminal Case; Appeal from Decision of CFI of Camarines Sur
- Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese,
together with the formers mother Gavina Avengoza and
Rafaela Anfante are being charged with violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law on transactions for the spouses to own
agricultural lands in the Philippines.
- Anselma Avengoza, upon marriage to Go Gam, acquired
Chinese citizenship
- The Anti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino citizens may
own local agricultural land.
- Pending litigation, Go Gam and Gavina passed away.
- Upon Go Gams passing, Anselma executed an oath of
allegiance to the RP and filed it with the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer for the purpose of reacquiring her citizenship by
repatriation, averring by reason whereof that her criminal
liability is thereby extinguished; and that the issue of the
criminal case is rendered moot and academic
- Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its opinion
that Anselma had validly reacquired Philippine citizenship
ISSUES
1. WON Anselma reacquired citizenship after executing an
oath of allegiance to the RP and filing it with the Municipal
Treasurer
2. if so, WON such reacquisition of citizenship exempted her
from liability for the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law
HELD
1. No.
Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Would-be repatriate should
show conclusive proof that she has the qualifications to be so
repatriated. Anselma became an alien by reason of her lawful
marriage to a Chinese citizen; however this does not
necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen prior to such
marriage.
2. No.
Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated, like an alien
who became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her repatriation will
not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti-
Dummy Law.
JAO V REPUBLIC
VASQUEZ; March 29, 1983
FACTS
- Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because she
was born of a Chinese father and an illiterate Filipina mother
who were not legally married. - She married a Chinese man
and therefore lost her Philippine citizenship but he is now dead.
- Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as an
alien and she was issued an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR).
- She is claiming back her Phil. citizenship, by way of a petition
for repatriation filed in CFI of Davao.
- CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as judicially
repatriated, and ordered cancelled her ACR.
- Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appealed the case.
ISSUE
WON the judicial decree by the RTC was necessary for
repatriation.
HELD
Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as judicially
repatriated are a complete nullity. There is no law requiring or
authorizing that repatriation should be effected by a judicial
proceeding.
Reasoning In Lim v. Republic, 37 SCRA 783, it was held that
there is no proceeding established by law or the rules by
which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a declaration
in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.
All that is needed for a female citizen of the Phil. who lost her
citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phil. citizen, upon the
termination of her martial status, is for her to take necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Phil. and to register
the said oath in the proper civil registry.
Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set aside.
5 Justices concur.
Obiter Petitioners claim of Phil. citizenship prior to her
marriage for being allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipina mother may not be established in an
action where the mother or her heirs are not parties. It is the
consistent rule in this jurisdiction that Phil. citizenship may not
be declared in a non-adversary suit where the persons whose
rights are affected by such a declaration are not parties, such
as an action for declaratory relief, petition for judicial
repatriation, or an action to cancel registration as an alien.
VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
MALCOLM; March 25, 1919

FACTS
- Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice,
ordered the closing of the citys red light district. The brothels
were closed and the workers (170 women) were rounded up
and kept confined to their houses in the district by the police for
a little more than a week. On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the
women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor
and Negros and sent off to Davao to work as laborers without
their consent, without opportunity to consult with friends/family
or to defend their rights. They reached Davao 4 days later and
were met by Francisco Sales, governor of Davao and by
hacendero Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo, etc.
- During their voyage, the womens relatives and friends
initiated an application for habeas corpus, alleging that Justo
Lukban, along with Anton Hohmann (the police chief), and
others deprived the women of their liberty. The court awarded
the writ of habeas corpus (w of hc) and ordered Lukban and co.
to bring the women before the court. Although they returned
with none of the women, they were given another chance. The
court issued another order this time calling for the respondents
to produce all of the women not in Manila. The respondents
were only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the
issuance of the writ.
ISSUES
1. Re: the proper granting of the writ:
a. WON the petitioners had standing
b. WON the S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction
c. WON the women were actually restrained of their liberty
2. WON there was compliance with the court orders
3. On contempt of court
HELD
1a. Yes
Ratio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an
application for the w of hc, another person may submit it in
his/her behalf.
Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have signed a
petition for habeas corpus with the way their expulsion was
conducted. They were first isolated from society and then
shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted
by persons in their behalf.
1b No
Ratio The w of hc may be granted by the Supreme Court or
any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippines. The
SC can decide upon where the writ shall be made returnable to
(whether before the SC or before a lower court).
Reasoning The CFI of Davao was not in session. The case
involves parties from different parts of the country. Habeas
Corpus was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
1c. Yes
Ratio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the women
is constitutive of deprivation of freedom of locomotion.
Reasoning The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieve a
person from such restraint if it is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
2. 1 st order: No. Respondents were not able to bring the
women before the court on the day named. The court could
have sent the respondents to jail however, the court forebore
drastic action because it did not want the public to see a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary and because it
wanted to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate
their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
2 nd order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were able
to produce 8 women. The mandate called for all of the women
not in Manila. However, the court decided that there was
substantial compliance, noting the effort (placards were posted,
police helped, free shipping to Manila was provided) and the
fact that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident
finally closed.
3. Ratio Only Lukban is guilty of contempt. His intentions
were commendable, his methods were unlawful. An officers
failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of
habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt
committed in the face of the court.
Reasoning He was primarily responsible for setting forth this
whole chain of events and had under his power as head of the
city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila
but failed. The rest of the respondents other than Lukban are
not guilty of contempt. Some were merely following the orders
of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was merely
drawn into the case through miscommunication.
Disposition No further action on the w of hc. Lukban found in
contempt of court and shall pay Php 100 within 5 days. Rest of
respondents found not to be in contempt of court.
KURODA JALANDONI
MORAN; March 26, 1949
FACTS
Kuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being charged
by the Military Commission with failure to perform duties as
commander in preventing crimes/atrocities against civilians,
and POWs. In defense, he is alleging that Executive Order No.
68 (EO68) which established a Natl. War Crimes Office is
unconstitutional and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and
Port (both American) have no authority to practice law in the
country. As such, the respondents should be prohibited from
proceeding with this case.
ISSUES
1. WON EO68 is unconstitutional
2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port
A. WON they are qualified to practice in accordance with the
Rules of Court
B. WoN their appointment as prosecutors is violative of the
Constitution
HELD
1. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully
empowered to consummate an unfinished aspect of war which
is the trial and punishment of war criminals through the
issuance and enforcement of EO68.
Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to establish a
Natl. War Crimes Office and provide for rules and regulations in
trying accused war criminals. It conforms to the generally
accepted principles/policies of international law, including the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention, which are part
of the law of the nation. Its promulgation was an exercise of the
President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the whole
armed forces. Iin Yamashita v. Tyer, the court held that the
power to create a military commission for the trial and
punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. A
military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state
of war continues.
2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military tribunal
governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court.
Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 which requires that
counsel appearing before said commissions must be attys.
qualified to practice law in the Phil. in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
2B. No
Ratio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not
violative of our national sovereignty.
Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US, which has
submitted the vindication of crimes against her govt. and her
people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed
representation in the trial of those very crimes.
Disposition The Military Commission having been convened
by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes
charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No.
68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere
with the due processes of such Military Commission. Petition
denied. With costs de oficio.
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO
LABRADOR; May 31, 1957
FACTS
- Injunction and Mandamus
- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate
the Retail Business. It prohibits aliens and associations,
partnerships, or corporations, which are not wholly owned by
citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. In
effect it nationalizes the retail business.
- Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of
other alien residents, corporations, and partnerships adversely
affected by RA 1180 filed a petition for Injunction and
Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of Finance
and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila.
- Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
A. Police Power
- the most positive and active of all governmental processes,
the most essential, insistent and illimitable
- necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework
B. Equal Protection Clause
- against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality; it
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions
- is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making distinction between those who fall within such class
and those who do not.
- Criteria for Test of EPC
1. presence of public interest and welfare
2. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and
means
3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and
classification made
C. Due Process clause
- has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power
- Questions for test:
1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?
2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislatures purpose; is it not
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means
used or is it merely an unjustified interference with private
interest?
ISSUES
1. WON RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection
of the laws.
2. WON RA 1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and
property without due process of law.
3. WON the title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it
conceals the real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the
retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
4. WON RA 1108 violates international and treaty obligations
of the Republic of the Philippines.
HELD
1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection
established by the Constitution if there is a question of public
interest involved or pursued and the classification or distinction
used by the legislature, in this case between nationals and
aliens, is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one
class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that
classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded.
Reasoning
a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes
his profit. Aliens lack spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the
country. Alien participation in the retail trade has been attended
by intolerable practices like the ff:
- hoarding essential commodities
- violating price control laws
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not
cater or yield to their demands
- believed to have evaded tax laws
- bribing public officials
b. Economic reason alien retailer never really makes a
genuine contribution to national income and wealth since the
gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the countrys economy and increase national
wealth.
c. precedents
Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden
Commonwealth vs. Hana, Anton vs. Van Winkle, Templar vs.
Michigan State Board of Examiners
- Essentially held that the difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.
Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs.
McConway & Tarley
- held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is
not valid because the laws were found to be arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product
of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no
question of public interest involved or pursued.
2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to
have reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Reasoning
a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law
- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life\
- Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are
subject to the economic control and domination of others,
especially if not of their own race or country.
b Nationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution
- Section 8 of Article XIV provides that no franchise, certificate,
or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
c. Provisions of law not unreasonable
- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is
in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views
inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the
legislation if not in excess of the legislative power.
3. No. The provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the
title. The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title
of the bill and the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law.
Reasoning
a. The term regulate is a broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been included
within the term regulation.
4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and
the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.
GONZALES V HECHANOVA
CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963
FACTS
- Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign rice
and created rice procurement committee. Gonzales, a rice
planter and President of Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed petition.
Procedure Case is an original action for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to restrain implementation of decision of
Exec. Sec. to import rice. Respondents were required to file
answer and hearing was set.
- on WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction
Petitioners stand:
- Yes, bec. RA 3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and
corn by Rice and Corn Administration and any other govt
agency.
Respondents stand:
- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
- Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies
available before coming to court.
- Petitioners action is not sufficient and not governed by RA
3452 because importation was authorized by President as
Commander in Chief for military stock pile purposes. As such,
Pres must prepare for threats without waiting for any special
authority.
- Also, they say its not under RA 3452 bec. the RAs prohibit
importation of rice and corn by government agency and not
the government itself.
- Even if the proposed importation violated the RAs, it can still
be permitted because it is for the benefit of the people.
- The Phils is already under executive agreements with
contracts for purchase of rice with Vietnam and Burma. In
case of conflict between the RAs and the contracts, the
contracts should prevail because it came later. These
contracts have been consummated bec. the Phils. has already
paid.
ISSUE
WON respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction
HELD
- RA 3452 says that the govt policy is to purchase basic foods
directly from farmers in Phils. Petitioner has sufficient interest.
- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal one. It
falls under the exemption from the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
- The proposed importation is governed by RA 2207 and RA
3452 bec it covers all importations of rice and corn into the
Phils.
- RA 2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the
government itself bec. RA 2207 talks about imports authorized
by the President, by and on behalf of government. RA 3452
also indicates that only private parties may import rice under its
provisions. These RAs are only in addition to Commonwealth
Act No. 138 which says that in all purchases by govt, incl.
those for armed forces, preference is given to materials
produced in the Phils.
- The benefit of the people argument cant be accepted voluntary landsharing.
because there is no local rice shortage. And the importation is
said to be for stockpile of Army, not for the civilian population.
- The contracts w/ Vietnam and Burma are not executive
agreements. Even if they were, they are unlawful, being
against the RAs. The alleged consummation does not render
this case academic. The contracts may have already been
entered into and the payment may have been made but the
actual importation has not yet taken place.
Disposition - For lack of requisite majority, injunction prayed
for is DENIED.
- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize
importation in question and he exceeded jurisdiction in granting
authority. The importation is not sanctioned by law and is
contrary to its provisions.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V
SECRETARY OF DAR
CRUZ; July 14, 1989
FACTS
- The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice
to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people," especially the, less privileged.
- In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding
specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property
and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.
Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate
and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at
emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
- The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these sentiments,
also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social
Justice and Human Rights. One of its sections:
- SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable
retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations
and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of
small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
- R.A, No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of
the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated
principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade
later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21,
1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.
- On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O.
No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of
still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987
by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O.
No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
- With its formal organization, the revived Congress of the
Philippines (formally convened on July 27, 1987) took over
legislative power from the President and started its own
deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the
improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after
almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A.
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June
10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
ISSUES
1. WON petitions are justiciable.
2. WON P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229 and R.A. 6657 contravene the Constitution
on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process,
equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Sub issues
a. The determination of just compensation may be made only
by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines.
b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is
payable only in money or in cash but not in the form of bonds
or other things of value.
c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land, E.O.
No. 228 deprives the petitioners of their property rights as
protected by due process.
d. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of
solving the agrarian problems is placed on the owners only of
agricultural lands.
e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the
owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored
judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.
f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress
and not the President. Although petitioners agree that the
President could exercise legislative power until the Congress
was convened, they contend that she could do so only to enact
emergency measures during the period.
g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund
under Proc. No. 131 is in futuro, not in esse, i.e., it has yet to
be raised and cannot be appropriated at that time.
h. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate group
with problems exclusively their own and by being lumped in the
same legislation with other farmers, their right to equal
protection has been violated.
i. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of
eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to
own property.
j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of
the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an
amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the
land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner
declares his own valuation, he is unjustly required to
immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in
violation of the uniformity rule.10
k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a
bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title.
HELD
1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied but even if they are not covered by the definition, it is
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing
and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
2a. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary
unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts
of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function. (Sec. 16f)
2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional medium for the
payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past
solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the
traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. 11 This is
not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its
owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal
with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1
that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners
as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
P.D. No. 27.
10
This was not discussed directly but may be construed as being under No. 1 above. It will still be the
courts who will decide what just compensation would be.
11
The power of eminent domain is one of the three inherent powers of the State. It is the power to
forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. It
is inherent because it exists without need for legislation, i.e., even if it is not sanctioned by any law or
even the Constitution, the State may exercise it. Why? Because these powers are necessary for a state to
exist. The other two are police power and taxation.
It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired
under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in
the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order
to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to
the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just
compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for
the land.
2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things
similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The argument that not
only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will
not see.12
2e. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.
No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 was authorized under Section 6 of
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is not
correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when
she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue
to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or
declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto
become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the
legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the Congress she is
alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact
substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has
specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No.
6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it
does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its
principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and
specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public
funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only
incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is
agrarian reform. Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are
not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this
12
Frankly, I dont like the way this ponente argues. Hes like saying, now I dont want to explain why. If
you cant see the reasoning its your fault. Anyway, were infallible remember? His next sentence:
There is no need to elaborate on this matter. Tsk
obviously could not have been complied with for the simple 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under -livestock and poultry raising is different from crop farming in
reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. that land is not a primary input in the former
exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of
been convened when the proclamation was issued. The retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights ISSUE
legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein WON S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are constitutional insofar
Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of prescribed. as said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
Congress. 5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are in its coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and
2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs. Guidelines
requisites of a valid classification have been violated. SO ORDERED. (Unanimous court)
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or HELD
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR Instant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 & 32 of RA 6657 are
from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must PARAS; December 4, 1990 constitutional insofar as said law includes the raising of
conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as in its
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes FACTS Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby declared null
of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Secretary and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary
and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. of the Department of Agrarian Reform injunction issued is hereby made permanent
The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the - 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA 6657 or the Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional construction;
measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which includes the in construing any ambiguous provisions, the courts may look to
2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry the debates of the concon
limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private 1/2/89: Sec. of Agrarian Reform (SAR) promulgated Guidelines -the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly show that the
property shall not be taken for public use without just and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing meaning of the word agricultural (its dictionary meaning
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has for RA 6657 (S13 & S32) aside) was never meant to include livestock and poultry
evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the - 1/9/89: SAR promulgated Rules and Regulations industries in its coverage;
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public implementing S11 (commercial farms) there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in
use and (2) just compensation.13 -Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in agrarian reform
Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximum livestock/poultry, adversely affected by RA 6657 -S13 & 32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory and is
retention under Art. XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution and under -petition prays that RA be declared unconstitutional; it is also thus violative of due process
P.D. 316 which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. 27. prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the
2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Sec. 6 of enforcement of the said law (injunction denied) SEPARATE OPINION
the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. 8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on injunctive
(Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5 hec. 3 hec may be awarded to relief SARMIENTO
each child at least 15 yrs old and actually tilling or directly -Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA 6657: -agrees that petition be granted but not that main issue is one
managing the land) S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of of consti construction and interpretation
2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be a Agricultural Enterprise/Activity A13, S4: ..in case of other farm workers, to receive a just
catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters S11: defines commercial farms as agricultural lands share of the fruits thereofthis phrase provides a possible
embodied in the text are relevant to each other. devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising coverage of livestock, poultry and swine
Decision S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3% of -every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: gross sales & 10% of gross profits to workers as constitutionality of a statute
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. additional compensation) ISSUE: WON assailed provisions violate equal protection
228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional S16(d) & 17: vests in DAR authority to determine clause of the consti
objections raised in the herein petitions. compensation to be paid for lands covered by RA 6657 -clearly, livestock & poultry lands and crop & tree farms are not
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13 similarly situated, hence the inclusion of the former in CARP
State only upon full payment of compensation to their -the constitutional provision under consideration is A13, S4, would be violative of the equal protection clause
respective owners. Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
13 which grants farmers and farm-workers who are landless, the GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
There was a shift in subject after this. He tackled the argument on why the State did not distribute
public lands only by pointing out the Constitutions the just distribution of all agricultural lands clause. right to directly or collectively own the land they are tilling CRUZ; December 2, 1991
Then he plays the political question card on the issue of why the distribution would be private lands first.

FACTS
Petitioner challenges RA7042 on the ground that:
- It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos and the protection of Filipino enterprises against unfair
foreign competition and trade practices
- He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign
enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages
over local investments which are practically elbowed out in
their own land with the complicity of their own government
- Under Section 5 of the said law a foreign investor may do
business in the Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise
up to 100% of its capital without need of prior approval
o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection in the case of a
single proprietorship
o The SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not
impose any limitations on the extent of foreign
ownership in an enterprise additional to those provided
in the Act
- Under Section 7, non-Philippine nationals may own up to one
hundred percent (100%) of domestic market enterprises unless
foreign ownership therein is prohibited or limited by existing law
or the Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8
hereof."
- However, the system of negative list under Section 8
abandons the positive aspect of regulation and exercise of
authority over foreign investments. In effect, it assumes that so
long as foreign investments are not in areas covered by the list,
such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the
national economy.
o List A merely enumerate areas of activities already
reserved to Philippine nationals by mandate of the
Constitution and specific laws
o List B - contain areas of activities and enterprises
already regulated according to law and includes small
and medium-sized domestic market enterprises or
export enterprises which utilize raw materials from
depleting natural resources with paid-in equity capital of
less than the equivalent of US$500,000.00; meaning,
SMEs are for Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not
encouraged to go big.
o List C - contain areas of investment m which "existing
enterprises already serve adequately the needs of the
economy and the consumers and do not need further
foreign investments."; However, existing enterprises
must be qualified as Filipino, if not, it shall protect
foreign enterprises too
- Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine national
believes that an area of investment should be included in list C,
the burden is on him to show that the criteria enumerated
in said section are met
- Articles 2, 32, & 35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982
are done away with by RA 7042.
- By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus
Investments Code, RA No. 7042 further abandons the
regulation of foreign investments by doing away with important
requirements for doing business in the Philippines.
- The Transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically
unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years, subject
only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment Negative
List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but
would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their
own country.
Sol-Gen answers:
- phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity
restrictions alone
o prior to the effectivity of RA 7042,
Article 46 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987
(EO No. 226), provided that a non-Philippine national
could, without need of prior authority from the Board of
Investments (BOI), invest in: (1) any enterprise
registered under Book I (Investments with Incentives);
and (2) enterprises not registered under Book I, to the
extent that the total investment of the non-Philippine
national did not exceed 40% of the outstanding capital
o On the other hand, under Article 47
thereof, if an investment by a non-Philippine nationals in
an enterprise not registered under Book I was such that
the total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the
outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%, prior
authority from the BOI was required.
- With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 &
15, the areas of investments not open to foreign investors are
already determined and outlined; hence, registration with the
SEC or BTRCP, as the case may be, is now the initial step to
be taken by foreign investors.
- This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of
authority over foreign investments. Under SEC and BTRCP
rules and regulations, foreign investors must first comply with
certain requirements before they can be issued a license to do
business in the Philippines.
- Section 7 of RA 7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own
up to 100% of domestic market enterprises only in areas of
investments outside the prohibitions and limitations imposed by
law to protect Filipino ownership and interest.
- The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8
reserves to Filipinos sensitive areas of investments. List C
prohibits foreign investors from engaging in areas of activities
where existing enterprises already serve adequately the needs
of the economy and the consumer.
o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after
securing to Filipinos their rights and interests over the
national economy.
o List A The provisions of the Constitution and other
specific laws regulate or limit the extent of foreign
ownership in enterprises engaged in areas of activity
reserved for Filipinos
o List B - contains areas already regulated pursuant to
law already makes it clear that it is regulatory. It
channels efforts at promoting foreign investments to
bigger enterprises where there is an acute lack of
Filipino capital; scheme is for foreign investments to
supplement Filipino capital in big enterprises.
o List C - to allow healthy competition, Activities which do
not adequately meet-the needs of the consumers
should not be included in list C; if not, consumers would
be at the mercy of unscrupulous producers
o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the
enactment of RA 7042 necessarily come within the
protection of the law.
- Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDA in
determining the areas of investment for inclusion in List C
o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing
at which affected parties will have the opportunity to
show whether the petitioner industry adequately serves
the economy and the consumers."
o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not
all existing enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in
List C.
- Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus
Investment Code
o purposely removed because the determination of the
areas of investment open to foreign investors is made
easy by the Foreign Investment Negative List
formulated and recommended by NEDA following the
 process and criteria provided in Sections 8 & 9 of the
Act
- Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List
o it practically includes the same areas of investment
reserved to Filipino under Section 5", and the SEC
shall disallow registration of the applying non-Philippine
national if the existing joint venture enterprises,
particularly the Filipino partners therein, can reasonably
prove they are capable to make the investment needed
for the domestic market activities to be undertaken by
the competing applicant.
Senator Paterno as Intervenor:
- the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-
reliant economy, as well as the provisions designed to promote
full employment for Filipinos
- suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected
outright for noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial
inquiry into a constitutional question, to wit: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (2) the constitutional question
must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution
of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision
of the case.
ISSUES
1. WON there is actual controversy
2. WON petitioners have legal standing
3. WON constitutionality lis mota of the case
4. WON this entails a political question
HELD
1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy,
particularly because of the absence of the implementing
rules that are supposed to carry the Act into effect
a. A controversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe"
for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory
2. The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and particularly as
a member of the House of Representatives, comes under
the definition that a proper party is one who has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of.
3. The constitutional question has not been raised tardily but in
fact, as just remarked, prematurely.
- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to
show that there is an indubitable ground for it, not to say even
a necessity to resolve it.
a. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to
sustain.
b. based on the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for
the acts of the other departments
c. theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the
President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
- the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the
petitioner
d. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions
the petitioner has mentioned
4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdom or the efficacy
of the Act, but this is a matter on which we are not
competent to rule.
a. In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation."
b. allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,"
5 and may not annul an act of the political departments
simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.
c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Decision Petition dismissed.
CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS
LAUREL; December 2, 1940
FACTS
- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC)
approved with modification the recommendation that originated
from the National Traffic Commission (NTC), which was
favorably indorsed by the Director of Public Works (PW), that
Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-
drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours from
7 a.m. to 11 p.m., for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all
animal drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of the Public Works
and Communications the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads.
Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen
and as a taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition against the Chairman of NTC, Director of PW,
Acting Secretary of PWC, Mayor of Manila and Acting Chielf of
Police of Manila.
ISSUES
1. WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an
unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being of all the people.
HELD
1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law; but
it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact
or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action depend.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs. Southard
it was held here that discretion may be delegated to
executive departments or subordinate officials the execution
of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
2. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
The provision that .the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly.
3. practicality
The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of
the subjects of govtl regulations, and the increased difficulty
in administering the law give rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, the delegation of greater powers by the
legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain
rules and regulations.
2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupation if the said laws are intended to promote the welfare
of the public. (police power of the State)
Reasoning
1. precedents (US vs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. Los Angeles &
People vs. Pomar)
2. Paradox - The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preservation
3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is
brought about to the greatest number.
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A and was
granted franchise under PD 1067-B to establish, operate and
maintain gambling casinos. PAGCOR proved to be a potential
source of revenue. Thus, PD 1399 was passed for PAGCOR
to fully attain its objectives. PD 1869 was passed later on to
enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all
games of chance, giving it territorial jurisdiction all over the
Philippines.
PAGCOR became 3rd largest source of govt revenue, next to
BIR and Bureau of Customs. It sponsored socio-cultural and
charitable projects and at that time employed 4,494 employees
in its 9 casinos.
Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR
charter PD 1869
ISSUES
Procedural Issue
WON petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can
question and seek the annulment of PD 1869
Substantive Issue/s
WON PD 1869 should be annulled based on the ff grounds:
1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order
2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City governments
right to impose taxes and license fees
3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes
PAGCOR but outlaws other forms of gambling and vices
4. it violates trend of government away from monopolistic and
crony economy
HELD
Procedural Issue:
- Considering transcendental public interest and the Courts
duty to check on limits of other branches of govt, SC brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and took cognizance of the
petition.
Substantive Issues:
1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But
prohibition does not mean that govt cant regulate it in exercise
of police power. Police power is state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote general welfare. PAGCOR has been
beneficial, not just to govt, but to society as well.
2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent
right to impose taxes, its power to tax must always yield to a
legislative act. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress, therefore Charter of Manila is subject to control by
Congress. If Congress can grant a municipal corporation the
power to tax, it can also provide exemptions or even take back
the power. Also, Manilas power to impose license fees on
gambling has long been revoked. The power is now vested
exclusively on national government.
Local governments, too, have no power to tax instrumentalities
of national government, such as PAGCOR. PAGCOR is
exempt from local taxes.
The power of local govt to impose taxes and fees is always
subject to limits w/c Congress may provide. It cant be
violative, but consistent with principle of local autonomy.
Local autonomy doesnt make local govt sovereign w/in state;
it simply means decentralization. The local govt has been
described as a political subdivision of state constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. It can only be an
intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation, it cant be an
imperium in imperio.
3. Equal protection doesnt preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded diff. treatment as long as
classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary. The fact that some
gambling activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery, races,
cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are prohibited
does not render applicable laws such as PD 1869
unconstitutional.
Whether or not PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress
to determine. But as of now, every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, there
must be a showing of clear and unequivocal breach of
Constitution.
4. If PD 1869 runs counter to govt policies, it is for Executive
to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. Judiciary
does not settle policy issues.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
OPOSA V FACTORAN
DAVIDE; July 30, 1993
FACTS
- The overarching theme of the case deals with the prevention
the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.
- In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their
parents) and the Philippine Ecological Network (PENI) against
the then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio Factoran, Jr. who was
substituted by the new secretary, Angel Alcala. The complaint
was instituted to be a taxpayers class suit as it alleges that all
citizens of the Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and
enjoyment of the countrys virgin tropical rainforests. The suit
also alleges that this suit represents people who are sharing
the same sentiment towards the preservation of our natural
resources (since not all of them could go before the court).
Furthermore, this was also asserted to be representative of the
current generation and generation that are yet to be born.
- The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), its
agents, representatives, and those acting on its behalf to, 1.
Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country
and 2. to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, and renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
- The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the
country, the countrys islands, its natural resources, and
scientific evidences pointing to the requirement for the country
to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology (54% should be
use for forest cover and 46% for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial, and other uses). They asserted that
deforestation resulted in, a. water shortages b. salinization c.
massive erosion and loss of soil fertility d. extinction of some of
the countries flora and fauna e. disturbance and dislocation of
indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g. drought
h. increasing velocity of typhoon winds i. flooding of lowlands j.
siltation and shortening of the life span of dams k. reduction of
earths capacity to process carbon dioxide.
- Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of
cause of action, of being political question, and of causing the
impairment of contracts. The petitioners filed for certiorari
hence this case. They contend that there is a cause of action
using articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code (the right to a
sound environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that
calls for the creation of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) to safeguard the peoples right to a
healthful environment, Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution that recognizes the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. As well as the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of mans inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation in natural law.
ISSUES
1. Locus Standi: WON the case is a class suit?
2. WON minors can assert that they represent other
generations and those succeeding theirs?
3. Merits: WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by declaring the
petitioners to have no legal right?
4. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the non-
impairment clause found in the Constitution?
HELD
1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest to all citizens of
the Philippines and that it would be impracticable to bring them
all to court. The plaintiffs in this case are numerous and
representative enough to ensure that all interests is protected.
2. Yes they can, following the concept of intergenerational
responsibility. Every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve the rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful environment.
3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction because it failed to recognize
the legal right of the petitioners which is the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology that is incorporated in the 1987
Constitution under Section 16 Article II.
- Moreover, this rights need not be written in the Constitution
for this deals with rights that are assumed from the very
inception oh humankind. The reason why it was written was
because the framers feared that without a mandate as stated in
the state policies future generations would inherit nothing to
sustain life. It is clear then that there is a legal right for a
balanced healthful ecology and the right to health. Given that it
could also be said that this right is further supported by
Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
making the cause of action existent.
4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause because
licenses are not contracts, properties or a property right that is
protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. As the
court held in Tan v. Director of Forestry, a license is merely a
permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful and
is not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief Executive may
validly amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses when
national interests so require.
Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked.
- Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in the
case still does not affect it given that no law or action by the
Chief Executive to amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses
so it is could not as of the moment be invoked. And
furthermore, if there would be a law passed it would not be
considered as a violation of the non-impairment clause as the
very nature of the law deals with the exercising of the police
power of the state to advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause
yields to the police power of the state.
Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of
the questioned timber license agreements.
DECS V SAN DIEGO
CRUZ; December 21, 1989
FACTS
- decided en banc, unanimous decision
- Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a BS Zoology
graduate from UE. He has taken the NMAT four times and
flunked it as many times. His application to take a fifth
examination was denied by petitioner DECS on the basis of the
three-flunk rule under MECS Order #12, Series of 1972.
San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the Valenzuela
RTC, invoking his constitutional rights to academic freedom
and quality education. In an amended complaint, he raised the
additional grounds of due process and equal protection and
also challenged the constitutionality of the aforementioned
order.
- Pendente lite, with the agreement of both parties, he was
allowed to take a fifth attempt at NMAT. This attempt he also
failed.
- RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition and
declared the challenged order invalid. It held that the petitioner
had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE
WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
Or, WON the three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the police
power of the State
HELD
Ratio Measures, such as admission exams and the three
flunk rule, designed to gauge the academic
preparation of an applicant fall within the valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
Reasoning
1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, unanimous
Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those
who have initially proved their competence and preparation for
a medical education.
- analogy: Tablarin case & case at bar issue is academic
preparation of the applicant. Admission test and the three-
flunk rule are both valid measures in the regulation of the
medical profession. The regulation of the practice of
medicine in all its branches is a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. This power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine also includes
the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine.
2. The police power of the State is validly exercised if
 - (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State <lawful subject>; &
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished, not
unduly oppressive upon individuals <lawful method>
- The case at bar complies with this requisites...
<subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their
lives and health.
<method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
3. The right to quality education is NOT absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to
choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements."
- It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality
education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show
that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise.
4. What the equal protection clause requires is equality
among equals. A law does not have to operate with equal force
on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section
1 of the Constitution.
- A substantial distinction exists between medical students
and other students who are not subjected to the NMAT and
the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects
the very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for
this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The
accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally
respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be
similarly treated.
- There would be unequal protection if some applicants who
have passed the tests are admitted and others who have
also qualified are denied entrance.
Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor,
he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. The
Court suggests the notion of appropriate calling. It is time
indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich
our system of education by directing the student to the course
for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations.
Decision Petition is granted. Decision of Valenzuela RTC
reversed. Costs against private respondent San Diego.
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
MALCOLM; February 23, 1909
FACTS
- An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands which affirmed a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Benguet, dismissing an
application for the registration of certain land.
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot, filed an application for the
registration of a certain land in the Province of Benguet. For
more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, in 1899, the
applicant and his ancestors had held the land as owners. His
grandfather had lived upon it and maintained fences sufficient
for the holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and had
used parts for pasturing cattle. He had received the land from
his father in accordance with Igorot customs and had used it for
pasture. They all had been recognized as owners of the land
by the Igorots. No document of title, however, had issued from
the Spanish crown and although I, in 1893-1894, and again in
1896-1897, he made application for one under the royal
decrees then in force, nothing has come of it. In 1901, he filed
a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the
lands were registered to him, that process establishing only a
possessory title.
- Applicant claims that he now owns the land, and is entitled to
registration under the Philippine Commissions Act No,496 of
1902, which established a court for that purpose with
jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago, and
authorized in general terms applications to be made by
persons claiming to own the land.
- The government claims that Spain had title to all the land in
the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to permit private titles
to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the
crown and that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880,
required registration within a limited time to make the title good;
that the applicants land was not registered, and therefore
became public land; that he United States succeeded to the
title of Spain, and that the he has no rights that the Philippine
government is bound to respect.
ISSUE
WON the applicant owns the land
HELD
- Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and
rights acquired by the United States are to be administered for
the benefits of the inhabitants of the Philippines. Thus, when,
as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been
held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it shall
be presumed to have been held in the same way before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
- Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he does
not own the land. Spain did not assume to convert all the native
inhabitant of the Philippines into trespassers or even into
tenants at will. The fact was that titles were admitted to exist
that owed nothing to the powers of Spain.
- Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 Where such possessor
shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if
they shall show that ancient possession, as valid title by
prescription. As prescription, even against the Crown, was
recognized by the laws of Spain, the court sees no sufficient
reason to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in
regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 For private ownership, there must
have been a grant by competent authority. For all legal effects,
those who have been in possession for certain times shall be
deemed owners. For cultivated land, 20 years; for uncultivated,
30 years. When this decree went into effect, the applicants
father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree.
This being the case and the fact that his possession was not
unlawful (no attempt at any such proceedings against him or
his father was ever made), the regulation for the registration of
royal land wrongfully occupied does not apply to him.
Moreover, the decree was not calculated to the mind of an
Igorot Chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it.
Disposition Judgment reversed. Law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not
be deprived of what by practice and belief of those among
whom he live, was his property.
RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
MALCOLM; February 28, 1919
FACTS
- Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of
Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to
remove their residence from their native habitat and to
establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the Province
of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by
imprisonment if they escaped. This reservation, as appears
from the resolution of the provincial board, extends over an
area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2,000
acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined.
One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and
placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from
the reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas
corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their
liberty in violation of law.
- The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1,
1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No.
25 signed by the provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr..
The laws primary objective is the advancement of the welfare
of the non-Christian people of Mindoro. In one of the Whereas
clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of the
opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on. Pursuant to the
Governors powers under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of
the Honorable Secretary of the Interior. Under the resolution of
the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply
with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceeding sixty days in accordance with section 2759 of the
revised Administrative Code. The resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph
3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs
among them.
ISSUES
1. WON the Mangyans were deprived of due process when
their liberty to choose their homes were limited by the law.
2. WON the Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the
law mandating the forcible transfer of the Mangyanes.
HELD
1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away
except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of
the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United
States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature,
said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under
the protection of the general rules which govern society." To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a
judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances,
even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the
administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases.
(See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due
process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power in furtherance of the public good which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice
must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California
[1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply * *
* "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its
operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it
shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all
of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104,
affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1)
"What is due process of law depends on circumstances it
varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation."
(Moyer vs. Peabody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
- There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right
conception of liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful
way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they
will-going from one place to another in the mountains, burning
and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not
knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same
rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived
thereof without due process of law?
- But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without due process of law apply to a
class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty
is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way?
- To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an
erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It
will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not
adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement
of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people
should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state
of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to
understand liberty in its true and noble sense. In dealing with
the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government
has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone
or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure
was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with
national conscience.
- The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the
State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes
and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to
involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them..
They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-
going from one place to another in the mountains, burning and
destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon. To allow
them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this
time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the
works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They
will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a
vulnerable point of attack by those who doubt, may challenge
the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say
that due process of law, has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the
police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature
has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual
exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally
drastic remedy.
- As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and
which in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that
section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should
assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late
decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs. Vanderbilt
University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can see no objection to the application of public policy
as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes
before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on
that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the
principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
 analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing
conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales
which the court believes will best promote the public
welfare in its probable operation as a general rule 2145 of
the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement
in reservations in accordance with said section does not
constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are
further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional.
Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARSON
- The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine
Islands clearly discloses that the standard of civilization to
which a specific tribe must be found to have advanced, to
justify its removal from the class embraced within the
descriptive term "non-Christian," as that term is used in the
Philippine statute-book, is that degree of civilization which
results in a mode of life within the tribe, such that it is feasible
and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its membership
the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative,
and judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly
civilized inhabitants of the Islands; a mode of life, furthermore,
which does not find expression in tribal customs or practices
which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the tribe
indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or
peril the lives or property of those who may be brought in
contact with the members of the tribe.
- So the standard of civilization to which any given number or
group of inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or
any individual member of such a group must be found to have
advanced, in order to remove such group or individual from the
class embraced within the statutory description of "non-
Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally
and normally result in the withdrawal by such persons of
permanent allegiance or adherence to a "non-Christian" tribe
had they at any time adhered to or maintained allegiance to
such a tribe; and which would qualify them whether they reside
within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only
to maintain a mode of life independent of and apart from that
maintained by such tribe, but a mode of life as would not be
inimical to the lives or property or general welfare of the
civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whom they are brought
in contact.
- The contention that in this particular case, and without
challenging the validity of the statute, the writ should issue
because of the failure to give these petitioners as well as the
rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes by the reconcentration
order an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made
to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to
a contention that there is no authority in law for the issuance of
such an order.
MOIR
- I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my
sense of justice will not permit me to let this decision go on
record without expressing my strong dissent from the opinion of
Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority of the court. I shall
not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the questions in
detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be the legal and
human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
- The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no
treaty with the Government of the Philippine Islands by which
they have agreed to live within a certain district where they are
accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of the Philippine
Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the
rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And
when the provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro
attempted to take them from their native habitat and to hold
them on the little reservation of about 800 hectares, he
deprived them of their rights and their liberty without due
process of law, and they were denied the equal protection of
the law. The majority opinion says "they are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines." They are to
be made to accept the civilization of the more advanced
Filipinos whether they want it or not. They are backward and
deficient in culture and must be moved from their homes,
however humble they may be and "brought under the bells"
and made to stay on a reservation. Are these petitioners
charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of
the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime
having been committed by these "peaceful, timid, primitive,
semi-nomadic people."
- It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of
men; that there is no arbitrary body of individuals; that the
constitutional principles upon which our government and its
institutions rest do not leave room for the play and action of
purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are
guided and limited by these provisions which the people have,
through the organic law, declared shall be the measure and
scope of all control exercised over them. In particular the
fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal protection
clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to
any arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was
intended to prohibit, and does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation
of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property.
- As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or
unreasonable classification, or which singles out any particular
individual or class as the subject of hostile and discriminating
legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as being opposed to the
fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal protection
clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further
discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S. Supreme Court
Reports, p. 366.) When we consider the nature and the theory
of our institutions of government, the principles upon which
they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their
development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not
mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal
and arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject
to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system,
while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remain with the people by whom
and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law is
the definition and limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true,
that there must always be lodged somewhere, and in some
person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in many
cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely
political, no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the
public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of opinion or
by means of the suffrage. But the fundamental rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional
law which are the monuments showing the victorious progress
of the race in securing to men the blessings of civilization under
the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the famous
language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the Government of
Commonwealth 'may be a government of law and not of men.'
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his
life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S.,
374.)
- It is said that the present law is an old Act being in substance
Act No. 547 of the Philippine Commission. But it has never
been brought before this court for determination of its
constitutionality. No matter how beneficient the motives of the
lawmakers if the law tends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion the
acts complained of which were taken in conformity with section
2145 of the Administrative Code not only deprive these
Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law, but will
in all probability deprive them of their life, without due process
of law. History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe from
their native fastnesses and to transfer them to the narrow
confines of a reservation is to invite disease and suffering and
death.
- From my long experience in the Islands, I should say that it
would be a crime of little less magnitude to take the Ifugaos
from their mountain homes where they have reclaimed a
wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness and to
transfer them to the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested
valleys which they look down upon from their fields-than it
would be to order their decapitation en masse. There can be no
denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes" and
are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the
Manguianes may be so taken from their native habitat and
reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then
so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made
more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
- There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the
Philippine Islands. All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior
approval of the head of the department have the power under
this law to take the non-Christian inhabitants of their different
provinces from their homes and put them on a reservation for
"their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and
the courts will grant them no relief. These unfortunate citizens
of the Philippine Islands would hold their liberty, and their lives,
may be subject to the unregulated discretion of the provincial
governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once
established might not a provincial governor decide that some
political enemy was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer
on the reservation. No matter what his education and culture,
he could have no trial, he could make no defense, the judge of
the court might be in a distant province and not within reach,
and the provincial governor's fiat is final.
- There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians,"
or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the
Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken from their
native habitat and reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an
open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes,
who have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may
the Moros.
- I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and 2759
of the Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null
and void, and that the petitioners are illegally restrained of their
liberty, and that they have been denied the equal protection of
the laws, and order the respondents immediately to liberate all
of the petitioners.
PIT-OG V PEOPLE
FERNAN; October 11, 1990
FACTS
- Appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
- There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt. Province
called the tayan. It was owned by the tomayan group whose
members were descendants of the original owners thereof
named Jakot and Pang-o. One of their descendants, Pel-ey
Cullalad, was requested by the tomayan to act in their behalf in
selling the 400-sqm residential portion of the tayan, in order
that the tomayan would have something to butcher and eat
during a celebration called ato. The sale was made in
consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of Edward
Pasiteng, whose house had been built thereon. It was agreed
that the unregistered property would be registered under Sec.
194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act
No. 3344. Besides Cullalad, several members of the tomayan
affixed their signatures or thumb marks on the notarized deed
of sale. Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own
for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon.
- In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og (aka
Mary Pit-og) and her companions destroyed the fence erected
by Pasiteng and cut down and took away the sugarcane worth
P1,000 and the banana fruits valued at P100 found in the
area. Pasiteng reported the matter to the police. Three days
later, the police filed a complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og
in the Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc.
- Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the tayan
belonged to her, her father Lobchoken being a descendant
Jakot. She did not declare the land for taxation purposes
because no one in the tomayan was allowed to declare the
land as his own. However, any member of the tomayan could
make improvements on the land and claim them as his own.
Anyone who abandoned the land would be succeeded only by
other members. No person outside the tomayan could succeed
to the cultivation of the tayan.
- Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and when
he died, his widow Pidchoy and their children continued
cultivating the land. They also built a granary thereon. The
land was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy for cultivation.
Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to build a house behind
the place where Pit-og and her family used to have a house
because Edward was Erkey's uncle being the brother of her
father. Erkey planted the bananas and avocado trees in the
area and harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever prevented
her from cutting the sugarcane and the other plants.
The municipal trial court discredited Pit-og's story emphasizing
that her claim of continuous occupation and possession of the
land was baseless as she had "no papers to show" or prove
such claim. It found that an the elements of theft under Article
308 of the RPC were present and accordingly rendered the
judgment of conviction.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower courts with the following findings and observations:
- Pasitengs claim of ownership is documented by a Deed of
Conveyance, a public document which was executed between
him and the members of the tomayan group. The validity of this
public document has never been questioned by any one of the
previous owners belonging to the tomayan group. Furthermore,
the tax declarations in the name of and the realty tax payments
by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of ownership, are,
nevertheless, prima facie evidence of his possession of the
land in question. In contrast to these documentary evidence,
petitioner offers nothing better than her bare claim. The
personal property taken by accused-petitioner not being hers
but those of Pasiteng, and she gained from the taking thereof
without the consent of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of
the crime of theft.
ISSUES
1. WON Pit-og had criminal intent in taking the sugarcane and
the bananas.
2. WON the present case is criminal or civil in nature.
HELD
1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent because she
took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her own.
- Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his documentary evidence
to prove ownership over the sugarcane and bananas. A careful
study of these documents, in conjunction with the testimonial
evidence extant in the record, however, discloses matters
which put a cloud of doubt upon Pit-ogs culpability. The deed
of sale describes the property as containing an area of 400
sqm, while the tax declarations show that the property contains
an area of 512 sqm. The testimonies presented by the
prosecution and the defense show that the areas cultivated by
Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so close to each other
that the possibility of confusion as to who planted which plants
is not remote. In fact, before the filing of this case, Pit-og had
sued Pasiteng's son, Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas
she had planted in the area. The fact that Edward had built a
fence around the area he claimed as his does not necessarily
prove that he enclosed only the 400 square meters he had
purchased from the tomayan. After all, he had declared as his
own for taxation purposes 112 square meters more than the
area he bought.
- There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-meter
area claimed by Edward but there are no indications therein of
the exact area involved in this case. Proof on the matter,
however, is important for it means the Identification of the
rightful owner of the stolen properties. It should be emphasized
that to prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and
indispensable to clearly Identify the person who, as a result of
a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.
2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard to
claims of ownership over the tayan should be threshed out in
an appropriate civil action.
- Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22 re Indigenous
Community
- We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a claim of
ownership founded on customs and tradition and another such
claim supported by written evidence but nonetheless based on
the same customs and tradition. when a court is beset with this
kind of case, it can never be too careful More so in this case,
where the accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be
expected to resort to written evidence of ownership, stands to
lose her liberty on account of an oversight in the court's
appreciation of the evidence.
Disposition Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTED for lack of proof
beyond reasonable doubt that she committed the crime of theft.
No costs.
KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO
MENDOZA; November 16, 1995
FACTS
- Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case
Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case has
already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue
and
(2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended)
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any
form of association or collaboration with any party in
operating an on-line lottery, and these questions can no
longer be reopened.
- Petitioners argue that the two justices who changed their
votes did not act according to law and that the two new
appointees regardless of the merits of the case must of
necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees who
were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority
in the second lotto case.
- SC said the decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6.
With the retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and
one of the dissenters (Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the
first decision in the first case was later reversed.
- SC cited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split
decision) which was overturned in People v. Yang.
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutional policies and principles (Art II Sec
5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13, Sec 17) invoked by the petitioners may be
resorted to for striking down laws or official actions which are
inconsistent with them
2. WON the petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional
grounds, given that the Constitution guarantees to peoples
organizations effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political and economic decision making (Art XIII
Sec 16).
3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its charter
(R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any form of
association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-
line lottery.
HELD
1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are not
self-executing. They do not confer rights which can be enforced
in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or
executive action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for
charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently
with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO
may be given this authority. That is why we said with respect to
the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in Cagayan de Oro,
"the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is
not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the
activity as it sees fit ." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
234 SCRA 255, 268 [1994]).
2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the
validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered
into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This
case, therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but
only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the
agreement, cannot raise.
- Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization does not give it
the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract
in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall
respect the role of independent people's organizations to
enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and
aspirations through peaceful and lawful means," that their right
to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged."
(Art. XIII, 15-16)
- These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that
only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case
may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this
Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is
limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII,
5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts
from decision-making in the political departments of the
government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
- Petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained
because this case does not involve illegal disbursement of
public funds. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring this suit
because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for
the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to
sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSO under its
charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) cannot enter into any
form of association or collaboration with any party in operating
an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN
THIS CASE ARE LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS
INVOLVED ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THOSE INVOLVED IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES. AS ALREADY STATED, THE ELA IS
SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT OF
LEASE DECLARED VOID IN THE FIRST CASE.
Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the
first contract, which were considered to be features of a joint
venture agreement, had been removed in the new contract.
VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR
CORTES; February 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirm
reports that certain members of the Batasang Pambansa,
including some members of the opposition, were granted
clean loans from the GSIS before the February 1986
elections. Petitioner Valmonte filed a special civil action for
mandamus with preliminary injunction, praying that respondent
Belmonte, in his capacity as GSIS General Manager, be
directed to:
1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the members
of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure
clean loans from the GSIS immediately prior to the February
7, 1986 elections through the intercession of then-First Lady
Imelda Marcos.
2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing said loans.
3. Allow petitioners access to public records for the subject
information.
ISSUES
Procedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies?
Substantive:
1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under
matters of public concern?
2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSIS and its
borrowers?
3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely incidental to
its insurance function, private in nature?
HELD
Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when
only a question of law is involved. The issue raised by
petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, can be passed upon by the
court more competently than GSIS or its Board of Trustees.
Substantive:
1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public office
held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought
clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity and not to public and governmental agencies
like the GSIS. The right cannot be invoked by juridical entities,
as a corporation has no right to privacy in its name. The entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief. However, even the concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they chose to invoke this right.
Public figures, most especially those holding responsible
positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy
as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject
to closer public scrutiny.
3. No. The constituent-ministrant dichotomy characterizing
government function has long been repudiated. The
government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or
running some business, discharges the same function of
service to the people. That the GSIS was exercising a
proprietary function in granting the loans would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of
the right to information. Transactions entered into by the GSIS,
a government-controlled corporation created by special
legislation, are within the ambit of the peoples right to be
informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in
government dealings.
Petitions are entitled to access to the documents subject
to reasonable regulations. The petition is held to be
meritorious as to the 2nd and 3rd alternative acts sought by
petitioners.
The same cannot be said, however, of the 1 st act sought. ISSUES
Although citizens are entitled to access to official
records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to
compel custodians of public records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern. It is essential for
a writ of mandamus to lie that the applicant has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to the thing demanded and
that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform
the act required.
CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998
FACTS
- These are the main questions raised in this original action
seeking (1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its
chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the
Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold
hoard; and (2) to compel respondents to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and
all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and
agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs.
- Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general,
brought this action in response to news reports in September
1997 referring to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars
of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks, and (2) the reported execution of a compromise
between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets. Acting on a motion
of petitioner, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents
and/or representatives from entering into, or perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten
wealth. On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and
Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court a motion
for intervention. They aver that they are among the 10,000
claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos family and/or
the Marcos estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate
of Ferdinand Marcos.
Procedural:
1. WON the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to
file the instant petition; and
2. WON this Court is the proper court before which this action
may be filed.
Substantive:
1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the
public the details of any agreement, perfected or
not, with the Marcoses; and
2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a compromise
agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative
to the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.
HELD
Procedural:
1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the object
of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real parties in interest; and
because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such
is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result of
the action.
2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly
confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus. The argument of respondent that
petitioner should have properly sought relief before the
Sandiganbayan in which enforcement of the compromise
agreements was pending resolution seems to have merit, if
petitioner was merely seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG
to disclose to the public the terms contained in said
Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the
public disclosure of all negotiations and agreement,
be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related or
relating to such negotiations and agreement between the
PCGG and the Marcos heirs. In other words, the
petition is not merely confined to the Agreements that have
already been drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or
future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to the precise
interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional
provisions on public transactions.
Substantive:
1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses
alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very
nature, assumes a public character. The assets and properties
referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To
all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution that
transactions contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to
the consummation of a transaction, it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and Supplemental
Agreements between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs reveals
serious legal flaws.
i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by
law, there is no similar general sanction as regards criminal
liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the
present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was
conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14 as amended by
EO No. 14-A. However, the Agreements do not conform to the
requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity
cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal
defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending
before the Sandiganbayan. The provision is applicable mainly
to witnesses who provide information or testify against a
respondent, defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
ii) Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the property to be
retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the
Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is
vested in Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local
legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant
tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to
compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. Even granting that
Congress enacts the law exempting the Marcoses from paying
taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the
test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any
special grant of exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will
constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional
rule that taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
iii) The government binds itself under the General Agreement
to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs,
pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a
direct encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in
regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well settled is the doctrine that
once a case has been filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within
the full discretion and control of the judge. Jurisdiction, once
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even
by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to
dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGG cannot guarantee the
dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses
pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole
power and discretion.
iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclaims,
whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate, against
the Marcoses. This all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to
law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be
waived. This is a palpable violation of the due process and
equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively
ensconces the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law.
v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or
determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their
respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the
Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards
for determining which assets shall be forfeited by the
government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses.
While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses
shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss
deposits (less government recovery expenses), such sharing
arrangement pertains only to the said deposit. No similar
splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties.
Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of
the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.
vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos approval of
the principal Agreement, an express condition therein,
renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable.
Nevertheless, even if such approval were obtained, the
Agreements would still not be valid.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999
FACTS
Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene
Marcos-Araneta filed before the court a motion for leave to
intervene and a motion for partial reconsideration, alleging that
they were parties and signatories to the General and
Supplemental Agreements which this Court declared NULL
AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Consitution. They
claim to have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties or an interest against both as to
warrant their intervention. They add that their exclusion from
the instant case resulted in a denial of their constitutional rights
to due process and to equal protection. They also the raise the
principle of hierarchical administration of justice to impugn the
Courts cognizance of petitioners direct action before it.
ISSUES
Procedural:
WON the Motion for Leave to Intervene should be allowed.
Substantive:
1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the proceedings
regarding the Agreements to which they were parties and
signatories was a denial of their property right to contract
without due process of law;
2. WON the Court violated the principle of hierarchical
administration of justice by ruling upon the validity of the
Agreements;
3. WON the issue of right to information raised by petitioner
was rendered moot and academic by the submission by the
movants of the Motion for Approval of Compromise
Agreements to the Sandiganbayan;
4. WON there was ratification of the Agreements by partial
implementation; and
5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an actual case
and a justiciable question.
HELD
Procedural:
No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides that a
motion to intervene should be filed before rendition of
judgment. Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case
already terminated by final judgment.
Substantive:
1. No. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is
null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. In legal terms, the movants have really no interest
to protect or right to assert in this proceeding. Moreover, the
movants are merely incidental, not indispensable, parties to the
instant case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to
enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to
determine whether the latter has been acting within the bounds
of its authority.
2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally applies
to cases involving factual questions, since the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts . Inasmuch as the petition at bar
involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning
public interest, the Court resolved to exercise primary
jurisdiction on the matter.
3. No. The Chavez petition was not confined to the concluded
terms contained in the Agreements, but likewise
concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and
agreements, perfected or not. It was therefore not rendered
moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the
subject Agreements.
4. No. The PCGGs grant to the claimants mother of access
rights to one of their sequestered properties cannot ratify the
Agreements. Being null and void, they are not subject to
ratification.
5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original
jurisdiction, is a proper recourse for a citizen to enforce a ISSUES
public right. There is no political question involved. The power
and authority of the PCGG to compromise is not the issue. But,
clearly, by violating the Constitution and the laws, the PCGG
gravely abused its discretion.
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V
ZAMORA
BUENA; October 10, 2000
FACTS
- This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the
constitutionality of the Visiting Forces Agreement. (Trivia: Si
Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang petitioners)
- March 14, 1947 The Philippines and USA forged a Military
Bases Agreement, formalizing, among others, the use of
installations in the Philippine territory by US military personnel.
- August 30, 1951 The Philippines and USA entered into a
Mutual Defense Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to
respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed
forces, public vessels and aircraft.
- 1991- RP-US Military Base Agreement expired. Senate
rejected proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Security. (Goodbye but Mutual Defense Treaty still in
effect.)
- February 10, 1998 President Ramos approved Visiting
Forces Agreement, after a series of conferences and
negotiations.
- October 5, 1998 President Estrada, through Secretary of
Foreign affairs, ratified VFA.
- May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring
with the ratification of the VFA. (Who concurred: Fernan, Ople,
Drilon, Biazon, Tatad, Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers,
Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmea, Flavier, Defensor-Santiago,
Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan. Total=17.
Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmea III, Pimentel,
Legarda-Leviste. Total=5)
- The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating
circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces
and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. The
VFA is an agreement which defines treatment of US troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It also defines the rights of
the US and the Phil government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing as concerned
citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA.
2. WON the VFA is governed by the provisions of Sec 21,
Article VII (concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the Senate)
or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the Constitution (foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities not allowed in the Phils except under a
treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and when Congress
requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in
a national referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State)
3. WON VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty.
a. WON the Philippine Courts will be deprived of their
jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by the US
Military personnel.
b. WON the Supreme Court will be deprived of its
jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the
VFA?
5. WON the VFA violates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection
clause), Sec 8 Article II (prohibition against nuclear weapons),
and Sec 28(4) Article VI (taxation) of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD
1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NO legal
standing as there are no public funds raised by taxation in the
case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not possess the requisite
locus standi as there is absence of clear showing of any direct
injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.
HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of paramount
importance and of constitutional significance. It is of
TRANSCENDENTAL importance, so the Court brushes aside
procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. It is governed by BOTH provisions. Section 25 Article
XVIII applies as it specifically deals with treaties involving
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. (The or is important
to take note as it signifies independence of one thing from the
others. Thus, it can just be an agreement covering only troops
not baseslike the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII makes
no distinction whether the troops or facilities will be transient
or permanent, so the VFA is covered by this provision). On
the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate (Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the
Senate, while Sec 25 Art XVIII just says duly concurred in by
the Senate with no specified number).
- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with?
Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:
a) it must be under a treaty. -- Complied with.
We treat VFA as a treaty.
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the
Senate, and so required by the Congress, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national
referendum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23 Senators
concurred (Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP).
Requirement of ratification in a national referendum
unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
c) recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State (US).-- Complied with. Ambassador
Hubbards letter states that the VFA is binding on the
US govt and that in international legal terms such
agreement is a treaty.
- A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, is an international instrument concluded between
States in written form and governed by the international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments.
- In international law, there is no difference between treaties
and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states
concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers.
3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the xxx
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land xxx (this doesnt
really answer the issue above, but the ponente didnt really
discuss an answer WON the VFA is an abdication of
sovereignty.. oh well here goes)
- With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and
incumbent on our part to be bound by the terms of the
agreement. As a member of the family of nations, the
Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for
the conduct of its international relations. We cannot readily
plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-
compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities
under international law.
- Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States
adopted by the International Law Commision 1949 provides
that every state has a duty to carry out in good faith its
obligations. Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt servanda.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
President, and of the Senate in ratifying/concurring with the
VFA? No.
- Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despostic manner.
- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or
International agreements in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of the members of Senate. The negotiation of the
VFA and the ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts of
the the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive
and diplomatic powers granted by the Constitution.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution
lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus once the Senate
performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the
boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence
cannot be viewed to constitute an abuse of power.
Decision Petitions Dismissed
11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [dissent]
- Most significant issue is whether the VFA violates Sec 25 Art
XVIII of the Constitution (see requirements above).
- POINT 1: Respondents claim that the requirements do not
apply as the VFA contemplates a temporary visit of the troops,
while the provision applies to a permanent presence of foreign
troops.
The said temporary nature of the VFA cannot stand. Neither the
VFA nor the Mutual Defense Treaty between RP and US
provides the slightest suggestion on the duration of the visits.
VFA does not provide for a specific and limited period of
effectivity.
- POINT 2: The requirement that it be recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting state is crystal clear and was put there
by the framers inorder not to repeat the anomalous asymmetry
of the 1947 Military bases agreement where we recognized it
as a treaty but the US treated it as an executive agreement.
- The VFA is equivalent to a sole executive agreement in the
US. The Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a
sole executive agreement like the VFA on the same
constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still questions on
the constitutional basis and legal effects of sole executive
agreements under the US law.
- With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal
force of sole executive agreements under the US constitutional
law, this Court must strike a blow for the sovereignty of our
country by drawing a bright line between the dignity and status
of a treaty in contrast with a sole executive agreement.
However we may wish it, The VFA as a sole executive
agreement cannot climb to the same lofty height that the dignity
of a treaty can reach. Consequently, it falls short of the
requirement set by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military
troops on Phil soil must be recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state. I vote to grant the petitions.
KILOSBAYAN, INC. V GUINGONA, JR.
DAVIDE; May 5, 1994
FACTS
Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction,
praying for a TRO and preliminary injunction, to prohibit and
restrain implementation of "Contract of Lease" between PCSO
and PGMC in connection with on-line lottery system a.k.a.
"lotto".
1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), PCSO
decided to establish an online lottery system for the
purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying
its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after
learning that PCSO was interested in operating an on-line
 lottery system, Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational
company in Malaysia, became interested to offer its
services and resources to PCSO and organized with
some Filipino investors in March 1993 a corporation
known as the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC).
2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally issued a
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of Contract of
an on-line lottery system for PCSO. Considering the
citizenship requirement in the RFP ("Lessor shall be a
domestic corporation, with at least 60% of its shares
owned by Filipino shareholders"), PGMC claims that
Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in
PGMC to 40%, by selling 35% out of the original 75%
foreign stockholdings to local investors.
3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. The
bids were evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids
and Awards committee (SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and
its Bid Report was thereafter submitted to the Office of the
President. (This was preceded by complaints from the
Committe's Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)
4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President announced that
it had given PGMC the go-signal to operate the countr's
on-line lottery system. Announcement was published in
Manila Times, PDI, and Manila Standard on Oct. 29.
5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to
President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an
on-line lotttery system on the basis of serious moral and
ethical considerations. KILOSBAYAN reiterated its
vigorous opposition to lotto at the meeting of the
Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on
Nov. 12, 1993
6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that despite the
opposition, Malacanang will push through with operation
of lotto, that it is actually PCSO which will operate the
lottery while winning corporate bidders merely lessors.
7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all
documents pertaining to the lottery award from Executive
Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., who informed
KILOSBAYAN that the documents will be transmitted
before the end of the month. However on the same date,
an agreement denominated as Contract of Lease was
finally executed by PCSO and PGMC.
8. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its
protest and the statement of Assistant Executive
Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can
stop Malacaang," and the imminent implementation of
the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN,
with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this
petition.
PETITIONERS' CLAIM
- Petitioners claim that PCSO cannot validly enter into the
assailed Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it is an
arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the
on-line lottery system in "collaboration" or "association" with the
PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries,
and other similar activities "in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any person, association, company or entity,
foreign or domestic." And that there are terms and conditions of
the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto
operator and not respondent PCSO."
- The petitioners also point out that the Contract of Lease
requires or authorizes PGMC to establish a
telecommunications network that will connect all the
municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMC
cannot do that because it has no franchise from Congress to
construct, install, establish, or operate the network pursuant to
Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended.
- Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled
corporation and cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for
that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed foreign
capital" of the PGMC "comes to about 75%, as shown by
paragraph EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot
lawfully enter into the contract in question because all forms of
gambling and lottery is one of them are included in the
so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign
Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign
capital is allowed.
- Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation
of PGMC do not authorize it to establish and operate an on-line
lottery and telecommunications systems.
RESPONDENTS' COMMENTS
- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely an
independent contractor for a piece of work and (2) as such
independent contractor, PGMC is not a co-operator of the
lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSO sharing its franchise,
'in collaboration, association or joint venture' with PGM.
- Finally, it states that the execution and implementation of the
contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the
issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the
PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be
ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not
appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject
contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought."
- Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant
Executive Secretary Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain
that the contract of lease in question does not violate Section 1
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the
petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration,
association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow,
strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality
that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with the basic and
essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or
contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its
purposes and objectives." What the PCSO charter "seeks to
prohibit is that arrangement akin to a "joint venture" or
partnership where there is "community of interest in the
business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of
control," a characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of
lease." They further claim that the establishment of the
telecommunications system stipulated in the Contract of Lease
does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will
not operate a public utility
- They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of
PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of Lease; and that
the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the
executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial review."
Finally, they allege that the petitioners have no standing to
maintain the instant suit.
ISSUES
Procedural: WON the petitioners have locus standi.
Substantive: WON the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in
light of RA 1169 as amended by BP Blg. 42, which prohibits
PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration,
association, or joint venture with any person, association,
company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
HELD
1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners
should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A party's standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in
the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because "the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.'
- The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental
importance to the public. The ramifications of such
issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral
well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the
country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of
the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then
of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of
2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. PGMC is
not only a Lessor, PCSO in the least will be conducting lotteries
in collaboration or association and in the most in joint its own expense, all the facilities needed to operate and
vernture with PGMC. The manegerial and technical expertise
of PGMC are indespensible to the operation of the on-line
lottery system, whereas PCSO only has its franchise to offer.
- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of
its charter, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another
by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither
can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise.
- It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to
individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises,
the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee ....
[o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the
common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by a
grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot
enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable
inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally granted is withheld.
Nothing passes by mere implication."
- Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether
the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be
decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract
but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the
provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the
contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of
the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is
not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is
merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one
where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association, in
the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the
contracting parties.
(Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a
joint project. Association means the act of a number of
persons in uniting together for some special purpose or
business. Joint venture is defined as an association of
persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial
enterprise; generally all contribute assets and share risks .
) rights which are legally demandable and enforceable/
- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC
reveal that the PCSO had neither funds of its own nor the
expertise to operate and manage an on-line lottery system, and
that although it wished to have the system, it would have it "at
no expense or risks to the government." Because of these
serious constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and
assume risks, the PCSO was candid enough to state in its RFP
that it is seeking for "a suitable contractor which shall build, at
maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating
expenses and expansion expenses and risks."
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [concurring]
- PGMC is plainly a partner of PCSO in violation of the law no
matter how the assistance is called or the contract
denominated.
PADILLA [concurring]
- Contract of Lease between PCSO and PGMC is a joint
venture because each part contributes its share in the
enterprise project. PGMC contributes the facilities, technology
and expertise, while PCSO contributes the market through the
dealers and in the totality the mass of Filipino gambling
elements. PGMC will get its 4.9% of gross receipts; the residue
of the whole exercise will go to PCSO, this is a joint venture
plain and simple.
MELO [dissenting]
- This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of a
statute nor an attempt to restrain expenditure of public funds.
The contract involves strictly corporate money.
- By considering this case as a taxpayer's suit could not cure
the lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners. The
contract does not involve an illegal disbursement of public
funds. No public fund raised by taxation is involved.
PUNO [dissenting]
- Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped
into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties
or entities claiming a grievance.
- It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not been
jettisoned by the Constitution for it still commands courts in no
uncertain terms to settle only actual controversies involving
- Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a
vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and perhaps more
importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of
government.
KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO
MENDOZA; July 17, 1995
FACTS
- As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan,
Incorporated v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994) invalidating
the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been
made in violation of the charter of the PCSO, the parties
entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be
"consistent with the latter's [PCSO] charter . . . and
conformable to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Decision."
- On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease
Agreement (thereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased
on-line lottery equipment and accessories to the PCSO in
consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 % of the gross
amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSO from the operation
of the lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual
rental computed at P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial
Operation. The rental is to be computed and paid bi-weekly. In
the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall short of the
annual minimum fixed rental thus computed, the PCSO agrees
to pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket
sales. (Pars. 1-2)
Under the law, 30% of the net receipts from the sale of tickets
is alloted to charity. (R.A. 1169, (B) )
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing from the
start of commercial operation of the lottery equipment first
delivered to the lessee pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par.
3)
- In the operation of the lottery, the PCSO is to employ its own
personnel. (Par. 5) It is responsible for the loss of, or damage
to, the equipment from any cause and for the cost of their
maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the expiration of the
leases, the PCSO has the option to purchase the equipment for
the sum of P25 million.
- A copy of the ELA was submitted to the Court by the PGMC in
accordance with its manifestation in the prior case. On
February 21, 1995 this suit was filed seeking to declare the
ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases nullified in
the first case. Petitioners seek the declaration of the amended
ELA as null and void.
- The PCSO and PGMC filed a separate comments in which
they question the petitioners' standing to bring suit. The
Kilosbayan, In. is an organization described in its petition as
"composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns and
lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice,
and national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their
individual and collective capacities as "taxpayers and
concerned citizens." The other petitioners (Sen. Freddie Webb,
Sen. Wigberto Taada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members
of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned
citizens."
- Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit
on the ground that, not being parties to the contract of lease
which they seek to nullify, they have no personal and
substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement of
the contract. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the
ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to
challenge the validity of the first contract for the operation of
lottery is now the "law of the case". and therefore the question
of their standing can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State
Policies set forth in Art. II of the Constitution:
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life,
liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the employment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy. (5)]
The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
(12)
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation
building and shall promote their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nacionalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
The state shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and
nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development. (17)
(Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7)
ISSUES
1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?
2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona constitute the
law of the case, thus precluding respondents from assailing
the legal standing of petitioners?
3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies be readily invoked by any person in the absence
of Congressional legislation (i.e., self-executing)?
HELD
Ratio
1. A ruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the
specific issue in that case is concerned. Parties may be the
same but cases are not.
2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are
not self-executing.
General Reasoning
- Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "law of the
case", nor that of conclusive of judgment poses a barrier to a
determination of petitioners' right to maintain this suit.
- Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case,
concern for stability in decisional law does not call for
adherence to what has recently been laid down as the rule.
The previous ruling sustaining petitioners' intervention may
itself be considered a departure from settled rulings on "real
parties in interest" because no constitutional issues were
actually involved. Just five years before that ruling this Court
had denied standing to a party who, in questioning the validity
of another form of lottery, claimed the right to sue in the
capacity of taxpayer, citizen and member of the Bar. (Valmonte
v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes, G.R. No. 78716, Sept . 22,
1987) Only recently this Court held that members of Congress
have standing to question the validity of presidential veto on
the ground that, if it true, the illegality of the veto would impair
their prerogative as members of Congress. Conversely if the
complaint is not grounded on the impairment of the powers of
Congress, legislators do not have stnding the question the
validity of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution
Association v Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994))
- There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the ruling
on standing. The voting on petitioners' standing in the previous
case was a narrow one, with seven (7) members sustaining
petitioners' standing and six (6) denying petitioners' right to
bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is not
likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition,
there have been changes in the members of the Court, with the
retirement of Justices Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of
the writer of this opinion and Justice Francisco. Given this fact
it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the ruling as
to petitioners' standing.
Specific Reasoning
1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have standing to
question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will
presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to
declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different from
the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the
PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No.
113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the
validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of the parties does not
preclude determination of their standing in the present suit.
- Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be
determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even
the issue in this case, SINCE STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION IS ACTUALLY INVOLVED. 14 The issue in this case
is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the
meaning of Rule 3, 2 of the Rules of Court which requires that
"Every action may be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party in interest."
- Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that they
are the real party in interest. They have not demonstrated that
the Contract entered into by the PCSO would directly injure or
affect their rights.
2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this
suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not
think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while
this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its
continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a
court a second time after a ruling by an appellate court.
14
COMMENT OF BRYAN_SJ: The logic of the Court in this case now becomes clearer: The
concept of legal standing is a constitutional law concept which is INAPPLICABLE IN CASES
WHERE THERE ARE NO CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED. In cases where no
constitutional issues are raised the governing principle should be the concept of real party in
interest in the Rules of Court.
- The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an
appellate court, ,merely expresses the practice of the courts in
refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res
judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not
dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if not
universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and
is confined in its questions of law, and is confined in its
operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . ."
(Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521
(1979) )
- It follows that since the present case is not the same one
litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling
there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this
case." The parties are the same but the cases are not.
- Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit
foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of
judgment." According to the doctrine, an issue actually and
directly passed upon the and determined in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between
the same parties involving a different of action. (Pealosa v.
Tuason , 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido,
108. 582 (1960))
- It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment
or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to
issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L.
Ed. 2d 210 , 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN AND
SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was
held in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898
(1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a
patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money
paid to his wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928
assignment was not part of his taxable income, this
determination is not preclusive in a second action for collection
of taxes on amounts to his wife under another deed of
assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax
purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not
conclusive as to any other contract which was not then in
issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on
collateral estoppel. it was held, "must be confined to situations
where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all
respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the
controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged."
(333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the
relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though they
may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern
the legal issues which occur in the second case. Thus the
second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction
identical with but in a form separable form, the one dealt with in
the first proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the
second proceeding to make an independent examination of the
legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)
3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions, the
disregard which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
- They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights but guidelines for legislation. Thus, while constitutional
policies are invoked, this case involves basically questions of
contract law. More specifically, the question is whether
petitioners have legal right which has been violated.
SEPARATE OPINION
FELICIANO [dissent]
- I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the majority
opinion written by my distinguished brother in the Court,
Mendoza, J.
- I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my
esteemed brothers Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ. In respect of
the matter of locus standi, I would also reiterate the concurring
opinion I wrote on that subject in the first Kilosbayan case.1 All
the factors which, to my mind, pressed for recognition of locus
standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case, still
exist and demand, with equal weight and insistence, such
recognition in the present or second Kilosbayan case, I fear
that the Court may well have occasion in the future profoundly
to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we have today
clamped on our own limbs.
PADILLA [concur]
- I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in
this case. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws
enacted by Congress and approved by the President, (unless
they are violative of the Constitution) even if such laws run
counter to a Member's personal conviction that gambling
should be totally prohibited by law.
- In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case (G.R.
No. 113375), expressed the view that the rule on locus standi,
being merely a procedural rule, should be relaxed, as the issue
then was of paramount national interest and importance,
namely, the legality of a lease contract into by PCSO with
PGMC whereby the former sought an "on-line high-tech"
lottery, undeniably a form of gambling, the terms of which
clearly pointed to an "association, collaboration or joint venture"
with PGMC.
REGALADO [dissent]
- Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has now evolved
other adjective theories which are represented to be either
different from or ramifications of the original "standing to sue"
objection raised in the first lotto case. I will hazard my own
humble observations thereon.
1. There is, initially, the salvo against the adoption of the "law of
the case" doctrine in the original majority ponencia. It is
contended that this doctrine requires, for its applicability, an
issue involved in a case originating from a lower court which is
first resolved by an appellate court, that case being then
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and with
the prior resolution by the higher court of that issue being the
"law of the case" in any other proceeding in or a subsequent
appeal from the same case. It is insinuated that said doctrine
exists only under such a scenario.
- It may be conceded that, in the context of the cited cases
wherein this doctrine was applied, two "appeals" are generally
involved and the issue resolved in the first appeal cannot be
reexamined in the second appeal. If so, then what is
necessarily challenged in the first recourse to the higher court
is either an interlocutory order of the court a quo elevated on
an original action for certiorari or an appealable adjudication
which nonetheless did not dispose of the entire case below
because it was either a special proceeding or an action
admitting of multiple appeals.
- That is the present reglementary situation in the Philippines
which, unfortunately, does not appear to have been taken into
account when the double-appeal procedure involved in one
particular American concept was cited as authority in the
majority opinion. No attempt was made to ascertain whether in
the American cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or
even substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of
review by a higher court on either an appeal by certiorari or writ
of error, or through an original action of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus. Yet on such unverified premises, and without a
showing that the situations are in pari materia, we are told that
since the case at bar does not posses the formatted sequence
of an initiatory action in a lower court, an appeal to a higher
court, a remand to the lower court, and then a second appeal
to the higher court, the "law of the case" doctrine cannot apply.
I have perforce to reject that submission as I cannot indulge in
the luxury of absolute espoused by this majority view.
- I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the factual
and procedural situations where such doctrine may apply,
through its undue insistence on the remedial procedure
involved in the proceedings rather than the juridical effect of the
pronouncement of the higher court. Even in American law, the
"law of the case" doctrine was essentially designed to express
the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has
been decided 5 and, thereby, to emphasize the rule that the
final judgment of the highest court is a final determination of the
rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic role that it
was conceived to play in judicial determinations, just like the
rationale for the doctrines of res judicata and conclusiveness of
judgment.
- Accordingly, the "law of the case" may also arise from an
original holding of a higher court on a writ of certiorari, 7 and is
binding not only in subsequent appeals or proceedings in the
same case, but also in a subsequent suit between the same
parties. 8 What I wish to underscore is that where, as in the
instant case, the holding of this highest Court on a specific
issue was handed down in an original action for certiorari, it
has the same binding effect as it would have had if
promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in our
jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control and set
aside a grave abuse of official discretion can be commenced in
the Supreme Court itself, it would be absurd that for its ruling
therein to constitute the law of the case, there must first be a
remand to a lower court which naturally could not be the court
of origin from which the postulated second appeal should be
taken.
2. Obviously realizing that continued reliance on the locus
standi bar to petitioner's suit is not an ironclad guaranty against
it, the majority position has taken a different tack. It now
invoked the concept of and the rules on a right of action in
ordinary civil actions and, prescinding from its previous
positions, insists that what is supposedly determinative of the
issue of representation is contract law and not constitutional
law. On the predicate that petitioners are not parties to the
contract, primarily or subsidiarily, they then are real parties in
interest, and for lack of cause of action on their part they have
no right of action. Ergo, they, cannot maintain the present
petition.
As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure, the syllogism
of the majority can claim the merit of logic but, even so, only on
assumed premises. More importantly, however, the blemish in
its new blueprint is that the defense of lack of a right of action is
effectively the same as lack of locus standi, that is, the
absence of the remedial right to sue. As the commentators of
Castille would say, the objection under the new terminology is
"lo mismo perro con distinto collar." That re-christened ground,
as we shall later see, has already been foreclosed by the
judgment of the Court in the first lotto case.
It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce
a cause of action. For its purposes, the majority urges the
adoption of the standard concept of a real party in interest
based on his possession of a cause of action. It could not have
failed to perceive, but nonetheless refuses to concede, that the
concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not
be straitjacketed within its usual narrow confines in private
interest litigations.
Thus, adverting again to American jurisprudence, there is the
caveat that "the adoption of provision requiring that an action
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest does not
solve all questions as to the proper person or persons to
institute suit, although it obviously simplifies procedures in
actions at law. . . There is no clearly defined rule by which one
may determine who is or is not real party in interest, nor has
there been found any concise definition of the term. Who is the
real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of each
separate case, and one may be a party in interest and yet not
be the sole real party in interest." 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority opinion quotes the view of a foreign author but
unfortunately fails to put the proper emphasis on the portion
thereof which I believe should be that which should correctly be
stressed, and which I correspondingly reproduce:
It is important to note. . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underspinnings, is very different
from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the
real party in interest or has the capacity to sue. Although all
three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only
certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions
require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as of
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would have
its way in this case, there would be no available judicial remedy
against irregularities or excesses in government contracts for
lack of a party with legal standing or capacity to sue. This legal
dilemma or vacuum is supposedly remediable under a
suggestions submitted in the majority opinion, to wit:
Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not leave
without remedy any perceived illegality in the execution of
government contracts. Questions as to the nature or validity of
public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding before
they may be made can be raised in an appropriate complaint
before the Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. . .
In addition, the Solicitor General is authorized to bring an
action for quo warranto if it should be thought that a
government corporation . . . has offended against its corporate
charter or misused its franchise. . .
- The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in
the present case petitioners are not the real parties, hence they
cannot avail of any remedial right to file a complaint or suit. It
is, therefore, highly improbable that the Commission on Audit
would deign to deal with those whom the majority says are
strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain
the assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested
recourse to the Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing
suggestion that petitioners ask the Solicitor General to bring a
quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex relatione, not
only because one has to contend with that official's own views
or personal interests but because he is himself the counsel for
respondents in this case. Any proposed remedy must take into
account not only the legalities in the case but also the realities
of life.
3. The majority believes that in view of the retirement and
replacement of two members of the Court, it is time to
reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A previous judgment
of the Court may, of course, be revisited but if the ostensible
basis is the change of membership and known positions of the
new members anent an issue pending in a case in the Court, it
may not sit well with the public as a judicious policy. This would
be similar to the situation where a judgment promulgated by
the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and which
motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a time
limit for the resolution thereof, stays unresolved until the
appointment of members sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind
criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or "court packing" levelled
by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.
- I hold the view that the matter of the right of petitioners to file
and maintain this action - whether the objection thereto is
premised on lack of locus standi or right of action - has already
been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto case, G.R.
No. 113375. If the majority refuses to recognize such right
under the "law of the case" principle, I see no reason why that
particular issue can still be ventilated now as a survivor of the
doctrinal effects of res judicata. 11
It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar. there is
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375 was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the
merits, and has long become final and executory. There is, to
be sure, an attempt to show that the subject matter in the first
action is different from that in the instant case, since the former
was the original contract and the latter is the supposed
expanded contract. I am not persuaded by the proffered
distinction.
The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a
contract, which nevertheless continues to operate under the
same basis, with on the property, fore the same purpose, and
the same contracting parties does not suffice to extinguish the
identity of the subject matter in both cases,. This would be to
exalt form over substance. Furthermore, respondents
themselves admitted that the new contract is actually the same
as the original one, with just some variants in the terms of the
latter to eliminate those which were objected to. The contrary
assumption now being floated by respondents would create
chaos in our remedial and contractual laws, open the door to
fraud, and subvert the rules on the finality of judgments.
- Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended
terms in the expanded lease agreement created a discrete set
of litigable violations of the statutory charter of the Philippines
Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby collectively resulting in a
disparate actionable wrong or delict, that would merely
constitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the
former and the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, we would still have a situation of collateral
estoppel, better known in this jurisdiction as conclusiveness of
judgment. Hence, all relevant issues finally adjudged in the
prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties in the
case now before us and that definitely includes at the very least
the adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or
the right to sue respondents on the contracts concerned.
In their case - whether of res judicata, on which I insist, or of
conclusiveness of judgment, which I assume arguendo - what
is now being primarily resisted is the right of petitioners to sue,
aside from the postulated invalidity of the contract for the
government-sponsored lottery system. It does seem odd, if not
arcane, that petitioners were held to have the requisite locos
standi or right of action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that
matter, were likewise so recognized in the expanded value
added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but are now mysteriously divested
of the "place of standing" allegedly due to, for legal purposes, a
compelling need for reexamination of the doctrine, and, for
economic reasons, an obsession for autarky of the nation.
4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be
decided on the merits and on substantive considerations, not
on dubious technicalities intended to prevent on inquiry into the
validity of the supposed amended lease contract. The people
are entitled to the benefit of a duly clarified and translucent
transaction, just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and
should even by themselves primarily seek, to be cleaned of any
suspicions or lingering doubts arising from the fact that the
sponsors for jail alai and, now, of lotto are different.
- On the merits, to obviate unnecessary replication I reiterate
my concurrence with the findings and conclusions of Mr.
Justice Davide in this dissenting opinion, the presentation
whereof is completely devoid of strained or speculative
premises, and moreover has the virtue of being based on his
first-hand knowledge as a legislator of the very provisions of
the law now in dispute. In this instance and absent any other
operative data. I find the same to be an amply sufficient and
highly meritorious analysis of the controversy on the contract.
- One concluding point. I am not impressed by their stance of
the majority that our taking cognizance of this case and
resolving it on the merits will hereafter invite others to unduly
overburden this Court with avoidable importunities. This
sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since the Court has clearly
indicated that it sets aside objections grounded on judge-made
constitutional theories only under cogent reasons of substantial
justice and paramount public interest.
On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience to the beguiling
locos standi or right of action doctrines posited by the majority
in this case would only not be an abdication of a clear judicial
duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the people of
recourse to us from dubious government contracts through
constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for
such stultification. This is a contingency which is not only
possible, but probable under our oligarchic society in esse; and
not only undesirable, but repugnant within a just regime of law
still in posse.
DAVIDE [dissent]
- I register a dissenting vote.
- I am disturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in
Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. vs. Guingona, et al. 1 referred to as the
first lotto case) regarding the application or interpretation of the
exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1 of the Charter of
the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and
on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the
contract of lease involving the on-line lottery system entered
into between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the law
of the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy
the faith and confidence of the people, specially the lawyers
and litigants, in the certainly and stability of the
pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to
endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements
and weakens this Court's judicial and moral authority to
demand from lower courts obedience thereto and to impse
sanctions for their opposite conduct.
- It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case was
unconditionally accepted by the PCSO and the PGMC, as can
be gleaned from their separate manifestations that they would
not ask for its reconsideration but would, instead, negotiate a
new equipment lease agreement consistent with the decision
and the PCSO's charter and that they would furnish the Court a
copy of the new agreement. The decision has, thus, become
final on 23 May 1994. 2
- As the writer of the said decision and as the author of the
exception to paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as
amended, I cannot accept the strained and tenuous arguments
adduced in the majority opinion it justly the reversal of our
rulings in the first lotto case. While there are exceptions to the
aforementioned doctrines and I am not inexorably opposed to
upsetting prior decisions if warranted by overwhelming
considerations of justice and irresistible desire to rectify an
error, none of such considerations and nothing of substance or
weight can bring this case within any of the exceptions.
- In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the
petitioners, and in no uncertain terms declared:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance
to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public
interest and of a category even higher than those involved in
many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues
immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being
of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country
and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the
billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing than
of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the
procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of.
- In this concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
further showed substantive grounds or considerations of
importance which strengthened the legal standing of the
petitioners to bring and maintain the action, namely: (a) the
public character of the funds or other assets involved in the
contract of lease; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard
of a constitutional or legal provision by the public respondent
agency; (c) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specified interest in raising the questions involved therein; and
(d) the wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its
implementation.
Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs. Garcia, 3 this
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason who
had joined in the dissenting opinions in the first lotto case the
petitioners, locus standi therein, invoked and applied the ruling
on locus standi in the first lotto case. He stated:
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow
taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national
government or government-owned or controlled corporations
allegedly in contravention of the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and to disallow the same
when only municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay
Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176
SCRA 240 [1989].
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not
reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold the
legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the
present action.
- Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also dissented in
the first lotto case on the issue of locus standi; unqualifiedly
concurred with the majority opinion in Tatad. Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza, the writer of the ponencia in this case,
also invoked the locus standi ruling in the first lotto case to
deny legal standing to Tatad, et al. He said:
- Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens.
In the cases in which citizens were authorized to sue, this
Court found standing because it though the constitutional
claims pressed for decision to be of "transcendental
importance," as in fact it subsequently granted relief to
petitioners by invalidating the challenged statutes or
governmental actions. Thus in the Lotto case [Kilosbayan, Inc.
vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relief by the majority for
upholding petitioner's standing, this Court took into account the
"paramount public interest" involved which "immeasurably
affect[ed] the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people . . . and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects
of the envisioned on-line lottery system." Accordingly, the Court
invalidated the contract for the operation of the lottery.
- Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice
Abdulwahid A Bidin, Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Jose C.
Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco, joined him in his concurring
opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took part in the first
lotto case and Justice Francisco who was not yet a member of
this Court at the time, the rest of the Justice who joined the
concurring opinion of Justice Mendoza had dissented in the
lotto case on the said issue.
- Under the principle of either the law of the case of res
judicata, the PCSO and the PGMC are bound by the ruling in
the first lotto case on the locus standi of the petitioners and the
application or interpretation of the exception clause in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended.
Moreover, that application or interpretation has been laid to rest
under the doctrine of stare decisis and has also become part of
our legal system pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code which
provides: 'Judicial decisions applying interpreting the laws or
the constitution shall from part of the system of the
Philippines."
- These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously.
They are based on public policy and other considerations of
great importance and should not be discarded or jettisoned in a
cavalier fashion. Yet, they are now put to naught in this case.
- The principle of the law of the case "is necessary as a matter
of policy to end litigation. There would be no end to a suit if
every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a
court to listen to criticism on their opinions, or speculate on
chances from changes in its members." 7
- It is, however, contended that the law of the case is
inapplicable that doctrine applies only when a case is before an
appellate court a second time after its remand to a lower court.
While indeed the statement may be correct, it disregards the
fact that the case is nothing but a sequel to and is, therefore,
for all intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto
case. By their conduct, the parties admitted that it is, for which
reason the PGMC and the PCSO submitted in the first lotto
case a copy of the ELA in question, and the petitioners
commenced the instant petition also in the said case. Our
resolution that the validity of the ELA could not be decided in
the said case because the decision therein had became final
does not detract from the fact that this case is but a
continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the
raping controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand,
and the PCSO and the PGMC, on the other, on the operation of
the on-line lottery system.
Equally unacceptable is the majority opinion's rejection of the
related doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment of the ground
that the question of standing is a question, as this case
involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal question of
locus standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in
the first lotto case is the same in this case and in every
subsequent case which would involve contracts relating or
incidental to the contract or holding of lotteries by the PCSO in
collaboration, association; or joint venture with any person,
association, company or entity. And, the contract in question is
not different from or unrelated to the first nullified contract, for it
in nothing but a substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato
was even candid enough to admit that no new and separate
public bidding was conducted for the ELA in question because
the PCSO was of the belief that the public bidding for the
nullified contract was sufficient.
Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8 that
preclusion or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of
law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved,
is misplaced. For one thing, the question of the petitioners'
legal standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and
the same issue of law. For another, these cases involve the
same and not substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the
second contract between the PCSO and the PGMC on the
operation of the on-line lottery system.
The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very
authority it cited regarding the exception to the rule of issue
preclusion (Testament of the Law, 2d Judgments $ 28), the
second illustration stated therein is subject to this NOTE: "The
doctrine of the stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to
reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply
means that stare decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination
of a prior judgment.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a
principle or rule of law which has been established by the
decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in
other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the
necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and
does not require identity or privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly
fleshed out in Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution
shall form part of the legal system. Such decisions "assume the
same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not
only of those called upon to aside thereby but also of those in
duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."10 Abandonment
thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons -
which I do not find in this case - otherwise, the becoming virtue
of predictabiity which is expected from this Court would be
immeasurably affected and the public's confidence in the
stability of its solemn pronouncements diminished.
The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue
of locus standi and a re-examination of the application or
interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1
of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Section 49 (b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court on effects of judgment expressly provides:
(b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to
the matter cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to other matter that could have
been parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceedings, litigating for the same thing in the same title and
in the same capacity.
This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution
of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of
action; and (2) as preclusion to the relitigation of particular facts
of issues in action between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action. 11 Public policy, judicial orderliness,
economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants as well as
the peace and order of society, all require that stability should
be accorded judgments: that controversies once decided on
their merits shall remain in repose; that inconsistent judicial
decisions shall not be made on the same set of facts; and that
there be an end to litigation which, without the said doctrine,
would be endless. It not only puts an end to strife, but
recognizes that certainty in legal relations must be maintained.
It produces certainty as to individual rights and gives and
respect to judicial proceedings. 12 The justifications given in
the majority opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to
ultimately discard it are unconvincing. It is not at all true, as the
majority opinion contends, that "[t]he previous sustaining
petitioners intervention may in fact be considered a departure
from settled ruling on real party in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved."
It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure
on real party in interest was never put in issue in the previous
case. It was the clear understanding of the Members of the
Court that in the light of the issues raised and the arguments
adduced therein, only locus standi deserved consideration.
Accordingly, the majority opinion and the separate dissenting
opinions therein dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in
the process a vast array of authorities on the issue. Moreover,
as explicitly stressed in the concurring opinion of Justice
Feliciano, both constitutional and legal issues were involved
therein. Finally, as shall hereafter be discussed, in public law
the rule of real party in interest is subordinate to the doctrine of
locus standi.
- Equally unconvincing is the majority opinion's contention that
the ruling locus standi in the first lotto case may not be
preserved because the majority vote sustaining the petitioners'
standing was a "tenuous one" that may not be maintained in a
subsequent litigation, and that there had been changes in the
membership of the Court due to the retirement of Justices
Isagani A. Cruz and Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment
of Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Ricardo J. Francisco. It
has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was reiterated in
Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his concurring opinion in
the Tatad case, Justice Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad,
et al., because their case did not have the same importance as
the lotto case, he thereby accepted the concession of standing
to the petitioners in the lotto case. I wish to stress the fact that
all the Justices who had dissented in the first lotto case on the
issue of locus standi were either for the majority opinion or for
the concurring opinion in the Tatad case. Hence, I can say that
the Tatad case has given vigor and strength to the "tenuous"
majority in the first lotto case.
The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is
not whether the petitioners have locus standi but whether they
are the real parties-in-interest. This proposition is a bold move
to set up a bar to taxpayer's suits or cases invested with public
interest by requiring strict compliance with the rule on real party
in interest in ordinary civil actions, thereby effectively
subordinating to that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I am not
prepared to be a party to that proposition.
- The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination to the
restrictive rule on real party in interest cannot be justified by the
claim that is involved here is contract law, not constitutional
law. True, contract law is involved. We are not, however,
dealing here with an ordinary contract between private parties,
but a contract between a corporation wholly owned by the
government - hence, an instrumentality of the government -
and a private corporation for the contract of the lotto, which is
invested with paramount and transcendental public interest and
other public policy considerations because the lotto has
counter - productive and retrogressive effects which are as
staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise and
provokes issues that immeasurably affect the social, economic,
and moral well-being of the people. We said so in the first lotto
case.
GARCIA V BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
GUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990
FACTS
- A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of
Investments (BOI)/ Department of Trade and Industry
approving the transfer of site of the proposed petrochemical
plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for
that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG).
- P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain in
Lamao, Libay, Bataan for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone
under the administration, management and ownership of the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
- Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI
for registration as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals.
It specified Bataan as plant site, and one of the terms and
conditions for registration was the use of naphtha cracker and
naphtha as feedstock for fuel for its plant, which was to be a
joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of
registration on Feb. 24, 1988.
- BPC was given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and other
incentives, like, (1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2)
eliminating the 48% ad valorem tax on naphtha if and when it is
used as raw materials for the petrochemical plant.
- In February 1989, A.T. Chong, Chairman of USI Far East
Corporation, the major investor in BPC expressed to DTI
Secretary his desire to amend the original registration
certification of its project by changing the job site from Bataan
to Batangas because of the insurgency and unstable labor
situation in Bataan and the presence in Batangas of a huge
LPG depot owned by Philippine Shell Corporation. Other
requested amendments are as follows: (1) increasing the
investment amount from $220 million to $320 million; (2)
increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker,
polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the
feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG.
- On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision stating that, The
BOI recognizes and respects the principle that the final choice
is still with the proponent who would in the final analysis
provide the funding or risk capital for the project.
- In the petition entitled Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. The
Board of Investments, this court ordered BOI as follows: (1) to
publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have
access to its records on the original and amended applications
for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the
respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding,
however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and
other business and financial information, (3) to set for hearing
the petitioners opposition to the amended application in order
that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his
possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the
site of the BPC petrochemical plant to Batangas.
- Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court to
rule on whether or not the investor given the initial inducements
and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant
site may change simply because it has the final choice on the
matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to
have lost interest in the case by his failure to appear in the
hearing that was set by BOI.
- A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed,
asking that the Court resolve whether or not the foreign
investor has the right of final choice of plant site; that the non-
attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the
decision was not yet final and executory, and therefore
petitioner has not waived his right. Court resolution stated that
BOI, not the investor has final choice on the matter and that
even a choice approved by BOI may not be final for
supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a
place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of
plant site in order that the project will not fail. However, petition
was denied.
- Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no right of
final choice.
ISSUES
1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or
should be transferred to Batangas
2. WON its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be
changed to naphtha and/or LPG the approved amended
application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation
(LPC)
3. WON the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the
investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on
the feedstock constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the
BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest
notwithstanding
HELD
1. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. The Court
has constitutional duty to step into this controversy to
determine the paramount issue.
2. The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the use of
feedstock is unjustified.
- The Bataan site is ideal, the result of careful study.
- The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the
alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor
situation warrant a transfer to the plant site in Batangas.
- The Bataan Refining Corporation, a government owned
Filipino corporation, can provide the feedstock requirement of
the plant in Bataan, whereas the country is short of LPG and
there is a need to import for the use of the plant in Batangas.
Transfer will divert scarce dollars unnecessarily.
- R.A. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock from ad valorem
tax but excluded LPG from the exemption. This law was
specifically for the petrochemical industry. Neither BOI nor a
foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed
policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
- Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does
not have to buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall
be limited to naphtha.
- With the plant site in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner,
thus giving the government participation in the management of
the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational
corporation.
3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the
transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas
and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in
the investor all other circumstances to the contrary not
withstanding.
- The government has already granted incentives for this
particular venture. Through the BOI decision, it surrenders
even the power to make a company abide by its initial choice,
a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations
and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the
Filipino people.
- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the
government expressed in numerous laws (i.e. Art. 2, 1987
Omnibus Investments Code) and the Constitution (Sec. 1 and
10, Art. XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own affairs the way it
deems best for the national interest.
Disposition: Petition granted. Decision set aside as null and
void.
SEPARATE OPINION
GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code
prohibiting the amendment of the investors application for
registration of its project, neither does the law prohibit the BOI
from approving the amended application.
- The matter of choosing an appropriate site for the investors
project is a political and economic decision which only the
executive branch, as implementer of policy formulated by the
legislature, is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to
determine what is, or should be, the BOIs final choice of plant
site and feedstock.
- The petitioners recourse against the BOIs action is by an
appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 1987 Investments Code), not
to this Court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting]
- [The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy
determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into what
might be termed a government by the Judiciary, something
never intended by the framers of the Constitution when they
provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of government and excluded the Judiciary from
policy-making.
ART VI: LEGISLATURE
TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
MENDOZA; August 25, 1994
FACTS
- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition,
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716.
- RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT
system by amending National Internal Revenue Code.
- Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in
House of Reps to amend NIRC relative to VAT. These were
referred to House Ways and Means Committee w/c
recommended for approval H No 11197.
- H No. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was
approved by House of Reps after third and final rdg.
- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means. The Committee submitted
report recommending approval of S No 1630, submitted in
substitution of S No 1129, taking into consideration PS Res No
734 and H No 11197
- Senate approved S No 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg
by affirmative votes of 13 and 1 abstention.
- H No 11197 and S No 1630 were referred to conference
committee w/c after meeting 4 times, recommended that HB in
consolidation w/ SB be approved in accordance w/ bill as
reconciled and approved by the conferees.
- The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of
Reps and Senate. The enrolled bill was presented to President
who, on May 5, 1994 signed it. It became RA 7716. On May
12, it was published in 2 newspapers of gen circulation and it
took effect on May 28.
- RA 7716 amended 103 and made print media subject to
VAT in all aspect of operations. However, Sec of Finance
issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94 exempting circulation
income of print media. Income fr advertisements are still
subject to VAT.
- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allow time for
registration of businesses. Implementation was stopped by
TRO fr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
- Petitioners contend:
Re: Art VI Sec 24
1. Although H No 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was
not passed by Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate
version in the Conference Committee to produce the bill.
The verb shall originate is qualified by the word
exclusively.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senates power in
revenue bills to compensate for the grant to the Senate of
treaty-ratifying power.
3. S No 1630 was passed no in substitution of H No 11197
but of another Senate bill (S No 1129). Senate merely took
H No 11197 into consideration in enacting S No 1630.
Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)
1. The second and third rdgs were on the same day, Mar 24,
1994.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no
emergency. The growing budget deficit was not an unusual
condition in this country.
3. Also, it was S No 1630 that was certified urgent, not H No
11197.
Re: BCC acted within its power
1. RA 7716 is the bill which the BCC prepared. BCC
included provisions not found in the HB or SB and these
were surreptitiously inserted. BCC met behind closed
doors.
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the
stenographic notes by ellipses.
3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in
preparation of BCC Report because Report didnt contain
detailed and explicit statement of changes
4. It is required that the Committees report undergo three
rdgs in the two houses.
- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends:
Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)
1. Neither H No 11197 nor S No 1630 provided for removal
of exemption of PAL transactions fr payment of VAT and this
was made only by the BCC. This was not reflected in the
title.
2. Besides, amendment of PALs franchise may be made
only by special law which will expressly amend the franchise
(24 of PD 1590).
- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends:
Re: Art III Sec 1
1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while
maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives not only
goes against policy to promote cooperatives but also violate
equal protection of law.
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
contends:
2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as
90%.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation.
- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
Re: Art III Sec 4
1. It questions law bec exemption previously granted to
press under NIRC was withdrawn. Although exemption was
subsequently restored, PPI says theres possibility that
exemption may still be removed by mere revocation by
Secretary of Finance.
Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press
freedom because of VAT on gross receipts on
advertisements.
2. RA 7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment,
giving broadcast media favored treatment.
3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales
exceeds P480,000 but not more than P750,000 is
discriminatory.
4. The registration provision of the law is invalid when
applied to the press.
- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
Re: Art III Sec 5
1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax
exemption because that power is vested in Congress and
the Secretarys duty is to execute the law and the removal of
exemption of religious articles violates freedom of
thought/conscience.
- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
contends:
Re: Art III Sec 10
1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no
law impairing obligation of contracts
- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association
contends:
Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate
govt mandate to prioritize education
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON theres violation of Art VI 24 of Consti (revenue bill
originating exclusively fr House of Reps)
2. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(2) of Consti (three
readings on separate days)
3. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee acted within its
power
4. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(1) of Consti (only one
subject which is expressed in title) / WON amendment of 103
of NIRC is fairly embraced in title of RA 7716 although no
mention is made therein
Substantive:
5. WON Art III 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal
protection) is violated
6. WON Art III 4 (freedom of speech/expression/press) is
violated
7. WON Art III 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated
8. WON Art III 10 (no law impairing obligation of contracts)
is violated
9. WON Art VI 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive
system of taxation) is violated
10. WON Art VI 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious
purpose exempt) is violated
11. WON Art II 17 (govt priority on education, science and
tech) is violated
HELD
- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions
are self executing. Other govt depts. are also charged w/
enforcement of Consti.
Procedural
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the
RA must be resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled bill doctrine is
absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than
surreptitiously inserting provisions, SC declines going behind
enrolled copy of bill. SC gives due respect to other branches of
govt.
1. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 24
a. Its not the law but the revenue bill which is required to
originate exclusively in the House of Reps. A bill originating in
House may undergo extensive changes in Senate. To insist
that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be the same as
the House bill would deny the Senates power to concur with
and propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the
legislative power of the two houses.
b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not
legislative power but an exercise of check on executive power.
c. Theres no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then
writing its own version on one hand and on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the subject matter.
Consti simply says that its the initiative for filing the bill that
must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be
more sensitive to the local needs.
Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of bill fr House so long as action by
Senate is withheld pending receipt of House bill. It was only
after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in respect of it
began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means.
2. NO there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)
a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This
certification dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate
days. The phrase except when the President certifies to the
necessity qualifies two stated conditions: (1) the bill has
passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in
final form and distributed 3 days before finally approved. To
construe that the except clause dispenses only with printing
would violate grammar rules and would also negate the
necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill.
Example is RA 5440 which had 2 nd and 3rd rdgs on the same
day after bill had been certified urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and
this should not be rvwd by the Court.
c. It was S No 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter
was before the House, Pres likewise certified H No 9210 then
pending.
3. YES the BCC acted within its power
a. Give and take often marks the proceedings of BCC. There
was also nothing unusual in the executive sessions of the BCC.
Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make
material changes but this is a difficult provision to enforce. The
result could be a third version, considered an amendment in
nature of substitute, the only requirement that the 3 rd version be
germane to subject of the HB and SB. It is w/in power of BCC
to include an entirely new provision. After all, report of BCC is
not final and still needed approval of both houses to be valid.
b. This could have been caused by stenographers limitations
or to incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations.
c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the
changes. This is standard practice in bill-drafting.
Also, SC is not proper forum for these internal rules.
d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation
since each house may seek modifications of the compromise
bill. That requirement must be construed only to mean bills
introduced for the first time in either house, not the BCC report.
4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT
system, one way is to widen the base by withdrawing some
exemptions. To insist that PD 1590 in addition to 103 of
NIRC be mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of a bill
be a complete index of its content.
b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent
statute. And under Consti, grant of franchise for operation of
public utility is subject to amendment, alteration, repeal by
Congress when common good requires.
Substantive
- as RA 7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the
orig VAT law, debate on wisdom of law should be in Congress.
5. NO there is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated
- When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands respect; when property is imperiled,
lawmakers judgment prevails.
a. This is actually a policy argument.
b. This is a mere allegation.
c. This is also short of evidence.
6. NO Art III Sec a is not violated
a. Theres no violation of press freedom. The press is not
immune fr general regulation by the State.
b. Its not that it is being singled out, but only because of
removal of exemption previously granted to it by law. Also,
the law would be discriminatory if the only privilege
withdrawn is that to the press. But that is not the case. The
statute applies to a wide range of goods and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has
been unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not apply to
press alone but to all sales.
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost
of registration. Registration is a central feature of the VAT
system. It is a mere administrative fee, not a fee on exercise
of privilege or right.
7. NO Art III Sec 5 is not violated
a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable
sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious
org.
8. NO Art III Sec 10 is not violated
a. Parties to a contract cant fetter exercise of taxing power
of State. Essential attributes of sovereign is read into
contracts as a basic postulate of legal order.
9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as
possible, particularly to those w/in reach of higher income grps.
Business establishments with annual gross sales of <
P500,000 are exempted.
Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required
is that we evolve a progressive taxation system.
10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable
sales and use tax on sale of religious materials by religious org.
11. NO there is no violation of Art II Sec 17
a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press.
Decision Petitions are dismissed.
Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and
svcs. Then, its equal to 10% of gross selling price
Narvasa, Separate Opinion
Cruz, Separate Opinion
Padilla, Separate Opinion
Vitug, Separate Opinion
Regalado, Dissenting Opinion
Davide, Dissenting Opinion
Romero, Dissenting Opinion
Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion
Puno, Dissenting Opinion
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
FACTS
- The increasing budget problems of the government in the
form of fiscal problems, revenue generation, and fiscal
allocation inadequacy prompted the congress to create a law to
address such problems. This gave way to the Expanded Vat
Law (E-Vat Law) otherwise known as Republic Act No. 9337.
The case revolves around the constitutionality of the Republic
Act 9337 that increased the Value-Added Tax percentage from
10% to 12%. In this case there were 4 different petitioners:
Abakada Guro Party List, Association of Pilipinas Shell
Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./
Estrada, J. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/ Osmea, Congressman
Escudero, and Governor Garcia. All of them question the
constitutionality of RA 9337.
- Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT):
> VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the
sale, barter, exchange, or lease of goods or properties and
services.
> It is an indirect tax on expenditure. The seller of goods or
services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer.
VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and end-
consumers.
- RA 9337s legislative history is as follows:
It originated from House Bill 3555 that was approved on the
27th of January 2005 and House Bill 3705 that was approved
on the 28th of February 2005 and Senate Bill 1950 that was
approved on the 13th of April 2005. This was later consolidated
the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Bicameral
Conference Committee inserted and deleted some of the
original provisions. The Bill was approved on the 11th of May
2005 by the Senate and 10 th of May 2005 by the House of
Representatives.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has strictly
complied with the rules of both houses thereby remaining
within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by congress.
2. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee violated Article
VI Sec 26 that states that no amendment would be done after
three readings.
3. WON there was a violation of the Origination Clause as
stated in Art VI Sec 24.
Substantive
4. WON there was undue delegation to the President and
Secretary of Finance.
5. WON a VAT law such as that of RA 9337 is in violation of the
Constitutional provision Art VI Sec 28 (1) that requires taxation
to be uniform, equitable and that the Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation.
HELD
1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on the
violation of the senate and house rules unless there is a
showing that it is in clear violation of a constitutional provision
or of the rights of private individuals. (favorite ratio )
2. No, because the amendment rule refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with
regard to bills in each of the said respective houses before the
bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence and
amendment.
3. No, the Senate within the said provision only proposed
amendments after the House Bills were approved. The Bill still
originated through the House of Representatives.
4. No, because the President is just executing the law and is
still working within the standard and policy of the law. The
Secretary of Finance is also not given undue delegation as he
is considered as an alter ego of the president thus following the
same logic, he is only executing the law.
5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is
directed towards a goal of a progressive taxation.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA 9337 is unconstitutional as 1) the
increase of tax rates on domestic, resident foreign and
nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the increase of tax credit
against taxes due from nonresident foreign corporations on
intercorporate dividends, and 3) the reduction of the allowable
deduction for interest expense were not really part of the
House version of the E-VAT Law therefore in violation of the
origination clause in Article VI Section 24.
BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
PADILLA; November 20, 1991
FACTS
- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee
- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the
civil case no. 0035, RP vs. Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et
al.
-The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette
Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich
themselves at the expense of the
Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:
-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI
Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators,
Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject
to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate
identity, etc.
8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez
companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG
approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquinos
brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa
Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible
violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by
affinity or consanguinity up to the 3 rd civil degree, to intervene
in any transaction w/ the government
-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee)
-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa
to testify on what they know about the sale of the 36
Romualdez corporations
-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the
former invoking the due process clause, and both averring that
such testimonies would unduly prejudice the defendants of
civil case no.0035
-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition,
praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive
relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose
-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the
Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of
legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting
Angara v. Comelec)
-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view
that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue
Ribbon Committee
ISSUES
1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of
legislation.
2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of
another branch of government.
3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due
process.
HELD
1. NO Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of
legislation
- Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo
Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez
corporationsthere was no intended legislation as required by
A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon
Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to
the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the
Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress power
of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it may not pry into private
affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task
of congressno inquiry is an end in itself.
2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of
another branch of government
- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan,
any further investigation by Congress would only serve to
complicate matters and produce conflicting opinionsas held
in Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c
are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.
3. YES the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process
- It has been held that a congressional committees right to
inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action, includingthe Bill of
Rights. As held in Hutcheson v. US, it cant be assumed that
legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress
cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v.
Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against self-
incrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and
in cases in w/c the witness is an accused.
Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the
Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence before it
because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if
pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as
ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.
SEPARATE OPINION
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid
of legislation.
-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent
and needs no textual granteven so, it is expressly granted by
A6 S21.
Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid
legislation might ensue from an inquiry does not limit the power
of inquiry
US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in
order to determine WON to legislate on a particular subject
matter on w/c it is w/in its constitutional powers to act.
US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns what
Congress can legislate, a legitimate legislative purpose must
be presumed.
-the requirement that an inquiry be in aid of legislation is
easier to establish here where Congress legislative field is
unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is not necessary that every
question be material to the proposed legislation, but directly
related to the subject of the inquiry.
-the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial
purpose; Congress may investigate for its own purposes even
thought the subjects of the investigation are currently under
trial.
Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due
process.
-A6 S21 provides that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
However, such a restriction does not call for the complete
prohibition of such investigations where a violation of a basic
right is claimed, but rather only requires that such rights be
respected.
-the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when
incriminating questions are posed, but the witness may not
refuse to take the witness stand completely. In the case at bar,
no incriminating questions had been asked, hence the
allegation of violation of rights is premature.
CRUZ [dissent]
Re: WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid
of legislation.
Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an
action of a legislative body is w/ legitimate object if it is capable
of being so construed, and It has no right to assume the
contrary.
-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case,
the possible violation of RA 3019 in the disposition of the
Romualdez corporations, is an indispensable duty of the
legislature
Mcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution
ordering an investigation expressly state that the object of
the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation
Re: WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due
process.
-the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary
witnesses, they may only invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when such a question is posed, and cannot
refuse taking the witness stand outright.
SENATE V ERMITA
CARPIO-MORALES;
FACTS
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 464 15
issued Sept. 28, 2005
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,;
Art. III Sec. 4, 7; Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate
Investigation Committees issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive Dept. including the AFP and PNP for them to
appear in public hearings on inquiries concerning mainly: (A)
The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the Wire-
Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam (D) the Venable contract
- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests
for postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as
existence of urgent operational matters, more time to prepare a
more comprehensive report, etc. Sen. Drilon, however, did not
accede to their requests because the requests were sent
belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have
already been completed.
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took
effect immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept.
officials subject to Senate investigations claimed that they were
not allowed to appear before any Senate or Congressional
hearings without consent (written approval) from the President,
which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend
due to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to
E.O. 464. Thereafter, several cases were filed challenging E.O.
464 and praying for the issuance of a TRO enjoining
respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing the
assailed order. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al.,
prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit.
ISSUES
Primary Issue
1. WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in
the Congress
Secondary Issues
2. Justiciability of the case:
a. Legal standing of petitioners:
G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL
G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez
G.R. 169667 Alternative Law Groups (ALG)
G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)
15
E.O. 464 Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation under the Constitution, and for other purposes.
b. Actual Case or Controversy
3. WON E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.
4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of
discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
HELD
Primary Issue
1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to
withhold information sought by the Congress in aid of
legislation, without it asserting a right to do so, and without
stating reasons therefor.
- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive
privilege, Congress nonetheless has the right to know why the
executive dept. considers requested information privileged.
E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without the need of clearly asserting a
right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere
expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of
Congress is frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials
of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information
cannot be presumed to be valid.
Reasoning
Executive Privilege
-The power of the President and other high-level executive
branch officers to withhold certain types of information of a
sensitive character from Congress, the courts and the public.
- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21
This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and
exact testimony that it may exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively. It gives the Congress the power to
compel the appearance of executive officials to comply with its
demands for information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
As determined from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, this provision was intended to be distinguished
from inquiries in aid of legislation, in that attendance here is
merely discretionary on the part of the department heads.
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to
executive dept. heads and to appearances in the question hour
(because of its specific reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it
valid on its face.
- Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of
office mentioned in section 2(b), on what is covered by the
executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the
other branches of government. It may be construed as a mere
expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and
scope of executive privilege.
- Sec. 2 (b) of E.O. 464
Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain
info. is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official
from appearing before Congress, only to the express
pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the appearance
of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization
is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Due to the
fact that executive privilege is of extraordinary power, the Pres.
may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it. Such power
must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive
hierarchy.
- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It is
invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert but merely implies
the claim of executive privilege. It does not provide precise and
certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464
coupled with an announcement that the President has not
given her consent, is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is justified
under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its
power of inquiry.
Secondary Issues
2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:
Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of
transcendental importance there must be a showing of: 1.
the character of the funds (public)/assets involved 2. a
clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions raised.
The Senate of the Philippines
- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of
their fundamental right for intelligent public decision-making
and sound legislation is the proper party to assail an executive
order which allegedly stifles the ability of the members of
Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has a
substantial and direct interest over the outcome of such a
controversy.
Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL)
- The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient
that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their
constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation and conduct
oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
IBP, Chavez, ALG (invoking right to info. on matters of public
concern)
- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in
assailing the constitutionality of laws must be direct and
personal. The Court held in Francisco v. Francisco that when a
proceeding involves assertion of a public right, the mere fact
that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
PDP-Laban (claiming standing due to the transcendental
importance of issue)
- There being no public funds involved and there being parties
with more direct and specific interest in the controversy (the
Senate and BayanMuna), gives PDP-Laban no standing.
b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court)
- A challenged order which has already produced results
consequent to its implementation and where such results are
the subject of questions of constitutionality, is ripe for
adjudication.
- The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials
excusing themselves from attending the Senate hearings. It
would be sheer abandonment of duty if the Court would refrain
from passing upon the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are
presumed to be a matter of public concern, therefore, it follows
that any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures
of information in such investigations deprives the people of
information.
4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
executive branch, it has a direct effect on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern therefore it
is not exempt from the need of publication. Due process
requires that the people should have been apprised of the
issuance of E.O. 464 before it was implemented.
Decision Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b)
and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a)
are VALID.
GUINGONA V CARAGUE
GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991
FACTS
- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4B in automatic
appropriation (86.8 going to debt service) and P155.3 from the
General Appropriations Act or a total of P233.5B; only P27B
was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the Senate,
question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for
debt service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential
Decrees 81, 117, and 1967.
- Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to
Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV of the Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7
of the Civil Code, when statutes run contrary to the
Constitution, it shall be void.
- They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no
longer operative since they became functus oficio after
President Marcos was ousted. With a new congress replacing
the one man-legislature, new legislation regarding
appropriation should be passed. Current appropriation,
operating on no laws therefore, would be unenforceable.
- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said
decrees did not expire with the ouster of Marcos, after adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, said decrees were inconsistent with
Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which stated that:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law
must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate
Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as
follows
Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and
exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President who determines
in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.
- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic
appropriation provides flexibility: ". . . First, for example, it
enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn
of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities and
borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term
instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten
our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset,
debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic
appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing
arising from any deviation from what has been previously
programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are
usually made one year in advance, are based on a
mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, `basket' of
foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's which may
significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to
changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic
appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await
and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this
comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions
which in the meantime may have already drastically changed.
In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may
have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total
expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand
for immediate-payment even before due dates.
- Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness
is conditioned upon the continuance of the person of President
Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and
purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or
without the person of Marcos."
ISSUES
1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared
to its appropriation of P27.7B for education in violation of Sec.
5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution.
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority
to education and ensure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of
job satisfaction and fulfillment.
2. WON the Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they
are, do they violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitutional.
3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by
automatic appropriation.
HELD
1. The Court disagrees that Congress hands are
hamstrung by the provision provided. There are other
imperatives of national interest that it must attend to;
the amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is the highest
in all department budgets thereby complying with the
mandate of having the highest priority as stated above.
The enormous national debt, incurred by the previous
administration, however, still needs to be paid. Not only
for the sake of honor but because the national economy
is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress allotted more for
debt service such an appropriation cannot be
considered by this Court as unconstitutional.
2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided
in Sec. 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the
Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked.
- This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely
been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order so that
legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized.
Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are
inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended,
repealed or revoked.
- Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by
implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the
principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it
is so clearly stated.
3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended,
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the
amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to
enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,
credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they
shall become due without the need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefore as the need arises. The purpose
of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain
the credit standing of the country.
- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific
amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the
problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.
The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts
to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only
the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges
on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold
in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and
when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts
as shown by the books of the Treasury.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is
that the sum authorized for release should be determinate or
determinable. The Presidential Decrees do not satisfy this
requirement. As to the ponencias reference to legislative
parameters provided by law, Cruz says no such regulatory
boundaries exist.
PADILLA [dissent]
- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that
Sec. 29(1)Article VI implies that a law enacted by Congress
(and approved by the President) appropriating a particular sum
or sums must be made before payment from the Treasury can
be made. Laws should be construed in light of current laws and
not those made by a one-man legislative branch.
- Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative
to debt service were tailored for the periods covered by said
decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and
approve the proper appropriations for debt servicing, as this is
a matter of policy that, in his opinion, pertains to the legislative
department, as the policy-determining body of the Government.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V
ENRIQUEZ
QUIASON; August 19, 1994
FACTS
- House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994
(GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of
Congress on December 17, 1993.
- On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law,
and declared the same to have become Republic Act No.
766316, the General Appropriation Act (GAA) of 1994. On the
same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto
Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in
either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
- In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) et al. prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare
as unconstitutional and void: (a) Article 41 on the Countrywide
Development Fund or pork barrels, the special provision in
Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, (b) Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service
or the amount appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of
the P37.9 B allocated for the DECS; and (c) the veto of the
President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of the GAA of
1994
- In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the
constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in
the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b)
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission
on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGU's) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC's); and (2) the constitutionality of the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt service.
- In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Taada together
with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic
corporation, sued as taxpayers, challenging the constitutionality
of the Presidential veto of the special provision in the
appropriations for debt service and the automatic appropriation
of funds therefor.
- In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Taada contest
the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the
President in the implementation of certain appropriations for
the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority
(NHA).
- In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues
raised in the four petitions, the Court invited former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice
Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae.
16
Entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
G.R. No. 113105
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing17
Substantive
2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or pork
barrels is an encroachment by the legislature on executive
power, since said power in an appropriation act is in
implementation of a law
3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not
education18 as the highest priority in the allocation of budget
unconstitutional
4. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress
to realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other
expense category is unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Article
VI Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution19
HELD
Procedural
1. A member of Congress has the legal standing to question
the validity of a presidential veto or any other act of the
Executive which injures the institution of Congress.
Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v.
Macaraig) and a US case (United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co) as secondary source to recognize legal standing. Then in
forming the ratio decidendi, it again relied on US cases as
secondary sources (Coleman v. Miller, Holtzman v.
Schlesinger) as well as the opinion of Justice Fernando as
Amicus Curiae.
Substantive
2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it
the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under
the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be.
Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and
other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to
17
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he
claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in
effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
18
Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment."
19
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations."
qualified beneficiaries" It was Congress itself that determined
the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under
the CDF involves implementation of the priority projects
specified in the law. The authority given to the members of
Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of the
GAA of 1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under
the CDF, it is the President who shall implement them. In short,
the proposals and identifications made by the members of
Congress are merely recommendatory.
3. The constitutional provision which directs the State shall
assign the highest budgetary priority to education is merely
directory.
Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v. Carague.
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution, Congress is mandated to assign the highest
budgetary priority to education it does not thereby follow that
Congress is deprived of its power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
4. The members only determine the necessity of the
realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating
expenses but it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives who shall approve the realignment.
Decision
Procedural
1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi
Substantive
2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature on
executive power, hence constitutional
3. No. Congress act is not unconstitutional. It simply exercises
its power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest
and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
4. No. It is not unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
ISSUE
WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of
1994 in the appropriation for debt service without vetoing the
entire P86.3 B for said purpose is unconstitutional
Or, simply put: WON the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution20
HELD
Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation,
is considered an inappropriate provision 21 which can be
vetoed separately from an item.
Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a mere
rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.
Hence, it used this case as precedent. It also cited another
case, Henry v. Edwards to support its ratio. Citing Gonzales: As
the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress
can include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to
some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its
operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it follows that
any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or
which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation,
is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed
separately from an item. Citing Henry v. Edwards: When the
legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general
appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as 'items' for
purposes of the Governor's (Presidents) item veto power over
general appropriation bills.
Decision
Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the
Special Provision of the item on debt service, including the
provisos that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be
used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be
used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators." The said provisos, being appropriate provisions
since they germane to and have a direct connection with the
item on debt service, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the
item veto of said provisions is void.
G.R. No. 113174
G.R. No. 113766
G.R. No. 113888
ISSUES
20
Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: The President shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the
item or items to which he does not object.
21
Also included in the category of inappropriate provisions which are intended to amend our laws,
because clearly these laws have no place in an appropriations bill, and therefore unconstitutional.
1. WON the veto for revolving funds of State Universities and
Colleges (SUCs) is unconstitutional
2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for the
Department of Public Works and Highways on 70%
(administrative) / 30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance is
unconstitutional
3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of medicines by
AFP is unconstitutional
4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval of
Congress for purchase of military equipment is unconstitutional
5. WON the veto of provision on use of savings to augment
AFP pension funds is unconstitutional
6. WON the Presidents directive that the implementation of the
Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject
to prior Presidential approval is tantamount to an administrative
embargo of the congressional will to implement the
Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's, therefore
unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment22)
7. WON veto of the President setting conditions or guidelines in
the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA,
DPWH and CHR is unconstitutional
HELD
[1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation, is considered an inappropriate provision which
can be vetoed separately from an item23
Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi from the issue in the
previous section is applied in the 5 issues in this section.
Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the same as well. (Notice
how the ratio is applied in the ruling or dispositive)
6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law requiring legislative approval of executive
acts must be incorporated in a separate substantive bill.
Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes from journals 24 in
discussing the issue of Impoundment to support his reasoning
in the present case.
7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of
public funds authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by
22
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue .
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of
Funds, Harvard Law Review)
23
Note that this ratio is also applied in issue [6] aside from the ratio which I formulated there. This can be
implied from, Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend
other laws. Hence, this is an inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately.
24
Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard Law Review; Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constitutional
Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown Law Journal; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive
Impoundment and Congressional Power, Yale Law Journal
the President of his constitutional duty to see that laws are the item of appropriation for the DPWH; and (b) Special
faithfully executed. Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP
which is GRANTED.
Decision Voting: 14 Concur, 1 Dissent
1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions. SEPARATE OPINION
2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is PADILLA [concur and dissent]
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the
other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended - - I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason
70% by administrative and 30% by contract. except in so far as it re-affirms the Court's decision in Gonzalez
3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable from the v. Macaraig
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the - An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and
special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without therefore outside the veto power of the Executive.
also vetoing the said item.
4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in VITUG [concur]
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and - I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more
substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, than the President and his colleagues, would have the best feel
Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. on the needs of their own respective constituents. It is not
5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for
use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in
System is violative of Sections 25(5) 25 and 29(1)26 of the Article whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally
VI of the Constitution. Thus veto is not unconstitutional. impermissible.
6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to
repeal or amend other laws. Impliedly, this is an inappropriate GONZALES V MACARAIG
provision which can be vetoed separately. MELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990
7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the
President is simply exercising his constitutional duty to FACTS
implement the laws faithfully. - The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential
veto of special and general provisions, particularly Sec. 55 of
Dispositive the General Appropriations Bill for 1989
Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to [1] - The petitioners claim they have locus standi on the ground of:
G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the - being member and ex-officio members of the Finance
annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service Committee
specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for - substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be affected
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic - The respondents in this case are member of the Cabinet who
indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for are sued in their official capacity for the implementation of the
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and [2] General Appropriations Act of 1989
G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of - December 16, 1988 - The House of Representatives passed
the veto of: (a) the 2nd paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of HB 19186 (GA Bill for 1989)
25 - eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Budget of the President
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
- presented to President for approval
appropriations." - December 29, 1988 - The bill was signed into law (became
26
"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law"
RA 6688)
- The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec. 55
- February 2, 1989- Senate expressed through Senate
Resolution No. 381 that the veto of Sec. 55 was
unconstitutional
- April 11, 1989 - Petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed
- assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55
- enjoined the implementation of RA 6688
- No restraining order was implemented by the Supreme
Court
- September 7, 1989 - Court resolved to give due course to the
petition
- Jan. 17, 1990 - Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Supplementary Petition which raised the same issue as the
original petition (questioning the presidential veto)
- The vetoed provisions include:
- Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item
submitted by the President which has been reduced by
Congress cannot be restored/increased. An item is deemed
disapproved if there is no corresponding appropriation in the
Act.
- Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to Sec.
55 of the 1989 Appropriations Act except that this was
lumped together with the use of savings
- The basic difference between both provisions is that in the
1989 Appropriations Act, the "use of savings" is in Section
12, apart from Section 55 whereas in the 1990
\Appropriations Act, "use of savings" and the vetoed
provision are both in Sec. 16
- The reason for the veto:
- Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5)
- Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of the
President, the Senate President, Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the
Heads of Con-Coms to augment any item in the General
Appropriations law
- If allowed, the President and the other abovementioned
officials cannot augment any item and appropriation from
their savings even if special circumstances like calamity
- Petitioners' arguments:
1) The president's line veto power regarding the
appropriations bill is limited to item/s and does not cover
provisions and therefore exceeded her authority (Sections
55 and 16 are provisions)
2) When the president objects to provisions of an
appropriation bill, it is not possible to exercise the item veto
power but should veto the whole bill as well
3) The item veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be
legislation already (violative of separation of powers)
4) Power of augmentation in Article 6, Sec. 25(5) is provided
by law so Congress has prerogative to impose restrictions in
the exercise of that power
- SolGen's arguments:
1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners have a
political remedy which is to override the veto.
2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the
Appropriations Act and should merit a veto.
3) The power of the president to augment items in
appropriations for the executive branches already provided
for in Budget Law (specifically Sec. 44 and 45 of PD 1177 as
amended by RA 6670)
4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of other
distinct and severable parts.
ISSUES
1. WON the issue is justiciable
2. WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and without effect
HELD
1. The issue is justiciable, not political.
a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy between
the Senate and the Executive that the Supreme Court may
take cognizance of. The Demetria v. Alba case declared that
the Supreme Court has the duty to declare acts of a
government branch void if beyond that branch's powers
b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners stress
the imperative need for definitive ruling by the Court
c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is a
taxpayer's suit. The Sanidad ruling (the Court may or may
not entertain a taxpayer's suit) and the Tolentino v.
COMELEC ruling (members of the Senate have
personality when a Constitutional issue is raised) were
used. This is also not the first time that the veto power was
discussed.
i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the veto
but reversed by the US Supreme Court because of the
Appropriations Bill was not involved.
ii) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia - rejected the veto in an
Appropriations Bill
2. NO the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill is constitutional
*The extent of item veto power still includes the vetoing of
provisions.
- Art. 6 Sec. 27 - Veto power of the President
Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President and if
exercised would veto the entire bill
Paragraph 2 - the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto over
a particular item in an appropriations, revenue or tariff bill.
The president may not veto less than all of an item (no
authority to veto part of an item and approve the remaining
portion of that item).
- Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations bills in the
Organic Act of Aug. 29, 1916
- 1935 Constitution, Art. 6, Sec 11(2) - The veto was more
expansive since it included provisions and items in revenue
and tariff bills
- 1973 Constitution - more compact version and refers to the
Prime Minister as the only official who has the power
- 1987 Constitution - verbatim reproduction of 1973 provision
except that a different public official (the President) was now
involved and eliminated the reference to a veto of a
provision
- The Court held that even if there was an elimination of any
reference to the veto provision, the extent of the President's
veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has
not changed.
- An item in a bill relates to the particulars, details, distinct and
severable parts of the bill whereas a provision is of a more
general nature.
- A restrictive interpretation as espoused by the petitioners
disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part
of the bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the
general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some
particular appropriation and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
- A provision does not relate to the entire bill.
- The exercise of veto power does not partake of a legislative
power as stated in the Bengzon case:
- The legislature has the power to enact laws while the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional
exercise of which he may defeat the will of the legislature.
- The President finds its authority in the Constitution.
- The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the
 constitutionality of a veto in the same way that they presume
constitutionality of an act passed by the Legislature.
* Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions.
- Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the executive
power to veto, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are not provisions in the
budgetary sense.
- Based on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Secs. 55
and 16 do not fit this requirement.
a) no relation to a particular or distinctive requirement. They
apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
b) disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found in
the Bill.
c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of
Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Secs. 55 and
16 are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as
items for the purpose of the veto power.
*Sections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and are
therefore susceptible to a veto.
- Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose conditions
in an Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached,
veto powers do not have the power to strike them out.
- These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can
impose conditions on expenditure of funds and that the
Executive cannot veto a condition of an appropriation while
allowing the appropriation itself to stand.
- But for the rule to apply, restrictions should be in the real
sense of the term. Restrictions should exhibit a connection
with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of
expenditures. The test is appropriateness.
- Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate conditions.
- Actually general law measures more appropriate for
substantive and therefore separate legislation.
- Neither shows the necessary connection with a schedule of
expenditures. Items reduced or disapproved by Congress are
not on the enrolled bill and can only be detected when
compared with the original budgetary submittals of the
President.
* The power of augmentation and the validity of the veto
- The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they
nullified the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of
different branches of government to augment any item in the
General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations (with
reference to Art. 6, Sec. 25(5)).
- The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law.
- The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the purpose
of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of a government branch so as to afford
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds.
- Separation of powers is endangered in no way.
- Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair the
constitutional and statutory authority of the President in the
interest of expediency and efficiency.
- The special power of augmentation from savings is merely
incorporated in the GA Bill. The GA Bill is one of primary and
specific aim to make appropriation of money from the public
treasury. The power of augmentation from savings is not
considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-
appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.
- To sanction this practice would withhold the power from the
Executive and other officials and put in jeopardy the exercise of
that power.
- If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the veto
powers by the executive were unconstitutional, a veto may be
overriden by the votes of 2/3 of the members of Congress. But
Congress made no attempt to do so.
ATITIW V ZAMORA
TINGA; September 30, 2005
FACTS
- This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory
relief as taxpayers, seeking the declaration of nullity of
paragraph 1 of the Special Provisions of RA 8760 (General
Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also seeking the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO to enjoin implementation
of the questioned provision. However, the 2000 GAA has long
been implemented, the issuance is already moot and
academic. But the Court shall pass upon the constitutional
issues.
- Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR):
- President Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to deal with
insurgency in the Cordilleras. These dialogues focused on the
establishment of an autonomous government in the Cordilleras.
- Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains the
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras, and Section 18, Article X mandates the
congressional enactment of the organic acts for each of the
autonomous regions.
- President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 on July 15,
1987, creating the CAR, which is the interim and preparatory
body tasked to administer the affairs of government in the
Cordilleras.
-Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989,
Congress enacted RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for for the Cordillera Autonomous Region ). A plebiscite was
held where the people of the Cordilleras could ratify the
Organic Act. However, the creation of an autonomous region
was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras except for
the Ifugao province. The Court ruled that Ifugao alone cannot
validly constitute the CAR and upheld the disapproval of the
Organic Act. The Court also declared E.O. No. 220 to be still in
force and effect.
-February 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law the 2000
GAA which includes the assailed Special Provisions:
1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shall be
used to wind up the activities and operations of the CAR,
including the payment of separation and retirement benefits
of all affected officials and employees
-July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270
extending the implementation of the winding up of operations of
the CAR.
ISSUES
1. WON the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is a rider
and as such is unconstitutional
2. WON the Philippine Government, through Congress, can
unilaterally amend/repeal E.O. No. 220
3. WON the Republic should be ordered to honor its
commitments as spelled out in EO 220.
HELD
1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a rider
TF it is constitutional
a. A rider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane to the
subject of the bill in which it is incorporated. 2 provisions of the
Constitution prohibit them: Art VI: Sec 25(2) No provisions or
enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein and Sec 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be embraced in the
title thereof
- The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the
hands of Congress: it simply requires that all the provisions are
either appropriation items, or non-appropriaton items which
relate specifically to appropriation items.
- Test: It must be 1) Particular if it relates specifically to a
distinct item of appropriation; 2) Unambiguous when its
application is apparent on the face of the bill and needs no
reference to details/souces outside the bill; 3) Appropriate
when its subject does not necessarily have to be treated in a
separate legislation.
- The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it passes
the above test.
Ratio when a provision is particular, unambiguous, and
appropriate to the appropriations bill to which it belongs, it shall
not be considered to be a rider
b. Petitioners allege:
- that instead of providing a budget for the
CAR, it had the effect of abolishing the CAR
- since a special law created the CAR, the
2000 GAA is not the place for amending or repealing a
standing law.
- However, the CAR was not abolished. It has only been
deactivated.
- Abolish to do away with, annul, abrogate, destroy
completely, office ceases to exist;
- Deactivate render inactive, break up by discharging or
reassigning personnel, office continues to exist, albeit dormant.
- But even if the limitation of the CARs budget had the effect of
abolishing certain offices, the Congress has he power to do so.
- creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function
- office created by the legislature is wholly within the power
of that body, and it may abolish the office if it sees fit.
c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the autonomous
region contemplated in the Constitution. EO 220 has not
established an autonomous regional government; rather, it has
only created an administrative region. It can be considered a
regional coordinating agency of the National Government.
2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailed paragraph is a
rider, the rest of the arguments look into the wisdom and
efficacy of said provisions. Political questions
Still
1. Contention that Congress cant unilaterally amend or repeal
EO 220: Rejected. There is no such thing as an irrepealable
law.
2. Implementation of EO 220 is an executive prerogative while
the sourcing of funds to support CARs activities is legislative.
Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot correct the
acts of the Executive or Congress.
ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- Petition for review of the decision of the HRET
- 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P. Arroyo
(JA) ran for congressman for the lone district of Makati. Board
of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS files an election
protest before HRET, seeking revision and recounting of ballots
in 75% of the precincts. His grounds: alleged
irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes &
massive fraud. JA files counter-protest questioning residence
qualification of AS; dismissed by HRET.
- HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious irregularities
found. Justice Gancaycos Report and Recommendation
confirm irregularities and anomalies engineered by some
HRET officials and personnel: Arroyo votes were consistently
reduced while Syjuco was always constant
- Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JA
submits certified true copies of the Revision Reports and
election returns. AS submits over 200,000 pages of
documentary evidence, mere photocopies and not certified or
authenticated by comparison with the original documents or
identification by any witness."
- In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his original
posture (revision and recount of ballots) to what he calls a truly
innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process" the
PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED EVIDENCES.
- By reason of the new allegations and substantial
amendments (which broaden the scope of his protest, change
his theory of the case or introduce additional causes of action
in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the Tribunal), HRET
ordered him to show cause why his protest should not be
dismissed.
- 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-
members as against the three Justices-members), HRET
resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the
examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and
thereafter to decide the case on the merits.
- JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings
were conducted thereafter.
- 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered its
now assailed Decision annulling JA's proclamation, & declaring
AS as the duly elected congressman. Said decision also refers
the case to COMELEC & the Office of the special Prosecutor
for appropriate actions.
- Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC.
ISSUES
1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in
a. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS precinct
level document based anomalies/evidence" theory;
b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and
the manner in which the evidence was procured; &
c. annulling election results in some contested precincts.
2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
HELD
1. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
a. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence"
theory
- This innovative theory broadened the scope of the election
protest beyond what AS originally sought. This is clearly
substantial amendment of the election protest expressly
proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules. Impropriety
of private respondent's belated shift of theory was sensed by
majority members of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss
the protestthis a clear indication of grave abuse of
discretion. No further hearings were conductedJA's right to
due process was clearly violated.
- Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only
within the same period for the filing of the election protest 15
which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after
the proclamation of the winner. The rule in an election protest is
that the protestant or counterprotestant must stand or fall upon
the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading
filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of
protest or counter
protest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the
cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after
having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action
and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew
either in the same forum or on appeal. <principle of
estoppel>
b. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured
- Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence
shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature
so long as the original evidence can be had. Certain vital
election documents (such as certified xerox copy of the number
of registered voters per precinct and photocopies of statements
of votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of
the majority decision, never offered in evidence by either of the
parties.
- Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by
themselves without the participation of any of the three (3)
remaining Justices-members, declared that 10,484 of the
contested signature are fake. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5
of HRET Rules (all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal
as a body; and presence of at least one (1) Justice-member is
required to constitute a valid quorum).
c. Nullification of election results
- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance
with the 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election
returns based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism:
i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of
votes in the precinct or precincts were involved, &
ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or
vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terrorism.
- Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly
illegal; it is the duty of the court to sustain an election
authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free
and fair expression of the popular will, and the actual result
thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent fraud, mere irregularities
or omissions committed by election officials which do not
subvert the expression of popular will cannot countenance the
nullification of election results. Corollarily, the misconduct of
election officers or irregularities on their part will not justify
rejecting the whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case)
where it does not appear that the result was affected thereby,
even though the circumstances may be such as to subject the
officers to punishment. 32 These omissions are not decisive
since actual voting and election by registered voters had taken
place in the questioned precincts.
- General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an
opportunity to rectify its error through a motion for
reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the members
of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown, recourse for a
reconsideration of its decision becomes nugatory and an
immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the
fundamental principle of due process. A prior motion for
reconsideration can be dispensed with if petitioner's Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
fundamental right to due process was violated. Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
- Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own Pampanga.
governing rules and of even the most basic rules of evidence - On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the
cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules election with a lead of 3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc filed a
should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of the very same internal protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives
rules expressly makes the Rules of Court, Supreme Court Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9) members:
decisions, and Electoral Tribunal decisions of suppletory 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House
application. of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional
- Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by representation from the political parties and the parties or
the Rules of Court and jurisprudence is because they have organizations registered under the party-list system
been tested through years of experience as the most effective represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as
means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. follows:
Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure
truth and exactness in elections as in anything else. AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
- Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before Associate Justice, SC
HRET and its majority decision in the election protest filed by ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
AS, Joker Arroyos proclamation as the winning congressman Associate Justice, SC
of the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to have been FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
challenged at all. Associate Justice, SC
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP
- Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
without aid of counsel appear to seriously undermine the Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP
integrity of some members of the Court SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
- Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP
excuse for the language employed by private respondent for it JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
is a well-known and established rule that derogatory words are Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP
to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
impartial observers Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, now NP).
is hereby GRANTED, and public respondent HRET's majority
decision dated January 25, 1995 is SET ASIDE. Private - July 1989 Bondoc filed petition
respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been found guilty of - Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-
indirect contempt, is hereby fined the amount of one thousand three (23) votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from receipt of reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some
this decision. precincts, delaying the finalization of the decision by at least (4)
months. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots
BONDOC V PINEDA resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991 Cong Camasura voted with the SC Justices and Cong Cerilles
to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
FACTS - March 4, 1991 Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S.
- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in the
1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong final tally in the case. This revelation stirred a hornets' nest in
Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista
the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves
to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
- March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of
Decision on March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No. 25.
- March 13, 1991 Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong.
Camasura by letter that on Feb 28, 1991 LDP had already
expelled him and Cong Benjamin Bautista for having allegedly
helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding" Cojuangco,
and for having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join
said political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from the LDP,
and asked the HoR, through the Speaker, to take note of it
especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.
- March 14, 1991 - the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus
Herrera, received a letter dated March 13, 1991, from the
Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR, informing the Tribunal that
on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the HoR decided to
withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Cong Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.
- Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the
CJ and Assoc Jus of the SC of this "distressing development'
and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET
because promulgation of the decision previously scheduled for
14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted. The decision reached
(5 to 4 vote) may now be expected to be overturned on a
motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which would
have been defeated. It was also said that:
> Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17
Const) should be amended to provide instead for a return to
the composition mandated in the 1935 Const: (3) members
chosen by the House or Senate upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and (3) of the party
having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial
component consisting of three (3) justices from the SC
> Suggestions:
+ The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the HoR and vice versa. So
that there would be lesser chances of non-judicial
elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of
election contests.
+ There should also be a provision in the Constitution that
upon designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal,
those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation
with their respective political parties, to insure their
independence and objectivity. (like thats possible)
- During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution
canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No.
25 because the decision lacks the concurrence of the 5
members without Cong Camasura's vote as required by Sec 24
of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
- March 19, 1991 - SC declined the request of the justices to be
relieved of their membership in the tribunal and directed them
to do their duties. The court even said that all members of
these bodies are appropriately guided only by purely legal
considerations in the decision of the cases before them and
that in the contemplation of the Constitution the members-
legislators, sit in the Tribunal no longer as reps of their political
parties but as impartial judges. The term of office of every
member thereof should be considered co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term and may not be legally
terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent
disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political
disloyalty.
- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda,
Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep who may be appointed
Vice Rep and HRET praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, 'to
withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of
Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be
designated in place of Camasura from assuming and
discharging functions as a member of the HRET
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to
immediately reassume and discharge his functions as a
member of the HRET; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
- The Court required the respondents to comment on the
petition
> Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
> Cong Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the
petition as the Congress' is the sole authority that nominates
and elects from its members. HRET allegedly has the sole
power to remove any member whenever the ratio in the
representation of the political parties in the House or Senate
is materially changed on account of death, incapacity,
removal or expulsion from the political party; that a Tribunal
member's term of office is not co-extensive with his
legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who changes
his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on
political affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is
"purely a party affair" of the LDP and the decision to rescind
his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives,
hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of
judicial review.
> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has
no cause of action against him because he has not yet been
nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET.
Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of
Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the
House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded
Congressman Camasura's membership in the HRET.
> Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a
party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no
cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not
question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his
rights. What he assails is the act of the HoR of withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as
a member of the HRET.
- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by
canceling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No.
25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also explained that Cong Palacol
was impleaded as one of the respondents because after the
HoR had announced the termination of Cong Camasura's
membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that the
HoR would nominate and elect Palacol to take Camasuras
seat in the Tribunal.
ISSUE
WON the HoR can interfere with the disposition of an election
contest in the HRET through "reorganizing" the representation
in the tribunal of the majority party
HELD
- Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution,
except the provision on the representation of the main political
parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional
representation from all the political parties, instead of equal
representation of three members from each of the first and
second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
- The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. It is a
non-political body in a sea of politicians.
- To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must
be independent.
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for
the specific purpose of determining contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly
may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all
contests relating to the election and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
+ Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the
independence of the HRET.
The resolution of the HoR is a clear impairment of the
constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be
the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
+ Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan.
They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party"
and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
+ Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election
contests are entitled to security of tenure just as members of
the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution
(Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in
the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for
a just cause, such as, the expiration of the term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party
he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another
political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may
not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with
another political group. As the records of this case fail to show
that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP
and from the HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure.
- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was not for
a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive
Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the
action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the
constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency
independent of the legislature, may not be interfered with by
the House
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus is granted. The decision of the HoR
withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Cong
Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal is hereby declared null and void ab initio for being
violative of the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the
HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14,
1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET
Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is
also set aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred
in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the
speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby
declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective
upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done
immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent
Marciano A. Pineda.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took
no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [dissent]
-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the
powers of government are distributed among three (3) great
departments. Each separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal
with the others each one deriving its authority directly from the
fundamental law.
- This does not extend to the point that those in authority in one
department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in
the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as
nugatory and not binding in every other department.
- The HoR has the power to nominate the members of the
House Electoral Tribunal provided that the proportional
representation of parties is maintained.
- The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of
Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal must necessarily include the power to remove said
member.
- The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such
legislative act is, does the House of Representatives have the
power to do what it has done and not whether the House of
Representatives should have done what it has done.
- The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the
constitutional authority of the legislature The judicial
department has no power to review even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise
of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution . To hold
otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of
powers.
SARMIENTO [dissent]
- I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it can the
Court annul an act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral
Tribunal? is a political question and a question in which the
Court cannot intervene.
- The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not
alter or discard the principle of separation of powers.
- Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal
was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This
Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the
last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If
they do, they risk their independence.
LOZADA V COMELEC
DE CASTRO; January 27, 1983
FACTS
- Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition for
mandamus as a representative suit 27 to compel the respondent
COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies
numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The
petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution28.
- Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide elector of
Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City, who desires to
run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while Igot
alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by
mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the
1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege
that they are deeply concerned with their duties as citizens,
and that they filed this petition in behalf of all other Filipinos
since subjects are of profound and general interest.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners had standing to file for petition for
mandamus
2. WON SC has jurisdiction to entertain this petition
3. WON Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution applies to
the Interim Batasang Pambansa
HELD
1. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for mandamus
- As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for
nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally
spent. Action complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to
call a special election, and therefore involves no expenditure of
public funds. It is only when an act complained of, which may
include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal
expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit
may be allowed.
- As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or
personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecute the
present petition, for to have legal standing is to have personal
and substantial interest in the case, or sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. Interest held in common by all
members of the public is of abstract nature (as is the injury that
will be sustained) and may not be used as standing to sue.
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that
indispensable element for one to have personality in a dispute.
27
28
for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation
Article VIII, Sec.5 (2): In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more
before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty
(60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
2. SC has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition
- The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only
to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings.
This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section II of the
1973 Constitution29. In this case, there is no such decision,
order or ruling. Even from the standpoint of an action for
mandamus, with the total absence of a showing that
COMELEC has unlawfully neglected or refused the
performance of a ministerial duty, it is not shown that
petitioners have a clear right to the holding of a special election
which is equally the clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC.
- Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary
appropriation for special elections, and this power of the may
neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel the Batasan to exercise its power of
appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in
the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the
funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative
on the matter must come from said body, not the COMELEC.
The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative
of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be
compelled through a petition for mandamus.
4. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not apply to
the Interim Batasang Pambansa
- The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not intended to
apply to the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
- The strongest reason for this is the fact that the Interim
Batasang Pambansa was to be composed by the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention, as well as the then incumbent
President and Vice-President, and the members or the Senate
and House of Representatives of Congress under the 1935
Constitution. With such number of representatives representing
each congressional district, or a province, not to mention the
Senators, there was felt absolutely no need for filling vacancies
occurring in the Interim National Assembly, considering the
uncertainty of the duration of its existence.
- The provision is intended to apply to the regular Batasang
Pambansa, because a province or representative district would
have only one representative in said body. The need to fill up
the Interim Batasang Pambansa is neither imperative nor
urgent, as there would always be adequate representation for
every province which forms only part of a certain region,
specially considering that the Body is only transitory in
character.
29
Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
- That the provision is found in the main body of the
Constitution and not in included in Transitory Provisions adds
to the intention that the provision applies only to the regular,
and not interim, Batasang Pambansa.
Decision Petition dismissed.
PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION
FERNANDO; July 23, 1971
FACTS
Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then
President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal
Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on
September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his
appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was
submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next
session in 1965. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on
May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of
Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending
him a congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his
confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of
Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal
judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator
Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on
Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a
motion for reconsideration of the appointment in view of
derogatory information which he had received.
ISSUES
1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the
Commission on Appointments (CA), without being acted on,
suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad
interim appointment.
2. WON the issue is a justiciable question, with the CA being
an independent organ of the Constitution.
HELD
1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must
be given force and effect.
Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the
ground that the letter of then Senator Ganzon, even on the
assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment
duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not
approved by the body as a whole.
Reasoning
a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo,
which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, which reads: Resolution of the
Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on
motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after
their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to
grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the
table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.
Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a
reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a
confirmation. In the case, Aldeguers (respondent in Altarejos
case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for
reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion
approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of
such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the
members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule
21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission.
In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing
the motion for reconsideration having expired, under
Section 22, then the motion for reconsideration not
having been acted upon is not approved and therefore,
has no effect whatsoever.
What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified
simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its
being voted upon and approved.
b. The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress.
- A distinction is made between the exercise of such
presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when
Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former,
the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA
may the person assume office. As with ad interim
appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The
appointment is effective until disapproval by the CA or until the
next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a
rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part.
2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. It would
extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond
its legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that
private rights are not invaded.
- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of
government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral
Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to
approve appointment submitted to it by the President of the
Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due
process.
AVELINO V CUENCO
PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949
RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC
FACTS
- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of
internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to look into
the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
and the Senates constitutional power to elect its own president
Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate,
Senators Lorenzo Taada and Prospero Sanidad prepared a
resolution enumerating charges30 against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and
called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was
confined in a hospital and another who is in the United States,
all the Senators were present.31
- TAADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his
followers prevented TAADA from delivering his privilege
speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and
9 other senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the Senate
President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the
session. The remaining senators unanimously approved,
among others, a resolution declaring vacant the position of the
President of the Senate and designating Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the
President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting
Senate President.
- Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to
declare him the rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO.
ISSUE
WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
30
BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government
(particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to which AVELINO was a member);
questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINOs assumption
of office; and justification of electoral fraud.
31
Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const.
HELD
NO (6-4 vote)
Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new
Senate President is a political question.
Reasoning
- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of
powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this case because
the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their
officers, change or reinstate them. If the majority of the
Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court.
- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the
Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into
a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved
that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful
and law-abiding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the
recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO
makes it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by
this Court in matters of similar nature.
Decision Petition dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [dissent]
- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The
power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a
legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single
individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The
functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact official
business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual
without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative
deliberative body is established in a democratic social order.
- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which
expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the
consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding
officer to decree motu propio said adjournment, and the sound
parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the
United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would
not authorize the existence of such a provision.
- AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because
the motion of a senator to said effect was properly made and
met with no objection. The evidence, however, fails to support
AVELINOs claim. The circumstances lead us to the conclusion
that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his
supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating
or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of
the charges against AVELINO and of his impeding ouster, by
the decisive votes of CUENCO's group.
- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO group
walkout) had no valid quorum to transact business. The
Constitution provides: A majority of each House shall
constitute a quorum to do business [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2),
1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be
other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate.
The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full
membership of each chamber of Congress. The Senate is
composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be
less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has
one-half ever been the majority. Majority necessarily has to be
more than one-half.
FERIA [concur]
- If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning
session, was it validly constituted? Yes. At the beginning of the
rump session there were at least 14 senators. Also, in view of
the absence from the country of one senator, 12 senators
constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall
constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the
members. There is a difference between a majority of "all the
members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for
the purpose of a quorum.
RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to
Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino group to return to the
session hall despite the compulsory process served upon
them), reversed its original decision and now assumed
jurisdiction over the case
ISSUES
1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case
2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid
HELD
1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction
over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its
intervention.
2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this
Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria [and]
Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there
was a quorum at the session where CUENCO was elected
acting Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the
result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum, it
appearing from the evidence that any new session with a
quorum would result in CUENCO's election as Senate
President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to
satisfy [the constitutional] formalism by issuing compulsory
processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to no
avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all
avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, [the Chief
Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the
majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and
with the requirements of public interest.
Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that
CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President and
the petition is dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERIA [concur]
I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump)
session. Among others, the amendment of the quorum
provision from "the majority of all the members of the National
Assembly constitute a quorum to do business," into "a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business,"
shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base
the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the
Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this
must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to
discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other causes
which make attendance of the member concerned impossible,
even through coercive process which each House is
empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the
session in order to constitute a quorum.
PERFECTO [concur]
- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the
determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have
been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the Houses of
Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as
Member of the Second National Assembly and in my capacity
as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one
who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because
"majority of each House" can mean only the majority of the
members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the
members.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a
precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means
more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-
half (1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is composed of 24
senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than
thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group
composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or
juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of two equal
numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers
combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of
the combined 10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is
incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority.
Majority presupposes the existence of a total and, in the
present case, the total number of 24 senators composing the
Senate.
- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now
inclined to conclude that for the purpose of choosing CUENCO
merely as Acting Senate President, the presence of the 12
senators was enough quorum. The Constitution provides: A
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel
the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under
such penalties as such House may provide" [again, cf Art. VI,
Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred to has
to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform
the functions specifically vested in it by the Constitution unless
presided by one among their number. The collective body
constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to
"compel the attendance of absent members," so as to avoid
disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber.
Said "smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12
senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary
or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is
restored.
- At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was
looking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting
Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend the
sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the presidency
thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to preside over the
sessions. AVELINOs refusal to attend the sessions,
notwithstanding CUENCOs commitment to allow him to
preside over them, can and should logically be interpreted as
an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.
OSMENA V PENDATUN
BENGZON; October 28, 1960
FACTS
- On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., in a
privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President. The House of
Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a special
committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President. It summoned Osmea to
appear before it to substantiate his charges.
- On July 14, 1960, Osmea filed with the Supreme Court a
petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada
Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special
Committee. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that
said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges
against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do
so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
Osmea alleged: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the
House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech
constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be
punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and
disciplined therefor, the House took up other business, and
Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if
other business has intervened after the Member had uttered
obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer
therefor nor be subject to censure by the House
- Aware of the petition, the special committee continued to
perform its task, and after giving Osmena a chance to defend
himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said
congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on
such report, the House approved on the same day-before
closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him
guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for
fifteen months.
- Thereafter, Osmea took the additional position that the
House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of
its members.
- On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer,
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition,
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension, upheld House Resolution No. .175 and then
invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its
session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are
the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.
ISSUES
1. WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete
parliamentary immunity for words spoken in the House
2. WON the Speech of Osmea constituted unruly behavior for
which he could be punished
3. WON Osmea can be held to answer for or be censured by
the House, given that other business had intervened after
gave the speech in question
4. WON the House has the power to suspend its members
HELD
1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides
that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a
copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the
United States, wherein the provision has always been
understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution
or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned
in Congress itself .
- Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly
of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly
or unbecoming a member thereof.
2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows
best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing,
if this Court assumed the power to determine whether
Osmea's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch
of the Government. The theory of separation of powers
fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation
a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been
said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme within its own sphere.
- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary,
subject only to such limitations as are found in the Republic's
Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine
Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera
vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the
House, such approval amounted to a suspension of the House
Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may
be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number
of members has agreed to a particular measure."
4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament
or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their
colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative
assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members,
including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been
recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House
of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of
the Congress of the United States shall apply in a
supplementary manner to its proceedings.
Decision Petition DISMISSED.
ASTORGA V VILLEGAS
 MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974
FACTS
- Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction
- HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading
without amendments in the House of Representatives (HoR). It
was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas.
Sen. Roxas suggested a minor amendment on HB 9266.
However, this recommendation was not acted upon by the
Senate during its second hearing, and instead, approved in
toto Sen. Tolentinos substantial amendment on the section
definig the powers and duties of the VM.
- After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoR
that HB. No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate with
amendments. However, the attached amendments were not
Sen. Tolentinos but Sen. Roxasamendments. The HoR
signified its approval of HB No. 9266 (with Roxas amendment)
and printed copies of it which were certified and attested by the
Secretary of the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of
the Senate, and the Senate President. The Secretary of the
House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of the
Philippines, who affixed his signatures by way of approval
enacted the bill into R.A. No. 406532
- The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA,
then Sen. Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled
copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is not the version
passed by the Senate since it did not contain the amendments
he made. The Senate President then informed the President
that the enrolled copy of the signed HB 9266 was not the bill
duly approved by Congress and that his signature is invalid and
had no effect, and could not validate the bill which was not the
version approved by the Congress. The President then
withdrew his signature on the HB 9266.
- With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate President and
the President of the Philippines, Villegas issued circulars
ordering city government officials and operators of business
establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He
likewise ordered the Chief of Police to recall the police officers
assigned to the vice-mayor presumably under the said RA.
- As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a
petition for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
32
An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further
Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA No. 409, Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel
respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065.
- Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law since
(1) it was not the bill approved by Congress and (2) entries in
the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill should be
decisive in the resolution of the issue. Since Mayor Villegas
was going abroad on an official trip, Court issued restraining
order for Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to him as
Acting Mayor under the RA 4065.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court could resolve the issue regarding the
enrolled bill doctrine
2. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress
approves the bill and validates it into a law
3. WON in the absence of the attestation of the presiding
officers, the journal entry in the Journals of Congress could
constitute proof of due enactment
4. WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore did not
become a law
HELD
1. Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution and
the legislative journals are conclusive upon the Courts under
Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as
evidence for the due enactment of a bill.
Obiter
- compared this case to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where the
Court denied to resolve the issue of WON a resolution of both
Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the 1935
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto had been
passed by a vote for three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives pursuant to
Article XV of the Constitution, saying that it involved a political
question (enrolled bill doctrine) which is not in the province of
the judiciary.
- using J. Bengzons separate opinion in the same case, J.
Makalintal said that the case at bar is justiciable since enrolled
copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are
conclusive upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act 190,
as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of due enactment of
provisions of acts.
- basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal and
independent departments which requires the judicial
department to accept, as having passed the Congress, all bills
authenticated by it.
2. Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the
lawmaking process and the certification/attestation of the bill
is only a mode of authentication devised by the Congress
which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect
already present upon it.
Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of
authentication; signify the Chief Executive that the bill being
presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is
ready for his approval or disapproval
3. Ratio YES. If attestation is absent and is not
mandated in the Constitution for the validity of a statute, the
courts may resort to the journals and other records of
Congress for proof of its due enactment.
Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not mandated in
the Constitution as a proof of due enactment of a bill, but
requires a Journal of the Congress proceedings [comparison of
Constitutions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI,
sec 26 (2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI, sec 27(1)]
4. Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could resolve the
issue regarding the enrolled bill doctrine, (2) that the Court
could use the attestation of the presiding officers of
Congress and, in the absence of the latter, the records of the
proceedings of the Congress entered into the Journals of
Congress as proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since
the law is deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the
3rd reading and the attestation of the presiding officers just
serve as a mode of authenticating the bill, (3) that, upon
referring to the journal entries of the proceedings of
congress, the Court discovered that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced to the HB but were not
incorporated in the printed text which was signed by the
President of the Philippines, and (4) that the President of the
Philippines and of the Senate already withdrew their
signatures, then RA 4065 was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become a law.
Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. TRO made
permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take part (I dont
know the difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]
MARTINEZ V MORFE
FERNANDO; March 24, 1972
FACTS
- Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were
delegates of the 1971 Constitutional Convention facing criminal
prosecution
o Martinez was charged with falsification of a public
document for stating under oath in his certificate of
candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional Convention that
he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth he was born on
June 20, 1946
o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the
Revised Election Code in that he gave and distributed free of
charge, food, drinks, and cigarettes at two public meetings
- Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued against
them to be quashed, by virtue of the parliamentary immunity
they enjoy as delegates, traceable to Section 15 Article VI of
the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners are immune from arrest
2. WON Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution should be
construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code,
thereby expanding congressional immunity
HELD
1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal arrests.
Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise
known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act,
delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a
senator or a representative.
Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides: The
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech o debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for
treason, felony and breach of peace
o Treason-levying war against the Republic and adhering
to enemies and giving them aid and comfort
o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law
o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether defined by
RPC or any special statute
History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never
intended to exempt members of the National Assembly
from criminal arrest
The power or right of the State to claim privileges is due to
the fact that it has the right to carry out its function without
obstacle
In England, operation of parliamentary privilege excludes
all crimes, applies only to prosecutions of civil nature
There is a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of the Congress, and likewise, delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom
to enable them to discharge responsibilities
However, when it comes to freedom from arrest, it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same.
A legislator or a delegate can perform his functions
efficiently and well without the need for any transgression
of criminal law.
If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal prosecution, he
should be treated like any other citizen considering that
there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that a crime
should not go unpunished.
2. No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is inoperative .
Article 145 penalizes a public officer or employee who
shall, during the session of Congress, arrest or search any
member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty
higher than prision mayor.
RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, before the
enforcement of the 1935 Constitution
Art. XVI, Sec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: All laws
of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the
inauguration the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered,
modified or repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines
Article 145 which accords legislators a generous
treatment exempting them from arrest even if warranted
under the penal law, is inconsistent with the Constitution,
and is consequently inoperative.
JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG
CONCEPCION; August 3, 1966
FACTS
- Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of
money by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly
libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang
- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a
privileged communication and not libelous since he was a
member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
House Committee on National Defense
- The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the
Philippines dated Nov 14, 1958 while congress was
presumably not in session.
- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several
newpapers.
- The open letter was an expos on allegedly three operational
plans. The first plan is said to be an insidious plan or a massive
political build up of then Sec. of Natl Defense, Jesus Vagas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to be
prepared to become candidate for President in 1961. (Plan II
A coup detat;Plan III A modification of Plan I)
- The letter also implicated that the planners have under their
control the following : (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose
Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos Albert, (4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt. Col
Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose Reyna.It is of course possible
that the officers mentioned above are unwitting tools of the
plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.
- Lower Court dismissed
- Petitioners appealed
ISSUES
1. WON the publication is a privileged communication
2. (if not) WON it is libelous
HELD
1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged.
It was an open letter to the President published by the
defendant when the Congress was not in session. And in thus
causing it to be published he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
House Committee.
- The phrase speech or debate therein as used in Article VI,
Sec 15 of the 1935 Constitution refers to utterances made by
congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such
as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the
halls of Congress while it is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress whether it is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the discharge of
their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its function as such, at
the time of the performance of the acts in question.
2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs action for damages. Although the letter says that
plaintiffs are under the control of the planners, the defendant
likewise added that it was possible that plaintiffs are unwitting
tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no
knowledge. The statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to
the point of entitling them to recover damages.
PELAEZ V AUDITOR GENERAL
CONCEPCION; September 24, 1965
FACTS
- During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the
President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
33 municipalities.
- RAC Section 68
- provides, among others, that the President may by
executive order define the boundary of municipality, increase
or diminish its territory provided that the authorization of the
Congress of the Phil shall first be obtained.
- The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void
because of RA 2370 Section 3 which provides that barrios
may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed except by Acts of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in
areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the
municipality in which the proposed barrio is situated.
- Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present civil action,
for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives
and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
- The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs
intervened in the case.
- Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando
appeared as amici curiae.
ISSUES
1. WON the executive orders are null and void upon the ground
that Section 68 of RAC, which was the basis of the EOs has
been impliedly repealed by RA 2730.
2. WON the power of the President to create municipalities
under RAC amount to an undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD
1. Yes. RA 2370s denial of the presidential authority to create
a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. There could only be a due
delegation of legislative power if the law is (a) complete in itself
it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate - and (b) fix a standard the
limits of which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.
- Sec 28 of RAC does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects of the power the President.
Reasoning
a. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs. US)
- It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an undue
delegation of legislative power because it supplies no
standards for any trade, industry or activity.
b. Constitutional provision (incompatible and inconsistent with
RAC)
- Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by LAW. (take note: such control does not include the
authority either to abolish or create)
Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent are permanently restrained from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Eos or any disbursement by the
municipalities concerned.
ARNAULT V NAZARENO
OZAETA; July 18, 1950
FACTS
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine
government as follows:
1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE
- The Philippine government leased from San Juan de Dios
Hospital for twenty five years the Buenavista estate and had an
option to purchase the same for P 3.0 million. This purchase
option was exercised by the then occupation republic by
tendering the owner the sum of P 3.0 million and, on its
rejection, depositing the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944
together with the accrued rentals of P 324,000.
- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property
to Ernest H. Burt, an non-resident American for P 5,000,000
with the initial downpayment of P 10,000 with the balance
payable under very favorable terms. Burt was unable to comply
with the terms agreed.
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase from Philippine
Trust Corporation, the Tambobong estate for P 1.2 million with
a downpayment of P 10,000.00 and terms which are as
generuous as those from San Juan de Dios. There was
however no other payment received from Burt.
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, acquired this same property from its original
owner for the sum of P 750,000 and subsequently instituted a
notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation
of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non
payment. The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the
cancellation of Burts title and the issuance of a new one under
the name of Rural Progress Administration.
- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine
government already owned both the above estate, it again
bought the same from Burt for a total consideration of P
5,000,000 (P 4.5 million for Buenavista and P 500,000 for
Tambobong). The government paid initially P 1,000,000 for
Buenavista and the full amount of P 500,000 for the
Tambobong estate through two corporations acting as Burts
attorneys-in-fact. These two were represented in the trasaction
by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.
- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration
was headed at that time by the Justice secretary who was at
the same time Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, the
institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress.
- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into
the Philippine Senate adopting Resolution 8 which created a
special committee to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates deal.
- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:
a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase
b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal
- During the public hearings of the Committee, various
witnesses were called. Among them and apparently the most
important was Jean Arnault, the person who represented Burt
in the transactions.
- During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the
money from the government and withdrawing, in cash, P
440,000 which he gave to someone on instruction of Burt.
When asked to identify the person he gave the money to, he
replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he
met the person on many occasions. When pressed to answer,
he also said that answering the question might incriminate him.
Based on this refusal, the senate approved a resolution on May
15, 1950 arraigning him for contempt and subsequently found
him guilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody of
the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of the
person he gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three
days later. The work of the Committee however was extended
via Resolution 16.
- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of
Habeas Corpus with the Supreme Court to obtain his release
cited the following grounds:
a. the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt since
the requested information is not material to the intended
legislation and his refusal to answer has not impeded or
obstructed the legislated process. The Senate has already
approved bills related to the transactions.
b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt
for a term beyond its legislative session.
c. the information sought will be self-incriminating
- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the
general principles of law with regard the power of either house
of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt as
this case is the first of its kind to be tried under the Philippine
constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw from
American precedents in recognition of the fact that the
Constitution of the Philippines were patterned after largely
American institutions and practices. The discussions were as
follows:
a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which
grant power to either House to investigate or exact
testimonies to exercise legislative function. However, this
power of inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a
necessary element to enable the body to wisely and
effectively perform their respective legislative functions. In
the absence of information that it requires, Congress has no
other recourse but to get the same from others who have
them. At times, the information required are not entirely
accurate or complete. Given this, Congress has the implied
coercive to obtain such information.
b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a
matter into which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.
ISSUES
WON the writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted
HELD
a. The requested information is needed to comply with the
direction of the senate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16
to secure the names of the persons responsible for the
transaction. The materiality of the question asked in the public
hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter
being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The only time that the
Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate is when a
petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not
pertinent to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain
vs Daugherty, Congress would be guilty of a clear abuse of
authority in the exercise of its power. As to whether the
information sought to be elicited is material to an proposed
legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their
scope.
- Citing the case Re: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed
for contempt of the US Senate for refusing to answer questions
with regard accounts of Senators in his company, the Supreme
Court held that the Philippine Senate has the authority to
compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information,
also the power find him in contempt and to imprison him until
he complies with said requirement.
b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does
not end with the termination of the legislative session. The
opinion of Justice Malcolm was cited with regard the Candido
Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of Lopez
terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing
however the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike
the House of Representatives which losses all its members
every four years (hence its term is only four years), the Senate
is deemed as a continuing body whose members are elected
for a six year term and are so divided that only a third of the
seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of the
Senate to hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat
of the Supreme Court in this case is that if the Senate
disregards the proper limitation to jail parties in contempt, the
remedy is with the Court.
c. Arnaults claim to self incrimination cannot be sustained
citing Mason vs US as a precedent. The Court must be given
the chance to determine from all the facts and circumstances
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer any
question which could incriminate him. Arnaults testimony was
obviously false. He obviously knew the name of the person he
gave the money to. His refusal to testify truthfully is punishable
with contempt.
Decision Petition is denied
SEPARATE OPINION
TUASON [dissent]
- The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is
based on the necessity for its attainment of the ends. The
power is however not absolute. And this is precisely where
disagreement occur.
- Justice Tuason is of the opinion that the question being asked
has no relation whatsoever to the contemplated legislation. A
stated reason for the insistence on getting an answer to the
question as to who received the money is supposedly to
vindicate or clear the names of the persons suspected of
getting the money (Antonio Quirino, one of the suspects, is the
brother of President Quirino). The Senate is not the proper
forum for such vindication. The Senate investigation seems to
have only one objective and this is to prepare the way for court
action since they could not expect the Justice department to
take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the responsible
parties as it seems that the Secretary of the Justice department
had a hand in the transaction. This is not the a duty of the
Legislative department.
- The Committees report has been submitted to the entire
Senate. And as a matter of fact three bills were passed by the
Senate in connection with the investigation. This being the
case there is no need to extract names. The importance of
names is when it comes to a criminal prosecution.
- In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the
Senate is commendable and legal. His main objection lies in
the fact that the Senate has overstepped its authority and
trespassed on the territory of other braches of government
when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is
unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone
moot.
LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SANCHEZ; October 25, 1967
FACTS
- On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House
Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The
body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said
municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The
seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the
new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred
sixty-seven general elections for local officials.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
- It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just
mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and
not of Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of
Parang, Cotabato, prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared
unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15,
1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for
electoral purposes, be nullified.
ISSUES
1. WON the title of RA 4790 conforms with the constitutional
requirement that the subject of a bill shall be expressed in the
title NO
2. WON RA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the
nine barrios in Lanao del Sur NO
3. WON petitioner has legal standing to challenge the statute
YES
HELD
1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in
the Province of Lanao del Sur" 8 - projects the impression that
solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation
of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that
communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in
the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. Such title did
not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the
law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur;
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill.
2. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and
the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld. But when the parts of the statute
are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other,
as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, and that if all could not be carried into effect, the
legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if
some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are
thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress,
unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios - not nine
barrios - was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is
so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter
enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in
Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of Buldon in
Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of
questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income
sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still apply to
a motely group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one?
3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967
elections His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the
case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence.
He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are formed into the new town; he may
prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was
constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he
acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the
new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone
of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the
officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by
constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in
its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community
affected thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the
constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that
community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge
the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
MILLER V MARDO
BARRERA; July 31, 1961
FACTS
- These are different cases taken together as they present only
one identical question
- 1st case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at
the DoL, claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily
dismissed without separation pay
- Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer
Mardo of the DoL on ground that HO has no jurisdiction to hear
and decide on the case
- Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not
repeal Judiciary Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to
take cognizance of money claims re violations of labor
standards
- 2nd case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against
Chin Hua Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and vacation
leave pay as a driver in the company
- same circumstances as 1st case, and court issued permanent
injunction against hearing the cases by the Hearing Officer, as
Reorg. Plan 2-A is null and void.
- 3RD case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint
against Sen Bee Trading Company for being underpaid, not
being paid overtime, without sick leave and vacation leave pay,
as a seamstress
- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does
not have jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with
Regional Office of DoL under Reorg. Plan 2-A
- 4th case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the
DoL Sia Leng did noy\t file an answer and a decision was
rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor Administrator
Hernando refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecision
as he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be heard
they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a
statute and unconstitutional
- 5th case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint
against Fred Wilson and Co., as he was summarily dismissed
wihout cause, without separation pay, and without sufficient
notice.
- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body,
with no power to adjudicate money claims
- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well that
Reorg Plan is null and void insofar as it vest original
exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
ISSUES
1. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted
under the authority of RA 997 as amended by RA 1241, is
valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of
the Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers for
wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.
2. WON Reorganization Plan 20-A was validly passed by
Congress
HELD
1. No it is not valid.
- While the Reorganization Commission could create functions,
it referred merely to administrative and not judicial functions
such as deciding on money claims. Judicial power rests
exclusively on the judiciary
- While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-
judicial powers, it must be incident to the exercise of
administrative dunctions
- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied from
a mere grant of power to create functions in connection with
reorganization of the Executive
2. No it was not validly passed by Congress
- A law is not passed by mere silence or non-action of
Congress even if it be stated in Sec 6(a) of RA 997
- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary
law- that two houses are to hold separate sessions for their
deliberations and the determination of the one upon a
proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination
of the other.
TANADA V TUVERA
ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985
FACTS
- Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to
the President.
- Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
constitution, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring
this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel
public duty, they need not show any specific interest.
Respondents further contend that publication in the OG is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE
WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable
requirement for the effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders,
EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates
HELD
Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public
concern & corollarily access to official records, & to documents
& papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may
be provided by law (Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to
be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OG or
otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI
states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication
in the OG as they constitute important legislative acts. The
publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
informed of its contents.
Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette
all unpublished presidential issuances of general application,
and unless so published shall have no binding force and effect.
Important Point It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued
by one man Marcos are in fact laws of general application
and provide for penalties. The constitution afforded Marcos
both executive & legislative powers.
- The generality of law (CC Art. 14) will never work w/o
constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides that
publication constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is
thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse.
- Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
TANADA V TUVERA
CRUZ; December 29, 1986
FACTS
- In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect."
- This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first
decision, specifically, on the following questions:
ISSUES
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
HELD
1 & 2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply
to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise
of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. The mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a
mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance.33
4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of
the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a
different period provided by the legislature.
5. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or
at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant
to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for
whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a
matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO V
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
TINGA; February 24, 2004
FACTS
- LDP together with other political parties formed a coalition
called Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
- KNP has chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for the
President of the Phils in the May 2004 elections
- LDP filed with COMELEC a petition to certify nomination of
candidates for the upcoming elections
- on Dec. 8, 2003, LDP filed a Manifestation informing the
COMELEC
a) that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo Angara or
his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of
candidacy of the partys official candidates
b) that LDP had placed its Secretary General,
Representative Agapito Aquino, on indefinite forced leave
and Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was the Acting Sec-Gen
- Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does not
have authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Sec-Gen
and asked COMELEC to disregard the Manifestation
- pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination was filed with
COMELEC, naming Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDPs Standard
Bearer for president; the certificate was signed by Rep. Aquino
- the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal party
matter and that the period for filing for the Certificate of
33
This was the manner in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Nomination was about to end, granted the petition for both
Petitioner (Angara) and Oppositor (Aquino) in that it recognized
all the candidates nominated by both parties as the official
candidates of the LDP identifying each set of candidates as the
Angara Wing and the Aquino Wing
- Angara filed the present petition assailing the COMELEC
Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion
ISSUE
WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it applied
equity and divided LDP into wings
HELD
YES there was grave abuse of discretion. The only issue to be
resolved by the Commission was who as between the
Chairman and the Secretary General had the authority to sign
the certificates of candidacy. To resolve the issue, the
COMELEC need only to refer to the Party Constitution. Equity
is applied only if there absence of law that can be applied to
resolve the issue which is not the case here.
- as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEC has
the authority to ascertain the identity of the political parties
and its legitimate officers; consequently it has the power to
settle any controversy regarding leadership of the party as
an incident to its power to register political parties. This
matter is important in determining as to who between Aquino
and Angara had the authority to certify LDPs candidates
- According to the Party Constitution, it is the Chairman who
has the power to sign documents in behalf of the party; the
Sec-Gen has power to sign documents only when
authorized by the Chairman. That Aquino had been given
authority in the past, as found by the COMELEC during the
2001 elections, it does not follow that said authority is still
existing since it can be gathered in Angaras Manifestation
that Aquinos authority had been revoked, which the
Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his
authority to grant such power
- However, the lack of authority of Aquino to certify
candidates does not cancel the certificates he signed. The
candidates named will only be treated as independent
candidates following COMELEC Resolution No. 6453,
section 7
- The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate their
own candidates, confused the electorate as to which set of
candidates truly represent the ideologies that the LDP
represents
- The constitutional policy towards a free and open party
system envisions a system that shall evolve according to
the free choice of the people and not one molded by the
COMELEC
BRILLANTES V COMELEC
CALLEJO; June 15, 2004
FACTS
- On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA 8436, authorizing
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the
process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local
elections for May 11 98. Also allowed the acquisition of
automated counting machines (ACM) and other devices to
adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. However, the
failure of the machines to read ballots correctly deferred
implementation of modernization plan.
- 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a
three-phase modernization program for the 2004 elections.
o Phase 1 computerized registration and validation
Encountered problems in implementation because machine
was reverting to old listing of voters
o Phase 2 computerized voting and counting
Scrapped because COMELEC had to maintain manual
voting and counting system due to the problems
encountered with validation
o Phase 3 Electronic transmission of unofficial results
(which is challenged in this case)
- Despite failure of the first 2 phases, COMELEC through its
commissioners still decided to implement Phase 3
- GMA issued EO 172 which allocated P250,000,000 to fund
the AES for the May 10 04 elections. Also issued EO 175,
giving an additional P500M budget for the AES project.
- Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the proposed
electronic transmission of results because according to the
Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4), Congress has the sole authority to
canvass votes for President and VP. Implementing Phase 3
would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress and would
also lack constitutional authority
- Aside from Drilons apprehension, there were budget
problems for implementation because the money allocated by
GMA had already been used for phases 1 and 2. COMELEC,
however, still conducted a field test of the electronic
transmission of results (phase 3) on 04/27/04 (Separate
opinions of COMELEC officials found on p. 277. Read just in
case.)
- COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local elections,
approved RESOLUTION 6712 stating the implementation of
phase 3 and declared that results of each city/municipality shall
be electronically transmitted in advance to COMELEC, Manila.
They established a National Consolidation Center (NCC),
Electronic Transmission Centers (ETC) for each
city/municipality and a special ETC at COMELEC for the
absentee voters. (procedure p. 278). Note that the results
garnered in the procedure are of unofficial character.
- Hence, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention brought their
misgivings to SC.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have locus standi
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing RA 6712
HELD
1. Petitioners claim their standing as taxpayers and since the
Resolution obviously involves the expenditure of funds, they do
have the requisite standing to question its validity. Most of the
petitioners-in-intervention are also part of NAMFREL, the
citizens authorized arm to conduct an unofficial quick count
during elections. Lastly, Drilon and De Venecia are heads of
Congress, the sole authority for canvassing votes for President
and VP.
2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results based
on a copy of the election returns the sole and exclusive
authority of Congress to canvass votes for President and VP.
COMELECs claim that it is not prohibited because it is an
unofficial vote is unacceptable.
- the resolution goes against the constitutional provision that no
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law (Sec 29, Art VI). Because the
tabulation in the resolution is unofficial in character, it is not an
appropriation made by law. In fact, it may be considered a
felony under Art 217 under the Penal Code (malversation of
public funds/property).
- it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting of votes
is done by NAMFREL by using a copy of the election returns.
Not even COMELEC is authorized to use a copy of election
returns for counting.
- COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of
accredited political parties and all candidates of the proposed
use of technology for the elections under Sec 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code. There are 2 conditions that
COMELEC must comply with before undertaking technology for
electoral purposes: take into account the situation prevailing
and the funds available, and notify authorized representatives.
These conditions give the affected people an opportunity to
object if need be. Details on p 302-303.
- resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for
COMELEC to undertake a separate and unofficial tabulation of
results. It also doesnt make sense that Phase 3 of the program
should go on when the first two phases have been scrapped.
They should be taken as a whole and not independent of each
other. In the first place, there is a great possibility that the
unofficial results will differ greatly from the official count so what
is the use of spending all that money for something uncertain,
something that the NAMFREL had always undertaken? It is an
unnecessary waste of government funds and effort.
- COMELEC uses the problem of dagdag-bawas as a reason
for the resolution. Accdg to them, modernization of the election
will decrease the possibility of dagdag bawas but it doesnt
make sense because dagdag-bawas is a result of human
intervention. No matter how modern the technology for
electoral purposes is, there will always be the need for human
intervention so the problem will not be eradicated.
Decision PETITION GRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is
NULL AND VOID.
PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
MAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975
FACTS
- September, 1964 the Public Service Commission assessed
several public utilities for supposed supervision and
regulation fees for that year
- PLDT (P214,353.60); Manila Electric Company -
P727,526.00; Bolinao Electronics Corporation - P11,610.40;
Philippine Stearn Navigation Company - P23.921.60; and
General Shipping Company - P33,146.80
- The assessed fees were based upon the value of the
respective properties or equipment pursuant to Section
40(e) of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act
3792
- After paying the demanded amounts, the said corporations
sent Separate letters to the Commission, (except the Philippine
Steam Navigation Company which filed a formal petition
instead) requesting for reconsideration of the
assessments their ground: under the said Section 40(e),
such assessments should be based not on the value of
the properties but upon the subscribed and paid up
capital stocks of the corporations.
- 28 September 1966Public Service Commission denied
request for reconsideration. Their reason:
o the clause "or of the property and equipment, whichever
is higher" in section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as an
alternative base for supervision fees collectible, applies to
both stock and non-stock corporations.
o to use the value of property and equipment as an
alternative base for fixing the rates only in case of public
services not issuing shares would result in unreasonable
discrimination against the latter
o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or paid" and
another after the words "Capital invested," immediately
preceding the clause "property and equipment, whichever
is higher," indicates the intention of the legislature to
constitute the latter as an alternative of both stock and
non-stock corp.
ISSUES
1. WON the law itself draws a distinction between public
utilities issuing shares and those that do not as the capital
invested is difficult to ascertain where no shares have been
issued. Thus, the value of their property or equipment should
provide as an alternative rate base for this class of operators
2. WON reliance on the use of comma/punctuation should have
bearing
3. WON there is alleged disproportion of the total amount to be
collected as supervisory fees
HELD
1. NO. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual capital
investment of public service operators that do not issue stocks.
These companies are required to submit annual reports of
finances and operations
2. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of statutory
construction
- the punctuation of the provision in question has undergone no
alteration at all
- the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed to
reinforce its main argument that nothing in the law justifies a
discriminatory application of the value of the property or
equipment (as alternative rate base) solely to operators not
issuing shares of capital stock.
3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are therein fixed
were designed to raise revenue for the general expenses of the
Commission, and were not limited to reimbursement of actual
expenditures in supervision.
- we are in accord with petitioner operators that the
Commission was in error in collecting the fees in question on
die basis of the original cost of their property and equipment
without due allowance for depreciation.
Decision judgment MODIED in the sense that the supervision
fees payable under Republic Act No. 3792 should be computed
upon present values of properly and equipment in use; the
appealed resolution of the Public Serviice Commission is
AFFIRMED
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT
DESICCATORS V PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998
FACTS
- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing
permits to applicants for the establishment of new desiccated
coconut processing plants issuance would violate PCAs
Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as applicants were seeking
to operate in congested areas
- Nov.6 trial court issued TRO enjoining PCA from ussiung
licenses
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution
No.018-93 providing for the withdrawal of the PCA from all
regulation of coconut product processing industry; registration
would be limited to the monitoring of their volumes of
production and admin of quality standards
- PCA then issued certificates of registration to those wishing to
operate desiccated coconut processing plants
ISSUE
- Whether or not the PCA can renounce the power to regulate
implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in
question actually is.
HELD
- The power given to the PCA to formulate and adopt a
general program of devt for the coconut and other palms oil
industry is not a roving commission to adopt any program
deemed necessary to promote the devt of the coconut and
other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context
of the regulatory structure.
Reasoning
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973 to
take over the powers and functions of the Coconut
Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco Admin, and the Phil. Coco
Research Institute
- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an independent
public corp...charged with carrying out States policy to promote
the rapid integrated devt and growth of the coco and other
palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become
direct participants and beneficiaries through a regulatory
scheme set up by law
- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 govt temporarily prohibited the
opening of new coco processing plants and on Dec.6 phased
out some of the existing ones--- because of overproduction in
the industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of the export
performance of coco-based products
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87 authorizing
establishment and operation of additional DCN plants because
of increased demand in world market
- The above measures were adopted within the framework of
regulation as established by law to promote rapid integrated
devt and growth of coco and other palm oil industry and to
ensure that the coco farmers become direct participants and
beneficiaries
- the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate
opening of new plants, but the virtual dismantling of the
regulatory infrastructure
- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Codethe role of the PCA is to
formulate and adopt a general program of devt for the coco
and other palm oil industry in all its aspects
o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring
volumes of production and admin. Of quality standards,
PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost
completely to market forces how the industry will develop
- Constitution Art.XII
o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distributive justice
and to intervene when the common good so demands
o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when
public interest so requires
o Any change in policy must be made by the legislative dept
of the govt. The regulatory system has been set up by
law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to
dismantle it.
Decision Petition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO [dissent]
- The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid
exercise of delegated legislation. Such resolution is in harmony
with the objectives sough to be achieved by the laws regarding
the coco industry, particularly to promote accelerated growth
and devt of the coco industry and the rapid integrated devt
and growth of the coconut industry
- The time has come for admin policies and regulations to
adapt to ever-changing business needs rather than to
accommodate traditional acts of the legislature
- Trimming down an admin agencys functions of registration is
not an abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998
FACTS
- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for
the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. Elections for
the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with
Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of Senate
President. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of
the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople
as president pro tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader.
- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position
of minority leader, with the agreement of Senator Santiago. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that
he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate
President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the
minority leader of the Senate.
- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an
original petition for quo warranto to seek the ouster of Senator
Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration
of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. They allege that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition
2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution
3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader
4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Guingona as the minority leader
HELD
1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or
its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and
prerogatives
- The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the
Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's
"expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
- Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of
judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or
application of a provision of the Constitution or the law,
including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this
scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the
validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in
nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies or
previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution
now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty,
viz.:
- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.
- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the
Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader.
- While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a
Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other
officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this
Court.
- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for
such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the
exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound
to protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the Court's
being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings of the Senate.
3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader.
- Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary
assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title
or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto
proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that
he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or
exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners did
not present sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise
to the office of the Senate minority leader.
4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader.
- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as
Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties
in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous
resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President.
Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after
at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides
were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate
President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the
Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and
authority.
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM
CARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioners : John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, Mateo
Carino Foundation Inc., Center for Alternative Systems
Foundation, Inc., Regina Victoria Benafin represented and
joined by her mother Elisa Benafin, Izabel Luyk represented
and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk, Katherine Pe
represented and joined by her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad
Camilo, Alicia Pacalso alias Kevab, Betty Strasser, Ruby
Giron, Ursula Perez alias Ba-yay, Edilberto Claravall, Carmen
Caromina, Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc
- Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion and
Development Authority; John Hay Poro Point Development
Corporation, City of Baguio, TUNTEX, ASIAWORLD, DENR
- Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with
prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
injunction assailing the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, Creating and
Designating a Portion of the Area Covered by the Former
Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7227
- RA 7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military
Reservations into other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose,
Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes OR Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992
 > setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced
conversion into alternative productive uses of former military
bases under the 1947 Philippine-United States of America
Military Bases Agreement, namely Clark and Subic military
reservations including extension Camp John Hay Station in
Baguio
> created Bases Conversion and Development Authority
(BCDA), Subic Special Economic (and free port) Zone
(Sebuc SEZ)
> granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free
importations, exemption of businesses from local and
national taxes
> gave authority to the President to create through executive
proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local
government units directly affected, other Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga), Wallace Air Station (La
Union), and Camp John Hay (Baguio)
- Aug 16, 1993 BCDA entered MoA and Escrow
Agreement with TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD, private
corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands, in preparing
for a joint venture for development of Poro Point in La Union
and Camp John Hay as a premier tourist destinations and
recreation centers
- Dec 16, 1993 BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed
a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) binding themselves to put
up a joint venture company called Baguio International
Development and Management Corporation leasing areas
within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for tourism and
recreation
Sangguaniang Panglungsod of Baguio Citys Resolutions
to BCDA
> Sept 29, 1993 to exclude all the barangays partly and
totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach and
coverage of any plan or program for development
> Jan 19, 1994 abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its
ownership over homelots being occupied by residents of 9
barangays surrounding CJH
> Feb 21, 1994 15-point concept of the development of
CJH which includes protection of the environment, making of
a family-oriented tourist destination, priority in employment of
Baguio residents, free access to base area, guaranteed
participation of the city government in the management and
operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously mentioned
9 bgys, liability for local taxes of businesses
BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLD response
> modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a
SEZ as a condition to its full development according to RA
7227
- May 11, 1994 sanggunian passed resolution asking mayor
to order determination of realty taxes which may be collected
from real properties of CJH checking if CJH real properties
exempt from taxes and economic activity from local and
national taxes
- June 1994 sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255 (Series
of 1994) seeking and supporting subject to its concurrence, the
issuance of Pres. Ramos of presidential proclamation declaring
area of 288.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance to
RA 7227
- July 5, 1994 Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a
SEZ on Camp John Hay which reads
Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the
resolution of concurrence by the City Council of Baguio
create and designate former Camp John Hay as John
Hay Special Economic Zone
Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out of
677 hectares surveyed and verified by DENR
Sec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227, the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is
established to govern JHSEZ, authorized to determine
utilization and disposition of lands subject to private rights
and in consultation and coordination with the City
Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants ,
and to promulgate necessary policies, rules, and regulations
to govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro
Point Development Corporation (JHPPDC), the
implementing arm for its economic development and
optimum utilization
Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec 5(m)
and Section 15 of RA 7227, the JH Poro Point Development
Corporation shall implement necessary policies, rules and
regulations governing the zone, including investment
incentives, in consultation with pertinent government
departments. The zone shall have all the applicable
incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those
applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing
Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 , the Foreign
Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that will be
enacted.
Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and
Instrumentalities: All heads of departments, etc of the
government are directed to give full support to BCDA and/or
implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate
necessary approvals to expedite programs.
Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government units
shall retain basic autonomy and identity.
- April 25, 1995 petition for prohibition, mandamus and
declaratory relief challenging Proc. No. 420s constitutionality
or validity as well as the legality of MoA and JVA between
BCDA and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD
- Petitioners Allege:
1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal
as it is an unconstitutional exercise by the President of a
power granted only to the Legislature
2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the
autonomy of the City of Baguio is invalid, illegal and
unconstitutional
3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the rule
that all taxes should be uniform and equitable
4. MoA having been entered into only by direct negotiation is
illegal
5. terms and conditions of the MoA is illegal
6. the conceptual development plan of respondents not
having undergone environmental impact assessment is
being illegally considered without a valid environmental
impact assessment
- a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin
BCDA, JHPPDC and the city government from implementing
Proc. No. 420 and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from
proceeding with their plan respecting CJHs development
pursuant to the JVA
- Public respondents (BCDA, JHPPDC, City of Baguio)
Allege
1. issues are moot and academic because in November 21,
1995 BCDA formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD of
the revocation of the MoA and JVA
2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420, extending to
the JHSEZ economic incentives to those enjoyed by Subic
SEZ (established in RA 7227), the proclamation merely
implements the legislative intent of said law to turn the US
military bases into hubs of business activity or investment
3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local autonomy of
Baguio City or violative of the equal protection clause
4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as
taxpayers in the absence of an actual controversy
5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies
- Petitioners Reply
 1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply since they are invoking the exclusive authority of SC
under Section 21 of RA 7227 to enjoin or restrain
implementation of projects for conversion of the base areas
2. they possess standing to bring petition as taxpayers
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON petitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
2. WON issues regarding TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD is moot
and academic
3. WON present petition complies with the requirements of
SCs exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues
Substantive
4. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for
national and local tax exemption within and granting other
economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
5. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering
with local autonomy of Baguio City
HELD
1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining
declaratory relief or direct resort to it except when the redress
sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts, or when
exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of
a remedy within and calling for the exercise of SCs primary
jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of RA 7227, only SC has the
power to enjoin implementation of projects for the
development of the former US military reservations
therefore SC will take cognizance of this petition.
Reasoning
- Also SC retains full discretionary power to take cognizance of
such petition. Besides, remanding this case to the lower courts
may unduly prolong adjudication of the issues
- transformation of an area in CJH into a SEZ is not a simple
re-classification of an area TF a crucial issue. Conversion
involves
> focal point for investments by local and foreign entities
> site for vigorous business activity spurring countrys
economic growth
> like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial,
commercial, financial and investment center
> critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns
affecting communities are located and nation in general
> challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable,
environmentally sound, equitable transition for city in CJH
reversion to government property e.g. problem of scarcity of
water supply in Baguio City
2. Revocation of the agreements with private respondents
made issues regarding them as moot and academic.
3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for judicial
review.
Reasoning
- Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review
1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case
> not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and concrete;
parties pitted against each other due to their adverse
legal interests
> in present case, there is a real clash of interests and
rights between petitioners and respondents arising from
issuance of Proc. No. 420 converting a portion of CJH
into a SEZ where petitioners insist Proc. No. 420 has
unconstitutional provisions and the respondents
claiming otherwise
> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged act,
the dispute is deemed to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without an overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or law is
enough to awaken judicial duty
2. personal and substantial interest of the party raising
the constitutional question
> RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local
government units to the creation of SEZs and this grant
by law on LGUs of the right to concurrence is equivalent
to vesting a legal standing on LGUs (recognition of real
interests of communities in the utilization of such base
areas)
> as INHABITANTS OF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No.
420, is personal and substantial that they have
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
government act being challenged; material interest for
what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. No. 420 is
the very economic and social existence of the people of
Baguio City
> Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of Limay,
Bataan where SC characterized their interest in the
establishment of a petrochemical plant in their place as
actual, real, vital and legal for it would affect not only
their economic life but even the air they breathe
> Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were
duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time; duties
included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents
on the question of concurrence to Proc. No. 420; they
opposed Res. No. 255 which supported Proc. No. 420
3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity
4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
- 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring
forth constitutionality issues
4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if there is no
express extension of tax exemption and other economic
incentives granted by law, any presidential proclamation
granting such extension through implication is unconstitutional
because it violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature,
not the executive, the full power to exempt any person or
corporation or class of property from taxation and its power to
exempt being as broad as its power to tax.
Reasoning
- Art VI Sec 28(4): No law granting any tax exemption shall be
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress.
- Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JH SEZ: the
zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under
Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in
the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of
1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 and new investment
laws that may be hereinafter enacted
> Sec 12 RA 7227: Subic SEZ
(b & c) exemption from tariff or custom duties, national
and local taxes of business entities
(d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties
(f) liberalized banking and finance
(g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
- deliberations of Senate confirm exclusivity to Subic SEZ
of the tax and investment privileges
(discussing Sec 12 RA 7227)
Angara: we must confine these policies to Subic and
provide that THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF
SUBIC SHALL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FOLLOWING POLICIES it is very clear
that these principles and policies are applicable only to
Subic as a free port
so we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of
pweors and description of the zone to Subic but that
does not exclude the possibility of creating other
economic zones within the baselands
 the provision now will be confined only to Subic
> RA 7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
- privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of
importing capital equipment and raw materials free from
taxes, duties and other restrictions
> Omnibus Investment Code of 1987
- tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and
other incentives
> RA 7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991
- applicability to the subject zone of rules governing
foreign investments in the Philippines
- It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ
which was granted by Congress with tax exemption,
investment incentives and the like and no express extension of
the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the
time via presidential proclamation ; also grant of privileges to
JH SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec
3 Proc. No. 420 which are already extant before the issuance
of the proclamation or the enactment of RA 7227
- SC can void an act or policy of the political departments of the
govt on two grounds infringement of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion and clearly, Proc. No. 420 infringes upon
the Constitution
5. NO because when the law merely emphasizes or reiterates
the statutory role or functions is has been granted.
Reasoning
- under RA 7227, BCDA is entrusted with the following
(a) to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of
John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell
Transmitter Station which may be transferred to it by the
President
- such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in
BCDA over CJH, BCDA virtually has control over it subject to
certain limitations of law
Decision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared
no legal force and effect. Proc. No. 420, without the invalidated
portion, remains valid and effective
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003
FACTS
- June 16, 2000 NTC, pursuant to its rule-making and
regulatory powers , issued Memorandum Circular (MC)
No. 13-6-2000. It promulgated rules and regulations on the
billing of telecommunications services:
1. Billing statements shall be received by the service
subscriber (SS) not later than 30 days from the end of
each billing cycle. In case it is received beyond 30 days,
SS shall have a grace period within which to pay the bill.
During such period, SS shall not be disconnected from
service by the public telecommunications entity (PTE).
2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a
voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message or similar
facility excluding the customers own equipment.
3. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each
purchaser of prepaid SIM cards . Prepaid call cards and
SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date
of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given
45 days from the date it is fully consumed but not beyond
2yrs 45 days from date of first use to replenish SIM card.
The validity of an invalid SIM card shall be installed upon
request of the SS at no addtl charge except the
presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
4. SS shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards
before the start of every call using the cards.
5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone) CMT
service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from
1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse. The authorized rates per minute
shall be divided by 10.
- The MC provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three
certified copies furnished at the UP Law Center.
- June 22, 2000 MC was published in the Philippine Star; MC
provisions regarding sale and use of prepaid cards & unit of
billing took effect 90 days from effectivity of MC
- August 30, 2000 NTC issued a Memorandum to all CMT
service operators (SO) which contained measures to
minimize incidence of stealing of cell phone units . It
directed CMT SO to:
1. Strictly comply with MC requiring the presentation and
verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM
card customers
2. Require all respective prepaid SIM card dealers to comply
with MC
3. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers using
stolen cell phone units or cell phone units registered to
somebody else when properly informed of all information
relative to the stolen cell phone units
4. Share all necessary info of stolen cell phone units to all
other CMT SO in order to prevent their use
5. Require all existing prepaid SIM card customers to
register and present valid identification cards.
- October 6, 2000 NTC issued another Memorandum
addressed to all PTEs, which was for strict compliance.
1. All prepaid cards and all SIM packs used by subscribers of
prepaid cards sold on Oct. 7, 2000 and beyond shall be
valid for at least 2 years from date of first use.
2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective October
7, 2000.
- Procedure
October 20, 2000 ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against
the NTC an action for Declaration of Nullity of MC (the
Billing Circular) and of the Oct. 6 Memorandum , with
prayer for injunction and TRO in the RTC-QC on the grounds
that-
a. NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods since such jurisdiction belongs to the
DTI under the Consumer Act of the Phils
b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process
Clause (deprivation of property)
c. MC will result in the impairment of the viability of
prepaid service by unduly prolonging the expiration of
prepaid SIM and call cards
d. Requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers
and call balance announcement are unreasonable
GLOBE and SMART filed a joint Motion to Admit Complaint-
in-Intervention
October 27, 2000 RTC issued TRO enjoining NTC from
implementing MC
November 20, 2000 RTC denied NTCs motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. Injunction is granted, pending finality of the
decision of the case.
October 9, 2001 CA granted NTCs petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
January 10, 2002 Motions for Reconsideration were
denied by CA
ISSUES
1. WON the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this
case
2. WON the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies is applicable
HELD
Obiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or
rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and
regulations, which should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to such
administrative agency. The regulations must be germane
to the purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to the
standards prescribed by law.
Quasi-judicial power is exercised by an administrative
agency when it performs in a judicial manner an act which
is essentially of an executive nature, where the power to
act in such a manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the administrative duty
entrusted to it.
1. Yes.
Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency in the performance of its
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction. The power of JUDICIAL REVIEW is vested in the
courts by the Constitution. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
is only applicable when the administrative agency is exercising
its QUASI-JUDICIAL function.
- Art.VIII Sec.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the govt.
- Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where
the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the admin. tribunal to determine technical matters of
fact.
2. No.
Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule
issued by an administrative agency, in exercise of its QUASI-
LEGISLATIVE powers, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. Only judicial review of
decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of
their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine
(Assoc. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA).
- Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies is applicable, records show that petitioners have
complied with such requirement:
- During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registered their
protests and submitted proposed schemes for the Billing
Circular.
- After issuance of MC, petitioners wrote successive letters
asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the MC.
- Such letters were not acted upon and instead, NTC issued
10/06/00 Memorandum. This was taken by petitioners as a
clear denial of their requests.
Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision
of CA and its Resolution are reversed. The case is
REMANDED to the RTC-QC for continuation of the
proceedings.
ART VII: EXECUTIVE
GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
CORTES; September 15, 1989
FACTS
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family filed a
petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order
the respondents to issue travel documents to them and to
enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners state that the right of
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under
Sections 1 and 6 of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the
right to travel may be impaired by any authority/agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect. They also
invoke generally accepted principles of international law: (1)
Art. 13, par. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which provides that everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his own country ,
and (2) Art. 12, par. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which states that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country. Respondents
contend that the issue of whether the two rights claimed by the
Marcoses collide with the more primordial and transcendental
right of the state to security and safety of its nationals involves
a political question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof,
they cite Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. They also point
out that the decision to bar Marcos and family from returning to
the Philippines for reasons of national security and public
safety has international precedents.
ISSUES
1. WON the President has the power under the Constitution to
bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and
decided to bar their return.
HELD
1. Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on
the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains
intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of the specific powers so
enumerated.
- The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return
to the Philippines cannot be considered in light solely of the
constitutional provision guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely
similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of
the President which are implicit and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect
general welfare.
2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and
whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses
poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and
in prohibiting their return. The documented history of the efforts
of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country
and the precarious state of the economy were the factual
bases for the President to conclude that the return of the
Marcoses during that time would only exacerbate and intensify
the violence directed against the State and instigate more
chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking preemptive action against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct. The preservation of the State the
fruition of the peoples sovereignty is an obligation in the
highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution of the laws,
cannot shirk from that responsibility.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNAN [concur]
History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have
conceded to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of
crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many terms
are applied to these powers: residual, inherent, moral, travel. The determination of whether the Marcos return poses a
implied, aggregate, emergency. Whatever they may be threat to national security should not be left solely to the Chief
called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if the
governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried
out effectively and efficiently.
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law may be impaired only upon lawful order of
the court, not of an executive officer, not even the President. I
do not think that we should differentiate the right to return home
from the right to go abroad or to move around in the
Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more
preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel.
CRUZ [dissent]
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of
abode that Aquino then invoked.
PARAS [dissent]
The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to
return to his own country, except only if prevented by the
demands of national safety and national security.
PADILLA [dissent]
With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel may be
impaired or restricted in the interest of national security, public
safety, and public health. Power of the state to restrict the right
to travel finds abundant support in police power. The
government failed to present convincing evidence to defeat
Marcos right to return to this country.
SARMIENTO [dissent]
The right to return to ones own country cannot be
distinguished from the right to travel and freedom of abode.
While the President may exercise powers not expressly
granted by the Constitution but may necessarily implied
therefrom, the latter must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of
Rights. Under the new Constitution, the right to travel may be
impaired only within the limits provided by law. The President
has been divested of the implied power to impair the right to
the Administrative Code is the genera law which
Executive; the Court itself must be satisfied that the threat is
not only clear but also present.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
(SEE DIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION)
VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
LAUREL; April 21, 1939
Control Power Supervision Suspension of a
Local Government Official
FACTS: Villena was the then mayor of Makati.
After investigation, the Secretary of Interior
recommended the suspension of Villena with the
Office of the president who approved the same. The
Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred
claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over
the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in
the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec
2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if
the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power
of supervision over local governments, that power,
according to the constitution, must be exercised in
accordance with the provisions of law and the
provisions of law governing trials of charges against
elective municipal officials are those contained in
sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In
other words, the Secretary of the Interior must
exercise his supervision over local governments, if
he has that power under existing law, in accordance
with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as
amended, as the latter provisions govern the
procedure to be followed in suspending and
punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of
must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior
can suspend an LGU official under investigation.
HELD: There is no clear and express grant of
power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation. On the
contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial
governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code
which provides that The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath
against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is
expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code to the provincial governor does not mean that
the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the
Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar
power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner
admitted in the oral argument that the President of
the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner
from office in virtue of his greater power of removal
(sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be
exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the
President could, in the manner prescribed by law,
remove a municipal official; it would be a legal
incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser
power of suspension. And the incongruity would be
more patent if, possessed of the power both to
suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec.
2078, Administrative Code), the President were to
be without the power to suspend a municipal
official. The power to suspend a municipal official is
not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued
to give way for an impartial investigation.
FACTS
- Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain the
Secretary of the Interior (SI) and his agents from proceeding
with the investigation against him until this case was settled by
the SC.
- Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation of the
Department of Justice conducted an inquiry into the conduct of
Villena. He was found to have committed bribery, extortion,
malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of the
law profession.
- Feb. 8, 1939 ~ SI recommended to the President that Villena
be suspended so as to prevent the coercion of witnesses. The
President verbally granted the recommendation on the same
day.
- Feb. 9,1939~ SI suspended Villena from office and instructed
the Provincial Governor of Rizal to advise Villena of his
suspension.
- Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges against
him and notifying him that Emiliano Anonas was the special
investigator of the case.
- Feb. 17, 1939~ the date set by Anonas when the formal
investigation would begin. But eventually postponed to March
28,1939 due to several incidents and postponements.
- Hence, this petition for Prelim Injunction. Villena contends
that:
> SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him, to file
administrative charges against him, and to decide the merits
of the charges because the power to suspend, to try and
punish municipal elective officials is lodged in some other
agencies of the government.
> SIs acts are null and void because:
+ SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to the
President when SI suspended him (Villena).
+ SI must exercise the power to supervise in accordance
with the provisions of law and the provisions of law
governing the trials and charges of against elective
municipal officials are those contained in sec. 2188 of the
Administrative Code as amended.
+ SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself
into a complainant and at the same time the judge of the
charges he filed against him.
+ SIs action didnt follow the procedure under Sec. 2188
of the AC, which requires that a complaint be based on a
private persons or citizens sworn statement.
- Villena prays that a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued to
stop the SI and his agents from proceeding further with the
investigation until this case is heard; that SI be declared as
without authority to suspend him and order his reinstatement in
office; that SI be declared as without authority to file charges
against him and to investigate such charges.
- His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was denied.
- The Solicitor General contends that:
> Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 86 of the Revised AC
expressly empowers the SI to order the investigation of any
act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department and in connection therewith to
designate an official or person who shall conduct such
investigation.
> Sec. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena, doesnt
preclude SI from exercising the powers stated in Sec. 79 in
connection to Sec. 86. Also, that invoked section, must be
read in relation to sec. 37 of the Reorganization Law of
1932.
> Villena didnt question the jurisdiction of the SI at the start
of the investigation but merely contended that such charges
were not in accordance with law for the reason that they
didnt bear the oaths of the complaints.
> The authority of a department head to order the
investigation of a subordinate necessarily carries with it by
implication the authority to take such measures as he may
deem necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
investigation, including suspending the officer; plus, the
President authorized the suspension.
> Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public officials
by injunction from performing any official act, which they are
required by law to perform, or acts, which are not in excess
of the authority, and discretion reposed in them.
ISSUES
1. WON the SI has the legal authority to order an investigation,
by a special investigator appointed by him, of the charges of
corruption and irregularity against Villena.
2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena
pending the investigation of the charges.
HELD
1. The SI is invested with authority to order the investigation of
the charges against the petitioner, Villena, and to appoint a
special investigator for that purpose.
- Sec. 79 of the Revised AC speaks of direct control, direction
and supervision over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction
of the SI but it should be interpreted in relation to sec. 86 of the
same Code which grants to the Dept of Interior executive
supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities,
chartered cities and other local political subdivisions.
- Citing Planas v. Gil: Supervision is not a meaningless thing.
It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at
least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in
order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is to
be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it
must be founded upon knowledge of actual facts and
conditions disclosed after careful study and investigation.
2. There is no clear and express grant of power to the
secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under
investigation.
- NOTE: There was an argument regarding the verbal approval
or acquiescence of the President to the suspension. It was said
that if the justices were to accept that the President had the
authority to suspend the petitioner, then the suspension made
by the SI, since the President approved it, should be sustained.
Then this was followed by the discussion regarding certain acts
of the President that could not be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification. There are certain constitutional powers
and prerogatives of the Chief Executive that should be
exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus and proclamation of martial law and the exercise of
pardon.) But there were doubts regarding the verbal approval
by the President of the suspension if such could be considered
as ratification in law (with law giving the power to suspend
being the Chief Exec.) Hence, the ratio.
Ratio xxxunder the presidential type of government which
we have adopted and considering the departmental
organization established and continued in force by par. 1, sec.
12, Art.VII of our (1935) Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or the law to act personally , the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive ,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept of the Govt,
there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible
without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that it is, the
establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
- The First Section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with
the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the
principle that The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines.
- Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is reality but the projection of
that of the President.
- Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ each head of a
department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is required by
law to exercise authority.
- As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted
departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid
legislation in the particular field.
- The President should be answerable for the acts of
administration of the entire Executive Department before his
own conscience
Note Read this case in relation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art. 7 of
the 1987 Constitution.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS V
MABALOT
BUENA; February 27, 2002
FACTS
- On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B.
Garcia, Jr. issued Memorandum Order No. 96-735 addressed
to Land Transportation Franchising Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
Chairman Dante Lantin directing him to effect the transfer of
regional functions of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional
Office
- On March 13, 1996, Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order against DOTC Secretary and LTFRB
chair, praying among others that Memorandum Order No. 96-
735 be declared illegal and without effect.
- On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining DOTC Secretary from implementing
Memorandum Order No. 96-735. The lower court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction on April 8, 1996.
- On January 29, 1997, then DOTC Secretary Amado
Lagdameo issued Department Order No. 97-1025 establishing
the DOTC-CAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the
LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the regional functions of the
LTFRB in the CAR
- On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision
declaring Memorandum Order Nos. 96-735 and 97-1025 null
and void and without any legal effect as being violative of the
provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the
powers of the legislative department and also of the provision
enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or
employment in the Government.
ISSUE
WON the assailed memorandum orders establishing the DOTC
Regional Office as an LTFRB Regional Office is
unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of legislative
power.
HELD
- The President may, through his/her duly constituted political
agent and alter ego, legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the National Government in exercise of
authority granted by law.
- A public office may be created through any of the following
modes: (1) by the Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law
(statute duly enacted by Congress), or (3) by authority of law.
The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office
was made pursuant to the third mode.
- The President, through Administrative Order No. 36 directed
the various departments and agencies of government to
immediately undertake the creation and establishment of their
regional offices in CAR.
- It is as if the President himself carried out the creation and
establishment of the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact,
the DOTC Secretary directly and merely sought to implement
the Chief Executives Administrative Order.
- The Presidents control over all executive departments come
from Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, while the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government is
vested by Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1416 (as ruled in Larin Vs. Executive
Secretary).
- Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: without minimizing the
importance of the heads of various departments, their
personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive.
- The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-
CAR as the Regional Office of the LTFRB in CAR and the
concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the
former as the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office fall within the scope
of the continuing authority of the President to effectively
reorganize the DOTC (and other departments).
- In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid
provided it is pursued in good faith. A reorganization is carried
out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in this case was
decreed in the interest of service and for purposes of
economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC
functions in CAR.
- The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections 7 and
8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution since the organic personnel
of the DOTC-CAR are, in effect, merely designated to perform
the additional duties and functions of an LTFRB Regional Office
subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB
Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB
Regional Office.
BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
FERNANDO; February 28, 1977
FACTS
- Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim
against a domestic Mining corporations (Benguet Exploration,
Inc.) Lode Lease Agreement covering three mining claims in
Benguet, Mountain Province.
- Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim
- Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resource maintaining the sufficiency of her adverse claim
- At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a second
motion for reconsideration and ordered a formal hearing of the
case
- Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for review
ISSUES
1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands
approved by the Secretary, upon a question of fact, is
justiciable
2. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
can be precluded from conducting his own inquiry
3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed to
abide by the requirements of the law
HELD
1. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved
by the Secretary of Agriculture and commerce, upon a question
of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the
courts unless there is a showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other
than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of
evidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the
preponderance of evidence, so long as there is some evidence
upon which the finding in question could be made
Reasoning
Acts of a department head, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumably the acts of the
Chief Executive
2. The State acting through the legislature through its power of
imperium acting as a sovereign regulating property to come up
with rules with which to exercise its power of dominium as
owner of the property cannot act arbitrarily but in accordance
with law
Reasoning
Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar
to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how such title
has been acquired
3. The Mining Act speaks of findings of facts of the Director of
Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources being final and conclusive, in which case
the aggrieved party may file a petition for review with this Court
where only questions of law may be raised
Reasoning No such affirmance by the secretary thats why he
ordered a hearing. It is but a right and proper in the interest of
justice that a formal hearing on the merits of this case be
conducted
Decision : petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Unanimous
LANSANG V GARCIA
CONCEPCION; December 11, 1971
FACTS:
- 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus.
Other petitions:
L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense
L-33973 David vs Garcia
L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia
L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia
L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia
L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago
L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia
L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia
- August 21, 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons died,
several injured
- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
889 suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, by
virtue of the powers vested upon the President by ART VII
Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution. His reason was that
lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and
disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State
and that public safety requires immediate and effective action
- Several people were apprehended and detained including the
petitioners on reasonable belief that they had participated in a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889-A,
the crime of insurrection or rebellion.
- August 30, 1971 Proclamation 889-A amended
Proclamation 889.
- September 18 and 25, October 4, 1971 -- Proclamations 889-
B, 889-C and 889-D lifted the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in some provinces, sub-provinces, cities,
EXCEPT in Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan, Camarines Sur, Ifugao,
Isabela, Laguna, Lanao, North and South Cotabato, Nueva
Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal, Tarlac,
Zambales, Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities including Manila.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court had authority to and should inquire into the
existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ
2. WON the Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WON it
complied with ART III Section 1 par 1434 and ART VII Section
10 par 235 of the Constitution?
3. WON the President act arbitrarily in issuing PN 889
4. WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. WON
petitioners detained should be released
HELD
1. YES. Upon deliberation, the Court abandoned the doctrine in
Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v Castaeda (determination
by the President of existence of any of the grounds prescribed
by the Constitution for the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus should be conclusive upon the courts. The President,
with all the intelligence sources was in a better position than
the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The
grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute no
unqualified. The authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is
circumcised, confined, restricted (more so because it is stated
in the negative shall not be except), and like the
limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may,
within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
- The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ, and the Executive is supreme within its
own sphere, however, the separation of powers goes hand in
hand with the system of checks and balances. The authority to
determine whether or not the Executive acted within the sphere
allotted to him is vested in the Judiciary.
2. YES.
declared the existence of an uprising -- lawless elements xxx
joined and banded their forces together for the avowed
34
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
35
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and, whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when
the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually
engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion xxx
b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must be
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof in the absence of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense they
and b) public safety must require the aforementioned
suspension are PRESENT.
c. The 1st condition can be attested through jurisprudence
(there were a lot of cases already HUKBALAHAP, etc). The
emergence and establishment of CPP NPA is proof of the
existence of a rebellion.
d. The 2nd condition is justified through the reports of the acts of
the NPA (its infiltration of several mass-based organizations,
various killings and bombings, encounters with the military, etc)
and the threat it poses to the public safety. According to
intelligence reports, the CPP and its front organizations are
capable of preparing powerful explosive, and that there was a
plan of a series of assassinations, kidnappings, mass
destruction of property, etc.
3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had possession
of intelligence reports, he consulted his advisers, and had
reason to feel that the situation was critical. The suspension of
the privilege of the writ in the entire Philippines was justified as
he could not have ascertained the places to be excluded at the
time of the proclamation, and he gradually lifted the
suspension.
4. Some petitioners were already released and with respect to
them, the issue is moot and academic. As to petitioners
David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes, del Rosario and Sison, still
under detention, they have been charged with violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act/ accused of overt acts covered by the
PN 889. The PN 889 being valid, their release may not be
ordered by the SC, but the CFI is directed to act with utmost
dispatch in conducting the preliminary investigation of the
charges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if
probable cause is found or otherwise , to order their release.
Decision President did not act arbitrarily. PN 889 not
unconstitutional. Petitions L33964, L33965, L33982, L34004,
L34013, L34039, L34265 dismissed. CFI to conduct
investigation and issue warrants of arrest or order of release as
to petitioners still under detention.
All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [dissent]
- I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six petitioners
still under detention should be set free.
- The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their liberty
may be held to answer, to be issued by a judge after a finding
of probable cause. That is to comply with the constitutional
requirement against unreasonable search and seizure.
- To keep them in confinement after ordinary processes of the
law are to be availed of is to ignore the safeguard of the Bill of
Rights that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE
MAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974
FACTS
- September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed
Proclamation No. 1081, proclaiming a state of Martial Law in
the Philippines
- September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed by the
President which provided an order to the Secretary of National
Defense to arrest and take into custody the individuals named
in the list for being participants in the conspiracy to seize
political and state power in the country and to take over the
government by force
- Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,
immediately effected the arrest of the herein petitioners
- Petitioners sought relief from Court, filing petitions for habeas
corpus
- Respondents filed their Return to Writ and Answer to the
Petition and prayed that the petition be dismissed
- Pending resolution of these Petitions, petitioners, except for
two (Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Sen. Jose Diokno), were
released from custody on different dates under a Conditional
Release
- December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition, imputing delay in the disposition of his case, and
asseverating that because of the decision of the Court in the
Ratification Cases and the action of the Members of the Court
in taking an oath to support the New Constitution, he cannot
reasonably expect to get justice in this case
- The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that
there is a public interest in the decision of these cases and that
the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue, unfair
and contemptuous.
- The Court denied Dioknos motion with a vote of 5 to 7
- Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Mu oz-
Palma, Aquino and Barredo voted to grant Dioknos
motion to withdraw petition
ISSUES
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law
2. WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the
circumstances required by the Constitution for the proclamation
of a state of martial law
3. WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them the
relief of habeas corpus
HELD
All petitions dismissed except those which have been
previously withdrawn by the respective petitioners with the
approval of this Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons for his
concurrence in the dismissal of all the petitions.
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs in the dismissals in a separate opinion.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation of martial
law (justiciability of the martial law proclamation)
CASTRO [justiciable]
- cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the power
to inquire into the existence of the factual bases for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in order
to determine the sufficiency thereof.
- The judicial department can determine the existence of
conditions for the exercise of the Presidents powers and is not
bound by the recitals of his proclamation. But whether in the
circumstances obtaining public safety requires the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation
of martial law is initially for the President to decide. The
Presidents findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the
courts.

FERNANDO [justiciable]
- The action taken by any or both the political branches
whether in the form of a legislative act or an executive order
could be tested in court. Where private rights are affected, the
judiciary has the duty to look into its validity. A showing that
plenary power is granted either department of government may
not be and obstacle to judicial inquiry. Its improvident exercise
or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy.
Necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to
ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political.
- The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by the Court
is necessarily limited to the ascertainment of whether or not
such a suspension, in the light of the credible information
furnished by the President, was arbitrary. The question before
the judiciary is not the correctness but the reasonableness of
the action taken.
- Referred to Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court sustained
the presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus as there was no showing of arbitrariness
in the exercise of a prerogative belonging to the executive, the
judiciary merely acting as a check on the exercise of such
authority. Chief Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the
exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to
check, not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely
whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or the
determine the wisdom of his act.
TEEHANKEE [justiciable]
"it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases [stated in the proclamation suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or placing the country under martial
law as the case may be, since the requirements for the
exercise of these powers are the same and are provided in the
very same clause] in order to determine the constitutional
sufficiency thereof."32 The Court stressed therein that "indeed,
the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute
nor unqualified. The authority conferred upon by the
Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept
in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an
exception thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the
negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that
'(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended x x x.' It is only by way of exception that it permits
the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion'-or under Art. VII of the Constitution,
'imminent danger thereof-'when the public safety requires it, in
any of which events the same may be suspended wherever
during such period the necessity for such suspension shall
exist.' Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend
the privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and
restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions
essential to its existence, but also, as regards the time when
and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and
the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and
define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power,
beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and
restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the
legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance
therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by the
courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional
provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the frames of
our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a
wasteful exercise in futility."
BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable]
- The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the
determination of the constitutional sufficiency of a proclamation
of martial law by the President should not go beyond facts of
judicial notice and those that may be stated in the
proclamation,, if these are by their very nature capable of
unquestionable demonstration.
- While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely conclusive,
the Courts inquiry into its constitutional sufficiency may not,
contrary to what is implied in Lansang, involve the reception of
evidence to be weighed against those on which the President
has acted, nor may it extend to the investigation of what
evidence the President had before him. Such inquiry must be
limited to what is undisputed in the record and to what accords
or does not accord with facts of judicial notice.
- It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its own
constitutional prerogatives vis--vis the proclamation and the
existing martial law situation, given the reasons for the
declaration and its avowed objectives.
1. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This
means among other things that all the powers of the
government and of all its officials from the President down
to the lowest emanate from it.
2. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the
Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts as to
what the Constitution or any part thereof means.
3. In the same way the Supreme Court is the designated
guardian of the Constitution, the President is the
specifically assigned protector of the safety, tranquility and
territorial integrity of the nation. This responsibility of the
President is his alone and may not be shared by any other
Department.
4. The Constitution expressly provides that in case of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, the Executive
may place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law
5. In the same manner that the Executive power conferred
upon the Executive by the Constitution is complete, total
and unlimited, so also, the judicial power vested in the
Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very whole of
that power, without any limitation or qualification.
6. Even the basic guarantee of protection of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law readily reveals that
the Constitutions concern for individual rights and liberties
is not entirely above that for the national interests, since
the deprivation it enjoins is only that which is without due
process of law and laws are always enacted in the
national interest or to promote and safeguard the general
welfare.
7. Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution
explicitly enjoins that the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended, there is no similar
injunction whether expressed or implied against the
declaration of martial law.
- Political questions are not per se beyond the Courts
jurisdictionbut that as a matter of policy, implicit in the
Constitution itself, the Court should abstain from interfering with
the Executives Proclamation.
ANTONIO [political question]
- The right of a government to maintain its existence is the
most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To protect the nation's
continued existence, from external as well as internal threats,
the government "is invested with all those inherent and implied
powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were
generally considered to belong to every government as such,
and as being essential to the exercise of its functions"
- These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's
protection and security have been lodged by the Constitution
under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on the President of the
Philippines, who is clothed with exclusive authority to
determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called
forth.
- Cited Barcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the time of
the framing and adoption of the 1935 Constitution was that of
Barcelon v. Baker. It enunciated the principle that when the
Governor-General with the approval of the Philippine
Commission, under Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion
exists, and by reason thereof the public safety requires the
suspension of the privileges of habeas corpus, this declaration
is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the
government. And when the Chief Executive has decided that
conditions exist justifying the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, courts will presume that such conditions
continue to exist until the same authority has decided that such
conditions no longer exist. These doctrines are rooted on
pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy.
The "doctrine that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives
a discretionary power to any person, such person is to be
considered the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
those facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never
been disputed by any respectable authority." The political
department according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott,
is the sole judge of the existence of war or insurrection, and
when it declares either of these emergencies to exist, its action
is not subject to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial
department of the State.
MAKASIAR [political question]
AQUINO [political question]
FERNANDEZ [political question]
- The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to
proclaim martial law. It is similarly explicit in specifying the
occasions for its exercise. "In case of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public Safety
requires it, he (the President as Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law."
- The power to proclaim martial law is exclusively vested in the
President. The proclamation and its attendant circumstances
therefore form a political question.
- Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and
of the legislature is justiciable there can be no clearer example
of a political question than Proclamation No. 1081. It is the
exercise by the highest elective official of the land of a supreme
political duty exclusively entrusted to him by the Constitution.
Our people have entrusted to the President through a specific
provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to
wield a powerful weapon. The people have entrusted to him the
estimation that the perils are so ominous and threatening that
this ultimate weapon of our duly constituted government must
be used.
- The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to share the
determination of the occasions for its exercise. It is not given
the authority by the Constitution to expand or limit the scope of
its use depending on the allegations of litigants. It is not
authorized by the Constitution to say that martial law may be
proclaimed in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater Manila. Much
less does it have the power nor should it even exercise the
power, assuming its existence, to nullify a proclamation of the
President on a matter exclusively vested in him by the
Constitution and on issues so politically and emotionally
charged. The Court's function in such cases is to assume
jurisdiction for the purpose of finding out whether the issues
constitute a political question or not. Its function is to determine
whether or not a question is indeed justiciable.
- Granted that Proclamation No. 1081 is not political but
justiciable, it is still valid because the president has not acted
arbitrarily in issuing it.
ESGUERRA [political question]
- I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid
and binding; that the veracity or sufficiency of its factual bases
cannot be inquired into by the Courts and that the question
presented by the petitions is political in nature and not
justiciable. Whether or not there is constitutional basis for the
Presidents action is for him to decide alone.
- Ruled Barcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia
MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable]
With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon itself
the grave responsibility of checking executive action and
saving the nation from an arbitrary and despotic exercise of the
presidential power granted under the Constitution to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or proclaim
martial law; that responsibility and duty of the Court must be
preserved and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its
role as the last bulwark of democracy in this country.
WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the
circumstances required by the Constitution for the
proclamation of a state of martial law
CASTRO [valid]
- Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial law in
cases not only of actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion but
also of imminent danger thereof.
- The so called open court theory does not apply to the
Philippine situation because our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
expressly authorize the declaration of martial law even where
the danger to public safety arises merely from the imminence
of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. Moreover, the theory is
too simplistic for our day, what with the universally recognized
insidious nature of Communist subversion and its overt
operations
FERNANDO [valid]
While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution
stipulates, in a transitory provision, that: All proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or
done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the
land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even
after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution,
unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly
modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
TEEHANKEE [no pronouncement]
BARREDO [valid]
The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a state of
anesthesia, since a major surgery is needed to save the
nations life.
MUNOZ-PALMA [valid]
The extreme measure taken by the President to place the
entire country under martial law was necessary. The
President's action was neither capricious nor arbitrary. An
arbitrary act is one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of
the will, caprice, or personal preference of the actor, one which
is not founded on a fair or substantial reason, is without
adequate determining principle, nonrational, and solely
dependent on the actor's will. Such is not the case with the act
of the President, because the proclamation of martial law was
the result of conditions and events, not of his own making,
which undoubtedly endangered the public safety and led him to
conclude that the situation was critical enough to warrant the
exercise of his power under the Constitution to proclaim martial
law
WON petitioners were illegally detained entitling them
the relief of habeas corpus
CASTRO [legal]
- Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law, the arrest
and detention of those reasonably believed to be engaged in
the disorder or in fomenting it is well nigh beyond questioning.
- In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the arrest
and detention of the petitioners on the ground of reasonable
belief in their complicity in the rebellion and insurrection.
Except Diokno and Aquino, all the petitioners have been
released from custody, although subject to defined restrictions
regarding personal movement and expression of views. As the
danger to public safety has not abated, I cannot say that the
continued detention of Diokno and Aquino and the restrictions
on the personal freedoms of the other petitioners are arbitrary,
just as I am not prepared to say that the continued imposition
of martial rule is unjustified.
FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law does not
automatically carry the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus]
It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs could be
traced to the wishes of the President himself, it carries with it a
presumption of validity. The test is again arbitrariness as
defined in Lansang. While the detention of petitioners could
have been validly ordered, as dictated by the very proclamation
itself, if it continued for an unreasonable length of time, then his
release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding.
BARREDO [legal]
- The imposition of martial law automatically carries with it the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any
event, the Presidential order of arrest and detention cannot be
assailed as deprivation of liberty without due process.
- The primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is to
maintain order and to insure the success of the battle against
the enemy by the most expeditious and efficient means without
loss of time and with the minimum effort. This is self-evident.
The arrest and detention of those contributing to the disorder
and especially of those helping or otherwise giving aid and
comfort to the enemy are indispensable, if martial law is to
mean anything at all.
ANTONIO [legal]
- The Court is precluded from inquiring into the legality of arrest
and detention of petitioners. Having concluded that the
Proclamation of Martial Law on September 21, 1972 by the
President of the Philippines and its continuance are valid and
constitutional, the arrest and detention of petitioners, pursuant
to General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 of the
President, as amended by General Order No. 2-A, dated
September 26, 1972, may not now be assailed as
unconstitutional and arbitrary.
- It should be important to note that as a consequence of the
proclamation of martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has been impliedly suspended. Authoritative writers on
the subject view the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as
an incident, but an important incident of a declaration of martial
law.
FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is ipso facto suspended upon a proclamation of martial
law]
MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal, the proclamation of martial
law did not carry with it the automatic suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus]
- First, from the very nature of the writ of habeas corpus which
as stressed in the early portion of this Opinion is a "writ of
liberty" and the "most important and most immediately
available safeguard of that liberty", the privilege of the writ
cannot be suspended by mere implication. The Bill of Rights
(Art. III, Sec. 1(14), 1935 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973
Constitution) categorically states that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended except for causes
therein specified, and the proclamation of martial law is not one
of those enumerated.
- Second, the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause, either
under Art. VII, Sec. 10(2), 1935 Constitution, or Art. IX, Sec. 12,
1973 Constitution, provides specifically for three different
modes of executive action in times of emergency, and one
mode does not necessarily encompass the other, viz, (a)
calling out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawlessness, etc., (b) suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and (c) placing the country or a part thereof
under martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes
for the executive action are the same, still the exigencies of the
situation may warrant the suspension of the privilege of the writ
but not a proclamation of martial law and vice versa.
- Third, there can be an automatic suspension of the privilege
of the writ when, with the declaration of martial law, there is a
total collapse of the civil authorities, the civil courts are closed,
and a military government takes over, in which event the
privilege of the writ is necessarily suspended for the simple
reason that there is no court to issue the writ; that, however, is
not the case with us at present because the martial law
proclaimed by the President upholds the supremacy of the civil
over the military authority,and the courts are open to issue the
writ.
IBP V ZAMORA
KAPUNAN; August 15, 2000
FACTS
- In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro
Manila, President Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the
PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the
purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
- The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, the Chief of Staff of the PNP and the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and
implement the said order.
- The PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay,
formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000, which contains the
ff:
> Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention and other
serious threats to national security
> Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been
perpetrated not only by ordinary criminals but also by
organized syndicates whose members include active and
former police/military personnel. The police visibility patrol in
urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially
those perpetrated by active or former police/military
personnel.
> Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimize or
eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members
include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-
armed active or former PNP/military personnel
> Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations:
a. Conducted jointly by the National Capital Region
Police Office and the Philippine Marines to curb
criminality in Metro Manila and to preserve the
internal security of the state against insurgents and
other serious threat to national security, although the
primary responsibility over Internal Security
Operations still rest upon the AFP.
b. Principle of integration of efforts: work cohesively and
unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and
holistic approach in addressing crime prevention.
c. A provisional Task Force Tulungan shall be organized
to provide the mechanism, structure and procedures
for the integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring
and assessing the security situation.
d. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle, SM City
North Edsa, Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills,
SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT
Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport.
- On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI
02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Marines, null and
void and unconstitutional because no emergency situation
obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the deployment of
soldiers for law enforcement work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3),
deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in
a civilian function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5), and
deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the
military to perform civilian functions of the government. It also
makes the military more powerful than what it should really be
under the Constitution.
- The President confirmed his previous directive on the
deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24
January 2000, addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief. The President expressed his desire to improve the
peace and order situation in Metro Manila through more
effective crime prevention program including increased police
patrols. He further stated that to heighten police visibility in the
Metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking
his powers as Commander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff
and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally,
the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a
reasonable period only.
ISSUES
1. WON the Presidents factual determination of the necessity
of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
a. WON petitioner has legal standing
2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in
joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy, over the military and the civilian character
of the PNP
HELD
1. On Judicial Review
Ratio 1: When questions of constitutional significance are
raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.
Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.
a. The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of
standing in this case.
> Definition of locus standi
+ a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged
+ interest means a material interest, an interest in
issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest
+ gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions
> The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case
> IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest
in the resolution of the case. It has not shown any specific
injury, which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the
questioned government act.
2. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
calling out the Marines
Definition of political question
- concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) questions which are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive department; if an issue is clearly
identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for
discretionary action by a particular branch of government or
to the people themselves then it is held to be a political
question
- (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case held
to be a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
courts undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
 embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on the one question
Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations
respected, is justiciablethe problem being one of legality or
validity.
Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the Constitution
limits the determination as to whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned.
- grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility
- There is no evidence to support the assertion that there
exist no justification for calling out the armed forces.
Likewise, there is no evidence to support the proposition that
grave abuse was committed because the power to call was
exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional
provision on civilian supremacy over the military.
There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec. 18,
par. 1 of the Constitution to bestow on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power The full
discretionary power of the President to determine the factual
basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also implied
and further reinforced in the rest of the said provision.
- Congress may revoke proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may
review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. There is
no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces
- Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
- Fr. Bernas: graduated power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief; when he exercises this lesser power
of calling on the armed forces, when he says it is necessary,
his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody
- Besides the absence of textual standards that the Court
may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive
at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. On the other hand, the President has a vast
intelligence network to gather information.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of
the police force
Constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement
- limited participation by the Marines
- real authority belongs to the PNP
Deployment of the Marines does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force
- the real authority in these operations is lodged with the
head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the
military
- since none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of
- the Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols; there can be no
insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor
can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause
in the Constitution
Military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms
persists in Philippine jurisdiction
- Military assistance in: elections, administration of the
Phil. Red Cross, relief and rescue operations, conduct
of licensure exams, sanitary inspections, conduct of
census work, etc.
- Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never
before questioned
- Mutual support and cooperation between the military
and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian
supremacy
Decision Petition dismissed
- 10 concur (Kapunan, Davide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon)
- 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing)
- 1 on official leave (Bellosillo)
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
- Political questions are defined as those questions which
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government They have two aspects: (1) those
matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular office of the
government, with discretionary power to act.
- (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our form of government, one
department has no authority to inquire into the acts of another,
which acts are performed within the discretion of the other
department. Whenever a statute gives discretionary power to
any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of
certain facts, the statute constitutes him the sole judge of the
existence of those facts. The exercise of this discretion is
conclusive upon the courts. Once a determination is made by
the executive and legislative departments that the conditions
justifying the assailed acts exist, it will presume that the
conditions continue until the same authority decide that they no
longer exist. The executive branch, thru its civil and military
branches, are better situated to obtain information about peace
and order from every corner of the nation, in contrast with the
judicial department, with its very limited machinery
- (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power of
the Senate to punish its members for disorderly behavior does
not authorize it to suspend an appointive member from the
exercise of his office. The Supreme Court does not possess the
power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any
particular action. The Philippine Legislature or any branch
thereof cannot be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process
- (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to
determine who shall be admitted to its membership
- (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the Constitution
is a highly political function performed by Congress in its
sovereign legislative capacity
- (Arnault v. Balagtas) The process by which a contumacious
witness is dealt with by the legislature is a necessary
concomitant of the legislative process and the legislatures
exercise of its discretionary authority is not subject to judicial
interference
- (Osmena v. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with
Congresspower to discipline its members
- (Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction over
the controversy in light of the subsequent events justifying
intervention among which was the existence of a quorum
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with full
discretionary authority in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the exercise of its power thereon is
subject to constitutional limitations, which are mandatory in
nature.
- (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments is a
creature of the Constitution and its power does not come from
Congress but from the Constitution
- (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly in proposing
amendments to the Constitution violates the Constitution was
held to be justiciable and not a political issue. The power to
amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is
not included in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. As a constituent assembly, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the fundamental law and
they do not have the final say on whether their acts are within
or beyond constitutional limits
- (Tolentino v. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional convention
called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the
Constitution are at par with acts of Congress acting as a
constituent assembly
- In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question
doctrine and assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of powers
conferred upon the Legislature
- The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of
Executive Power
- (Severino v. Governor-General) When the Legislature
conferred upon the Governor-General powers and duties, it
did so for the reason that he was in a better position to know
the needs of the country than any other member of the
executive department, and with full confidence that he will
perform such duties as his judgment dictates
- (Abueva v. Wood) Under the principle of separation of
powers, it ruled that it was not intended by the Constitution
that one branch of government could encroach upon the field
of duty of the other. Each department has an exclusive field
within which it can perform its part within certain
discretionary limits.
- (Forbes v. Tiaco) The Presidents inherent power to deport
undesirable aliens is universally denominated as political,
and this power continues to exist for the preservation of
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation
- (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President upon which no
limitations may be imposed by Congress except those
resulting from the need of securing concurrence of the
Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the
limited legislative power to prescribe qualifications to the
given appointive office
- (Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, the President has the power to determine
whether war, in the legal sense, still continues or has
terminated. It is within the province of the political
department and not the judicial department of government to
determine when war is at the end
- (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide whether
the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension of the
privilege belongs to the President and his decision is final
and conclusive on the courts.
- (Lansang v. Garcia) The suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus was not a political question. The power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is neither absolute
nor unqualified because the Constitution sets limits on the
exercise of executive discretion on the matter. These limits
are: (1) that the privilege must not be suspended except
only in cases of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or
imminent danger thereof; and (2) when the public safety
requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for
the suspension shall exist. The extent of the power, which
may be inquired into by courts is defined by these limitations.
The function of the Court is not to supplant but merely to
check the Executive; to ascertain whether the President has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom
of his act.
- (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of the
Court held that the issue of whether or not the 1973
Constitution was justiciable, a majority also ruled that the
decisive issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had come
into force and effect, with or without constitutional ratification,
was a political question
- (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the Presidents
declaration of martial law. On whether the validity of the
imposition of martial law was a political or justiciable
question, the Court was almost evenly divided.
- (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the Presidential
Commitment Order by the President was not subject to
judicial inquiry. In times of war or national emergency, the
President must be given absolute control for the very life of
the nation and government is in peril
- (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review, the
Court must inquire into every phase and aspect of a persons
detention from the moment he was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition
- The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court the
power to strike down acts amounting to grave abuse of
discretion of both the legislative and executive branches of
government
- It is clear that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces of the Philippines, may call out the armed forces
subject to two conditions: (1) whenever it becomes necessary;
and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down the sine qua
requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective
sought to be attained by the exercise of the power. They define
the constitutional parameters of the calling out power. Whether
or not there is compliance with these parameters is a justiciable
issue and is not a political question.
- On the use of Bernas opinion: The Constitution does not
derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of
the people.
- When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the Court
must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though questions
of extreme political importance are necessarily involved.
VITUG
The act of the President in simply calling on the armed forces
of the Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the PNP
in joint visibility patrols in the metropolis, does not constitute
grave abuse of discretion that would now warrant an exercise
by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so
envisioned by the fundamental law.
MENDOZA [concur and dissent]
- The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised
by petitioner must await an actual case involving real parties
with injuries to show as a result of the operation of the
challenged executive action
- A citizens suit challenging the constituti0onality of
governmental action requires that (1) the petitioner must have
suffered an injury in fact of an actual or imminent nature; (2)
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action by this Court
- Only a party injured by the operation of the governmental
action challenged is in the best position to aid the Court in
determining the precise nature of the problem presented.
- Because of the absence of parties with real and substantial
interest to protect, we do not have evidence on the effect of
military presence in malls and commercial centers
- Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner
and the consequent lack of an actual case or controversy
SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TINGA; February 3, 2004
FACTS
- July 27, 2003 Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of
AFP, armed with ammunitions and explosives, stormed into
Oakwood apartments in Makati. They demanded the
resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP Chief.
- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4 both declaring a state of rebellion
and calling out the AFP to suppress the rebellion.
- Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations.
- August 1, 2003 President lifted the declaration.
- PARTIES
> Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)
o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of
rebellion to call out the armed forces
o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite
period since Oakwood occupation had ceased.
> Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers,
law professors and bar reviewers
o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that
confuses because overzealous public officers acting
pursuant to the proclamation are liable to violate the
constitutional rights of citizens
o Circumvention of the report requirement in
Sec 18, Art 7, commanding the President to submit a
report to Congress within 48 hours from proclamation of
martial law
o Presidential issuances cannot be construed
as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President
> Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of
Representatives
o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly
affected
o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise
of emergency powers and therefore is a usurpation of
the power of the Congress in Art 6, Sec 23 par 2
> Sen. Pimentel
o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive
exercise of a martial law power that has no
constitutional basis
> Solicitor-General
o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the
declaration
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and
legal standing of the parties
b. WON petitioners have legal standing
2. WON issuances of the President are valid
HELD
1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling
out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are
purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1
and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6.
- Justiciable even if moot
- Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable
of repetition yet evading review
- Lacson v. Perez mootness preclude the Court from
addressing its Constitutionality
- Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing
because when an act of the Executive injures the institution of
the Congress and causes a derivative but substantial injury,
then any member can file suit (Phil. Constitution Association v.
Enriquez)
- Sanlakas, PM, and SJS have no legal standing because they
did not obtain any direct injury from the governmental act that
is being challenged. Peoples organization status would not
vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity
of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato)
- SJS as taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing
because there was no illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation
2. Presidential issuances are valid
- Art 7, Sec 18 Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out
power, 2.power to suspend writ of habeas corpus, 3.power to
declare martial law.
- 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion
AND that public safety requires the exercise of such power.
These are not required in calling-out power (IBP v. Zamora)
- It does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a
state of rebellion. The Constitution vests the President not
only with Commander-in-Chief powers but with first and
foremost, Executive powers
- US Constitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are
broad enough as it is and become more so when taken
together with the provision on executive power and presidential
oath of office
- Presidents authority to declare state of rebellion springs in
the main from her powers as chief executive and at the same
time draws strength from her commander-in-chief powers
- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the
nation that such a state exists and the armed forces may be
called to prevent or suppress it.
- Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality
protected rights (Lacson)
- President has full discretionary power to call out the armed
forces and to determine the necessity of the exercise of such
power. There is no proof that the President acted without
factual basis.
- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to
declaration of martial law.
DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006
FACTS
- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20 th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which
states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes
 necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent
or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17,
Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.
- The declaration is premised military and police intelligence
containing concerted efforts of Left and Right wing factions to
bring down the Arroyo Government.
- On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017 (hence, the same premise as PP1017),
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under
the Constitution as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of
the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017
dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief
of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP
and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress
and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence .
- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a
state of national emergency and after all these petitions had
been filed, the President lifted PP 1017.
ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples
Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a
plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. [4] They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006,
the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS
NO REFUTATION FROM PETITIONERS COUNSELS.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza
and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan
and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group
indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed
to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called
upon the people to show and proclaim our displeasure at the
sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by
going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands
on our left arms. [5]
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a
document entitled Oplan Hackle I which detailed plans for
bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy
Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to
assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members
and President Arroyo herself.[6] Upon the advice of her
security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a
bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured
in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his
possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the
meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the
National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette
cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents. [7]
Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that
the Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20 th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao
intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special
Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately
ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to
disavow any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued
a public statement: All SAF units are under the effective
control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven
integrity and unquestionable loyalty.
On the same day, at the house of former
Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos
brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials
plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly
Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon,
longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about
his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also
phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as
B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite Scout
Ranger. Lim said it was all systems go for the planned
movement against Arroyo.[8]
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col.
Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge
number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical
mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be
held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2)
officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers
because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join
the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga
has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the
chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen.
Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine
Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of
political and revolutionary work within the military and the
police establishments in order to forge alliances with its
members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio Ka
Roger Rosal declared: The Communist Party and
revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to
the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its
immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of
rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take
much longer to end it.[9]
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for
the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central
Mindanao, publicly announced: Anti-Arroyo groups within the
military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the
economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers
and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency
operations in the field. He claimed that with the forces of the
national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative
political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been
reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents
ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of
telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan
was also considered as additional factual basis for the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an
army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3)
soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro
Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass
protests.[10]
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President
convened her security advisers and several cabinet members
to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order
situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account
for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains
solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any
possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the
President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National
Capital Region.
PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David,
et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches
on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to
avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of
martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-
Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case
of censorship or prior restraint. They also claimed that the protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
term emergency refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane
and similar occurrences, hence, there is absolutely no
emergency that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485 , petitioners herein are
Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one
(21) other members of the House of Representatives, including
Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro
Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of legislative
powers; violation of freedom of expression and a
declaration of martial law. They alleged that President Arroyo
gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces
without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of
lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do
so.
In G.R. No. 171483 , petitioners KMU, NAFLU-
KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President
Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance
was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of
expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble
to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400 , petitioner Alternative Law
Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4[15] of
Article II, (b) Sections 1,[16] 2,[17] and 4[18] of Article III, (c)
Section 23[19] of Article VI, and (d) Section 17[20] of Article XII
of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an arbitrary and unlawful
exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers . And
assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial
Law, petitioners argued that it amounts to an exercise by the
President of emergency powers without congressional
approval. In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 goes
beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined
under the Revised Administrative Code.
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B.
Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of
expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the
press and the right to access to information on matters of
public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution. In this regard, she stated that these
issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election
Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
- In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General
countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being
moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424
(Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and
171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not
necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal
basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to
free expression and redress of grievances.
actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the moot and academic principle precludes
the Court from taking cognizance of the cases
2. WON petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.),
G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.),
171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have
legal standing
Substantive
3. WON Supreme Court can review the factual basis
of PP 1017
4. WON PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
HELD
Procedural
1. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
[31]
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; [32] third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; [33] and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[34]
Reasoning
- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; [31] second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved;[32] third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; [33] and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.[34]
- All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this
Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions.
5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues
being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the
peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly
and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts,
doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the
bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and
the police, on the extent of the protection given by
constitutional guarantees.[35] And lastly, respondents contested
subject to judicial review. In their attempt to prove the alleged
mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio
V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary.[36] However, they failed to take into account the
Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise moot case
may still be decided provided the party raising it in a proper
case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged
as a direct result of its issuance. The present case falls right
within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the
Chief Justice.
2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question shall be
set aside by the Court whenever it is shown that the case is of
transcendental importance.
Reasoning
- Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.[37] In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest .
Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [38]
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right
to the relief sought.
- By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from
the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing
to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question;
4. or concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
5. or legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
- Now, the application of the above principles to the present
petitions.
- The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396,
particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same
holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-
Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged direct
injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly
so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
- In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged
there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised
the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is
necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial
Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that
those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their
Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the
alleged violations of their basic rights.
- In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality
rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,[60] Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod
sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan ,[61] Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,[62] Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,[63] and Taada v. Tuvera,[64] that when the issue
concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a
citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
- In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be
deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations
may be granted standing to assert the rights of their
members.[65] We take judicial notice of the announcement by
the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all
permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5.
- In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are
national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or
potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members
may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017
and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
[66]
the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in
this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the
transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that
petitioner have locus standi.
- In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a
taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of
illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a
former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue
as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
solely vested in his wisdom. However, this does not prevent
her because there was no showing that the enforcement of
these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation.
Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance.
She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the
proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more
the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court
may relax the standing rules.
- It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus
standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise
of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the
liberality doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be doubted
that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial
question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino
people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine
society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on
this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the
application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a
relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the
PP 1017 cases.
- This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus
standi.
- Incidentally, IT IS NOT PROPER TO IMPLEAD PRESIDENT
ARROYO AS RESPONDENT. SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE
THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS TENURE OF OFFICE
OR ACTUAL INCUMBENCY,[67] MAY NOT BE SUED IN ANY
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASE, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO
PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs
his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.
However, this does not mean that the President is not
accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains
accountable to the people[68] but he may be removed from
office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.[69]
Substantive
3. The Presidents calling-out power is a discretionary power
an examination of whether such power was exercised
within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. This ruling is based on Section 1, Article VIII of
1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments. Under the new definition of judicial
power, the courts are authorized not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The latter part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.[81] It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in
terms of power but also of duty.[82]
- However, judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the Presidents decision is correct, but that the
President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down
is not correctness, but arbitrariness. [83] It is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is
totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of
proof, to support his assertion, then this Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings.
- Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of
the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of
factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.
4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the
constitutional exercise of the President of his/her calling out of
power, the Courts shall have authority to inquire into the factual
basis of such exercise to determine whether it was within the
constitutionally permissible limits or whether grave abuse of
discretion attended its exercise. (This interpretation was based
on Article VIII, section 1
a. Facial Challenge. Facial invalidation of laws (overbreadth
doctrine) shall not be resorted to in the absence of clear
showing that (1) the law involves the exercise of free speech;
(2) that there can be no instance that the assailed law may be
valid; and that (3) the Court has no other alternative remedies
available.
- Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a law shall be facially
invalid only if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
Reasoning
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of
its overbreadth. They claim that its enforcement encroached
on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution and sent a chilling effect to the
citizens.
- A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is
uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an
analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in
free speech cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it
is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v.
Salerno,[104] the US Supreme Court held that we have not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment (freedom of speech) .
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing
the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful
and constitutionally unprotected conduct.
- Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as
manifestly strong medicine, to be used sparingly and
only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored;[107]
The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional
rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a
person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to
challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be
applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations
not before the Court. [108]
- And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance
when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did
not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
- Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for
vagueness doctrine which holds that a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. [110] It
is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing on
their faces statutes in free speech cases. And like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on
its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP
1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to
establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand
the meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President to
exercise his calling out power to suppress lawless violence
shall not be deemed to include the power to authorize: (a)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as
these powers can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
- The take care power of the President, which includes the
power to enforce obedience of laws shall not be deemed to
include calling the military to enforce or implement certain laws,
such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like.
- The ordinance power of the President shall not include the
power to make decrees with the same force and effect as
those issued by President Marcos.
- In the absence of delegated authority from Congress, the
authority of the President to declare a state of emergency shall
not be deemed to include the power to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
- Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed
to be punishable in the absence of legislation clearly defining
said acts and providing specific punishments therefor.
Reasoning
Calling-out Power
- The Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. These are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The
only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Considering the circumstances then
prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP
1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in
the best position to determine the actual condition of the
country.
- Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the
armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence,
invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action.
But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out
power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He
cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a
lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the
greater the power, the greater are the limitations.
- It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction
between the Presidents authority to declare a state of
rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of
national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to
declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as
Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was
Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a
date or declaring a status or condition of public moment
or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of
a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force
of an executive order.
- President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was
merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment
or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above.
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless,
without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these
cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision
on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public interest.
Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.
Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless,
without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of
Sanlakas.
- Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is
actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines
the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein
that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.
- In his Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice
on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said that of
the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the
power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to
civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be
resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute
critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the
President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people
from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their
individual freedoms.
- Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration
of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As
such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid
declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other
purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act
done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a)
arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and
press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees,
are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of
Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
- Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is
not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces
to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.
Take Care Power
- The second provision of PP 1017 pertains to the power of
the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
- As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested, [115]
the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as
well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws.
He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as
President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its
laws.[116] In the exercise of such function, the President, if
needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,[117]
including the Philippine National Police[118] under the
Department of Interior and Local Government.[119]
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate
decrees?
- PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the
laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction.
- The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter
2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987), which allows her to issue executive orders,
administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders/circulars, general or special orders. President Arroyos
ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She
cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former
President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are
laws which are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President in the
exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial
Law under the 1973 Constitution.[121]
- The assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress
of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing
decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and
laws through the military?
- As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority
to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she
cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws,
such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She
can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders, and
regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a state
of national emergency.
- The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during
the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of
Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
 temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public
interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the
above provision when she issued PP 1017?
- During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP
1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or
delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation
of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
- This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution.
In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos
Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972
instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over the
management, control and operation of the Manila Electric
Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air
Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful
prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve
and end the present national emergency.
- Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of
Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of
Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the
legislatures emergency powers.
- A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority
to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise
emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants
the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
- Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of
both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the
Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above
provision refers not only to war but also to other national
emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution
was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a
state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers
could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he can
declare a state of national emergency. Therefore, President
Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national
emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
- But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking
over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.
- Constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed
together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and
provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject
matter will be construed together and considered in the light of
each other.[123] Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and
Section 23 of Article VI relate to national emergencies, they
must be read together to determine the limitation of the
exercise of emergency powers.
- Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article
VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed
upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it
may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such
restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry
out a national policy declared by Congress.[124]
- Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of
the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of
the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during
the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President.
Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
- Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of
conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger
to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal.
Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety,
and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been
occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under
three (3) principal heads: a) economic, b) natural disaster,
[129]
and c) national security.
- Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the
same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect. [131] This is
evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission.
- Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked
by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without authority from Congress.
- Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can
declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. The President
cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
without legislation , the President has no power to point out
the types of businesses affected with public interest that should
be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute
authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section
17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act
passed by Congress.
c. Applied Challenge. The Court shall not declare laws as
invalid solely on the basis of their misapplication or abuse or
susceptibility to abuse by the people tasked to implement them.
- The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the
authorities pursuant to the parts of the laws herein considered
unconstitutional are also deemed unconstitutional without
prejudice to the filing of necessary administrative, criminal or
civil actions against specific abuses committed by authorities.
Reasoning
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O.
No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the
illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
- Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare
statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused [135] and may afford an opportunity for abuse in
the manner of application.[136] The validity of a statute or
ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects
in a particular case.[137] PP 1017 is merely an invocation of
the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to
command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired
which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there
is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or
impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens
constitutional rights.
- Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance
unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed
illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the
validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the
essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion.[138] This is logical.
- President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the
provisions of PP 1017. General orders are acts and
commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They are internal
rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates
precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law.
Such rules and regulations create no relation except between
the official who issues them and the official who receives them.
[139]
They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in
which power is their source, and obedience, their object. [140]
For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid
is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or
capricious.
- G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately
carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence.
- Unlike the term lawless violence, the phrase acts of
terrorism is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress
has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.
- The absence of a law defining acts of terrorism may result in
abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military.
- So far, the word terrorism appears only once in our criminal
laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by
President Marcos during the Martial Law regime.
- P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws
the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President
Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however,
do not define acts of terrorism. Since there is no law defining
acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No.
5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute
terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without
restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest
without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking
over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all
assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All
these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts
go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly,
they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus,
this Court declares that the acts of terrorism portion of G.O.
No. 5 is unconstitutional.
VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY
AUTHORITIES PURSUANT TO PP 1017 AND G.O. NO.
5 right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for
- In the Brief Account[144] submitted by petitioner David, certain
facts are established: first, he was arrested without warrant;
second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP
1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City
where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a
criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by
policemen who held his head and tried to push him inside an
unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 [145] and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he
was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was
eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
- The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no person
shall be arrested without warrant. The recognized exceptions
are in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
- Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies
petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for
the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with
the invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
[146]
Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his
immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-
shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to
charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated
that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation
of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David
was the leader of the rally.[147]
- But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is
that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated,
but also their right to peaceably assemble.
- Assembly under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution means a
consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary
consequence of our republican institution and complements the
right of speech. This right is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In
other words, the right to assemble is not subject to previous
restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the
prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government
authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be
held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and
not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.
- The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were
arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was
there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted
the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and
violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the
Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the
arresting officers conduct.
- On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise
considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et
al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Their dispersal was done
merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all
permits previously issued by local government units. This is
arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a
blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly
is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent .[149] Tolerance is
the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing
that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that
the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it.With the
blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between
protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.
- Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies
and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They
have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits
after due notice and hearing on the determination of the
presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were
not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.
The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal.
Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a persons right
is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic
government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable,
and according to procedure.
- G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another
facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press.
Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed
to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribunes
offices were searched without warrant; second, the police
operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the
search was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of
February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the
absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security
guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves
at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
- Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government
officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was
quoted as saying that such raid was meant to show a
strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or
do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down
this government. Director General Lomibao further stated
that if they do not follow the standards and the
standards are if they would contribute to instability in the
government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in
General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will
recommend a takeover. National Telecommunications
Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio
networks to cooperate with the government for the duration
of the state of national emergency. He warned that his
agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any
broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media
coverage during times when the national security is
threatened .
- The search is illegal. Rule 126, Section 4 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure requires that a search warrant
be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the
search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two
(2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must
direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is
on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which
case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of
the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.
- Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the
press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests
in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos
v. Chief of Staff[152] this Court held that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the
business and printing offices of the " Metropolitan Mail"
and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of
the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint
or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and
constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom
to express themselves in print. This state of being
is patently anathematic to a democratic framework
where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth
of the citizenry.
- While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and
sealed like the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that
the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The
search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing
of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices,
and the arrogant warning of government officials to media,
are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may
speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than
what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he
be so rash as to disobey.[153] Undoubtedly, the The Daily
Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because
of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate
the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves
the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on
public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta
principiis.[154]
- Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General
admitted that the search of the Tribunes offices and the
seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are
illegal; and that the same are inadmissible for any purpose,
- The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these
issuances. Suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the
calling out by the President of the military to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military
and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights
under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts
unconstitutional and illegal.
- In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans
concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral
part of this ponencia.
Decision
- WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court
rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence . However,
the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce
laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees
promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration
does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned
public utility or business affected with public interest without
prior legislation.
- G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a
standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
- The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of
proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint
on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune
offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and
other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
BAUTISTA V SALONGA
PADILLA; April 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari to review decision of Commission on
Appointments
- Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as
Acting Chair of CHR, who took oath of office before CJ Fernan.
She discharged functions/duties of Chair of CHR.
- Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on Appointments
requesting her to submit info and docs in connection w/ her
confirmation as Chair of CHR.
- Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her presence at
a meeting to deliberate on her appointment.
- Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on Appointments,
saying why she considered Comm on Appointments as having
no jurisdiction to review her appointment.
- As conveyed in a letter to the Exec Secretary, Commission
on Appointments disapproved Bautistas ad interim
appointment as Chair.
- Bautistas motion for reconsideration was denied.
- A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres designated
Mallillin as Acting Chair of CHR pending resolution of Bautistas
case.
- Bautista filed this petition w/ prayer for issuance of restraining
order to enjoin Commission of Appointments not to proceed w/
deliberation on her appointment.
- Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order
impleading Mallillin as respondent. She also filed ex-parte
motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of Chair and fr
demanding courtesy resignations fr officers.
- Court issued TRO regarding Mallillin but not regarding
Commission on Appointments, being instrumentality of coequal - To say otherwise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can from
branch.
- Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent appointment as
Chair on Dec 17, 1988. This appointment was for Pres solely
to make.
ISSUES
1. WON appointment by Pres of Chair of Commission on
Human Rights is to be w/ or w/o confirmation of Commission
on Appointments
2. WON Pres could extend another appointment to petitioner
on Jan 14, 1989 an ad interin appointment or any other kind of
appointment to same office of Chair of CHR that called for
confirmation by Commission on Appointments.
3. WON in appointments solely for Pres to make, the Pres can
voluntarily submit such appointment to Commission on
Appointment for confirmation.
4. WON the petition has become moot and academic.
HELD
1. NO
- CHR Chair position is not among positions mentioned in Sec
16 Art 12 of Consti. Therefore, appointment must be w/o
review of Commission on Appointments.
- Unlike Chair/Members of CSC, COMELEC and CoA, the
position of CHR Chair does not have express provision that
appointment should be with consent of Commission on
Appointments.
- Sec 2(c) of EO 163 says CHR Chair is among those w/c Pres
is authorized by law to appoint.
2. NO
- Bautistas appointment on Dec 17, 1988 as Chair was a
completed act on the part of the Pres. - Marbury V. Madison
- No new appointment could be made to position already filled
by a previously completed appointment, accepted by appointee
through qualification and assumption of duties.
- Even if Pres could submit to Commission on Appointments
an appointment that belongs solely to her, still, there was no
vacancy on Jan 14 1989.
- Nor can respondents contend that the new appointment on
Jan 14 was an ad interim appointment bec it does not apply to
appointments solely for Pres to make. It extends only to those
where review of Comm on Appointments is needed. That is
why those types of appointments remain valid until disapproval
by Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment of
Congress.
3. NO
time to time move power boundaries in Consti.
- Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where Consti
confers none. If Consti made appointment exclusive for Pres,
Pres cant grant power of participation in Commission on
Appointments. Nor can Commission on Appointments create
power to confirm appointments that Consti has reserved to
Pres alone.
4. NO
- Respondent contends that w/ or w/o confirmation, Bautista
can be removed fr office anytime at pleasure of Pres. And w/
disapproval of appointment/nomination by Commission on
Appointments, there was greater reason for her removal.
Thus, issue is moot and academic. SC disagrees and says
petitioner came in timely manner and didnt show intention of
abandoning her petition.
- EO 163 speaks of term of office (7 yrs without
reappointment) while EO 163-A speaks of tenure in office (at
pleasure of Pres). The diff bet term and tenure is impt.
Consistent w/ CHRs needed independence, tenure in office
cant be later made dependent on pleasure of Pres.
Obiter
- Sarmiento III V. Mison
- Issue: Which appointments under 1987 Consti are to be
w/ and w/o review of Commission on Appointments?
- Ratio: Only appointments mentioned in 1 st sentence of
Sec 16 Art VII are to be reviewed by Commission. Other
appointments by President are to be made w/o participation
of Commission.
- Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs head
is valid.
- Ratio: Once appointment is made, Pres power over the
office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is
not removable by him.
Decision Petition is granted; TRO is made permanent against
Mallillin; Petitioner Bautista is lawful Chair of CHR, she may be
removed only for cause.
Gutierrez Jr., Dissenting Opinion
Cruz, Dissenting
Grio-Aquino, Dissenting

SARMIENTO V MISON
PADILLA; December 17, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers, lawyers,
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
Constitutional Law professors seeks to enjoin Salvador Mison
from performing the functions as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs. In addition, they would want to enjoin Budget
Secretary Guillermo Carague from disbursing Misons salary
and emoluments. The grounds for the petition was that Misons
stay in Office is unconstitutional as there was no confirmation
coming from the Commission on Appointments that is
required by the Constitution. The Commission on
Appointments was allowed to intervene in the court proceeding.
- The case was considered justiciable given that there is great
public interest such as the need for stability in public service.
This disposed the question of whether this is the proper
remedy to question respondents right to the Office of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and also that of the
legal standing of the petitioners.
- The Constitutional Provision under careful examination is
Article VII Section 16, which states that:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
ISSUE
WON Misons stay in Office was Constitutional
HELD
- Yes it is constitutional.
- Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of officers
who the President is able to appoint. The first group would be
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. The
second group is composed of those officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. The
third group are those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint. Lastly, the fourth group, are those officers
lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
- To interpret the law the Justices went back in history to look at
the previous constitutions, the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In
the 1935 Constitution all appointments is subject to the
approval of the Commission on Appointments while this was
removed in the 1973 Constitution wherein the President is able
to appoint without the need for the approval of the Commission
on Appointments. Both were problematic as the 1935 provision
became a venue of horse-trading (used for political leverage)
while the 1973 provision gave too much power to the
President. The court held that the 1987 provision on
appointment was the middle ground that was sought by the
1986 Constitutional Commission.
- Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission they said that the clear and positive intent of the
framers were to make those officers in the first sentence the
individuals that are subject to the approval and confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments while those on the second
and third sentence need not seek such confirmation. Given that
the position as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
not under those specified in the first sentence but the second,
therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the approval of the
Commission on Appointments and thus should be able to
exercise full authority and functions and be entitled to his salary
and emoluments.
Decision Petition DISMISSED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Cortes, Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento- concurring
(11)
Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2)
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety. The focus
of the records was merely on the first sentence of the provision
and the not on the following sentences. Those are crucial given
that the position in question falls under the latter. Also, the
records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic
aids and are at best persuasive only and not necessarily
conclusive. In addition, strictly interpreting the third sentence
may create an absurdity for it gives Congress the discretion of
not creating a law that would give the President the power to
appoint those who are lower in rank. An irony arises when
those in a lower position require the approval of the
Commission on Appointments while those who are higher in
position would not.
PIMENTEL V ERMITA
CARPIO; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session
- 8/25/2004: The Commission on Appointments (composed of
members of Congress) was constituted
+ meanwhile, GMA issued appointments to respondents as
acting secretaries of their respective departments:
Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul Gonzales
(DOJ), Florencio Abad (DOE) Avelino Cruz (DND),
Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor
(DENR)
+ the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of office
and assumed their duties as acting secretaries
- 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen. Pimentel, filed
this present petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for a
writ of preliminary injunction to declare these appointments by
GMA unconstitutional
- 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary) appointments,
replacing respondents acting capacity
- Sol Gen argues
+ petition is moot because GMA had issued the ad interim
appointments after the recess of Congress; prohibition may
not enjoin acts already done.
+ the power to appoint is executive in naturethe
Commission of Appointments, though it be composed of
members of Congress, is a body independent of Congress,
and its executive power emanates from the Consti.
+ only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada and
Osmena, as members of the Commission, possess standing
in the present petition.
- Petitioners Argument
+ petitioners assert that GMA cannot issue such
appointments because no law grants such a power
 S10 Ch2 B4, EO 292: in case of a vacancy in the Office
of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be
designated as Acting Secretary
+ while Congress is in session, no appointments can be
made w/o the consent of the Commission
Respondents Argument:
-respondents assert that GMA can issue such appointments for
the reason that no law prohibits it
S16 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: The Pres. shall exercise the
power to appoint such officials as provided bythe law
S17 Ch5 T1 B3, EO 292: the Pres. may appoint an officer
already in service or any other competent person
ISSUE
WON GMAs appointment of respondents as acting secretaries
w/o the consent of the Commission of Appointments while
Congress is in session is unconstitutional
HELD
- the court held that the President may make such
appointments, as the law expressly provides it
S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3, EO 292: the President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government
service or any other competent person to perform the
function of an office in the executive branch
- EO 292 applies to appointments vested in the President by
lawCongress is not the only source of law
S17(3) of the previous provision states: In no case shall a
temporary designation exceed one (1) year. Petitioners fail
to consider that this provision acts as a safeguard against
the abuse of such appointments
- a department secretary is considered an alter ego of the
President, that is, it holds a position of great trust and
confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose that the
undersecretary automatically be appointedthe Pres. must
appoint an alter ego of her choice.
J. Bernas, SJ.: acting appointments may be extended any
time there is a vacancy; ad interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress and require
submission to the Commission of Appointments for approval
or rejection.
- notwithstanding Bernas textbook definition, the court finds no
abuse of appointments in the present case as such were
issued immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before
the lapse of one year.
Decision Petition DISMISSED
MATIBAG V BENIPAYO
CARPIO; April 2, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of prelim
injunction and TRO. Petitioner questions the appointment and
the right of respondents to remain in office as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC
- On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was
appointed by the COMELEC en banc as Acting Director IV of
the Education and Information Dept. (EID), her appointment
was renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a Temporary capacity and
renewed yet again on Feb 15, 2001 in the same Temporary
capacity.
- On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim, respondents
Alfredo Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion
Borra, and Florentino Tuason as COMELEC commissioners
respectively, for a term of 7 years, expiring on Feb. 2, 2008.
They took their oaths and assumed their positions with the
President submitting their ad interim appointments to the
Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 for
confirmation. The Commission on Appointments, however, did
not act on their appointments.
- On June 1, 2001, PGMA renewed their ad interim
appointments with the term and the expiration remaining the
same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2, 2008). The new
appointees took oath a 2 nd time and the same was transmitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation on June
5, 2001. The Congress adjourned before the Commission
could act on the appointments resulting in the renewal of their
ad interim appointments by the President for the 3rd time on
June 8, 2001.
- Benipayo, acting as COMELEC chairman, assigned a Velma
Cinco as officer-in-charge of EID and reassigned petitioner to
the Law Dept, a move which she requested reconsideration for,
citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular no. 7
(transfer of employees prohibited during election period: Jan.2-
June 13, 2001). Benipayo denied the request and citing
COMELEC Resolution no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the
COMELEC, filed an administrative and criminal complaint with
the Law Dept against Benipayo and while the complaint was
pending, she also filed this action. She claims that ad interim
appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC, and on temporary
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and
members. Petitioner also assails her reassignment to the Law
Dept, the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements
made by the COMELEC Finance Services Dept officer by way
of salaries and emoluments in favor of respondents.
- PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for a term of 7
years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008.
ISSUE
1. WON Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of
office as COMELEC chairman is constitutional
2. WON issue is justiciable
3. If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed
lawfully, WON the renewal of their appointments and
subsequent assumption of office was constitutional
4. WON petitioners removal and reassignment is illegal (done
w/o approval of the COMELEC as a collegial body)
5. WON the Officer-in-charge of COMELEC Finance Services
Dept, in making disbursements in favor of the new appointees,
acted in excess of jurisdiction.
HELD
1. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
made by the Pres. in the meantime that Congress is in recess.
It is not an appointment in a temporary or acting capacity. It
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by
the Pres. once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
Reasoning
- Although the last sentence of Art IX-C Sec 1(2) of the
Constitution says, In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, an ad interim
appointment is not a temporary appointment. A distinction was
made between the two in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila
v IAC, where it was held that an ad interim appointment as
defined in Blacks Law Dictionary is one that is appointed to fill
a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the
absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent. But
such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of
Phil. law. Ad interim is used to denote the manner in which said
appointments were made, that is, done by the President, in the
meantime, while the body, which is originally vested with the
power or appointment, is unable to act.
- Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision
prohibiting temporary or acting appointments, this Court then
decided such an appointment in Nacionalista Party v Bautista
as unconstitutional declaring that, It would be more in keeping
with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the
Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to
designate one to act temporarily. Likewise, In Brillantes v
Yorac, decided under the present Constitution, this Court struck
down as unconstitutional the designation by then Pres. Aquino
of Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC.
- Art. IX-A 1 should be harmonized with Art. VII 16. for to hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the
Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointments before the appointees can assume office will
negate the Presidents power to make ad interim appointments.
- The original draft of Art. VII 16 did not provide for ad interim
appointments, however, it was reinstated to avoid interruptions
in vital govt services that would result from prolonged
vacancies in govt offices. The ad interim appointment has since
been practiced by Presidents Aquino, Ramos and Estrada.
2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the
justiciability of the case by tackling the requisites of judicial
review raised by the respondents which they claimed to be
lacking (actual case/controversy was not raised)
> personal and substantial interest of the party
Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the
resolution of the case. If Benipayos appointment is
unlawful, petitioners reassignment is without legal basis; if
it is lawful, then she has no cause to complain provided
that it was done in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Because of her personal and material stake in the
resolution of the constitutionality of respondents
assumption of office, she has locus standi to raise it as a
constitutional issue
> exercise of judicial review must be pleaded at the earliest
opportunity
It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines
whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest
opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a
constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a
competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it
is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at
the trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim
appointments when she filed her petition before this
Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the
constitutional issue before a competent body.
> the constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case
The Respondents claim that the legality of petitioners
reassignment from the EID to the Law Dept. is the issue.
The Court, however, held that unless the constitutionality
of Benipayos appointment is determined, the legality of
petitioners assignment cannot be determined, therefore
the lis mota of this case is clearly the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner.
3. The phrase without reappointment in Art. IX-C 1(2) Congress.
applies only to appointments by the President and confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, regardless of WoN such
person appointed completes the term of office.
Reasoning The phrase without reappointment does not
apply to the renewal of appointments to Benipayo, Tuason and
Borra because there were no previous appointments that were
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
- The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the
Commission on Appointments. It was not acted upon on the
merits at the close of the session of Congress. There was no
final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the
Constitution. It is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term.
Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee as recognized in
Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments.
Moreover, their appointments were all for a fixed term expiring
on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly not in breach of the 7 year term limit.
4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized
by law to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel and the
person holding that office, in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo.
He has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office for
so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective.
Moreover, in COMELEC Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC
en banc, approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC
personnel during the election period.
5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELEC
chairman, the Officer-in-Charge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their salaries.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Concurred with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Puno and Vitug, JJs, were on official leave.
Consti Provisions cited:
Art. IX-A 1 The Consti Commissions COMELEC shall be
independent
Art. IX-C 1(2) Nature and term of appointment of Comelec
chairman and commissioner: (7 years w/o reappointment). In
no case shall there be appointment in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Art. VII 16 power of Pres. to make appointments during
recess of Congress effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
CONSTANTINO V CUISA
TINGA; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails
said contracts which were entered into pursuant to the
Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992. It
seeks to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt-
relief contracts pursuant thereto.
- The Financing Program was devised under President
Corazon Aquino to manage the countrys external debt problem
through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy by means of two
debt-relief options: 1) cash buyback of portions of the
Philippine foreign debt at a discount, or 2) allowed creditors to
convert existing Philippine debt instruments into
bonds/securities.
- Petitioners challenge the Program as follows:
1. That it is beyond the powers granted to the President
under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
That buyback and securitization/bond conversion
schemes are neither loans nor guarantees, and
hence, beyond the power of the President.
2. That assuming the above as constitutionally permissible, it
is only the President who may exercise the power to enter
into these contract and such power may not be delegated.
3. That the Program was made available for debts
fraudulently contracted or void. Petitioners rely on 1992
Commission on Audit report identifying several behest
loans contracted or guaranteed fraudulently during the
Marcos regime. That since these were eligible for buyback
 or conversion, they would be void for being waivers of the
Republics right to repudiate the void or fraudulently
contracted loans.
- For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by
petitioners. They also question the standing of petitioners and
the justiciability of the issues presented.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners have locus standi.
2. WON the case is ripe for adjudication
Substantive
3. WON the scope of section 20, Article VII includes bond-
conversion and buyback
4. WON the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved
by the Constitution in the person of the President and may not
be delegated
5. WON there has been grave abuse of discretion and violation
of constitutional policies
HELD
1. The Courts cognizance of this petition will not only
determine the validity or invalidity of the subject pre-termination
(buyback) and bond-conversion of foreign debts but also create
a precedent for other debts or debt-related contract executed
or to be executed in behalf of the President by the Secretary of
Finance. Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of
the issues herein cannot be doubted.
- Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context
of alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor
significance. By the very nature of the power wielded by the
President, the effect of using this power on the economy, and
the well-being in general of the Filipino nation, the Court must
set aside the procedural barrier of standing and rule on the
justiciable issues presented by the parties.
2. The Court holds that some issues are not ripe for
adjudication.
One such issue raised by petitioners is the allegation that
respondents waived the Philippines right to repudiate void and
fraudulently contracted loans is not justiciable.
- Records do not show whether the so-called behest loans
were subject of the debt-relief contracts.
- Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently
contracted loans begs the question of whether indeed
particular loans are void or fraudulently contracted. Petitioners
theory depends on a prior annulment or declaration of nullity of
the pre-existing loans, which thus far have not been submitted
to this Court.
- As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret over a
possible waiver of the right to repudiate void contracts.
Respondents unequivocally assert that the Republic did not
waive any such right, it having incorporated a no-waiver
clause in the agreements.
- Obiter Many advocates that the Republic should renege on
obligations that are considered as illegitimate. However, such
course of action would have adverse repercussions. Among
the consequences is that the standard cross-default provisions
in Philippine foreign loans may come into effect, in which case,
default even in one loan would be ground for other creditors to
declare default on other loans.
- In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with the
Courts but with the executive.
3. On Bond-Conversion
- An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to the
issuer, and the bond represents the issuers contractual
promise to pay interest and repay principal according to
specific terms. The language of the Constitution is simple and
clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and
guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the
issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which
kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others.
- The only restriction that the Constitution provides aside from
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans
must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard, it
is noted RA 245 as amended by PD 142 entitled An Act
Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public
Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes,
allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of bonds thus:
the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the
President after consultation with the Monetary board, is
authorized to borrow and to issue therefore evidences of
indebtedness may be of the following types: Treasury
bonds
- Also under the foregoing provision, sovereign bonds may also
be provided for the purchase, redemption, or refunding of nay
obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the Philippine
Government.
On the Buyback Scheme
- It is true that in the separation of powers, it is Congress that
manages the countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing and
spending powers. However, the law-making authority has
promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations
provision for debt servicing. The Court in Guingona v.
Carague, held:
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act,
since authorization therefore already exists under RA 4860
and 245, as amended, and PD 1967. In the light of this
subsisting authorization, Congress does not concern itself
with details for implementation by the Executive. Upon such
approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have
delegated its wisdom to the Executive.
- Specific legal authority for the buyback even without further
action from Congress is established under Section 2 of RA 240
thus:
the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any
moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated any interest falling due, or accruing on any
portion of the public debt authorized by law. He shall also
cause to be paid out the principal amount of any
obligations which have matured or, if redeemed prior to
maturity, such portion of the face value as is prescribed by
the terms and conditions under which such obligations were
originally issued.
- Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of
the foreign borrowing power. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary
to effectuate its object and purpose.
- Also, the Constitution, as a rule, does not enumerate let
alone enumerate all the acts which the President (or any
other public officer) may not do, and the fact that the
Constitution does not explicitly bar the President from
exercising a power does not mean that he or she does not
have that power.
4. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance
implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-
relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of
establishing and executing strategy for managing the
governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of
the Department of Finance. If the President were to personally
exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, this
would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the
respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded,
and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running
the government.
- Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political
agency. Though the President is the Executive of the
Government and no other, the heads of the executive
department occupy political positions and hold office in an
advisory capacity and should be of the Presidents bosom
confidence and alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise authority
subject to the direction of the President. And it is upon the
Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal
with matters regarding the sound and efficient management of
the financial resources of Government.
- And although there are powers vested in the President that
may not be delegated are only those that call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised
by co-equal branches of government, e.g. power to suspend
the write of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (Par. 3 Sec
11, Art VII) and the benign prerogative of mercy (Par. 6 Sec 11,
Art VII), the power to contract or guarantee foreign debts does
not fall within the same exceptional class.
- Another important qualification is that the Secretary of
Finance or any designated alter ego of the President is bound
to secure the latters prior consent to or subsequent ratification
of his acts. A lack of showing that President Aquino
countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude
that the said acts carried presidential approval.
5. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra that under the
Program a best case scenario would give a yield significantly
lower than estimated by the Program and a worst case
scenario where what can be gained in the best case is lesser
than what can be lost in this worst case. In addition, petitioners
postulate a more simple rescheduling agreement in place of
the debt-relief package. Petitioners allege therefore that the
Program violates constitutional state policies to promote a
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence
of the nation and free the people from poverty, foster social
justice in all phases of national development, and develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos.
- The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution as
litanized are not a panacea that can annul every governmental
act sought to be struck down. Insofar as the case at bar, the
court can make no conclusion other than that respondents
efforts were geared towards debt-relief with marked positive
results and towards achieving the aforementioned
constitutional policies.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
- Indubitably, former President Aquinos decision to honor
outstanding debts of the Republic was purely an executive call;
hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. For this reason, neither can
respondents be faulted for implementing the Program executed
pursuant to that constitutional executive policy.
- Also, that petitioners question the legality of several foreign
loans necessitates a review of the assailed contracts. Because
the petitioners failed to substantiate the charges, the argument
cannot be addressed. A determination of the validity of such
allegations requires a review of factual matters. The Supreme
Court is not a trier or facts. The proper action for petitioners is
to file their petition in the lower courts, which had concurrent
jurisdiction over the subject matter and which are better
equipped to conduct a firsthand examination of factual
evidence in support of their allegations. This notwithstanding,
there is nothing in this decision to preclude the Department of
Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman from initiating an
investigation of the alleged fraudulent loans. Suppletorily,
probable cause must be shown in order that prosecution may
be brought to bear.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS V MINISTER
FERNANDO; October 30, 1981
- Free Telephone Workers Union, herein petitioner, attacks the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 36 (BP 130) in so
far as it amends Art. 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the
Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory
arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in
effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.
36
"In labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest,
such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution
of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work
and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issue to enforce the same."
Petitioner contends that [a] BP 30 is an undue delegation of
legislative powers [b] such conferment of authority may also
run contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers' right
to self-organization and collective bargaining.
- Procedure
+ Sept. 14, 1981 notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for
unfair labor practices stating the following grounds: 1)
Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct;
2) Illegal terminations and suspensions of officers and
members as a result of the implementation of said Code of
Conduct; and 3) Automatic treatment as of sick leaves as
AWOL with suspensions, in violation of Collective Bargaining
Agreement
+ Sept. 15, 1981, notification to the Ministry of compliance with
the 2/3 strike vote and other formal requirements of the law and
Implementing Rules. Conciliation meetings called by the
Minister followed.
+ Sept. 25, 1981, respondent certified the labor dispute to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondent's
establishment.
+ Hearing at NLRC was set on Sept. 28. Petitioner filed petition
to SC the next day. Court issued resolution for respondents to
file answer. After parties were duly heard y SC on Oct. 8, case
was ripe for decision.
ISSUES
1. WON BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC
is unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative power
2. WON there is unconstitutional application of BP 130
HELD
1. The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power to
assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute likely to affect the
national interest or to certify the same to the NLRC for
arbitration does not constitute undue delegation of legislative
powers.
Reasoning:
First. It lays down the premise. The power which would be
denied the Minister of Labor by virtue of such principle is within
the competence of the President, who in its opinion can best
determine national interests, but only when a strike is in
progress. Such admission is qualified by the assumption that
the President "can make law." But what possesses significance
for the purpose of this litigation is that it is the President who
"shall have control of the ministries." It points that the adoption
of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended
Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential
character.37 Then it cites the expanse of the powers of the
President by the provisions in the Constitutions both of 1935
and 1973. (Note: My reading here is that the power by the
Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute is an
executive function)
Second. The ponencia cited precedence to develop its
argument. Villena v. Secretary of Interior says that "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive.
In other words, without minimizing the importance of the heads
of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. (Note: It used this doctrine in
a later case Phil. American Management Co. v. Phil. American
Management Employees Association)
Third. Even on the assumption that the authority conferred to
the Minister of Labor partakes of a legislative character, still no
case of an unlawful delegation of such power may be
discerned. It cites Edu v. Ericta: To determine whether or not
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry
must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority. [a] Distinction between delegation of
power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no
valid objection can be made; [b] To avoid unlawful delegation,
there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of' principle and lays
down fundamental policy; [c] Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. In
People v Exconde: regulation should be germane to the objects
and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
37
Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the head of state and
chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation
that it is a presidential system that obtains in our government. Thus: "All powers vested in the President of
the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or
conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang
Pambansa provides otherwise."
contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that the law
prescribes. BP 130 did not violate these guidelines.
Fourth. The ponencia stressed the ruling in People v. Vera,
saying that though scholarly and erudite, it aroused
apprehension for being to rigid. The liberal approach in the
ruling in Edu v. Ericta as reinforced in Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of
Unions in Government Corporations and Offices recognized
that: It would be self-defeating in the extreme if the legislation
intended to cope with the grave social and economic problems
of the present and foreseeable future would founder on the
rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic meaning
to be affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation.
- Also quoting Professor Jaffe: The occasions for delegating
power to administrative offices [could be] compassed by a
single generalization. Thus: Power should be delegated where
there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot
be effectively performed by the legislature without the
assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so
great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business.
Delegation is most commonly indicated where the relations to
be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation
requires a course of continuous decision.
2. In the absence of factual determinations (by the Ministry of
Labor and the NLRC), this Court is not in a position to rule on
whether or not there is unconstitutional application.
Decision
[1] No. BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same to the NLRC
is NOT on its face unconstitutional since there was no undue
delegation of legislative power.
[2] There is no ruling on the question of whether or not BP 130
has been unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being
repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective
bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private
respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination
Dispositive Petition Dismissed.
Voting 11 concur, no dissent.
AYTONA V CASTILLO
BENGZON; January 19, 1962
FACTS
- December 29, 1961 Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona
took his oath of office on that day.
- December 30, 1961 President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
took his oath of office
- December 31, 1961 Macapagal issued Administrative Order
# 2 recalling, withdrawing and cancelling all ad interim
appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the
date Macapagal was proclaimed as the elected president by
Congress)
- January 1, 1962 Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as
ad interim governor of the Central Bank
- January 2, 1962 Both Aytona and Castillo exercised the
powers of their office but Castillo informed Aytona of his
appointment. The next day, Aytona was prevented from
holding office
- Aytona instituted a quo warranto which challenged Castillo's
right to exercise the powers of Governor of Central bank.
Aytona claims he was:
1. validly appointed
2. qualified for the post
3. and that the subsequent appointment and qualification
of Castillo was void because the occupation was
occupied by him
- Castillo argued that the appointment of Aytona had been
revoked by AO 2.
ISSUE
WON the new President (Macapagal) had the power to issue
the order of the cancellation of the ad interim appointments
made by the past President (Garcia) even after the appointees
had already qualified.
HELD
Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank.
- December 29, 1961 Garcia sent to the Commission on
Appointments (not yet in session) a communication submitting
for confirmation ad interim appointments of several officials
including the Central Bank Governor in the person of Aytona.
There were three other communications regarding the same
matter submitted on the same day.
- All in all there were 350 midnight appointments by Garcia.
- In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based on the
following reasons:
1) outgoing President should have refrained from filling
 vacancies to give the new President the opportunity to
consider names in the light of new plicies
2) Scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall
within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision
authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments
3) Appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust
because they were issued only upon the condition that
the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to
prevent a recall by the incoming President which would
result to those deserving the appointment of the new
President to be declined and by-passed
4) Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and
qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the
outgoing President to merely subvert the policies of the
incoming administration
- Many of the persons mentioned in the December 29
communication did not qualify.
- It is Malacanang's practice to submit ad interim appointments
only when the Committee on Appointments is in session so that
only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified
are submitted for confirmation.
- It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of
the election of Macapagal, Garcia's administration was no
more than a caretaker administration. He was supposed to
prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming
President and he should not do acts which he ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor.
- The appointment of 350 people in one night could be
regarded as abuse of Presidential prerogatives.
- When the President makes appointments with the consent of
the Commission of Appointments, he has the benefit of their
advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises
a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure
approval of his selection either by previous consultation with
the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to
them the reason for such selection.
- But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful
because:
the Commission that would consider the appointments
is different from the one existing during the time the
appointments were made
the names are to be submitted by his successor who
may not fully approve of the appointments
- The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order 2 and
cancelled the midnight appointments. There are precedents
that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be
reconsidered. But none of the precedents have involved mass
ad interim appointments.
QUIMSING V TAJANGLANGIT
BARRERA; February 29, 1964
FACTS
- May 20, 1960- Quimsing designated Acting Chief of Police of
Iloilo City
- Dec. 20, 1961- Pres. Garcia extended an ad-interim
appointment to Quimsing to the same position
- Dec. 28, 1961- Quimsing took his oath of office, continued
discharging functions of Chief of Police
- May 16, 1962- Quimsings, as well as other peoples
appointments were confirmed
- May 17, 1962- at the session of the Commission on
Appointments, a motion for reconsideration of all the confirmed
appointments was approved, and the Commission was
adjourned with no future date fixed for its next meeting
- June 11, 1962- President Macapagal designated Eduardo
Tajanglangit as Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo.
- Hence this -Petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo
Tajanglangit from occupying the position of Chief of Police to
which petitioner Quimsing had previously been appointed and
duly qualified and the functions of which he was actually
discharging.
ISSUE
WON Quimsings appointment was not lawfully confirmed,
because of the motion for reconsideration of his confirmation,
which has, to the present, remained unacted upon
HELD
The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of
Police of Iloilo City was null and void, because said position
was not vacant.
- The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments
provide:
SEC. 21: Any motion to reconsider the vote on any of the City of Manila file separate oppositions to the granting of
appointment may be laid on the table, and this shall be a final
disposit on such a motion
SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an
appointment shall not be sent to the President of the
Philippines before the expiration of the period for its
reconsideration, or while a motion for reconsideration is
pending.
- The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsings
appointment, it was merely under reconsideration. It has been
established that on July 19, 1962, Quimsings appointment was
delivered to Malacanang. This, as well as the provisions above,
supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for
reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of
withholding the effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it
synonymous with disapproval of the appointment. In fact, it is
recognition that the appointment was confirmed.
PEOPLE V VERA
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
FACTS
- 15 October 1931: information for criminal case People v.
Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al. filed in CFI Manila. In the said case,
HSBC, being the offended party, intervened as private
prosecutor.
- 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, CFI rendered a
judgment of conviction sentencing MCU to imprisonment.
- 26 March 1935: SC upholds sentence of conviction w/ a slight
modification of the duration of imprisonment.
- 17 December 1935: MFR and 4 motions for new trial by MCU
denied by Phil SC.
- 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phil SC.
MCU seeks to elevate the case to US SC.
- November 1936: US SC denies petition for certiorari.
- 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCUs petition for leave to
file a 2nd alternative MFR or new trial; & remands the case to
CFI Manila for execution of the judgment.
- 27 November 1936: MCU files application for probation under
the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the Phil Legislature. CFI
Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, refers the application to
the Insular Probation Office (IPO)
- 18 June 1937: IPO recommends denial of MCUs application
for probation
- 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila, 7th
branch with Judge Jose O. Vera presiding. HSBC & the Fiscal
probation. HSBC attacks constitutionality of Act No. 4221 on
the following grounds: equal protection of the laws (its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue
delegation of legislative power (section 11 of the said Act
endows provl boards w/ power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective provinces).
- 28 June 1937: Judge Jose O. Vera of CFI Mnla promulgates
resolution with a finding that MCU is innocent of the crime of
which he stands convicted but denying the latter's petition for
probation.
- 3 July 1937: counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution
denying probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was
followed by a series of alternative motions for new
reconsideration or new trial. A motion for leave to intervene in
the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys was also
filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a
petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae
on the ground that the motion was circulated at a banquet
given by counsel for MCU & that he signed the same "without
mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.) HSBC
files opposition to motion for intervention.
- 6 August 1937: the Fiscal of the City of Mnla files motion w/
TC for issuance of an order to execute judgment of Phil SC in
said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said
judgment.
- 19 August 1937 is the date set for hearing on the various
motions for CFIs consideration. On this same date, this instant
case was field before Phil SC to put an end to what they
alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla.
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a
probation case may look into the circumstances attending the
commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse
the findings and conclusive of this court, either directly or
indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was
merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of
the parties. If each and every Court of First Instance could
enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme
Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos
would result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in the Philippine
judicial system>
ISSUES
1. WON the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly
raised in these proceedings
2. if YES, WON said Act is constitutional
a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning power
of the Executive
b. WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power
c. WON the Probation Act violates Bill of Rights provisions
on equal protection of the laws
3. WON the entire Act should be avoided
HELD
1. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised
and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case. <lis mota> The question of the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised
in ordinary actions BUT resort may be made to extraordinary
legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary
course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and
adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an action of quo
warranto, in habeas corpus proceedings, on an application for
injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute, &
even on an application for preliminary injunction where the
determination of the constitutional question is necessary to a
decision of the case, or through petitions for prohibition and
certiorari.
- Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516:
Philippine SC is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition
with courts of first instance over inferior tribunals or persons,
and original jurisdiction over courts of first instance, when such
courts are exercising functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction.
- General rule: the question of the validity of the criminal
statute must be raised by a defendant in the trial court and be
carried regularly in review to the Supreme Court. BUT in cases
where a new act seriously affected numerous persons and
extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity
of actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring
the issue of the act's validity promptly before it and decide in
the interest of the orderly administration of justice.
- The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing
out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior
court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from
usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
General rule: the merit of prohibition will not lie where the
inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the
constitutionality of which is questioned. BUT where the inferior
court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an
unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by the writ of
prohibition from enforcing that statute. A CFI sitting in probation
proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in
such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of
the Philippine Legislature. It is unquestionable that the
constitutional issue has been squarely presented not only
before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court
by the private prosecution.
- The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to
permanently refuse to do so. The authority to define and fix the
punishment for crime is legislative and includes the right in
advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose of
executing the statute, elements of consideration which would
be otherwise beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that
the right to relieve from the punishment, fixed by law and
ascertained according to the methods by it provided belongs to
the executive department.
- Cooley on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not consider
any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one
who has no interest in defeating it because his rights are not
affected by its operation. The power to declare a legislative
enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the
fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in
any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to
duty and official oath decline the responsibility.
- General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may
question the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial
decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by
a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the
court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the
issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in
the effect to be given the statute.
- General rule: the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings,
ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in
the trial court, it will not considered on appeal. BUT courts, in
the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time
when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. In criminal cases, the question may be
raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either
in the trial court or on appeal. Same is true in civil cases if it
appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a
decision of the case. Also, a constitutional question will be
considered by an appellate court at any time, where it involves
the jurisdiction of the court below
- General rule: the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The People of the Philippines, in
whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having Act No. 4221 set aside. Of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-
settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own
laws. The constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests
the courts, the legislature, and the people must bow. The state
is always interested where the integrity of its Constitution or
statutes is involved.
- A judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional
until the question of constitutionality is tendered for decision,
and unless it must be decided in order to determine the right of
a party litigant. An officer on whom a statute imposes the duty
of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon the
ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and
hence in enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility
if the statute be unconstitutional. Executive officers (e.g., the
state auditor and state treasurer) should not decline to perform
ministerial duties imposed upon them by a statute, on the
ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
- The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly
relied upon the past and all that time has not been attacked as
unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary,
has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no
reason for considering the People of the Philippines estopped
from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona
fide cases for determination, and the fact that the question has
not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to
allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified
in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held
void by the courts in proper cases.
- Is the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
necessary to resolve the instant case? While the court will
meet the question with firmness, where its decision is
indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for the
legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it
arises, can be decided on other points.
- General rule: the determination of a constitutional question
is necessary whenever it is essential to the decision of the
case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a
statute the validity of which is attacked. There is no doubt that
Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No.
4221 now being assailed.
- Moreover, the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute
books and its validity has never before been passed upon by
the courts; many persons accused and convicted of crime in
the City of Manila have applied for probation; some of them are
already on probation; more people will likely take advantage of
the Probation Act in the future; and the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since
his first conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance
which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity
of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.
- Also, in Phil SCs ruling in an analogous situation in Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad, the Court said: "Inasmuch as the property
and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are
affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act No. 2972
is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of
the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we
have determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction
in order that we may decide the main issue. We have here an
extraordinary situation which calls for a relaxation of the
general rule." Phil SCs ruling on this point was sustained by
the US SC. A more binding authority in support of the view we
have taken can not be found.
2. <the essence of judicial duty> It is the office and duty of the
judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear
implication from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and
section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may declare an act
of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the
fundamental lay. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to enforce
the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give
effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict
therewith.
- Fundamental criteria: all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of
the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be
within constitutional limitations. The members of the Legislature
and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true
to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular
law they did not intend to violate the Constitution. The courts
cannot but cautiously exercise its power to overturn the solemn
declarations of two of the three grand departments of the
governments. The judiciary ought to reflect the wisdom of the
people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an
elective Chief Executive.
- The President of the Philippines had already expressed his
opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation Act. In a
message dated September 1, 1937, he recommended to the
NA its immediate repeal, resulting in the approval of Bill No.
2417 of the NA repealing the probation Act, subject to certain
conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by
the President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish.
In vetoing the bill referred to, the President exercised his
constitutional prerogative. He may express the reasons which
he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons are
not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies
submitted for our determination. Whatever opinion is expressed
by him under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our
judgment on way or another and prevent us from taking what in
our opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case. We are independent of the Executive no less than of the
Legislative department of our government independent in
the performance of our functions, undeterred by any
consideration, free from politics, indifferent to popularity, and
unafraid of criticism in the accomplishment of our sworn duty
as we see it and as we understand it.
- The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three
principal grounds: (1) That said Act encroaches upon the
pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that its constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the
equal protection of the laws.
a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No.
4221 vests in the Governor-General of the Philippines "the
exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines
and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the President of
the Philippines (A7, s11(6)). Our Constitution also makes
specific mention of "commutation" and of the power of the
executive to impose, in the pardons he may grant, such
conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper;
and to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the NA. But the
pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
- Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief
Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be
vested in anyone else. Where the pardoning power is conferred
on the executive without express or implied limitations, the
grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such
power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or
control the proper exercise thereof.
- Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case: US SC ruled
in 1916 that an order indefinitely suspending sentenced was
void. Under the common law the power of the court was limited
to temporary suspension and the right to suspend sentence
absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive branch
of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of
Congress to establish probation by statute was conceded.
- US v Murray: when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a
district court has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no
power under the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 to grant him
probation even though the term at which sentence was
imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the
constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but
was assumed. US SC denied the right of the district courts to
suspend sentence. The court pointed out the necessity for
action by Congress if the courts were to exercise probation
powers in the future.
- Riggs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit
held that the constitutionality of Probation Act of March 4, 1925
have been sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the same was held in no
manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the
President.
- 1916: US SC, in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to
Congress as possessing the requisite power to enact probation
laws. A federal probation law was actually enacted in 1925. The
constitutionality of the Act has been assumed by the US SC in
1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior federal courts in
a number of earlier cases. The Philippine Legislature, like the
US Congress, may legally enact a probation law under its
broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal
offenses. Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all
crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably, the
legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts --
particularly the trial courts -- large discretion in imposing the
penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is
believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power
in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the
penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced,
should suffer. <Revised Penal Code, Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Parole Act, Juvenile Delinquency Law, (Adult) Probation
Law, etc show the intention of the legislature to humanize the
penal laws.>
- Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in
the courts the power to suspend the operation of a sentenced,
by probation or otherwise, as to do so would encroach upon
the pardoning power of the executive. Other cases, however,
hold contra. Phil SC elects to follow the long catena of
authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by
the legislature to suspend sentence by the establishment of a
system of probation however characterized.
- Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the
same. They are actually district and different from each other,
both in origin and in nature. Probation, the power to suspend
sentence, was always a part of the judicial power. It simply
postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely,
but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil
disabilities, remain and become operative when judgment is
rendered. The power to grant reprieves and pardons, on
the other hand, was always a part of the executive power. A
pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense
and the guilt of the offender. It releases the punishment, and
blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law, the
offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores
him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man,
and gives him a new credit and capacity.
- Probation should also be distinguished from reprieve and
from commutation of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State: the
power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with the
power of the Governor to grant reprieves. A reprieve postpones
the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a
suspension is for an indefinite time. A commutation is but to
change the punishment assessed to a less punishment.
- State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is an act
of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted with the
execution of the laws which exempts the individual on whom it
is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of the
offense. "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the
punishment; a substitution of a less penalty for the one
originally imposed. "Reprieve" or "respite" is the withholding of
the sentence for an interval of time, a postponement of
execution, a temporary suspension of execution.
- The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power
of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those
serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and
complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted. The
President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it
beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and
imprisonment.
b. Under the Consti, govt powers are distributed among 3
coordinate and substantially independent organs: legislative,
executive and judicial. Each department derives its authority
from the Constitution, the highest expression of popular will.
Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a
unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution (A6,s1). The
Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not
escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power
to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the
power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that
potestas delegata non delegare potest, an accepted corollary
of the principle of separation of powers.
- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative
power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions
like: (1) delegation of legislative powers to local authorities; (2)
to such agencies in US territories as Congress may select; (3)
to the people at large; and (4) to those whom the Constitution
itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the President).
The case before us does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
- Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the statute
was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment
of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. BUT to a
certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by
rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act
of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not
lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of
the discretionary powers delegated to it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various
provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The
applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely
placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all
that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the
Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.
- It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the
adoption by the people of a particular community. The
legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may
itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a
power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially
legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as
the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental
process common to all branches of the government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will
must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of
the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left
to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then
may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other person
or body the power to determine when the specified
contingencies has arisen. In the case at bar, the various
provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the
power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law in their
respective provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or
operation of a law, a law may not be suspended as to certain
individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others. The
suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual
cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can
only exercise what is delegated to them according to the
constitution. It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil
liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our constitution
and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and
advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses,
damages, suits, or actions from which all others under like
circumstances are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality
different from those applicable to other localities. But option
laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character
which should receive different treatment in different localities
placed under different circumstances. While we do not deny
the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving
matters of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities
or for the people of small communities to pass upon, we
believe that in matters of general of general legislation like that
which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general
subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner
so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The
validity of a law is not tested by what has been done but by
what may be done under its provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not
only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy
but in the elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this
power, legislation would become oppressive and yet imbecile."
The mass of powers of government is vested in the
representatives of the people and that these representatives
are no further restrained under our system than by the express
language of the instrument imposing the restraint, or by
particular provisions which by clear intendment, have that
effect. (Angara case)
- We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void.
c. This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a
restraint on all the tree grand departments of our government
and on the subordinate instrumentalities and subdivision
thereof, and on many constitutional power, like the police
power, taxation and eminent domain. BUT what may be
regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a
question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover
every case can be formulated.
- Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring
others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis,
and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The
classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.
- In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be
said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in
every case. While inequality may result in the application of the
law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided,
inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever
may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation
Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality
are permitted or allowed.
- There is no difference between a law which denies equal
protection and a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if
it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibitions. Statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If the law
has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional.
3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against
any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to
elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is
interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent
and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional
features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the
process.
- Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the
Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if
separable from the valid, may stand and be enforced. The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting
the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the
intention of the Legislature. What remains must express the
legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court
has no power to legislate.
- In the case at bar, section 11 (which makes the Probation Act
applicable only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards provided for the salaries of probation officers)
is so inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that
with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare
idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a
large number of people who may be deserving of the intended
beneficial result of that system.
- Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and
propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think
a law better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said
regarding progressive interpretation and judicial legislation we
decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read into the
law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any
purpose not even to save a statute from the doom of
invalidity. The clear intention and policy of the law is not to
make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation
officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them
should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto.
- Probation as a development of a modern penology is a
commendable system. Probation laws have been enacted,
here and in other countries, to permit what modern
criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment", the
adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and
the circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of
grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender.
It takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convicts gives promise of reform.
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is,
accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding
costs. So ordered.
TORRES V GONZALES
FELICIANO; July 23, 1987
FACTS
- an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of
petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
- Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of
Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was sentenced
to an aggregate prison term of from (11) yrs, (10) mos and (22)
days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day, and to pay an indemnity
of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the CA.
The maximum sentence would expire on 2 Nov 2000.
- On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the
President on condition that petitioner would "not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition
be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon
and was consequently released from confinement.
- On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved
to recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
recommendation, the Board relied upon the decisions of this
Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons and Espuelas us.
Provincial Warden of Bohol. The petitioner had been charged
with 20 counts of estafa, which were then pending trial before
the RTC, and convicted by the RTC of the crime of sedition,
which was then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other
charges have been brought against the petitioner, although
some have been identified as dismissed.
- On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to
the President informing her of the Resolution of the Board
recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon
previously granted to petitioner.
- On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the
conditional pardon of the petitioner.
- On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence.
- Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment.
Petitioner also contends that he was not given an opportunity
to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison,
and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights
under the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WON conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD
- Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons . - It was held that the
determination if the parole had been breached rested
exclusively in the sound judgment of the GovGen and that such
determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro
had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment
of the power that had granted it, the Court held that "he [could
not] invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered."
Tesoro had in effect agreed that the GovGen's determination
(rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had
breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing
adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and
conclusive upon him.
- Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency is
extended upon the conditions named in it, and it is accepted
upon those conditions. The governor may withdraw his grace in
a certain contingency, and the governor shall himself determine
when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full
competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly
contracted and agreed that, whenever the governor should
conclude that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an
executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison should
at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court
reaffirmed the Tesoro and Sales rulings. "Due process is not
necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and
been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial
for the crime of inciting to sedition with which he was charged,
that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and
confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of
his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the
convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the
Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the
pardon has or have been violated To no other department of
the Government [has] such power been entrusted."
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration
may be summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms
and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive
acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and
conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art 159
RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64
(i) RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefore by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial
process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial
and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally
pardoned, Sec 64 (i) RAC is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice.
- A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner
herein, who is recommitted must of course be convicted by
final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with
which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such
subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed upon him. Since Art 159
RPC defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or
convict who is regarded as having violated the provisions
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty
prescribed in Art 159.
- In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions
of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Sec 64 (i) RAC; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Art 159 RPC, upon a convict who "having
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the WON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled to the
petitioner under Sec 64 (i) RAC. benefits of Proclamation No. 8 (grant of amnesty)
Decision Petition dismissed
HELD
SEPARATE OPINION - In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty
Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he
CRUZ [dissent] should admit having committed the criminal act or offense with
which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense. For
- As many as such charges may be, none of them so far has whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the
resulted in a final conviction, without which he cannot be offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should
recommitted under the condition of his pardon. conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
- Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed
Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A prima facie case only justifies the the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or
filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and
reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to
- The executive can only allege the commission of crime and be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable
thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence. If the services to the nation.
prosecution succeeds, the court will then affirm the allegation - Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts
of commission in a judgment of conviction. and Amnesty Commissions should apply the benefits granted
The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Sec 64(i) RAC, the to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether
President may in his judgment determine whether the condition pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses
of the pardon has been violated. or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is
- I agree that the authority is validly conferred as long as the entitled to said benefits.
condition does not involve the commission of a crime but, say, - If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case
merely requires good behavior from the pardonee. and decide whether the offense committed by the defendant
comes within the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation although
BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZ the defendant has pleaded not guilty, there is no reason why
FERIA; January 21, 1949 the Amnesty Commissions can not do so.
- (This case is under Executive of our outline, and the
FACTS following, although really obiter, is most relevant to this section)
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez
was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Barrioquintos trial Difference of Amnesty from Pardon
was delayed because he was arrested later than Jimenez. Both Pardon Amnesty
submitted their cases to the Guerilla Amnesty Commission -granted by the Chief -by proclamation of the
pursuant to Proclamation No. 8 38 which the said commission Executive, thus a private act president with the
remanded to the CFI of Zamboanga without deciding if they which must be pleaded and concurrence of the Congress,
were entitled to amnesty or not on the ground that neither of proved by the person and is a public act of which
them has admitted to the commission of the offense. pardoned and which the the courts may take judicial
courts may not take notice of. notice.
ISSUE Granted to one after Granted to classes of
conviction persons or communities who
may be guilty, generally
38
Proclamation No. 8 (dispositive): I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, in accordance with the before or after institution of
provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaim an
prosecution and sometimes
amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war effort of the enemy, and after conviction
committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines was actually liberated from the enemy control and occupation. This amnesty shall not apply to -looks forward and relieves -looks backward and
crimes against chastity or to acts committed from purely personal motives.
offender of consequences of abolishes and puts into
crime; abolishes and forgives oblivion the offense itself, as
punishment, but doesnt though he had committed no
abolish civil liability offense
Doesnt restore rights to hold Rights not affected as the
public office, suffrage, unless offender is treated as if he
expressly restored by pardon committed no crime at all
Decision respondents ordered to hear and decide the
applications for amnesty of petitioners unless courts have
already decided WoN they are entitled to benefits of amnesty.
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [concur]
To entitle a person to have his case heard and decided by a
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission only the following elements are
essential:
1. that he is charged or may be charged with an offense
penalized under the RPC, except those against chastity or
for purely personal motives;
2. that he committed the offense in furtherance of the
resistance to the enemy;
3. that it was committed during the period from December 8,
1941, to the date when the area where the offense was
committed was actually liberated from enemy control and
occupation.
If these three elements are present in a case brought before a
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, the latter cannot refuse to hear
and decide it under the proclamation. There is nothing in the
proclamation to even hint that the applicant for amnesty must
first admit having executed the acts constituting the offense
with which he is charged or may be charged.
TUASON [dissent]
- As to the determination of the pretended right of the
defendants, to the benefits of amnesty, the two orders of the
Commission are decisions on the merits, definite and final as
far as the Commission is concerned. The fact that the
defendants denied having committed the crime imputed to
them was cited by the Commission as ground for its decision to
turn down their application. That circumstance was not given
as ground for refusal to act. The Commission has thus amply
performed the duties required of it by the Amnesty
Proclamation in both the matters of investigating and deciding.
- The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities
acting for and in behalf of the President. They are not courts;
they are not performing judicial functions, and this Court has no
appellate jurisdiction over their actuations, orders or decisions.
- Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio
vs. Fernandez) - The Court can order the Commission to act
but it can not tell the Commission how to act. How or for whom
a case should be decided is a matter of judgment which courts
have no jurisdiction to control or review. The writ of mandamus
will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a
public officer where the law imposes upon a public officer the
right and the duty to exercise judgment. In reference to any
matter in which he is required to act, it is his judgment that is to
be exercised and not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of
Medical Examiners)
- Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an
accused says that he has not committed a crime he cannot
have any use for amnesty. It is also self-evident that where the
Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain conditions, it is
incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those
conditions. A petition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance. The pleader has to confess the
allegations against him before he is allowed to set out such
facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank
inconsistency for one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for
an act of which, according to him, he is not responsible.
MONSANTO V FACTORAN
FERNAN; February 9, 1989
FACTS
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan
convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment and payment of fine.
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the SC which affirmed the
same. She filed a motion for reconsideration, but while the
motion was pending, she was extended absolute pardon on
December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos, which she
accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be
reinstated to her former post. The Finance Ministry ruled that
petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she
was extended the absolute pardon, but she still has to pay.
Seeking reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing
that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime
which implies that her service in the government has never
been interrupted, and therefore the date of her reinstatement
should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982. Petitioner contended that:
she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension.
she should not be required to pay the proportionate
share of the amount of P4,892.50.
ISSUES
1. WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to
her former position without need of a new appointment.
2. WON petitioner is still liable to pay civil indemnities
notwithstanding pardon.
HELD
1. Ratio Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding
from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is
the private, though official act of the executive magistrate xxx
and not communicated officially to the Court. This was
governed by the 1973 Constitution.
Reasoning
- People v. Lising
xxx acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public
officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former
position and entitlement to payment of his salaries,
benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of
his suspension pendent elite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official
must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his
former position. xxx
- The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties
of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during
the term of the principal penalty. Temporary absolute
disqualification bars the convict from public office or
employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the
sentence.
- In the present case, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after the conviction, for the result
would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon,
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and
her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality. Pardon implies guilt. It
does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the
conviction thereof, as opposed to the Ex Parte Garland,
Pelobello, and Cristobal cases. It involves forgiveness, and not
forgetfulness.
- While the Court is prepared to concede that pardon may remit
all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to
give a meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action,
we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out
the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he
should be treated as if he were innocent. Pardon cannot
mask the acts constituting the crime.
- Public offices are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They
cannot be compromised to favor private interests. A
pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the
appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character.
2. As for the exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity,
the Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability is governed by RPC,
and subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence.
Decision The assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. is affirmed.
1. Petitioner is not automatically reinstated, and must apply for
appointment to her former position.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to any backpay, and must pay the
proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
MACAGA-AN V PEOPLE
FELICIANO; July 39, 1987
FACTS
- The 22 petitioners include municipal treasurers of various
municipalities of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the
Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Treasurer's Office of Lanao
del Sur, as well as the Provincial Auditor and the Assistant
Provincial Auditor of Lanao del Sur. Petitioners were charged
and convicted in 33 cases for estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents (Article 315, in relation to
Article 17 1, Revised Penal Code) in a decision of the
Sandiganbayan promulgated on 15 July 1981. The total
amount of Government funds (treasury warrants) involved was
somewhat over P2.7 million.
- The petitioners state that they applied for amnesty through
the 3rd and 11th Amnesty Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur
and Marawi City and that on 2 February 1985, they were
granted conditional amnesty by the said Commission, subject
to the approval or final action of the President of the Philippines
pursuant to P.D. No. 1082, dated 2 February 1977. The
Amnesty Commission, the petitioners continue, endorsed the
amnesty applications of the petitioners to the President,
recommending approval thereof or grant of executive clemency
to the petitioners. The petitioners' amnesty applications are
said to have been submitted to the Office of the President by
the then Presidential Assistant Victor Nituda. Former Governor
Mohammed Ali Dimaporo, the petitioners further state, made
written representations dated 27 January 1986 with former
President Marcos concerning the petitioners' applications
during a political rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22
January 1986. Mr. Marcos apparently wrote on the upper
righthand corner of former Governor Dimaporo's letter the
following: "Approved" and signed the same with a partly
illegible date. The petitioners state, finally, that the original
copies of the amnesty papers were in the possession of then
Presidential Adviser Joaquin Venus and were lost or destroyed
at Malacaang "during the February 1986 bloodless military
revolution" and could not now be located.
- The respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty were
never available to the petitioners under P.D. No. 1182 as
amended by PD 1429. They further contend that the applicable
law to them is PD 1082, which granted amnesty to those
resisting the duly constituted authorities in several parts of
Mindanao.
ISSUE
WON President Marcos grant of amnesty to the petitioners is
in accordance with law.
HELD
NO. Acts of the President in contravention with the laws, which
he himself promulgated in the exercise of his concurrent
legislative powers, are void and of no effect.
Reasoning
The benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioners
under PD 1182.
- Under said law, the crimes to be amnestied must have
been for violations of subversion laws or for crimes against
public order under the RPC. Among those disqualified from
amnesty under PD 1182 are those who, while holding
public office or employment diverted public funds from the
lawful purpose for which they had been appropriated . In the
instant case, petitioners were charged with and convicted of
Art. 315 viz Art 171, RPC. Art. 315 is under Crimes Against
Property, while Art. 171 is under Crimes Against Public
Interest. Clearly, petitioners are among those expressly
disqualified under PD 1182.
Neither were petitioners able to avail of amnesty under PD
1082.
- The offenses for which amnesty may be granted under PD
1082 are acts penalized by existing laws in the furtherance
of resistance to the duly constituted authorities of the
Republic by members and supporters of MNLF, Bangsa
Moro Army and other anti-government groups with similar
motivations and aims. The resistance referred to is typified
by the offenses of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or
conspiracy to commit rebellion or sedition, all offenses with a
political character and all of which are embraced in the RPC
under Crimes Against Public Order. On the other hand, the
acts of which petitioners were convicted were ordinary
crimes without any political complexion and consisting
simply of diversion of public funds to private profit.
- We do not discount the possibility that the former President
did in fact act in contravention of PDs 1082 and 1182 by
granting the amnesty claimed by petitioners, and that by
such act, he may indeed have aroused expectations
(however unjustified under the terms of existing law) in the
minds of the petitioners. If such be the case, then the
appropriate recourse of petitioners is not to this Court, nor to
any other court, but rather to the Executive Department.
Decision Petition denied.
ARANETA V DINGLASAN
TUASON; August 26, 1949
FACTS
- The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the
President avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No.
671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive
Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is
under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
violation of the provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for
the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city
fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192,
which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case,
Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the
Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner
of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner.
Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the
ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is
forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to
Executive Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the
operation of the Government of the Republic uf the Philippines
during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for
other purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a
tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party,
applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing money under this Executive Order.
Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection
with, and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to
be held in November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as
a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent the
respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing
of that amount or any part of it.
- Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the
C.A. No. 671 ( An Act Declaring a State of Total Emergency as
a Result of War involving the Philippines and Authorizing the
President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such
Emergency) has ceased to have any force and effect, thereby
rendering the assailed Executive Orders null and void.
ISSUE
WON the emergency powers delegated to the President had
ceased when Congress held its regular session
HELD
YES. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law.
- Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration
of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought
for in its nature, the object to be published, the purpose to be
subserved, and its relation to the Constitution.
- Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may by law authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared
national policy."
- The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are
beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration.
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency
powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an
emergency." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No.
671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite
theory would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and
is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to
have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers.
- The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act
would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new
and different law were necessary to terminate the delegation,
the period for the delegation would be unlimited, indefinite,
negative and uncertain; that which was intended to meet a
temporary emergency may become permanent law; for
Congress might not enact the repeal, and even if it would, the
repeal might not meet with the approval of the President, and
the Congress might not be able to override the veto.
Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while
Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might
not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers
than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be, the law.
- Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and
effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise
provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the
authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the
repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a
clear manifestation of the belief held by the National Assembly
that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would
be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency
Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to
make a provision for its termination in the same way that it did
for the termination of the effects, and incidents of the
delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling
the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law
itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President
could not only make new rules and regulations but he could
restore the ones already annulled by the legislature.
- More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by
the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise
of its authority is the fact that there would be two legislative
bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently
and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions.
Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested,
be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived
after each adjournment, the anomaly would not be eliminated.
Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders
promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and
the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between
sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. In entire good
faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as
they saw them, a former President promulgated an executive
order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the
subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive
issued an executive order on export control after Congress had
refused to approve the measure.
- Quite apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the
language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National
Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the
President to the time the Legislature was prevented from
holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought
on by the war. Section 3 provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as
practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the
Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted."
- The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only
one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an
account of his trusteeship. The section did not say each
meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the
intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report
mentioned in section 3 was to be the first and last and did not
think that upon the convening of the first Congress Act No. 671
would lapse, what reason could there be for its failure to
provide in appropriate and clear terms for the filing of
subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was
expected to continue making laws in the form of rules,
regulations and executive orders, were as important, or as
unimportant, as the initial one.
- As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's
statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening
and should carry much weight, considering his part in the
passage and in the carrying out of the law. Pres. Quezon, who
called the National Assembly to a special session, who
recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if
indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President
to be entrusted with its execution, stated in his autobiography,
"The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain
period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These
phrases connote automatic extinction of the law upon the
conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new
legislation was necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law
after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same
law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should
be prolonged.
- Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography
furnished part of the answer. He said he issued the call for a
special session of the National Assembly "when it became
evident that we were completely helpless against air attack,
and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would
hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1,
1942." It can easily be discerned in this statement that the
conferring of enormous powers upon the President was
decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National
Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability
could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to
amount to an abdication by the National Assembly of its
authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so
destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could
not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a
complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of
government. The period that best comports with the
constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general
context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if
not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period
coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period
ending with the convening of that body.
- In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the
first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration
of the Act, the purpose and intention of the National Assembly
is given effect. In a special session, the Congress may
"consider general legislation or only such subjects as the
President may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the
Constitution.) In a regular session, the power of Congress to
legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed
by the organic law.
- After all the criticisms that have been made against the
efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact
remains that the Constitution has set up this form of
government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in
preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group
of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary
government have given notice that they share the faith of other
democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as
the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government,
legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting
periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of
the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution
have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of the
legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to
another department, not even when that Republic was fighting
a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle
to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of
constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than
in normal circumstances the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon
to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities
committed to them respectively.
Decision Petitions GRANTED.
QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION BOARD
BARRERA; September 30, 1963
FACTS
- Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila denying the
petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari,
and mandamus filed by the petitioner-appellants
- The petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board
(DB) with having purchased $130,000.00 US dollars without
the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines
and having remitted the same to HK; and three of the
petitioner-appellants with having attempted to bribe officers of
the Philippine and US Governments in order to evade
prosecution for said unauthorized purchase of US dollars.
- After filing of deportation charges , presiding member of the
DB issued a warrant of arrest for the said aliens but upon filing
of a surety bond and cash bond, the petitioner-appelants were
provisionally set free.
- The petitioner-appellants then filed a joint motion to dismiss
the charges on the grounds that (1) deportation charges do not
constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens and (2) the DB
has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges, but was denied
by the DB. The petitioner-appellants then filed a petition for
habeas corpus and/or prohibition which was remanded to
the CFI of Manila. The CFI issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, restraining DB from hearing the deportation
charges against the petitioners, pending final termination of the
habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. DB filed its
answer to the original petition, maintaining that the DB, as an
agent of the Prexi, has jurisdiction over the charges and the
authority to order their arrest. CFI dismissed the petition ,
hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the deportation charges constitute legal ground form
deportation of the petitioner-appellants
2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President can
personally order the arrest of the alien complained of, such
power can be delegated by him to the DB
HELD
1. Yes. The act of profiteering, hoarding, or blackmarketing of
US dollars violate Central Bank regulations and could be
treated as ECONOMIC SABOTAGE, which is a ground for
deportation under RA 503 amending Sec 37 of CA 613.
2. No. Official functions requiring the exercise of discretion
such as the power to arrest cannot be delegated to an agent of
the President.
Obiter
2 ways to deport an undesirable alien:
Section 37, CA No. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940):
Commissioner of Immigration empowered to effect the
arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of ground or grounds therefore BUT did not
concentrate exercise power to deport to the
Commissioner, as seen in Sec 52 [which is the
repealing clause of the Immigration Act, which expressly
exempted Sec 69 of Act 2711
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Act
No. 2711): only indicates that the Executive or his
authorized agent could only deport/expel/exclude from RP
aliens upon conducting a prior investigation of the ground
of such action and the rest of it indicates the procedure
concerning the protection of the said alien during the
deportation proceedings. [indication of the recognition of
the existence of power of the executive to deport aliens]
Presidents power under Sec. 69, Act 2711 may be
delegated: proofs through history
EO No. 494 (first EO of Gov-Gen Murphy, 1934):
constitute a board to take actions on complaints against
foreigners, conduct investigations and make
recommendations
EO No. 33 (Quezon, 1936): creation of DB to receive
complaints against aliens, to conduct investigations (under
Sec 69, Act 2711) and make recommendations
authorized by President
***TAKE NOTE: Power to INVESTIGATE, not POWER TO
ORDER ARREST OF THE ALIEN
EO 69 (Roxas, 1947): orders respondents in
deportation proceedings to file a bond with the
Commissioner of Immigration to ensure their appearance
and facilitate execution of deportation order whenever the
President decides the case against the respondent
***TAKE NOTE: Filing of BOND, NOT AUTHORIZE ARREST
OF THE RESPONDENT
EO 398 (Quirino, 1951): reorganized the DB and
authorized the DB, upn filing of formal charges by the
Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue warrant for the
arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under
detention during the investigation unless he files a bond
(so here, PRESIDENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED ARREST
OF RESPONDENT ALIENS)
On rights of the accused: Sec 1, ART III of 1935 CONSTI
= Sec 2, ART III, 1987 CONSTI
This provision specifies that the probable cause must be
determined by the judge after examination under oath of
the complainant and the witness produced unlike that of the
4th Amendment, Philippine Bill, or Jones Act which does not
determine who exactly would determine the probable cause
for the order of arrest. The Consti is silent on whether a
warrant of arrest may be issued upon determination of the
probable cause by other authority besides the Judge.
*DURING INVESTIGATION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT
THE ALIEN BE ARRESTED. IT IS ENOUGH THAT A BOND
BE REQUIRED TO INSURE THE APPEARANCE OF THE
ALIEN DuriNG THE INVESTIGATION.
Decision EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the
DB to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges
against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the
conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared
illegal.
Order of arrest null and void, bonds filed decreed cancelled.
Decision appealed from affirmed with modification.
ART VIII: JUDICIARY
DEMETRIA V ALBA
FERNAN; February 27, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ
of preliminary injunction assailed the constitutionality of the first
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177,
otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 on
the ff. grounds:
o it infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the
illegal transfer of public moneys
o it is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the
objectives and purposes for which the proposed
transfer of funds are to be made
o it allows the President to override the safeguards, form
and procedure prescribed by the Constitution in
approving appropriations
o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers
o the transfer of funds by the President and the
implementation thereof by the Budget Minister and the
Treasurer are without or in excess of their authority and
jurisdiction
- Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the
legal standing of petitioners. He further contended that:
o The provision under consideration was enacted
pursuant to Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973
Constitution
o Prohibition will not lie form one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latters sphere of
responsibility
- On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply
to the Comment
- Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the
administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the
present case in abeyance
- The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss
setting forth as ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5),
Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution,
rendering the petition moot and academic
ISSUES
1. WON the case is justiciable
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES
- The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELEC where it said that:
This Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on
the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become
moot and academic.
- As regards taxpayers suit, this Court enjoys that open
discretion to entertain the same or not
- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the
judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government
had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177, being repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, is null and void.
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall
have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical
- For flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway
- The purpose and condition for which funds may be
transferred were specified
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege
granted under Section 16(5), and empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included
in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard to WON the funds to be transferred
are savings, or WON the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which the transfer is to be made
- It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental
law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative power
DE AGBAYANI V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FERNANDO; April 29, 1971
FACTS
- Francisca De Agbayani obtained a P450.00loan from PNB
dated July 19, 1939 maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real
estate mortgage
- As of November 27, 1959 the loan balance was P1,294.00
- July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings in the office of Pangasinan Provincial Sherriff for
the recovery of the unpaid loan balance
- August 10, 1959 Plaintiff filed suit against PNB and Sheriff
alleging that 15 years having elapsed from the date of maturity
the mortgage have prescribed.
- PNB prayed for the dismissal since the defense of
prescription would not be available in the period of March 10,
1945 , when EO 32 providing for a moratorium on debts was
issued, to July 26, 1948 when RA 342 which extended the
period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be
deducted from the time during which PNB took no legal steps
for the recovery of the loan
- Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani
ISSUES
1. WON a statute subsequently adjudged as invalid should be
deemed to have force and effect before the declaration of its
nullity.
2. (if yes) WON prescription ran during the eight year period
that EO 32 and RA 342 was in force.
HELD
1. YES Prior to the declaration of nullity a challenged legislative
or executive act must have been in force and effect.
- The actual existence of a statute, prior to the determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a
valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who
were war sufferer the SC has made clear its view in a series of
cases that during the eight year period that EO 32 and RA 342
was in force, prescription did not run. (cases decided: Day v.
CFI, Republic vs. Hernaez.
- Orthodox view on an unconstitutional act: An unconstitutional
act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance
likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken
under it.
- SC said, in Agbayani vs. PNB that orthodox view is unrealistic
and that until after the judiciary declares its invalidity it is
entitled to obedience and respect.
DE LA LLANA V ALBA
FERNANDO; March 12, 1982
FACTS
- The National Assembly enacted the Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, entitled "An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for other Purposes". BP 129 mandates that
Justices and Judges of inferior courts from the Court of
Appeals to municipal courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless
appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would
be considered separated from the Judiciary. The intent of this
Act is to attain (1) more efficiency in the disposal of cases, (2)
improvement in the quality of justice dispensed
by the court, (3) democratization of social and economic
opportunities and the substantiation of the true meaning of
social justice.
- Procedure De La Llana,a judge, together with other
petitioners filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the
Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and
respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing BP 129.
ISSUES
1.WON the petitioners have legal standing.
2.On Constitutionality of BP 129
a. WON there was lack of good faith on the part of
Legislature in its enactment.
b. WON the abolition of an office by the Legislature is valid.
c. WON the provision of BP 129 (regarding fixing of
compensation and allowances of members of Judiciary by
the Executive) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
d. WON BP 129 is violative of the security of tenure (Art. X
Sec 7 of 1973 Constitution) enjoyed by incumbent justices
and judges and the Supreme Court's power to discipline and
remove judges.
HELD
1.YES. The petitioners, being members of the bar and officers
of the court and taxpayers, have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
2.a. NO. The Legislature, after careful study and evaluation of
the judicial system in the country, found out that institutional
reforms is both pressing and urgent.
b. YES. The abolition of an office,if within the competence of a
legitimate body and if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity.
Reasoning
0 adherence to precedent (in Bendanillo Sr. v. Provincial Gov
and in Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court also held that the
abolition of
office is valid)
- Interpretation of the Consti provision - Article VII Sec 2 of
1973 Consti "vests in the NA the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to
certain limitation in the case of SC." In short, the NA has the
power to abolish an office that it created.
c. NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the
law is complete and provides for a standard.
Reasoning
- In this case, the Act provides a clear standard. The President
may be authorized to fix the allowances and compensation but
guided by
Letter of Implementation No. 93 and pursuant to PD 985.
d. NO. Removal from office is different from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. In case of removal, there is
an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position.
In the case of abolition, there is in law no occupant. There can
be no tenure to a non-existent office.
Reasoning
- Conflicting constitutional provisions, the power of the NA to
abolish an office on one hand and the security of tenure, on the
other, must be reconciled and harmonized. Reconciliation and
balancing is well high unavoidable under the fundamental
principle of separation of powers.
- Political theory (Holmes and Tuazon): There is more truism
and actuality of interdependence among different branches of
government
than in independence and separation of powers.
Decision : Dismissed. The unconstitutionality of BP 129 has
not been shown.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [dissent]
The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of
judges must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to
abolish courts and to oust judges. Such subjection of a judge to
public "harassment and humiliation ....can diminish public
confidence in the courts." The ills the judiciary suffers from
were caused by impairing its independence: they will not be
cured by totally destroying their independence. It would be
ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process
cannot count it on themselves.
an BARREDO [concur]
Inferior courts are mere creatures of law (of the Legislature) . It
follows that it is within the legislature' s power to abolish or
reorganize them no matter what the cost is. He personally
believes that the present situation in the judiciary calls for its
reorganization. He believes that the Constitution is a living
instrument which translates and adapts itself to the demands of
obtaining circumstances (realist approach in interpreting the
Consti)
AQUINO [concur in the result]
the
For him the suit is premature, but affirming expressly that the
abolition was in good faith. CONCEPCION (concurs in the
result)
GUERRERO [concur]
Social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold
its constitutionality is the ratio decidendi of this case. For him,
inquiring into the wisdom of the law is a political question.
Public office is a privilege in the gift of the State and not a right.
Dura lex sed lex, even though it is harsh.
ABAD SANTOS [concur and dissent]

Concurs but dissented on the ground that the statute being free
from any constitutional infirmity, the "Executive is entitled to
exercise its constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial
positions without any obligation to consult with the Supreme
Court and to accord its views the fullest consideration.
DE CASTRO [concur except as qualified]
The power of the Legislature to create courts also includes the
power to abolish them. When there is a conflict between public
welfare(the duty of the legislature to provide a society with a
fair and effective judicial system) and personal benefit (security
of tenure), the latter must of necessity to yield to the former.
The abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into
which no judicial inquiry is proper. Petition is premature. No
actual controversy yet. Not until the abolition of courts is not
done, can there be possibly a violation of the security of tenure.
"Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is
the supreme law.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur]
Tenure of Judges is different from tenure of Courts. A
legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to courts. The
constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as
their Courts exist.
ERICTA [concur]
No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes
the power to abolish them. "Salus populi est suprema lex" -
The welfare of the people is the supreme law.
PLANA [concurs and dissent]
Actual and not merely presumptive good faith attended its
enactment. His qualification being that the "President is under
no obligation to consult with the SC and the SC as such is not
called upon to give legal advice to the President."
PEOPLE V CUARESMA
NARVASA; April 18, 1989
FACTS
- On the basis of affidavits of Luz Lumacao and her witness,
Soledad Tanilon, both dated August 21,1978 which were sworn
to before the First Assistant City Fiscal of Dumaguete City, said
Assistant Fiscal filed on the same day an information with the
City Court Judge of Dumaguete City charging Rosie Cuaresma
with oral defamation. The complaint was docketed as Criminal
Case Number 7238.
- Rosie Cuaresma moved to quash the case contending that
the case had been commenced by an information by the fiscal
instead of a complaint of the offended party as required by
Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The said article provides
that criminal action for defamation cannot be prosecuted de
oficio except at the instance of and upon the complaint
expressly filed by the offended party.
- The Judge, on August 4, 1980, denied the motion on the
basis of the Supreme Court ruling in Fernandez v. Lantin, 74
SCRA 338 (1976), which stated that the error can be corrected
by the filing of the sworn statement of the complainant,
assuming it contains all the information required under the
Rules, with the Court to comply with Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code. Alternatively, the fiscal can file with the court a
verified complaint of the offended party. In the order denying
the quashal, the judge, however, required the fiscal to file the
verified complaint within ten days. The fiscal complied with the
order by filing the needed document on the same day.
- Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months later
alleging that the offense had prescribed since the filing of the
original information o August 2, 1978 did not interrupt the
running of the period of prescription of the crime ( two months
from discovery) and that said prescriptive period had long
lapsed prior to the submission of the corrective complaint on
august 4, 1980. Judge granted her the motion stating that it
was the filing of the verified that conferred jurisdiction upon the
Court and this was on August 4, 1980.
- The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on Jube
26, 1981 which was denied for lack of merit and for having
been filed out of time.
- Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court as
filed by the Second Assistant City Fiscal on May 31, 1984 or
three years after the dismissal of the motion to reconsider.
ISSUE
WON the Supreme Court should give due course to the
application for certiorari
HELD
1. The order of dismissal dated April 4, 1980 is a final order
having been disposed of by the Court. The appeal, if taken in a
timely fashion, could have succeeded as the order of the Court
was tainted by an error of law. The filing of the complaint in the
form of an affidavit, the investigation by the fiscal, and the
subsequent filing of the information with the Court did indeed
toll the period of prescription.
2. The filing of the writ for certiorari was also improper in
several counts:
a. The filing should have been done by the Solicitor General
instead of the Second Assistant City Fiscal and was
dismissible on this account [Republic v Partisala , 118 SCRA
870 (1982)].
b. Remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any
agency or officer exercising judicial functions or of
any judge which are claimed to be without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. In the
case at bar, the correct procedure is the filing of an
appeal as the judgment rendered is an error in law and not
grave abuse of discretion.
c. The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to issue extraordinary
writs (e.g. certiorari, mandamus, etc.) is not exclusive and
granted to lower courts. There is also a hierarchy that should
be followed in matters of this nature. Direct action to the
Supreme Court will be allowed only when there are special
and important reasons therefore. And these reasons should
be clearly set out in the petition.
Decision Petition dismissed.
YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
CRUZ; March 20, 1987
FACTS
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A. The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ
of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court
sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they
could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of
authority and also for its presumed validity. The thrust of his
petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as
it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is
that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent
and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He
complains that the measure should not have been presumed,
and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to
the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former
President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES
1. WON the SC impliedly affirmed the constitutionality of EO
No. 626-A
2. WON lower courts have authority to rule on constitutionality
of statute
3. WON EO No. 626-A violates due process
4. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid exercise of police power
5. WON EO No. 626-A is an invalid delegation of legislative
power
HELD
1. NO. While also involving the same executive order, the case
of Pesigan v. Angeles is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of
the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on
the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this
Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly
affirm the constitutionality of EO No. 626-A.
2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We
have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality
of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.
3. YES. The minimum requirements of due process are notice
and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to
the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos
when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
4. YES. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the
promotion of the general welfare. To justify the State in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a
lawful subject of EO No. 626-A. But while the amendatory
measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive
order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with
the second requirement, that there be a lawful method. To
strengthen the original measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an
absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement, providing that "no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another." The object of the
prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between
the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing.
5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: The carabao or
carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef,
and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. There is
an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. The phrase "may
see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition.
Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and
sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep
it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore
invalid delegation of legislative powers.
BENGZON V DRILON
GUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992
FACTS
- Petition to review the constitutionality of the veto by the
President of certain provisions of the General Appropriations
Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992
- Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA who
were receiving monthly pensions under RA No.910 as
amended by RA No. 1797
- Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official capacities of
the Executive, involved in the implementation of the release of
funds under the GAA
- RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement pensions to
Justices of the SC and the CA who have rendered service at
least 2o years either in the judiciary or in any branch of govt, or
in, both, or having attained the age of 70, or who resign by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office; he
shall receive until his death the salary which he has received at
the time of his retirement
- RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement
benefits were given to Consti Commissions and the AFP, under
RA1568, as amended by RA3595, and PD578, respectively
- Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically
readjusted the retirement pensions of military officers and
enlisted men. But those in the judiciary and the Consti
Commissions were not included in this automatic readjustment,
as Marcos repealed the automatic readjustment provisions
(Section 3-a of RA1797 and RA3595) for the judiciary and the
Consti Commissions
- Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to reenact
the repealed provisions by approving a bill on the matter
(HB16297 and SB740)
- Pres. Aquino vetoed the HB on the ground that it would erode
the foundation of the policy on standardization of compensation
under the Salary Standardization Law, RA6758
- On the other hand, retired CA justices Barcelona and
Enriquez filed a petition for readjustment of their pensions in
accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out that PD644
repealing RA1797 did not take effect as there was no valid
publication pursuant to Tanada v Tuvera, supposedly
promulgated in 1975 but published only in the OG in 1983;
Court authorized it as a result
- As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress included
in the GAA appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the
payment of adjusted pensions rates for the retired justices
- In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and the
entire Section 4 of the Special Provision for the SC and the
Lower Courts on the ground that the President vetoed the HB
on the matter already, and such appropriation would erode the
policy of salary standardization
ISSUE
WON the veto by the president of certain provisions in the
General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to
the payment of the adjusted pension of the retired Justices of
the SC and the CA
HELD
- The President did not veto items but provisions of the law in
the GAA.
- While veto power is generally all or nothing, vetoing the
entire bill or none at all, it does not hold when it comes
to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills.
o The Constitution has a item veto power to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable
appropriation or revenue measure; only a particular
item or items may be vetoed
o Item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the
distinct and severable parts; it is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision
of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation
bill
o The President did not veto the general fund
adjustment of 500M, to meet certain obligations
WHICH is an ITEM.
o What she vetoed were provisions methods and
systems placed by Congress to insure that
obligations would be paid when they fell due
o Thus, augmentation of specific appropriations found
inadequate to pay retirement benefits is a provision
and not an item
o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 and
the Resolution of the SC dated Nov 1991. WHICH
SHE CANNOT VETO.
- The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking away the
automatic readjustment for the judiciary never became valid
law because it was never published, pursuant to the Tanada v
Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was never repealed and there was
no need for an HB in 1990 to restore it so even the presidents
veto of the HB does not even have any effect in the continuing
implementation of the law
- The Veto by the president trenches upon the constitutional
grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary
o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their
needs require
o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding highest rates authorized
by law
o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary how its
funds should be utilized
- The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to
RA1797
o The purpose retirement laws like such is to entice
competent men and women to enter the government
service and retire with relative security
GARCIA V MACARAEG
BARREDO; May 31, 1971
FACTS
- Administrative complaint filed by Paz M. Garcia against Hon.
Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Judge of the CFI of Laguna Branch VI,
now Undersecretary of Justice, in his former capacity as judge,
for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge ...
gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55
and 58 thereof.
- Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna
and San Pablo City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970.
The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches,
had to be organized from scratch. After consultations with the
officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba
and the Department of Justice, he decided to accept the offer
of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for
the courtroom and offices of the court, to utilize the financial
assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for
the purchase of the necessary supplies and materials and to
rely on the national government for the equipment needed by
the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative
Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial
government The provincial officials of Laguna, however,
informed him that the province was not in a position to do so).
- As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal
Mayor of Calamba assured him that the court could be
accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal
building as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer and his
personnel are transferred to another location. When the
projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about
to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal councilors
objected. The municipal mayor then requested Macaraig to
look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with
the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder
the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice was the
second floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the
negotiations failed when the owner of the building refused to
reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space
selected by Macaraig was the second floor of the Laguna
Development Bank. After a month's negotiations, the
municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on
October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the municipal
government could release the amount necessary for the
improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was
a big hall without partitions, into a courtroom and offices for the
personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial fiscal.
Thereafter, upon Macaraig's representations, the provincial
government appropriated the amount of P5,000 for the
purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court.
Early in December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for
the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the DOJ
but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of the
CFI was released only on December 23, 1970 and the
procurement of the equipment chargeable against this
allotment is still under way.
- When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he
could actually preside over his court, he applied for an
extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the DOJ,
Macaraig had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on
extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits
he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by
the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed
upon him to forego his leave and instead to assist him,
without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was
not busy attending to the needs of his court.
- Complainant Garcia alleged:
> That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive,
respondent has not submitted his monthly reports containing
the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or
resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one
 month, two months to over three months, together with the
title, number, number of hours of court session held a day.
> That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New
Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to December,
1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive.
> That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, CFI of Laguna and
San Pablo and knowing fully well that he has never
performed his official duties or discharged the duties
appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his
salaries from July 1970 to February 1971 in flagrant violation
of Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
> That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports on
the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear
violation of Sections 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his oath of
office as judge, gross incompetence and violation of Circular
No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of Justice
and RA 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 particularly Sections 5,
55 and 58
HELD
- Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10
of the Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not
actually discharging his judicial duties. Respondent's inability to
perform his judicial duties under the circumstances does not
constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer
who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume
his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being 'a judge
without a sala,' but forces and circumstances beyond his
control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not
constitute dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and
money he spent in Organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked
in the Department of Justice.
- None of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks
with favor at the practice of long standing of judges being
detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only
in connection with his work of exercising administrative
authority over the courts. The line between what a judge
may do and what he may not do in collaborating or
working with other offices or officers under the other
great departments of the government must always be
kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of
separation of powers on which our government tests by
mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually
eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good
intentions in the interest of the public service. The
fundamental advantages and the necessity of the
independence of said three departments from each other,
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and
balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any
temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the Judiciary under
our present constitutional scheme of government that no Judge
of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in
a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for
action or resolution would be subject to review and prior
approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can have legal
effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the
Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is
discontinued.
Decision Complaint dismissed. (8 votes to dismiss, Castro &
Teehankee took no part.)
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur]
- Respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise
accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his
conduct. What he was required to do was in accordance with
the practice heretofore followed by the Department of Justice.
He is, under the statute in force, under the administrative
supervision of its head. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of
Justice Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by him was
likewise in accordance with what previous secretaries of justice
were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then is the
statutory authority of the Department of Justice over
courts of first instance and other inferior courts. While a
distinction could be made between the performance of judicial
functions which in no way could be interfered with by the
Department and the task of administration which is executive in
character, still the conferment of such competence to a
department head, an alter ego of the President, is to my mind,
not only unwise but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing
administrative rules and regulations over matters deemed non-
judicial, they may trench upon the discretion of judges which
should be exercised according to their conscience alone. What
is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them is
magnified. It is already unavoidable under our scheme of
government that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at
times depend on it. With this grant of authority, the assertion of
independence becomes even more difficult. it is thus
objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That
certainly is not the way to reduce to the minimum any
participation of the executive in judicial affairs arising from the
power to appoint. As it is, even when the government as the
adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations
is in the right, a favorable decision from the lower courts could
be looked upon with suspicion. The judiciary must not only
be independent; it must appear to be so.
- The presence in the statute books of such power of
administrative oversight then, is, to my mind, anomalous. More
specifically, were it not for such power granted the department
head, respondent Judge in this case could not have been
called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering
that the Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is
to be hoped that it be made clear that the judiciary is to
be totally freed from any supervisory authority of an
executive department. (Take note guys that this case was
decided just a day before the Manila Hotel inaugural session of
the con-con that created the 1973 Consti. And remember that
the supervision of the CFI and other inferior courts (under the
DOJ in the 1935 Consti) was transferred to the SC under the
new Consti which provision was copied in the 1987 Consti. I
guess this case was influential in making that change possible.
By the way, Macaraig was a former UP law prof.)
BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION
GRINO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991
FACTS
Respondent David Quema alleges that he is the owner of a
parcel of land which he mortgaged to Dra. Valera. He was able
to redeem the property but only after 22 years. On the other
hand, petitioner spouses claim the property was sold to them
by Dra. Valera. Quema filed a case before the Barangay
Council but when it failed to settle, he filed a complaint in the
tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. (The disputed land is located in
Villaviciosa, Abra) The tribal court decided in favor of Quema.
But as the spouses did not immediately vacate the land, they
received a warning order from the Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army (CPLA). Petitioners filed this action alleging
that respondent Cordillera Bodong Administrations decision is
void for lack of judicial power or jurisdiction. Respondent
contends the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over tribal
courts because they are not part of the judicial system.
ISSUE
WON a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can
render a valid and executory decision
HELD
NO. Decision of tribal court is annulled for lack of jurisdiction.
The creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected
in a plebiscite by the provinces and cities of the Cordillera
Region hence the Cordillera Bodong Administration, the
indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural
communities and the CPLA as a regional command of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines do not legally exist. The
Maeng Tribal Court not being constituted into an indigenous
court, it is but an ordinary tribal court existing under the
customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not part of the Philippine Judicial
System which consists of the Supreme Court and the
lower courts which have been established by law. They
do not possess judicial power.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V COURT OF
APPEALS
ROMERO; February 5, 1996
FACTS
- Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) entered into three contracts
regarding various services at the South Harbor:
> With Ocean Terminals Services, Inc. (OTSI). OTSI was
granted exclusive right to manage and operate stevedoring
services at the South Harbor
> With Marina Port Services Inc. (MPSI). MPSI was granted
exclusive management and operation of arrastre and
container handling services at the South Harbor
> With 7-R Ports Services. 7-R was granted warehousing
services
- On November 28, 1991, the contract with MPSI was renewed.
Part of the contract required the MPSI to cause integration of
storage, arrastre and stevedoring services at the South Harbor.
Consequently, OTSI and 7-R assigned their respective
stevedoring and warehousing services to MPSI. In effect MPSI
had the duty and responsibility to manage, operate and render
the following services:
- Arrastre- receiving, handling, checking as well as custody
and delivery of cargo services. These are services done on
land.
- Stevedoring- all work performed on board vessel, that is, the
process of loading and unloading cargo, stowing inside
hatches, compartments and on deck or open cargo spaces on
board vessels.
- Container Terminal Handling- the services of handling
container discharged or loaded unto vessels.
- Storage- storing of containers, bulk and break bulk cargoes
in all storage areas at the South Harbor.
- April 2, 1992, PPA entered into a contract with petitioner
Manila Floating Silo Corporation (MAFSICOR) whereby the
latter was granted right, privilege, responsibility and authority to
provide, operate a floating bulk terminal facilities for bulk
cargoes bound for the South Harbor with a proviso that use of
such facility shall not be compulsory to bulk shippers or
importers. Contract would be enforced for 5 years and shall be
on an interim basis until an actual land based bulk terminal
plant for the Port of Manila.
- Sept. 8, 1192, PPA and MAFSICOR entered a supplemental
agreement stating that manpower needed for stevedoring
services shall be hired from OTSI.
- MPSI filed a petition against PPA and MAFSICOR for
declaratory relief, final injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary prohibitory injunction claiming
that said contract was in complete derogation of their rights
under their contract with PPA.
- RTC of Manila through judge Veridiano II, issued TRO
directing PPA to maintain status quo and enjoining MAFSICOR
from bringing in the floating terminal and set a hearing on the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
- PPA filed an opposition to the issuance of said writ stating
PPA-MAFSICOR contract actually supports PPA-MPSI contract
as stevedoring manpower would be hired from MPSI. And that
on a 2-day public hearing, most of the registrants agreed to the
operation of the floating terminal.
- MAFSICOR also filed an urgent motion for the lifting of the
TRO and a denial of the the preliminary injunction on the
ground that an injunctive relief is not available in an action for
declaratory relief. They filed another motion to dismiss
complaint stating that declaratory relief was not available to
MPSI because MAFSICOR was not a party in the PPA-MPSI
contract therefore they were not a party-in-interest.
- AUGUST 25, 1993, trial court denied writ of preliminary
injunction and lifted TRO stating that first, the right to operate a
floating terminal was not on the PPA-MPSI contract and there
would be no conflict between contracts with MPSI and
MAFSICOR since MPSI is not the sole entity authorized to
render stevedoring services in the South Harbor and besides,
stevedoring services for MAFSICOR shall be provided by
OTSI. Second, contract with MAFSICOR was noon-exclusive
meaning MPSI could also operate a floating terminal. Third,
injunctive relief may not be granted for an action for declaratory
relief. Further, MPSI could not question PPA-MAFSICOR
contract they being not a party thereto.
- MPSI filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the court on Sept. 15, 1993.
- Meanwhile on Sept. 3 1993, Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa
sa Daungan (KAMADA) the bargaining agent or the 4000
stevedores employed by MPSI, filed a complaint against MPSI,
PPA and MAFSICOR for the annulment of PPA-MAFSICOR
contract alleging that the operation of the floating bulk would
duplicate their function of stevedoring in the South Harbor.
They also alleged that MAFSICOR had not contacted them on
the matter regarding the hiring of their services in the
supplemental contract. Also, KAMADA said that the
requirement of MAFSICOR of trained and qualified stevedores
(since services in the floating terminal would be done by
machine), certainly some of their member employees would be
deprived.
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Mabunay. Court
granted TRO stating great and irreparable injuries upon the
applicant would result before the matter can be heard on
notice.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion to dismiss civil case and for the
lifting of the TRO (complete reasons in p.224-25). Reasons
included Court Circular No. 13-93 which prohibits the issuance
of injunction against certain government agencies including
public utilities. Motion was denied.
- Sept. 10, 1993, MAFSICOR filed a supplement to its motion
to dismiss and to lift TRO, raising as an additional reason,
Section 1 of P.D. no. 1818 which states that:
no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary
mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or controversy
involving an infrastructure project including among others
public utilities for the transport of goods or commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or
 persons, entity or government office from proceeding with
the operation of such public utility
- MPSI opposed stating MAFSICOR is not a public utility nor is
performing a public function and thus non public interest may
be affected.
- Judge Mabunay denied MAFSICORs motion.
- Sept. 28,1993, KAMADA case was resolved by Judge
Mabunay in which writ was denied due to failure of KAMADA
to present clear and convincing evidence of any damages it will
suffer.
- Another case was filed by yet another party. This was a case
for injunction with provisional remedy of preliminary injunction
involving the same PPA-MAFSICOR contract. This was filed by
the Chamber of Customs Brokers Inc., the only accredited
association for customs brokers in the country, stating that they
were never informed of the proposal to put up a floating grains
terminal and that operation of such would adversely affect and
prejudice its members (reason in p.226-227).
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Bayhon. Court
issued a restraining order. In due course, on October 1, 1993,
lower court issued a preliminary injunction upon the filing of
MPSI of an injunction bond.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed before the SC a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a
TRO and/or preliminary injunction. Petition impleaded Judge
Verdiano as a public respondent. Petition also prayed Judges
Mabunay and Bayhon be administratively dealt with for
disregarding Circular No. 13-93.
- Pursuant to Sec. 9(1) of B.P. 29, SC referred case to Court of
Appeals.
- October 13, 1993, CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction
finding that MPSI has exclusive stevedoring rights at the South
Harbor and that the operation of a floating grains terminal by
MAFSICOR would overlap on the rights of MPSI. On the
applicability of PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, court stated
that what is being stopped temporarily is private respondents
operation of the floating bulk terminal facility that would lessen
MPSIs stevedoring services as it infringes on the latters
contractual right.
- MAFSICOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
- On June 8, 1994, CA decided that writ of preliminary
injunction is made permanent and that Judge Bayhon be
permanently enjoined from issuing injunctive orders during the
trial of the case in the court.
- Thus, CA affirmed the exclusivity of the stevedoring contract
in favor of MPSI. That being so, it precluded infringement of the
PPA-MPSI contract by the PPA-MAFSICOR contract. CA
explained that the floating grains terminal is simply a
mechanized unloading of grains cargo from the vessel to the
barge or other transport facilities. And also that what is solely
done by stevedores is substituted by machines complemented
by needed stevedores. With respect to the supplemental
agreement which states that stevedores would be hired by
MAFSICOR from OTSI, court stated that it was just an
adjustment in order not to violate PPA-MPSI contract. And that
MAFSICOR can legally excuse themselves from the contract
because OTSI already assigned its stevedoring services to
MPSI. As regards to forum shopping allegation of MAFSICOR
(filing of separate petitions by MPSI, KAMADA and Chamber),
court said that there was no forum shopping because
petitioners had separate and distinct legal personalities. There
also was no proof that they confabulated to forum-shop. On the
applicability of PD 1818, CA affirmed its Oct.13 ruling.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed a motion for review on certiorari
alleging that Court of Appeals decision: a) violates PD 1818
and Circular No. 13-93, the constitutional principle of
separation of judicial and executive powers and prescription
against forum shopping, b) supplants the discretion of the trial
court to pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction and
c) is contrary to the evidence on record.
ISSUE
WON PD 1818 applicable to the case
HELD
YES
Ratio no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute or
controversy involving an infrastructure project including
among others public utilities for the transport of goods or
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government office
from proceeding with the operation of such public utility injunction or a restraining order would be to stave off
- Clearly, the prohibition in PD 1818 does not cover
infrastructure alone. It includes among others stevedoring
services. The law being clear, there is no room for
interpretation or construction. A verbis legis non est recendum
(from the words of a statute there should be no departure).
- PD 1818 applies in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. It is founded on the
principle that to allow courts to determine such matters would
disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery.
- In Republic v. Capulong discretion was defined as a power or
right conferred upon them by law of acting officially under
certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others.
- Entering into a contract for the operation af a floating grains
terminal notwithstanding the existence of other stevedoring
contracts pertaining to the South Harbor is undoubtedly an
exercise of the discretion on the part of the PPA. No other
persons or agencies are in a better position to gauge the need
for the floating terminal than the PPA; certainly not the courts.
Courts have no brooding of such administrative agencies (Hon.
Reinerio Reyes et al v. Hon Doroteo Caneba et al). courts will
intervene only to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality
of the Government has transgressed its constitutional
boundaries (Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President). Under
the separation of powers, the courts may not tread into matters
requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in
the executive and legislative branches, unless it is clearly
shown that the government official or office abused his or its
discretion. In this case there is no showing that the PPA
abused its discretion in entering into the contract with
MAFSICOR. Judge Veridiano correctly concluded that
there is no provision for the putting up of a floating
grains terminal in the PPA-MPSA contract. All it covers
are the general services of stevedoring. While the
operation of a floating grains terminal may be considered
as part and parcel of stevedoring as such operation
merely entails the mechanization of stevedoring, it was
considered by the PPA, in the exercise of its discretion,
as necessary to improve the services rendered in the
South Harbor in the meantime that no land-based bulk
terminal is yet operational.
- There are actually instances when PD 1818 should not find
application. These are a) where there is clear and grave abuse
of discretion b) where the effect of the non-issuance of an
implementation of a government project. In this case the
operation of a floating bulk terminal would augment and
improve the over-all operations at the port of Manila and/or
stevedoring services awarded to MPSI.
- Another contention against the applicability of PD 1818 is that
MAFSICOR is a private entity. Such contention betrays a
failure to comprehend the functions of the PPA. One of the
duties of the PPA is to provide services (whether on its own, by
contract or otherwise) within the Port Districts to make or
enter contracts of any kind or nature to enable it to discharge
its functions under its decree.
- Section 1 of PD 1818 clearly states that an injunction may not
be issued to prevent any person or persons, entity or
government official from undertaking the protected activities
enumerated. The prohibition therefore applies regardless of
whether or not the entity or person being enjoined is a public or
private person or entity, provided that the purpose of the law to
protect essential government projects in pursuit of economic
development is attained.
- court did not resolve main issues offered (such as the
exclusivity of the PPA-MPSI contract) for resolution therein
which necessitates trial on merits. However court took note of
the allegations against two judges
Decision Petition on certiorari granted decision of the CA is
reversed and set aside.
IN RE: VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA
NARVASA; November 9, 1998
FACTS
- The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May
14, 1998, sets out the relevant facts.
- Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the
appointments signed by the President under date of March 30,
1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta
as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City
and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively.
- received at the Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998
- view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado,
Consultant of the Council, who had been a member of the
Committee of the Executive Department and of the Committee
on the Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission: that on the basis of the Commission's records,
the election ban had no application to appointments to
the Court of Appeals. Without any extended discussion or
any prior research and study on the part of the other Members
of the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then
submitted to the President for consideration, together with the
Council's nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of
Appeals
- April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official communication
from the Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of
eight (8) Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which
had been duly signed on March 11, 1998 by the President
- In view of the fact that all the appointments had been signed
on March 11, 1998 - the day immediately before the
commencement of the ban on appointments imposed by
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution - which impliedly
indicated that the President's Office did not agree with the
hypothesis that appointments to the Judiciary were not covered
by said ban, the Chief Justice resolved to defer consideration
of nominations for the vacancy in the Supreme Court created
by the retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco
- May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from the
President, addressed to the JBC, requesting transmission of
the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy" no later than
Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in view of the duty imposed on him
by the Constitution "to fill up the vacancy . . . within ninety (90)
days from February 13, 1998, the date the present vacancy
occurred."
- May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested
the Chief Justice for "guidance" respecting the expressed
desire of the "regular members" of the JBC to hold a meeting
immediately to fill up the vacancy in the Court in line with the
President's letter . The Chief Justice advised Secretary Bello to
await the reply that he was drafting
- May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to the
President-- stating that no sessions had been scheduled for the
Council until after the May elections because of the "need to
undertake further study of the matter," prescinding from "the
desire to avoid any constitutional issue regarding the
appointment to the mentioned vacancy"; delivered to
Malacaang May 6, 1998, and a copy given to the Office of
Justice Secretary Bello
- Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had
already taken action on May 6, 1998 they came to an
agreement on a resolution: they drew attention to Section 4 (1),
Article VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention of Section
15, Article VII) as well as to the President's letter of May 4, with
an appeal that the Chief Justice convene the Council for the
purpose "on May 7, 1998
- CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 7, 1998
- May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter from President:
"the election-ban provision applies only to executive
appointments or appointments in the executive branch of
government," the whole article being "entitled 'EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT.'", "firmly and respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his)
request for the Judicial and Bar Council to transmit . . . the final
list of nominees for the lone Supreme Court vacancy."
- May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of Article VII
imposes a direct prohibition on the President which is the
general rule, the only exception being only as regards
"executive positions"(judicial positions are covered by the
general rule)
- Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article VII, the
duty of filling the vacancy is not specifically imposed on the
President
- normally, when there are no presidential elections
Section 4 (1), Article VIII shall apply but when (as now)
there are presidential elections, the prohibition in
Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President
shall not make any appointments
- requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar
Council to defer action on the matter until further advice by the
Court
- May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a
resolution that "the constitutional provisions be referred to the
Supreme Court En Banc for appropriate action
- May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received from Malacaang the
appointments of two (2) Judges of the Regional Trial Court
mentioned above; places on the Chief Justice the obligation of
transmitting the appointments to the appointees so that they
might take their oaths and assume the duties of their office
(trouble is that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of
acting in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution)
- the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing proceedings
and the deliberation by the court on the matter, and until further
orders, no action be taken on the appointments of Hon.
Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the meantime shall be
held in abeyance and not given any effect and said appointees
shall refrain from taking their oath of office and the Judicial and
Bar Council is INSTRUCTED to defer all action on the matter of
nominations
- Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his
"Explanation" he stated that he did so because on May 7, 1998
he "received from Malacaang copy of his appointment . . ."
which contained the following direction: "By virtue hereof, you
may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of
the office"
- The Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Section 15, Article VII:
"Two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
prejudice public service or endanger public safety."
Section 4 (1), Article VIII:
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof ."
Section 9, Article VIII:
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the
appointments within ninety days from the submission of the
list."
ISSUE
WON during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of
Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
HELD
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March
30, 1998 were unquestionably made during the period of the
ban. Such appointments come within the operation of the first
prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be
for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election.
Reasoning
- While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in
the public interest there is no showing in this case of any
compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban. On the other hand, there is a
strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments
made within the period of the ban.
- Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the
President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the
time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of
Article VII.
- journal of the commission which drew up the present
Constitution discloses: desire to make certain that the size of
the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as
a result of vacancies, the insertion in the provision of the same
mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME
SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM
OCCURRENCE THEREOF." was proposed
- Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of
appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those
appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15,
Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments
- the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to
important positions which have to be made even after the
proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long
as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made
by the outgoing President
- The exception allows only the making of temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of
the President during the period of the ban.
- Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for
filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the
President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as
a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should
yield to the latter
- the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one,
single instrument; instances may be conceived of the
imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the
ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court.
- concerning Valenzuela's oath-taking and "reporting for duty"--
Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments to the
Judiciary to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office
of the Chief Justice, the appointments being addressed to the
appointees "Thru: the Chief Justice, Supreme Court, Manila." It
is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in the Chief
Justice's behalf, who thereafter advises the individual
appointees of their appointments and also of the date of
commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be
conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V OCURT OF
APPEALS
MARTINEZ; July 23, 1998
FACTS
- Oil & Natural Gas Commission (petitioner)- a foreign
corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India
- Pacific Cement Company (respondent) -a private
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines.
- The two parties entered into a contract on Feb 26, 1983,
where respondent undertook to supply the petitioner (4,300)
metric tons of oil well cement; petitioner to pay ($477,300.00)
- The oil well cement was loaded on the ship MV SURUTANA
NAVA in Surigao City, for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta,
India.
- respondent had already received payment but failed to deliver
the oil well cement due to a dispute between the ship owner
and respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and did not
reach its point of destination
- so they just agreed that the private respondent will replace
the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with Class "G"
cement cost free. However, upon inspection, the Class "G"
cement did not conform to the petitioner's specifications.
- The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it
was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of
their contract
- July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator (Shri N.N. Malhotra)
resolved the dispute in petitioner's favor
- Respondent- to pay $ 899,603.77 + 6% interest
- To enable the petitioner to execute the award, it filed a
Petition before the Court in India praying that the decision of
the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India which the
said court granted
- The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant
US$899,603.77 with 9% interest per annum till the last date of
realization
- However, respondent refused to pay
- Petitioner filed a complaint to RTC of Surigao
- RTC and CA dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between
the petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of
the contract; phrased differently, WON the non-delivery of the
said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the above-
quoted Clause 16
2. WON the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this
jurisdiction
HELD
1. YES. the correct interpretation to give effect to both
stipulations in the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all
claims or disputes arising from or relating to the design,
drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials
of the supply order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all
other claims or disputes.
- For the sake of argument, granted that the non-delivery of the
oil well cement is not a proper subject for arbitration, the failure
of the replacement cement to conform to the specifications of
the contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause
16.
2. YES.
- This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 32
Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra
Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered by adopting the
arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect
- if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of
the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the
necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because
our rules provide otherwise
- the private respondent herein, as the party attacking a foreign
judgment, has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity which it failed to do in the instant case.
Decision Petition GRANTED
ART X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CORTES; November 10, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioner Abbas, a representative of other taxpayers in
Mindanao, filed this petition to(1) enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the
Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to
the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734,
or parts thereof, unconstitutional
- The 1987 Constitution provides for regional autonomy through
Article X, section 15 which provides that "there shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines."
- To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of
the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall
define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family, and property
law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution
shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of
both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic
act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the
regions shall be the responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised,
and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense
and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the
National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was
enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.The present
controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for
November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No.
6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
ISSUES
1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the
Tripoli Agreement.
2 .WON R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution.
HELD
1. No, RA 6743 does not conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
SC finds it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to
rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding
effect on the Philippine Government whether under public
international or internal Philippine law. The Constitution itself
provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A.
No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the
Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A.
No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not
have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic
Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli
Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it
would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal
law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of
the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same
class as the latter.
2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987 Constitution.
a. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally
creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the
aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous
region which make the creation of such region dependent upon
the outcome of the plebiscite.
 The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed
over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous
region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the
Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in
the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of
Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred
twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That
only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do
not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain
the existing administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of
the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority
vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the
autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous
region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created,
not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be
included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the
Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
b. Equal protection of the law Petitioner insists that R.A. No.
6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and
Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not
all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in
the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and
cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By
including areas which do not strictly share the same
characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress
has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the
constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays
down the standards by which Congress shall determine which
areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by
these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive
realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. SC
cannot do this without doing violence to the separation of
governmental powers
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification.
The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this
case, the classification having been made by Congress on the
basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution
itself.
c. Free exercise of religion Petitioner questions the validity of
R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The
objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which
mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim
Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on
the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the
Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah)
is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law.
Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating
possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim
Code and national law, wherein an application of national law
might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be
exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first
exist. In the present case, no actual controversy between real
litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of
religious freedom. The Court in this case may not be called
upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
TANO V SOCRATES
DAVIDE; August 21, 1997
FACTS
- special civil action for certiorari and prohibition praying to:
1. declare as unconstitutional:
(a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa
(b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January
1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of
Puerto Princesa City; and
(c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993,
dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan;
2. enjoin the enforcement thereof; and
3. restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the
Regional Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases
concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office
Order.
- Ordinance No. 15-92
- took effect on January 1, 1993
- entitled: "AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,
1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF,"
- Purpose: to effectively free our water from Cyanide and
other Obnoxious substance
- unlawful for any person, business enterprise, company to
ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination
either via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish (all alive,
breathing not necessarily moving, used for foor and for
aquarium purposes) and lobster except SEA BASS
(apahap), CATFISH (hito-hito), MUDFISH (dalag), AND
MILKFISH FRIES.
- Penalty: fine of not more than P5,000.00, imprisonment of
not more than 12 mos and/or cancellation of their permit to
do business in the City of Puerto Princesa
- Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993
- pursuant to City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74 (requirement
of mayors permit) and Ordinance No. 15-92 (banning of
shipment of live fish and lobster), authorized and directed to
check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes
containing live fish and lobster to ascertain whether the
shipper possessed the required Mayor's Permit issued by
this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or
clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
- Resolution No. 33
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms
coming from Palawan waters (mameng, suno,
panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams, tiger
prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquarium fishes) for a
period of five years
- WHEREAS
- studies disclose only 5% of the corals of Palawan remain
to be in excellent condition
- cannot be gainsaid that destruction and devastation of
the corals of our province were principally due to illegal
fishing activities like dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide
fishing, use of other obnoxious substances
- need to protect and preserve the existence of the
remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones
to regenerate within 5 years
- RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) empowers
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties e.g. to dynamite fishing
and other forms of destructive fishing
- Ordinance No. 2
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms coming from Palawan waters (mameng, suno,
panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams,
tiger prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquarium fishes)
for a period of five years
- Policy Considerations:
- Sec. 2-A (RA 7160: policy of the state that
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to be self-reliant
communities, more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall
be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and
resources.
- Sec. 5-A (RA 7160): Any fair and reasonable doubts
as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the Local Government Unit concerned
- Sec. 5-C (RA 7160). The general welfare provisions in
this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to LGU in accelerating economic development
and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community.
- Sec. 16 (RA 7160). Every LGU shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and ISSUES
those which are essential to the promotion of the 1. WON SC has jurisdiction
general welfare. 2. WON Ordinances 15-92, Office Order 23, Ordinance 2 of
- Policy of the Province of Palawan : to protect and Resolution 33 are constitutional
conserve the marine resources of Palawan
- Penalty: fine of not more P5,000.00, and/or HELD
imprisonment of 6 mos to 12 mos and confiscation and 1.NO because there is clear disregard for hierarchy of courts
forfeiture of paraphernalia and petitioners have no cause of action BUT SC opt to resolve
- Petitioners Allege: this case because of the lifetime of the challenged Ordinances
- Ordinances deprived them of due process of law (no is about to end (1993-1998).
consultation), their livelihood (all the fishermen of Palawan), Reasoning
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade Petitioners Tano, et al WRT cause of action
(Airline Shippers Association of Palawan), in violation of Art - no cause of action because there is no showing that the
XII Sec 2 (2) (3)39 and Art XIII Sec 240, 741 (1987). petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the information in their
- Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or condition respective criminal cases that would have this remedy proper
under which the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied therefore the petitioners cannot allege the lower courts of
(Mayor - absolute authority WON to issue permit) having acted in excess of their jurisdiction or grave abuse of
- Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching, discretion
gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live - If petitioners filed motion to quash information, it should have
marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction contained that the facts charged do not constitute an offense
whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing because the ordinances in question are unconstitutional. BUT
method if their Motion to Quash was denied, the remedy is not certiorari
- fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special
- members of Airline Shippers Association were unduly defenses and if an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal
prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering should have been the proper remedy. And if there is an
contracts essential to carry out their business endeavors exceptional circumstance where special civil action for
to a successful conclusion certiorari may be filed, the lower court must be accorded a
- if Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, TF criminal cases Motion for Reconsideration to allow itself to correct any errors
against Tano et al have to be dismissed Petitioners Airline Shippers et al WRT Declaratory Relief
- Interests of petitioners - SC is not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for
- Tano et al: to prevent prosecution, trial and determination of declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved
the criminal cases until constitutionality or legality of the said being settled that the SC merely exercises appellate jurisdiction
Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved over such petitions
- Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and 77 fishermen: People v Cuaresma
declaratory relief because Ordinances adversely affects them - There is after all hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
39
Art XII Sec 2 (2): The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition . This is
(3) The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fisherworks in rivers, lakes, established policy strict adherence thereto in the light of what
bays and lagoons.
40
it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants
Art XIII Sec 2: The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
41
Art XIII Sec 7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
extraordinary writs directly and immediately by the highest
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and tribunal of the land...
offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also Santiago v Vasques
protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fisherworks shall receive a just share form their labor in
the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
- judicial policy that SC will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
BUT, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the
exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the
protection and preservation of the environment and are
thus novel and or paramount importance. No further
delay then may be allowed.
2. YES, since it is settled that laws, including ordinances of
LGUs enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and the
petitioners did not present clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence to overthrow this assumption.
Reasoning
Peralta v COMELEC
- presumption of constitutionality of laws including
ordinances of LGUs and to overthrow this presumption, it
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Subsistence or Marginal Fishermen
- There is no showing that any of the petitioners qualify as
subsistence or marginal fishermen
> Airline Shipping Association of Palawan: a private
association composed of marine merchants
> Virginia and Robert Lim: merchants
> the rest of petitioners: fishermen without any
qualification to their status
- Since consti does not provide for the definition of
subsistence or marginal
Marginal Fisherman
- Generally, an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of
return or reward in his harvest of fish is barely sufficient to
yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering fish
- Sec 13 RA7160 an individual engaged in subsistence
fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange
of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and
his immediate family
Subsistence Fishermen
- Generally, one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood
Art XII Sec 2
- aim primarily not to bestow any right of subsistence
fishermen but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect
the nations marine wealth
- provision merely recognizes priority to subsistence
fishermen
Sec 149 of LGC
- only provision of law which speaks of preferential right of
marginal fishermen
Joint Administrative Order No. 3 (1996)
- prescribed guidelines concerning preferential treatment of
small fisherfolk relative to fishery right in Sec 149 but this
case does not involve such fishery right
Protection of the Environment v Right of Marginal Fishermen
Art XIII Sec 7
- speaks not only of communal marine and fishing resources
but of their protection, development, and conservation
Art XII Sec 2 (Regalian Doctrine)
- marine resources belong to the State and EDU shall be
under full control and supervision of the State
Constitutional Commission
- between Rodrigo and Bengzon
- marginal fishermen subject to rules and regulations and
local laws
Oposa v Factoran
- even though balanced and healthful ecology is under
Declaration of Principles and State Policies it does not follow
that is less important the civil and political rights enshrined in
the Bill of Rights for it concerns self-preservation and self-
perpetuation this basic right need not be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception
of humankind
Sec 16 LGC
- right of people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
General Welfare Clause
Realization of the General Welfare Clause, Decentralization
and Exercise of Police Power
Sec 5(c) LGC
- general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to the LGU in accelerating
economic development and upgrading the quality of life
Fishery Laws
- that LGU may enforce under Sec 17 in municipal water
include
- PD 704
- PD 1015 closed season
- PD 1219 exploration, exploitation, utilization,
conservation of coral resources
- PD 5474 unlawful to catch, sell, etc. ipon during closed
season
- PD 6451 prohibits and punishes electrofishing
Memorandum of Agreement (1994)
- between Dept of Agriculture and DILG
- issuance of permits to construct fish cages, gather
aquarium fishes, gather kapis shells, gather/culture shelled
mollusks, establish seaweed farms, establish culture pearls,
transports fish and fishery products and establishment of
closed season
RA 7611 Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan Act
- comprehensive framework for sustainable development of
Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the
natural resources and endangered environment of the
province which shall serve to guide the local government of
Palawan nd the government agencies concerned in the
formulation and implementation of plans, programs and
projects affecting Palawan
Principal Objectives of Ordinances
1) establish closed season for the species covered in the
said ordinances for a period of five years
2) to protect the corals in the marine waters of Puerto
Princesa and Palawan from further destruction due to illegal
fishing activities
Jurisdiction of BFAR or LGU
- Bellosillo: Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Puerto Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because
supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility of
BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704
otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for
lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res)
- Majority: BFAR jurisdiction over management, conservation,
development, etc not all-encompassing; excludes municipal
waters; BFAR no longer under DNR, now under DoA TF
incorrect to challenge that ordinances unenforceable because
no approval of Sec of DENR but of Sec of DoA instead; BUT
this can be dispensed with because of Repealing Claus of LGC
insofar as those provisions are inconsistent and power to enact
ordinances to enhance right of people to a balanced ecology
contained in the General Welfare Clause in the LGC
Decision Petition dismissed for lack of merit and TRO lifted
Voting 10 concur, 4 dissent, 1 on leave
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA [concur]
- fully concurs with the decision
- two important points: uphold presumption of validity of the
ordinances in view of total absence of evidence that undermine
their factual basis AND need not allow shortcircuiting of the
normal process of adjudication on the mere plea that unless we
take cognizance of petitions like this, by-passing the trial
courts, alleged violations of constitutional rights will be left
unprotected, when the matter can be very well be looked into
by trial courts and in fact it should be brought there
BELLOSILLO [dissent]
- Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Princesa to enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because
supposed to be within the jurisdiction and respoinsibility of
BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD 704
otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for
lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR (Natl Res)
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO
CALLEJO; May 30, 2004
FACTS
- EO 48 issued by Pres. Estrada on 12/07/98 entitled
Establishing a Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization:
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was
created
DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be
determined by the Oversight Committee based on
appraisal surveys by DILG
Oversight Committee (which was constituted under
Local Govt Code of 1991) has been tasked to issue
implementing rules and regulations governing equitable
allocation and distribution of the said fund to the LGUs
- GAA of 1999 In this General Appropriations Act, the
program was renamed as Local Govt Service Equalization
Fund (LGSEF)
Php96.78B was the allotted share of the LGUs in the IR
taxes
Special Provisions included that the amount of Php5B
shall be earmarked for LGSEF, and it shall be released to
the LGUs subject to the IRR (Implementing Rules and
Regulations) prescribed by the Oversight Committee
Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by
the DBM to the LGUs concerned
- OCD Resolutions Oversight Committee allocated Php5B
as follows:
Php2B in accordance with formula sharing scheme
prescribed under LGC of 1991
Php2B allocated with a modified CODEF sharing scheme
Php1B to be earmarked to support local affirmative action
projects and other priority initiatives; proposals were to be
submitted by the LGUs to the Oversight Committee
subject to its approval (OC prescribed a Criteria for
Eligibility)
- GAA of 2000 Also contained a proviso earmarking Php5B
of the IRA for the LGSEF (similar to GAA of 1999)
Php3.5B shared by the LGUs using a percentage-sharing
formula agreed upon by the various Leagues of LGUs
Php1.5B to be earmarked for projects, which are to be
endorsed to and approved by the Oversight Committee
- GAA of 2001 GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted and
OC allocated Php5B LGSEF as follows:
Php3B according to the modified codal formula
Php1.9B is earmarked for priority projects
Php100M for capability building fund subject to OCs
approval
- Procedure
Province of Batangas, represented by Gov. MANDANAS
filed a petition for CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, and
MANDAMUS to declare as unconstitutional the assailed
provisos in GAA of 99, 00, 01 and OCD Resolutions and was
issued against Exec. Sec. ROMULO (Chairman of Oversight
Committee on Devolution), Sec. BONCODIN (Dept. of Budget
and Mngmt.), and Sec. LINA (DILG)
- Petitioners grounds
Violative of Sec.6 Art.10 of 1987 Consti (just share must
be automatically released to the LGUs)
Vesting the Oversight Committee with authority in
determining distribution and release of LGSEF is contrary
to the principle of local autonomy
Improper sharing scheme (provisos modified sec.285 of
LGC) resulting to an illegal amendment by the Executive
branch of substantive law
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON petitioner has legal standing
2. WON petition involves factual questions properly cognizable
by lower courts
3. WON petition has been rendered moot and academic
Substantive
4. WON assailed provisos violate constitutional provision on
local autonomy
5. WON the assailed provisos result to a proper amendment of
sharing scheme provided in LGC
HELD
1. Yes.
- The petitioner seeks relief in order to protect or
vindicate its own interests, which pertains to the LGUs
share in the national taxes (IRA). The potential injury it
stands to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA, which
is clearly a plain, direct and adequate interest.
2. No.
- It involves a legal question (on what is the proper legal
interpretation) which is to be settled by the SC. Also, the
facts necessary to resolve the issue need not be determined by
a trial court since they are not disputed.
3. No.
- Even if the LGSEF for 99, 00, and 01 have already been
released, there is still compelling reason for the SC to resolve
substantive issues.
- Even in cases where supervening events, whether
intended or accidental, had made the cases moot, the
Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
Obiter
- Sec.25 Art.2: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
- Sec.2 Art.10: The territorial and political subdivisions shall
enjoy local autonomy.
- Presidents power over LGUs is one of general supervision,
and this excludes power of control. ( Drilon v. Lim: The
supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them.)
- Autonomy is either DECENTRALIZATION of
ADMINISTRATION or decentralization of POWER.
- LOCAL AUTONOMY means a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization. LGUs are subject to regulation,
however limited, for no other purpose than to enhance self-
government.
- Local autonomy includes both ADMINISTRATIVE (autonomy
in the exercise of its functions) and FISCAL AUTONOMY
(power to create own sources of revenue, in addition to
equitable share in national taxes.)
4. Yes.
- Sec.6 Art.10 mandates that -
o LGUs shall have a JUST SHARE in the NATIONAL
TAXES
o Just share shall be DETERMINED BY LAW
o Just share shall be AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED to
the LGUs
- As such, the LGUs are NOT required to perform any act
to receive the just share accruing to them from national
taxes (Sec.286 LGC: It shall be released to them without need
of further action.) The provision is IMPERATIVE. Any
retention is prohibited.
- Ratio To subject the distribution and release of the LGSEF
to implementing rules and regulations, including mechanisms
prescribed by the OC, as sanctioned by the provisos in the
GAAs of 99, 00, 01 and the OCD Resolutions makes the
release NOT automatic, which violates the Constitution .
- OC exercising jurisdiction and control contradicts principle of
local autonomy. There is also NO STATUTORY BASIS for this
power since the OC was created merely to formulate rules and
regulations for efficient implementation of the LGC (only ad hoc
character)
- As evident from the Con-Com deliberations, the Automatic
release provision was intended to GUARANTEE principle of
local autonomy.
5. No.
- The sharing scheme provided for in the LGC is fixed
and may not be reduced except in the event that the
national government incurs an unmanageable public
sector deficit. (Sec.285 LGC: Provinces 23%, Cities
23%, Municipalities 34%, Barangays 20%)
- Congress may amend LGC but should do so through a
separate law, and not just through an appropriations law.
Decision Petition granted.
Provisions relating to LGSEF declared unconstitutional.
Respondents are directed to rectify unlawful distribution of
LGSEF.
Entire IRA to be released automatically without further
action by LGUs.
MIRANDA V AGUIRRE
PUNO; September 16, 1999
FACTS
- Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. of prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction.
- Petitioners are Miranda, mayor of Santiago City at time of
filing of petition, and residents of Santiago City (located in
Province of Isabela)
- Respondents are executive, local government and budget
secretaries, and public officials of the province of Isabela
- Intervenor is winner of additional seat in provincial board
brought about by the reallocation.
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 8528 AN
ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN ACT
CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE
CITY OF SANTIAGO.)
- The RA deletes the word independent and treats
Santiago City just as a component city. Its territory and
territorial jurisdiction remains unchanged.
- Petitioners believe that this amounts to a
conversion of Santiago City and must therefore be decided by
the citys citizens in a plebiscite, of which the RA has no
provisions provided for. Respondents, on the other hand, deem
that this is a mere reclassification.
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON a plebiscite must be provided
HELD
1. Ratio The enumeration in Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution shall include any material change in the political
and economic rights of the local government unit(s) directly
affected.
- Petitioners have standing. The change will affect the powers
of the mayor and the voting exercise of residents.
- Not a political question. Petitioners claim that under Sec. 10,
Art. X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or
disapprove RA 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced.
The Court has the duty to ensure that Congress complies with
the Constitution in law-making.
2. Ratio The change from independent component city to
component city shall amount to a conversion which therefore
requires a plebiscite as contemplated in Rule II, Article 6,
paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code.
- Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or
divided, merged, or abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
- Respondents emphasize that the change provided in the RA
is not among those enumerated in the foregoing provision.
Moreover, the territory and boundaries of Santiago City
remained unchanged.
- But the ponente points out that there is a common
denominator among those enumerated in the provision all of
them result to a material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units directly affected and the
people therein. The same applies to the present case.
- As the petitioners mentioned, the change of Santiago City
from independent component city to component city will have
the following effects:
From being directly under the Office of the President,
the city will be reverted to the Provincial Government of
Isabela, thereby increasing its land area and
subsequently increasing its share in the internal
revenue allotment.
Taxes which the city collects for its benefit will be
redefined and may be shared with the province.
Allocation of operating funds will now come from the
Province which amounts to a decrease in the citys
funds.
Registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can
be voted as provincial officials
City officials, especially the mayor, will now be under
the control of the Provincial Governor
Resolutions and ordinances by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod will now be subject to review of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
- Clearly this amounts to a conversion if not a downgrade of
Santiago City.
- Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord
with the Constitution when it provides that:
- (f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall
take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected.
The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
Decision Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued
commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said
law.
Voting 10 concur; 4 dissent
TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITY
MELENCIO-HERRERA; January 29, 1987
FACTS
- Residents and taxpayers of Butuan City with Torralba, a
member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the same city
contend that Batas Pambansa (BP) 56, creating the
Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, violated
Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 Constitution: No province, city,
municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Petitioners argue that under the said provision, the Local
Government Code must first be enacted to determine the
criteria of the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of the boundary of any province, municipality, or
barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet
been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the statute
could not have possibly complied with any criteria when
respondent Municipality was created. Hence, it is null and void.
- The Local Government Code was enacted only on 10
February 1983 so that when BP 56 was enacted, the Code was
not yet in existence. A plebiscite had also been conducted
among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of
the new Municipality, who expressed approval thereof; and that
officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed
and had assumed there respective positions as such.
ISSUE
WON BP Blg 56 is unconstitutional.
HELD
- No. The absence of the Local Government Code at the time
of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple
legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Sec.
3, Art. 11 of the 1973 does not prohibit the modification of
territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the
Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the
Local Government Code is a condition sine qua non for
creating a new municipality, in much the same way that
creating a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of
a Local Government Code. What the constitutional provision
means is that the once said Code is enacted, the creation,
modification or dissolution of local government units should
conform to the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum,
before the enactment of such code, the legislative power
remains plenary except that the creation of the new local
government unit should be approved by the people concerned
in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
- The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to
said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the
unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the
new local government unit. Further, it is a long-recognized
principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is
essentially legislative in nature. Absent any constitutional
limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it
deems essential for the more efficient administration of
government. The creation of the new municipality of Sibagat
was a valid exercise of the legislative power then vested by the
1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.
TAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ALAMPAY; July 11, 1986
FACTS
- A plebiscite was held on January 3, 1986 which divided the
province of Negros Occidental into two Negros del Norte and
Negros Occidental.
- The petitioners, residents of the province of Negros
Occidental, challenge the constitutionality of the Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885, the act which created Negros del Norte.
The said law provides that some cities from the island of
Negros would be separated in order to create the new
province, subject to a concurrence of the majority in a
plebiscite.
- The petitioners contend that the act is not in accord with the
Local Government Code as in Article 11, Section 3 of the
Constitution. The Constitution provides that a plebiscite be held
in the unit or units affected. The petitioners said that Negros
Occidental is a unit affected by the creation of the new
province, thus, they should be allowed to vote. Also, they
contend that the minimum requirement of 3500 square
kilometers for the creation of a new province (as provided by
the Local Government Code) has not been complied since the
Negros del Norte is only comprised of 2856.56 square
kilometers. They pray that the plebiscite be declared null and
void, and that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct
another plebiscite which includes Negros Occidental.
- The respondents, meanwhile, argue that the term unit or
units affected does not include Negros Occidental. As such,
they cited a Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, where the court
ruled that only the members of the newly created barangay are
allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Also, they contend that Negros
del Norte actually is comprised of 4,019.95 square kilometers,
thus, it has met the requirement of the LGC. Lastly, they argue
that since the plebiscite has already happened, the case is
moot and academic.
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the act complied with the constitutional requirements
HELD
1. No. The case cannot be truly viewed as moot and academic.
The legality of the plebiscite itself is being challenged by the
petitioners. The Court has the duty to repudiate acts which run
counter to the Constitution, done by whatever branch of
government.
2. No.
Plebiscite
- The province of the Negros Occidental should be allowed to
vote in the plebiscite. It is clear that they are part of the units
affected by the creation of the new province, it being the
parent province.
- The case cited by the petitioners, Paredes vs. Executive
Secretary, is different with the case at bar. It merely includes
the division of a barangay, the smallest political unit. This case
refers to a division of the largest political unit, a barangay, thus
there will be more problems involved. The Court also looked at
the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in that case, which
mimics they decision of the Court in this case.
- Looking at Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, the bill wherein BP
Blg. 885 originated, it clearly said that a plebiscite shall be
conducted in the areas affected. BP Blg. 885, on the other
hand, says that a plebiscite shall be conducted in the
proposed new province which are the areas affected. The
Court found no legal basis for the change.
- The Court also declared the pronouncement in Paredes vs
Executive Secretary is abandoned.
- However, the act being unconstitutional, the Court cannot
direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, there being no legal
basis to do so.
Minimum area requirement
- Upon examining the certification issued by the Provincial
Treasurer, the new province, at most, has a land area of only
2765.4 square kilometers. Respondents contention that the
term land area is meant to include not only land, but water
also cannot be appreciated. The Court looked at the last
sentence of the first paragraph of Sec 197 of the LGC which
states that the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands. It is clear that the use of the word territory
has reference only to land mass since it speaks of territory not
needing to be contiguous or adjacent to each other.
Decision Petition granted. BP Blg. 885 declared
unconstitutional. The plebiscite is void as well as the
proclamation of Negros del Norte as a new province and the
appointment of its new officials.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE
- congratulated the Court in its unanimity in the decision.
- Additional facts: Act was approved in deep secrecy and
inordinate haste in
the last day of session, Dec 3, 1985. Though the act provided
that a plebiscite be conducted 120 days its approval, but the
plebiscite was held in Jan 3, 1986. The petitioners filed the
case in Dec 23, 1985, even as no printed copies of the Act
were available, since its has not been published. Since it was
Christmas break at that time, the petition was only acted upon
by the Court only on January 7, 1986, after the plebiscite has
been held.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
CORTES; January 29, 1990
FACTS
- Note Read first sec. 15-21, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution for this case.
- The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July
15,1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is
assailed on the primary ground that it pre-empts the enactment
of an organic act by the Congress (see sec. 18, Art. X) and the
creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
- Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the
exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the
1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region
(CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio
[secs. 1 and 2].
- It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in
the region and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec. 3].
- Its main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region,
particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as
well as with the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying,
planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in
the region [sec. 5)].
- It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national
and local government projects in the region.
- The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a
policy formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an
implementing arm (secs. 7, 8 and 10].
- The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist
until such time as the autonomous regional government is
established and organized [sec. 17].
- Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its
last "Whereas" clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and
the enactment of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous
region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national
security and public order, for the President to reorganize
immediately the existing administrative structure in the
Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein
and the Government's legitimate concerns in the areas,
without attempting to pre-empt the constitutional duty of the
first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous
region on a permanent basis.
- During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The
Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created
under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature.
ISSUE
1. WON EO No. 220 is unconstitutional because it pre-empts
the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the
creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the said organic act through a plebiscite
2. WON EO No. 220 created a new territorial and political
subdivision with CAR
3. WON the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional
guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces
HELD
1. EO. No. 220 is constitutional.
- Petitioners assertions that the President has pre-empted
Congress from its mandated task of enacting said organic act.
- EO No. 220 does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for
transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an
organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
- The President is acting on a contingency. The complex
procedure in Art. X of the Constitution will take time.
o The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative
powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened,
saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the
urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the
organic act had not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created.
- The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean
that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the
interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras."
o EO No. 220 created a region, covering a specified area,
for administrative purposes with the main objective of
coordinating the planning and implementation of
programs and services [secs. 2 and 5].
o The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the
existing local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies. They merely
constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings
together the existing local governments, the agencies of
the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or
tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.
- The Congress was convened. It enacted Republic Act No.
6658, which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative
Commission. (per Sec. 18, Art. X). The President then
appointed its members.
 o The commission prepared a draft organic act, which
became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives. The result was
Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera
autonomous region, which was signed into law on
October 23, 1989.
o A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be
conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined
in the Constitution, in the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had
been in force and effect for more than two years and
despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras is still to be created. Events have shown that
petitioners' fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for
the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
was totally unfounded.
2. It did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or
merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.
- The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and
political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
o Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally
granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue
and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property,
the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc.
o As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to
coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas.
- Considering the control and supervision exercised by the
President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No.
220, and considering further the indispensable participation of
the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may
be considered more than anything else as a regional
coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the
regional development councils which the President may create
under the Constitution (Art. X, see. 14).
o These councils are "composed of local government
officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the region for
purposes of administrative decentralization to
strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to
accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region."
3. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just
administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision
in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with
a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a
legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family
and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions
[Art. X, sec. 18].
- The concept of local autonomy:
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of
local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers
to the administrative autonomy of local government
units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority [Villegas v.
Subido, G.R. No. L31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA
11.]
The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that
would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the
Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of
transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political
subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with
political autonomy.
Decision Petition to declare EO No. 220 as unconstitutional is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Voting All 15 justices concurred with J. Gutierrez, Jr.
concurring in the result since for him the issue has become
moot and academic because Republic Acts No. 6658 and No.
6766 superseded the assailed EO already.
ORDILLO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GUTIERREZ; December 4, 1990
FACTS
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled
An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region, the people of the provinces of Benguet,
Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the
city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in
Ifugao, rejected by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The
province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of total population, and
as such has the second smallest number of inhabitants, of the
abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259
stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved
and/or ratified by majority of votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a memorandum for the
President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that
Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then.
Alone, legally and validly constitutes CAR.
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861
setting elections in CAR of Ifugao on first Monday of March
1991.
- Even before COMELEC resolution, Executive Secretary
issued February 5, 1990 a memorandum granting authority to
wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and
Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order
No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No.
160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive
Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all offices under
Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the
ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous
Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic
Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of
more than one constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a. declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit
and restrain the respondents from implementing the same
and spending public funds for the purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the
Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Assembly and other offices to be still in force and effect
until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall
have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly
ratified by the voters in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution provinces, cities, municipalities and
geographical areas connote that region is to be made up
of more than one constituent unit. The term region used
in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
 - rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the
language of the Constitution, as much as possible
should be understood in the sense it has in common
use and that the words used in constitutional provisions
are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the
Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions
which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting
the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a
single province may constitute the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd
situation of having two sets of officials: a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over
exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the
smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise)
(Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of
RA 6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional
Government for its initial organizational requirements
can not be construed as funding only a lone and small
province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming
from different provinces and cities in the Region, as
well as tribal courts and the development of a common
regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII;
Art XV RA 6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the
COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be
impractical and illogical.
Decision Petition (both a and b) granted.
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT GAMING
CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- Petitioners are taxpayers and practicing lawyers. Petitioner
Basco is the Chairperson of the Committee on Laws of the
City Council of Manila. On July 1981 PAGCOR was created
under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise
or permitted by law
- Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of PD 1869 and
they pray for its annulment based on the ff. grounds:
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third
person willing right recognized bylaw. It waived the Manila
City government's right to impose taxes and license fees,
which is recognized by law.
"B. The law has intruded into the local government's right to
impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of
the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution
in that it legalizes PAGCOR - conducted gambling. while
most other forms of' gambling are outlawed. together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
"C. It violates the avowed trend of the government away
from monopolistic and crony economy and toward free
enterprise and privatization.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioners have standing to question and seek the
annulment of PD 1869
2. WON PD 1869 violates the principle of local autonomy of
Manila
3. WON PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
HELD
1. Yes, petitioners have standing to question and seek the
annulment of PD 1869.
- Considering the importance to the public of the case at bar,
and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or riot the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this
petition.
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as
applied in the cases before the Supreme Court, it holds that
the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors
because each of them has sustained or is in danger of'
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of." And even if, strictly speaking they
are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
2. No, PD 1869 does not violate the local autonomy of Manila
with regard to its exemption clause.
a. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation
hits no inherent right to impose taxes. Its "power to tax"
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior
having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
"inherent power to tax"
b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by
Congress. The City of Manila's power to impose license fees
on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 197.5, the
power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the
grant of "franchise. licenses or permits" was withdrawn by
P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National
Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to
issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling.
Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees
which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or
permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
3. No, PD 1869 does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution
- The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects
upon which different rules shall. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R
-A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and
races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under
certain conditions. while others are prohibited, does not render
the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one. unconstitutional.
JUDGE LEYNES V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CORONA; December 11, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, was formerly assigned in the
Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding
judge of the Municipal Trial Court.
- His salary and representation and transportation allowance
(RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In
addition, he received a monthly allowance from the local funds
of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.
- March 15, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through
Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor
and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary
limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the
municipality to petitioner judge.
- May 7, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved
Resolution 101, increasing petitioner judges monthly
allowance starting May 1993.
- February, 17, 1994- Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay
sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang
Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the
monthly allowance and to require the immediate refund of the
amounts previously paid. Her directive was based on the
following:
1. Section 36, RA No.7645, General Appropriations Act of
1993
2. National Compensation Circular No. 67 of the
Department of Budget and Management
- Petitioner Judge appealed to Commission on Audit, Regional
Director upheld opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay and added
that Resolution No. 101 Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with Section 3 of the Local
Budge Circular No. 53 outlining the conditions for the grant of
the allowances to judges and other national officials or
employees by the local government units.
- Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the
Regional Director to the Commission on Audit.
- September 14, 1999- Commission on Audit issued its decision
affirming Resolution of the Regional Director.
1. the main issue is whether or not the municipality can
validly provide RATA to its municipal judge
2. Section 36 of RA 7645 states:
- Payable from the programmed/appropriated amount
and others from personal services savings of the
respective offices where the officials or employees draw
their salaries;
- Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual
General Appropriations Act;
- Officials/amployees on detail with other offices or
assigned to serve other offices or agencies shall be
paid from their parent agencies
- No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source.
2. The municipal government may provide additional
allowances and other benefits to judges and other
national government officials or employees assigned or
stationed in the municipality, provided, that the finances
of the municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to
Section 447, Par. 1 RA 7160, and provided further that
similar allowances/additional compensation are not
granted by the national government to the
official/employee assigned to the local government unit
as provided under Section 3(e) of local Budget Circular
No. 53.
3. Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 101 is null and
void. The Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a
national government official is prohibited to receive
additional RATA from the local government fund
pursuant to Section 36 of the General Appropriations
Act and National Compensation Circular No. 67.
- Position of Commission on Audit
> The municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to
the RATA already received from the Supreme Court
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67
- the RATA of national officials and employees shall be
payable from the programmed appropriations or
personal services savings of the agency where such
officials or employees draw their salary and
- no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source
2. General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645)
- the RATA of national officials shall be payable from the
programmed appropriations of their respective offices
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53
- prohibits local government units from granting
allowances to national government officials or
employees stationed in their localities when such
allowances are also granted by the national government
or are similar to the allowances granted by the national
government to such officials or employees
- Position of Petitioner
> Municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by
RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) to enact
appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other
benefits to judges stationed in its territory.
> DBM cannot amend or modify a substantive law like the
Local Government Code 1991 through mere budget circulars.
ISSUE
WON Judge Leynes can validly receive allowance from
municipality
HELD
- Ratio When a national official is on detail with another
national agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent
national agency and not from the other national agency he is
detailed to.
-Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of the monthly
allowance by the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge
Leynes
- Reasoning
RA 7645 is amended by NCC No. 67. No, administrative
circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify, or nullify a
statute.
The Constitution guarantees the principle of local
autonomy
- Article 10, Section 2
An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of
evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law.
ART XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PER CURIAM; September 27, 2005
FACTS
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House Committee on Justice,
represented by Its Chairman, Rep. Simeon Datumanong, The
House of Representatives, represented by Its Speaker, Rep.
Jose de Venecia and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
MINUTE RESOLUTION
- Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2005:
DENIED WITH FINALITY as no substantial arguments were
presented to warrant the reversal of the questioned resolution
- Urgent Motion for Consolidation dated 24 September 2005
DENIED for lack of merit
- Letter dated 26 September 2005 NOTED WITHOUT ACTION
FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA
MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC.
CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003
FACTS
- Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of
this Section.
- November 2001 - 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure
in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules)
superseding the Rules approved by 11th Congress
> Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. In cases where a Member of the House files a
verified complaint of impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated on the day the Committee
on Justice finds that the verified complaint and/or resolution
against such official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the case may be, is not
sufficient in substance. In cases where a verified complaint
or a resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as the
case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated
at the time of the filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the Secretary General.
> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of one (1) year from the
date impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated as
provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same
official.
- July 2002 House of representatives adopted a Resolution
directing Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in
aid of legislation on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Judiciary
Development Fund
- June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment
complaint against Davide and 7 associate justices for
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust,
and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico, Zamora,
and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice dismissed
the complain because insufficient in substance
- October 2003 Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second
impeachment complaint founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry; resolution of endorsement/impeachment was
signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives
ISSUES
1. WON issue is justiciable
2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by 12th Congress is constitutional and second
impeachment complaint is valid
HELD
1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the
matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress.
Instead, it provided for judicially discoverable standards for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion
through power of judicial review.
o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic
importance.
o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had been
filed and the 2001 rules had been promulgated and
enforced.
o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12 th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution;
and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution.
o Judicial Restraint not an option because the Court is
not legally disqualified; no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred.
2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House
of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the
House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
o Interpretation of the term initiate takes place by the
act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of the
HR with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Sec 3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear.
o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI once an impeachment
complains has been initiated, another complaint may
not be filed against the same official within a period of
one year.
o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the
House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or
a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V DACOYCOY
PARDO; April 29, 1999
FACTS
- Respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was charged with habitual
drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism before the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the Commission conducted
a formal investigation, and thereafter, promulgated its
resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge
of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the
Commission found respondent guilty of nepotism on two counts
as a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped
Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their
assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the
Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the
service.
- The Commission denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration.
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil
action for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set aside the
Civil Service Commissions resolutions. The Court of Appeals
then reversed and set aside the decision of the Civil Service
Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or
recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not
guilty of nepotism. The Court of Appeals further held that it is
"the person who recommends or appoints who should be
sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited act." It
likewise declared null and void the Civil Service Commissions
resolution dismissing him from the service.
- The Commission then filed an appeal via ceriorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES
1. WON respondent is guilty of nepotism
2. WON the Commission is the "party adversely affected by
the decision" of the Court of Appeals who may file an appeal
therefrom
HELD
1. YES
- Under the definition of nepotism (Section 59 of Executive
Order 292), one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is
issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
- the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended
or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or
the person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
- Respondent is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. He did not
appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver
and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades.
It was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of
the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr.
Daclag's authority to recommend the appointment of first level
positions such as watchmen, security guards, drivers, utility
workers, and casuals and emergency laborers for short
durations of three to six months was recommended by
respondent Dacoycoy and approved by DECS Regional
Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the provision that such positions
shall be under Mr. Daclags immediate supervision. Atty.
Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII,
Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. Mr.
Daclag also appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker.
However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds
are available for the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy
and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. On the
other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form
that his father was his next higher supervisor. The
circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious.
Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent
Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He
authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first
level employees under his immediate supervision. Then Mr.
Daclag recommended the appointment of respondents two
sons and placed them under respondents immediate
supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school.
Both positions are career positions.
- To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent
Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or recommending
authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is
guilty of nepotism.
- Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and
the efficiency of its personnel. The basic purpose or objective
of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that
the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one. The
Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the
prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If
not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be
nipped in the bud or bated whenever or wherever it raises its
ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is
not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding
civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of
corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing
legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or
circumvention of the law."
2. YES
- There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal
to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official
meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner
therein, here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil
Service Commission as public respondent as the government
agency tasked with the duty to enforce the constitutional and
statutory provisions on the civil service.
- Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of
nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent,
who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant
George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has
become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which
seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an
aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now
expressly abandon and overrule extant jurisprudence that
"the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to
the government employee against whom the administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not included are
"cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the
charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In other words, we
overrule prior decisions holding that the Civil Service
Law "does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative
charges."
- The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service
Commission, to support its ruling is misplaced. The issues in
Debulgado are whether a promotional appointment is covered
by the prohibition against nepotism or the prohibition applies
only to original appointments to the civil service, and whether
the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling
and disapproving the promotional appointment given to
petitioner after the Commission had earlier approved that
appointment. Debulgado never even impliedly limited the
coverage of the ban on nepotism to only the appointing or
recommending authority for appointing a relative. Precisely, in
Debulgado, the Court emphasized that Section 59 "means
exactly what it says in plain and ordinary language: x x x The
public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly fundamental in
importance, and the Court had neither authority nor inclination
to dilute that important public policy by introducing a
qualification here or a distinction there."
Decision Petition granted. The Court of Appeals' decision is
reversed and the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
are revived and affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [dissent and concur]
- Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with
the wisdom in which the issues relating to nepotism are
threshed out in the majority opinion, I do not agree with the
majority opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission may
appeal a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case
involving nepotism. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by
allowing even a private complainant and by implication, a
complainant office, to appeal a decision exonerating or
absolving a civil service employee of charges against, or even
imposing a penalty upon him. This totally contravenes our well-
settled ruling in several cases.
- The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the
charge of nepotism. From such adverse decision, the Civil
Service Commission, through its Office for Legal Affairs,
interposed the present appeal by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under existing
laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled
in the above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the
Court, the present decision might be misconstrued as a
watering down of the settled doctrine.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provision of law.
- A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as The
Philippine Civil Service Law shows that said law does not
contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges.
- Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
- "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more that thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office."
- Said provision must be read together with Section 39
paragraph (a) of P.D. 805 (should be 807) which contemplates:
"Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the
party adversely affected by the decision."
- The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers
to the government employee against whom the administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The remedy of
appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent
is found guilty of the charges against him. But when the
respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in the case, there
is no occasion for appeal.
- Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil
Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to
the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person
or the respondent employee who has been meted out the
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary
or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the
disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the
Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed
is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by
law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the
decision.
- It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine
whether this practice of disallowing appeals in cases of
exoneration should still continue or not, exclusively belongs to
Legislature. The Court cannot and should not arrogate this
policy-making power of Congress unto itself, not even in the
guise of the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review
under the 1987 Constitution. Only Congress has authority to
remedy inadequacies in the wisdom of a law, should it find any,
especially when the definite intention of the existing law was to
disallow the State to appeal from judgments of exoneration.
Any attempt by the Court to transgress this most basic principle
in the separation of powers between these two branches of
government would to my mind, result in the abhorrent act of
judicial legislation.
- Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
95 ordained that, appeals from awards, judgments or final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial
agency (which includes the Civil Service Commission) in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be taken by filing a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although
in general, appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals may be filed via a verified
petition for review on certiorari with this Court (where pure
questions of law, distinctly set forth therein, may be duly
raised), an appeal involving a judgment or final order of the
Court of Appeals exonerating a government employee in an
administrative case, in particular, falls within the ambit of the
provisions of Section 39, paragraph (a) of Presidential Decree
No. 807. It is elementary that a special law such as Presidential
Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of
procedure such as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. No appeal
may, therefore, be taken under Rule 45.
- Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an
administrative case which could result in the revocation of
license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from office,
constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature.
Being such, provisions of law pertaining thereto must perforce
be construed strictly against the State, just as penal laws are
strictly construed strictly against the State. Any ambiguity,
should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the
respondent in the administrative case. The term "party
adversely affected" should not be construed as to include the
State in administrative charges involving nepotism.
- To allow appeals from decisions, be they exonerative or
otherwise, against civil service employees would, to my mind,
be stocking the stakes too much against our civil servants. It
should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk of our
government workers are ordinary people, working under
supervision and, more often than not, exposed to political
pressure and the influence of peddlers of power. Their simple
status notwithstanding, they are not easily cowed and
intimidated. Many, though, are threatened with complaints,
transfer of station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding
of some unscrupulous superiors or politicians. I can, therefore,
understand why the law and our jurisprudence disallow appeal
by the complainant from decisions in administrative cases, be
they exonerative or otherwise. Verily, an employee may be
hounded into spending up to his last resources and losing his
self-respect and honor by successive appeals.
- What will happen, if for instance, the respondent government
employee is initially exonerated or given a light penalty, and the
complainant may appeal, insisting that the employee is guilty or
that he deserves a heavier penalty? And, if the Civil Service
Commission thereafter metes out a penalty not to the liking of
the complainant, the matter may still be elevated to the Court of
Appeals or even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not
in the physical and financial exhaustion of the respondent civil
servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak here of the
ordinary employees. The big shots in government who commit
wrongs may somehow hereby benefit, but then we shall be
content in concluding that we decided in favor of the many, that
the good of the majority prevailed.
- A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the
case of a judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service
Commission or the now defunct Merit System Protection
Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the government
agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This
is especially so when there had been lapses in the
interpretation and/or application of the law as in the present
case. This notwithstanding, the right to appeal, which is merely
statutory may not be invoked, much less exercised, when the
law does not provide any. Again, until and unless Congress
exercises its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is
bound by it and has no other recourse except to apply the
same. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for respondent, the
latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a similar
case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to
interpose any objection to an appeal may be deemed to have
waived this right.
- Premises considered and with the above observations, I vote
to grant the petition as stated in the dispositive thereof.
PUNO [concur]
- Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative
case is extended to the party adversely affected by the
decision, that is, the person of the respondent employee who
has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even
final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in
cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more
than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days
salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within
fifteen days from receipt of the decision.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provision of law.
- By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be
availed of only in a case where the respondent is found guilty
of the charges filed against him. But when the respondent is
exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no
occasion for appeal.
- The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to
the government employee against whom the administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may
take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
- With humility, I make the submission that is time to strike
down the doctrine disallowing appeals to the Civil Service
Commission when the decision exonerates a government
official or employee from an administrative charge. The
doctrine is principally based on a constricted interpretation of
Section 39 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law) which states:
Sec. 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by
the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen
days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be
decided within fifteen days. x x x
- According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase
party adversely affected by the decision refers alone to the
respondent government official or employee against whom the
administrative case is filed. They excluded from its compass
the party complainant whose charge is dismissed. Hence,
when the respondent government official or employee is
exonerated, the decision is deemed final as the party
complainant is precluded from appealing.
- I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation which is
not only too narrow but is subversive of the essence of our civil
service law. In the case at bar, private respondent is the
Vocational Administrator of the Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades. His charged with the offense of nepotism for the
appointment of two sons as driver and utility worker under his
immediate control and supervision. It is beyond argument that
nepotism is prohibited by our civil service law for it breeds
inefficiency, if not corruption, in government service. The critical
question, therefore, is: who has the standing to prevent the
violation of this law and protect public interest? I submit that a
taxpayer has the standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for
he has an interest that appointments in the civil service shall
be made only according to merit and fitness x x x. A taxpayer
has a right to good government and good government cannot
result from appointments determined by bloodlines. The Civil
Service Law itself recognizes that there are offenses which can
be the subject of a complaint by any private citizen. Thus,
Section 37 of the law allows any private citizen to file a
complaint against a government official or employee directly
with the Commission. Section 38 also recognizes that
administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the head of the department
or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government or
chiefs of agencies, or regional directors or upon sworn written
complaint of any other persons. The general rule is that
one who has a right to be heard has standing to seek
review of any ruling adverse to him . Hence, if a private
citizen has the right to file an administrative complaint, he must
also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his complaint,
unless the law clearly precludes his right of appeal for
indubitable policy reasons. A contrary rule will diminish the
value of the right to complain. The cases of Paredes, Mendez
and Magpale do not give any policy reasons why the
dismissal of a charge of nepotism cannot be appealed. They
merely resort to doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to
appeals. Such an approach goes against the rule that
preclusions of judicial review of administrative action . . . is not
lightly to be inferred.
- In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically
sanctioned by the Civil Service Law. For what the law
declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving
suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not
exceeding 30 days salary. But there is a clear policy reasons
for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve
minor offenses. They are numerous for they are the usual
offenses committed by government officials and employees. To
allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless overburden the
quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and
defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these
administrative agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty
offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be
over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The objective
should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous
decisions allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity
from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non
sequitur to contend that since some decisions exonerating
public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed, ergo,
even a decision acquitting a government official from a major
offense like nepotism cannot also be appealed.
- Similarly, the doctrine barring appeal cannot be justified by
the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission to review decisions involving: (1) suspension for
more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding
thirty (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4)
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Again, there is
nothing in this provision indicating legislative intent to bar
appeal from decisions exonerating a government official or
employee from nepotism. Statutory preclusion of appeals is the
exception rather than the rule, for as stressed by Mr. Justice
Douglas, "tolerance of judicial review has been more and more
the rule against the claim of administrative finality." Yet the
cases of Paredes, Mendez and Magpale precisely barred all
appeals despite lack of an explicit, positive provision in the Civil
Service Law.
- Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party
adversely affected to resort to judicial review. This case does
not involve the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission, i.e., whether or not it has the power to review a
decision exonerating a government official from a charge of
nepotism. The facts show that it was the Civil Service
Commission that at the first instance found Dacoycoy guilty of
nepotism. It was Dacoycoy who appealed the decision of the
Civil Service Commission to our regular court, more exactly,
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Court. As
Dacoycoy only impleaded Suan as respondent, the Court of
Appeals ordered that the Civil Service Commission should also
be impleaded as party respondent. The Court of Appeals then
reversed the Commission as it cleared Dacoycoy from the
charge of nepotism. The question therefore is whether or not
this Court is precluded from reviewing the decision of the Court
of Appeals on a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Again, I
submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this review.
Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has
even been expanded "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government." The question is not our lack of jurisdiction but
the prudential exercise of power. In certiorari cases alleging
grave abuse of discretion, our given task is to determine how
much is too much of an abuse.
- To my mind, it is also of de minimis importance that the
petition of thus Court was filed by the Civil Service
Commission. The records will reveal that Suan, the original
complainant, wrote to the Civil Service Commission urging it to
make the appeal ostensibly for lack of means. But even without
Suan, I submit that the nature of the issue in the case at
bar and its impact on the effectiveness of government
give the Civil Service Commission the standing to pursue
this appeal. The issue in the case at bar is basically a legal
one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of
nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court has the authoritative say
on how to interpret laws. Administrative agencies have always
conceded that the final interpretation of laws belongs to regular
courts. And the issue has broad implications on the merit and
fitness philosophy of our civil service system. Under Sec. 3,
Article IX (B) of our Constitution, it is the Civil Service
Commission that has oversight of our civil service system. It is
thus the party better equipped to argue the diverse dimensions
of the issue. It is also the most affected, for it has the duty not
to stand still when nepotic practices threaten the principle of
meritrocacy in our government. It seems to me self evident that
this type of injury to public interest can best be vindicated by
the Commission and not by a private person.
- There are other disturbing implication if we do not junk the
doctrine of non-reviewability of decisions exonerating
government officials from charges of nepotism. For one, the
doctrine unduly favors officials charged with nepotism, for while
we allow further review of their conviction, we disallow review
of their exoneration, regardless of the errors. This distorted rule
contravenes our distaste against nepotism, a practice whose
continuance can fatally erode faith in government. For another,
perpetuating a nepotic act, an evil that should be extirpated
wherever found, can never be the intent of our legislators who
crafted our Civil Service Law. For still another, completely
cutting off access to judicial review goes against the
spirit of the 1987 Constitution expanding the jurisdiction
of this Court. Putting up borders of non-reviewability
weakens the judiciarys checking power. Indeed,
shielding abusive administrative actions and decisions
from judicial oversight will ultimately erode the rule of
law. As Justice Brandeis opined, "supremacy of law demands
that there shall be an opportunity to have some court decide
whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the
proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted
regularly."
- I join the majority opinion.
ROMERO [dissent]
- Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality
to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating an
employee charged in an administrative case, which decision, in
effect, reversed and nullified the Commissions finding that the
respondent employee is guilty as charged?
- After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807
(otherwise known as the Civil Service Law), Executive Order
No. 292 (otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code
of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, I find no legal basis to support the
contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal
personality.
- The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency
of the government. Corollarily, it is equipped with the power
and function to hear and decide administrative cases instituted
by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of
its offices and the agencies attached to it. This is in
consonance with its authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law. It is thus
clear that the Civil Service Commission has been constituted
as a disciplining authority.
- Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to
who may appear before the Commission, thus:
"Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or employee by the following officials
and employees:
(a) Secretary of department;
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
(d) Chief of Agency;
(e) Regional Director; or
(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other
Person."
- Consequently, the complaint can either be the Secretary of
department, head of office of equivalent rank, head of a local
government unit, chief of agency, regional director or any other
person or party. The phrase any other party has been
understood to be a complainant other than the head of
department or office of equivalent rank or head of local
government or chiefs of agencies or regional directors.
- The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer
or employee. Nowhere can be found, expressly or impliedly, in
Section 34 of Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one of the parties, either
as complainant or respondent in an administrative case.
Logically and by necessary implication, it cannot considered
either a complaint or a respondent. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Based on the
foregoing, there is no other conclusion but that the Civil Service
Commission is not a party to an administrative proceeding
brought before it. As provided by Supreme Court Administrative
Circular 1-95, decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court, now to the Court of
Appeals, on certiorari by the aggrieved party. By inference, an
aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the complaint
before the Commission or the respondent, the person subject
of the complaint. In fact, the question as to who is an
aggrieved party has long been settled in a litany of cases. An
aggrieved party in an administrative case is the government
employee against whom an administrative complaint is filed.
The Civil Service Commission is definitely not a government
employee. Neither is it an agency against whom an
administrative charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in a
sense, the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative
proceedings before the Commission, it nevertheless is not the
"aggrieved party" contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or the Civil
Service Law.
- Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a
party, much less an aggrieved party, then indubitably, it has no
legal personality to elevate the case to the appellate authority.
The Commission, therefore, has no legal standing to file the
instant petition.
- While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered
a nominal party when its decision is brought before the Court of
Appeals, such is only a procedural formality. As with appellate
processes, a nominal party is not the aggrieved party. Its
inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact that the
decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed
and secondarily, for purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the
Commission in the performance of its quasi-judicial functions is
just like a judge who should "detach himself from cases where
his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison
detre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an active
combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing
parties to contend their individual positions and for the
appellate court to decide the issues without his active
participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to
be judicial and has become adversarial instead."
- I dissent from the ponencias conclusion that the Commission
may appeal a judgement of exoneration in an administrative
case involving nepotism in light of the foregoing disquisition.
ART IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
CIVIL SERVICE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
PANGANIBAN; April 3, 2001
FACTS
- Dr. Alfredo De Torres is UPLB Assoc Prof., who went on
vacation LOA w/o pay, during which he served as official rep to
the Centre on Integrated Rural Devt for Asia and the Pacific
(CIRDAP). CIRDAP requested UPLB for extension of LOA but
was denied by Director of ACCI of UPLB. The Director advised
De Torres to report for duty. Also. UPLB Chancellor de
Guzman apprised him on rules of Civil Service and possibility
of being considered AWOL. When De Torres wrote that he will
continue with CIRDAP, Chancellor warned that UPLB would be
forced to drop him fr rolls of personnel.
- After almost 5 yrs of absence w/o leave, De Torres wrote that
he was reporting back to duty at UPLB. Chancellor Villareal
said he should have come fr an approved leave. ACCI Director
said De Torres was considered AWOL and advised him to
reapply. But Chancellor Villareal reversed his stand and said
De Torres may report bec records do not show that he had
been officially dropped. ACCI requested ruling from Civil
Service Commission.
- CSC ruled that De Torres have been dropped fr service.
Petitioners sought recourse before the CA but the petition was
dismissed.
ISSUE
WON De Torres automatic separation from civil service was
valid
HELD
NO. Automatic dismissal was invalid.
- Section 33, Rule XVI of Revised Civil Service Rules speaks
of automatic separation even w/o prior notice and hearing.
- Quezon v. Borromeo: chief nurse of Iligan City Hospital
requested for two extensions of leave. Both granted. She
sought third extension. It was not acted upon. It was ruled that
she violated Sec 33. She was dropped.
- Isberto v. Raquiza: Employee, absent w/o official leave
ought to have known that he was deemed automatically
separated.
- Ramo v. Elefao: Petitioner was dropped fr service for her
failure to return to duty after expiration of leave of absence.
- There is sufficient notice when Chancellor advised petitioner
and warned of possibility of being considered AWOL. But in
those three cases, the petitioners were actually dropped. Here,
De Torres was never actually dropped. He remained in the
rolls. His salary was even increased several times during his
absence. His appointment was also reclassified. These are
acts inconsistent w/ separation. UP has chosen not to exercise
its prerogative to dismiss petitioner.
- Here, UP exercised academic freedom. It has power to
determine who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, who may be admitted to study. CSC has no authority to
dictate UP the outright dismissal of its personnel.
CUEVAS V BACAL
MENDOZA; December 6, 2000
FACTS
- Justice Cuevas, Executive Secretary Zamora, and Atty.
Demaisip v Atty. Bacal
- This case is a petition for certiorari of a previous ruling of the
Court of Appeals regarding the legality of the appointment and
transfer of Josefina Bacal to the Office of the Regional Director
of the Public Attorneys Office. Josefina Bacal is a Career
Executive Officer III which she alleges entitled her to the
position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office.
- Bacal passed the Career Executive Services Examinations in
1989 and on 1994 was conferred CES eligibility and was
appointed as Regional Director of the PAO. On January 5,
1995 she was appointed to the rank of CESO III and on
November 5, 1997 the Secretary of Justice appointed her as
Chief Public Attorney that was confirmed by President Ramos
on February 5, 1998, wherein she took her oath and assumed
office.
- On July 1, 1998 Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief Public
Defender by Pres. Estrada while Bacal was appointed Regional
Director without her consent. Demaisip took her oath of office
on the 7th of July. Bacal filed a petition quo warranto that
questioned her replacement to the Supreme Court that was
dismissed without prejudice for it to refiled in the Court of
Appeals. Court of Appeals ruled in Bacals favor.
ISSUES
1. WON the case should be dismissed for its failure to exhaust
administrative remedies through an appeal to the Office of the
President
2. WON Bacals removal amounted to a removal without cause
(which is illegal)
3. WON by the mere fact of being appointed would enable the
individual to acquire security of tenure
4. WON a Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted
from one office to another without violation of their right to
security of tenure as their status and salaries is based on their
ranks and not on their jobs
5. WON Demaisip has a security of tenure
HELD
1. No, because the administrative decision sought to be
reviewed is that of the President himself. No appeal need be
taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a
department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of
the former. In addition, exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply when the question raised is purely legal.
2. No, her appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney
requires her to be appointed to a CES Rank Level I which
never materialized. If the rank of an individual is not
appropriate to the position her appointment is deemed to be
temporary and she cannot claim security of tenure. The right to
tenure is conferred upon the individual filling the position based
on the possession of required qualifications. The general rule
would be that those who were qualified would be appointed,
but as an exception, those with insufficient qualifications may
be appointed but merely in an acting capacity.
3. No, security of tenure is acquired with respect to the rank
and not to the position. In addition, the guaranty of security of
tenure is applicable only to those in the first and second level in
the civil service.
4. No, reading through PD No. 1 that created the Integrated
Reorganization Plan, the Career Executive Service provides
that reassignments or transfers are allowed provided that it is
made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction
in the rank or salary of the individual and that this should not be
done more oftener than two years. If the individual deems it as
unjustified s/he may appeal to the President. The rule that an
employee can claim security of tenure is applicable only to
Election Registrars, Election Officers, also in the Commission
on Elections, and Revenue District Officers in thew Bureau of
Internal Revenues. Bacal was just CESO III therefore, she is
meant to qualify in the position where she was subsequently
appointed to which is Regional Director.
5. No, she does not. The security of tenure is also not
permanent following the same logic that was used for Bacal,
Demaisip having not acquired the qualification of CES Rank
Level I implies that her stay in the position is temporary.
CANONIZADO V AGUIRRE
GONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000
FACTS
- PETITITON to declare RA 8851 (RA 8551) unconstitutional
- the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) was originally
created under RA 6975 entitled An Act Establishing The
Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of
The Interior And Local Government, And For other Purposes.
- under RA 6975, petitioners Alexis Canonizado, Edgar Torres,
Rogelio Pureza, and respondents Jose Adiong and Dula Torres
were appointed as NAPOLCOM commissioners on Jan. 1991
for six year terms
- 3/6/1998: RA 8551, aka the Philippine National Police
Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998 took effect, declaring
the terms of the current commissioners expired
- the petitioners question the constitutionality of S4 of RA 8551
which amends S13 of RA 6975, altering the composition of
NAPOLCOM as well as S8, which removes them from office
and allegedly violates their security of tenure.
- as members of the civil service, the petitioners cannot be
removed from office except for causes provided by law, that
is, with legal cause and not merely for reasons deemed fit by
the appointing power
- the creation or abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function; Congress may abolish any office w/o
impairing the officers right to continue in his position. This
power may be exercised for reasons such as a lack of funds or
the interests of the economy; abolition must be made in good
faith, not personal or political reasons
ISSUES
1. WON there was a bona fide reorganization of NAPOLCOM
2. WON there was a valid abolition of the petitioners offices
HELD
1. NO. Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a
collegial body w/in the DILG, and under RA 8551 it was
defined as an agency attached to the Department for policy
and program coordination. This increase in the agencys
autonomy does not result in the creation of an entirely new
office. S4 of RA 8551amends the NAPOLCOMs composition
by adding the PNP Chief as an ex-officio member, requiring the
membership of 3 civilian commissioners, a fourth commissioner
from the law enforcement sector and at least one female
commissioner. Such changes are trivial and do not affect the
nature of the NAPOLCOM; in fact, the powers and duties of
NAPOLCOM remain unchanged. Reorganization only takes
place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of the
office including lines of control and authority and may involve a
reduction of personnel or abolition of offices if done in good
faith (economic purposes, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) Despite
the new law, NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially
the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory
and adjudicatory functions.
2. NO. Respondents stress that S8 of RA 8551 discloses
legislative intent to abolish NAPOLCOM pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization. As held in UP Board of Regents v. Rasul,
the removal of an incumbent is not justified if the functions of
the old and new positions are the same, that is, if there is no
true reorganization. The court finds that RA 8551 does not
expressly abolish the petitioners positions upon examination of
the changes introduced by the new law. In the event of a
reorganization done in good faith, no dismissal actually occurs
because the office itself ceases to exist. If the abolition merely
seeks to enact a change of nomenclature or attempt to
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
personnel, then the abolition is void a b initio. In the case at bar,
no bona fide reorganization had been mandated by congress;
hence, petitioners were removed from office with no legal
cause, making S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional, and entitling
them to immediate reinstatement.
Decision -Petition GRANTED, but only to the extent of
declaring S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for violating the
petitioners rights to security of tenure. Petitioners are entitled
to reinstatement.
GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
PARDO; December 13, 2000
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul
and set aside two decisions of the Commission on Audit
(COA)
- On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was
appointed as ad interim Commissioner of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) by then Pres. Ramos for a term expiring
Feb. 2, 1999. She assumed office after taking her oath and her
appointment was confirmed by Congress.
- Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner
sought clarification from the Office of the Pres. as to the expiry
date of her term of office. In reply, the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel (now Associate Justice) Corona, in a letter, opined that
petitioners term would expire on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2,
1999. She thus remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying
on the said advisory opinion.
- On Feb. 04, 1999, CSC Chairman Alma De Leon, requested
opinion from the COA on whether petitioner and her co-
terminous staff should continue to be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the fact that their appointment had already
expired. COA General Counsel issued an opinion that the
petitioners appointment had indeed expired.
- CSC Resident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in audit the
salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her staff,
a decision which petitioner appealed to the COA en banc. The
appeal was dismissed, COA affirmed the disallowance, and
held that the issue of petitioners term of office may be
addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which
had Feb. 02, 1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that the
Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her
term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of
the President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, she was
again denied; hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON petitioner Atty. Gamindes term of office, as
CSCommissioner, expired on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2, 2000
HELD
It expired on Feb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year term)
the count is:
Feb.02, 1987---Feb.02, 1992---Feb.02, 1999---Feb.02, imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory
2006
Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of
the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under
the 1987 Constitution must be on Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution in order to maintain the
regular interval of vacancy every 2 years consistent in the
previous appointment intervals.
Reasoning
- The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil
Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution
under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2). The 1973 Constitution introduced the
first system of a regular rotation or cycle in the membership of
the CSC (Art. XII Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy of the
Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of
a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and
members of the Commission on Elections (Art. X Sec. 1, 1935
Consti, as amended).
- In Republic v Imperial, it was said that the operation of the
rotational plan requires two conditions: (1) that the terms of the
first (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and,
(2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability
before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for
the unexpired balance of the term.
- Consequently, the terms of the first Chairman and
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the
1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of
the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of
the appointees, in order that the expirations of the firs terms of
7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-
year interval between the expiration of the terms.
- In the law of public officers, term of office is distinguished
from tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during
which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office
is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter
than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.
- Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent members
of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for
one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they
are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term,
what it contemplates is tenure not term. The term unless
provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Consti
Commissions shall continue for 1 year after ratification of the
Consti under their existing appointments at the discretion of the
appointing power who may cut short their tenure by reasons
the reasons stated therein. However, they do not affect the
term of office fixed in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational
interval for the 1st appointees.
Decision Term of office expired on Feb. 2, 1999. However,
petitioner served as de facto officer in good faith until Feb. 2,
2000 and thus entitled to receive her salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered. COA decision
disallowing salaries/emoluments is reversed.
Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of the
parties, Puno, concur (In the result), De Leon, Jr., Concurring
and Dissenting opinion
Mendoza, Joins De Leons dissent
SEPARATE OPINION
DE LEON [concur and dissent]
Dissents:
-the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2,
1999 as explained in ponencia.
-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed under
the 1987 Constitution commenced on the Feb. 2, 1988 not on
the date of its ratification on Feb. 2, 1987.
Concurs:
-that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as
CSCommissioner received after Feb. 2, 1999 should not be
disallowed by COA.
BLAQUERA V ALCALA
PURISIMA; September 11, 1998
FACTS
- G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are cases for
certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality and
validity of AO 29 and 268
- Petitioners are officials and employees of several government
departments and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for
the year 1992, pursuant to EO 292 otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292.
- In 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorized the
grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the
maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition
under Section 7 of AO 268 (issued by President Aquino) ,
enjoining said grants without prior approval of the President.
Section 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and
agencies which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity
Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount authorized under
Section 1 hereof to immediately cause the return/refund of the
excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned, who
are the herein Respondents, caused the deduction from
petitioners salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the alleged overpayments.
- To prevent the Respondents from making further deductions
from their salaries or allowances, the Petitioners have come
before this Court to seek relief.
- In G.R. No. 119597, the facts are different but the petition
poses a common issue with the other consolidated cases. The
Petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (ADEPT), is an association of
employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) who
were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year
1992 pursuant to RA 6971, otherwise known as the Productivity
Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however,
disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was
prohibited under AO 29. The disallowance of the bonus in
question was finally brought on appeal to the Commission on
Audit (COA) which denied the appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON with regard to G.R. No. 119597, Incentives under RA
6971 are applicable to ADEPT employees
2. WON AO 29 and 268 (being Presidential pronouncements)
are violative of the provisions of EO 292 (being a law passed
by the legislature), and hence null and void, and WON AO 29
and 268 unlawfully usurp the Constitutional authority granted
solely to the Civil Service Commission
3. WON the forced refund of incentive pay is an
unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation
4. WON assuming arguendo that the grant of incentives was
invalid, the same should be the personal liability of officials
directly responsible therefore in accordance with section 9 of
AO 268
HELD
1. There are generally two types of GOCCs:
1. Those incorporated under the general corporation
law. Employees of this type have the right to bargain
(collectively), strike, and other such remedies
available to workers of private corporations.
Functions are mainly proprietary.
2. Those with special charter (a.k.a. original charter),
which are subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right
to bargain (collectively). Incorporated in pursuance
of a State Policy.
- Only GOCCs incorporated under the general corporation law,
and thus performing proprietary functions, are included under
the coverage of RA 6791. GOCCs created in pursuance of a
policy of the state and those whose officers and employees are
covered by the Civil Service are expressly excluded.
- The legislative intent to place only GOCCs performing
proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971 is also
gleanable from the other provisions of the law making
reference to remedies available only to laborers akin to the
private sector.
- Also, pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987,
which provides for the establishment of Department or Agency
Employee Suggestions and Incentives Award Systems for
GOCCs with original charters, it is thus evident that the PTA is
already within the scope of an incentives award system.
2. In accordance with EO 292, the functions of the Civil Service
Commission have been decentralized to the offices and
agencies where such functions can be effectively performed;
specifically, the implementation of the Employee Suggestions
and Incentive Award System ahs been decentralized to the
President or to the head of each department or agency (as
his/her alter ego).
- The President is the head of government. His/her power
includes control over executive departments. Control means
the power to alter what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter. In issuing AO 29 limiting the
amount of benefits, enjoining heads of departments from
granting benefits without prior approval from him/her, and
directing the refund of any excess over the prescribed amount,
the President was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments. Specifically, seeing that the incentives
program was producing demoralization instead of the original
goal of encouragement, owing to the fact that employees not
receiving the incentives felt slighted and underappreciated, the
President merely exercised his power of control by modifying
the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits
without appropriate clearance from the Office of the President.
- Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the
authority of the Civil Service Commission to grant benefits to
government employees. AO 29 and 268 did not revoke, but
rather only regulated, the grant and amount of incentives.
3. Not all contracts entered into by the government will operate
as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made
between its sovereign and proprietary acts. The acts involved
in this case are governmental. Besides, incentive pay is in the
nature of a bonus, which is not a demandable or enforceable
obligation.
4. Absent a showing of bad faith, public officers are not
personally liable for damages resulting form the performance of
official duties.
Decision In upholding the Constitutionality of AO 268 and 29,
the Court reiterates the doctrine that in interpreting statutes,
that which will avoid a finding of unconstitutionality is to be
preferred.
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good
faith, the Court cannot countenance the refund of the
incentives which amount the petitioners have already received,
as a corollary, further deductions from salaries are thus
enjoined.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
PADILLA; May 5, 1994
FACTS
- Nature Petitions for prohibition to stop the threatened illegal
transfer, disbursement, and use of public funds in a manner
contrary to the Constitution and the law
- 18 April 1994: Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an
organization of barangays, represented by petitioner Alex
David (as taxpayer and as president and secretary-general of
the organization) filed this petition for prohibition, with prayer
for a temporary restraining order.
- 22 April 1994: Another petition raising the same issues were
filed.
- Petitioners question what they perceive as the threatened
illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of public funds in a
manner contrary to the Constitution and the law relative to the
conduct of the forthcoming barangay elections. They claim that
in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994, only
P137,878,000.00 were appropriated by the Congress for the
holding of the said elections. The petitioners claim that by early
1994, Congress itself has made the assessment that the
money is insufficient to defray cost of holding the elections.
Petitioners allege that in order to augment said amount,
respondents have threatened and are about to transfer/re-
allocate certain moneys to be sourced from the executive and
legislative branches of government to COMELEC, which in turn
will use it to fund the elections: [a] P180M from the
appropriation of the DILG, [b] P160M from the Countryside
Development Fund; P70M from the Senate; P30M from the
HReps; and [c] P43M from the Internal Revenue Allotments
(IRA) of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities (Note: This is the
scheme that is being assailed in the issue of this case)
- 21 April 1994: Court resolved to require respondents to
submit comment on the petition within the non-existentiable
period of 5 days
- 26 April 1994: Respondents through the Solicitor General filed
their comment. They claim that petitioners acted solely on the
basis of reports made in the newspaper (Barangay Poll Funds
Found article from the Manila Bulletin) and did not bother to
confirm the veracity of article. They also claim that said reports
were mere unofficial proposals/suggestions made in the
process of searching for funds. COMELEC further alleges that
that it intends to fund the barangay elections from the money
allotted by Congress for the purpose and from its own savings
resulting from unused funds. The Solicitor General supports the
stand of the respondents, as it is according to Sec. 25 (5),
Article VI of the Constitution and Sectoons 17 (Use of Savings)
and 19 (Meaning of Savings and Appropriations) of the GAA for
Fiscal Year 1994.
- Respondents also maintain that funds from LGUs may also DILG. (Note: This is based on the Opinion No. 51, s. 1994 of Jolo). Ballots rejected because of the wrong sequence
be used to help defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay Sec. of Justice which was cited as authority) code.
elections. They cite Opinion No. 51 of the Secretary of Justice, [b] Sections 17 and 19 of GAA for FY 1994 where it was stated > COMELEC issued Minute Resolution 98-1747 ordering
dated 19 April 1994, which says that under Sec. 50 of the that the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX manual recount in Pata. By 12 midnight of May 12, Atty.
Omnibus Election Code, LGUs are required to appropriate of the Constitutionare hereby authorized to augment any Tolentino had sent an en banc report to the COMELEC
funds for barangay elections item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other reommending manual recount in the whole province of Sulu
items of their respective appropriations. because it is possible that the same problem would extend
ISSUE Decision Petitions DISMISSED for lack of merit. to other provinces in Sulu.
WON the existence or lack of factual basis on WON the Voting 14 concur, no dissent. > The COMELEC approved of Atty. Tolentino's
impleaded public respondents are attempting, or intending to recommendation with the following implementation
effect the transfer of funds which would be in direct LOONG V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS procedures:
contravention of Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution 42 PUNO; April 14, 1999 + Counting machines from Jolo be transported to
Manila in the PICC to keep COMELEC away from
HELD FACTS bloodshed between AFP and MNLF
Any threat or attempt to pursue a transfer of funds scheme that - RA 8436 prescribed the adoption of an automated election + Authorize the official travel of the board of canvassers
exists only in newspaper reports is not sufficient factual basis system concerned for the conduct of the automated and
to render such scheme by the COMELEC unconstitutional. > Was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections in the manual operations of the counting of votes at PICC
Reasoning ARMM which includes Sulu + To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized
1. [a] The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was one, > Atty. Jose Tolentino was the head of the COMELEC Task representative of the political parties concerned and the
existed only in newspaper reports which could have misled the Force in Sulu candidate watchers both outside and inside the
general public, including the petitioners, into believing that the - Sulu voting readily peaceful except that there was a problem perimeters of the PICC
same emanated from impeccable sources. [b] Court with the automated counting of votes > May 15, 1998 COMELEC laid down rules for manual
acknowledges petitioners have displayed vigilance and acted > Discrepancies were reported (May 12, 1998) between the count through Minute Resoln 98-1796
with the best of intentions, but they should have first obtained election returns and the votes cast for mayor in the > May 18, 1998 Loong filed objection to Minute Resolution
an official statement or at least confirmation from respondents muncipality of Pata (later on confirmed when checked by 98-1796
as to the veracity of the report instead of relying on the Atty. Tolentino) + Violates provisions of RA 8436 providing for
newspaper article. > The automated counting of ballots in Pata were suspended automated counting of ballots in ARMM. Automated
2. The court went further in saying actually, in affirming the and the problem was immediately communicated to the count is mandatory and could not be substituted by
arguments of the respondents that consistent with Art. VI COMELEC technical experts manual counting.
Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, the following may be availed by > The problem was caused by the misalignment of the ovals + Ballots were rejected because ballots were tampered
the COMELEC to defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots but with and/or the texture was different from the official
elections: nothing was wrong with the machines. ballot
[a] Article IV of the Omnibus Election Code provides that LGUs - Emergency meeting called by Atty. Tolentino participated in + Counting machines designed in such a way as only
should appropriate funds for the barangay elections. by military police officials and local candidates. Petitioner genuine official ballots could be read by the machine
COMELEC may make arranges with local governments to Loong was among those who attended along with private + Other counting machines in other municipalities were
comply with this article pursuant to its constitutional authority to respondent Tan. in order.
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the > Discussed how ballots should be counted. > COMELEC still began with the manual count on May 18.
conduct of elections. COMELEC may also issue an appropriate > Shift to manual count recommended by Brig. Gen. > Loong filed petition for certiorari with Supreme Court:
directive for the province city, or municipality to advance Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director Alejandrino, + COMELEC issued Minute Resolutions without prior
election expenses that are chargeable to it. Since the President gubernatorial canddidates Tan and Tulawie and congressinal notice and hearing to him
exercises general supervision of all local governments, the candidate Tulawie + Order for manual counting violated RA 8346
COMELEC may course its directives to local governments > Automated count insisted by gubernatorial candidates + Manual counting gave opportunity to election
through the Office of the President and to be implemented by Loong and Jikiri. Written position papers were required to be cheating:
42 submitted. < Counting by human hands of fake, tampered and
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme > Local ballots in five municipalities were rejected by counterfeit ballots which machines were
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
automated machines (Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and programmed to reject
appropriations.
 < Opportunity to substite ballots in PICC
< 22 Board of Election Inspectors for 1,194
precincts gives sufficient time to change and
tamper ballots
< Opportunity to delay the proclamation of winning
candidates through dilatory moves in pre-
proclamation controversy because the returns and
certificates are already made by man
> Tan proclaimed winner in Sulu. Loong garnered 3 rd highest
votes.
ISSUES
1. WON petition for certiorari was appropriate remedy to
invalidate COMELEC resolutions
2. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdisction in order manual count
a. Is there legal basis for manual count?
b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
c. Was there denial of due process when COMELEC ordered
manual count?
3. Won it is proper to call for special election for the position of
Sulu governor assuming the manual count is illegal and result
is unreliable.
HELD
1. Certiorari is the proper remedy according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of
the Constitution
- Interpretation of RA 8436 must be made in relation the
COMELEC's broad power in Art. 9, Section 2(1) to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election.
- Adjudicatory for the petitioner, private respondent and
intervenor so there are enough considerations for the certiorari
jurisdiction.
2. No grave abuse of discrection amounting to lack of
jurisdiction because the post election realities show that the
order for the manual count was not arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical.
a. There was legal basis for the manual count.
- RA 8436 cannot be insisted upon after the machines
rejected the local ballots in five municipalities of Sulu. The
errors were not machine related by were because of the
ballots.
- Congress failed to provide for remedy when the error in
counting is not machine-related. The vacuum in the law
cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating the problem.
Article 9, Section 2(1) of the Constitution gives the
COMELEC the broad power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
b. There was reasonable factual basis.
- Automated machines failed to read the ballots correctly
in Pata. Local ballots in Jolo, Siasi, Tapal, Indanan and
Talipao were rejected.
> Flaws were carefully analyzed by COMELEC
experts and found nothing wrong with the machines
but with the ballots.
> To continue with the automated count would result
in a grossly erroneous result.
- COMELEC had to act derisively in order to restore peace
and order, especially since past election tensions have
been created by failures in automated counting. Military
and authorities recommended manual counting to
preserve peace and order.
c. There was no denial of due process when COMELEC
ordered the manual count.
- They were given every opportunity to oppose the manual
count of local ballots in Sulu.
> Orally heard
> Written position papers
> Representatives escorted transfer of ballots and
automated machines to Manila
> Watchers observed manual count
- The integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when
they were transferred from Sulu to Manila and when they
were manually counted.
- Manual count is reliable because when the COMELEC
ordered manual count, it issued corresponding rules and
regulations to govern the counting and the ballots were
not difficult to understand.
3. A special election for Sulu governor is improper.
- A special election only governs exceptional circumstances.
The plea can only be grounded on a failure of election.
> A failure of election applies when on account of force
majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes,
the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the dosing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission
of the election returns or in the custody of canvass
thereof.
> A plea for special election must also be addressed to
the COMELEC not to the SC (Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code should be read in relation to RA 7166).
> Grounds for failure of election involve questins after
the fact. They can only be determined by the
COMELEC en banc after due notice and hearing to the
parties. Loong did not do this in the present case. His
plea for special election was an afterthought.
- To hold a specal election would be discriminatory.
> All elected officials in Sulu now discharging functions.;
> Tan's election cannot be singled out as invalid for
alikes cannot be treated unalikes.
In addition
- COMELEC was organied under Comm. Act 607 in August
1940. The power to enforce election laws was originally vested
in the President and exercised through the Dept. of Interior.
- 1940 amendments to 1935 Constitution transformed the
COMELEC to a constitutional body. COMELEC was granted
power to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections.
- 1973 Constitution broadened powers of the COMELEC by
making it the sole judge of all election contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the national
legislature and elective provincial and city officials. It was
given judicial power asde from the traditional administrative
and executive functions.
- 1987 Constitution added powers to the COMELEC by
allowing it to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiative,
referenda and recalls. It also includes contets involving
elective municipal and barangay officals.
SANCHEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982
FACTS
- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran for
Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga
- Biliwang was proclaimed winner
- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null and
void the local elections due to alleged large scale terrorism
- Ultimately, the COMELEC found that after the voting was over
in the local elections, terrorism and irregularities were
committed- counters were threatened by armed goons and
policemen into making spurious election returns in favor of
Biliwang.
- Thus, COMELEC issued a resolution ordering:
1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the setting
aside of the proclamation of Biliwang
2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister and the
Batasang Pambansa the failure of election, so that remedial
legislation may be enacted, and pending such enactment,
the President/PM may appoint municipal officials in San
Fernando
- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution
certifying the failure of election, and praying instead that
COMELEC call a special election in San Fernando
- COMELEC denied reconsideration
- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC, which
were consolidated into the following issues:
ISSUES
1. WON the COMELEC has the power to annul an entire
municipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism
2. WON the COMELEC has the authority to call for a special
election
HELD
1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul
elections of municipal officials because, under Section 190 of
the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests
relative to elective municipal officials is vested in the CFI
- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting
COMELEC with authority to annul an election. Under the 1935
Constitution, the SC said that COMELEC did not have this
power, and that instead the power lay with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. Now, however, it is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa
and elective provincial and city officials. The COMELEC must
be deemed possessed of the authority, in line with its plenitude
of powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections.
2. COMELEC opined that it had no powers to order the holding
of a new or special election, because the actual election itself
took place, and in a proper, orderly fashion. According to
COMELEC, the Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 grants COMELEC
authority to call for a new or special election only in a failure of
election, but in this case, there was a failure to gauge the true
and genuine will of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of
election (tainted casting of ballots (failure of election) vs.
tainted counting of ballots (failure to gauge the will))
- SC: to state that this is not the failure of election contemplated
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 because elections did take place is
too tenuous a distinction. In practical effect, no election has
been held; there has been in truth and in fact, a failure to elect.
This interpretation only hampers the effectiveness of the
COMELEC and delays the opportunity to the voters to cast
their votes.
Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of the
COMELEC to annul an election and to call for a special
election.
UNIDO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BARREDO; April 3, 1981
FACTS
- Appeal by the UNIDO (a political org campaigning for "NO"
votes to amendments to the 1973 Consti proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa), from the resolutions of COMELEC dated
March 18 and March 22, 1981.
- 5 March 1981: COMELEC issued 3 Resolutions providing for
Rules and Regulations concerning the plebiscite campaign:
(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for equal opportunity on
free public discussions and debates;
(2) Resolution No.1468 providing for equal time on the use
of the broadcast media (radio & TV) <equal as to duration
and qualityat the same rates or given free of charge>; &
(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for equal space on the use
of the print media; but COMELEC recognizes the principle of
self-regulation & shall practice only minimal supervision.
- 10 March 1981: UNIDO writes to COMELEC re: news that
Pres. Marcos will lead the campaign for "Yes" votes in his 2-hr
nationwide "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-TV program on
March 12, which will be carried live by 26 television and 248
radio stations throughout the country. Citing the said
COMELEC resolutions, they demand exactly the same number
of TV and radio stations all over the country to campaign for
'No' votes.
- 17 March 1981: UNIDO writes a follow-up letter to
COMELEC, stating that on March 21, they will hold a public
meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, & requesting
that it covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M.
They expect COMELEC to direct the radio & TV facilities to
comply with their request.
- 18 March 1981: COMELEC issued Resolution saying
UNIDOs request "cannot be granted and is hereby denied" &
that
(1) 'Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo' is not a political or partisan
vehicle but an innovative system of participatory democracy
where the President as leader of the nation enunciates
certain programs or policies. Its format is intended to result
in effective multi-way consultation between the leader of the
nation and the people; and that
(2) UNIDO, not having the same constitutional prerogatives
vested in the President/Prime Minister, has no right to
'demand' equal coverage by media accorded President
Marcos but is free to enter into appropriate contracts with the
TV or radio stations concerned. COMEMEC cannot direct
these media to grant free use of their facilities.
- 20 March 1981: UNIDO writes another letter as MFR. Denied
by COMELEC for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal before SC.
Petitioner raises the following grounds:
(1) COMELEC resolutions in question are contrary to the
Constitution and the law, for being unjust, unfair &
inequitable. They violate the basic principles of equality,
good faith and fair play, & are not conducive to insure free,
orderly and honest elections;
(2) UNIDOs request/demand for equal broadcast media of
its public meeting/rally at Plaza Miranda was arbitrarily
denied. The campaign for NO votes should be granted the
same right & equal use of facilities granted Marcos
campaign for YES.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
HELD
for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent
Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than what
the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation
and/or privilege inherent in the head of state to directly
dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion
demands, for being impractical under prevailing circumstances,
and for its failure to join in the instant petition
indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of
jurisdiction to act , and for these alone among other reasons
which there is hardly time to state herein, the prayer in the
instant petition cannot be granted.
- The proposed changes of the Charter are of deep and
transcendental importance and the more the people are
adequately informed about the proposed amendments, their
exact meaning, implications and nuances, the better.
- Denial of due process is considered generally as the first and
the most valued right of everyone under the Bill of Rights.
UNIDO should have made the television and radio stations
(who will be directly affected by any injunction of the Comelec
upon SCs orders) parties to this case. Said parties are
indispensable without which the Court cannot proceed properly.
- In fact, petitioner has not shown, for apparently they have not
done so, that they have requested any TV or radio station to
give them the same time and style of "pulong-pulong" as that
which they afforded the President. Also, there are other groups
and aggrupations not to speak of individuals who are similarly
situated as petitioner who would also want to be heard.
- The "free orderly and honest elections" clause of the
Constitution is applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one
relative to constitutional amendments. It is indispensable that
they be properly characterized to be fair submission: the voters
must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of
conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with sufficient
understanding of what they are voting on.
- Nothing can be of more transcendental importance than to
vote in a constitutional plebiscite. It is the duty of the Comelec
to see to it that the sale of air time by TV and radio stations
insures that time equal as to duration and quality is available to
all contending views.
- Curtailment of the freedom of speech and the press of
television and radio stations is permissible for election
purposes.
- The head of state of every country in the world must from the
very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not
equally available to those who are opposed to him. When the
head of state wants to communicate on matters of public
concern, no government office or entity is obliged to give the
opposition the same facilities. They have to avail themselves of
their own resources.
- In instances where the head of state is at the same time the
president of the political party that is in power, it does not
necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he
dialogues with the governed. When the President spoke in
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" he spoke as President-Prime
Minister and not as head of the KBL, the political party now in
power.
- The petitioner had not adequately shown that COMELEC
acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Comelec has indeed
the power to supervise and regulate the mass media with
respect to the equal opportunity provisions, but such authority
arises only when there is a showing that any sector or member
of the media has denied to any party or person the right to
which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to
the media.
- There are other political parties similarly situated as petitioner.
To grant to petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow
that such other parties should also be granted. That would be
too much to expect from the media that has also its own right to
which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not supposed to dictate to
the media.
Decision Appeal dismissed.
CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BIDIN; July 3, 1992
FACTS
- Petition for the issuance of a TRO enjoining COMELEC from
proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate.
- May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case
"Francisco Chavez v. Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor
Chavez from running for Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections.
The petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the Comelec
praying that it (1) disseminate to all its agents and the general
public the resolution; and (2) order said election officials to
delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified
list of candidates, tally sheets, election returns and "to count
all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in
favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."
- May 8, 1992 - Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to
delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified
candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all
"Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation
of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On
Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of
qualified candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive
over the radio and TV ordering that all Chavez votes be
credited to the petitioner however it did not reach all the
precincts
- Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to perform its
mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166 which states that if
a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the
Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the name
of said candidate.
- Confusion arose as the "Chavez" votes were either declared
stray or invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors
(BEIs).As a result, "Chavez" votes were not credited in favor of
petitioner.
- May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing
all municipal and city election registrars throughout the country
to examine the minutes of voting submitted by the BEIs and to
credit all the "Chavez" votes, which have been declared stray
or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.
- Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile
because it did not reach all the various BEIs throughout the
country on time for implementation and that the minutes of
voting did not indicate the number of "Chavez" votes which
were declared stray or invalidated.
- May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the
respondent Comelec praying the latter to (1) implement its May
12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the
ballot boxes to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of
crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries
in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to
suspend the proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.
- Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on
his petition, petitioner filed this urgent petition for prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO,
enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest
senatorial candidate, without first implementing Comelec's
resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioner's
letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated
May 22, 1992. Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec
acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of
discretion.
- June 8, 1992, Sen Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of
the instant petition on the ground that the law does not allow
pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members
of the Senate.
ISSUE
1. WON SC has jurisdiction over the case
HELD
1. Jurisdiction
- The alleged inaction of Comelec in ordering the deletion of
Melchor Chavez's name in the list of qualified candidates does
not call for the exercise of the Court's function of judicial
review. The Court can review the decisions or orders of
the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion
committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial
powers and not those arising from the exercise of its
administrative functions.
- Comelec can administratively undo what it has
administratively left undone. Comelec has ordered the deletion
of Melchor Chavez's name not only on the official list of
candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet and
certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioner's allegation that
respondent Comelec failed to implement the resolutions does
not hold water.
- Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in
the nature of a pre-proclamation. While the Commission has
exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies
involving local elective officials, such are not allowed in
elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of
the House of Representatives.
- Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator, and Member of the House
of Representatives. - For purposes of the elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House
of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed
on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election returns or the
certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does
not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body
motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person
to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it.
xxx xxx xxx
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or
municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal certificates
of canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or
district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings."
What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or
election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections
thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers
and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings.
- The petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of
"manifest error's in the certificates of canvass or election
returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot
boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. He has
not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of
canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There
being none, the proper recourse is to file a regular election
protest which exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
- The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals'
jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective
Members is therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner
involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a
member of the Senate. Petitioner's proper recourse is to file a
regular election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
after the winning senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.
- Petitioner argues that a recount before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal would force him to shell out the expenses imposes not
only a property requirement for the enjoyment of the right to be
voted upon but also a price on the right of suffrage which would
ultimately stifle the sovereign will.
- The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right for
petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence,
engage in judicial legislation, amend the Constitution and alter
the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid
down by the existing law in cases like the one at bar must be
faithfully followed. The proper recourse is for petitioner to ask
not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial measures.
- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: " (1) Errors in the
appreciation of ballots by the board of inspectors are proper
subject for election protest and not for recount or
reappreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots is not
part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The
function of ballots appreciation is performed by the board
election inspectors at the precinct level. (3) The scope of pre-
proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated
under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete election returns whose
authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered
valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation
of the winning candidates.
"The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is
clearly not among the issues that may be raised in pre-
proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation
of "Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to
the correctness and authenticity of the election returns
canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has
granted the Comelec or the board of canvassers the
power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond
the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes
v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 1252, 1256)."
- Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the
certificates of canvass or election returns before the Comelec
which would warrant their correction.
Decision Premises considered, the Court Resolved to
DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
Narvasa, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Notes Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as "any
question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board
of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
the election returns." [Sec. 241, Omnibus Election Code).
BUAC AND BAUTISTA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND CAYETANO
PUNO; January 26, 2004
FACTS
- Buac and Bautista filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
to compel the COMELEC to take cognizance of contests
involving the conduct of a plebiscite and the annulment of its
result.
- In April 1988, a plebiscite was held to ratify the cityhood of
Taguig (converting Tagiug into a highly urbanized city). The
Plebiscite Board of Canvassers (PBOC), without completing
the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election returns, declared
that the No votes won, indicating that the people rejected the
conversion of Taguig into a city. However, upon order of the
COMELEC, the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass
of the plebiscite returns, eventually proclaiming that the
negative votes still prevailed.
- Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and
counting of votes, Buac and Bautista filed with the COMELEC
a petition seeking the annulment of the announced results of
the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the
ballots. The COMELEC treated the petition as an election
protest.
- Cayetano intervened in the case. He filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over an action involving the conduct of a plebiscite. He
alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election
protest, and such must be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
- COMELEC initially gave due course to the petition and ruled
that it had jurisdiction over the case, but this was overturned
completely upon the MFR of Cayetano.
ISSUE
WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide cases regarding
plebiscite contests.
HELD
YES
Ratio COMELEC has jurisdiction over plebiscite contest
contests as power to decide such cases is part of the power
vested by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC under Art.
IX(C) Sec. 2(1)43.
Reasoning: there are 7 reasons given.
1. Part of judicial power is the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. Under the present case, there is no
involvement of the violation of any legally demandable right,
for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the
electorate of Taguig.
2. Jurisdiction of RTC is only on civil actions. A Plebiscite is
NOT a civil action but a determination of public will.
3. To grant jurisdiction to RTC would result to jumbled justice.
There would be confusion if plebiscite contest cases were
given to the RTC for what if the plebiscite was a national
one. Every RTC in the Philippines would have jurisdiction
over nationwide plebiscite, which runs contrary to the
principle that jurisdiction of an RTC is limited to their region.
4. The Consti gives jurisdiction of contests involving only
election of officers to the courts (part of judicial function) or
to administrative tribunals (exercising quasi-judicial power).
As such, jurisdiction over plebiscite contests is not vested on
the courts.
5. The Constitutional mandate to COMELEC to enforce and
administer laws and regulations relative to conduct of
plebiscites (among others) includes the power to ascertain
the true results of such plebiscite. It includes the power to do
all that is necessary to achieve honest and credible
plebiscites.
*The provision granting COMELEC jurisdiction over contests
re: elected officials is not limiting in the sense that it only
limits quasi-judicial power of COMELEC to such cases. The
power to ascertain true results is implicit in its power to
enforce all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.
43
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
6. COMELEC is best suited to have jurisdiction over such
cases because of their indisputable expertise in election and
related laws.
7. MFR of Cayetano filed out of time (filed 10 days, not the
prescribed 5 days, after receipt of the Order or Resolution of
COMELEC).
Decision COMELEC directed to reinstate the petition to annul
the results and decide it without delay.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES [dissent]
- Quasi-judicial function of COMELEC is limited to contests
involving election of regional, provincial, and city officials
(limited to what the provision in the Consti said). As such,
jurisdiction must be granted to the RTC, since no other court or
agency has jurisdiction over it.
- Present contest is based on allegations of fraud and
irregularities, which involves a legal question that is
determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial body.
- There is also the involvement of a demandable right (right to a
canvass free from fraud, anomalies, and irregularities) which
arose from their right to to vote in a plebiscite.
- Jurisdiction is settled upon determining WoN there is
involvement of a judicial controversy or a purely administrative
function. In this case, it is clearly judicial.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENT WORKERS V MINISTER
OF LABOR
GUTIERREZ; August 3, 1983
FACTS
- Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a
registered labor federation while the other petitioners are its
affiliate unions with members from among the employees of the
following offices, schools, or government-owned or controlled
corporations: PNB, MWSS, GSIS, SSS, PVTA, PNC, PUP. The
workers in the respondent institutions have not directly
petitioned the heads of their respective offices or their
representatives in the Batasang Pambansa. They have acted
through a labor federation and its affiliated unions. The workers
and employees are taking collective action through a labor
federation which uses the bargaining power of organized labor
to secure increased compensation for its members.
- The petitioners contend that they should be included as
recipients of the P.D. 851 Christmas bonus which states:
SECTION 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all
their employees receiving a basic salary of
not more than P 1000 a month, regardless
of the nature of their employment, a 13 th-
month pay not later than December 24 of
every year.
SECTION 2. Employers already paying their employees
a 13th-month pay or its equivalent are not
covered by this Decree.
- Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 851
provides:
Section 3. Employees covered. The Decree shall apply to all
employers except to:
b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions,
including government-owned and controlled corporations,
except those corporations operating essentially as private
subsidiaries of the Government;
- The petitioners argue that regulations adopted under
legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of
the law and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. A legislative act cannot be amended by a
rule and an administrative officer (Minister of Labor) cannot
change the law.
ISSUE
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case;
2. WON branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government included among the
employers under PD 851 are required to pay all their
employees receiving a basic salary of less than P1000 13 th-
month pay;
3. Whether or not branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government are allowed to collectively
bargain for wages and benefits.
HELD
1. The Court does not have jurisdiction over the petition.
Reasoning The petitioners are faced with a procedural
barrier. The petition is one for declaratory relief, an action not
embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for petitioners
statement that the SC has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over declaratory relief suits where only questions of law are
concerned.
HOWEVER, the petition has far reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved.
2. Government employees are not entitled to 13 th -month
pay as provided in PD 851.
Ratio Unless so specified, the government does not fall within
the terms of any legislation or decree (STATCON).
Reasoning The Republic of the Philippines, as
sovereign, cannot be covered by a general term like employer
unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that
effect.
In fact, it has been expressly stated in Section 3 of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing PD 851 that Government
subdivisions, etc. are not covered by the Decree. The benefit is
extended only to employees of private companies/
corporations. In addition, Sec. 2 of PD 851 bars the petitioners
from receiving the bonus, since government offices have
instituted an across the board wage increase.
3. Public officers and employees may not join
associations which impose the obligation to engage in
concerted activities in order to get salaries, fringe
benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different
from that provided by law and regulation.
Reason ing Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law government workers cannot use
the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector
to secure concessions from their employers. The principle
behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial
peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations
between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. In government employment, it is the
legislature and the administrative heads (when properly
delegated the power) of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment.
- Under the present Constitution, government-owned or
controlled corporations are specifically mentioned as embraced
by the civil service (Section 1, Article XII-B). This was to correct
the situation where more favored employees of the government
could enjoy the benefits of two worlds. Salaries and fringe
benefits of those embraced by the civil service are fixed
by law. As such petitioners have no standing to bargain
collectively (or to bargain at all) for wages.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur pro hac vice]
- This is in conformity to the prevailing doctrine of statutory
construction that unless so specified, the government does not
fall within the terms of any legislation or decree.
- ART. XIII Sec. 1: Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility xxx
> Under the Constitution there can be no right to strike by
them nor to take a mass leave which is a way of doing
indirectly what is not legally allowable.
- Government workers cannot use the same weapons
employed by workers in the private sector to secure
concessions from employers (terms are fixed by law).
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- All the whereases are the premises of the decree requiring
all employers to pay all their employees receiving a basic
salary of not more than P1000 a month. All working masses,
without exception whether private sector or public, are also
suffering from ravages of inflation, and are entitled to properly
celebrate Christmas every year.
- Both the employees of the respondents and the employees of
the private sector are similarly situated and have collective
bargaining agreements with their respective employers.
NATIONAL SERVICE CO. V NLRC
PADILLA; November 29, 1988
FACTS
- Nature: Special civil actions for certiorari to review the
decision of the NLRC.
- Summary: In NASECO, the Court explained that the civil
service under the 1987 Const does not cover employees from
GOCCs organized as subsidiaries under the general
corporation law. Accordingly, employees in such GOCCs are
under NLRCs jurisdiction. By further implication, the auditing
power of COA does not apply over said GOCCs.
- Eugenia Credo was an employee of NASECO, a corporation
that provides manpower services to PNB and its agencies.
Because of certain administrative charges against her such as
discourtesy and insubordination, she was dismissed from
NASECO in 1983. In the same year Credo filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, which was eventually decided by the NLRC in
1984 in her favor.
- NASECO contends, among others, that the NLRC 44 has no
jurisdiction to order Credo's reinstatement. NASECO claims
that, as a GOCC [by virtue of its being a subsidiary of the
National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a
subsidiary of the PNB, which in turn is a GOCC], the terms and
conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In support of this
argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs.
Juco [134 SCRA 172 (1985)], where SC held that "employees
of GOCCs are governed by the civil service law.
ISSUE
For the purpose of determining whether the case falls under
the NLRC or CSC, WON NASECO (without original charter)
covered by the civil service as defined in the 1987 Constitution
HELD
- GOCCs without legislative charter shall not be deemed to be
embraced by the term civil service under the Constitution. By
implication, labor disputes in said GOCCs shall fall within the
jurisdiction of the NLRC. By further implication, the auditing
power of COA shall not apply to them.
Reasoning In the matter of coverage by the civil service of
GOCCs, the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973
Constitution, upon which NHC is based. Under the 1973 Const,
it was provided that
"[t]he civil service embraces every
instrumentality of the Government,
including every government-owned or
controlled corporation."
- On the other hand, the 1987 Const provides that [Art. IX-B,
Sec. 2(1)]
[t]he civil service embraces all
instrumentalities of the Government,
including government owned or controlled
corporations with original charters."
- Thus, the situation sought to be avoided by the 1973
Constitution and the NHC case regarding subsidiary
corporations created under the Corporation Code, whose
"officials and employees would be free from the strict
accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the
regulations of the Commission on Audit, appear relegated to
relative insignificance by the above 1987 Constitutional
provision. By clear implication [of Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)], the Civil
44
BRYAN_SJ: NLRC does not have jurisdiction over those covered by the CSC. It had
jurisdiction on labor issues of private corporations or broadly speaking, private businesses.
Service does not include GOCCs which are organized as
subsidiaries of GOCCs under the general corporation law.45
- On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs
the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the
time of [SCs] decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to
accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the
NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a GOCC
without original charter.46 NLRC decision affirmed.
CRISTOBAL V MELCHOR
MUNOZ-PALMA; July 29, 1977
FACTS
- Jose Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary
in the President's Private Office in Malacaan, having been
appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of
P4,188.00 per annum. On the second week of January, 1962,
the then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc, thru a letter,
informed the plaintiff that his services as private secretary in
the President's Private Office were terminated effective
January 1, 1962. A similar letter was addressed by Sec. Mutuc
to some other employees in the Office of the President (OP).
The dismissed employees appealed to the President by means
of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962 for a
reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a letter
dated February 21, 1962, their request for reconsideration was
denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting 'by authority of the
President'.
- On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were
separated (excluding Cristobal) filed a civil action before the
CFI of Manila against Secretary Mutuc and the Cash
Disbursing Officer of the OP praying for reinstatement and the
payment of their salaries effective as of January 1, 1962. From
a judgment dismissing their complaint, the said employees
appealed to the Supreme Court which rendered a decision
promulgated on November 29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of
their complaint and declaring their removal from office as illegal
and contrary to law, and ordering their reinstatement and the
payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date
of their actual reinstatement.
45
BRYAN_SJ: A corporation can be created generally in two ways: by incorporation under the
Corporation Code , or by special law . Corporations created by special law are also called
corporations with special/original charters.
46
BRYAN_SJ: What the Court seems to mean is that although PNB has an original charter,
and hence covered by civil service law, NASECO (as PNBs sub-subsidiary) was organized
under the Corporation Code. Hence, NASECO is under NLRCs jurisdiction.
- Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul
Ingles, et al was still pending in the CFI of Manila, the
dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to
their positions in the OP, without prejudice to the continuation
of their civil action. With respect to the other employees who
were not reinstated Cristobal included, efforts were exerted
by Sec. Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacaan so
that they may be reemployed. Cristobal waited for Sec. Mutuc
to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the
service, until the latter was replaced by other executive
secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance to
be reemployed at the opportune time.
- After the decision of the SC promulgated on November 29,
1968, the plaintiff addressed a letter to the OP dated January
19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former position and
the payment of salary from January 1, 1962 up to the time of
actual reinstatement, supposedly in accordance with said
decision. This request was denied repeatedly by the OP in
successive letters addressed to the plaintiff dated September
1, 1969, January 19, 1970, April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970, and
May 19, 1971, the last of which declared the matter 'definitely
closed',
- Consequently, Cristobal filed on August 10, 1971, with the CFI
of Manila a complaint against then Exec. Sec. Alejandro
Melchor and Federico Arcala, Cash Disbursing Officer of the
OP, and praying for the following: 1. Declaring his dismissal as
illegal and contrary to law; 2. Ordering Sec. Melchor to certify
his name in the payroll of the OP, to be retroactive as of
January 1, 1962, the effective date that he was illegally
dismissed from the service; 3. Ordering Arcala to pay all the
emoluments and/or salary to which the plaintiff is entitled
effective as of January 1, 1962; and 4. Ordering them to allow
him to continue with the performance of his duties in the
Secretary Office Staff, Office of the President of the Philippines.
- The defendants, represented by the Solicitor General alleged
that Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have
abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper
proceedings to assert his right within one year from the date of
separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
he having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine
years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and
therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his
employment.
- On May 18, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint reasoning that: Section 16 of Rule 66
of the Rules of Court expressly provides that an action against
a public office or employee may not be filed for the plaintiffs
ouster from office unless the same is commenced within one
year after the cause of the ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to
hold much office or position arose. This period of one year is a
condition precedent for the existence of the cause of action for
quo warranto. The rationale of this doctrine is that the
Government must be immediately informed or advised if any
person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the civil
service, as against another actually holding- it, so that the
Government may not be faced with the predicament of having
to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding the
office although illegally, and another for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so. The fact that the
petitioner sought to pursue administrative remedies to secure
his reinstatement does not excuse the failure to file the action
within the one year period.
ISSUE
WON Cristobal has abandoned his right to seek judicial relief
for not having filed his complaint within the one-year period
provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
HELD
NO. The Court agrees that in actions of quo warranto involving
right to an office, the action must be instituted within the period
of one year from the time the cause of action arose; Persons
claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally
dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said
office and that if they do not do so within a period of one year,
they shall be considered as having lost their right thereto by
abandonment. However, this doctrine of laches (laches is
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it ) which is invoked to defeat
Cristobal's suit, is not applicable in this case. There are certain
exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out
of the rule.
Reasoning
1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of
Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right to
reinstatement in office.
> Upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962 advising him of
his separation from the service, Cristobal, with the other
dismissed employees, sought reconsideration in a letter dated
January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Sec.
Mutuc that he was a civil eligible employee with eight years of
service in the government and consequently entitled to security
of tenure under the Constitution. This was followed by another
letter of January 26, 1962. Reconsideration having been
denied, a complaint was filed on March 24, 1962, with the CFI
of Manila entitled Ingles vs. Mutuc, which prayed for
reinstatement and payment of salaries as of January 1, 1962,
wherein the SC held that the removal of the plaintiff-employees
was illegal and contrary to law and that they were entitled to be
reinstated with payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962
up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
> Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is
true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his cause of action.
During the pendency of the civil case, Cristobal continued to
press his request for reinstatement together with the other
employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact
promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later.
More importantly, Cristobal could be expected - without
necessarily spending time and money by going to court - to
relic upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to
protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to
that of the plaintiffs therein and the identifical relief being
sought.
2. It was an act of the government through its responsible
officials more particularly then Sec. Mutuc and his successors
which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's
present complaint for reinstatement.
> After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed
employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek
reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that Sec. Mutuc
assured the employees that without prejudice to the
continuation of the civil action, he would work for their
reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the dismissed employees
were recalled to their respective positions in the OP among
whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others
who were not parties therein. Sec. Mutuc even tried to place
the others outside of the Malacaan Office. In the meantime,
however, Sec. Mutuc was replaced by other Exec. Secretaries
to whom Cristobal over and over again presented his request
for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that
Cristobal would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportune
time".
> It was this continued promise of the government officials
concerned which led Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the
Office of the President to comply with its commitment.
Furthermore, he had behind him the decision of the Supreme
Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed should be applied
in his favor. But when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters,
received the letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the
President denying his reinstatement and declaring the matter
"definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in
court within one year from his separation, it was only then that
he saw the necessity of seeking redress from the courts.
> Surely, it would now be the height of inequity and injustice, if
after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the
word and promises of the former Executive Secretaries who
dealt with him and who preceded the herein respondent Sec.
Melchor, that the court hold that he lost his right to seek relief
because of lapse of time.
3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on
the strength of the Supreme Court's decision in Ingles vs.
Mutuc.
> In Ingles, the defendants maintained that the principal issue
in the case was whether or not the employees were occupying
positions primarily confidential in nature and therefore subject
to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that
this issue was to be resolved in the affirmative. The Court held:
that one holding in the government a primarily
confidential position is "in the Civil Service" and that
"officers or employees in the unclassified" as well as
"those in the classified service" are protected by the
provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee
in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII,
1935 Constitution); that while the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of
the appointing power and such pleasure turns into
displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or
"dismissed" but that his term merely "expires"; that there
was no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of the
dismissed employees were "primarily confidential" in nature
and on the contrary the compensation attached and the
designation given thereto suggest the purely or at least mainly
clerical nature of their work; and consequently, considering that
the dismissed employees were admittedly civil service eligibles
with several years of service in the Government, their removal
from office was "illegal and contrary to law".
> No evidence was adduced by the government to show that
Cristobal's position was "primarily confidential". On the contrary
as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc, the compensation
attached to his item and the designation of the position indicate
the purely clerical nature of his functions. In fact, none of the
letters sent to him from the OP ever indicated that he was
holding his position at the pleasure of the appointing power or
that his services were terminated because his term of office
had "expired". The only reason given - and this appears in the
letter of September 1, 1969 from the OP - was that he failed to
institute the proper proceeding to assert his right, if any, to the
position within the period of one year from the date of
termination and under settled jurisprudence he is deemed to
have abandoned his right to said office or acquiesced in his
removal.
> In granting relief to the Cristobal on the matter of back
salaries, however, there is no proof to show that from January
1, 1962 up to the promulgation of this decision, Cristobal at no
time worked or was employed at some other office. The court
cannot ignore the probability of Cristobal's having sought
employment elsewhere during that period to support himself
and his family. Considering the lapse of almost nine years
before he filed this suit, the resolved to grant back salaries at
the rate last received by him only for a period of five (5) years
without qualification and deduction.
> The Public Officials concerned are directed to reinstate Jose
Cristobal, either in the OP or in some other government office,
to any position for which he is qualified by reason of his civil
service eligibility, subject to present requirements of age and
physical fitness; and to pay him back salaries for a period of 5
years at the rate of P4,188.00 per annum without qualification
and deduction.
Decision Decision set aside.
ACOLOLA V TANTUICO
SANTOS; June 27, 1978
FACTS
- Nature ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari, mandamus with
preliminary injunction.
- Petitioner Arturo A. Acolola was assigned as Provincial
Auditor of Capiz on April 16, 1972. Sometime before December
12, 1972, an administrative complaint was filed against him
charging him with various irregularities in connection with
the discharge of his duties . The complaint was subsequently
dismissed.
- On December 27, 1974 he was again administratively
charged with offenses ranging from " misconduct, neglect of
duty to incompetence in the performance of official
duties ," which charges were likewise dismissed.
- On December 3, 1976, while petitioner was assigned as
Acting Highway Engineering District Auditor of Romblon ,
private respondent Horacio A. Martinez, a contractor of
Public Works Project in the province of Romblon, filed another
complaint against petitioner charging him, this time, with
(1) Delaying action on payment of vouchers.
(2) Delaying action on request for inspection of
accomplished work:
(3) Refusal to assign an auditor's representative to check
deliveries of materials at job sites at the time of deliveries;
(4) Piecemeal suspension of vouchers:
(5) Demanding free transportation and meals when on
inspection of materials delivered or work accomplished, and
(6) Demanding P24,000 cost of plane fare for his twin
daughter's trip to the United States.
- Upon the recommendation of the Civil Security Office of the
Commission on Audit, an entrapment scheme was devised and
executed on December 15, 1976. Petitioner was apprehended
by the PC Provincial Command in the act of receiving from
complainant Horacio A. Martinez, the amount of P2,000.00 in
marked P20 bills as bribe money, while he was about to enter
his room at the Seaside Hotel.
- On January 12, 1977, a formal administrative charge was
preferred against him. At the same time the preventive
suspension of petitioner was ordered by the respondent
pursuant to Section 41, Presidential Decree No. 807.
Respondent, now petitioner, answered the charge.
- On May 12, 1977, petitioner was summarily dismissed
from the service , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807 ,
dated October 6, 1975. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
praying for a formal investigation denied, appeals to Court,
seeking: (1) the review and reversal of the order of May 27,
1977 of the Acting Chairman Cormnission on Audit, (Hon.
Francisco S. Tantuico Jr.) summarily dismissing him from the
service, on the grounds that respondent acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
and the said order is violative of his constitutional rights; and
(2) his reinstatement to his former position. Petition was given
due course, respondents required to file their comments, TRO
issued.
- On March 18, 1978, the Solicitor General for and in behalf of
respondent Tantuico, Chairman of COA, filed the required
comment and prayed that the petition be dismissed for lack of
merit. Petitioner filed his rejoinder (should be reply) to the said
comment on April 20, 1978.
ISSUE
WON the respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
could summarily dismiss petitioner pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 807.
HELD
Ratio Yes, the respondent Chairman of COA could summarily
dismiss petitioner Pursuant to PD 807.
Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specifically provides:
"SEC. 40. Summary Proceedings.-No formal investigation is
necessary and the respondent may be immediately removed or
dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is
strong.
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been
repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to
believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
- Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining authority shall
be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the end that
no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal
except those by the President, himself, or upon his order, may
be appealed to the Commission."
- Petitioner was caught red-handed by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary in the entrapment operations, and the evidence
against him was over whelming which warranted his summary
dismissal from the service under PD 807. The seriousness of
the offense charged, the circumstances surrounding its
commission and the evidence of guilt, being overwhelming and
indubitably strong, the interest of the public service demanded
the drastic remedy of summary dismissal, which respondent
Chairman of the Commission -on Audit judiciously took against
petitioner.
Decision Petition DISMISSEd for lack of merit. TRO LIFTED
and SET ASIDE.
Voting 4 concur: Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and
Aquino
1 on official leave: Concepcion Jr.
SANDIGANBAYAN
NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNANDO; January 30, 1982
FACTS
- Petitioner Rufino Nuez was accused before the
Sandiganbayan of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents committed in connivance with his other
co-accused, all public officials
- Informations were filed on February 21 and March 26, 1979
- On May 15, petitioner filed a motion to quash on constitutional
and jurisdictional grounds
- Respondent court denied the motion, as well as the MFR
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
SC, assailing the validity of PD 1486, as amended by PD 1606,
creating the Sandiganbayan
ISSUE
WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative
of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses
of the Constitution
HELD
Petition dismissed. Petitioner has been unable to make a case
calling for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 1486, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1606.
Ratio
On the equal protection clause of the Constitution
- Petitioners premise is that the Sandiganbayan proceedings
violates petitioners right to equal protection because:
> Appeal, as a matter of right, became minimized into a
matter of discretion
> Appeal was limited to questions of law, excluding a review
of facts and trial evidence
> There is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari
to the SC, instead of the traditional two chances
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a
matter of right covering questions of law and of facts, and
to two appellate courts (CA and SC)
- Classification satisfies the test announced by this court in
People v. Vera
> Must be based on substantial distinction
> Must be germane to the purposes of the law
> Must not be limited to existing conditions only and must
apply equally to each member of the class
- The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of
a special court, in response to problem, namely, the dishonesty
in the public service.
- Petitioners, should therefore have anticipated that a different
procedure that would be prescribed for that tribunal would not
be violative of the equal protection clause
- The general guarantees of the Bill of Rights must give way to
specific provisions of the Constitution, for the promotion of the
general welfare, which is the end of the law
On the ex post facto provision of the Constitution
- Petitioners contention that the challenged Presidential
Decree is contrary to the ex post facto law is premised on the
allegation that petitioners right of appeal is being diluted or
eroded efficacy wise.
- Justice Makasiar, in the Kay Villegas Kami decision, defined
an ex post facto law as one which:
> makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an
act
> aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when
committed
> changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed
> alters the legal rules on evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense
> assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful
> deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty
- the lawful protection to which an accused has become
entitled is qualified, not given a broad scope
- the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to
appeal can hardly be argued to be embraced therein
- the test to whether the ex post facto law is disregarded, in the
language of Justice Harlan in Thompson v. Utah, is taking from
an accused any right that was regarded, at the time of the
adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life
and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him
- the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal does not
deprive the petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his
liberty
- his innocence or guilt is passed upon by a three-judge court,
where a unanimous vote is required
- if convicted, the SC has the duty to see whether any error of
law was committed
- the SC in determining whether to give due course to the
petition for review must be convinced that the constitutional
presumption of innocence has been overcome
- SC carefully scrutinizes whether the quantum of evidence
required for a finding of guilt has been satisfied
- It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the
omission of the CA as a reviewing authority results in the loss
of vital protection of liberty.
On the due process clause of the Constitution
- Petitioner alleges lack of fairness
- In Arnault v. Pecson, the court declared that what is required
for compliance with the due process mandate in criminal
proceedings is a fair and impartial trial and reasonable
opportunity for the preparation of defense
- In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the
accused is informed as to why he is proceeded against and
what charge he has to meet, with his conviction being made to
rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full
opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed
in accordance with a valid law.
- If an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly process
of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment
awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has
had due process of law.
the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new
ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; May 19, 1988
FACTS
GR Nos. 79690-707
- Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar (Antique Governor) sought to
restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales
from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal
cases Nos. 12159 12161 and 12163-12177
- Petitioner alleged that said cases were filed by Tanodbayan
without legal and constitutional authority since the 1987
Constitution conferred upon the Ombudsman (not the present
Tanodbayan) the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan
GR No. 80578
- Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, on substantially the same grounds
as first petition, sought to restrain Tanodbayan Gonzales from
conducting preliminary investigations and filing similar cases
with the Sandiganbayan
ISSUES
1, WON the Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, have
the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and direct
the filing of cases with the Sandiganbayan
HELD
NO. The incumbent Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution
is without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan
- The Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, has been
transformed into the Office of the Special Prosecutor which
shall continue to function and exercise its powers provided by
law, EXCEPT those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the sam Constitution (1987).
- The 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman as
distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan has the
duty to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
- The Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzales) is thus a subordinate
of the Tanodbayan(Ombudsman) and can investigate and
prosecute cases only upon the latters authority or orders.
Obiter Raul Gonzales does not remain as Ombudsman in as
much as he has not been replaced because he has never been
creation under Article XI of the 1987 constitution different from
the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
EXPORT PROCESING ZONE AUTHORITY V
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
GRINO-AQUINO; April 14, 1992
FACTS
- Nature Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition to
review the orders of the Commission on Human Rights
- P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain
parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the
Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ). The area was
divided into four four Phases and Phase IV was bought by Filoil
and was later sold to EPZA.
- Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several
individuals, had entered the premises and planted agricultural
products therein without permission from EPZA or Filoil. To
convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA paid a P10K-
financial assistance to those who accepted the same and
signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and
Alfredo Aledia, the father of the respondent Loreto Aledia.
- Ten years later, the private respondents filed in CHR a joint
complaint praying for justice and other reliefs and remedies.
The CHR conducted an investigation.
- According to CHR, EPZA, together with help of PNP,
bulldozed and level the area, despite the fact that the
occupants presented a letter from the Office of the President of
the Phil ordering postponement of bulldozing.
- Because of this, the CHR issued an Order of injunction to
desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism and
harassment until further orders from the CHR and to appear
before the Commission for a dialogue.
- However, the same group again bulldozed the area and
allegedly handcuffed private respondent Valles, pointed their
firearms at others and fired a shot in the air.
- The CHR issued another injunction Order reiterating the same
order.
- Procedure
1. EPZA filed in CHR a motion to lift the Order of injunction
for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary
restraining orders but this was denied.
2. EPZA filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for issuance of restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction. It was granted by the Court.
3. CHR filed a Motion to lift the restraining order contending
that CHR has the power not only to investigate but also to
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the under privileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection (Art. 13 Sec. 18, 1987 Consti)
ISSUE
WON the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or
restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to
compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of
HELD
NO. Not being a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body,
the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction, for it may only be issued by the judge of any court in
which the action is pending (within his district), or by a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court or by the
judge of the Regional Trial Court.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
- In Hon. Isidro Carino vs. CHR the Court held that the CHR is
not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. Fact-
finding function is different from adjudication and cannot be
likened to a judicial function.
2, textual interpretation of the text - plain meaning
- The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the under
privileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the
Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for,
if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly
said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
la. It is never derived by implication.
- preventive measures and legal aid services refer ti
extrajudicial and judicial remedies which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims.
Decision The petition for certiorari and prohibition is
GRANTED. Orders of injunction of CHR are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. TRO which the Court issued is made
PERMANENT.
ART XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
KRIVENKO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
MORAN; November 15, 1947
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS
BELLOSILLO; February 3, 1997
FACTS
- Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to
51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC
which owns the historic Manila Hotel. In a closed bidding held
on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51 % of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT Sheraton as its hotel operator, which
bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner
in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995
matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995
petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for
Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to
match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad
which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
- On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that
the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came
to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October
1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the
Malaysian firm. On 10 September 1996 the instant case was
accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by the
First Division.
- The petitioner argues the following:
1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippines heritage and culture. To all intents and purpose, it
has become a part of the national patrimony.
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the
MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of
the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to
which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution,
applies.
3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is
part of the national patrimony and its business also
unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner
should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the
Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any
reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
 Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders
that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share.
- Respondents maintain that:
1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a
self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s). Thus, for the said provision to operate, there
must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which
business may be done."
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel
does not fall under the term national patrimony which only
refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna
and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive
marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs of
Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. While petitioner speaks of
the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that
have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these
alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the
nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is
addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from
the Philippines as a State.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national
patrimony, the constitutional provision invoked is still
inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building
nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51%
of the equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the
national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of the shares
of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner
should have questioned it right from the beginning and not
after it had lost in the bidding.
4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. I., of the
bidding rules which provides that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares,
GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders
are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege
of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares.
5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of
discretion should fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise
its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it
did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for
mandamus should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to
what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative
duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
ISSUES
1. WON Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
non-self-executing
2. WON the Manila Hotel falls under the term national
patrimony
3. WON 51% of the equity of MHC can be considered part of
national patrimony
4. WON petitioner should be allowed to match the highest bid
5. WON GSIS committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD
1. NO. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature
discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a
way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but
simply for purposes of style. The argument of respondents that
the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art. XII
is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos,
as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to
regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori,
by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-
executing as it does not by its language require any legislation
in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and
which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable.
2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national
patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed
with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily,
Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony.
3. YES. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or
owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Respondents further argue that the
constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to
respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and
distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of
persons distinct from the government are considered "state
action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it
engages in is a "public function"; (2) when the government is
so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident
that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and third categories
of "state action." Therefore the transaction, although entered
into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State
and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The
bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall
only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest
bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they
under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by
the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested
parties. Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules provides that [i]f
for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block
of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share. The constitutional mandate itself is reason enough
not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the
highest, bid. Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a
public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that
the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are
to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of
the 1987 Constitution. The argument of respondents that
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that
a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the
bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no
Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the
highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before
us, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the
bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had
not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Only after it
had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did
the latter have a cause of action.
5. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price
tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules,
respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to
petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and
procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with
petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has
matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Voting Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco,
and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur with the main opinion.
Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur]
- Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony" consists of
the natural resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in
our territory (Article 1) consisting of land, sea, and air. The
concept of national patrimony has been viewed as referring not
only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. The Manila Hotel is very much a part of
our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional
protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation.
This institution has played an important role in our nation's
history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and
serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House
for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and
others.
- "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must
refer not only to things that are peripheral, collateral, or
tangential. It must touch and affect the very "heart of the
existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of
things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to
qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or
equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not
operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and the non-
Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly
be made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference
should give the qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or
equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference
of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
VITUG [separate]
- The provision in our fundamental law which provides that "(i)n
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-executory. The provision
does not need, although it can obviously be amplified or
regulated by, an enabling law or a set of rules.
- The term "patrimony" does not merely refer to the country's
natural resources but also to its cultural heritage. A "historical
landmark, Manila Hotel has now indeed become part of
Philippine heritage.
- The act of the GSIS, a government entity which derives its
authority from the State, in selling 51% of its share in MHC
should be considered an act of the State subject to the
Constitutional mandate.
- On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified
Filipinos," the only meaningful preference would really be to
allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid. The
magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible
for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone,
under the dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.
MENDOZA [separate opinion in the judgment]
- The only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos" is to allow petitioner Philippine corporation to equal
the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase
of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila Hotel
Corporation.
- We are dealing here not with common trades or common
means of livelihood which are open to aliens in our midst, but
with the sale of government property, which is like the grant of
government largess or benefits. Therefore no one should
begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens.
- Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a
Filipino bidder to match the highest bid of an alien could
encourage speculation, since all the Filipino entity would then
do would be not to make a bid or make only a token one and,
after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest
bid, make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not
possible under the rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under
these rules there is a minimum bid required. If the Filipino
entity, after passing the prequalification process, does not
submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of
the foreign firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those
who have "validly submitted bids."
TORRES [separate]
- History, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and
is the product of events, customs, usages and practices. It is
actually a product of growth and acceptance by the collective
mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila
Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. The Manila
Hotel is witness to historic events which shaped our history for
almost 84 years. The history of the Manila Hotel should not be
placed in the auction block of a purely business transaction,
where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our
people.
PUNO [dissent]
- The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
1. Whether Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution
is a self-executing provision and does not need
implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII is self executing,
whether the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term "State," hence,
mandated to implement Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of
the Constitution;
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed
to give preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino
corporation, over and above Renong Berhad, a
foreign corporation, in the sale of the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;
5. Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning the
sale of the shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation.
- 1st issue: courts as a rule consider the provisions of the
Constitution as self executing, rather than as requiring future
legislation for their enforcement. If they are not treated as self-
executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the
sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by
Congress. Case law also lays down the rule that a
constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely
announces a policy and its language empowers the Legislature
to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into
effect. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing.
By its express text, there is a categorical command for
Congress to enact laws restricting foreign ownership in certain
areas of investments in the country and to encourage the
formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different.
They are directed to the State and not to Congress alone which
is but one of the three great branches of our government. Their
coverage is also broader for they cover "the national economy
and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national
jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments."
Their language does not suggest that any of the State agency
or instrumentality has the privilege to hedge or to refuse its
implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to
implement is unconditional and it is now.
- The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the
stocks of the Manila Hotel Corporation involves the disposition
of part of our national patrimony. The records of the
Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners
entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to
Commissioner Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich
natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race.
The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history and culture
cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel
goes beyond pesos and centavos. The Hotel may not, as yet,
have been declared a national cultural treasure pursuant to
Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not exclude it from our
national patrimony.
- The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the
State includes the respondent GSIS. The GSIS is not a pure
private corporation. It is essentially a public corporation created
by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a public
purpose. As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-
bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution
especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the
people. One of these policies is the Filipino First policy which
the people elevated as a constitutional command.
- To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree
of the preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules
and regulations of respondents Committee on Privatization and
GSIS to determine the degree of preference that petitioner is
entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A look at
the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the
degree of preferential right to be accorded a qualified Filipino
bidder. However, they cannot be read to mean that they do not
grant any degree of preference to petitioner for Par. 2, Sec. 10,
Art. XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and
regulations. I submit that the right of preference of petitioner
arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance,
all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino
bidder should be preferred. Under the rules, the right to match
the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the highest bidder
cannot be awarded the block of shares" No reason has arisen
that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a
bidder. It complied with the procedure of bidding. It was
declared as the highest bidder by the GSIS and the rules say
this decision is final. It deserves the award as a matter of right
for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified
Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner.
What the rules did not grant, petitioner cannot demand.
- Petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of
Renong Berhad. It knew that the rules and regulations do not
provide that qualified Filipino bidder can match the winning bid
after submitting an inferior bid. It knew that the bid was open to
foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first
bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it
wins and disregard them when it loses.
PANGANIBAN [dissent]
- The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted
to mean that, after a bidding process is concluded, the losing
Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest
foreign bid, and thus to win. No statute empowers a losing
Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning
foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the
majority's strained interpretation, I respectfully submit,
constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes
bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where
no foreigner can win.
- Aside from being prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial
legislation is short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely
prejudicial to long-term Filipino interests. It encourages other
countries - in the guise of reverse comity or worse, unabashed
retaliation - to discriminate against us in their own jurisdictions
by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat
the higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other
hand, allowing similar bids of other foreigners to remain
unchallenged by their nationals.
- In the absence of a law specifying the degree or extent of the
"Filipino First" policy of the Constitution, the constitutional
preference for the "qualified Filipinos" may be allowed only
where all the bids are equal. The Constitution mandates a
victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied.
But not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly
posted the highest score.
MINERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V
SECRETARY
ROMERO; January 16, 1995

FACTS
- Controversy is due to the change introduced by Art XII,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration,
development and utilization of the countrys natural resources.
Utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through
license, concession or lease is no longer allowed in the present
Consti.
- With the state in full control and supervision, the only options
for mineral exploration development and utilization is only
through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or by entering
into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale
exploration, development and utilization.
- The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils
- In view of these provisions, the President issued Executive
Order No. 211 and No. 279. The former prescribes interim
procedures in the processing and approval of applications for
the exploration, development and utilization of minerals
pursuant to the 1987 Consti. The latter authorizes the DENR
secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-
production or production-sharing agreements, and prescribed
guidelines for these agreements and those with foreign-owned
corporations
- To implement the legislative acts, the DENR Secretary
promulgated AO Nos 57 and 82. The former converts all
existing mining leases or agreements prior to the 1987 Consti
into production-sharing agreements except small-scale mining
leases and those pertaining to sand, gravel and quarry
resources cover an area of 20 hectares or less. The latter laid
down the Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement Through Negotiation (MPSA).
- It is for these AOs that the MAP, Inc. filed the petition
- They contend that:
o The issuance of the AOs was in excess of his rule-
making power under EO279
o The AOs violate the non-impairment of contract
provision under Art 3, Sec 10 of the 1987 Consti as
AO57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining
leases and other mining agreements and converts
it into production-sharing agreements within a year
of its effectivity and
AO82 declares that failure to submit Letter of
Intent and MPSA within 2 years of effecitivity of
guidelines shall cause the abandonment of their
mining, quarry and gravel permits
o AOs have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing
mining laws which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of EO279 as the Eos merely reiterated the
acceptance and registration of declarations of location
and all other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau
of Mines and Geo-Sciences under PD 463, as
amended, until Congress opts to modify the same
- A TRO was given enjoining the implementation of the AOs.
The Continental Marble Corp. also intervened as its DENR
refused to renew its mining permit
ISSUES
1. WON DENR Sec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating AOs 57 and 82
2. WON PD 463 continues to subsist insofar as it allows
licenses, concessions and leases for the exploration, utilization
and development of mineral resources
3. WON AO 57 and 82 impairs vested frights as to violate the
non-impairment of contract doctrine as guaranteed by Art 3,
Section 10 of the Consti
4. WON AO 57 and 82 authorizes automatic conversion of
mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Consti into production sharing agreements
HELD
- There is no clear showing that the DENR Sec has
transcended the bounds demarcated by EO279 for the
exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion
o The power of administrative officials to
promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation
of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into
effect what is provided in the legislative enactment
o By such regulations, the law cannot be
extended. So long as the relate solely to carrying into
effect the provision of law, they are valid
o The rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted
o In case of discrepancy between the basic
law and a rule issued to implement said law, the basic
law prevails as rule or regulation cannot go beyond the
terms and provisions of the basic law
o Sec 6 of EO269 specifically authorized the
said official to promulgate such supplementary rules
and regulations as may be necessary to effectively
implement the provisions of the law. More so, the
subject sought to be governed and regulated is
germane to the objects and purposes of EO279,
specifically issued to carry out the mandate of the 1987
Consti
- PD 463 is not the governing law anymore as it pertained to
the old system of exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources through license, concession or lease which
has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti.,
except those provision in PD463 that are not inconsistent with
the provisions of EO279
o To continue the licenses, concessions or lease would
be inconsistent witht raison detre of EO279 and
contravening the express mandate of the Article XII,
Section 2 the 1987 Consti.
o The Consti only orders that the State have full control
and supervision of the mineral resources and the only
mode for its exploration, utilization and development is
through a direct act, or may enter into co-production,
joint venture, production sharing agreements or into
agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on
real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country.
- The AOs do not unduly preterminate existing mining leases in
general as it does not apply retroactively to license, concession
of lease granted by government under the 1973 Consti or
before the effectivity of the 1987 Consti but to those granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti and shall be subject to
modifications and alterations which Congress may adopt
o As such, by issuing EO279, the President validly
modified or altered the privileges granted as well as the
terms and conditions of mining leases under EO211
o Moreover, even if there were contracts, leases or
agreements granted by the State such as those granted
by EO211, these are still subject to alterations through a
reasonable exercise of the police power of the State
and even the court recognizes the superiority of police
 power over the sanctity of the contract especially when
such power is exercised to preserve the security of the
state and the means adopted are reasonably adapted
to the accomplishment of that end and are, therefore,
not arbitrary or oppressive.
o The State may not be precluded by the constitutional
restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or
agreements granted under PD 463 or EO211
o The object of this police power is clear the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral
resources are matters vital to the public interest and the
general welfare of the people
- There is not provision in AO57 that leads to the conclusion of
an authorization of automatic conversion of mining leases and
agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti
pursuant to EO211, into production-sharing agreements
o The use of the term production-sharing agreement
implies negotiation and cannot be presumed as a
unilateral declaration on the part of government
o The MPSA requires a meeting of the minds of the
parties after negotiations are arrived at in good faith and
in accordance with procedure as laid out in AO 82
Decision AO 57 and 82 are valid and constitutional
REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS AND DELA ROSA
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
FACTS
- Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel
of land divided into 9 lots in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province
on February 11, 1965 on his own behalf and on behalf of his
children. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to
Jose dela Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya
Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively in 1964. Balbalio and
Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription.
- It was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5,
Atok Big Wedge Corporation as to portions of Lots 1-5 and all
of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic through the Bureau of Forestry
Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet opposed on the ground
that June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934 by the successors-in-interest of James
Kelly who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it
on October 14, 1909. Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5
and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December
25, 1930 and recorded on January 2, 1931 in the Office of the
mining recorder of Baguio. The locations of the mineral claims
were made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902.
- The Bureau of Forestry Development argued that the land
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February
16, 1929. By reason of its nature, it was not subject to
alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
ISSUE
WON the Benguet and Atok Mining Companies have exclusive
rights to the property in question.
HELD
YES. Though the property was considered forest land and
included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, this did not
impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that
time. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property
into mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it
from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government,
without need of any further act such as the purchase of the
land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land became
the private property of the locators, they had the right to
transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
- There was insufficient evidence of open, continuous, adverse
and exclusive possession submitted by the applicants to
support their claim of ownership. They acquired the land only
in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965.
- This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is
intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons.
The rule reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in
public and even private land. Thus, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land in which mineral is discovered, his ownership
of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the
said minerals without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
- Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they
validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural
lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use could be shared simultaneously
by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes.
Voting Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-
Aquino, concur.
ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING V COURT OF APPEALS
PARAS; January 18, 1991
FACTS
- Fredia Mineral claim was located in Itogon, Benguet by A. I.
Reynolds in 1930. The mineral claim was duly recorded in the
Office of the Mining Recorder. In 1931, the mineral claim was
sold by A.I. Reynolds to petitioner. Since then petitioner has
been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of
said claim.
- In 1964, respondent Liwan Consi constructed a house in the
land where the claim was located. It was only in 1984 when he
was told that said lot belonged to Atok. Respondent contends
that he had been paying taxes on said land which his father
had occupied before him. Atok filed a complaint for forcible
entry. The MTC dismissed the case. The RTC decided in
favor of Atok. Upon appeal by Consi, the CA dismissed the
forcible entry action ruling that both Consi and Atok are holders
of possessory titles, the former through long term occupancy,
and the latter by virtue of its being the claim locator.
ISSUE
WON an individuals long term occupation of land of the public
domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat
the rights of the owner of that claim
HELD
NO. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property
to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it
from the public domain. As the land had become private
property of the locators (A.I.) they had the right to sell it to Atok.
Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area
becomes segregated from the public and the property of
the locator. (Note however that the sale in the case took
place in 1931) Atok then have exclusive rights to the property
in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution prohibited
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural
lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption.
- Neither could Consi argue long term possession. His
possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining claim
but of the property as agricultural land. Since the subject lot is
a mineral land, private respondents possession did not confer
upon him possessory rights,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V KALAHI INVESTMENTS
MADIALDEA; January 31, 1989
FACTS
- On December 12, 1963, Kalahi Investment Inc., moved for an
advanced hearing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca Cadastre.
Evidence was presented and Kalahis title was to be registered
under the provisions of Act 496.
- It was later on found out that this lot was a vast land of
mountain ranges covering an area no less than 886,021,588
square meters. This lot contains the alleged 123 mineral claims
of Kalahi. It was also found out that the said lot was labeled as
timber land under RA 3092. in the land classification of the
province of Pampanga and Zambales, these lands were also
considered part of the Project No. 11, Timber Land.
- The Bureau of Forestrys opposition on the registration of the
lot is based on the ground that these lands are part of the vast
public forest known as TIMBER LAND. These lots are not yet
released as alienable agricultural lands and were even
declared by the President of the Philippines under
Proclamation No. 82 as part of the Mt. Dorst Forest Reserve.
- Kalahi thus abandoned its former claim over Lot No. 1851-B.
it limited its claim to two land which when combined, cover an
area of 1,730 hectares. This land contained the 123 mining
claims of Kalahi and where the alleged 500,000 coffee plants
were planted. Kalahi claimed and presented evidence that it
had located in 1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in
Floridablanca Mountains; made annual assessments work
thereto; made declaration of location and paid annual
assessment work from 1965-1966; constructed roads
traversing the mountains and hills and planted 500,00 coffee
trees. These however were not considered by the court as
basis sufficient in law and in fact for the registration of title
under act 496.
- Kalahi thus contended that these mineral lands were now
segregated from government lands and its mining claims
thereon deemed property rights. These were based on an
opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated August 31, 1956
which stated that the legal effect of a valid location of a mining
claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain,
but to grant the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim
and the right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the
terms and conditions prescribed by law the area is
segregated and becomes the property of the locator.
- Citing the San Mauricio doctrine
Under the Act of Congress of 1902 (Philippine Bill), a right or
rights acquired by a holder of unpatented but valid and existing
claim located and registered under its provisions becomes the
property of the locator the right of the locator to enjoy the
surface ground and the minerals within the limits of his claim
becomes exclusive as against the whole world, limited only by
extralateral rights of adjoining locators. He is not required to
purchase the claim or secure a patent and as long as he could
comply with the mining laws, his possessory rights of
ownership are as good as though secured by patent.
- It also claims registration of title based on its actual, open,
public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years or confirmation of
imperfect title under Sec. 48 (b) CA141 as amended by RA No.
1942.
- In its decision, the court a quo denied the claim for
registration ruling that a) the 123 mining claims are governed
by mining law; hence under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Mines which is the proper agency to enforce the claims and to
adjudicate the rights of the claimants, which in fact Kalahi
recognized when it filed an application for lease with said
Bureau, and b) that the claim for confirmation of imperfect title
based on the evidence of Public Land Law provisions:
- The lands in the public domain are classified under three
main categories: Mineral, Forest and Agricultural lands in the
public domain that title could be issued the Public Law never
governs private lands.
- The Public Land Law is not applicable to forest lands nor to
mineral lands. The confirmation of imperfect land title can not
be basis for registration of titles over forest and/or mineral
lands.
- On appeal Kalahi assigned as errors the following:
1)the lower court erred in not considering the basis for the
registration of land in question sufficient in law and in fact.
2)the lower court erred in declaring that the doctrine of the
Supreme Court and the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
never contemplate of a procedure that will entitle the
claimants to the registration of the lands in question.
3)the lower court erred in denying the claim for registration of
the claimants title over the land in question at last a portion
thereof covered by the mining claims and their gaps.
- On the other hand the Director of Lands contended:
Kalahi admitted that the land in question is a mining property
consisting of mining claims located and registered under the
provisions of the Act of the US Congress of July 1, 1902. and
as such, said Act requires Kalahi as holder of mining claims to
do no other act except to proceed with the acquisition of mining
patent in the Bureau of Mines. The Act prescribes an explicit
and definite procedure by which mining patents are to be
secured administratively
- CA thus certified the following questions (issues) for SC
resolution:
ISSUES
1. WON mining claims acquired, registered perfected and
patentable under the Old Mining Law matured to private
ownership would entitle claimant-appellant to the ownership
thereof
2. who has the authority to examine process and find out WON
the requirements of the Act of Congress of 1902 have been
complied by applicant- the Court or the Bureau of Mines
HELD
1. NO. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co. v Hon
Minister of Natural Resources Jose Leido jr. and Director of
Mines Juanito Fernandez the SC ruled that while it recognized
that the right of a locator of a mining claim is a property right,
this right is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right
more so when petitioners claims are still unpatented.
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
located claim. It merely segregates the located land or area
from the public domain by barring other would-be locators from
locating the same and appropriating for themselves the
minerals found therein the intention of the lawmaker is that
the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the
requirements for annual work and improvements in the located
mining claims. This case modifies the San Mauricio doctrine in
that while a perfected location of a mining claim has the effect
of segregating said land from the body of public domain, the
area covered does not thereby become the private property of
the locator.
- Concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Gold Creek Mining
Corp. v Rodriguez and Abadilla: my opinion is that while the
locator, under the circumstances, secures the beneficial
ownership or the dominum utile, the government retains the
bare ownership or the dominium directum, until the locators
claim ripens into full ownership upon full compliance with all
requirements of the law for the issuance of a patent.
- Dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Gold Creek
Mining Corp. case: To give a broader meaning and give a
greater effect to the location of a mining claim is to contend that
location is all that is necessary to acquire absolute ownership
over a located mining claim. This is not the law. Location
without more,confers only the right of possession I maintain
that in prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any
existing right, the Constitution does not refer to the right of
location or the inherent right of possession, or any inchoate or
contingent right which are only means to bring about another
right; it refers only to the right to obtain a patent.
- It is not clear if Kalahi has fully complied with the
requirements of Act of Congress of 1902. this is a factual issue
which is beyond the issue of the Court. Nonetheless, even
assuming claimant to be a holder of a subsisting and valid
patentable mining clai8m, we hold that it can no longer proceed
with the acquisition of a mining patent in view of PD No. 1214
issued in October 14, 1977, directing holders of subsisting an
valid patentable mining claims located under the provisions of
the Act of Congress of 1902 to file a mining lease application
within one year of the approval of the Decree non-filing of the
application within the period prescribed shall cause the
forfeiture of all his rights to the claim.
- Records show that claimant has already filed a mining lease
application.
2. Having filed a mining lease application, its mining claims
therefore, are deemed covered by PD 1214 and the Bureau of
Mines may accordingly process the same as a lease
application, in accordance with PD 463, pursuant to PD 1214.
As to whether or not the Bureau of Mines is qualified to rule on
whether there has been full and faithful compliance with the
requirements of Philippine Bill of 1902, SC ruled that the
Bureau is empowered as a corollary function in the processing
of mining lease applications.
Decision The decision of the CFI of Pampanga is affirmed,
with the modification that Kalahis mining claims may be
processed as a mining lease application by the Bureau of
Mines.
TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
MAKASIAR; October 27,1983
FACTS
- Petitioner-appellant: Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
- Respondents-appellees: Sec. of Agri. And Nat. Resources
(DANR) Jose Feliciano, Director of Bureau of Forestry (BOF)
Apolonio Rivera
- Intervenors: Ravago Commercial Co., Jorge Lao Happick,
Atanacio Mallari
- April 1961 the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice
advertising for public bidding a tract of public forest land (6,420
hectares) in Olongapo, Zambales. It was located within the
former US Naval Reservation.
- May 5, 1962 petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his
application plus nine other applicants
- Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdom of having the
are declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be
awarded to the most qualified bidder
- June 7, 1961 then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued a directive to
the Dir. Of Bureau of Forestry to prepare a draft proclaiming the
said land as a watershed forest reserve for Olongapo and to
reject the bids they have received
- Sec. Fortich (DANR) however sustained the
recommendations of the director of BOF who concluded that it
would be beneficial to the public interest of the are is made
available for exploitation. The Director said that to the declare
the forest are as a forest reserve rather than to open it for
timber exploitation under license and regulation would do more
harm than good to the public interest since it might just become
a Free Zone and Logging Paradise to the problem loggers of
Dinalupihan, Bataan an open target for timber smugglers and
kaingineros; also, rejecting the received bids would cause the
department huge embarrassment
- The area was then awarded to Wenceslao Tan by the BOF
against the other bidders, Rovago Commercial Company and
Jorge :Lao Happick
- May 30, 1963 DANR Sec. Gozon (who succeeded then
Sec. Fortich) issued a memorandum authorizing the grant of
new ordinary timber license for areas not more than 3,000
hectares each and the extension of ordinary timber licenses for
areas not exceeding 5000 hectares
- Dec. 19, 1963- Gozon was then replaced by acting Sec.
Jose Feliciano, who upon assumption of office he revoked the
memorandum.
- But that same day, the license of Wenceslao Tan was signed
by acting Director of (BOF), Estanislao Bernal, without the
approval of the Secretary of DANR
- Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick then
wrote a letter to the Sec. of DANR praying that the license
issued to Tan be cancelled on the ground that it was irregular,
anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws, rules and
regulations
- The license was declared void ab initio
- Petitioner Tan claims that respondents unlawfully, illegally,
whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted w/o or in excess
of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion by revoking
a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by
denying petitioner Tan of the equal protection of the laws and
by depriving him of his constitutional right to property w/o due
process of law by impairing the obligation of contracts
- His petition was dismissed because it did not state a
sufficient cause of action
ISSUE
WON the facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of
action
HELD
cause of action 3 essential elements
1. legal right of the plaintiff
2. correlative obligation of the defendants
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation
of that right
NO.
- the petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted; the timber license
relied upon by the petitioner was void ab initio
- also, court takes judicial notive that the are has been declared
a forest reserve on April 39, 1964
- what is important for the validity of a timber license is the date
of release of the license and n the sate of signing. Before the
release, not tight is acquired by the licensee. Tans license was
signed Dec. 9, 1963 and was released Jan. 6, 1964 by
January 6, the Director of Forestry no longer had any authority
to release the license
- the petitioner had not acquired any legal right under such void
license
- the petitioner also failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies. He should have appealed the order of the DANR
Secretary to the President, who has the power to review on
appeal the orders/acts of the said secretary where
administrative appeal is available, special civil action of
certiorari cannot be availed
- moreover, not only did the petitioner fail to exhaust his
administrative remedies, he also failed to note that his action is
a suit against the state which under the doctrine of immunity
from suit, cannot prosper unless the state gives it consent to be
dued
- Next, granting that the license granted to him was valid, still
the respondents can validly revoke this license
REPUBLIC V QUASHA
REYES; August 17, 1972
FACTS
- The case involves a judicial determination of the scope and
duration of the rights acquired by American citizens and
corporations controlled by them under the Parity Amendment
appended to the Constitution as of Sept. 18, 1946
- William Quasha is an American citizen who purchased a
land in Forbes Park on Nov.26,1954. He filed a petition on
March 1968 where he averred the acquisition of the said land;
that the RP claimed that upon expiration of the Parity
Amendment (PA) on July 3, 1974, rights acquired by US
citizens shall cease; that this claim affects his right and interest
and that the uncertainty as to the status of his property after the
PA ends reduces the propertys value and precludes him from
having improvements made on it; and so he contends that
the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the
PA continues despite its termination
- Sol.Gen. Antonio Barredo: land acquired by Quasha is
private agri. land and that the acquisition violated Sec.5
Art.XIII of the Constitution which prohibits the transfer of
private agricultural land to non-Filipinos except by hereditary
succession; and assuming validity of acquisition, his rights
acquired through the PA will expire on July 3, 1974
- CFI: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that
acquisition was valid and he has a right to continue in
ownership of property even beyond July 1974.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON by virtue of the so-called PA to the Philippine
Constitution Quasha could validly acquire ownership of the
private residential land which is concededly classified private
agricultural land
2. On the assumption that Quashas purchase of the private
agricultural land is valid and constitutional, WON his rights will
expire on July 3, 1974
HELD
1. NO. The Parity Amendment gives Americans no right to
validly acquire ownership of private agricultural land in the
Philippines.
-examination of the PA reveals that it only establishes an
express exception to 2 provisionsSection 1 Article XIII
(disposition, exploitation, etc. of public lands) and Section 8
Article XIV (operation of public utilities)
> no other provision was referred to, not Sections 2 & 5 of
Art.XIII
-Quasha argues that since PA permitted US citizens/entities
to acquire agricultural lands of the public domain, then such
citizens/entities became entitled to acquire private
agricultural land in the Phils., even without hereditary
succession
> this argument does not rest upon the text of the PA
but upon a mere inference; if it was ever intended to
create an exception to Sec.5, it would have bee
mentioned just as Sec.1 and 8 were mentioned
-whether from the Phil. Or the American side, the intention
was to secure parity for US citizens only in:
1)exploitation, development and utilization of public
lands and other natural resources, and 2) the
operation of public utilities
-Quasha further contends that when the Constitution was
adopted in 1935, US citizens were already qualified to
acquire public agri land, so even without hereditary
succession transfer of private agri lands to Americans is
permitted
> such capacity could exist only during the American
sovereignty over the Islands (before the RP is
established)
2. His rights will expire. All the exceptional rights conferred
upon US citizens and business entities owned or controlled by
them, under the Parity Amendment, are to last during the
effectivity of the agreement entered into on July 4, 1946, but in
no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974.
-text of PA: in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974in
conformity with Article X, Section 2 this agreement shall
have no effect after July 3, 1974. It may be terminated be
either the US or the Phils at any time...
-Quasha argues that the limitative period should not be
applicable because under Art.428 of the Civil Code, the
owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law
> this limitation already existed when he purchased the land
> The cant complain of deprivation of due process because
PA is part of Consti, the highest law of the land
> if the Philippine Government can not dispose of its
alienable public agricultural lands beyond that date under
PA, then, logically, the Constitution, as modified by PA, only
authorizes either of two things: a) alienation or transfer of
rights less than ownership or b) a resoluble ownership that
will be extinguished not later than the specified period.
Discussion
Historical Background
Article XIII Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources
Sec.1 All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain...belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corps. At least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens...
Sec.2 No private corporation...may acquire, lease, or hold
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares...
Sec.5 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Article XIV General Provisions
Sec.8 No franchise...for the operation of a public utility shall
be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, 60%
of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines...
nationalistic spirit are self-evident in these provisions
1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular
Affairs: when the Philippines do become independent next July,
they will start on the road to independence with a country
whose commerce, trade and political institutions have been
very damaged; internal revenue have been greatly diminished
by war.
in 1946, US enacted Philippine Trade Act authorizing the
President of the US to enter into an Exec. Agreement with the
President of the Philippines, which should contain a provision
thatthe disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization...be open to citizens of the US and to all forms of
business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly,
by US citizens.; and that the govt of the Phil. Will take such
steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the
Constitution so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the
Phils. Of such part of the provisions
Commonwealth Act No.733- authorized the President of the
Phils. To enter into the Executive Agreement
proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was
ratified in Nov. 1946
Parity Amendment: Notwithstanding the provision of
section 1, Article 13, and section 8, Article 14, of the
foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of the Executive
Agreement entered into...on July 4, 1946...but in no case to
extend beyond July 3, 1974, the disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization...be open to citizens of the
US and to all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by US citizens in the same manner as to,
and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled
by citizens of the Philippines.
Laurel-Langley Agreement (revision of PA enacted in June
1955): establishes some sort of reciprocity rights between US
and Phils.
--no direct application to the case at bar, since the purchase by
Quasha of the property in question was made in 1954, prior to
the effectivity of this agreement
LAUREL V GARCIA
GUTIERREZ; July 25, 1990
FACTS
- The subject property in this case (Roppongi) is one of the four
(4) properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government
under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan in
1956, the other lots being: Nampeidai Property , Kobe
Commercial Property, and Kobe Residential Property. The
properties are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people
for their losses in life and property and their suffering during
World War II.
- The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued
at $550 million would be payable in twenty (20) years in
accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed
by the Philippine and Japanese governments. Rep. Act No.
1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and development
loans. The Roppongi property was acquired from the
Japanese government under the Second Year Schedule.
- On August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to
study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government
properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
- On July 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations'
capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or
disposition. RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive has been ABAD-SANTOS; February 15, 1982
pushing its decision to sell the reparations properties starting
with the Roppongi lot. Petitioners have filed two petitions to FACTS
stop the sale of the Roppongi property. - APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11,
ISSUES 1964) among principal beneficiaries:
1. WON the Roppongi property and others of its kind can be Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
alienated by the Philippine Government - widow
2. WON Executive Order No. 296, which entitles non-Filipino - French who lives in Paris
citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and - received (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of
services, is constitutional. WON EO 296 violate the following the free portion
constitutional provisions: Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
a. constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the - two grandnephews
national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 - lives in Malate
Constitution - received the (free portion)
b. reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable Wanda de Wrobleski
lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens - companion
c. there is preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of - Austrian who lives in Spain
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national - received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
economy and patrimony - vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
d. WON there is protection given to Filipino enterprises Horacio Ramirez
against unfair competition and trade practices - Maria Luisa Palacios - administratix
e. WON there is guarantee of the right of the people to - Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
information on all matters of public concern a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct
f. WON there is declaration of the state policy of full public and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest to Wandas usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle
and Wanda) survived the testator
HELD b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first
1. NO, the Roponggi property is public domain. As property of heirs not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the
public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda,
collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an violated Art XIII Sec 5
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz
in the social group. Building between widow and appellants violates testators
2. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional express will to give this property to them
questions unless these questions are properly raised in - LC: approved partition
appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the
determination of the case. The Court will not pass upon a ISSUE
constitutional question although properly presented by the WON the partition is valid insofar as
record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground a. widows legitime
such as the application of a statute or general law. b. substitutions
Decision Petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is c. usufruct of Wanda
issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale
of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the
widow47 and over which he could impose no burden,
encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever48
- the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the
testators widow of a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the
testators estate cannot be made where it will run counter to the
testators express will. The Court erred for Marcelle who is
entitled to of the estate en pleno dominio as her legitime
and which is more than what she is given under the will is not
entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give
Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the
testators intention for as stated above his disposition even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the
testator is not the only case where a vulgar substitution can be
made. Also, according to Art 859 CC, cases also include
refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID because Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez are not related to
Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it validates a
fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted. Another is that there is no absolute duty imposed on
Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the substitutes and in
fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the
establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he
permits the properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon
mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
- Art XIII49 Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold land of the public domain in the
Philippines.50
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but
also testamentary succession BUT SC is of the opinion that
this provision does not apply to testamentary succession for
otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless.
47
Art 900 CC: If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to of the
hereditary estate
48
49
Art 904 (2) CC
50
Art XIII (1935): Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources
Art XII Sec 7 (1987): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private [removed agricultural] lands
shall be transferred or conveyed [1935: assigned] except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain [removed in the Philippines ].
Any alien would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to
a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a piece of
land BUT an alien may be bestowed USUFRUCTUARY
RIGHTS over a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore, the
usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld
because it does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary
(Wanda) and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto mineral resources. RA 7942 defines modes of mineral
Ramirez (free portion) in naked ownership and the usufruct to
Wanda de Wrobleski with simple substitution in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
CRUZ V NCIP
PER CURIAM; December 20, 2000
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM)
LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V WESTERN MINING
CORPORATION PHILIPPINES
CARPIO-MORALES; January 29, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and
Prohibition.
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise known
as the PHILIPPINE MINING ACT OF 1995, along with the
Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995
by the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining
Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP), a corporation
organized under Philippine laws.
- July 25, 1987 President Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing
the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign investors
for contracts of agreements involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent. In entering into such proposals, the
President shall consider the real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized,
as well as the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources that will be promoted by the proposed
contract or agreement. Until Congress shall determine
otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall
mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral
resources exploration, development, and utilization involving a
committed capital in a single mining unit project of at least Fifty
Million Dollars in United States currency (US $50,000,000.00).
- March 3, 1995 President Ramos approved 7942 to govern
the exploration, development, utilization and processing of all
agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for
filing and approval, assignment/transfer, and withdrawal, and
fixes their terms. These also apply to FTAAs.
- The law also prescribes the contractors qualifications, grants
certain rights such as timber, water, easement rights and right
to possess explosives. Surface owners or occupants are
forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights from
entering private lands and concession areas. A procedure for
settlement of conflicts is also provided for.
- The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and other
permits. It regulates the transport, sale and processing of
minerals, and promotes the development of mining
communities, science and mining technology, and safety and
environmental protection.
- The governments share in the agreements is spelled out and
allocated, taxes and fees are imposed, incentives granted.
Aside from penalizing certain acts, the law likewise specifies
grounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of
agreements and permits.
- April 9, 1995 RA 7942 took effect.
- March 30, 1995 Shortly before RA 7942 took effect, the
President entered into and FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del
Sur and North Cotabato.
- August 15, 1995 DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known
as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942. This
was later repealed by DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted
on December 20, 1996.
- January 10, 1997 Counsels for petitioners sent letter to
DENR Secretary demanding that they stop the implementation
of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, giving them 15 days from receipt
to act thereon. DENR has yet to respond or act on petitioners
letter.
- Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order.
- Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary without or in
excess of jurisdiction:
1) In signing and promulgating DAO 96-40 implementing
RA 7942, the latter being unconstitutional in that:
It allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore,
develop, utilize and exploit mineral resources in a
manner contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987
Constitution
It allows the taking of private property without the
determination of public use and for just compensation
It violates Art. III, sec. 1
It allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well as fully
foreign owned corporations of the nations marine
wealth contrary to Art. XII, sec. 2, par. 2
It allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned
corporations in the exploration, development and
utilization of mineral resources contrary to Art. XII
2) In recommending approval of and implementing the
FTAA between the President and WMCP because the
same is illegal and constitutional
- They pray that the Court issue an order permanently enjoining
the respondents from acting on any application for an FTAA;
declaring RA 7942, DAO 96-40 and all other similar
administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null and void;
and, canceling the FTAA issued to WMCP as unconstitutional,
illegal and null and void.
- Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners contentions,
argue that the requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met,
the petition does not comply with the criteria for prohibition and
mandamus, and there has been a violation of the rule on
hierarchy of courts.
- WMCP subsequently filed a Manifestation dated September
25, 2002 alleging that on January 23, 2001 WMC sold all its
shares in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, 60% of the equity
of which is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned
corporations while about 40% is owned by Indophil Resources
NL, an Australian company.
- Because of this, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December
18, 2001, approved the transfer and registration of the subject
FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was
appealed by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Lepanto).
Because there is no final judgment yet, the case cannot be
considered moot.
ISSUES
1. WON case is justiciable
2. WON EO 279 took effect
3. WON the WMCP FTAA is constitutional
4. WON RA 7942 is constitutional
HELD
1. Case is justiciable.
Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the Court is
not concerned with whether petitioners are real parties in
interest, but with whether they have legal standing.
- Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are
La Bugal BLaan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and
indigenous peoples cooperative organized under Philippine
laws representing a community actually affected by the mining
activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as
other residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of
WMCP. Even if they are not the actual parties in the contract,
they claim that they will suffer irremediable displacement as a
result of the FTAA allowing WMCP to conduct mining activities
in their area of residence.
- And although RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 were not in force
when the subject FTAA was entered into, the question as to
their validity is ripe for adjudication. RA 7942 explicitly makes
certain provisions apply to pre-existing arrangements. The
WMCP FTAA also provides that any term and condition
favorable to FTAA contractors resulting from a law or regulation
shall be considered part of the agreement.
- The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the
appropriate remedy. Public respondents, in behalf of the
Government, have obligations to fulfill under said contract.
Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such obligations
on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and,
therefore, void.
- The contention that the filing of the petition violates the rule
on hierarchy of courts does not likewise lie. The repercussions
of the issues in this case on the Philippine mining industry, if
not the national economy, as well as the novelty thereof,
constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify
resort to this Court in the first instance. Indeed, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, this
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
2. YES.
Ratio When the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure.
- Petitioners contend that EO 279 did not take effect because
its supposed date of effectivity came after President Aquino
had already lost her legislative powers under the Provisional
Constitution. But it was explained that the convening of the first
Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers
by the President it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she
had previously enacted.
3. NO.
Ratio The convening of the first Congress merely precluded
the exercise of legislative powers by the President and did not
prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.
In accordance with Art. XII, sec. 2 of the constitution, FTAAs
should be limited to technical or financial assistance only.
However, contrary to the language of the Constitution, the
WMCP FTAA allows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining
corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical
assistance to the State, for it permits WMCP to manage and
operate every aspect of the mining activity.
- WMCP nevertheless submits that the word technical
encompasses a broad number of possible services, perhaps,
scientific and/or technological in basis. It thus posits that it may
well include the area of management and operations. The
Court is not persuaded. Casus omisus pro omisso habendus
est a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. Moreover, the
management or operation of mining activities by foreign
contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts,
was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to eradicate.
- Respondents insist that agreements involving technical or
financial assistance is just another term for service contracts.
The proceedings of the CONCOM indicate that the members
used the terms interchangeably. The Court is likewise not
persuaded. While certain commissioners may have mentioned
the term service contracts, they may have been using the
term loosely and not in the context of the 1973 Constitution.
Also, the phrase service contracts has been deleted in the
1987 Constitutions Article on National Economy and
Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the concept of
service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have
simply adapted the old terminology instead of employing new
and unfamiliar terms (agreements involving either technical
or financial assistance).
- The UP Law Draft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the same
terminologies. And the UP Law draft proponents viewed service
contracts under the 1973 Constitution as grants of beneficial
ownership of the countrys natural resources to foreign owned
corporations. While, in theory, the State owns these natural
resources and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries service
contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose,
explore for, develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This
arrangement is clearly incompatible with the constitutional ideal
of nationalization of natural resources. But the proponents
nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical
know-how in the large-scale exploitation, development and
utilization of natural resources. Hence, they proposed a
compromise technical or financial agreements.
4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Ratio Financial or technical agreements as contemplated in
Art. XII, sec. 2 shall refer to financial agreements and/or
technical agreements only and not to service contracts.
- Although the statute employs the phrase financial and
technical agreements, it actually treats these agreements as
service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign
contractors contrary to fundamental law.
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Court
hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
1) The following provision of RA 7942
a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq)
b) Section 23,
c) Section 33 to 41,
d) Section 56,
e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and
f) Section 90.
2) All provisions of DAO 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in
conformity with this Decision, and
3) The FTAA between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.
Voting 8 concur including ponente, 5 dissent, 1 took no part
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG
- It could not have been the object of the framers of the Charter
to limit the contracts which the President may enter into, to
mere agreements for financial and technical assistance; The
Constitution has not prohibited the State from itself exploring,
developing, or utilizing the countrys natural resources, and, for
this purpose, it may, enter into the necessary agreements with
individuals or entities in the pursuit of a feasible operation.
PANGANIBAN
- The petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness.
The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in
WMCP is between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and
Lepanto). So regardless of which side wins, the FTAA would
still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company.
- The word involving signifies the possibility of inclusion of
other activities. If the intention of the drafters were strictly to
confine foreign corporations to financial or technical assistance
and nothing more, their language would have been
unmistakably restrictive and stringent.
- The present Constitution still recognizes and allows service
contracts (and has not rendered them taboo), albeit subject to
several restrictions and modifications aimed at avoiding pitfalls
of the past.
- In the minds of the commissioners, the concept of technical
and financial assistance agreements did not exist at all apart
from the concept of service contracts duly modified to prevent
abuses technical and financial agreements were understood
by the delegates to include service contracts duly modified to
prevent abuses.
- Current business practices often require borrowers seeking
huge loans to allow creditors access to financial records and
other data, and probably a seat or two on the formers board of
directors, or at least some participation in certain management
decisions that may have an impact on the financial health or
the long-term viability of the debtor, which of course will directly
affect the latters capacity to repay its loans.
- If the Supreme Court closes its doors to international realities
and unilaterally sets up its own concepts of strict technical and
financial assistance, then it may unwittingly make the country a
virtual hermit an economic isolationist in the real world of
finance.
- The commissioners fully realized that their work would have
to withstand the test of time, that the Charter, though crafted
with the wisdom born of past experiences and lessons painfully
learned, would have to be a living document that would answer
the needs of the nation well into the future.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; December 1, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in Supreme Court. Mandamus and
Prohibition
- Ponente: Panganiban, J. (take note: major dissenter in part1)
- All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) must always be
subject to the full control and supervision of the State. More
specifically, given the inadequacy of Filipino capital and
technology in large-scale EDU activities, the State may secure
the help of foreign companies in all relevant matters
especially financial and technical assistance provided that, at
all times, the State maintains its right of full control. The foreign
assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and
entrepreneurial risks in the EDU activities; hence it may be
given reasonable management, operational, marketing, audit
and other prerogatives to protect its investments and enable
the business to succeed.
- The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It
should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve
narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to
grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and
reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign
investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people
and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace.
- On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds the
constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing
Rules and Regulations insofar as they relate to financial and
technical agreements as well as the subject Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
ISSUES
1. WON the case been rendered moot by the sale of the WMC
shares in WMCP to Sagittarius and by the subsequent transfer
and registration of the FTAA from WMCP to Sagittarius
2. Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, WON it
would still be proper to resolve the constitutionality of the
assailed provisions of the Mining Law, DAO 96-40 and the
WMCP FTAA
3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements
Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance contained in
paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution?
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
 - The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares
in WMCP is between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and
Lepanto). So regardless of which side wins, the FTAA would
still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company. The plea to
nullify the Mining Law has become a virtual petition for
declaratory relief, over which this Court has no original
jurisdiction.
- Petitioners argue that the sale of shares and transfer of the
FTAA is invalid. Government cannot enter into FTAA with
Filipinos.
- It does not take deep knowledge of law and logic to
understand that what the Constitution grants to foreigners
should be equally available to Filipinos.
2. Ratio FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those of the
1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to several safeguards.
- Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a case
becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits, what is at issue is not only
the validity of the WMCP FTAA but also the constitutionality of
RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second,
the acts of private respondent cannot operate to cure the law of
its alleged unconstitutionality or to divest this Court of its
jurisdiction to decide. Third, the Constitution imposes upon the
Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any law that offends
the Constitution.
- But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of
uncertainty hanging over the mining industry, which is even
now scaring away foreign investments. It is evident that strong
reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue
be resolved now. And citing Acop v. Guingona, the courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.
3. Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, the ponencia
reiterated the well settled principles of constitutional
construction:
Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used
in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers.
Ut magis valeat quam pereat . The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole.
- Petitioners claim that the phrase agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance simply means technical
assistance or financial assistance agreements, nothing more
and nothing else.
- But if that was the intention, then what is the point of requiring
that they be based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country?
- It is also unclear how a verba legis approach leads to the
conclusion that the management or operation of mining
activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of
service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the
1987 Constitution sought to eradicate. If the framers had
intended to put an end to service contracts, they would have at
least left some transitory guidelines.
- The drafters will have to be credited with enough pragmatism
and savvy to know that these foreign entities will not enter into
such agreements involving assistance without requiring
arrangements for the protection of their investments, gains and
benefits.
- Using ratio legis est anima, we may now examine the
CONCOM deliberations. It may be observed that the members
use the terms financial and technical assistance agreements
and service contracts interchangeably. From their statements,
it may be concluded that FTAAs are service contracts. But
unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to
several safeguards (in accordance with law, President as
signatory, reporting to Congress)
- With ut magis valeat quam pereat, we may notice a
contradiction between the States full control and supervision
and the safeguarded service contracts with foreign contractors.
It must be pointed out that the full control and supervision
cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and
supervises everything involved, down to the minutest details,
and makes all decisions required in the mining operations.
Control by State may be on the macro level establishment of
policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards, etc.
- To further disabuse the notion of these new service
contracts, the governments share in these operations will not
be limited to taxes, duties and fees to be imposed. Those only
consist of the basic government share. The law provides for an
additional government share to be determined using formulas
presented in DAO 96-40, either of which results to at least 50%
of the net benefits from the mining.
Decision WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT
the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts
January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and to
issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL 1) RA
7942 (Phil. Mining Law), 2) its Implementing Rules and
Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 insofar as they relate to
financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in
par. 4 of Section 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution; and 3) the
FTAA dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and
WMCP, except Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which
are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy
and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Voting 10 concur including ponente, 4 dissent, 1 took no part
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO
- Provisions of RA 7942 abdicate the States constitutional duty
to control and supervise fully the exploitation of mineral
resources.
- The change in language in the Constitution was a clear
rejection of the old system of license, concession or lease.
- The State as owner of the natural resources must receive
income from its exploitation taxes, fees and charges cannot
substitute.
- State must receive at least 60% of the net proceeds in
FTAAs, which share is equivalent to the Filipino equity
requirement.
- The majority opinion refused to accept that the State is
entitled to what the entire mining industry is willing to pay the
State.
CARPIO-MORALES [part 1 ponente]
- The phrase natural resources are owned by the State
simultaneously vests the legal title to the nations natural
resources to the Government, and the beneficial ownership of
these resources in the sovereign Filipino people.
- In the EDU of natural resources, Government acts as trustee.
So it cannot, without violating its sacred trust, enter into any
agreement or arrangement which effectively deprives the
Filipino people of their beneficial ownership of these resources.
- Art. XII, sec. 2 in mentioning based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the country
articulates the value which the Constitution places on natural
resources, and recognizes their potential benefits.
- Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because the
motherlands natural resources are the birthright not only of the
present generation of Filipinos but of future generations as
well.
- Involving as the majority construes it runs counter to the
restrictive spirit of the provision.
- Either refers to one of two items and any is required when should be applied beginning Jan. 1, 2004. The Court En Banc
more than two items are involved.
- Either is not merely descriptive but restrictive.
- Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally.
- It is understandable, however regrettable, that a government,
strapped for cash and in the midst of a self proclaimed fiscal
crisis, would be inclined to turn a blind eye to the
consequences of unconstitutional legislation in the hope,
however false or empty, of obtaining fabulous amounts of hard
currency; As always, the one overriding the consideration of
this Court should be will of the sovereign Filipino people as
embodied in their Constitution.
- The task of reclaiming Filipino control over Philippine natural
resources now belongs to another generation.
FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION V ERC AND
MERALCO
TINGA; January 15, 2004
FACTS
- Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order assailing the Order
dated November 27, 2003 of respondent Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), provisionally authorizing respondent
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by
an average amount of 12 centavos per kilowatt hour. Freedom
from Debt Coalition (FDC) argues that the said Order of the
ERC is void for having been issued without legal basis or
statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Sec. 4 of the
Implementing Rules of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
of 2001 (EPIRA) is unconstitutional for being an undue
delegation of legislative power. FDC further asserts that the
Order is void for having been issued by the ERC with grave
abuse of discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer
for the issuance of injunctive relief, FDC claims that the
implementation by MERALCO of the provisional rate increase
will result in irreparable prejudice to the FDC and others
similarly situated unless the court restrains such
implementation.
- On Dec. 29, 2003, FDC filed with the Court an Urgent Motion
to Grant Restraining or Status Quo Order. On Jan. 9, 2004, the
ERC issued an Order clarifying that the provisional rate
increase granted to MERALCO in its Nov. 27, 2003 Order
1. Yes. The ERC is endowed with statutory authority to approve
issued on Jan. 13, 2004, a Resolution ordering ERC and
MERALCO to file their respective Comments on the Petition.
The Court also enjoined ERC and MERALCO to observe the
status quo prevailing before the filing of the Petition and set the
case for oral arguments on Jan. 27, 2004. On Jan. 26, 2004,
ERC, MERALCO, and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed their respective Comments on the Petition.
- In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments of the
OSG and insists that it is authorized to issue provisional orders
under the law. ERC argues that it must not have been the
intention of Congress to expand the functions of the ERC, as
the successor of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), and clip
its powers at the same time. The ERC also asserts that it is
authorized to issue provisional rate increases ex parte, and that
it may base its provisional order on the verified application and
supporting documents submitted by the application, and it is
not required to wait for the comments of consumers or local
government units (LGUs) concerned before issuing a
provisional order. The ERC also denies that the Nov. 27, 2003
Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. On the
contrary, it claims that the Order is supported by substantial
evidence. Finally, ERC contends that the filing of the instant
Petition is premature because it was denied the opportunity to
have a full determination of the Application after trial on the
merits, and is violative of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
- For its part, MERALCO asserts that the Order is valid,
because it was issued by the ERC pursuant to Sec. 44 of the
EPIRA which allows the transfer of powers (not inconsistent
with the EPIRA) of the old ERB to ERC. It also denies that the
assailed Order was issued by the ERC with grave abuse of
discretion, asserting that on the contrary, the issuance thereof
was based on the Application, affidavits and other supporting
documents which it submitted earlier.
ISSUE
1. WON ERC has legal authority to grant provisional rate
adjustments under RA No. 9136, otherwise known as the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA)
2. Assuming that the ERC has the authority to grant provisional
orders, WON the grant by the ERC of the provisional rate
adjustment in question constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction
HELD
provisional rate adjustments under the aegis of Sections 44
and 80 of the EPIRA. The sections read, thus:
Sec. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. The powers
and functions of the Energy Regulatory Board not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and
functions shall include all applicable funds and
appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel
as may be necessary.
Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause The
applicability provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Services Act,
Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter of NPC;
Presidential Decree 269, as amended, referred to as the
National Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638, otherwise
known as the Department of Energy Act; Executive Order
172, as amended, creating the ERB; Republic Act 7832
otherwise known as the Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1004; shall
continue to have full force and effect except insofar as they
are inconsistent with this Act. The provisions with respect to
electric power of Section 11(c) of Republic Act 7916, as
amended, and Section 5(f) of Republic Act 7277 are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
- Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
The principal powers of the ERB relative to electric public
utilities transferred to the ERC are the following:
1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by
electric companies;
2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the
operation of electric power utilities;
3. To grant or approve provisional electric rates.
- It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERC of the
power to grant provisional rate adjustments is not inconsistent
with any provision of the EPIRA. The powers of the ERB
transferred to the ERC under Section 44 are in addition to the
new powers conferred upon the ERC under Section 43.
Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it
mandates the continued efficacy of the applicable provisions
 of the laws referred to therein. The material provisions of the
Public Service Act which continue to be in full force and
effect are contained in Section 16(c), which states thus:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice
and hearing.
The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and
hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this
Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and
saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll charges,
classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and other special rates
which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter
by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may,
in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services
provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it
shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon
publication and notice to the concerned parties operating in
the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case public
service equipment of an operator is used principally or
secondarily for the promotion of a private business, the net
profits of said private business shall be considered in relation
with the public service of such operator for the purposes of
fixing the rates.
- Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of EO No. 172 or the ERB
Charter continue to be in full force by virtue of Sections 44 and
80 of the EPIRA. Said provisions of the ERB Charter read:
SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. The Board
may, upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or
at any stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on the
basis of the supporting papers duly verified or authenticated,
grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on
its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after
hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, together
with such affidavits, documents and other evidence which
may be submitted in support of the motion, substantially
support of the provisional order; Provided, That the Board
shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon
within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice
to all affected parties.
SEC. 14. Applicability Clause The applicability
(applicable) provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act;
Republic Act No. 6173, as amended, otherwise known as the
Oil Industry Commission Act; Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended, revising the charter of the National Power
Corporation under CA 120; Presidential Decree No. 269, as
amended, also referred to as the National Electrification
Administration Decree, and Presidential Decree No. 1206,
as amended, creating the Department of Energy, shall
continue to have full force and effect, except insofar as
inconsistent with this order. (Words in parenthesis supplied).
- Furthermore, under Sec. 80, only three specific laws were
expressly repealed or modified. Sec. 8 of EO No. 172 and
Section 16(c) of CA No. 146 which both grant the regulatory
body concerned the authority to approve provisional rate
increases are not among the provisions expressly repealed or
modified. This clearly indicates the laws intent to transfer the
power to ERC.
- Be it noted that implied repeals are not favored in our
jurisdiction. Thus, a statute will not be deemed to have been
impliedly repealed by another enacted subsequent thereto
unless there is a showing that a plain, unavoidable, and
irreconcilable repugnancy exists between the two.
- Likewise, it may not be asserted with success that the power
to grant provisional rate adjustments runs counter to the
statutory construction guide provided in Sec. 75 of the law. This
section ordains that the EPIRA shall be construed in favor of
market competition and people power empowerment, thereby
ensuring the widest participation of the people. To the Court,
the goals of market competition and people empowerment are
not negated by the ERCs exercise of authority to approve
provisional rate adjustments. The concerns are taken care of
by Sec. 43 of the EPIRA and its IRR. Again for one, even if
there is a ground to grant the provisional rate increase, the
ERC may do so only after the publication requirement is met
and the consumers affected are given the opportunity to
present their side. For another, the rate increase is provisional
in character and therefore may be modified or even recalled
anytime. Finally, the ERC is mandated to prescribe a rate-
setting methodology in the public interest and to promote
efficiency. For that matter, there is a plethora of provisions in
Sec. 43 and related sections which seek to promote public
interest, market competition, and consumer protection.
- All the foregoing undeniably lead to the conclusion that the
ERC, under Sections 43(u), 44, and 80 of the EPIRA, in
relation to Sec. 16(c) of the Public Service Act and Sec. 8 of
EO. No. 172, possesses the power to grant provisional rate
adjustments subject to the procedure laid down in these laws
as well as in the IRR.
2. Yes. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion when
an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or when
executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill
will, or personal bias. What makes the challenged Order
particularly repugnant is that it involves a blatant and
inexcusable breach of the very rule which the ERC is
mandated to observe and implement. The violated provision
which is Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the IRR specifies how the ERC
should exercise its power to issue provisional orders pursuant
to Sec. 44 in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPIRA. First, the
application for rate increase must be published in a newspaper
of general circulation in the locality where the applicant
operates; second, ERC must consider the comments or
pleadings of the customers and LGU concerned in its action on
the application or motion for provisional rate adjustment. Since
the IRR was issued pursuant to the EPIRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3
as part of the IRR has the force and effect of law and thus
should have been complied with.
- In view of the infirmities which attended the November 27,
2003 Order, particularly: 1) the failure of MERALCO to publish
its Application or at least a summary thereof; 2) the failure of
ERC to resolve the Motions for Production of Documents filed
by the oppositors to MERALCOs Application before acting on
the motion for provisional rate adjustment; and 3) the failure of
the ERC to consider the arguments raised by the oppositors in
their respective pleadings prior to the issuance of the assailed
Order, the Court declares void the November 27, 2003 Order of
the ERC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROSEMOOR
MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
PANGANIBAN; March 30, 2004
FACTS
- The petitioners, after having been granted permission to
prospect for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato,
succeeded in discovering marble deposits in Mount Mabio,
which forms part of Biak-na-bato mountain range. The
petitioners then applied with the Bureau of Mines for the
issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble
deposits. License No. 33 was granted to them. Shortly after
respondent Ernesto Maceda was appointed Minister of the
Department of Energy, he cancelled the petitioners license
through his letter to Rosemoor Mining and Development
Corporation dated Semptember 6, 1986. Because of the
cancellation, the original petition was filed on August 21, 1991.
- The trial court granted the petition and said that the privilege
granted under the license had already ripened into a property
right, thus the cancellation of the license without notice or
hearing was against the Constitutional right of the petitioners
against deprivation of their property rights. It was unjustified
because that could be covered by four separate application is
400 hectares. Finally, they ruled that Proclamation No. 84,
which confirmed the cancellation of the license, was an ex post
facto law. Thus, they were allowed to continue their operations
until the expiration of their license.
- On appeal, the CA held that the grant of quary license
covering 330.3062 hectares to the respondents was valid
because it was covered by four separate applications, each for
an area of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the limitation
under PD 463 - that any quarry license should not cover not
more than 100 hectares in any given province was
supplanted by RA 7942, which increased the mining areas
allowed under PD 463,
ISSUES
1. WON the case is moot and academic
2. WON the license is valid
3. WON Proclamation No. 84 is valid
HELD
1. No. With the shift of constitutional policy (Art 12 Sec 2)
toward full control and supervision of the State over natural
resources the Court in Miners Association of the Philippines vs
Factoran declared the provisions of PD 463 as contrary to the
Constitution.
- RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the
new constitutional
mandate. It has repealed all laws that are inconsistent with any
of its provisions. However, it does not apply retroactively to a
license granted by the government under the 1973
Constitution. The Court therefore needs to determine WON the
license of the respondents falls within the type of licenses
wherein the new law cannot be applied.
2. No. The license granted to the petitioners is subject to the
terms and conditions of PD 463. Proclamation No. 2202, which
awarded the license to Rosemoor, expressly states that the
grant is subject to existing policies, laws, rules and
regulations. The license is thus subject to Section 69 of PD
463, which states that a license cannot cover more than 100
hectares in any one province. The law does not provide any
exception to the number of applications for a license. Moreover,
the license was issued solely in the name of Rosemoore
Mining and Development Corporation, rather than the four
individual stockholders.
3. Yes. Citing Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs.
Balite Portal Mining Cooperative, Tan vs. Director of Forestry
and Ysmael vs. Executive Secretary, the Court ruled that
licenses may be revoked by executive action when national
interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause. The license
merely evidences the privilege granted by the state and does
not vest any permanent or irrevocable right. The license
likewise contains a provision which says that the license may
be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines
and Geo-Sciences when in his opinion, public interest so
require. As to the exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice to
say that while the cancellation or revocation of the license is
vested in the said director, the latter is subject to the
department head.
- Moreover, granting that the license is valid, it may also by
revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. The
exercise of power through Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in
accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the State ownership
of all natural resources.
- Proc No. 84 is also not a bill of attainder since the declaration
of the license as a nullity is not a declaration of guilt. Neither is
the cancellation a punishment within the purview of the
constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
- Proclamation No. 84 is also not an ex post facto law. It does
not fall under the six recognized instances when a law is
considered as such. Also, an ex post facto law is limited in its
scope only to matters criminal in nature.
Decision Petition granted
DIDIPIO EARTHSAVERS ASSOCIATION V SECRETARY
CHICO-NAZARIO; March 30,2006
FACTS
- Nature Prohibition and mandamus
- Assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942
otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together
with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant
thereto, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996.
- 25 July 1987 ~ President Aquino promulgated EO No. 279
which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and
evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts of agreements involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon
appropriate recommendation of the Secretary, the President
may execute with the foreign proponent.
- 3 March 1995 ~ President Ramos signed into law Rep. Act
No. 7942 entitled, An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral
Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and
Conservation, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995.
- 15 August 1995 ~ DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995,
containing the implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942.
- 23 January 1997 ~ DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect
on after due publication superseded DAO No. 23, s.1995.
- Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994,
President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land
area of 37,000 hectares covering the provinces of Nueva
Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is Barangay Dipidio,
Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
- Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited
to form a single company that now goes under the new name
of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling
99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.
- 7 September 2001 ~ counsels for petitioners filed a demand
letter addressed to then DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for
the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that
Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional.
- The Office of the Executive Secretary was also furnished a
copy of the said letter.
- There being no response to both letters, another letter of the
same content dated 17 June 2002 was sent to President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo.
- This letter was indorsed to the DENR Secretary and
eventually referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional Office No. 02,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
- 12 November 2002 ~ counsels for petitioners received a letter
from the Panel of Arbitrators of the MGB requiring the
petitioners to comply with the Rules of the Panel of Arbitrators
before the letter may be acted upon.
- Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President Arroyo
another demand letter dated 8 November 2002. Said letter
was again forwarded to the DENR Secretary who referred the
same to the MGB, Quezon City.
- In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected the
demand of counsels for petitioners for the cancellation of the
CAMC FTAA.
- Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition
and mandamus, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order. They pray that the Court issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents from acting on any
application for FTAA;
2. declaring unconstitutional the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
3. canceling the FTAA issued to CAMC.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the petitioners' eminent domain claim is a justiciable
issue.
Substantive
2. WON RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void becausethey
allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without
payment of just compensation, in violation of Art III Sec 9 of the
Constitution
3. WON the mining act and its implementing rules and
regulations are void and unconstitutional for sanctioning an
unconstitutional administrative process of determining just
compensation
4. WON the state, through RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA,
abdicated its primary responsibility to the full control and
supervision over natural resources
5. WON the respondents interpretation of the role of the wholly
foreign and foreign-owned corporations in their involvement in
mining enterprises, violates Art XII Sec 2 (4) of the Constitution
6. WON the 1987 Constitution prohibits service contracts
HELD
1. YES. It is a justiciable issue. Based on the following
considerations:
a. Locus Standi~ In the case, there is a clash of legal
rights as Rep. Act No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO
96-40 has been approved and an FTAAs have been
entered into. Petitioners embrace various segments of
the society, like DESAMA representing a community
actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as
well as other residents of areas affected by the mining
activities of CAMC. These petitioners have the
standing to raise the constitutionality of the questioned
FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial injury.
They are under imminent threat of being displaced from
their landholdings as a result of the implementation of
the questioned FTAA.
b. Ripeness~ By the mere enactment of the questioned
law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even
without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.
c. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and
the magnitude of the public interest involved will have a
bearing on the countrys economy, which is to a greater
extent dependent upon the mining industry. Also
affected by the resolution of this case are the
proprietary rights of numerous residents in the mining
contract areas as well as the social existence of
indigenous peoples, which are threatened.
2. On the Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO
96-40
- PETITIONERS contend that Sec. 76 of RA No. 7942 and Sec.
107 of DAO 96-40 allow the "unlawful and unjust "TAKING" of
private property for private purpose in contradiction with Sec. 9,
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property
shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding
payment of just compensation."
- They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining
Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its
own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of
land without payment of just compensation.
- They cited the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi to
illustrate the concept of taking of property for purposes of
eminent domain to wit:
> "taking under the concept of eminent domain as entering
upon private property for more than a momentary period,
and, under the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it
to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof."
- Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that
there is no absolute, physical taking, at the very least, Section
76 establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners,
occupants and concessionaires of a mining contract area
sufficient to deprive them of enjoyment and use of the property
and that such burden imposed by the legal easement falls
within the purview of eminent domain.
(NOTE: An easement is defined to be a liberty privilege or
advantage, which one man may have in the lands of another,
without profit; it may arise by deed or prescription)
- PUBLIC RESPONDENTS argue that Section 76 is NOT A
TAKING provision but a VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the
public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for
the use or economic exploitation of private property.
- Public respondents concluded that to require compensation
in all such circumstances would compel the government to
regulate by purchase.
- Public respondents are inclined to believe that by entering
private lands and concession areas, FTAA holders do not oust
the owners thereof nor deprive them of all beneficial enjoyment
of their properties as the said entry merely establishes a legal
easement upon surface owners, occupants and
concessionaires of a mining contract area.
- Hence the distinctions below:
1. Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished from Regulation in
Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the
state (and of those entities to which the power has been
lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public
use upon payment of just compensation.
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state
to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent
domain have the general welfare for their object, and
recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter
being used as an implement of the former, there are still
traditional distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence, no
compensation shall be paid. (NOTE: noxious= harmful)
Jurisprudence shows: WHERE A PROPERTY INTEREST
IS MERELY RESTRICTED BECAUSE THE CONTINUED
USE THEREOF WOULD BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC
 WELFARE, OR WHERE PROPERTY IS DESTROYED
BECAUSE ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE WOULD BE
INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC INTEREST, THERE IS NO
COMPENSABLE TAKING. However, WHEN A
PROPERTY INTEREST IS APPROPRIATED AND
APPLIED TO SOME PUBLIC PURPOSE, THERE IS
COMPENSABLE TAKING.
In the exercise of its police power regulation, the state
restricts the use of private property, but none of the
property interests in the bundle of rights, which constitute
ownership, is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of
the public. (-Bernas)
TAKING MAY INCLUDE TRESPASS WITHOUT ACTUAL
EVICTION OF THE OWNER, MATERIAL IMPAIRMENT
OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY OR PREVENTION
OF THE ORDINARY USES FOR WHICH THE
PROPERTY WAS INTENDED SUCH AS THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EASEMENT.
In Republic v. Castellvi, the Court had the occasion to
spell out the requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
1. the expropriator must enter a private property;
2. the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;
5. the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results
in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of,
the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears
why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of the condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable
that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected
to an easement right of way.
THE ENTRY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 76 IS NOT JUST A
SIMPLE RIGHT-OF-WAY WHICH IS ORDINARILY ALLOWED
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE. Here, the
holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of
conducting mining activities such as exploration, extraction and
processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine
infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare
tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots, install their
machinery, equipment and sewer systems. On top of this,
under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where
they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric
transmission, railroads and other infrastructures necessary for
mining operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or
occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of
their lands. WITHOUT A DOUBT, TAKING OCCURS ONCE
MINING OPERATIONS COMMENCE.
1. On Section 76 of RA No. 7942 as a Taking Provision
Brief History of Mining Laws:
First found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137
A similar one was found in a provision of Presidential
Decree No. 463, otherwise known as The Mineral
Resources Development Decree of 1974
Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing
surface rights for the entry into private lands for
purposes of mining operations, Presidential Decree No.
512 dated 19 July 1974 was passed into law in order to
achieve full and accelerated mineral resources
development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512
provides for a new system of surface rights acquisition
by mining prospectors and claimants.
Whereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and
Presidential Decree No. 463 eminent domain may only
be exercised in order that the mining claimants can
build, construct or install roads, railroads, mills,
warehouses and other facilities, this time, the power of
eminent domain may now be invoked by mining
operators for the entry, acquisition and use of private
lands.
Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512
granted the qualified mining operators the authority to exercise
eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed
incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking
provision.
o The taking to be valid must be for public use.
o Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is now synonymous with
public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience.
o It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit
or advantage. Public use as traditionally understood as
actual use by the public has already been abandoned.
Decision THEREFORE, the Mining Law and the CAMC FTAA
are not void because Sec. 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Sec.
107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just
compensation based on the agreement entered into by the
holder of mining rights and the surface owner, occupant or
concessionaire in accordance to PD 512.
Reasoning and Held/s on the Second Substantive Issue:
3. On the Power of Courts to Determine Just Compensation
The question on the judicial determination of just compensation
has been settled in the case of Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay wherein the Court declared that the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function. Even as the executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations, the same
cannot prevail over the courts findings. (NOTE: I think this is
the ratio already.)
There is nothing in the provisions
of the assailed law and its implementing rules and
regulations that exclude the courts from their jurisdiction
to determine just compensation in expropriation
proceedings involving mining operations.
There is nothing wrong with the
grant of primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators
or the Mines Adjudication Board to determine in a
preliminary matter the reasonable compensation due
the affected landowners or occupants.
The jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts is not any less original and exclusive
because the question is first passed upon by the DAR,
as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the
administrative determination.
4. On the Sufficient Control by the State Over Mining
Operations
Citing La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos: The Court held that RA 7942 provides for the
states control and supervision over mining operations.
o The gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and
limitations imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the
statute and regulations easily overturns petitioners
contention that the setup under RA 7942 and DAO 96-
40 relegates the State to the role of a passive
regulator dependent on submitted plans and reports.
On the contrary, the government agencies concerned
are empowered to approve or disapprove -- hence, to
 influence, direct and change -- the various work
programs and the corresponding minimum expenditure
commitments for each of the exploration, development
and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
- Considering the provisions of the statute and the regulations
just discussed, the Court believes that the State definitely
possesses the means by which it can have the ultimate word in
the operation of the enterprise, set directions and objectives,
and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor;
likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to
impose sanctions, should the occasion therefore arise.
In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do
whatever it pleases and get away with it; on the
contrary, it will have to follow the government line if it
wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then, RA
7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than
a sufficient degree of control and supervision over the
conduct of mining operations.
5. On the Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase
"Agreements Involving Either Technical or Financial
Assistance"
Citing La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos:
Par. 4 of Sec. 2 Art XII allows for the possibility that
matters, other than those explicitly mentioned, could be
made part of the agreement.
o The use of the word involving implies that these
agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to
mere financial or technical assistance. The difference in
sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose
agreements for technical or financial assistance
against agreements including technical or financial
assistance. This much is unalterably clear in a verba
legis approach.
o The word involving as used in this context has three
connotations that can be differentiated thus: one, the
sense of concerning, having to do with, or affecting;
two, entailing, requiring, implying or necessitating; invest in and operate and manage extractive enterprises,
and three, including, containing or comprising.
If the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign
corporations to financial or technical assistance and
nothing more, their language would have certainly been
so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no
doubt in anyones mind about their true intent.
o For example, they would have used the sentence
foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from
involvement in the management or operation of mining
or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search
for such stringent wording yields negative results.
- The meaning of the phrase agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance must not be construed in an
exclusionary and limiting manner since there was a conscious
and deliberate decision by the drafters to avoid the use of
restrictive wording.
6. On Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized
The 1987 Constitution allows
the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who would invest in and
operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject to
the full control and supervision of the State; this time,
however, safety measures were put in place to prevent
abuses of the past regime.
Citing Philippine Veterans Bank
v. Court of Appeals:
a. "The phrase agreements involving either technical
or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in
fact service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973
variety, the new ones are between foreign corporations
acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other,
the government as principal or owner of the works."
b. "xxx..From the foregoing, we are impelled to
conclude that the phrase agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance, referred to in
paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike
those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between
foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one
hand; and on the other, the government as principal or
owner of the works. "
- "As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by the
people, the Constitution allows the continued use of service
contracts with foreign corporations -- as contractors who would 369 which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve.
subject to the full control and supervision of the State -- sans - Petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission
the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is clear: to
develop and utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources
on a large scale for the immediate and tangible benefit of the
Filipino people." (id.)
Decision The petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED.
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO
96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 insofar as they relate to
financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in
paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution are
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING V BALITE
PORTAL MINING
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 3, 2002
FACTS
- Diwalwal Gold Rush Area rich tract of mineral land
situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. It is
located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo and
Cateek in Davao Del Norte. The land has been embroiled in
controversy since mid-80s due to the scramble over gold
deposits found within its bowels.
- March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted
Exploration Permit No. 133 (EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares
of land, which included the Diwalwal area.
- June 27, 1991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 or
the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act which established a
Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by
the secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR Secretarys direct
supervision and control. It also authorized the PMRB to declare
and set aside small-scale mining areas subject to review by the
DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to small-scale
miners under certain conditions.
- December 21, 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran issued Department Administrative Order (DAO) No.
66 declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest
land open to small-scale mining. This was made pursuant to
the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No.
of a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal
over Diwalwal was filed before the DENR Regional Executive
Director (RED Mines Case)
- February 16, 1994, while RED mines case was pending,
Marcopper assigned its EP No. 133 to Southeast Mindanao
Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which in turn applied for an
integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit. The
Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in
Davao City (MGB-XI) accepted and registered SEMs
integrated MPSA application. Several small-scale miners filed
their opposition (MAC cases).
- March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act was enacted. Pursuant to this, the MAC cases were
referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to
resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights. RPA took
cognizance of the RED Mines cases which was consolidated
with the MAC cases.
- April 1, 1997 Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Davao
passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1997 authorizing the
issuance of ore transport permits (OTPs) to small-scale miners
operating in the Diwalwal mines.
- May 30, 1997, petitioner SEM filed complaint for damages
against DENR Secretary and PMRB-Davao, alleging that the
illegal issuance of the OTPs allowed the extraction and hauling
of P60,000 worth of gold ore per truckload from SEMs mining
claim.
- Meanwhile, June 13, 1997, the RPA resolved the
Consolidated Mines cases and decreed in an Omnibus
Resolution that the validity of EP No. 133 is reiterated and all
adverse claims against MPSAA No. 128 are dismissed.
- June 24, 1997 the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 which provided among others, that:
a. DENR shall studythe option of direct state utilization of
the mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area
b. Study shall include studying and weighing the feasibility
of entering into management agreements or operating
agreements
c. Such agreements shall include provisions for profit-
sharing including profit-sharing arrangements with
small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to
indigenous cultural communities
- July 16, 1997 petitioner SEM filed a special civil action for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the CA for the
nullification of Memorandum Order No. 97-03 on the ground
that the direct state utilization espoused therein would
effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133, among
others
- January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the
Consolidated Mines cases, setting aside the judgment of the
RPA. This decision was then elevated to he Supreme Court by
way of consolidated petition.
- March 19, 1998, the CA dismissed petition of SEM ruling that:
a. DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing
Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since it was merely a
directive to conduct studies on the various options
available to the government for solving the Diwalwal
conflict.
b. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt
direct state utilization as official government policy on the
matter, but was simply a manifestation of the DENRs
intent to consider it as one of its options, after determining
its feasibility through studies.
c. Petitioners rights under EP No. 133 are not inviolable,
sacrosanct or immutable and, being in the nature of a
privilege granted by the State, the permit can be revoked,
amended or modified by the Chief Executive when the
national interest so requires.
- Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in upholding the questioned acts of the
DENR Secretary which petitioner allege as violative of mining
laws and in derogation of vested rights of petitioner over the
area as covered by EP No. 133.
2. WON CA erred in holding that an action on the validity of ore
transport permit (OTP) is vested in the Regional Panel of
Arbitrators (RPA).
HELD
1. SC agreed with CA that the challenged MO 97-03 did not
conclusively adopt direct state utilization as a policy in
resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum
clearly indicate that what was directed was merely a study of
this option and nothing else. It did not grant any
management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to small-
scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply
instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to
determine its feasibility.
- Petition was premature. The MO did not impose any
obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever
between and among the parties to the dispute. Petitioner can
show no more than a mere apprehension that the State,
through the DENR, would directly take over the mines, and
until the DENR actually does so and petitioners fears turn into
reality, no valid objection can be entertained against MO 97-03
on grounds which are purely speculative and anticipatory.
2. Whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over
Diwalwal under EP No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled
matter, as the EPs validity is still being disputed in the
Consolidated Mines cases.
- Whether or not respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining
Cooperative (BCPMC) and the other mining entities it
represents are conducting illegal mining activities is a factual
matter that has yet to be finally determined in the Consolidated
Mines Cases.
- SC also pointed out that under no circumstances may
petitioners rights under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and
absolute, as EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege granted
by the State, which may be amended, modified or rescinded
when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so
since the exploration, development and utilization of the
countrys natural mineral resources are matters impresses with
great public interest.
- Looking into Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, the
SC said that the State may pursue the constitutional policy of
full control and supervision of the exploration, development and
utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either
directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements
with qualified entities. The State need be guided only by the
demands of public interest.
- In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENR
Secretary violated the law or abused his discretion, he is
presumed to have regularly issued the memorandum with a
lawful intent and pursuant to his official functions.
- With regard to the second issue, the Court did not rule on it as
the grounds invoked by petitioner for invalidating the OTPs are
inextricably linked to the issues raised in the Consolidated
Mines cases.
Decision Petition was denied; CA ruling affirmed.
CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI
COASTAL BAY
CARPIO; July 9, 2002
FACTS
- Nature original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
Petition also seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority
(PEA) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with
AMARI involving such recalamtion.
- 1973-The government through the Commission of Public
Highways signed a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim
certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
- 1977-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating the PEA. And was tasked to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas and to develop, improve,
acquire x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands. On the
same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to
PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the
Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
- 1981-Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to
amend its contract with CDCP which stated that CDCP shall
transfer in favor of PEA the areas reclaimed by CDCP in the
MCCRRP
- 1988-President Aquino issued Special Patent granting and
transferring to PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the
MCCRRP. Subsequently she transferred in the name of PEA
the three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands
- 1995-PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands
and this was done without public bidding
- President Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
approved the JVA
- 1996-Senate President Maceda delivered a privileged speech
in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of
all scams. As a result, investigations were conducted by the
Senate. Among the conclusions were: (1) the reclaimed lands
PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands;
(2) the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are
thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal
- 1997-President Ramos created the Legal Task Force to
conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate
Committee report.1998-The Philippine Daily Inquirer published
reports on on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI
- PEA Director Nestor Kalaw and PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo
and former navy officer Sergio Cruz were members of the
negotiating panel
- Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA
of the reclaimed lands to AMARI and prays that PEA publicly
disclose the terms of the renegotiations of JVA. He cited that
the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting
sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private
corporations and Article 2 Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the
Constitution on the right to information on matters of public
concern
- 1999-PEA and AMARI signed Amended JVA which Pres.
Estrada approved
ISSUES
1. WON the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot
and academic because subsequent events
2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the
principle governing the hierarchy of courts
3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of
administrative-remedies
4. WON petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement
6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture
agreement for the transfer to amari of certain lands, reclaimed
and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 consitution; and
7. WON the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of
whether the amended joint venture agreement is grossly
disadvantageuos to the government.
o threshold issue: whether amari, a private corporation,
can acquire and own under the amended jva 367.5
hectares of reclaimed froeshore and submerged area in
manila bay in view of sections 2 and 3, article 12 of the
1987 constitution
HELD
(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on
constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have
signed one in violation of the Constitution and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of an unconstitutional
contract
(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to
cases involving factual questions
Reasoning the instant case raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public
(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question
(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public
importance and as such, there is the right of a citizen to bring a
taxpayers suit on these matters of transcendental public
importance
(5) The constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract and
must therefore constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order
Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces the peoples
right to information on matters of public concern. PEA must
prepare all the data and disclose them to the public at the start
of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the
contract. While the evaluation or review is on-going, there are
no official acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or
proposals but once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part
of the government
(6) In a form of a summary:
o The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in
the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of
these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
o The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay
remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain and outside the commerce of man until
classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public
service. The government can make such classification
and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate.
o Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a
private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain
o Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to
AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void
 for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural
resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas.
Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public services. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article 12 which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
Reasoning Commonwealth Act 141 of the Philippine National
Assembly empowers the president to classify lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable sec. 6. The
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the
lands of the public domain into(a) Alienable of disposable,
(b) timber, and (c) mineral lands.-The President must first
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and
then declare them open to disposition or concession.
-Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title shall
be classified as follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the
Government by dredging, filling, or other means; (b)
Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in any of
the foregoing classes. -Sec. 61 states that the lands comprised
in classes (a), (b) and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise
-After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government
reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain
continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties.
These lands remained suis generic as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain the government could
not sell to private parties. The only way that the government
can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to
pass a law authorizing such sale.
-in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public
domain, a public bidding is required
-1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. Article 12, Sec. 3
states that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited
to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area.
-ration behind the ban on corporations from acquiring except
through lease is not well understood. If the purpose is to
equitably diffuse lands ownership then the Consti could have
simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain
that corporations could acquire. If the intent was to encourage
owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to
prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case, then
placing the land in the name of a corporation would be more
effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the
death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the
corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the farmland. This
would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into
smaller and smaller plots from one generation to the next. In
actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation
on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of
alienable lands of the public domain. Without the ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of
alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up
corporations to acquire more alienable public lands. An
individual could own as many corporations as his means would
allow him. He could even hide his ownership of a corporation
by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation.
J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS V COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO; September 24, 2003
FACTS
- January 27, 1977 The National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC), a government corporation,
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Kawasaki Heavy
Industry, Ltd of Kobe, Japan for the construction, operation,
management of the Subic National Shipyard, which became
the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation
(PHILSECO) with 60-40% capitalization.
- One of the features of the agreement is the grant to the
parties the right of first refusal should either of them decide to
sell, assign or transfer its interest in the joint venture.
- November 25, 1986-- the NIDC transferred all its rights, title
and interest in PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). And subsequently transferred to the Natl Government
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14
- December 8, 1986-- Pres Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50
establishing the Committee on Privatization (COP) and the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to take possession of, manage
and dispose of non*performing assets of the National
Government.
- APT was named trustee in the National Govt share in
PHILSECO.
- COP and APT decided to sell the govt shares to private
entities (87.67% equity share).
- APT and KAWASAKI agreed to exhange KAWASAKIs right of
first refusal for the right to top by 5% the highest bid, and be
entitled to name the company which could top. KAWASAKI
named Philyard Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
- JG Summit Holdings Inc submitted a bid of
2,030,000,000.00php with an acknowledgment of
KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top. JGSHI was declared the highest
bidder.
- KAWASAKI/PHI exercised the option to top and the COP
approved. APT and PHI executed a Stock Purchase
Agreement.
- JGSHI filed a petition for mandamus to question the legality of
the right to first refusal and right to top exercised by
KAWASAKI/PHI.
- CA held that petition for mandamus was not the proper
remedy, and that JGSHI was estopped from questioning the
validity because it participated in the public bidding with the full
knowledge of KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top.
- SC held that a) the right to top granted to KAWASAKI/PHI
was illegal. Because it allows foreign corporations to own more
than 40% equity in PHILSECO, which is a public utility whose
capitalization should be 60% Filipino-owned. It also violates the
rules of competitive bidding; b) JGSHI cannot be estopped
from questioning the unconstitutional, illegal and inequitable
provision; c) APT should accept the 2,030,000,000.00 bid of
JGSHI, execute Stock Purchase Agreement, return to PHI the
amount of 2,131,500,000.00php, and cancel the stock
certificates issued to PHI.
- Respondents filed MFR with the ff. issues
ISSUES
1. WON PHILSECO is a public utility.
2. WON under 1977 Joint Venture Agreement, KAWASAKI can
exercise its right of first refusal only up to 40% of the total
capitalization of PHILSECO
3. WON the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates the
principles of competitive bidding.
HELD
1. No. PHILSECO is not a public utility. A shipyard is not a
public utility by nature, and there is no law declaring it to be.
a) Public utility = a business or service engaged in regularly
supplying the public with some commodity or service of
public consequence such as electricity, water,
transportation. The facility must be necessary for the
maintenance of life and occupation of residents.
b) Public utility implies public use and service to the public.
Determinative characteristic: service or readiness to serve
an indefinite public (not a privileged few), which has rights
to demand and receive the services and commodities.
c) Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The fact
that a business offers services and goods that promote
public good and serve the interest of the public does not
make it a public utility.
d) True criterion to judge the character of the use: whether
the public may enjoy it by RIGHT or only by PERMISSION
e) Shipyard = a place or enclosure where ships are built or
repaired. It has a limited clientele whom it may choose to
serve as its discretion. It is not legally obliged to render its
services to the public. Though the industry may be imbued
with public interest, its public service is only incidental.
f) Shipyards in the past were declared as public utilities (by
Act No 2307, Commonwealth Act No 146). Then Marcos
PD No. 666 removed it from the list of public utilities to
free the industry from the 60% citizenship requirement
under the Constitution (he wanted to accelerate the
growth of the industry). Then BP Blg 391 repealed PD No.
666 , reverting back the status of shipyards as public
utilities.
g) Pres Aquino repealed BP Blg 391 with EO No. 226. But
this did not revive PD No 666 or the other repealed laws.
The status of shipyards reverts back to non-public utility
prior to the Public Service Law.
2) No. There is nothing that prevents KAWASAKI to acquire
more then 40% of PHILSECOs total capitalization, under
the Joint Venture Agreement. (or YES, it can own more
than 40%). They agreed that in the event that one party
sells its shares, the non-selling party have a preferential
right to buy or to refuse the selling. The partnership is
based on delectus personae. No one can become a
member of the partnership association w/o the consent of
all other associates.
3) No. The right to top did not violate the rules of
competitive bidding.
a) bidding = making an offer or an invitation to
prospective contractors whereby the govt manifests
its intention to make proposals for the purpose of
supplies, materials and equipment for official
business or public use. Public bidding is the accepted
method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price, and
ensures that overpricing, favoritism, and other
anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized.
b) Principles of bidding: 1) the offer to the public; 2) an
opportunity for competition; 3) a basis for comparison
of bids. As long as the three are complied with, the
bidding is valid and legal.
c) The highest bid may not be automatically accepted.
Bidding rules may specify other conditions or
reservations.
d) In the case, 1) all interested bidders were welcomed;
2) basis for comparing bids were laid down; 3) all
bids were accepted sealed and were opened and
read in the presence of the COAs official
representative and before all other bidders.
e) The bidders were placed in equal footing.
And they were made aware of the rules that the govt
reserved the right to reject the highest bid should
KAWASAKI/PHI decide to exercise its right to top.
f) If the parties did not swap right to first
refusal with right to top, KAWASAKI would still have
the right to buy the shares (for the original amount,
which was lesser), so there is no basis in the
submission that the right to top unfairly favored
KAWASAKI.
Decision : MFR granted. Decision & resolution of CA affirmed.
Voting Concur: Davide, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga (w/
sep op)
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA
Shipyard is not a public utility. Since the enactment of CA No.
454 shipyards have never been considered public utilities. PD
666 merely removed any doubt as to their non-public utility
status.
BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATION
QUAISON; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of
a block of shares of Petron Corporation and the award made to
Aramco Overseas Company as the highest bidder and to stop
the sale of said block of shares to Aramco
- PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1966 under the corporate name
Esso Philippines, Inc.
- In 1973, the Philippine government acquired ESSO through
the PNOC and became a wholly-owned company of the
government under the corporate name PETRON and as a
subsidiary of PNOC.
- On December 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated
Proclamation No. 50 entitled Proclaiming and Launching a
Program for the Expeditious Disposition and Privatization of
Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets thereof
and creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset
Privatization Trust in the exercise of her legislative power
under the Freedom Constitution.
- Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise revenue for
the government and the ideal of leaving business to the private
sector.
- December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the
privatization program to be successful and beneficial.
- September 9, 1992, the PNOC Board of Directors approved
Specific Thrust No. 6 and moved to bring the attention of the
administration to the need to privatize Petron.
- October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the
Committee on Privatization, endorsed to President Ramos the
proposal of PNOC.
- January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by Secretary Del
Rosario to President Ramos.
- January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of Energy
endorsed for approval
- January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of
Petron as part of the Energy Sector Action Plan.
- March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring and
Coordinating Committee recommended a 100% privatization of
Petron.
- March 31, 1883, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a
resolution authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a
contract with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong
Limited and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory
services to be rendered to Petron.
- April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the privatization of
Petron up to a maximum of 65% of its capital stock.
- August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%-40%-
20% privatization strategy of Petron.
- Invitation to bid was published.
- The floor price bid for the 40% block was fixed at US$400
million.
- The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS),
ARAMCO, and WESTMONT were submitted while the floor
price was being dicussed.
- ARAMCO was declared the winning bidder at US$502 million
- December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, President and Chief
Executive Officer of PNOC, endorsed to COP the bid of
ARAMCO for approval. And was approved on the same day.
Also on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint
questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO.
- February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock
Purchase Agreement
- March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders
Agreement
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioner have locus standi
2. WON the inclusion of Petron in the privatization program
contravened the declared policy of the State
3. WON the bidding procedure was valid
4. WON Petron was a public utility
HELD
1. YES. Taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the
national government or government-owned or controlled
corporations alleged to be in contravention of the law.
2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the
approval of the COP of such privatization, being made in
accordance with Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by
the Court. Such acts are exercises of the executive function as
to which the Court will not pass judgment upon or inquire into
their wisdom.
3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should
be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of
the law it is merely tasked to administer.
4. NO. A public utility under the Constitution and the Public
Service Law is one organized for hire or compensation to serve
the public, which is given the right to demand its service.
Petron is not engaged in oil refining for hire and compensation
to process the oil of other parties.
Decision Petitions dismissed
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V COURT OF
APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 20, 2001
FACTS
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals
- Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is engaged in
the business of importing crude oil, refining the same and
selling various petroleum products through a network of service
stations throughout the country
- Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns
and operates a Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA
and Domestic Roads in Pasay City
- June 30, 1983: Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy
Utilization (BEU) an application for authority to relocate its Shell
Service Station at Tambo, Paranaque to Imelda Marcos Ave,
Paranaque. The application was initially rejected because the
old site had been closed for five years such that relocation of
the same to a new site would amount to a new construction of
a gasoline outlet, which construction was then the subject of a
moratorium. Subsequently, BEU relaxed its position and gave
due course to the application.
- PDSC filed opposition on the grounds that: (1) there are
adequate service stations attending to the motorists
requirements in the trading area, (2) ruinous competition will
result, and (3) there is a decline not an increase in the volume
of sales in the area. Petrophil and Caltex also opposed on the
ground that Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements.
- March 6, 1984: BEU dismissed application on jurisdictional
grounds and for lack of full title of the lessor over the
proposed site
- May 7, 1984: BEU reinstated application and conducted a
hearing thereon
- June 3, 1986: BEU rendered a decision denying application
because there was no necessity for an additional petroleum
products retail outlet on the site. Shell appealed to the Office of
Energy Affairs (OEA)
- May 8, 1987: EO 172 was issued creating the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory
and adjudicatory functions of the BEU
- May 9, 1988: OEA denied Shells appeal. Shell moved for
reconsideration and prayed for new hearing or remand of the
case for further proceedings. Shell submitted a new feasibility
study to justify application.
- July 11, 1988: OEA remanded case to ERB noting the
updated survey conducted by Shell
- September 17, 1991: ERB allowed Shell to establish the
service station
- PDSC filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by
the ERB. It thus elevated the case to the CA.
- November 8, 1993: CA reversed ERB judgment
- CA denied motion for reconsideration. Shell and ERB thus
elevated matters to the Supreme Court
- While case was pending in the CA, Caltex filed a similar
application in the same area. PDSC opposed on the same
grounds but ERB also approved application. PDSC again filed
a petition with the CA. Petition was dismissed in May 14, 1993.
- ERB arguments: evidence used as basis for ERBs decision is
neither stale nor irrelevant and justifies establishment of retail
outlet, evidence on vehicle volume and fuel demand supports
construction of outlet, new outlet will not lead to ruinous
competition
- Shell arguments: ERB findings based on substantial
evidence, feasibility study has not become irrelevant even if
presented two years after preparation, CA erred in passing
judgment and making pronouncement of purely economic and
policy issues on petroleum business, proposed outlet will not
result to ruinous competition, CA should have referred the new
evidence to ERB under the doctrine of prior resort to primary
jurisdiction
ISSUES
1. WON the court should set aside the ERB decision
2. WON there is substantial evidence to support ERBs finding
of public necessity to warrant approval of Shells application
3. WON the Feasibility study has become stale because it was
submitted in evidence two years after it was prepared in 1988
4. WON the establishment of the outlet would result to ruinous
competition
HELD
Ratio The courts will not interfere with actions of an
administrative agency, except if there is an error of law, abuse
of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
General Rule : The courts will not interfere in matters, which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies
- Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized
themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning
and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent,
conscientious and competent expert opinion
- Exception An action by an administrative agency may be
set aside if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with
the letter and spirit of the law.
- When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues
a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and
the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the
courts that finally determine what the law means.
1. No cogent reason to depart from general rule since ERB
findings conform to the governing statutes and controlling
case law on the matter
Regulatory boards were empowered to entertain and act
on applications for the establishment of gasoline stations
in the Philippines.
There is a worldwide trend towards economic
deregulation. This trend is reflected in our policy
considerations, statutes and jurisprudence.
- RA 8479 was enacted to implement Art XII, Sec.
19 of the Constitution
- Government believes deregulation will
eventually prevent monopoly
- Art XII, Sec. 19 is anti-trust in history and spirit.
It espouses competition. The objective is based
upon the belief that through competition
producers will satisfy consumer wants at the
lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest
resources. Competition among producers allows
consumers to bid for goods and services and
thus, matches their desires with societys
opportunity costs.
Recent developments in the oil industry as well as
legislative enactments and jurisprudential
pronouncements have overtaken and rendered stale
the view espoused by the appellate court in denying
Shells petition
2. ERB Decision was based on hard economic data
Data includes: developmental projects, residential
subdivision listings, population count, public
conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic
count, fuel demand, growth of private cars, public
utility vehicles and commercial vehicles increased
market potential which will benefit community and
transient motorists
ERB is in a better position to resolve Shells
application being primarily the agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter
Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support
an administrative finding of fact. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
to support a conclusion
3. The pronouncement of Court of Appeals Sixteenth
Division affirming ERB Decision approving a similar
application by Caltex is more in keeping with the policy of
the State and the rationale of the statutes enacted to
govern the industry
CA: no gasoline station along the entire stretch; need
not necessarily result in ruinous competition, absent
adequate proof to that effect; unless petitioner is able
to prove by competent evidence that significant
changes have occurred sufficiently to invalidate that
afore-stated study, the presumption is that said study
remains valid
4. The mere possibility of reduction of earnings of a business
is not sufficient to prove ruinous competition
In determining the allowance or disallowance of an
application for the construction of a service station,
the CA confined the factors thereof within the rigid
standards governing public utility regulation, where
exclusivity, upon satisfaction of certain requirements,
is allowed. However, exclusivity is more the
exception rather than the rule in the gasoline service
station business
PDSC failed to show that its business would not have
sufficient profit to have a fair return on investment
Caltex, PDSCs principal, never filed any opposition
to Shells application
A climate of fear and pessimism generated by
unsubstantiated claims of ruinous competition
already rejected in the past should not be made to
retard free competition, consistently with legislative
policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry
to ensure a truly competitive market under a regime
of fair prices, adequate and continuous supply,
environmentally clean and high quality petroleum
products
Decision
(1) Challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside
(2) ERB Order granting the amended application of Pilipinas
Shell Corporation to relocate its service station to Benigno
Aquino Jr., Ave., Pque, Metro Manila reinstated
Voting 3 Justices concurred, 1 on sick leave
ART XIII: AGRARIAN REFORM
FORTRICH V CORONA
MARTINEZ; November 17, 1998
FACTS
- Two separate motions for reconsideration seeking reversal of
the SCs decision nullifying the win-win resolution dated
November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the President (OP)
- Decision struck down as void the act of the OP in reopening
the case in OP Case No. 96-C 6424 through the issuance of
November 7, 1997 win-win Resolution which substantially
modified its March 29, 1996 OP Decision that had long become
final and executory
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same
office as final and executory after the DARs motion for
reconsideration of the said decision was denied for having
been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
- Movants:
o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an
erroneous ruling
o Proper remedy for petitioner is a petition for review and
not certiorari
o Filing of motion for reconsideration is a condition sine
qua non before petition for certiorari may be filed
o Petitioners are guilty of forum shopping
- Intervenors:
o They have right to intervene
o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an
erroneous ruling
o Win-win resolution properly addresses the substantial
issues of the case
- Both movants ask that their motions be resolved en banc
since the issues are novel and of transcendental
significance Issue here according to them is WON the power
of the local government units (LGUs) to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the Dept of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
- Other issues raised by movants described as substantial (1)
whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land
with irrigation facility; (2) whether the land has long been
covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3)
whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants
for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof;
and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the
legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional
use
ISSUE
WON the SCs decision nullifying the win-win resolution dated
November 7, 1997 issued by the Office of the President (OP)
must be reversed.
HELD
- The issues presented are matters of no extraordinary import
to merit the attention of the Court en banc
o The issue is no longer novel as having been decided in
Province of Camarines Sur, et al. v. CA wherein it was
held that LGUs need not obtain the approval of the
DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to
non agricultural use.
o Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a
unanimous vote of all five members of the 2nd Division.
- The order which denied the DARs motion for reconsideration
of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was not an erroneous
ruling and it does not have to be corrected by the November 7,
1997 win-win resolution
o In accordance with Administrative order No. 18 which
mandates that decisions, orders, resolutions of the OP
shall become final after the lapse of 15 days from
receipt of copy thereof unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed within such period.
o Late filing of DAR is not excusable because DAR must
not disregard the reglementary period fixed by law in
referring the decision to the departments concerned for
the preparation of the motion of consideration
o Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect
and due regard as they are designed to facilitate the
adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem
of delay in the resolution of rival claims in the
administration of justice
- There is a grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
second motion for reconsideration and on the basis thereof
issued the win-win resolution was a flagrant infringement of the
doctrine of res judicata. These grave breaches of the law, rules
and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of
technical nature.
o When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision
was declared final and executory, vested rights were
acquired by the petitioners
- When the DARs order denying the petitioners first application
for conversion was first brought by petitioner to the OP, the
appropriate administrative rules were not complied with. But
movants cannot now question the supposed procedural lapse
for the first time before the SC. It should have been raised and
resolved at the administrative level.
- Intervenors do not have certain right or legal interest in the
subject matter.
o Being merely seasonal farmworkers without the right to
own, application for intervention must fail as they have
no legal or actual and substantial interest over the
subject land
o even "win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 did not
recognize the latter as proper parties to intervene in the
case simply because the qualified farmer-beneficiaries
have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in
the said resolution.
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly
disposed of the aforementioned substantial issues
o Factual findings of administrative agencies which have
acquired expertise in their field are binding and
conclusive on the Court, presuming the OP is the most
competent in matters falling within its domain
- Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of the
impoverised members of society will be benefited by the agro-
economic development of the disputed land which the province
of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend
to undertake.
o The OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the
eventual benefit of the many, no just of the few. This is
clearly shown from the development plan on the subject
land as conceived by the petitioners
- WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of
the April 24, 1998 Decision of this Court, filed by the
respondents and the applicants for intervention, are hereby
DENIED with FINALITY.
SIGRE V COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; August 8, 2002
FACTS
- Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of
the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to prohibit the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepting the
leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner
Rolando Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent
the rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre.
- Ernesto Sigre was private respondents tenant in an irrigated
rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was
previously paying private respondent a lease rental of 16
cavans per crop or 32 cavans per agricultural year. In the
agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his rentals
to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP
pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reforms Memorandum
Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the guidelines in the
payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries
under the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27.
- The pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum Circular No.
6 reads:
"A. Where the value of the land has already been
established.
The value of the land is established on the date
the Secretary or his authorized representative has
finally approved the average gross production data
established by the BCLP or upon the signing of the
LTPA by landowners and tenant farmers
concerned heretofore authorized.
Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered
by OLT shall terminate on the date the value of the
land is established. Thereafter, the tenant-farmers
shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the
LBP or its authorized agents: provided that in case
where the value of the land is established during
the month the crop is to be harvested, the cut-off
period shall take effect on the next harvest season.
With respect to cases where lease rentals paid
may exceed the value of the land, the tenant-
farmers may no longer be bound to pay such
rental, but it shall be his duty to notify the
landowner and the DAR Team Leader concerned
of such fact who shall ascertain immediately the
veracity of the information and thereafter resolve
the matter expeditiously as possible. If the
landowner shall insist after positive ascertainment
that the tenant-farmer is to pay rentals to him, the
amount equivalent to the rental insisted to be paid
shall de deposited by the tenant-farmer with the
 LBP or its authorized agent in his name and for his
account to be withdrawn only upon proper written
authorization of the DAR District Officer based on
the result of ascertainment or investigation."
- According to private respondent, she had no notice that the
DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior to October
1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per hectare, and the
value of the land was pegged at P13,405.67. Thus, the petition
filed before the Court of Appeals, assailing, not only the validity
of MC No. 6, but also the constitutionality of P.D. 27.
- The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and
declared MC No. 6 null and void. The LBP was directed to
return to private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre,
while Sigre was directed to pay the rentals directly to private
respondent. In declaring MC No. 6 as null and void, the
appellate court ruled that there is nothing in P.D. 27 which
sanctions the contested provision of the circular; that said
circular is in conflict with P.D. 816 which provides that
payments of lease rentals shall be made to the landowner, and
the latter, being a statute, must prevail over the circular; that
P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for
determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on the
judicial prerogative of determining just compensation; and that
it is no longer applicable, with the enactment of Republic Act
No. 6657.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES
1. WON MC No. 6 is valid
2. WON MC No. 6 can be reconciled with PD 816
3. WON PD 27 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES.
- PD 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand
E. Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a land reform
area and decreed the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the
land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a
system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as
the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling.
Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum
retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified
farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was
pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued MC No. 6, series
of 1978.
- The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not sanction
said Circular, particularly, the provision stating that payment of
lease rentals to landowners shall terminate on the date the
value of the land is established, after which the tenant-farmer
shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its
authorized agents.
- We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows
administrative bodies to implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that
the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes
of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such
administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6.
As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel, emancipation is the
goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by
transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land
theyre tilling. As noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the
Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious
implementation of the land reform program, thus necessitating
its promulgation.
- The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized
by the appellate court when it stated that (T)he main purpose
of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments
of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the
purchase price of the land. x x x The circular was meant to
remedy the situation where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to
landowner were not credited in his favor against the
determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a
perpetual obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed
Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of
P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has the
force of law and is entitled to great respect.
2. YES.
- The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between
P.D. No. 816 and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in
1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural
lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value
of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates
that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after
the value of the land has been determined.
- In Curso v. Court of Appeals, involving the same Circular and
P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that there is no
incompatibility between these two.
- In other words, MC No. 6 merely provides guidelines in the
payment of lease rentals/amortizations in implementation of
P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and MC No. 6, payment of lease
rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the land is
established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay
amortizations to the Land Bank. The rentals previously paid are
to be credited as partial payment of the land transferred to
tenant-farmers.
- Private respondent, however, splits hairs, so to speak, and
contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption
that the Circular implements P.D. 816, whereas it is expressly
stated in the Circular that it was issued in implementation of
P.D. 27. Both MC No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to
and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in
isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D.
816, rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After the
value of the land has been determined/established, then the
tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as
provided in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly, there is no
inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR
Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the
guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural
property.
3. NO.
- P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity. It is a
judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by this Court
in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in De Chavez v.
Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld
as part and parcel of the law of the land, viz.:
"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly
therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is
more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law
of the land according to the revised Constitution
itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply
out of the question. That would be to set at naught
an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it
has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is
unavoidable. This is not only so because of the
cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the
supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also
because any other approach would run the risk of
setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away
with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with
the promise and the hope associated with an open
society. To deprive petitioners of the small
landholdings in the face of a presidential decree
considered ratified by the new Constitution and
 precisely in accordance with its avowed objective
could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the
misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as
well as the grave social problems thereby created.
There can be no justification for any other decision
then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on
the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of
implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy
goals."
- Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally involves
private respondent and counsel in the case at bench, the Court
emphatically declared that "Presidential Decree No. 27 has
survived the test of constitutionality."
- Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial
imprimatur in Association of Rice & Corn Producers of the
Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council .
- Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform , involving the
constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A.
6657, any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27 was ultimately
foreclosed when it was declared therein that R.A. No. 6657,
P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in
the herein petition.
- The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets
limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just
compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides:
"For the purpose of determining the cost of the
land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer
pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall
be equivalent to two and one half (2 ) times the
average harvest of three normal crop years
immediately preceding the promulgation of this
Decree;"
- E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:
"SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn
lands covered by P.D. 27 shall be based on the
average gross production determined by the
Barangay Committee on Land Production in
accordance with Department Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related
issuances and regulation of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The average gross production
per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a half
(2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by
Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00), the government
support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on
October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00),
the government support price for one cavan of 50
kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount
arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn
land, as the case may be, for the purpose of
determining its cost to the farmer and
compensation to the landowner."
- The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27,
like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final
or conclusive. This is evident from the succeeding paragraph of
Section 2 of E.O. 228:
"x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner
regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the
farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian
Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land
Production concerned shall resolve the dispute
within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant
to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent
issuances. In the event a party questions in court
the resolution of the dispute, the landowners
compensation shall still be processed for payment
and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust
Department of the Land Bank in accordance with
the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the
resolution of the dispute before the court."
- Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-
farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barrio
Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may
bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate
amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the
prerogative of the court.
- Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or
the CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657
covers all public and private agricultural land including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as provided
for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229;
while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O.
229, which provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states: (P)residential
Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with
respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or
supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of
P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657 shall be
suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-
farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of
R.A. 6657.
Decision Petitions GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
ROXAS AND CO. V COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO; December 17, 1999
FACTS
- Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
- Three haciendas (Palico, Banilad, Caylaway) in Nasugbu,
Bats is owned by Roxas and Co., a domestic corp.
- President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 131 and EO 229
for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
- Congress passed RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law or CARL). This was signed by Pres. Aquino.
- Roxas and Co. filed w/ DAR a voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later
placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance w/
CARL.
PALICO AND BANILAD
- For Haciendas Palico and Banilad, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) sent notices Invitation to Parties to
Roxas and Co. through Mr. Jaime Pimentel, Hacienda
Administrator. This was to discuss the results of DAR
investigation of Haciendas. The reports recommended that the
haciendas be subject to compulsory acquisition. DAR, through
its Secretary, sent Notices of Acquisition.
- Whether they accept or reject this offer, they must inform
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution. In case of
rejection or failure to reply, DAR conducts administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation of the land. In
case of acceptance or if compensation has already been
deposited, DAR takes immediate possession of the land.
- Bec petitioner rejected, DAR sent to Landbank a Request to
Open Trust Account in favor of petitioner for its compensation.
- Petitioner applied w/ DAR for conversion of Palico and
Banilad fr agricultural to non-agri lands. Despite this
application, DAR proceeded w/ acquisition of the haciendas.
- The Landbank trust accounts for compensation were
replaced by DAR with cash and Landbank bonds.
- DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) and distributed them to farmer beneficiaries.
CAYLAWAY
- This hacienda was voluntarily offered for sale to the govt.
DAR accepted the petitioners voluntary offer and sent Notice
of Acquisition.
- However, Roxas and Co. President sent letter to DAR
withdrawing voluntary offer for sale (VOS) bec Sangguniang
Bayan of Nasugbu reclassified Caylaway fr agri to non-agri
land.
- DAR said reclassification would not exempt the land fr
agrarian reform. It denied the withdrawal of the VOS.
- Petitioner instituted case w/ DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for cancellation of the CLOAs bec Nasugbu is a
tourist zone and not suitable for agri production. This petition
for conversion was denied by the MARO.
- Petitioner filed w/ CA, but CA dismissed the petition. Hence,
the recourse to SC.
ISSUES
1. WON SC can take cognizance despite failure of petitioner to
exhaust administrative remedies
2. WON acquisition proceedings were valid
3. WON SC can rule on reclassification of the haciendas
HELD
1. Yes.
- Administrative remedies must be exhausted first. But judicial
action can be resorted to immediately when
- question is purely legal
- the administrative body is in estoppel
- act is patently illegal
- theres urgent need for judicial intervention
- respondent disregarded due process
- the respondent is a department secretary
- irreparable damage will be suffered
- theres no other speedy remedy
- strong public interest is involved
- subject of controversy is private land
- in quo warranto proceedings
- DAR issued CLOAs w/o just compensation. And the law
provides that deposit must be made only in cash or Landbank
bonds. DARs initial action to open trust account deposits does
not constitute payment.
2. No.
- CARL provides for 2 modes of acquisition: compulsory and
voluntary.
- In compulsory acquisition, the farmer beneficiaries and the
landowners must first be identified. However, the law is silent
on how identification must be made. To address this, DAR
issued Admin Order 12-1989. This was amended by DAR AO
9-1990 and DAR AO 1-1993. In these amendments, Notice of
Coverage and letter of invitation to conference meeting were
expanded.
- The Notice of Coverage notifies landowner that his property
is placed under CARP, informs him that a public hearing will be
conducted and a field investigation of the land will be
conducted.
- Notices and pleadings against a corp are served on the
President, Manager, Secretary, Cashier or agent or directors.
This is to ensure prompt and proper notice. Jaime Pimentel is
not one of these parties.
- Petitioners principal place of business is in Makati. Pimentel
is based in Nasugbu.
- Assuming that Pimentel was an agent of the corp, there is no
showing that he was duly authorized to attend the conference
meeting.
- Assuming petitioner was duly notified, the areas subject to
CARP were not properly identified before they were taken over
by DAR. The acquisition covers only portions, not the entire
haciendas. The haciendas are not entirely agri lands.
Petitioner had no idea which portion was subject to compulsory
acquisition. This is important bec petitioner can exercise right
to retention choose to retain not more than 5 hectares out of
the total area subject to CARP.
- With respect to Caylaway, notices were not deemed received
by the petitioner.
3. No.
- DARs failure to observe due process in acquisition does not
ipso facto give SC power to adjudicate on application for
conversion from agri to non-agri land. Its DARs job.
- Guiding principle in land use conversion is to preserve prime
agri lands for food production while recognizing need of other
sectors for land. CARL promotes social justice,
industrialization, and optimum use of land.
- Land use manner of utilization of land incl. allocation, devt
and mgmt.
- Land use conversion requires field investigation.
- Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant SC to
arrogate authority to resolve controversy jurisdiction over w/c is
initially lodged w/ an administrative body. Here, DAR must be
given chance to correct its procedural lapses.
Decision Petition is remanded to DAR for proper acquisition
proceedings and determination of petitioners application for
conversion.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [concur and dissent]
- PP 1520 which declared Nasugbu, Bats as tourist zone, has
force and effect of law unless repealed. It cannot be
disregarded by DAR.
YNARES-SANTIAGO [concurr and dissent]
- If acts of DAR are patently illegal and rights of party are
violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be reversed and
set aside.
- CLOAs do not have nature of Torrens Title and administrative
cancellation of title is sufficient to invalidate them.
ART XIV: EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF
REGENTS V COURT OF APPEALS AND
ARIOKASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE
MENDOZA; August 31, 1999
FACTS
- Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is an Indian citizen
taking her doctoral program in Anthropology at the University of
the Philippines. To complete the doctoral program she was
required to pass a dissertation and she created one entitled,
Tamil influences in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
She defended her dissertation although prior to it Dr. Medina
noted some lifted material in the dissertation without proper
acknowledgment. She got the nod of four of the five panelist
and thus was allowed to graduate because the letter coming
from Dean Paz that wanted her to be temporarily struck off the
list of candidates for graduation to clear the problems regarding
her dissertation did not reach the Board of Regents on time.
- Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a letter
that she would not be granted academic clearance without
Celine substantiating her accusation of Drs. Diokno and
Medina maliciously working for the disapproval of her
dissertation. Celine answered by saying that the unfavorable
attitude was due to some failure to include Dr. Medina in the list
of panel members and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of
harassment. Dr. Medina answered back and wrote that Celines
dissertation contained plagiarized materials and that her
doctorate be withdrawn.
- An ad-hoc committee was formed to investigate the charges
and that the request for the withdrawal of the doctorate degree
was asked of the Board of Regents. In the investigation it was
found out that in at least 90 instances the dissertation included
lifted materials without proper or due acknowledgment. The
College Assembly therefore unanimously approved and
recommended the withdrawal of the doctorate degree and
forwarded it to the University Council. The University Council
approved, endorsed, and recommended the withdrawal to the
Board of Regents. UP Diliman Chancellor Roman summoned
Celine to a meeting and that she should submit her written
explanation to the charges against her. The Chancellor
informed Celine of the charges and showed a copy of the
findings of the investigating committee. A second meeting was
done as well as a third one, however Celine did not attend the
third meeting alleging that the Board of Regents at that time
already had decided her case before she was fully heard.
Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the jurisdiction was
placed on the student disciplinary tribunal in the case of
dishonesty and that the withdrawal of the doctorate degree is
not an authorized penalty.
- A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman that
investigated the case and they came out with the findings
through all the documents and an interview of Celine. It was
established that at least 22 counts of documented lifting were
identified that forms the 90 instances found by the College ad-
hoc committee. That Celine admits of being guilt of the
allegation of plagiarism. The Board of Regents decided to
withdraw the doctorate degree. Celine requested an audience
with the Board of Regents and a reinvestigation which was
denied.
- Thus this case, a petition for mandamus and a prayer for a
writ of mandatory injunction and damages was filed. Trial court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit while Court of Appeals
reversed and ordered the restoration of the degree.
ISSUES
1. WON the writ of Mandamus is applicable in this situation
2. WON THE withdrawal of the doctoral degree can be done by
the University
3. WON there was a denial of due process
HELD
1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an
institution of higher learning from the exercise of its academic
freedom that is a constitutional right
2. Yes, because Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done
when it or s/he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, there being no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of a law. It could not be invoked against the
academic freedom of the school as academic freedom as a
Constitutional right (Article XIV Section 5 (2)) gives a wide
sphere of authority over the choice of students. This entails as
well that it can also determine who would have the distinction
of being a graduate of the school. If the University discovers
that the honor and distinction was obtained through fraud it has
the right to revoke or withdraw such distinction. The actions of
the University through the Board of Regents is to protect
academic integrity by withdrawing her academic degree that
she obtained through fraud.
3. No, Due process was done as there were several
investigations done by the school starting from the college to
the Board of Regents. She was also invited in the investigation
to clear up her name. However, the actual admission and the
clear plagiarism of her sources proved that indeed she
committed the offense. Her demand for the Student Tribunal to
decide her case is untenable, as it is obvious that such case is
useless for the penalty it gives is suspension. Celine in not in
the ambit of disciplinary powers of the UP anymore.
MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION V COURT OF
APPEALS
KAPUNAN; December 15, 2000
FACTS
-PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals
-Vol. 41, No. 14, or the September-October 1994 issue of
Miriam Colleges school paper Chi-Rho entitled Libog at Iba -hence this present petition by Miriam College
Pang Tula was odiously received by the MCHS community,
calling it obscene, indecent and devoid of all moral values ISSUES
among other things.
-an excerpt written by Mr. Gomez, who wrote the foreword
(Foreplay) reads:
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang
mga putang bikay na sa gitna
di na puwedeng paglabhan
di na maaring pagbabaran
-several other poems and stories are contained w/ the theme
sekswalidad at ibat ibang karanasan nito
-ff the publication of the paper, Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the MC
Discipline Committee wrote a letter to the editorial board,
informing them of the complaints filed against their publication
by the Miriam Community, along with the alleged school
regulations violated, and requiring the board to submit a written
statement in answer to the charges.
-the students requested to transfer the case to DECS, w/c
under Rule 7 of DECS order no. 94, has jurisdiction
-the students atty., Ricardo Velmonte, contends that for actions
committed w/in their capacity as campus journalists, what
applies is RA 7079 (The Campus Journalism Act) and not
committee regulations
-the committee proceeded w/ its investigation ex parte,
suspending 5 students, expelling 3, dismissing 2 and
withholding graduation privileges of 1 student
-these students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari
with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order before the
RTC of QC, questioning the Discipline Boards jurisdiction
-the RTC denied the prayer for a TRO and held that nothing in
the DECS Order No. 94 excludes school Admin from exercising
jurisdiction and that it cannot delimit the jurisdiction of schools
over disciplinary cases
-the students then filed a Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration after w/c the RTC granted the writ for
preliminary injunction (against expulsion and dismissal) so as
not to render the issues moot
-both parties moved for reconsideration after w/c the RTC
recalled the issues and dismissed the case
-the RTC referred the case to the CA for disposition w/c issued
a resolution requiring the respondents to show cause why no
preliminary injunction should be issued, and issued a TRO
(against the dismissals/suspensions)
-the CA granted the students petition, declaring the RTC order
and the dismissals/suspensions as void
1. WON the case has been rendered moot
2. WON the TC has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
certiorari by the students
 3. WON Miriam had jurisdiction over the complaints against
the students
HELD
1. NO. Petitioner asserts that the case is moot since more than
1 year had passed since the court issued the TRO. A
preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of a proceeding
prior to the judgment of a final order to preserve the status quo
of things until the merits of the case can be heard and persists
until issuance of a final injunction.
A TRO on the other hand preserves the status quo until the
hearing of the application of the preliminary injunction. In the
instant case, no such preliminary injunction was issued, hence
the TRO automatically expired (BP 224, TRO expires after 20
days if judge takes no action on application of preliminary
injunction). The CA erred in assuming its order was complied
w/ by Miriam; it cant be said that the students had graduated
w/in that short span of time. Miriam also allegedly refused the
students readmission, and so actual controversy still existed.
Since the RTC had set aside all previous orders, it allowed the
dismissals and suspensions to remain in force.
2. YES. RA 7079 includes a certain S4 which states that the
editorial board of a school publication is free to determine its
editorial policies; S7 of the same act provides that a ..a
student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the basis
of articles he/she has written orperformance of his/her
duties. S9 mandates DECS to promulgate the rules and work orinvades the rights of others.
regulations for the act, as embodied by DECS Order No. 94,
series of 1992 which under Rule 12 provides that DECS
regional office shall have original jurisdiction over cases as a
result of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial
board of a school w/in its area of administrative responsibility.
When the Discipline Board imposed the sanctions on the
students, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
raising the ff grounds: (1) the Discipline Board had no
jurisdiction over the case (2) the Board did not have the
qualities of an impartial and neutral arbiter, w/c would deny the
students their right to due process.
The issues thus raised were purely legal in nature and well
within the jurisdiction of the TC to determine. The TC had the
duty to render a decision for a case w/in its jurisdiction and
should have settled the issues before dismissing the case.
3. YES. A14 S5(2) of the Constitution guarantees all institution
of higher learning academic freedom w/c includes the right of
the school to decide for itself how best to attain it:
(1) who may teach (2) what may be taught (3) how it shall be
taught (4) who may be admitted to study
-how it shall be taught certainly encompasses the right of the
school to discipline its students. what may be taught
embodies the Constitutional obligation to instill discipline in
students, stated in A14 S3(2)
-who may be admitted to study clearly provides the school w/
the right to determine whom to expel
A14 S4(1) merely recognizes the States power to regulate and
supervise educational institutions, not deprive them of their
rights
-In several cases, the Court has upheld the rights of students to
free speech in school premises.
-As held in Tinker v. Des Moines School District: petitioners
have the right to peacable assembly and free speechthey do
not shed these constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate. A
students rights extend beyond class hours, and he/she may
express even controversial subjects on school grounds
-however, free speech is not absolute and students lose
immunity when conduct by the studentdisrupts class work or
involvesinvasion of the rights of others.
-provisions of RA 7079 should be construed alongside the
provisions of the Constitution. Consistent w/ jurisprudence, S7
of RA 7079 should be read to mean that the school cant
suspend/expel a student on the sole basis of articles he/she
has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class
administrative complaint with the criminal complaint.
- From the foregoing, it is evident that Miriam College has
jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, as the
power to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or
expel students. It is a necessary corollary to its enforcement of
rules and regulations, w/c is inherently granted by the
Constitution. The court therefore rules that MC has the
authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent
students.
CAMACHO V CORESIS
QUISUMBING; August 22, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action for certiorari against the graft
investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, Atty. Jovito
Coresis Jr., in dismissing the administrative and criminal
complaints against private respondents.
- In June 1995, Petitioner Manuel Camacho, the Dean of the
College of Education of the University of Southeastern
Philippines (USP) received complaints from several doctoral
students regarding a class held by respondent Dr. Daleon
during the 1st sem. of SY 1994-1995. The complaints were that
there were ghost students in Dr. Daleons class, namely
respondents Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson,
who were given grades of 1.0, 1.5, and 1.25 respectively,
despite their failure to attend regular classes.
- June 13, 1995, petitioner requested respondent Daleon to
furnish copies of exams, term papers, records of attendance,
which respondent ignored. The matter was raised in a
university council meeting and a committee was created to
investigate the complaint. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made
special arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding
their course without petitioners approval.
- Petitioner recommended to Dr. Prantilla (the University Pres)
that Agulo, Alaba, and Tecson be required to attend regular
classes and comply with the course requirements. Dr. Prantilla
approved the recommendation; however, he also entertained
an appeal by Agulo to validate the grades given to them. The
BoR upheld the grades and consequently, petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against Dr. Daleon, as well as criminal
complaints against Dr. Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson, and
members of the USP BoR including Dr. Prantilla for violating
R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws to the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao. Said office ordered respondents to
desist from further proceedings to consolidate the
- On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito
Coresis, Jr., the graft investigator of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto. It dismissed both complaints upon finding insufficient
evidence to hold Dr. Daleon liable for the administrative
charges as well as finding no prima facie violation for the
criminal complaint. Petitioner moved for reconsideration and
was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the case was brought
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction (in exonerating Dr. Daleon
from administrative as well as criminal liability arising from his
giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson, and Alaba without
requiring them to attend classes).
HELD
- Absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the Courts
power of judicial review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
may not be invoked.
Reasoning
1. From the records, there is no valid ground nor cogent
reason to hold respondent Office of grave abuse of
discretion because the conclusions in its assailed
Resolution are based on substantial evidence easily
verifiable. Well established is the principle that factual
findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, provided such
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
2. Public respondent anchored his decision on Art. 140 of the
University Code which provides that the rules on
attendance of students shall be enforced in all classes
subject to the modification by the Dean in the case of
graduate students and other courses. It is undisputed that
Dr. Daleon had already been designated Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and
was even entitled to emoluments inherent to the Dean of
the Grad. School. Accordingly, as OIC, performing the
functions of the Dean of the Grad. School, Dr. Daleon had
the authority to modify the rule on attendance without
seeking permission of petitioner.
3. Dr. Daleons teaching style had support of the members of
the Board of Regents (BoR), the body with the authority to
formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on
attendance of students in the graduate school. In passing
its resolution, they not only validated the grades given by
Daleon, they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety,
regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleons instructional
approach.
4. Dr. Daleons teaching style, validated by the USP BoR, is
bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic
freedom. Academic freedom is two-tiered - that of the
academic institution and the teachers. As was held in
Miriam College v. CA, Institutional freedom includes the
right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
and objectives and the methods on how best to attain
them, free from interference or outside coercion except
when overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It
includes the freedom to determine for itself: who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught , and
who may be admitted to study.
5. It was said in Montemayor v. Araneta University
Foundation that, Academic freedom also accords a
faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty. Applied to the case at bar, academic
freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to
innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which
is most fitting to his students, subject only to the rules and
policies of the university. Consider that the BoR, whose
task is to lay down school rules and policies, has validated
his teaching, there can be no reason for petitioner to
complain before the Court simply because he holds a
contrary opinion on the matter.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Resolution of
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao is affirmed.
Voting Concurred with by JJs: Bellosillo, Mendoza, and
Corona
GARCIA V LOYOLA THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL
FERNANDO; November 28, 1975
FACTS
- This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology to allow petitioner
to continue studying there.
- Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the
Summer of 1975 to pursue graduate studies leading to an MA
in Theology, but was denied re-admission in the following
semester. She contended that the reason given by respondent
for such denial, namely: that "her frequent questions and
difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of
slowing down the progress of the class," is not valid ground for
expulsion
- Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner was
admitted, not to a degree program but merely to take some
courses for credit, since admission to a degree requires
acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of
Ateneo de Manila University (as opposed to, the Loyola School
of Theology), and no such acceptance was given.
- Further, that respondent, being an "institute of higher
learning" has the "academic freedom" to discretion whether to
admit or continue admitting any particular student considering
not only academic or intellectual standards but also other
factors.
- Finally that there is no "clear duty" to admit petitioner since
the School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood and
petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the
priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON a mandamus proceeding is proper in the case at bar
Substantive
2. WON respondent is deemed possessed of a right to
continued admission to the Loyola School of Theology.
3. WON her expulsion was based on reasonable grounds
(therefore, not aribtrary).
HELD
1. Mandamus shall not lie absent a showing that there is a
clear legal right on her part and a clear duty on respondent's
part to so admit her.
- What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right.
She cannot therefore satisfy the prime an indispensable
requisite of a mandamus proceeding.
2. Autonomy recognized by the Constitution: "All institutions of
higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom."
- Although "academic freedom" is more often identified with the
right of a faculty member to publish his findings and thoughts
without fear of retribution, the reference given by the
constitution of "institutions of higher learning," show that the
school or college itself is possessed of such a right.
- J. Frankfurter: "four essential freedoms" - determine for itself
who may teach, what may taught, how, and who may be
admitted to study
- Universities, unlike public utitlities, have discretion as to
whom to admit or reject.
3. Denied not only on general principle, but also in view of the
character of the particular educational institution involved. It is
a seminary for the priesthood. Therefore, at most, she can lay
claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school.
- Decision for her expulsion was deemed best considering the
interest of the school as well as of the other students and her
own welfare. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of
the circumstances deemed relevant.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [concur]
- Same points as Ponencia, plus:
- A petition will be dismissed where petitioner has admittedly
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
- Questions of admission to the school are matters of technical
and academic judgment that the courts will not ordinarily
interfere with. Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies
and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere
with the academic judgment of the school faculty.
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- 1935 Constitution: "Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom." VS. 1973 Constitution which
broadened the scope into "All institutions of higher learning."
Thus guaranteed, it is not limited to the members of the faculty
nor to administrative authorities of the educational institution. It
must also be deemed granted in favor of the student body
because all three constitute the educational institution, without
any one of which the educational institution can neither exist
nor operate.
- An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn and
develop his faculties. The Constitution provides for this in
various provisions. The happiness and full development of the
curious intellect of the student are protected by the narrow
guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader
right of free expression, which includes free speech and press,
and academic freedom.
- No private person has the inherent right to establish and
operate a school. Education is a sovereign state function;
therefore, not different in this respect from commercial public
utilities, whose right to exist and to operate depends upon state
authority. Constitutional rights must be respected by the State
and by enterprises authorized by the state to operate.
REYES V BOARD OF REGENTS OF UP
MEDIALDEA; February 25, 1991
FACTS
- Nature Petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and restraining order to review the decision of the CA
- Respondent-students (students hereinafter) as then
applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of
Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percent in
the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which was the
cut-off score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the
UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved
by the University Council (UC) on April 8,1986.
- However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-
off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of
October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88.
- Upon appeal of some concerned PreMed students, the Board
of Regents (BOR) in its 996th resolution dated February 24,
1987 reverted to the NWAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The
BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated
March 24, 1987.
- subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the
instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an investigation on the
student's case and recommended inter alia the admission of all
applicants obtaining a percentile I rating ranging from 70 to 90
"as a matter of right".
- The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR
directive for them to admit the students. This prompted the
students to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC. On June
11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
for their admission.
- Students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached
thereto their letter51 to the UPCM Faculty. In an Order dated
June 15, 1990, the RTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In
view of this development, the UPCM Faculty held an
emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where it denied the
appeal of the students on the ground that they were not
qualified for admission to the UPCM. As a result, the students
filed with the RTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal.
On June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission
of the students to the college. Whereupon, the petitioners
moved to lift the ex-parte mandatory order.
- Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June 28,
1990, invoking its plenary power under the Charter of the
University over matters affecting university affairs, resolved to
approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice
and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them.
- Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of
Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an Order for
their Preventive Suspension. So, herein petitioners appealed to
the CA but their appeal was dismissed. Motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
51
Students manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's right to academic freedom; that
they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in
implementing admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the
court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their
case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to
remain in the college
WON the BOR violated the petitioners academic freedom, and
thus could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to
the college of medicine.
HELD
There is no violation of academic freedom when an order of
BOR in upholding the admission requirement approved by the
University Council (in 1986) is supportive of right of the
University Council to fix or approve admission requirements,
against the UPCM Faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the University Council
without following the prescribed rules and procedures of the
University.
Reasoning The method deployed was simply referring to the
UP Charter or to the University Code, and then applying the
relevant provisions or rules to the case at bar. The ponencia
cited the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee 52,
Loyola School of Theology, citing Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire53, though as
obiter dicta only, to strengthen the arguments in support of the
ratio decidendi.
First. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements
for admission to any college of the university is vested in the
University Council (See. 9). The power to prescribe the courses
of study is vested in the University Council subject to the
approval of the Board of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to
appoint the academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of
service and other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents
[Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income among the
different categories of expenditures is vested in the Board of
Regents
Second. Academic freedom54 may be asserted by the
University Council or by the Board of Regents or both in so far
(sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them by law which
are essential to institutional academic freedom
The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have been
violated by the Board of Regents when it issued the questioned
order is related to the right of the University to fix admission
requirements. This right and power to fix admission
52
The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and
thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be
visited on him in the event that His conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that
be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments
53
In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study
54
Art. XIV Sec.5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution sates that Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
requirements is clearly vested by law in the University Council.
The College Faculty was merely empowered by the Board of
Regents under Article 324 of the University Code to initially
determine the admission requirements, subject to the approval
of the University Council and the President of the University.
Third. When the Board of Regents retained the cut off score in
the NMAT at 70th percentile (p, 161, Rollo) which was the cut
off score approved by the University Council on 8 April 1986, it
did not exercise the power to prescribe the entrance
requirements. It merely upheld the power of the University
Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to
the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM
Faculty, which attempted to exercise that power to increase the
cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the approval of
the University Council and the President of the University in
violation of Section 324 of the University Code (supra) which is
very explicit on this matter.]
Fourth. The BOR only exercised its power of governance and
its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law,
university rules and regulations.
Fifth. Under the Constitution, the students have the right to
select a profession or course of study subject to a fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements [Article XIV, Section 5(3)]. While it may be the UC
could ratify the acts of the College regarding admission
requirements, the same should be done within a reasonable
time. It is to be recalled that the controversy regarding the
students' admission started in 1987. It is surprising that despite
petitioners' insistence on the UC's jurisdiction over admission
requirements, they did not seek recourse to it immediately.
From the records, there appears to be no physical or legal
hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the students'
case. To validate these resolutions at this point in time would
not be fair and equitable to the students. In the span of three
years, they have proved their mettle by passing the academic
requirements of the college
Therefore No. There was no violation of the petitioners
academic freedom by the BOR since the BOR only exercised
its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it that all the
units abide with the law, university rules and regulations.
Decision Petitions DISMISSED and the decisions of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Voting 3 concur, no dissent, 2 took no part.
MORALES V UP
CHICO-NAZARIO; December 13, 2004
FACTS
- According to Art. 410 of the UP Code, students who complete
their courses with the following minimum weighted average
grade shall be graduated with honors:
Summa cum laude 1.20
Magna cum laude 1.45
Cum laude 1.75
- Provided that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in the
curriculum, as well as subjects that qualify as electives, shall
be included in the computation of the weighted average grade;
provided further that in cases where the electives taken are
more than those required in the program, the following
procedure will be used in selecting the electives to be included
in the computation of the weighted average grade:
1) For students who did not shift programs, consider the
required number of electives in chronological order.
2) For students who shifted from one program to
another, the electives to be considered shall be
selected according to the following order of priority:
a. Electives taken in the program where the student
is graduating will be selected in chronological
order.
b. Electives taken in the previous program and
acceptable as electives in the second program will
be selected in chronological order.
c. Prescribed courses taken in the previous program,
but qualify as electives in the second program will
be selected in chronological order.
- Nadine Morales transferred from UP Manila (majored in
Speech Pathology) to UP Diliman and enrolled in the European
Languages undergraduate program in SY 1997-98. She was
enrolled under the Plan A curriculum and chose French as her
major and German as her minor.
- Under Plan A, a student has to complete 141 units with 27
being electives.
- 1st semester of AY 1997-98 Morales enrolled in German 10
and German 11 where she obtained a grade of 1.0 in both
subjects.
- 2nd semester of AY 1997-98 Morales changed minor to
Spanish but maintained French as her major.
- End of 1st semester of SY 1990-2000 Morales included in
list of candidates for graduation with probable honors based on
the computation made by the College of Arts and Letters of
Morales GWA inclusive of her grades of 1.0 in German 10 and
11. Her GWA then was 1.725.
- 2nd semester of SY 1999-2000 Morales GWA was 1.729
after obtaining an average of 1.708 in her final semester in UP,
making her eligible for cum laude honors.
- During the assessment for graduation, she was not granted
cum laude honors because her grades in German 10 and 11
were excluded in the computation, bringing her GWA to 1.760.
- According to Prof. Bautista of the Dept. of European
Languages, a Plan A student is required to major in a European
language other than Spanish and minor in any other discipline
allowed in the curriculum.
o In Morales case, her major is French and her minor is
Spanish so German does not fit into her curriculum.
o Plan A curriculum also does not allow for free electives.
Electives must be major language electives taken
from French courses in either literature or translation.
German 10 and 11 are basic language courses and
do not fall under electives as contemplated in the
Plan A curriculum.
- Morales requested that her German 10 and 11 grades be
included in the computation of her GWA.
o Her letter was taken up on a no-name basis during the
University Council meeting upon the endorsement of
the Registrar. By a vote of 207-4, the Council affirmed
the decision of the CAL in not awarding honors to
Morales.
o Issue was then elevated by Morales to the UP Board of
Regents and it was resolved that the appeal be
returned to the University Council for further
consideration with full disclosure of petitioners identity.
o By a vote of 99 in favor-12 against-6 abstaining, the
Council denied the award of cum laude honors to
Morales.
o A subsequent appeal was made to the Board of
Regents. This appeal was denied 9-2.
- Morales filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before
the RTC and assailed the decision of the UP Board of Regents
as erroneous. The RTC ruled in her favor by saying that the
UP Board of Regents greatly abused its discretion in the
improper application of its academic discretion in interpreting
Art. 410 of the UP Code. The RTC ordered that UP
recomputed Morales grades by including German 10 and 11
and confer upon her cum laude honors.
- In the Court of Appeals:
o In resolving the issue, the CA initially determined
whether only questions of law were involved and
 eventually decided that an analysis of the facts of the
cases was indispensable.
o The CA ruled that the lower court violated UPs
constitutionally protected right to academic freedom
when it substituted its own interpretation of the internal
rules and regulations of the University for that of the UP
Board of Regents and applied the same to the case at
bar.
ISSUES
1. WON the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal of the RTC
Order because the essential facts were never in dispute, the
case involving only questions of law
2. WON the RTCs interpretation of Art. 410 of the UP Code
violated the academic freedom granted to UP as an institution
of higher learning
HELD
1. Yes, the appeal raises questions of law.
- A question of law arises when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on
the matter. There is a question of fact when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
law.
- Both parties admitted to the facts. Any conclusion based on
these facts would not involve a calibration of the probative
value of such pieces of evidence, but would be limited to an
inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the state
of facts of the case. Since the appeal raises only questions of
law, the proper mode of appeal is through a certiorari. The CA
did not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal.
2. Yes, the RTC violated the academic freedom granted to UP.
Ratio decidendi: Unless there is a clear showing of
arbitrary and capricious exercise of judgment, courts
may not interfere with the Universitys exclusive right to
decide for itself its aims and objectives and how best to
attain them (in this case, to whom among its graduates it
shall confer academic recognition based on its
established standards).
- In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, it was said
that the discretion of schools of learning to formulate the rules
and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation forms part of the academic freedom. Such 11 were excess subjects, her total units taken up in the
discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the University being 147, instead of the required 141.
courts unless there is a grave abuse of discretion in its - Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the special
exercise. knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over
- Grave abuse of discretion involves capricious and whimsical matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact in
The power should be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and it must Courts.
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive Art. 14, Sec. 4 of the Constitution proves that academic
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at freedom shall be enjoyed in all institution
all in contemplation of law.
- UP proceeded fairly in evaluating the situation of Morales and
gave her and her parents ample opportunity to present their
side on different occasions. There is no showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness.
o Deliberations were done in the University Council.
A member asked whether German 10 and 11 could
be counted as electives for Morales and the Registrar
responded the student was enrolled in Foreign
Languages with a major in French and a minor in
Spanish and German 10 and 11 are not required in
the checklist. These can neither be considered as
electives because electives should be non-language
electives. German 10 and 11 are excess subjects.
Even if Morales completed all the required subjects
under the curriculum so that German 10 and 11
should be included, the Dean of the CAL said that the
same rule had applied in the past to previous
students. Applying the rules to Morales would be
unfair to the other students.
o Since the rule provides for an order of priority in the
electives, there is an implication that not all electives
may be included in the GWA.
o The Advising Committee allows students to change
their majors and minors but these shifts are not counted
as part of the course with credit in the curriculum.
- The word program in Art. 410 must be interpreted in the
context of a particular curriculum. In computing the GWA, the
grades of subjects prescribed in the curriculum and the grades
of subjects that qualify as electives in the curriculum are
included.
- The interpretation of the required subjects or allowable
electives in the curriculum should be taken in the context of the
entire courses. Morales decision to shift caused the exclusion
of her grades in German 10 and 11. Besides, German 10 and