Write-up; Poes vs.

Comelec case

The doctrine or principle laid down in this case is to be considered

pro hac vice and finds no application to future cases as it would cause frailty
to the tenets of the Constitution regarding natural-born Filipino citizenship.

This petition for certiorari is basically confined to the jurisdictional

issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the issuance of its assailed rulings. COMELEC in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial power merely relies on the satisfaction of substantial
evidence presented before them. Findings of fact of the Commission when
supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable.1 A
certiorari proceeding is limited in scope and narrow in character, certiorari
will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of
judgment, particularly in the findings or conclusions of the quasi-judicial
tribunals like the COMELEC or the lower courts.2

COMELECs quasi-judicial power in resolving a Section 78 of the

Omnibus Election Code proceeding includes the determination of whether
a candidate has made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy (CoC) and the determination of whether the eligibility he
represented in his CoC is true. The said provision provides, to wit:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a

certificate of candidacy - A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that
any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed
at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

This was the point raised in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brion.
The dissenting Justice opined in support the case of Tecson v. COMELEC
wherein the Supreme Court recognized the COMELECs jurisdiction in a
Section 78 proceeding over a presidential candidate. That the Courts
conclusion in Grace Poe case would wreak havoc on existing jurisprudence
recognizing the COMELEC jurisdiction to determine a candidates eligibility
in the course of deciding a Section 78 proceeding before it. The ponencia
disregarded the cases involving Section 78 since the year 2012, thats when the
COMELEC Rules was published, these cases are the following:

1 Varias vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189078, February 11, 2010

2 INC Shipmanagement vs. Moradas, G.R. No. 178564, January 15, 2014
 In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the
COMELECs cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes CoC and affirmed its
determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is neither a Philippine citizen nor a
resident of Marinduque. In this case, the Court even affirmed the
COMELECs capability to liberally construe its own rules of procedure
in response to Ongsiako-Reyes allegation that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that had
not been testified on, offered and admitted as evidence.

In Cerafica, the Court held that the COMELEC gravely

abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica, a candidate for
councilor, did not file a valid CoC and subsequently cannot be
substituted by Olivia Cerafica. Kimberlys CoC is considered valid
unless the contents therein, including her eligibility, is impugned
through a Section 78 proceeding.

In Aratea v. COMELEC, the Court affirmed the COMELECs

determination that Lonzanida has served for three terms already and
therefore misrepresented his eligibility to run for office; this according
to the Court, is a good ground for cancelling Lonzanidas CoC under
Section 78.

In Maquiling v. COMELEC, the Court reversed the

COMELECs determination of Arnados qualification to run for office
because of a recanted oath of allegiance, and thus cancelled his CoC and
proclaimed Maquiling as the winner. The Court, in reviewing the
COMELEC determination, did not dispute its capacity to determine
Arnados qualification.

The ponencias reliance in the Fermin case is out of context. This case
clarified that Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is to be read in relation
to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility
for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate.

A proceeding under Section 78 is likened to a quo warranto

proceeding under section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation,
while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning
candidate. The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under
Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the
certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the
elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be
brought on the basis of two grounds (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines, and must be iniated within 10 days after the
proclamation of the election results.

This enunciation in Section 78 falls squarely in the case of Grace Poe

Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution defines

natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

It was never intent of the framers of 1935 Constitution to presume that

foundlings are natural born citizens.