RULE 58

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Purpose of the Writ

G.R. No. 164548 September 27, 2006

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
RJ VENTURES REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RAJAH BROADCASTING
NETWORK, INC.,respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 31
March 2004 Decision1 and the 8 July 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
56119. The challenged Decision disposed, thus:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED, the assailed
Orders dated July 28, 1999 and October 26, 1999, respectively, [are] REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, and the preliminary injunction earlier issued is reinstated. No cost.3

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner Philippine National Bank's (PNB's) Motion for
Reconsideration dated 3 May 2004.

The Antecedents

As culled from the records, the facts show that on 26 February 1999, respondents RJ Ventures
Realty & Development Corporation (RJVRD) and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc. (RBN) filed a
Complaint for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction4 against petitioner PNB and Juan S. Baun, Jr.5 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 66 of Makati City, and docketed as Civil Case No. 99-452.

In its Complaint, respondents contended that on 13 June 1996, First Women's Credit Corporation
(FWCC) received an invitation to bid from PNB anent the sale of an 8,000 square meter property,
located at Paseo de Roxas corner Sen. Gil. Puyat Avenue, Makati City, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. S-15223 (Buendia Property).6On 10 July 1996, FWCC bid the amount
of P455,000.00 per square meter or a total of P3,640,000,000.00; and pursuant to PNB Rules and
Regulations on the Acceptance and Evaluation of Proposals, it deposited ten percent (10%) of the
offered price or P364,000,000.00 with the PNB by way of two checks, No. 418796 and No. 418797,
in the amounts of P312,000,000.00 and P52,000,000.00, respectively.7 On 11 July 1996, FWCC
submitted a revised offer increasing its bid by P5,000.00 per square meter or a total additional
amount of P40,000,000.00. In view of the increase, FWCC deposited with PNB an additional amount
of P4,000,000.00.8 On 17 July 1996, FWCC was awarded the Buendia Property.9 PNB's Notice of
Award to FWCC set a condition that within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt of the same, the
successful offeror shall tender payment of the balance of the purchase price in the form of a
manager's or cashier's check.10 On 24 July 1996, FWCC, invoking Section 7.211 of the PNB Rules
requested PNB to finance the entire balance of the purchase price.12 On 17 September 1996 and
pending action on its loan application, FWCC assigned all its rights, claims, interest, and title over
the Buendia Property to RJVRD.13The latter assumed the right to purchase the Buendia Property
and the obligations of FWCC to PNB on the balance of the bid price.

Respondents further posited that PNB initially refused to finance the entire balance of the purchase
price except to the extent of seventy-five percent (75%) thereof.14 However, PNB finally agreed to
grant a loan to RJVRD equivalent to eighty percent (80%) of the purchase price or for the amount
of P2,944,000,000.00. The grant was conditioned on the deposit by RJVRD with PNB of an
additional ten percent (10%) of the purchase price to the first ten percent (10%) downpayment which
the former had paid. Otherwise stated, RJVRD was required to raise an additional amount
of P368,000,000.00.15 Moreover, to allow RJVRD to raise the additional amount, PNB proposed to
lend RBN the required amount, the latter being an affiliate company of RJVRD, which amount will be
available for relending to RJVRD.16

Respondents described the said arrangement in this wise:

15.0 PNB shall extend a loan to RBN in the amount of P350,000,000.00 which in turn would
be loaned to RJVRD.

15.1 The proceeds of the loan shall be used by RJVRD to partially pay the additional 10%
orP368,000,000.00 deposit on the Property. PNB documents would however show that the
loan was for the expansion of RBN.

15.2 Mr. Ramon P. Jacinto, the majority stockholder of RJVRD will pledge to PNB 70% of his
shares of stock in RBN and 40% of his shares of stock in FWCC.17

Moreover, in their Complaint a quo, respondents avowed that on 30 September 1996, following the
payment by RJVRD to PNB of the additional deposit of P368,000,000.00, the parties entered into a
loan agreement wherein PNB will finance the balance of the purchase price in the amount
of P2,944,000,000.00 subject to conditions, inter alia, that after the transfer of the Buendia Property
in the name of RJVRD, the same shall be mortgaged in favor of PNB. On even date, RJVRD and
PNB executed a Loan Agreement.18 A Deed of Sale19 and a Real Estate Mortgage,20 both dated 30
September 1996 were similarly executed between RJVRD and PNB over the Buendia Property. The
Loan Agreement included a two-way peso/dollar convertibility feature at the option of RJVRD;
hence, to avail of a lower interest rate, RJVRD converted its peso loan to US dollar based on a rate
of exchange of P26.23 to US$1.00, or for a total amount of US$112,237,895.54.

Respondents claimed that RJVRD undertook to engage foreign investors for the project. It entered
into negotiations with Hyundai Construction of South Korea which were eventually suspended. Its
talks with Siemens of Austria, and Property Investment and Development Management Corporation
of Singapore failed.21 Respondents interposed further that the Asian currency crisis on 11 July 1997
caused a depreciation of the Philippine peso which correspondingly increased the obligation of
RJVRD to PNB from P2,944,000,000.00 to P5,405,301,470.82 inclusive of interest.22 On 30
September 1997, in an effort to continue the project, RJVRD entered into a joint venture agreement
with Fil-Estate Management Incorporated for the development of the Buendia Property. RBN
secured another loan from PNB in the amount of P100,000,000.00, part of which was used in paying
the interest for the loan it had secured in favor of RJVRD. In addition, as and by way of security,
RBN assigned in favor of PNB, all its rights and interest over radio and television frequencies issued
by the National Telecommunications Commission, located in Tuguegarao, Baguio, Manila, Cebu,
Bacolod, Iloilo, including those in Cagayan de Oro (FM Stations), and Manila (AM Station and TV-
UHF Station).23 On September 1997, RJVRD paid PNB the accrued interest on the loan amounting
to P353,478,628.88. RBN also updated its first account with PNB by paying about P41,000,00.00. In
March 1998, RJVRD, RBN and PNB entered into discussions on the restructuring of the loans.
Respondents alleged that while discussions were ongoing, the accounts of RJVRD and RBN
became delinquent.24 PNB sent RJVRD, a notice,25 dated 2 June 1998, declaring their accounts
delinquent and demanding the settlement of the same.26

Respondents asserted that prior to 11 June 1998, in line with the continuing discussions between
PNB and RBN for the restructuring of the loan, PNB required the redenomination of RBN's loan as a
condition for its restructuring.27On 11 June 1998, RBN sent a letter to PNB in agreement to the
redenomination of the loan, stating therein the agreed terms for the restructuring of the loan. RJVRD
sent a letter to PNB agreeing to redenominate its own loan based on PNB's initial proposal, which
letter was returned to RJVRD for the reason that, at that time, the proposals for the restructuring of
the RJVRD loan component did not call for the redenomination of the loan of RJVRD.28 On 24 June
1998, RBN sent a letter to PNB, confirming to redenominate the loan under the terms stated in its
letter of 11 June 1998.29 On 9 September 1998, respondents asseverated that PNB made a call to
RJVRD, asking the latter to redenominate its loans. On the same date, RJVRD sent PNB, a letter in
agreement to the redenomination.30 On 23 October 1998, the RJ Groups of Companies sent Mr.
Benjamin Palma Gil, president of PNB, a proposal for the settlement of respondents' accounts,
including a request for the restructuring of the loans.31

On 25 January 1999, PNB, through its counsel, sent RBN a demand letter, requiring the latter to
settle their outstanding account of P841,460,891.91.32 In a letter similarly dated 25 January 1999,
PNB by counsel, demanded from RJVRD the settlement of its total obligation
of P5,405,301,470.82.33 On 28 January 1999, RBN sent a letter to PNB's counsel, expressing its
surprise to receive the demand letter despite their continuing negotiations with PNB for the
restructuring of its accounts.34 In its letter, RBN said that it was, in fact, required by PNB to
redenominate its dollar loans into pesos as an initial step for the restructuring of the account, and
which it has complied.35 On even date, RJVRD sent a letter to PNB's counsel emphasizing that it had
not been advised of any adverse development in their negotiation with PNB nor had it been informed
of the discontinuance of the negotiation. RJVRD sought for additional time to justify its proposal to
PNB with the aim of arriving at a friendly settlement.36

On 18 February 1999, PNB made a demand to RBN to turnover the possession and/or control of
Broadcasting Equipment Inventory located at No. 33, Dominican Hills, Baguio City.37 On 18 February
1999, RJVRD received a Notice of Extrajudicial Sale, dated 1 February 1999 for the sale of the
Buendia Property38 to be held on 2 March 1999 at the City Hall, Makati City.

Respondents manifested in their Complaint that when RJVRD, as assignee of FWCC purchased the
Buendia Property from PNB, the Philippine economy was progressive; that it was under this
favorable economic scenario that RJVRD agreed to the terms and conditions of the loan
agreements; however, following the Asian economic crisis of July 1997, and with the depreciation of
the Philippine peso, the loan of RJVRD which was denominated in US dollars rose
from P2,944,000,000.00 (US$112,237,895.54) to P5,405,301,470.82.39 According to respondents,
from the original contract price of P3,680,000,000.00, RJVRD already made a payment
of P736,000,000.00, representing twenty-percent (20%) of the value of the Buendia Property
and P353,478,628.88, representing interest on the loan or a total of P1,089,478,628.88; and that
PNB never effectively lost control over the Buendia Property, considering that simultaneous with the
execution of the Loan Agreement between RJVRD and PNB, RJVRD executed a Real Estate
Mortgage over the Buendia Property in favor of PNB. Furthermore, respondents sought to find
recourse under Article 1940 of the Civil Code. They contended that the action on the part of PNB to
foreclose the collaterals pledged or mortgaged by RJVRD and RBN, including the extrajudicial sale
of the Buendia Property on 2 March 1999 at the City Hall of Makati City, and the planned take over
of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio City would be, among others, premature.41
Finally, in support of its Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, respondents alleged that RJVRD and RNB would suffer great and irreparable
injury by the extrajudicial foreclosure of the property and the take over of RBN's radio facilities in
Baguio, unless a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued
enjoining defendants from implementing the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale dated 1 February 1999, and
enjoining PNB from taking possession and control of RBN's radio facilities in Baguio City.
Respondents maintained that the commission or continuance of the acts complained of during the
litigation or the non-performance thereof would work injustice to RJVRD and RBN. They manifested
their willingness to post a bond as the court a quo may fix in its discretion, to answer for whatever
damages PNB may sustain for the reason of the restraining order or injunction, if finally determined
that respondents are not entitled thereto.

Acting on respondent's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, the RTC, issued
an Order42 dated 2 March 1999, denying the same. The RTC held that the evidence showed that
respondents are in default of payment of its loan from PNB, amounting to P5,405,301,470.82,
including interests and penalties. According to the RTC, the respondents failed to prove that they
have a clear right to restrain the foreclosure of the Buendia Property; whereas, it is PNB which has a
clear right to the Buendia Property. The RTC opined that the evidence failed to prove that
respondents will suffer "irreparable injury" if the foreclosure of the Buendia Property is not enjoined,
for under the law, respondents have one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale with the
Register of Deeds within which to redeem the Buendia Property; thus, respondents will have a
chance to recover the ownership thereof by way of redemption. Finally, the RTC ruled that the rule of
equity is on the side of PNB considering that the Buendia Property was formerly owned by PNB. The
RTC denied the application for Temporary Restraining Order for lack of merit, and held that the
exposure of PNB in the transaction amounted to P5,405,301,470.82, while the exposure of
respondents is P1,089,478,628.00.43

On 2 March 1999, the Buendia Property was sold in a public auction conducted by Atty. Juan S.
Buan, Notary Public of Makati City.44 There being no other bidder, the Buendia Property was sold to
PNB for the amount ofP2,800,000,000.00. On 3 May 1999, RBN received a Notice of Extrajudical
Sale from PNB, specifying therein that the property covered by Broadcating Equipment Inventory
located at No. 33 Dominical Hills, Baguio City will be sold for cash at public auction to the highest
bidder on 10 May 1999, at the City Hall, Baguio City, pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Chattel
Mortage dated 19 June 1994 to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness of P841,460,491.91.45

Following this development, on 4 May 1999, respondents filed an Urgent Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.46 Respondents
prayed that a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining PNB or any persons acting under its
instructions from foreclosing on any other collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB,
particularly that which is subject of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to be conducted by Notary Public
Perlita Chan-Rondez in Baguio City on 10 May 1999. It was likewise prayed that after due
proceedings, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be similarly issued. 47

On 7 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order48 granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction respondents'
application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), upon posting of a bond in the
amount of P1,000,000.00.

On 27 May 1999, the RTC issued an Order,49 granting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, enjoining
PNB from foreclosing all collaterals pledged or mortgaged by respondents to PNB, in particular
those described in Exhibits A to L thereof, after the posting of a bond in the amount
of P5,000,000.00.50 According to the court, the right of PNB to foreclose the chattel mortgages is still
challenged by the respondents and therefore, is not yet clearly established. Hence, if PNB is allowed
to foreclose the subject chattel mortgages, the determination of the right of PNB to foreclose the
subject properties will become moot and academic. Subsequently, on 28 May 1999, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued.

On 9 June 1999, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration51 of the Order of 27 May 1999. PNB
averred, inter alia, that RBN failed to produce any evidence to substantiate and support its claim that
it is entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in order to enjoin PNB from foreclosing on the
subject chattels. According to PNB, it was able to show that RBN failed without justifiable cause or
reason to service the credit facilities extended to it. PNB advanced the argument that RBN has no
clear right in esse; therefore, it cannot seek relief from the court. PNB claimed that they were able to
prove irreparable damage to the bank if PNB will be enjoined from foreclosing on the chattel
mortgages. PNB maintained that proceeding with the auction sale of the subject properties would
lower the bank's "past due ratio" approximately by 2%; hence, with the decrease in the bank's "past
due ratio percentage," there would be no legal impediment to PNB's resumption to full lending
operations since the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas' recommendation for stoppage of grants of new
loans is anchored on PNB's current high "past due ratio." In support of its Motion for
Reconsideration, PNB further theorized that decreasing its "past due ratio" would improve investors'
confidence; hence, substantially enhancing the viability of PNB in its move to attain full privatization
by the year 2000.

In its Opposition,52 respondents submitted that during the hearing of the application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, the court expressed its position that it will not receive evidence relative to the
merits of the case as the same would pre-empt the resolution of the merits or dispose of the main
case without trial; therefore, by agreement of the parties, the principal issue was limited to whether
RBN will suffer irreparable injury if the writ of preliminary injunction is not issued. According to
respondents, the damage to RBN's image, loss of listenership, advertisers, staff and employees is
unquantifiable in monetary terms. Irreparable damage would be caused to RBN if PNB is allowed to
foreclose its equipments. It would also disrupt, if not, paralyze, the operations of RBN's stations.
They further asserted that there is no reason to disturb the injunction issued by the court absent a
showing of manifest abuse.

On 28 July 1999, the RTC issued an Order53 granting PNB's Motion for Reconsideration. This was
subsequently rectified in the Order of 29 July 1999 as to the date of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
from May 28, 1998 to May 28, 1999.54 In lifting the Writ of Preliminary Injunction of 28 May 1999, the
RTC rationalized that the failure of RBN to pay the three (3) credit facilities it obtained from
defendant PNB was established; thus, RBN was considered to have effectively "defaulted" on its
loan obligation. In the same Order, the RTC concluded that RBN made express admission of its
delinquency in its Complaint. Moreover, the RTC held that the "cross-default provision"55 embodied
in the Loan Agreement between the parties establishes against the grant of the injunction.

Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the 28 July 1999 Order, submitting that there was no
reason to disturb the preliminary injunction order as there was no showing of a manifest abuse by
then Presiding Judge Hon. Eriberto U. Rosario, in the issuance thereof. Respondents
explicated, inter alia, that the sufficiency of their application was already passed upon by the RTC
through the Order dated 27 May 1999.

On 26 October 1999, the RTC issued an Order,56 denying respondents' Motion for Reconsideration
for the lifting of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 May 1999.

Aggrieved, on 7 December 1999, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Orders dated 28 July 1999 and 26
October 1999, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dissolving the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction earlier issued.

Before the appellate court, respondents argued that the sufficiency of their application for preliminary
injunction was already raised and passed upon by the RTC in the Injunction Order dated 27 May
1999; however, PNB was not able to allege "other grounds" for the lifting thereof as mandated by
Section 6 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.57Moreover, respondents asserted that on the issue of the
purported delinquency, the RTC failed to consider PNB's judicial admissions, whereby the rights of
PNB should be those of a seller covered by the law on Sales (Title VI, Book IV, Civil Code), and not
those of a money-lender covered by the law on Loans (TitleXI, Book IV, Civil Code); hence, PNB's
rights as a seller are either to rescind the sale, retrieve the title to the property transferred to the
buyer, and exact payment of damages or to leave the property with the buyer, to exact payment of
the entire price with interest, and recover damages thereby suffered. According to the respondents,
the PNB as seller had recovered through foreclosure the Buendia Property. They alleged that: PNB
had forfeited in its favor as mortgagor, the payments already made by RJVRD and the interest
thereon; PNB is in the process of recovering as mortgagor and seller additional damages in the form
of interests, penalties, charges, attorney's fees, etc; and PNB is in the process of recovering as
mortgagor, by way of the foreclosure of mortgage, other realty and chattels of significant value.
Respondents contended that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction because the contemplated foreclosure of the other properties will work
injustice to RBN and would render ineffectual any judgment on the merits of the case ineffectual.

Anent the issue of whether respondents will suffer irreparable injury, respondents pleaded that
although the immediate effect of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction may be quantifiable in pesos, the
effect on the respondents is its viability that stands to be affected in the long-term. Respondents
rationalized that the foreclosure of the radio equipment will result in the stoppage of operations, and
eventually, the loss of the image of the station. These factors will cause the loss of its listenership
and client confidence, which cannot be quantifiable in monetary terms. Moreover, respondents set
forth the contention that even as PNB suggested that after foreclosure, the radio equipment would
either be sold to improve PNB's liquidity or disposed by way of lease-purchase agreement, there
exists no assurance that RBN can repurchase the foreclosed collaterals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On 9 December 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution58 temporarily enjoining PNB from
foreclosing any collateral pledged or mortgaged by RJVRD and RBN, and from taking possession
and control of the latter's radio facilities in Baguio City, until further orders from the appellate court. In
granting the same, the Court of Appeals underscored that the purpose of the temporary injunctive
relief is to preserve the status quo ante between the parties, and so as not to render moot and
academic the relief prayed for in the Petition. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals set the hearing on
the application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on 11 January 2000.

On 10 January 2000, the PNB filed a Comment with the Court of Appeals, disputing the imputation
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it lifted the preliminary injunction. The PNB
opposed respondents' claim that there exists in their favor a right to be protected. According to PNB,
the foreclosure of the collaterals shall be effective upon the default of RBN, which default had been
established as RBN was unable to properly service the loan agreements without justifiable cause
and despite due demand. Anent the issue on the existence of irreparable injury, PNB challenged
respondents' contention by arguing that there is, in fact, a pecuniary standard by which RBN's
damage can be measured per the testimony of RBN's witness that it will suffer a loss of P1.2 Billion
for the next ten (10) years. PNB further posited that there were no judicial admissions on their part to
the effect that RJVRD and RBN are not delinquent. In furtherance of its opposition, PNB averred that
it acted in two separate capacities as seller and lender. As a seller, PNB owned the Buendia
Property and offered it for sale to interested parties. PNB accepted the bid of RJVRD and the
property was sold to the latter. As a lender, PNB supplied the credit facility to RJVRD as the latter
needed to borrow money to finance the payment of the remaining balance. PNB insisted that these
two transactions cannot be treated as one and the same; hence, there is nothing that prevents it
from acting as a seller and lender at the same time. In fine, PNB maintained that RJVRD did not
default on the payment of the purchase price for such was completely paid; rather, it defaulted on
the payment of the loan, on its principal, and interest.

On 4 February 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution,59 granting the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, enjoining PNB and its agents from foreclosing the collaterals pledged and mortgaged by
RJVRD and RBN and from taking over possession and control of RBN radio facilities in Baguio City.
The appellate court, held, viz:

The principal action in the petition at bar dwells on the controversy on whether or not the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order lifting and setting
aside the injunctive relief earlier issued in Civil Case No. 4592 (sic). If no preliminary
injunction is issued in this case, pending resolution of such main petition, respondent will
proceed to foreclose the pledged or mortgaged collaterals. In that eventuality, petitioners
stand to sustain injury and irreparable damage, the loss of its properties, income[,] and
clientele listeners in the subject radio broadcasting station in Baguio City, even before the
instant certiorari proceeding could be resolved. To allow the impending foreclosure to
proceed, at this point in time, will surely be violative of petitioners' right to be heard and to
due process. It is for this reason, for the preservation of thestatus quo between the parties,
pending decision of the main petition and in order not to render the same moot and
academic, We feel justified to grant the preliminary injunction prayed for.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction be issued in this case enjoining the respondent PNB, its officers or
agents from foreclosing the collateral pledged and mortgaged by petitioners, RJ Ventures
Realty & Development Corporation and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc., from taking over
possession and control of RBN radio facilities in Baguio City, upon the posting of
a P1,000,000.00 injunction bond.

Undeterred, PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Order of 4 February 2000 be set
aside and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court of Appeals be immediately lifted and
dissolved.

Acting on the Motion, the Court of Appeals, rendered the assailed Decision dated 31 March 2004,
denying the same. In the same order, the appellate court, reversed and set aside the Orders dated
28 July 1999 and 26 October 1999 of the RTC; hence, effectively reinstating the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction earlier issued on 28 May 1999. The Court of Appeals held that the RTC was not asked to
make a definitive conclusion on the issue of whether RBN was indeed guilty of default in paying its
loan nor was it asked to resolve whether RBN committed a breach against PNB which necessitated
foreclosure. A determination of whether there was default or breach can be only be reached after the
principal action is set for trial on the merits after the parties are given opportunity to present evidence
in support of their respective claims.

The appellate court decreed, to wit:

It must be emphasized that a preliminary injunction may be granted at any stage of an action
prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As the term itself
 suggests, it is merely temporary, subject to the final disposition of the principal action. The
justification for the preliminary injunction is urgency. It is based on evidence tending to show
that the action complained of must be stayed lest the movant suffer irreparable injury or the
final judgment granting the relief sought become ineffectual.Necessarily, that evidence need
only be a "sampling," as it were, and intended merely to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. The
evidence submitted at the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction is not conclusive
of the principal action, which has yet to be decided. (Olalia vs. Hizon, 196 SCRA 665 [1991]).

Anent the issue of whether RBN would sustain "irreparable injury" should the chattel
mortgage be foreclosed, it bears repeating that the evidence to be submitted at the hearing
on the motion for preliminary injunction need not be conclusive and complete. On this score,
We find petitioners to have sufficiently established the existence of irreparable injury to
justify, albeit provisionally, the restraint of the act complained against them.

We find that the potential injury demonstrated by the various testimonies presented by
petitioners more than satisfies the legal and jurisprudential requirements of "irreparable
injury." There is no gainsaying in that the foreclosure of the subject radio equipment[s] would
inevitably result in stoppage of operations. This, in turn, shall result to (sic) the station's
tarnished image and consequent loss of public listenership. Loss of listenership then leads to
loss of confidence of the station's patrons and advertising clients that would cause serious
repercussions on its ability to sustain its operations. Undoubtedly, the loss of image and
reputation by a radio station are matters that are not quantifiable in terms of monetary value.

All told, We find the court a quo's lifting of the injunction earlier issued tainted with grave
abuse of discretion properly correctable by the special writ of certiorari.60

On 4 May 2004, PNB moved for the reconsideration thereon. On 8 July 2004, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Resolution, finding no justification to compel a modification or reversal of the 31 March
2004 Decision.

Hence, the instant Petition.

The Issues

PNB recites the following statement of the issues, viz:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FILED BY PNB INVOLVES QUESTIONS OF FACTS

WHICH SHOULD BE A CAUSE FOR ITS DISMISSAL;

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFAULT BY RJVRD AND RBN IN THE PAYMENT OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE LOAN OBLIGATIONS TO PNB JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FOR THE FORECLOSURE
OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTIES;

III
 WHETHER OR NOT RBN'S ADMISSION OF ITS FAILURE TO SETTLE ITS LOAN
OBLIGATION IN FULL GIVES PNB A CLEAR RIGHT TO FORECLOSE THE MORTGAGE;

IV

WHETHER OR NOT [THE] RIGHT OF RJVRD AND RBN TO A WRIT OF INJUNCTION IS

CLEAR, EXISTING[,] AND UNMISTAKABLE; and

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD LEGAL BASIS IN

REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER DATED JULY 28, 1999 AND OCTOBER
26, 1999 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 66, AND THEREBY
ISSUING A WRIT OF CERTIOARI IN FAVOR OF RJVRD AND RBN.61

The Ruling of the Court

The pivotal issue in the instant Petition is whether the Court of Appeals correctly reinstated the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 May 1999. Hence, the question is whether respondents RJVRD
and RBN are entitled to the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. It is for this reason that we shall address
and concern ourselves only with the assailed writ, but not with the merits of the case pending
before the trial court. A preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main
case subject to the latter's outcome.62 It is not a cause of action in itself.63

This Petition has no merit.

Foremost, we reiterate that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status
quo until the merits can be heard. 64 A preliminary injunction65 is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party's substantive
rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies
upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for
otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned.66

The grounds for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction are prescribed in Section 3 of Rule
58 of the Rules of Court. Thus:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to

do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of
 the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following requisites must be
present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.67 Indubitably, this Court has
likewise stressed that the very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the
existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary
compensation and the prevention of multiplicity of suits.68 Sine dubio, the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance
of the case since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of
facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination.69 Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion
by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is grave abuse of
discretion.70 Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined,
or to act at all in contemplation of law.71

We find the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals to be in accord with law.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.72 While this is perhaps one of our more emphatic doctrines,
it admits of certain exceptions, inter alia, when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court.73 In the case at bar, we apply the exception and proceed to make a
determination of whether there is a factual and legal bases for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to
issue.

First, respondents were able to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the
subject collaterals. Evidently, as owner of the subject collaterals that stand to be extrajudicially
foreclosed, respondents are entitled to the possession and protection thereof. RBN as the owner
and operator of the subject radio equipment and radio stations have a clear right over them. The
instant case does not involve abstract rights, or a future and contingent rights, but a right that is
already in existence. To our minds, petitioner's claim that respondents have lost their rights to the
subject collaterals in the face of their admission of default is best threshed out in a full-blown trial a
quo where the merits of the case can be tried and determined. Significantly, to give the trial court a
fair idea of whether a justification for the issuance of the writ exists, only a "sampling" of the
evidence is needed, pending a decision on the merits of the case.74 Hence, the determination of
respondents' default and the legality of the defenses they adduced are matters appropriately subject
of the trial on the merits.

Second, there is an urgent and paramount necessity to prevent serious damage. Indeed, an
injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.75 PNB assails the
existence of this ground by raising the argument that there is, in actuality, a pecuniary standard by
which RBN's damage can be measured, as evidenced by the testimony of RBN's witness that it will
suffer a loss of P1.2 Billion for the next ten (10) years.

To be sure, this court has declared that the term irreparable injury has a definite meaning in law. It
does not have reference to the amount of damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty of
measuring the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be obtained by way of damages, equity
will not apply the remedy of injunction.76The Court of Appeals declared that the evidence adduced by
respondents more than satisfies the legal and jurisprudential requirements of irreparable injury. It
behooves this court to appreciate the unique character of the collaterals that stand to be affected
should the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be dissolved as PNB would have it. The direct and
inevitable result would be the stoppage of the operations of respondents' radio stations,
consequently, losing its listenership, and tarnishing the image that it has built over time. It does not
stretch one's imagination to see that the cost of a destroyed image is significantly the loss of its good
name and reputation. As aptly appreciated by the appellate court, the value of a radio station's
image and reputation are not quantifiable in terms of monetary value. This conclusion can be
gleaned from the testimony of respondents' witness, Jose E. Escaner, Jr., General Manager of RBN,
thus: xxx

Evidently, there exists in the case at bar a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences to
respondents which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. After a careful scrutiny of
the attendant circumstances, we do not find herein a reason for reversing the reinstatement by the
Court of Appeals of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction earlier issued.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 31 March 2004 and the Resolution
dated 8 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56119, reversing and setting aside the
28 July 1999 and 26 October 1999 Orders of the RTC, Branch 66 of Makati City in Civil Case No.
99-452, and reinstating the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on 28 May 1999 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

STATUS QUO ANTE

G.R. No. 144499 February 19, 2002

FIRST GLOBAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTOPHER SAN AGUSTIN, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued pendente lite to preserve the status quo. To be entitled to
one, the applicant must show a prima facie right to the relief demanded in the complaint. In the
present case, the applicant has sufficiently demonstrated that, indeed, he has such right and that
grave and irreparable injury would befall him and his family, unless the injunctive relief is granted
while the main case pends in the trial court.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
April 28, 2000 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49083 and the August 10,
2000 CA Resolution4 denying reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the order dated May 21, 1998 and June 26, 1998 of the court a quo are SET ASIDE
and the petition is hereby GRANTED. FGRDC is hereby enjoined from taking possession of the
subject property until Civil Case No. 97-2678, which is pending before the court a quo has been
heard and finally resolved."5

The Facts

The undisputed facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

"The subject matter of the instant controversy is a parcel of land, including the house built thereon,
located at No. 3491 Honda St., Bo. Pinagkaisahan, Makati City (subject property). The subject
property was previously covered by TCT No. 180235, dated January 27, 1967, which was issued in
the name of [herein respondents] mother, Lilian Sales-San Agustin. [Respondent], together with his
parents, brothers and sisters have been in possession of the subject property since 1967 up to the
present.

xxx xxx xxx

"The conflict leading to the instant petition began when the subject property was sold to spouses
Enrique and Angelina Camacho (spouses Camacho) in 1994 for the amount of P2.5 million pesos,
net of capital gains tax, documentary stamp tax, transfer taxes and the remaining balance of the
petitioners loan with DBP.

"The records show that spouses Camacho succeeded in convincing petitioner to accept a partial
payment of P100,000.00 pesos upon the execution of a deed of absolute sale in their favor over the
subject property. The balance of P2.4 million pesos would be paid once the title over the same was
transferred in the name of spouses Camacho. The latter agreement came about because spouses
Camacho would use the subject property to raise the amount of P2.4 million pesos, that is to say,
they would secure a loan from a bank or financial institution with the subject property as collateral.

"On May 24, 1994, DBP released the subject property to petitioner upon full payment of the latters
outstanding loan. Thereafter, [respondent] executed a deed of sale in favor of spouses Camacho,
who in turn paid respondent] the amount of P100,000.00 pesos. On May 26, 1994, TCT No. 194868
was issued in the name spouses Camacho.

"It appeared that First Global Realty Development Corporation (FGRDC), [herein petitioner], granted
spouses Camachos loan application with the subject property as collateral, in the amount of P1.190
million. However, despite receipt of the loan and petitioners demand to pay the balance of the
purchase price of the subject property, spouses Camacho did not pay the same.

"Sensing that [respondents] demand to pay fell on deaf ears, he filed a criminal complaint for estafa
against spouses Camacho. Unfortunately, the case did not prosper because the spouses Camacho
could not be located for the proper service of the warrant of arrest.

"In the ensuing period, [respondent] discovered that FGRDC filed a special civil action for the
foreclosure of the subject property inasmuch as spouses Camacho defaulted in the payment of their
loan obligation. The case was assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City (Branch
143), and docketed as Civil Case No. 95-697.

"On June 28, 1996, Branch 143 rendered a decision ordering the foreclosure of the subject property
and the subsequent sale thereof at public auction. Spouses Camacho did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the said decision. Consequently, FGRDC filed a motion for execution which was
granted on February 7, 1997.

"The sale of the subject property at public auction was, nevertheless, thrust aside in view of
the dacion en pago which spouses Camacho executed in favor of FGRDC. On April 29, 1997,
the dacion en pagowas registered before the Register of Deeds of Makati City, which paved the way
for the issuance of TCT No. 209050 in the name of FGRDC.

"Accordingly, on September 8, 1997, FGRDC demanded rentals from [respondent], specifically

[from] his mother, for the latters use of the subject property. When FGRDCs demand was
unheeded by [respondent], it filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession before Branch 143.

"Apparently, on November 20, 1997, [respondent] filed a motion for intervention before Branch
143,wherein he asked for the rescission of the deed of absolute sale/mortgage, dacion en pago and
cancellation of FGRDCs title over the subject property.

"However, finding the motion for intervention to be a futile undertaking, [respondent] filed a separate
complaint for rescission of the deed of absolute sale, annulment of the dacion en pago and
cancellation of title and issuance of a new title with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of injunction against FGRDC, seeking to enjoin the latter from taking possession
of the subject property. The case was raffled to Branch 141 (court a quo), where public respondent
is the presiding judge, and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2673.

"On May 21, 1998, the court a quo issued an order denying [respondents] prayer for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but [it] was denied in an
order dated June 26, 1998 for lack of merit."6

Order of the Trial Court

In its Order7 dated May 21, 1998, the RTC denied the application of respondent for a preliminary
injunction to prevent petitioner from evicting him from the subject property. The trial court held that
under the facts alleged in the Complaint, respondent had sold the property to the Camacho spouses
for P2,500,000. The spouses initially gave him P100,000, with the balance to be paid after they
would have secured a loan using the property as collateral. The lower court added that cause of
action of respondent was to demand payment of the balance from the Camachos. The formers
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was denied by the RTC in its June 26, 1998 Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive relief prayed for by respondent. It
held that petitioner should not be given possession of the property pendente lite, because it knew of
the agreement between respondent and the Camachos. Moreover, the fact that the property
remained in the possession of respondents mother at the time the couple sold it to petitioner should
have warned it of a defect in its claims.

Aggrieved by the CA Decision, petitioner lodged the present recourse.8

Issues

In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
 "1. Whether or not the factual findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals upon which it
issued the April 28, 2000 Decision and the August 10, 2000 Resolution are devoid of support
by the evidence or the same are based on a misapprehension of facts; and

2. Whether or not petitioner is a purchaser in good faith and for value; hence, entitled to the
possession of the litigated property."9

The foregoing points really boil down to the gut issue of whether respondent is entitled to the
possession of the property while the main case for rescission is pending in the RTC.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Principal Issue:

Possession Pendente Lite

Petitioner seeks to dispossess respondent of the subject property on the strength of a dacion en
pago executed in its favor by the Camacho spouses who, in turn, had purportedly bought it from
herein respondent.

Respondent, on the other hand, claims that petitioner failed to show a clear right to possess it. To
dispossess himpendente lite would be clearly unjust. We agree.

Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates various grounds for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, as follows:

"SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

"(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring
the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

"(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

"(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual."

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued to preserve
the status quo ante -- the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded the actual
controversy.10 In Saulog v. CA, the Supreme Court ruled thus:

"A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment,
requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. It may be granted at any time after the
commencement of the action and before final judgment, when it is established that the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually; that the commission or continuance of some act complained of
during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.

"A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely temporary, subject to the final
disposition of the principal action and its purpose is to preserve the status quo of the things subject
of the action and/or the relation between the parties, in order to protect the right of the plaintiff
respecting the subject of the action during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise or if no preliminary
injunction were issued, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act
which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered
afterwards granting the relief sought by the plaintiff. Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of
the court taking cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of
manifest abuse."11

Likewise, in Paramount Insurance v. CA, this Court held that "[i]njunction is an extraordinary remedy
calculated to preserve the status quo of things and to prevent actual or threatened acts violative of
the rules of equity and good conscience as would consequently afford an injured party a cause of
action resulting from the failure of the law to provide for an adequate or complete relief x x x. Its sole
purpose is not to correct a wrong of the past, in the sense of redress for injury already sustained, but
to prevent further injury."12

The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is "to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole
aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully."13 Thus, it will be
issued only upon a showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent
and permanent necessity for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.14

In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be preserved is the possession of the property
by respondent and his right to use it as his dwelling, pending determination of whether or not he had
indeed sold it to the Camachos and, consequently, whether the latters transfer of its ownership to
petitioner via dacion en pago should be upheld.

Prima Facie
Right to Possess

Respondents Complaint in the trial court seeks the following: the rescission of the Deed of Absolute
Sale between himself and the Camacho spouses, the annulment of the dacion en pago executed by
the latter in favor of petitioner, and the cancellation of petitioners certificate of title to it as well as the
issuance of a new one in favor of respondent.

The factual findings of both the trial and the appellate courts show that respondent intended to sell
the subject property to the Camacho spouses for the sum of P2,500,000. The couple initially
paid P100,000, with the agreement that the balance would be paid when they would have secured a
loan using the subject property as collateral. To facilitate their procurement of a loan, the title to the
property was transferred to them.

Using the subject property as collateral, the Camachos were able to obtain a loan of P1,190,000
from petitioner. Upon the formers failure to pay the loan, the latter sought to foreclose the mortgage
over it. However, before the property could be foreclosed, petitioner and the couple allegedly agreed
on a dacion en pago, in which the latter ceded ownership of the property in favor of the former in
consideration of the payment of the loan. Respondent contends that when petitioner conducted an
on-site investigation of the property in connection with the couples application for a loan, the latter
learned that the former was living in the subject premises and was thus in actual possession of it.
The CA found, in fact, that petitioner was aware that respondent -- the previous owner -- remained
an unpaid seller.

Moreover, respondent argues that the dacion en pago is riddled with a number of irregularities. He
maintains that the Camachos executed it way back in 1994 when they were still applying for a loan,
not immediately prior to the supposed foreclosure in 1997. At the same time, they also executed a
promissory note and mortgage for the same amount. As respondent points out, a dacion en
pago that cedes property in favor of the creditor is not compatible with a mortgage wherein property
is foreclosed in case of failure to pay the principal loan.

Indeed, the records show that the dacion en pago signed in 1994 was registered only in 1997. It 1wphi 1

was executed in lieu of the foreclosure of the property when the Camachos failed to pay their loan
obligations. The amount stated in the dacion as consideration was the P1,190,000 loan that they had
obtained from petitioner. It is therefore strange that the couple would buy a parcel of land
for P2,500,000, obtain a loan to help finance payment for the same, and finally cede the same
property for an amount much lower than that for which they purchased it. Moreover, by executing
a dacion, the sellers effectively waived the redemption period normally given a mortgagor.

In sum, we hold that respondent was able to show a prima facie right to the relief demanded in his
Complaint. The Camachos nonpayment of the purchase price agreed upon and the irregularities
surrounding the dacion en pagoare serious enough to allow him to possess the
property pendente lite.

Grave Injustice in a
Transfer of Possession

In addition, respondent has shown that to allow petitioner to take immediate possession of the
property would result in grave injustice. As we have stated above, the ownership of the property, the
validity of the sale between respondent and the Camachos and the legitimacy of the dacion en
pago executed by the latter in favor of petitioner are still subject to determination in the court below.
Furthermore, there is no question that respondent has been in possession of the premises during all
this time -- prior to and during the institution of the Complaint. He and his family have long owned,
possessed and occupied it as their family home since 1967. To dispossess him of it now would
definitely alter the status quo to their detriment.

Ineffectual Judgment

By selling their family home to the Camachos for P2,500,000, the respondent hoped to improve the
plight of his family. By a strange turn of events, he will now find himself homeless with only the sum
of P100,000 to purchase a new dwelling for himself and his relatives. Indeed, justice and equity
dictate that he should remain in possession of the property pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SECTION 1

G.R. No. 169304 March 13, 2007

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA

GALON and USEC. ANTONIO M. LOPEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84457, to
wit: a) Decision1dated May 12, 2005 which affirmed the order issued by Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264 denying petitioners motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 68208; and b) Resolution2 dated August 9, 2005 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of

manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines.

On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 27,3 Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of
government suppliers for pharmaceutical products.

A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10,4 Series of 2000, providing for additional guidelines
for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact
business with petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Part V of A.O. No. 10 reads, in part:

1. Drug Manufacturer, Drug Trader and Drug Importer shall be allowed to apply for
accreditation.

2. Accreditation shall be done by the Central Office-Department of Health.

3. A separate accreditation is required for the drug suppliers and for their specific products.

xxxx

12. Only products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be procured by the DOH
and all otherentities under its jurisdiction.5 (Underscoring supplied)

On May 9, 20006 and May 29, 2000,7 respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G
Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and
release of the result of respondents request were due on September 2000, the last month of the
quarter following the date of its filing.8
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of
the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids9 for the procurement
of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract).

Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondents request for inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies
participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid atP82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS
Laboratories (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of
respondents Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS.

Respondent thus filed a complaint10 for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that the trial court "nullify the award of the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract (IFB No. 2000-10-11 [14]) to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant DOH,
defendant Romualdez, defendant Galon and defendant Lopez to declare plaintiff Pharmawealth as
the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly
award the same to plaintiff company" and "adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable,
jointly and severally to plaintiff, for [the therein specified damages]."11

In their Comment,12 petitioner DOH, Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr. who was later succeeded by
petitioner Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit, and individual petitioners Undersecretaries Margarita Galon
and Antonio Lopez argued for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit in view of the express
reservation made by petitioner DOH to accept or reject any or all bids without incurring liability to the
bidders, they positing that government agencies have such full discretion.

Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion13 (motion to dismiss) praying for the
outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. Additionally, they alleged
that respondents representative was not duly authorized by its board of directors to file the
complaint.

To petitioners motion to dismiss, respondent filed its comment/opposition14 contending, in the main,
that the doctrine of state immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being
sued both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable for
damages.

By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court15 denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,16 petitioners filed a petition for certiorari17 with
the Court of Appeals, before which they maintained that the suit is against the state.

By the assailed Decision18 of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Order. And
by Resolution of August 9, 2005, it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition for review which raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals
erred in upholding the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss.

The petition fails.

The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within
his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official
functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the
Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review,19 and it is the official concerned who
should be impleaded as the proper party.20

In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their
official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who
should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit.21

Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by respondent is the enjoinment of the implementation, as
well as the nullification of the award to YSS, the grant of which may not be enforced against
individual petitioners and their successors except in their official capacities as officials of the DOH.22

As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 5823 of the Rules of Court, preliminary
injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of
state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State.24

As regards individual petitioners suability for damages, the following discussion on the applicability
of the defense of state immunity from suit is relevant.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of
the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have
now adopted as part of the law of the land.25

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties.26 The suit is regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a
positive act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded
against them.27

The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. Shauf v.
Court of Appeals28 elucidates:

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.,29 Inasmuch as the
State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers
are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have
been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State
within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at
law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have,
is not a suit against the Statewithin the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 1avvphi1
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that
are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the
public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although
the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position.30

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in
connection with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official positions to make sure that
plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad
faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law"31 is permissible,
in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him
by law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.32

It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing paragraph in no way
reflect a ruling on the actual liability of petitioners to respondent. The mere allegation that a
government official is being sued in his personal capacity does not automatically remove the same
from the protection of the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand, does the mere
invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from suability and liability for an act
committed without or in excess of his or her authority.33 These are matters of evidence which should
be presented and proven at the trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 12, 2005 and Resolution
dated August 9, 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138900 September 20, 2005

LEVI STRAUSS & CO., & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.), INC., Petitioners,
vs.
CLINTON APPARELLE, INC., Respondent.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by Levi Strauss & Co. (LS & Co.) and Levi Strauss (Philippines), Inc. (LSPI) assailing the Court
of Appeals Decision2 andResolution3 respectively dated 21 December 1998 and 10 May 1999. The
questioned Decision granted respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in
its Petition4 and set aside the trial courts orders dated 15 May 19985 and 4 June 19986 which
respectively granted petitioners prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

This case stemmed from the Complaint7 for Trademark Infringement, Injunction and Damages filed
by petitioners LS & Co. and LSPI against respondent Clinton Apparelle, Inc.* (Clinton Aparelle)
together with an alternative defendant, Olympian Garments, Inc. (Olympian Garments), before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90.8 TheComplaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
98-34252, entitled "Levi Strauss & Co. and Levi Strauss (Phils.), Inc. v. Clinton Aparelle, Inc. and/or
Olympian Garments, Inc."
The Complaint alleged that LS & Co., a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the State of Delaware, U.S.A., and engaged in the apparel business, is the owner by prior
adoption and use since 1986 of the internationally famous "Dockers and Design" trademark. This
ownership is evidenced by its valid and existing registrations in various member countries of the
Paris Convention. In the Philippines, it has a Certificate of Registration No. 46619 in the Principal
Register for use of said trademark on pants, shirts, blouses, skirts, shorts, sweatshirts and jackets
under Class 25.9

The "Dockers and Design" trademark was first used in the Philippines in or about May 1988, by
LSPI, a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of various products
bearing trademarks owned by LS & Co. To date, LSPI continues to manufacture and sell Dockers
Pants with the "Dockers and Design" trademark.10

LS & Co. and LSPI further alleged that they discovered the presence in the local market of jeans
under the brand name "Paddocks" using a device which is substantially, if not exactly, similar to the
"Dockers and Design" trademark owned by and registered in the name of LS & Co., without its
consent. Based on their information and belief, they added, Clinton Apparelle manufactured and
continues to manufacture such "Paddocks" jeans and other apparel.

However, since LS & Co. and LSPI are unsure if both, or just one of impleaded defendants are
behind the manufacture and sale of the "Paddocks" jeans complained of, they brought this suit under
Section 13, Rule 311 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.12

The Complaint contained a prayer that reads as follows:

1. That upon the filing of this complaint, a temporary restraining order be immediately issued
restraining defendants, their officers, employees, agents, representatives, dealers, retailers or
assigns from committing the acts herein complained of, and, specifically, for the defendants, their
officers, employees, agents, representatives, dealers and retailers or assigns, to cease and desist
from manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or otherwise using denims,
jeans or pants with the design herein complained of as substantially, if not exactly similar, to
plaintiffs "Dockers and Design" trademark.

2. That after notice and hearing, and pending trial on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining defendants, their officers, employees, agents, dealers, retailers, or assigns from
manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, jeans the design herein complained
of as substantially, if not exactly similar, to plaintiffs "Dockers and Design" trademark.

3. That after trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:

a. Affirming and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction;

b. Ordering that all infringing jeans in the possession of either or both defendants as the evidence
may warrant, their officers, employees, agents, retailers, dealers or assigns, be delivered to the
Honorable Court of plaintiffs, and be accordingly destroyed;13

Acting on the prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the trial court issued an Order14 setting it for hearing
on 5 May 1998. On said date, as respondent failed to appear despite notice and the other defendant,
Olympian Garments, had yet to be notified, the hearing was re-scheduled on 14 May 1998.15
On 14 May 1998, neither Clinton Apparelle nor Olympian Garments appeared. Clinton Apparelle
claimed that it was not notified of such hearing. Only Olympian Garments allegedly had been issued
with summons. Despite the absence of the defendants, the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a TRO continued.16

The following day, the trial court issued an Order17 granting the TRO applied for, the pertinent
portions of which state:

Considering the absence of counsel/s for the defendant/s during the summary hearing scheduled
on May 5, 1998 and also during the re-scheduled summary hearing held on May 14, 1998 set for the
purpose of determining whether or not a Temporary Restraining Order shall be issued, this Court
allowed the counsel for the plaintiffs to present on May 14, 1998 their arguments/evidences in
support of their application. After hearing the arguments presented by the counsel for the plaintiffs
during the summary hearing, this Court is of the considered and humble view that grave injustice
and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs would arise before the matter of whether or not the application
for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction can be heard, and that, in the interest of justice,
and in the meantime, a Temporary Restraining Order be issued.

WHEREFORE, let this Temporary Restraining Order be issued restraining the defendants, their
officers, employees, agents, representatives, dealers, retailers or assigns from committing the acts
complained of in the verified Complaint, and specifically, for the defendants, their officers,
employees, agents, representatives, dealers and retailers or assigns, to cease and desist from
manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising or otherwise using denims, jeans or
pants with the design complained of in the verified Complaint as substantially, if not exactly similar,
to plaintiffs "Dockers and Design" trademark; until after the application/prayer for the issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is heard/resolved, or until further orders from this Court.

The hearing on the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as embodied in the
verified Complaint is set on May 26, 1998 (Tuesday) at 2:00 P.M. which setting is intransferable in
character considering that the lifetime of this Temporary Restraining Order is twenty (20) days from
date hereof.18

On 4 June 1998, the trial court issued another Order19 granting the writ of preliminary injunction, to
wit:

ORDER

This resolves the plaintiffs application or prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as
embodied in the verified complaint in this case. Parenthetically, this Court earlier issued a temporary
restraining order. (see Order dated May 15, 1998; see also Order dated May 26, 1998)

After a careful perusal of the contents of the pleadings and documents on record insofar as they are
pertinent to the issue under consideration, this Court finds that at this point in time, the plaintiffs
appear to be entitled to the relief prayed for and this Court is of the considered belief and humble
view that, without necessarily delving on the merits, the paramount interest of justice will be better
served if the status quo shall be maintained and that an injunction bond of P2,500,000.00 appears to
be in order. (see Sections 3 and 4, Rule 58, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is GRANTED. Accordingly, upon the plaintiffs filing, within ten (10) days from their receipt
hereof, an injunction bond ofP2,500,000.00 executed to the defendants to the effect that the plaintiffs
will pay all damages the defendants may sustain by reason of this injunction in case the Court
should finally decide that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue
enjoining or restraining the commission of the acts complained of in the verified Complaint in this
case, and specifically, for the defendants, their officers, employees, agents, representatives, dealers
and retailers or assigns or persons acting in their behalf to cease and desist from manufacturing,
distributing, selling, offering for sale, advertising, or otherwise using, denims, jeans or pants with the
design complained of in the verified Complaint in this case, which is substantially, if not exactly,
similar to plaintiffs "DOCKERS and DESIGN" trademark or logo as covered by the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer Certificate of Registration No. 46619, until after this
case shall have been decided on the merits and/or until further orders from this Court.20

The evidence considered by the trial court in granting injunctive relief were as follows: (1) a certified
true copy of the certificate of trademark registration for "Dockers and Design"; (2) a pair of
DOCKERS pants bearing the "Dockers and Design" trademark; (3) a pair of "Paddocks" pants
bearing respondents assailed logo; (4) the Trends MBL Survey Report purportedly proving that
there was confusing similarity between two marks; (5) the affidavit of one Bernabe Alajar which
recounted petitioners prior adoption, use and registration of the "Dockers and Design" trademark;
and (6) the affidavit of one Mercedes Abad of Trends MBL, Inc. which detailed the methodology and
procedure used in their survey and the results thereof.21

Clinton Apparelle thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss22 and a Motion for Reconsideration23 of
the Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction. Meantime, the trial court issued
an Order24 approving the bond filed by petitioners.

On 22 June 1998, the trial court required25 the parties to file their "respective citation of authorities/
jurisprudence/Supreme Court decisions" on whether or not the trial court may issue the writ of
preliminary injunction pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to
Dismiss filed by respondent.

On 2 October 1998, the trial court denied Clinton Apparelles Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Reconsideration in an Omnibus Order,26 the pertinent portions of which provide:

After carefully going over the contents of the pleadings in relation to pertinent portions of the records,
this Court is of the considered and humble view that:

On the first motion, the arguments raised in the plaintiffs aforecited Consolidated Opposition
appears to be meritorious. Be that as it may, this Court would like to emphasize, among other things,
that the complaint states a cause of action as provided under paragraphs 1 to 18 thereof.

On the second motion, the arguments raised in the plaintiffs aforecited Consolidated Opposition
likewise appear to be impressed with merit. Besides, there appears to be no strong and cogent
reason to reconsider and set aside this Courts Order dated June 4, 1998 as it has been shown so
far that the trademark or logo of defendants is substantially, if not exactly, similar to plaintiffs
"DOCKERS and DESIGN" trademark or logo as covered by BPTTT Certificate of Registration No.
46619 even as the BPTTT Certificate of Registration No. 49579 of Clinton Apparelle, Inc. is only for
the mark or word "PADDOCKS" (see Records, p. 377) In any event, this Court had issued an Order
dated June 18, 1998 for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction after the plaintiffs filed the
required bond ofP2,500,000.00.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the aforecited Motion To Dismiss and Motion For Reconsideration
are both DENIED for lack of merit, and accordingly, this Courts Order dated June 18, 1998 for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is REITERATED so the writ of preliminary injunction
could be implemented unless the implementation thereof is restrained by the Honorable Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court.

The writ of preliminary injunction was thereafter issued on 8 October 1998.27

Thus, Clinton Apparelle filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition28 for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, assailing the orders of the trial court dated 15 May 1998, 4 June 1998 and 2 October
1998.

On 20 October 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution29 requiring herein petitioners to file
their comment on the Petition and at the same time issued the prayed-for temporary restraining
order.

The appellate court rendered on 21 December 1998 its now assailed Decision granting Clinton
Apparelles petition. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not follow the procedure
required by law for the issuance of a temporary restraining order as Clinton Apparelle was not duly
notified of the date of the summary hearing for its issuance. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
TRO had been improperly issued.30

The Court of Appeals also held that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is questionable.
In its opinion, herein petitioners failed to sufficiently establish its material and substantial right to
have the writ issued. Secondly, the Court of Appeals observed that the survey presented by
petitioners to support their contentions was commissioned by petitioners. The Court of Appeals
remarked that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to testimony given in
open court. The appellate court also considered that the injury petitioners have suffered or are
currently suffering may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration, if after trial, a final
judgment shall be rendered in their favor.31

In addition, the Court of Appeals strongly believed that the implementation of the questioned writ
would effectively shut down respondents business, which in its opinion should not be sanctioned.
The Court of Appeals thus set aside the orders of the trial court dated 15 May 1998 and 4 June
1998, respectively issuing a temporary restraining order and granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.

With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration,32 petitioners are now before this Court seeking a
review of the appellate courts Decision and Resolution. LS & Co. and LSPI claim that the Court of
Appeals committed serious error in: (1) disregarding the well-defined limits of the writ of certiorari
that questions on the sufficiency of evidence are not to be resolved in such a petition; (2) in holding
that there was no confusion between the two marks; (3) in ruling that the erosion of petitioners
trademark is not protectable by injunction; (4) in ignoring the procedure previously agreed on by the
parties and which was adopted by the trial court; and (5) in declaring that the preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court will lead to the closure of respondents business.

In its Comment,33 Clinton Apparelle maintains that only questions of law may be raised in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It asserts that the question of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in: (1) disregarding the survey evidence; (2) ruling that there was no confusion
between the two marks; and (c) finding that the erosion of petitioners trademark may not be
protected by injunction, are issues not within the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. Clinton Apparelle also contends that the Court of Appeals acted correctly when it
overturned the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. It believes that the issued writ in
effect disturbed the status quo and disposed of the main case without trial.
There is no merit in the petition.

At issue is whether the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the trial court was proper and
whether the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court.

Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any
stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only
upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy,
injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to
prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard.34 It may be resorted to
only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose
during the pendency of the principal action.35 It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity
to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The
resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an
emergency or of a special recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of
proceedings.36

Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be
shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not
issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not
give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual right.37 There must be a patent showing by
the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of said right.38

There are generally two kinds of preliminary injunction: (1) a prohibitory injunction which commands
a party to refrain from doing a particular act; and (2) a mandatory injunction which commands the
performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.39

The Court of Appeals did not err in reviewing proof adduced by petitioners to support its application
for the issuance of the writ. While the matter of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, this discretion must be exercised based upon the
grounds and in the manner provided by law. The exercise of discretion by the trial court in injunctive
matters is generally not interfered with save in cases of manifest abuse.40 And to determine whether
there was abuse of discretion, a scrutiny must be made of the bases, if any, considered by the trial
court in granting injunctive relief. Be it stressed that injunction is the strong arm of equity which must
be issued with great caution and deliberation, and only in cases of great injury where there is no
commensurate remedy in damages.41

In the present case, we find that there was scant justification for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.

Petitioners anchor their legal right to "Dockers and Design" trademark on the Certificate of
Registration issued in their favor by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer.* According to Section 138 of Republic Act No. 8293,42 this Certificate of Registration
is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, the registrants ownership of the mark and
of the exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods or services and those that are
related thereto specified in the certificate. Section 147.1 of said law likewise grants the owner of the
registered mark the exclusive right to prevent all third parties not having the owners consent from
using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for goods or services which are identical or
similar to those in respect of which the trademark is registered if such use results in a likelihood of
confusion.

However, attention should be given to the fact that petitioners registered trademark consists of two
elements: (1) the word mark "Dockers" and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo. Notably, there is
only one registration for both features of the trademark giving the impression that the two should be
considered as a single unit. Clinton Apparelles trademark, on the other hand, uses the "Paddocks"
word mark on top of a logo which according to petitioners is a slavish imitation of the "Dockers"
design. The two trademarks apparently differ in their word marks ("Dockers" and "Paddocks"), but
again according to petitioners, they employ similar or identical logos. It could thus be said that
respondent only "appropriates" petitioners logo and not the word mark "Dockers"; it uses only a
portion of the registered trademark and not the whole.

Given the single registration of the trademark "Dockers and Design" and considering that respondent
only uses the assailed device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the latter from using the
challenged "Paddocks" device is far from clear. Stated otherwise, it is not evident whether the single
registration of the trademark "Dockers and Design" confers on the owner the right to prevent the use
of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is also unclear whether the use without the owners
consent of a portion of a trademark registered in its entirety constitutes material or substantial
invasion of the owners right.

It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as opposed to the word mark, is the
dominant or central feature of petitioners trademarkthe feature that prevails or is retained in the
minds of the publican imitation of which creates the likelihood of deceiving the public and
constitutes trademark infringement.43 In sum, there are vital matters which have yet and may only be
established through a full-blown trial.

From the above discussion, we find that petitioners right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and
unmistakably demonstrated. The right has yet to be determined. Petitioners also failed to show proof
that there is material and substantial invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive
writ. Neither were petitioners able to show any urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.

Petitioners wish to impress upon the Court the urgent necessity for injunctive relief, urging that the
erosion or dilution of their trademark is protectable. They assert that a trademark owner does not
have to wait until the mark loses its distinctiveness to obtain injunctive relief, and that the mere use
by an infringer of a registered mark is already actionable even if he has not yet profited thereby or
has damaged the trademark owner.

Trademark dilution is the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish
goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of: (1) competition between the owner of
the famous mark and other parties; or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. Subject to
the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction "against another
persons commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark
has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark." This is intended to
protect famous marks from subsequent uses that blur distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or
disparage it.44

Based on the foregoing, to be eligible for protection from dilution, there has to be a finding that: (1)
the trademark sought to be protected is famous and distinctive; (2) the use by respondent of
"Paddocks and Design" began after the petitioners mark became famous; and (3) such subsequent
use defames petitioners mark. In the case at bar, petitioners have yet to establish whether "Dockers
and Design" has acquired a strong degree of distinctiveness and whether the other two elements are
present for their cause to fall within the ambit of the invoked protection. The Trends MBL Survey
Report which petitioners presented in a bid to establish that there was confusing similarity between
two marks is not sufficient proof of any dilution that the trial court must enjoin.

The Court also finds that the trial courts order granting the writ did not adequately detail the reasons
for the grant, contrary to our ruling in University of the Philippines v. Hon. Catungal Jr., 45 wherein we
held that:

The trial court must state its own findings of fact and cite particular law to justify grant of preliminary
injunction. Utmost care in this regard is demanded.46

The trial court in granting the injunctive relief tersely ratiocinated that "the plaintiffs appear to be
entitled to the relief prayed for and this Court is of the considered belief and humble view that,
without necessarily delving on the merits, the paramount interest of justice will be better served if
the status quo shall be maintained." Clearly, this statement falls short of the requirement laid down
by the above-quoted case. Similarly, in Developers Group of Companies, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,47 we held that it was "not enough" for the trial court, in its order granting the writ, to simply
say that it appeared "after hearing that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for."

In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals in its holding that the damages the petitioners had
suffered or continue to suffer may be compensated in terms of monetary consideration. As held
in Government Service Insurance System v. Florendo:48

a writ of injunction should never have been issued when an action for damages would adequately
compensate the injuries caused. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction
rests in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary estimation and the prevention of
the multiplicity of suits, and where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the
relief of injunction should be refused.49

We also believe that the issued injunctive writ, if allowed, would dispose of the case on the merits as
it would effectively enjoin the use of the "Paddocks" device without proof that there is basis for such
action. The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that
would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.50 There would be a prejudgment of the main
case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which
petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.51
Parenthetically, we find no flaw in the Court of Appeals disquisition on the consequences of the
issued injunction. An exercise of caution, we believe that such reflection is necessary to weigh the
alleged entitlement to the writ vis--vis its possible effects. The injunction issued in the instant case
is of a serious nature as it tends to do more than to maintain the status quo. In fact, the assailed
injunction if sustained would bring about the result desired by petitioners without a trial on the merits.

Then again, we believe the Court of Appeals overstepped its authority when it declared that the
"alleged similarity as to the two logos is hardly confusing to the public." The only issue brought
before the Court of Appeals through respondents Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
involved the grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed by the trial court in granting the TRO and
the writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court in making such a statement went beyond that
issue and touched on the merits of the infringement case, which remains to be decided by the trial
court. In our view, it was premature for the Court of Appeals to declare that there is no confusion
between the two devices or logos. That matter remains to be decided on by the trial court.

Finally, we have no contention against the procedure adopted by the trial court in resolving the
application for an injunctive writ and we believe that respondent was accorded due process. Due
process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard. And in applications for preliminary
injunction, the requirement of hearing and prior notice before injunction may issue has been relaxed
to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction must undergo a trial-type hearing, it being a
hornbook doctrine that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential
to due process. Due process simply means giving every contending party the opportunity to be
heard and the court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their favor. Accordingly, this
Court has in the case of Co v. Calimag, Jr.,52 rejected a claim of denial of due process where such
claimant was given the opportunity to be heard, having submitted his counter-affidavit and
memorandum in support of his position.53

After a careful consideration of the facts and arguments of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners
did not adequately prove their entitlement to the injunctive writ. In the absence of proof of a legal
right and the injury sustained by the applicant, an order of the trial court granting the issuance of an
injunctive writ will be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.54 Conformably,
the Court of Appeals was correct in setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21
December 1998 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1999 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

SECTION 2

DOCTRINE OF NON-JURISDICTION
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863 October 22, 2004

ATTY. JOSE ALFONSO M. GOMOS, FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO PRIVATE EDUCATION

(FAPE), complainants,
vs.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, respondent.
 DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In two verified complaints dated March 12, 2001 and March 22, 2001 filed with the Office the Court
Administrator (OCA), Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum, in his capacity as President and Chairman of
Pacasum College, Inc., Atty. Alfonso M. Gomos and Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, as counsel and
President of the Fund for Assistance to Private Education (FAPE) respectively, charged respondent
Judge Santos B. Adiong of RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City with gross ignorance of law, abuse of
authority and gross misconduct.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On February 26, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum filed Special Civil Action No. 690-01 for
mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction against FAPE. He alleged
that FAPE was required by law to pay subsidy to Pacasum College, Inc. under the
Educational Service Program of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS);
that although the DECS has already released to FAPE the total amount of P746,000,000.00
for payment to different participating schools, FAPE refused to release to Pacasum College,
Inc. the sum of P1,845,040.00 which represented the remaining unpaid collectible of the said
institution for the school year 2000-2001; that the continued refusal by FAPE to release the
said amount has caused the school to fail in its obligation to pay the salaries of its teachers
for 3 months.

On the same day the petition was filed, respondent judge granted1 the application for preliminary
mandatory injunction upon the posting by the petitioner of a surety or property bond in the amount of
P200,000.00.

On February 28, 2001, the respondent judge issued another order directing the president of FAPE,
Dr. Roberto T. Borromeo, "to prepare and issue a check for P1,845,040.00 representing the
payment to the Pacasum College, Inc. x x x payable to its president and chairman Saripada Ali
Pacasum, the petitioner herein."2 On the same day, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto served upon FAPE,
throught its president, summons and a copy of the petition.

On March 5, 2001, FAPE filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. No.
635333 before the Court of Appeals, challenging the Orders, both dated February 26, 2001, issued
by the respondent judge. It argued that a pending ownership dispute between Sultan Sabdulah Ali
Pacasum and Saripada Ali Pacasum over the shares of the Pacasum College before the Securities
and Exchange Commission precludes the release of the remaining balance of the subsidy to
Pacasum College under the ESC Program, which requires that any dispute must be settled first
before the release could be made. The petition further stated that the RTC of Marawi City has no
jurisdiction to enforce the writs of mandamus and preliminary injunction to FAPE, in its principal
office in Makati City, since the place is outside the 12th judicial region where it belongs.4 FAPE also
prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Saripada Ali Pacasum and his agents who have been
harrassing its employees with hourly calls and threats of bodily harm.

On March 9, 2001, Sheriff Acmad Alipanto and Saripada Ali Pacasum served an Order dated March
7, 2001, which was allegedly issued on a mere ex-parte motion by Saripada Ali Pacasum, reiterating
the Orders of February 26, 2001 with a warning that "failure to comply would be under pain of
contempt of court."5 On March 13, 2001, Saripada Ali Pacasum together with a Makati policeman
served warrant of arrest upon Dr. Borromeo.
On March 14, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO enjoining the respondent judge from
enforcing the orders of February 26, 2001. Despite the TRO, respondent judge ordered the arrest of
Dr. Borromeo and certain FAPE employees for failure to comply with his directive. Two of FAPEs
employees, namely: Evangeline Domondon and Nenita Torres, were subsequently arrested and
detained.

On March 12, 2001, Sultan Sabdulah Ali Pacasum filed a letter complaint before the OCA charging
the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct. On March 22, 2001, a
similar letter-complaint was filed by Atty. Jose Gomos on the same ground that the respondent judge
violated the hearing, notice and jurisdictional requirements of the Rules of Court in issuing the
questioned orders of February 26 and 28, 2001.

In his Comment, respondent judge claimed that he took cognizance of Special Civil Action No. 690-
10 after it was raffled to his court. He found that the pleadings were in order; that after a careful
examination of the pleadings submitted by the petitioner, he saw an extreme necessity to resolve the
case expeditiously; and that all the pending incidents has been rendered moot and academic with
the dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 690-10.

After evaluation of the records, the OCA found that the respondent judge was liable for gross
ignorance of the law, oppression and abuse of authority; that the respondent, as the Presiding Judge
of RTC, Marawi City, has no authority to enforce a preliminary injunction in Makati City where the
principal office of FAPE was located; that he violated the rights of FAPE employees when he
summarily cited them in contempt without regard to the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.
He abused his authority when he issued a warrant of arrest on May 25, 2001 despite a TRO issued
by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the OCA made the following recommendations:

1. This matter be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against the respondent judge;

2. Respondent judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules;

3. Respondent judge be meted with the penalty of FINE in the sum of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00).6

Upon being directed by the Court,7 complainants manifested their willingness to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings submitted.8 Respondent judge, on the other hand, failed to file
his manifestation hence, the Court was constrained to dispense with the filing thereof.

We agree with the recommendations of the OCA, except as to the penalty.

Respondent judge granted Saripada Ali Pacasums application for preliminary mandatory injunction
on the very same day the Special Civil Action No. 690-01 was filed on February 26, 2001. Sections
4(c) and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure9 is very explicit that the writ of preliminary
injuction may issue only after prior notice and hearing upon the adverse party. In issuing the subject
writ on the very same day the application was filed and considering that the person against whom
the same was to be served was located in Makati, summons could not have been served upon them
or a hearing conducted in evident disregard of the due process requirements of the Rules of Court.

Respondent judges failure to comply with procedural due process is aggravated by his total
inattention to the parameters of his jurisdiction. As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he
should have known that Makati City was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction
insofar as enforcing a writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be
enforced in any part of their respective regions. The rationale, as explained in Embassy Farms, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,10 is "that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed outside its territorial jurisdiction."

In the case at bar, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction is not a mere deficiency in
prudence, or lapse of judgment on the part of respondent judge but a blatant disregard of basic rules
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. The responsibility of judges to keep abreast of the law and
changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court, is a pressing need. One
cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance
of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even judges.11

Respondent judge is likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law for summarily punishing FAPEs
president and employees without any written charge for indirect contempt or giving them any
opportunity to explain their refusal to obey the courts order, as mandated by Section 3, Rule 71 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.12 What makes the act more reprehensible was the four FAPE
employees cited for contempt, two of whom were arrested and detained with the exception of Dr.
Borromeo, were not even impleaded in Special Civil Action No. 690-10. Worse, the arrest of the said
employees was made despite the issuance by the Court of Appeals of a TRO enjoining the
respondent from enforcing the Order of February 26, 2001.

The contempt power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity,
inasmuch as respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws necessary to the good
order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves. As in all other powers of the
court, the contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness
in the performance of his duties.13 The failure of a judge to afford the alleged contemner the
opportunity to be heard as a matter of due process of law deserves administrative sanction.

The seeming eagerness and haste with which respondent judge demonstrated in issuing the
assailed orders, warrants and writ betray a design to railroad judicial processes to favor a preferred
litigant. The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which displays obvious
partiality is deplorable and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires a
judge to behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.14 A judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of judicial authority for
having precipitately adjudged guilty of indirect contempt in disregard of the elementary rules of
procedure.

The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if
committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only in cases within the
parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the procedure is so simple and the facts so
evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the
law.15

Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline
of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which carries
with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension for more than 3 months but not
exceeding 6 months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

We take judicial notice that the respondent judge had been previously sanctioned in (1) A.M. No.
RTJ-98-1407 per Resolution of July 20, 1998, where he was fined in the sum of P20,000.00 for
ignorance of the law; and (2) A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581 per Resolution of July 2002, where he was also
fined in the sum of P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.

Obviously, after being chastised twice, respondent judge has remained undeterred in disregarding
the law which he has pledged to uphold and the Code which he has promised to live by. He appears
undaunted by the previous penalties and warnings he received. If only for this, we are constrained to
impose a penalty more severe than a fine, as earlier recommended. Suspension from office for 6
months would be reasonble under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, Marawi City, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction in violation of Section 21(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Sections 4(c)
and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and for citing FAPE employees in contempt of
court in disregard of Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits for SIX (6) MONTHS
with WARNINGthat a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857 November 23, 2004

GABRIEL DELA PAZ, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE SANTOS B. ADIONG, RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a verified letter complaint dated May 15, 2002,1 Gabriel dela Paz, Officer-in-Charge of Fund for
Assistance to Private Education (FAPE),2 charged Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Marawi City, Branch 8 of gross ignorance of the law and/or abuse of authority.

Pacasum College, Inc., represented by Saripada Ali Pacasum, filed with the RTC, a petition for
mandamus with application for a preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as Special Civil Action
No. 813-02, against FAPE, represented by Roberto T. Borromeo, Secretary Raul S. Roco, Ramon
C. Bacani and Carolina C. Porio.

On March 4, 2002, respondent judge issued an Order, to wit:

WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION

Considering that the petition herein is sufficient in form and substance, a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction is hereby issued requiring the respondents, specifically FAPE and its
officials, including its Chairman respondent RAUL S. ROCO, to prepare and issue a check in
the amount of P4,000,000.00 representing the entitlement of the petitioner for School Year
2001-2002, payable to its President/Chairman DATU SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, under pain
of arrest and contempt.3

The following day, March 5, 2002, respondent issued another Order, thus:

Finding the ex-parte motion of the petitioner to be impressed with merit, it is hereby
approved.
 WHEREFORE, the appropriate Sheriffs of Makati and Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, are
hereby ordered to serve the attached Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction upon the
respondents, and make a return on their actions taken thereon. 4

On March 12, 2002, FAPE, through counsel, filed an omnibus motion set aside orders of March 4
and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case.5 In its motion, FAPE claimed that it was not served with
summons but received copies of the questioned orders on March 8, 2002; that the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which was intended to be enforced in Makati is outside the jurisdiction of the
Twelfth Judicial Region of RTC Marawi City; that Section 21 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the RTC has jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction which may be enforced in
any part of its respective regions; that the writ was granted without hearing and notice; neither was
there a showing of an affidavit that would establish that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard nor was there a showing that a bond had been filed.

On May 6, 2002, another Order was issued by the respondent, thus:

It appears on record that despite service to the respondents copies of the Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued by this Court on March 4, 2002 and until date respondents failed
to obey or comply (sic) the Writ as directed and considering that funds due to the petitioner
has been deposited in the bank, the assigned Sheriff of Makati City is ordered to take
custody of the said funds/check in the name of PACASUM COLLEGE INC., in the amount of
4 million pesos. Collectible for the school year 2001-2002 and release the same to
SARIPADA ALI PACASUM, President/Chairman of the said school thru garnishment
proceedings at the (BPI), Bank of Philippine Islands, Benavidez St., Legaspi Village, Makati
City or BPI main at Ayala Ave., Makati City and/or any other banks including LANDBANK of
the Philippines, Ortigas Center Branch which is the official depositary bank of the DECS out
of the deposit of Funds for Assistance for (sic) Private Education (FAPE) in order not to
defeat the purpose of the said Writ. 6

On May 8, 2002, Makati Sheriff Melchor C. Gaspar issued notices of garnishment to Land Bank
Head Office in Ortigas Center Branch and BPI-Far East Bank in Pasay Road Branch,
Makati.7 Subsequently, FAPE, through counsel, wrote Sheriff Gaspar a letter asking the latter to
rectify his act of issuing notices of garnishment considering that the same was made pursuant to a
patently illegal and void order of the respondent.8

In his letter-complaint, dela Paz claims as follows: Respondent's issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction dated March 4, 2002 was in glaring disregard and defiance of Section 21 of
B.P. Blg. 129 which limits the authority of RTCs to issue writs of mandamus within their respective
regions. The issuance of the writ was in disregard of the notice and hearing requirements under Rule
58 of the Rules of Court. Respondent continues to issue orders directing FAPE to release the
amount of P4,000,000.00 to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum even in a case where it was not a party
thereto as in Corporate Case No. 010 filed by Sultan Sabdullah Ali Pacasum against Datu Saripada
Ali Pacasum,9 et al., respondent issued an Order dated April 22, 2002, wherein he stated the
following:

In view of this order there exists no legal impediment to the enforcement of the previous
orders of this Court particularly a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issued in Special
Civil Action No. 813-02 dated March 4, 2002 directing the respondent FAPE to release to the
petitioner the sum of P4,000,000.00 representing the petitioner's entitlement for the School
Year 2001-2002 and the order of the Court in Special Civil Case No. 878 dated March 4,
2002 directing the defendant DR. CARMEN DOMMITORIO to immediately release to the
 plaintiff SARIPADA PACASUM the sum of P1,000,000.00 under pain of arrest and
contempt.10

Respondent explains in his second indorsement dated July 29, 2002 that he had ordered the
dismissal of Special Civil Action No. 813-02 per his resolution dated June 21, 2002 and that he had
recalled and set aside his questioned orders dated March 4 and 5, 2002. He submits that with the
dismissal of the said case, the herein complaint has become moot and academic and should no
longer be given due course.11

Complainant, in a letter dated August 23, 2002,12 informed us that FAPE's counsel was not furnished
with a copy of the respondent's resolution dismissing the case; and that there is still a pending
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the said case and FAPE's manifestation with
comment and opposition thereto. Complainant claims that aside from the Orders dated March 4 and
5, 2002 ignorantly issued by respondent judge, his order dated May 6, 2002 which directed the
garnishment of the funds of their office and followed by a writ of garnishment issued by a Makati
sheriff really paralyzed FAPE's operations until a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Court of Appeals.13 Complainant prays that their complaint be treated better than just being
dismissed for being moot and academic as respondent would want it to be.

Both parties manifested that they are submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings
filed.14

The Court Administrator submitted his Report finding respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of
law and grave abuse of authority and recommending that he be meted with the penalty of
suspension from office for a period of six (6) months without pay with a warning that the commission
of a similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service. In arriving at his findings and
recommendations, the Court Administrator stated:

As correctly claimed by the complainant, respondent judge had indeed issued the two (2)
orders of March 4 & 5, 2002 without complying with the mandatory requirement of notice and
hearing under Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that:
"No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined x x x." Because of his total disregard of the rules, respondent
judge is clearly ignorant of the rules. The subsequent dismissal of Special Proceeding No.
813-02 per order dated 21 June 2002, which also recalled and set aside the orders of March
4 and 5, 2002, does not render the instant administrative complaint moot and academic
considering that the issue involved in the instant case is administrative and not judicial in
character. Specifically, the issue is with regard to respondent judge's violation of the law or
procedure which is tantamount to ignorance of the law or procedure. Undoubtedly,
respondent judge violated the above-cited rules because the records are bare that prior to
the issuance of the subject writ, he notified the respondent FAPE and conducted a hearing.
For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent judge is guilty of ignorance of the rules.

Concerning respondent judge's issuance of an order dated 22 April 2002 in Corporate Case
No. 010 directing FAPE to issue a check in the sum of P4 million pesos pursuant to the order
dated 04 March 2002 in Special Civil Action No. 813-02, such an act is tantamount to an
abuse of his authority. Records revealed that FAPE was not a party to Corporate Case No.
010. Nonetheless, respondent judge still directed FAPE to comply with an order in a case,
which they have nothing to do.

Aside from the fact that respondent judge issued an order against a non-party to Corporate
Case No. 010, he also had no authority to issue said order because he already inhibited
himself from trying the case. Records revealed that on 21 November 2001 respondent judge
inhibited himself from trying and hearing Corporate Case No. 010 (SEC Case No. 10-99-
6437). Respondent judge even caused the forwarding of the records of the said case to the
Office of the Court Administrator so that the court in Iligan City, which was designated as
special court to try and decide corporate cases (SEC-related cases) would be designated in
lieu of respondent judge. Acting on the said request, the Court, per Resolution of 10 June
2002 in A.M. No. 02-4-207-RTC, designated Judge Amer R. Ibrahim, Pairing Judge, RTC,
Marawi City to try and decide Corporate Case No. 010.

Despite said inhibition and the subsequent designation of another judge, respondent judge
still issued the order of 22 April 2002. Respondent judge's justification for the issuance of the
said order was because the Office of the Court Administrator returned the records of
Corporate Case No. 010 to his sala for further proceedings. While it is true that the records
were indeed returned to his sala, there is no showing that respondent judge was given the
authority to handle the case. The Court's directive was for Judge Ibrahim, the pairing judge
of Branch 8, to continue the trial and hearing of Corporate Case No. 010. Thus, respondent
judge was fully aware of his lack of authority to handle the case. For lack of authority to do
so, respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

Worse, respondent judge issued the subject extraordinary writ to be enforced outside his
judicial region, in gross violation of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129 which provides that Regional
Trial Courts exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part
of their respective judicial regions.

The Honorable Court in the case of PNB versus Pineda, 197 SCRA 1 (1991), held that:
"Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of injunction within their respective
designated territories." Likewise, in the case of Embassy Farms, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(1990), it was held that: "Generally, an injunction under Section 21 of the Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 is enforceable within the region. The reason is that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to
be performed outside its territorial boundaries."

Similarly, the Court, in the case of Martin vs. Guerrero, 317 SCRA 166 (1999), penalized
then Assisting Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero, RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City with a fine of
P1,000 pesos and admonition with warning for issuing a writ against a party who is a
resident of Paraaque City, an area which is outside of his judicial jurisdiction. Specifically,
the Court held that: "Under the foregoing clear provisions of B.P. 129 and the Rules of Court,
regional trial courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus only when such writs
can be enforced within their respective judicial districts, as extraordinary writs issued by them
are limited to and operative only within such areas. Clearly then, respondent judge had no
authority to issue writ of habeas corpus against herein complainant, who was a resident of
Paraaque, an area outside his judicial jurisdiction".

Thus, consistent with the aforesaid rulings of the court, it follows then that respondent judge,
being a presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, has no authority to enforce the subject
preliminary mandatory injunction in Makati City. The subject writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction just like the subject writ of habeas corpus in the aforesaid case of Judge Guerrero
cannot be enforced by respondent judge against a party who is in Makati City, an area
outside of his judicial jurisdiction. Clearly, respondent judge had grossly violated the
provisions of Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129.
 From all the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of authority.

Under Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated 11 September 2001, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is considered a serious charge with the following
sanctions: (a) dismissal from the service; or (b) suspension from office without pay for more
than 3 months but not exceeding six months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 pesos but
not exceeding P40,000.00 pesos.

Record in the Docket and Clearance Division, OCA shows that respondent judge had been
previously penalized in the following cases:

1. FINED in the sum of P20,000.00 pesos (sic) for Ignorance of the Law in A.M. No. RTJ-98-
1407 per Resolution of 20 July 1998;

2. FINED in the sum of P5,000.00 pesos (sic) for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Grave
Abuse of Discretion in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581 per Resolution of 02 July 2002.

In determining the penalty to be imposed, it is important to note that this is respondent

judge's 3rd offense involving the same act, which is gross ignorance of the law, hence he
may be meted with a severe penalty of either DISMISSAL from the service or SUSPENSION
from office without pay for more than 3 months but not exceeding 6 months, at the discretion
of the Court.15

The OCA's findings and recommendations are well-taken.

The rule on injunction as found under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that the same can only
be granted upon a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded
and upon the filing of a bond executed to the party or person enjoined.16 It is also provided that no
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined unless shown that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the
matter can be heard on notice; that a temporary restraining order may be issued effective for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party sought to be enjoined.17

A perusal of the Order dated March 4, 2002 failed to show that respondent conducted a hearing
before the injunction was granted or that complainant was given prior notice thereof. In fact,
complainant stressed that FAPE was not at all served with summons before the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was issued. It was not also shown whether the applicant posted a bond and
the same was approved before the order granting the preliminary mandatory injunction was issued.
A bond is required unless exempted by the court. The Order merely stated that the petition was
sufficient in form and substance without even stating the facts which would support the granting of
the injunction. This is a clear violation of the rule.

Moreover, Section 21 of B.P. Blg. 129, provides:

SEC. 21. Original Jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original
jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions;


Respondent's court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial region. The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding office in
Makati City, and its officials who have their residences in Metro Manila, to issue a check in the
amount of P4,000,000.00 payable to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum, is outside the territorial jurisdiction
of respondent's court. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent is
void considering that his authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and operative only within
his respective provinces or districts.18

Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati and Mandaluyong to
serve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the
respondent can only enforce his orders within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.19

Likewise, respondent has also shown abuse of his authority in issuing his Order dated April 22, 2002
in Corporate Case No. 010 requiring FAPE, a non-party to the case, to comply with the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction issued in Special Civil Action No. 813-02. Notably, respondent in
his Order dated November 21, 2001 inhibited himself from hearing the corporate case and forwarded
the entire records to the OCA for further assignment to other designated corporate courts of the RTC
in Lanao and Cagayan de Oro City. Despite this pending matter, respondent acted on a motion to
set aside his Order of inhibition citing the fact that the records of the case which he forwarded to the
OCA were returned to his court for further proceedings. He then concluded that there exists no legal
impediment to the enforcement of the previous orders of this Court particularly a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction issued in Special Civil Action No. 813-02 dated March 4, 2002 directing the
respondent FAPE to release to the petitioner the sum of P4,000,000.00 representing the petitioner's
entitlement for the School Year 2001-2002. Although the respondent in Corporate Case No. 010 is
the petitioner in Special Civil Action No. 813-02, (where the subject preliminary mandatory injunction
was issued and now the basis of this administrative complaint) FAPE, however, was not a party in
the Corporate Case.

Moreover, respondent has no authority to issue the Order in Corporate Case No. 010 since the
matter of his inhibition was still pending with the OCA. In fact, because of respondent's Order of
inhibition with further assignment to other corporate courts of RTC, Lanao and Cagayan de Oro City,
the plaintiff in Corporate Case No. 010 filed with OCA a motion to retain the corporate case with the
RTC of Marawi City, which we granted in our Resolution dated June 10, 2002. In the same
resolution, we authorized Judge Amer R. Ibrahim,20 Pairing Judge, RTC of Marawi City, Lanao del
Sur, Branch 9, to try and decide Corporate Case No. 010; and reminded respondent of Supreme
Court Circular No. 10.

Circular No. 1021 provides that with respect to single sala courts, only the order of inhibition shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for appropriate action; the records of the case shall be kept in the
docket of the court concerned while awaiting the instruction and/or action of the Supreme Court
thereon. This aims to avoid needless moving of the records in order to prevent the possibility of the
records being lost in transit. Thus, the return of the records of Corporate Case No. 010 to
respondent's court is not an authority for respondent to proceed with the case.

It has been held that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, erroneous acts of a judge in
his juridical capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, for no magistrate is infallible. The lack of
malicious intent however, cannot completely free the respondent from liability specially so when the
law is so elementary, thus not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.22 We reiterate what
we said in a case23 which also involved the herein respondent, thus:
 A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. When a judge
displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in
the courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is
expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a
judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.

In his Comment, respondent contends that Special Civil Action No. 813-02 had already been
dismissed per his Resolution dated June 21, 2002, thus the instant administrative complaint has
become moot and academic. In dismissing the case, respondent explained that in the course of the
inventory of all his pending cases, he found an unresolved omnibus motion to set aside the orders
dated March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case filed by FAPE's counsel and since the
allegations were found to be well-taken, he granted the motion by setting aside his earlier orders and
dismissed the case.

We are not persuaded. We find the belated action on complainant's omnibus motion as a mere
afterthought because the same was filed as early as March 12, 2002. Respondent could have easily
reconsidered his previous Orders dated March 4 and 5, 2002. In fact, the Order dated April 22, 2002
in Corporate Case No. 010, which we found to have been issued when respondent had no authority
to do so because of his Order of inhibition, had even reiterated his previous order for FAPE to
release the P4,000,000.00 to Datu Saripada Ali Pacasum. Moreover, the issuance of respondent's
Order dated May 6, 2002, directing the sheriff of Makati City to take custody of the funds/check in
the name of PACASUM COLLEGE, INC., in the amount of 4 million pesos for release to SARIPADA
ALI PACASUM, President/Chairman of the said school through garnishment proceedings, was
already tantamount to a denial of the omnibus motion. Thus, the fact that the omnibus motion was
subsequently granted by respondent and Special Civil Action No. 813-02 was dismissed, would not
absolve respondent from administrative liability.

Finally, this is respondent's third offense. He had previously been fined and sternly warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with most severely. We find the penalty
recommended by OCA to be reasonable for respondent's offense.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi
City, is hereby found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of authority and is hereby
suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay, effective immediately, with a warning that the
commission of a similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157866 February 14, 2007

AUGUSTO MANGAHAS and MARILOU VERDEJO, petitioners,

vs.
Hon. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Br. 124, Regional Trial Court,
Caloocan City; SHERIFF ERLITO BACHO, Br. 124, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City; and
AVELINO BANAAG,Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy filed
by petitioners Augusto Mangahas and Marilou Verdejo seeks to nullify and set aside the 14 February
2003 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 124, Caloocan City, denying their Motion to
Suspend Execution in Civil Case No. C-19097.

The instant controversy arose from a verified complaint for Ejectment filed by private respondent
Avelino Banaag on 31 January 1997 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 49,
Caloocan City, against petitioners. Private respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of the
disputed property identified as Lot 4, Block 21, located in Maligaya Park Subdivision, Caloocan City,
as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 196025 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City. Private respondent averred that petitioners constructed houses on the property without his
knowledge and consent and that several demands were made, but the same fell on deaf ears as
petitioners refused to vacate the premises. This prompted private respondent to refer the matter to
the Lupon Tagapayapa for conciliation. The recourse proved futile since the parties were not able to
settle amicably. Private respondent then filed an ejectment suit before the MeTC.

On 23 April 1997, petitioners filed their answer denying having unlawfully deprived private
respondent possession of the contested property. Petitioners claimed that they have resided in the
subject lot with the knowledge and conformity of the true owner thereof, Pinagkamaligan Indo-Agro
Development Corporation (PIADECO), as evidenced by a Certificate of Occupancy signed by
PIADECOs president in their favor.

On 10 July 1997, petitioners filed a Manifestation And Motion To Suspend Proceedings on the
ground that the subject property is part of the Tala Estate and that the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
85, in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810 issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 10 November 1997,
enjoining the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City from ordering the eviction and demolition of
all occupants of the Tala Estate. They posited that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC is
enforceable in Caloocan City because both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.

In an order dated 7 August 1997, the MeTC denied said manifestation and motion. It ratiocinated
1awphi1.net

that the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC has binding effect only within the territorial
boundaries of the said court and since Caloocan City is not within the territorial area of same, the
injunction it issued is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

For failure of the parties to arrive at a compromise agreement during the preliminary conference,
they were required to submit their respective position papers containing their positions on the
following issues: (a) whether or not the torrens title of private respondent is a valid basis of his right
to eject petitioners, (b) whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and (c)
whether either the private respondent or petitioners are entitled to their respective claims for
damages.

In their position paper, petitioners insisted that they are entitled to the possession of the land
because they have been occupants thereof as early as 1978, long before the property was acquired
by private respondent. Since they possessed the property for that long, the MeTC has no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the case as ejectment suit applies only to instances where possession of the land
lasted for a period of not more than one year. In addition, they claimed that private respondent has
not proffered any evidence that he has prior physical possession over the property. Petitioners
reiterated their posture in the motion to suspend proceedings wherein they urged the MeTC to
respect the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC. They also alleged that
private respondents certificate of title originated from a fictitious title.
In a decision dated 5 October 1999, the MeTC ruled for private respondent. It opined that TCT No.
196025 in private respondents name was an indefeasible proof of his ownership of the lot and his
inherent right to possess the same. This title entitled private respondent better right to possess the
subject property over petitioners Certificate of Occupancy executed in their favor by PIADECO. It
held that it has jurisdiction over the controversy since private respondent filed the case within one
year from the time the demand to vacate was given to petitioners. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, ordering defendants Augusto Mangahas,
Victor Solis, Elisa M. Dionila, Joselito Mangahas and Rogelio Verdejo and all persons claiming right
under them as follows:

1) To vacate the lot in question by removing their houses erected thereat and restore
possession of the lot to the plaintiff;

2) To pay plaintiff a reasonable compensation for their use of the premises for the period
from August, 1996 until the property is vacated at the rate of two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos per month;

3) To reimburse to plaintiff the sum of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos as and for attorneys
fees; [and]

4) To pay the costs of this suit.2

On 2 December 1999, petitioners appealed to the RTC, which case was docketed as Civil Case No.
C-19097. In a Decision dated 16 November 2000, the trial court affirmed in toto the MeTC decision.
It ruled that the MeTC was correct in denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings anchored
on the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC reasoning that the writ of the
latter court is limited only to its territorial area, thus, the same has no binding effect on the MeTC of
Caloocan City. It sustained the MeTCs ruling that the latter court has jurisdiction over the case as
the same has been filed within the reglementary period from the date of demand to vacate.
Furthermore, the RTC stated that the validity of private respondents title cannot be assailed
collaterally in the instant case.

On 18 December 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in a
resolution dated 1 June 2001.

Unfazed, petitioners appealed the ruling of the RTC to the Court of Appeals on 6 June 2001 which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65076.

In a Decision3 dated 25 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was, likewise, denied in a Resolution dated 20 November 2002.

The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on 13 December 2002.

Meanwhile, on 11 December 2000, private respondent filed with the RTC a motion for execution
pending appeal which was opposed by petitioners. In an order dated 12 September 2001, the RTC
granted the motion.
To implement and enforce its decision, the same court on 27 September 2001 issued a Writ of
Execution. On 28 September 2001, petitioners filed a Motion to Reconsider Order dated 12
September 2001 which was denied in an order dated 5 February 2002.

On 17 January 2003, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Execution before the RTC. Said motion
was denied in an order dated 14 February 2003. On 05 March 2003, Sheriff Erlito Bacho
implemented and enforced the writ of execution.

Hence, the instant recourse.

At the outset it must be pointed out that petitioners direct recourse to this Court via petition for
Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, Prohibition With Prayer For Provisional Remedy is an utter disregard
of the hierarchy of courts and should have been dismissed outright. This Courts original jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction is not
exclusive.4 It is shared by this Court with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals.5 Such
concurrence of jurisdiction does not give the petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court
forum.6 A direct recourse of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition.7

In the instant case, petitioners have not offered any exceptional or compelling reason not to observe
the hierarchy of courts. Hence, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.

Equally noteworthy is petitioners resort to this Court through petition for declaratory relief. This
action is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.8 Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court which deals with actions for declaratory relief, enumerates the subject matter thereof,
i.e., deed, will, contract or other written instrument, the construction or validity of statute or
ordinance. Inasmuch as this enumeration is exclusive, petitioners action to declare the RTC order
denying their motion to suspend execution, not being one of those enumerated, should warrant the
outright dismissal of this case.9

At any rate, since the complete records of this case have already been elevated, this Court deems it
wise to resolve the controversy on the merits.

Petitioners assail the Order dated 14 February 2003 of the RTC Caloocan City and its Decision
dated 16 November 2000 on the sole ground that the said court is precluded from issuing said Order
and Decision by virtue of the Writ of Injunction issued on 10 November 1997 by the Quezon City
RTC.

It must be remembered that the issue on the enforceability of the injunction order originating from the
Quezon City RTC had already been litigated and finally decided when the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 65076 affirmed the Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. C-19097. Said Decision had
become final and executory per Entry of Judgment dated 25 April 2002.10 The relevant portion of the
Court of Appeals Decision reads:

The petitioners postulate that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated November 10, 1997 which
emanated from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City should have prompted the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City to suspend the ejectment proceedings then pending before it. It was the
petitioners contention that the injunction writ issued in Quezon City is enforceable also in Caloocan
City inasmuch [as] both cities are situated within the National Capital Region.
Under Sec. 17 of B.P. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and their judges is
basically regional in scope (Malaoan vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 249), but under Sec. 18, it
may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in which the judges sits (OCA vs. Matas, August 2,
1995).

Sec. 18 of B.P. 129 states:

"Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define
the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory
thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. xxx"

Taking Our bearings from the above pronouncement, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
could not be deemed to have committed a reversible error when it denied the petitioners Motion to
Suspend Proceedings. Apparently, the extent of the enforceability of an injunction writ issued by the
Regional Trial Court is defined by the territorial region where the magistrate presides.11

Consequently, the issue involving the binding effect of the injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC
became the law of the case between the parties. Under this legal principle, whatever is irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, so long as the facts on which the decision was predicated
continue.12 Stated otherwise, the doctrine holds that once an appellate court has declared the law in
a case that declaration continues to hold even in subsequent appeal.13 The reason lies in the fact
that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at some definite time and that the
prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the
losing party.14

Petitioners are therefore barred from assailing the ruling that the injunction issued by the Quezon
City RTC has no binding effect to the courts of Caloocan City as this issue had already been passed
upon with finality. Issues should be laid to rest at some point; otherwise there would be no end to
litigation. As elucidated in Hufana v. Genato15 :

It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what
was once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding
between the same parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to be
the facts of the case before the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can
no longer be relitigated anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest in
that aforementioned case (Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 306 [1986]), if not by the principle of res
judicata, but at least by conclusiveness of judgment.

Quite conspicuously, the instant petition assailing the order of the RTC denying petitioners motion to
suspend execution is a ploy to deprive private respondent of the fruits of his hard-won case. It must
be stressed that once a decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the
presiding judge to issue a writ of execution except in certain cases, as when subsequent events
would render execution of judgment unjust.16 Petitioners did not allege nor proffer any evidence that
this case falls within the exception. Hence, there is no reason to vacate the writ of execution issued
by the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan
City, denying petitioners Motion to Supend Execution dated 14 February 2003 in Civil Case No. C-
19097 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

EXCEPTIONS
G.R. No. L-30070 August 29, 1980

FEDERICO DECANO, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO F. EDU, as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation and CIPRIANO POSADAS,
as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation Commission, Dagupan City Agency, respondents-
appellants.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

In this appeal, the Court upholds the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan over the
petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" filed by herein petitioner-appellee against respondents-
appellants, although the official station of the first named respondent, whose official actuation is
assailed, is in Quezon City which is outside the jurisdictional district of the said court. The main issue
raised is the correctness and legality of said national official's order dismissing petitioner from the
service of the Land Transportation Commission, and the power of judicial review of the
administrative decisions of national officials is not confined to the courts of first instance of
Metropolitan Manila where their offices are maintained to the exclusion of the courts of first instance
in those localities where the aggrieved parties reside and the questioned decisions are sought to be
enforced. The Court further affirms the decision of said court adjudging the order of removal from
office as null and void for having been issued by said respondent who was not the appointing
authority and had no authority to remove, since under the applicable law, the power to remove
petitioner was vested in the department head as the appointing authority.

The facts are undisputed.

On September 12, 1962, the then Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications issued to
Federico Decano, herein petitioner-appellee, a temporary appointment to the position of janitor in the
Motor Vehicles Office, 1 Dagupan City Agency, with compensation at the rate of P1,440.00 per annum.
The appointment having been approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service, the said appointee
assumed office on September 10, 1962 and he served therein for almost four years, or until April 29,
1966 when herein respondent-appellant Cipriano Posadas, as Acting Registrar, Land Transportation
Commission, Dagupan City, received a telegram from respondent-appellant Romeo F. Edu, in his then
capacity as Acting Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission (LTC), terminating his (Decano's)
services effective as of the close of business on that day.

Shortly thereafter, the aggrieved petitioner-appellee filed before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan a petition for "Mandamus and Injunction" claiming that the aforementioned officials of
the LTC acted without power and in excess of authority in removing him from the service, and
therefore praying of the court to declare as null and void the order for his removal, to declare him
entitled to the position, to compel his reinstatement and payment of his regular salary, and to enjoin,
preliminary, and then permanently, respondents from disturbing, molesting or otherwise ousting him
from his position as janitor.

As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court at the commencement of
the proceedings commanding respondents "to desist and refrain from disturbing, molesting or
otherwise ousting the petitioner from his position as janitor in the Land Transportation Commission,
Dagupan City Agency, and to pay the petitioner his corresponding salary from the date of notice of
said preliminary injunction, until further orders from the Court."

After trial, while agreeing with respondent Edu that petitioner's appointment as janitor was temporary
and therefore the latter could be ousted from his position at any time with or without cause, the lower
court nevertheless declared in its judgment of October 29, 1968 that petitioner's removal was null
and void upon the ground that under the law, respondent Commissioner of Land Transportation was
not the appointing authority insofar as the position of petitioner and an other minor positions in his
office were concerned; and thus lacking the power of appointment, said respondent had neither the
power of removal.

Hence, this appeal interposed by respondents-appellants which we find to be not well taken.

There is no question that petitioner could be removed from office at any time, for it has been held
repeatedly 2 that the acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security
of tenure against removal without cause. it is readily apparent from petitioner's appointment papers that
the character of his term of office was "Temporary" and signed by the then Undersecretary of Public
Works and Communications. 3 He could therefore be removed at the pleasure of the appointing official.

But this is not to say that petitioner could be removed by the respondent Commissioner of Land
Transportation since the latter was not the official who appointed him but the Undersecretary acting
for the Secretary of Public Works and Communications nor had said respondent been granted by
law the power of removal.

Per section 79(d) of the Revised Administrative Code, the provision then in force, it is the
department head, upon the recommendation of the chief of the bureau or office concerned, who has
the power to "appoint all subordinate officers and employees whose appointment is not expressly
vested by the law in the President of the Philippines; 4and it is also the department head who may
remove or punish such employees, except as especially provided otherwise in the Civil Service Law." 5 It
appears that this provision has been precisely applied in the appointment of petitioner, for upon the
recommendation of the then Administrator of the defunct Motor Vehicles Office, it was signed and issued
by the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications.

It should be further noted that after petitioner's aforementioned appointment as janitor in the then
Motor Vehicles Office, Republic Act No. 4136 known as the Transportation and Traffic Code created
the Land Transportation Commission from which law respondent Edu is supposed to have derived
his powers as Commissioner. Perusal of this law however shows nothing that vests in the said
commissioner any power to appoint or to remove employees in that new office. On the contrary, the
placement of said commission under the Department of Public Works and Communications is
specifically provided. 6 Hence, the power to appoint, and the corollary power to remove, employees in
the Land Transportation Commission thus remained with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. As generally the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint 7, it follows that
the termination of petitioner's services by respondent Edu, who then had no power to appoint, was
without authority and therefore null and void.
In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision, respondents make capital of the fact that the petition
for mandamus with injunction was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan while respondent
Edu holds office in Quezon City which, they claim, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the said
court. Respondents cite the long line of cases from the 1960 case of Acosta vs. Alvendia 8 where this
Court, pursuant to sec. 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act, jointly or alternatively with sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court and/or section 2 of Rule 58, ruled that a court of first instance has no jurisdiction to require or
control the execution of an act committed beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. These cases
invariably involved petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts of first instance where said petitions had been
filed. The Acosta ruling of non-jurisdiction does not apply, however, to the facts and circumstances at bar.

Here, petitioner seeks primarily the annulment of the dismissal order issued by respondent Edu,
mandamus and injunction being then merely coronary remedies to the main relief sought, and what
is prayed to be enjoined, as in fact the trial court did enjoin by preliminary injunction, is the
implementation of the termination order against the petitioner. It is true that the order of dismissal
was issued by respondent Edu, but it was to be implemented in Dagupan City by his subordinate
officer, respondent Acting Registrar of the LTC stationed at Dagupan City. Insofar, therefore, as
respondent Edu is concerned, the order terminating the services of respondent was a fait
accompli and this he had done without authority, as earlier discussed. The injunction is question,
consequently, must be taken only to restrain the implementation of respondent Edu's order by his
co-respondent whose official station at Dagupan City is within the territorial boundaries of the trial
court's jurisdictional district.

Thus, in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen, et al., 9 in which the acts sought to
be controlled by "Injunction with Preliminary Injunction" were relative to the establishment of a local
telephone system being done within the territorial boundaries of the judicial district of the Court of First
Instance of Roxas, the Court similarly upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Roxas over
the petition, although two of the respondents named therein the Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, and the Regional Superintendent of Region IV of the Bureau of
Telecommunications had their official stations at Manila and Iloilo City, respectively, as follows:

... In the instant case, the acts relative to the establishment of a local telephone
system by petitioners were being done within the territorial boundaries of the
province or district of respondent Court, and so said Court had jurisdiction to restrain
them by injunction. It does not matter that some of the respondents in the trial court,
at whom the injunction order was issued, had their official 'residence outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. In the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Public
Works, et al., (G.R. No. L-21988, September 30, 1966, 18 SCRA 296), wherein the
only question raised was whether the Court of First Instance of Davao had
jurisdiction to entertain a case the main purpose of which was to prevent the
enforcement of a decision of the Secretary of Public Works who was in Manila this
Court held that, inasmuch as the acts sought to be restrained were to be performed
within the territorial boundaries of the province of Davao, the Court of First Instance
of Davao had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case, and to issue the necessary
injunction order. This Gonzales case was an action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or preliminary mandatory injunction to prevent the
demolition of Gonzales' dam in Davao in compliance with the order of the Secretary
of Public Works.

It follows, therefore, that since the acts to be restrained were being done in Roxas
City, or within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent court, the latter had jurisdiction
to restrain said acts even if the office of respondent Director of the Bureau of
 Telecommunications is in Manila, and that of respondent Regional Superintendent of
Region IV is in Iloilo City.

As in the above-cited case of Aligaen, the national official stationed at Quezon City, namely,
respondent Commissioner Edu, was impleaded as respondent in the Pangasinan court for a
complete determination of the issues involved, the legality of Edu's order of dismissal being the
pivotal issue to determine the merits of the mandamus and injunction aspects of the petition. In other
words, Mr. Edu was joined as respondent not for injunction purposes but mainly for testing the
legality of his dismissal order and his transmittal thereof to his corespondent registrar at Dagupan
City to implement the same and terminate the services of the petitioner in Dagupan City.

As held by the Court in the 1965 case of Gayacao vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary, etc, et
al., 10 where the issue is the correctness of a national official's decision, the provincial courts of first
instance have equal jurisdiction with the Manila courts to review decisions of national officials, as
otherwise litigants of ted means would practically be denied access to the courts of the localities where
the reside and where the questioned acts are sought to be enforced. Thus, Justice J.B.L. Reyes stressed
on behalf of the Court that

A careful analysis of the allegations made in the petition wig show that the
petitioner's principal complaint was that the decision of the Director of Lands, as
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and the Executive Secretary, was contrary to
law in giving retroactive application to Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. In other
words, the remedy sought was the judicial review of the administrative decision in
question and its annulment on account of errors of law allegedly committed. ...

The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction (Castano vs.

Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91;Acosta vs. Alvendia, L-14958, Oct. 31, 1960; Samar Mining Co.
vs. Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961) are inapplicable, in that those cases involved
petitions for writs of injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent courts involved. Here the sole
point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally
correct or notand without going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent
reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of first
instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to
the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs
reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced.

It is easy to see that if the contested ruling of the court below is sustained, the same
would result not only in hardship to litigants of limited means, practically amounting
to denial of access to the courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the Manila
courts whose dockets are already over burdened.Actually, since Ortua vs.
Singson, 59 Phil. 440, the power of provincial courts of first instance to review
administrative decisions of national officials has been consistently recognized.

While the petitioner herein also prayed that the land authorities be ordered to
reinstate her original application, such remedy is purely a corollary to the main relief
sought; for, as the allegations now stand, reversal' of the questioned administrative
decision would necessarily lead to the same result.

Respondents finally raise a technical point referring to the allegedly defective verification of the
petition filed in the trial court, contending that the clause in the verification statement "that I have
read the contents of the said petition; and that [to] the best of my knowledge are true and correct" is
insufficient since under section 6 of Rule 7, 11 it is required that the person verifying must have read the
pleading and that the allegations thereof are true of his own knowledge. We do not see any reason for
rendering the said verification void. The statement "to the best of my knowledge are true and correct"
referring to the allegations in the petition does not mean mere "knowledge, information and belief." It
constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement of section 6 of Rule 7, as held in Madrigal vs.
Rodas. 12 At any rate, this petty technicality deserves scant consideration where the question at issue is
one purely of law and there is no need of delving into the veracity of the allegations in the petition, which
are not disputed at all by respondents. As we have held time and again, imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure are to be disregarded except where substantial rights would otherwise be
prejudiced.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

G.R. No. L-49510 January 28, 1980

DAGUPAN ELECTRIC CORPORATION, ISABELITA L. LLAMES, PRIMO C. NARVAEZ and

JOSE T. APIGO,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ERNANI CRUZ PANO, DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XVIII and MC ADORE FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
INCORPORATED, respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is an original special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to, annul the proceedings in Civil
Case No.. Q-26502 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City, entitled "MC
Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., plaintiff, versus Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al.,
defendants" on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and to prohibit the respondent judge from
proceeding further in the case, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed
by Dagupan Electric Corporation, Isabelita I. Llames, Primo C. Narvaez and Jose T. Apigo against
Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, and MC
Adore Finance and Investment, Incorporated. The pertinent allegations of the petition are:

5. That petitioner DECORP is a legislative franchise holder to operate and maintain

for profit electric services within its franchised area comprising the City of Dagupan
and the towns of Sta. Barbara, Calasiao, San Jacinto and San Fabian, an in the
province of Pangasinan, and that its generating plant is located in San Miguel,
Calasiao, Pangasinan;

6. That private respondent MC Adore is the owner of the MC Adore International

Palace Hotel which is located in the City of Dagupan and which became operational
in March, 1978;

7. That private respondent MC Adore is a customer of the petitioner;

8. That for failure on the part of private respondent MC Adore to pay its September
and October 1978 bills, the petitioner served a Notice of Disconnection on November
25, 1978 that unless payment is made within the usual period of 48 hours, the
disconnection of service will be made, hence on November 27, 1978 at 1: 15 p.m.,
after the expiration of the 48-hour period and no payment was made, the petitioner
corporation disconnected the electrical services to the former;
9. That on December 6, 1978, respondent MC Adore filed a complaint for damages
with writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioner corporation in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, presided by the respondent judge, and
which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-26502, a xerox copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex. "A" and. made an integral part of this petition; Amended
Complaint, Annex "A-l";

10. That on the same date December 6, 1978, the judge, issued ex parte Order for a
preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the petitioner corporation as well as
its agents in Dagupan City to "restore immediately not later than 5-M p.m., December
7, 1978, the electrical power of the MC Adore International Palace Hotel and resume
the electrical supply of an the electrical services and facilities to said hotel to enable
plaintiff to operate it fully, under pain of contempt for violation thereof" and in the
same Order, the respondent judge set the application for preliminary mandatory
injunction for head on December 11, 1978 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. A certified,
xerox copy of said Order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made an integral part
hereof;

11. That on December 8, 1978, the private respondent also moved that its "cash
bond in the sum of P50,000.00 represented by Check No. 12100 of the Bank of
Philippine Islands payable to the clerk of court" be substituted by a surety bond. A
copy of said motion is hereto attached as Annex C 1;

12. That for failure of the petitioner and its agents in Dagupan City to comply with the
aforesaid preliminary mandatory injunction, MC Adore filed a petition to declare
defendant Corporation and its corporate officers in contempt of court, also on the
same day, December 8, 1978. A xerox copy of said petition is hereto attached as
Annex "D" and made an integral part hereof;

13. That also on the same date, December 8, 1978, acting on the said petition for
contempt, Annex "C", the respondent judge issued an order. the pertinent portion of
which reads as follows:

In today's hearing nobody appeared for- defendant Dagupan Electric

Corporation. the Court finds that pursuant to Sec- 3, (Rule 7 1), Rules
of Court and without finally resolving whether defendant's corporate
officers may be adjudged in contempt, the Court finds that their
corporate officers, except Atty. Leonardo Baro may be held in
custody until the order is complied, as the Court finds no valid
justification for this contumacious disobedience. Defendant
Corporation has its head offices in Quezon City, and although the
plant is in Dagupan City, the plant can only act upon orders of the
Quezon City head office. The Court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71,
Rules of Court orders the arrest and confinement of Isabelita Llames,
President of defendant corporation, Primo Narvaez, General Manager
of defendant corporation and Jose Apigo if by 12:00 o'clock midnight,
December 8, 1978 the mandatory injunction is not complied with, and
for detention to continue until the order is complied with. The
Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary and the
Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Pangasinan
are ordered to enforce this order if by midnight December 8, 1978 the
mandatory injunction is not complied with. This order of arrest is
 deemed cancelled if the restoration is made within the aforesaid
period, without prejudice to the Court considering whether the
respondents may be adjudged guilty of contempt correspondingly
punished.

A certified xerox copy of the said Order is hereto attached as Annex 'E' and made an
integral part hereof;

14. That on December 11, 1978, the date for hearing of the petitioner for preliminary
mandatory injunction, as set in the Order of December 6, 1978, the petitioner
corporation appeared and moved for the reconsideration of the Orders of December
6, 1978 and December 8, 1978, Annexes "B' and "E", for want of jurisdiction, excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. A copy of the Motion for Reconsideration
is hereto attached and marked as Annex "F";

15. That the respondent judge in an order dated December 19, 1978, denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and further ordered the enforcement of the
preliminary mandatory injunction, specifically its order of December 6, 1978, Annex
"B". A certified xerox copy of said order is hereto attached and marked as Annex "G";

16. That the private respondent MC Adore, even before the Order of December 19,
1978, was served upon the petitioner, has already mobilized the police authorities to
arrest the petitioners, and to enforce the preliminary mandatory injunction, which in
effect constitutes final judgment in the case even before the petitioners have
answered the complaint in the civil case before the respondent judge;

17. That in the light of the earlier actuations of the respondent judge, more
particularly the issuance of the Order of December 8, 1978, there is imminent danger
that the petitioners may be unlawfully deprived of their liberty, as well as their
property, without due process of law, to which there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as in fact, the respondent court
has just issued the two other orders today which are hereto attached and marked as
Annexes 'h' and 'i' respectively.

18. That there is no appeal from the orders of December 6, 8, and 19, 1978, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

19. That pending the resolution of this petition only a writ of preliminary injunction
issuing from the Honorable Supreme Court can stop the enforcement of the void
Orders complained of thru subsequent orders of the respondent court designed to
implement the void orders complained of: ... " 1

In a resolution dated January 3, 1979, this Court, without giving due course to the petition, required
the respondents to comment thereon. 2

The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., in its comment filed on March 7,
1979, alleged:

Respondent MC ADORE is the owner and operator of the MC Adore International

Palace Hotel located at Dagupan City Philippines, which is a five-star hotel costing
P75M in which the government through the Development Bank of the Philippines has
a 75% equity. In a relatively short span of tune. the hotel has earned an excellent
reputation in the tourism industry, particularly in Dagupan City and its environs. On
the other hand, respondent (should be petitioner) DECORP is engaged in the
business of supplying electricity in Dagupan City BUT its principal office and
executive address is at Suite 201 Delta Building West Avenue, Quezon City.
Its modus operandi or system of business operation is to buy electric power from the
National Power Corporation and retails this, in turn, to its customers in Dagupan City,
such as MC ADORE.

On or about October 29, 1977, respondent MC ADORE engaged the services of

petitioner DECORP to supply electric power to the aforementioned MC ADORE
HOTEL by depositing with petitioner DECORP the amount of P35,000.00 for
consumption and the amount of P25,000.00 for the extension line of 313.8 KV; that,
however, the Polyphase meter a, the said hotel and the transmission line from
DECORP to the hotel were installed and paid for by MC ADORE by its own
expenses although the same were the obligation and duty of petitioner DECORP;
that, actually, it was only sometime in March, 1978, that plaintiff utilized or consumed
electric power during the process of testing the centralized air-conditioning system of
the hotel building until the end of April, 1978.

The electric bills for the months of March and April, 1978 in the amount of P7,221.00
and P65,822.47, respectively, were duly and fully paid for by respondent MC ADORE
to petitioner DECORP.

Pursuant to MC ADORE's energy conservation program in line with governmental

policy to this effect, and because the testing period of the centralized air-conditioning
system had been successfully terminated, the electric consumption of MC ADORE
for May, 1978 significantly lowered and its electric bill for said period amounted to
only P35,707.85 which MC ADORE likewise diligently and fully paid to the
petitioners.

Sometime on or about July 10, 1978, petitioners sent its (sic) electric bills to
respondent MC ADORE in the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED EIGHTY & 70/100 (P25,380.70) PESOS covering the electrical
consumption of the hotel for the period May 31 to June 30, 1978. Immediately after
having sent to MC ADORE the said electric bill, petitioners, by means of fraud and
deceit, retrived said Bill and summarily wrote on the face of the bill the word
"ERRONEOUS"

To complicate matters and aggravate the injury to MC ADORE, petitioners on or

about July 12, 1978, without the knowledge and consent of MC ADORE,
surreptitiously removed the electric meter of the hotel and made some adjustments
and reinstalled the same.

MC ADORE strongly protested against petitioners' abovedescribed unlawful and

malicious acts but petitioners sent instead to respondent MC ADORE on July 26,
1978 an electric bill unilaterally prepared by petitioners for the period May 31 to June
30, 1978 in the amount of EIGHTY THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY THREE &
62/100 (P80,243.62) PESOS thereby changing without justifiable basis the original
bill for P25,380.70.

In due course, MC ADORE filed with the Board of Power and Waterworks a
complaint against the petitioners dated August 12, 1978 and subsequently amended
on August 21, 1978, demanding redress from petitioners' illegal and highhanded
acts, as a result of which the Board of Power and Waterworks issued an Order dated
August 18, 1978 directing petitioners to "refrain from disconnecting electric service of
MC ADORE International Palace, Dagupan, pending resolution of Letter-Complaint
dated August 12, 1978."

Instead of complying with the Restraining Order of the Board of Power and
Waterworks, petitioners sent to MC ADORE on November 25, 1978, a Saturday, at
about 1:00 o'clock p.m. when banking facilities were already closed, a notice of
disconnection, and, two (2) days later, or on November 27, 1978, petitioners
disconnected electrical power to the respondent's MC Adore Hotel, without any legal
or factual basis and justification, thereby causing to the respondent MC ADORE
tremendous actual damages and losses in an amount of not less than Five Million
(P5,000,000.00) Pesos and such other sum representing moral, exemplary and other
damages that shall be proved at the trial, as duly claimed in the Amended Complaint
(Annex "A-1", Petition).

After the illegal and unlawful disconnection of the electrical powers of the hotel made
by petitioners as alleged hereinabove, the Board of Power and Waterworks required
petitioners, particularly petitioner Isabelita Llames, in a letter dated December 1,
1978, duly received on the same date by petitioner DECORP, to re-connect
immediately electric powers and service to the hotel, but petitioners likewise did not
obey this, and by said unwarranted disobedience and open defiance rendered the
Board of Power and waterworks helpless and impotent to protect the rights of the
respondents MC ADORE; hence, with all the more reason, the present action before
the lower court is respondent's effective remedy.

As a matter of fact, respondent MC ADORE had already invited foreign guests and
local patrons to the hotel's commitment to Penthouse 7 scheduled and to be
televised on December 9, 1978 for which respondent MC ADORE had already paid
Penthouse 7 and that several tickets had already been sold, and that several guests
had already checked in to the hotel but due to the complete power breakdown of the
hotel brought about by petitioners' abovedescribed malicious, unlawful and
malevolent acts, the said guests had to transfer to other hotels and/or residences
and other expected guests and patrons were likewise forced not to check-in to the
hotel, thereby also causing additional tremendous losses and damages to MC
ADORE.

Respondent MC ADORE (Plaintiff in the court below), was thus constrained to file
before the court a quo a complaint for damages with writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction docketed as Civil Case No. Q-26502 (Annex A of Petition) which was later
on amended so as to include petitioner DECORP's executive officers Isabelita
Llames, Primo Narvaez and Jose T. Apigo (who are also petitioners in this case). per
Amended Complaint filed with the lower court on December 14, 1978, Annex A-I
Petition. While the petitioners make reference to the orders of December 6 and 8,
1978, Annexes B and E of the petition. petitioners however have completely omitted
the fact that on December 11, 1978, the lower court issued the following order which
we reproduce hereunder:

Considering the manifestation of the parties, and it appearing that

defendant corporation as well as its corporate officers strongly
disputes the factual allegations of the petition as it is claimed that
 petitioner is in arrears in the payment of its electric bill in the amount
of almost half a million pesos: and it appearing further that this matter
is also pending before the Board of Power, the Court in the interest of
justice suspends the enforcement of the warrant of arrest issued on
December 6, 1978, as well as its mandatory injunction pending a full
hearing on the facts leading to the disconnection of the electrical
facilities of petitioners. The Court orders the parties to submit
memoranda with supporting affidavits in support of their respective
claims.

Let this, case be reset to December 15, 1978, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

The above-quoted Order shows that the injunction incident was fully discussed and
ventilated before the lower court and that the parties submitted exhaustive
memoranda and affidavits in support of their respective claims, after which full
hearing the lower court issued its order of December 19, 1978, Annex G Petition.
Emphasis is made on the Order of December 11, 1978 to highlight the fact that the
subsequent order of December 19, 1978, now sought to be reviewed by the
petitioners, was issued by the lower court after fun hearing on the controversy. 3

This Court issued a resolution dated March 14, 1979 which reads:

L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz-Patio, et al.).
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction as well as private respondents'
comment thereon, the Court Resolved: (a) TO GIVE DUE COURSE to the petition;
and (b) to REQUIRE (1) the petitioners to deposit P80.40 for costs and clerk's
commission within five (5) days from notice hereof; and (2) both parties submit
simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. As prayed for, let
a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER issue restraining respondents from
enforcing or continuing to enforce the orders of December 6, 1978 and December
12, 1978 all issued in Civil Case No. Q-26502, entitled "MC Adore Finance &
Investment, Inc., Plaintiff, versus, Dagupan Electric Corp., Defendant' of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII at Quezon City, unless within five (5) days from
notice, respondent (1) files a counter bond of P225,000.00 to cover payment of its
account in arrears with petitioner, stated by petitioner to be in the sum of
P466,099.15; (2) shows that it has made regular payment to petitioner and continues
to make regular monthly payments of its monthly electrical consumption after
reconnection as per the monthly bills presented by petitioner." 4

On March 21, 1979 the private respondent manifested that it had filed a counterbond of P225,000.00
and that since the reconnection of electrical power was effected on December 22, 1978 it had
depositing with the lower court the sum of P35,000.00 beginning January 1979 in compliance with
the order of said court of December 19, 1979. 5

In a motion filed on April 10, 1979 by the petitioner, it is alleged that on March 29, 1979 the Dagupan
Electric Corporation sent a letter to the private respondent requesting payment of its monthly bills
from December 22, 1978 up to February 1979; that the said letter was received by the private
respondent on March 26, 1979; and that despite the lapse of 12 days since the private respondent
had received the billings of the Dagupan Electric Corporation, no payment had been made; and
prayed that its Court "declare its temporary restraining order effective" so that the petitioner may act
accordingly. 6

The private respondent MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. opposed the motion of the
petitioners dated April 10, 1979 and asked that the temporary restraining order of March 14, 1979, in
so far as it orders MC Adore to make regular monthly payments to the petitioners of the monthly
electrical consumption after reconnection "as per the monthly bills presented by petitioners" be lifted
and/or set aside inasmuch as the meter had not yet been tested and sealed by the Board of Power. 7

On May 12, 1979, the petitioners filed an urgent supplemental motion reiterating their prayer that
they be allowed to redisconnect the electric power from the hotel of the respondent MC Adore
Finance and Investment, Inc. on the ground that said respondent had failed and refused to pay its
electric power consumption based on the actual meter readings as directed by this Court. 8

This Court issued on May 18, 197 9 the following resolution:

L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz Patio, etc., et al.)
Upon consideration of petitioners' manifestation and motion with prayer that the
Court's temporary restraining order of March 14, 1979 be declared effective, and
respondent McAdore Finance and Investment, Inc.'s opposition thereto as well as
petitioners' manifestation and urgent supplemental motion praying that they be
allowed to redisconnect electric power from the premises of said respondent in
implementation of said restraining order, the Court Resolved to GRANT petitioners'
prayer declaring effective the Temporary Restraining Order of March 14, 1979 and
allowing petitioners to disconnect the electric power at the premises of respondent if
within ten (10) days from notice hereof, the total amount due from said respondent to
petitioner corporation by way of payment of respondent's electric consumption after
reconnection (on December 22, 1978) as per the monthly bills presented by
petitioner is not fully paid.

The Court expressly laid down two (2) conditions for the suspension of the effectivity
of the temporary restraining order under its resolution of March 14, 1979, namely: (a)
the filing of a counterbond of P225,000.00 to cover payment of respondent's account
in with petitioner., stated by petitioner to be in the sum of P466,099.15; and (b) that
respondent show that 'it has made regular payment to petitioner and continues to
make regular monthly payments of its monthly electric consumption after
reconnection as per the monthly bills presented by petitioner.' And it in behooves
respondent after availing of said conditions for suspension of the restraining order to
now renege on making such monthly payments and belatedly ask for the setting
aside of such condition.

The urgent motions of petitioners for first and second extensions totalling thirty (30)
days from April 22, 1979 within which to file memorandum, are GRANTED.

The letter dated April 22, 1979 of Ms. Modesta R. Sabeniano, President and
Chairlady of the Board of McAdore International Palace, addressed to Acting Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, in amplification of her telegrams requesting among
others, for the early disposition of this case, and said respondent McAdore
International Palace's memorandum in this case, are NOTED. 9

The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., filed on May 24, 1979 an urgent
motion to hold in abeyance compliance with the second portion of the resolution dated March 16,
1979 in relation to the resolution dated May 21, 1979 (should be May 18, 1979) on the ground that
the current monthly bills being presented by the petitioner, Dagupan Electric Corporation, to private
respondent are the result of readings taken from the electric meter which was tampered and asked
that it be allowed to continue depositing the regular payment in the amount of P35,000.00 per month
with the respondent court until such time that the issue on the tampered meter and questionable bins
shall have been finally resolved. 10

On May 28, 1979, this Court issued the following resolution:

L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz-Patio, et al.)
The motion of Attys. Teves, Campos, Hernandez, and Lim for leave to withdraw as
counsel for respondent McAdore Finance and Investment, Incorporated, and the
urgent motion of petitioner for an extension of ten (10) days from May 22, 1979 within
which to file memorandum and reply, are GRANTED. Considering respondent's
urgent motion to hold in abeyance compliance with the second portion of the
resolution of March 16, 1979 in relation to the resolution of May 21, 1979, the Court
Resolve to REQUIRE petitioner (a) to COMMENT thereon; and (b) to SUBMIT to this
Court, a month by month itemization of the accrued electric bills of respondent from
December 22, 1978 (date of reconnection) to April 1979 stated by petitioner to total
P378,669.49 in its manifestation and urgent supplemental motion of May 11, 1979
and whether such bills were based on the electric meter readings or some other
mode of computation, both within five (5) days from notice hereof.

Pending receipt of such comment and until further orders of this Court,
implementation of the May 18, 1979 resolution allowing petitioner to disconnect the
electric power in respondent's premises if the aforesaid accrued monthly bills since
reconnection are not fully paid, shall be HELD in abeyance. Meanwhile, in order to
avoid future disputes as to the monthly readings taken from the allegedly tampered
meter, the Court DIRECTS both parties or either of them to forthwith make
representations with the Board of Power and Waterworks (1) to immediately
REPLACE the electric meter presently installed in respondent's premises with a new
sealed one at respondent's expense; and (2) to CONDUCT with prior notice to and in
the presence of both parties and/or their duly authorized representatives, a check-up
and verification of the present electric meter upon its removal and replacement with a
new meter as to whether or not it has been tampered with, and to REPORT to this
Court the action taken hereon and the results within five (5) days from notice. 11

The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., manifested on June 5, 1979 that
on June I and 2, 1979, a thorough check-up and investigation of the then existing power meter was
conducted after which a new sealed meter was installed in replacement of the old one by a group
composed of duly authorized representatives of the petitioner, Dagupan Electric Corporation, and
the private respondent, together with the authorized representatives of the Board of Power.

Pursuant to this Court's resolution of May 28, 1979, the Acting Executive Director and the Office-In-
Charge of the Board of Power and Waterworks submitted on June 8, 1979 its report containing the
following remarks:

1. The terminal covers of the potential and current transformers were sealed by the
engineers of the Dagupan Electric Corporation after the wiring connections from the
secondary terminals of the potential and current transformers to the terminals of the
existing meter were traced and checked.
 2. The meter which was placed, after it was tested and sealed by the Board of Power
Technician, was placed in a carton box and sealed with masking tape. Signatures of
representatives of both parties and the Board were made and appears on the
masking tape. The said meter is in the custody of MC Adore International Palace.

3. After the newly installed meter was checked for the correct rotation of the meter
disc, the representatives of the Dagupan Electric Corporation sealed the meter
terminal cover and KW demand resetting lever and padlocked the meter box. This
was done in the presence of the engineer of the MC Adore International Palace and
representatives of the Board.

4. The connection of the NEW meter is in accordance with the G.E guide except for
the consideration of line 1 (L1) and line 3 (L3) in diagram were interchanged. By
redrawing and analyzing the circuit, the results conforms with the G.E. guide for
installing watthour meters.

On June 13, 1979, the petitioners filed the following manifestation:

1. The petitioners have secured a copy of the Report and Findings of the Committee
constituted by the Board of Power BOP composed of the BOP Chief Utilities
Regulation Engineer Domingo C. Villanueva, BOP Electrical Engineer Margarito C.
Gatbonton, and BOP Supervising Precision Instrument Technician Romeo R.
Pulanco in accordance with the Resolution dated 28 May 1979 of this Honorable
Tribunal and submit the said attached copy of the Report and Findings in compliance
with the said Resolution

2. From the said Report and Findings, it can be seen that the meter then installed
(before replacement) was "within the limits of tolerance of plus or minus 3% allowed
by the Board" (paragraph 2, page 2 of Report and Findings), meaning the meter then
installed, upon which the electric billings sent by petitioner DECORP to private
respondent was based, reflected the actual and true electric power consumption of
the Hotel.

3. It should be noted also that the new wiring connection of the meter now presently
installed. which is in accordance with the Guide for Installing General Electric
watthour Meters (a wiring con. section which is also correct and acceptable like the
wiring connection "as found") was upon the instance of the Electric Engineer of
private respondent, Engr. Roque A. Barrientos (paragraph 4, page 2, of Report and
Findings), so that private respondent would really not have any reason whatsoever
for refusing to pay the future electric bills that will be sent by petitioner DECORP.

This Court issued on June 22, 1979 the following resolution:

In L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz-Pano, etc. et
al.), the Court Resolved: (a) to NOTE (1) petitioners' (1-a) comment on respondents'
urgent motion and amended urgent resolution of March 16, 1979; (2-a) manifestation
and compliance with the resolution of May 28, 1979; (3-a) manifestation and motion
stating that they have made representations with the Board of Power and
Waterworks in connection with the resolution of May 28, 1979; and (4-a)
manifestation stating that they have already secured a copy of the report and findings
of the committee constituted by the said Board of Power and Waterworks; (2) private
respondent MC Adore Finance & Investment, Inc.'s manifestation and motion
 alleging compliance with the resolution of May 28, 1979; (3) the compliance by the
Officer-in-charge of the Board of Power and waterworks with the resolution of May
28, 1979; and (4) the appearance of Atty. Teodoro P. Regino as counsel for private
respondent McAdore Finance & Investment, Inc.; and (b) both petitioners and
respondents having filed their respective memoranda, to declare this case
SUBMITTED for decision.

The petitioners filed a motion on June 20, 1979 to cite Modesta Sabeniano for contempt for having
signed the manifestation and motion dated June 4, 1979 for MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc.
when she is not a member of the bar and having unlawfully assumed to be a lawyer, thereby
committing an act constituting contempt of court and reiterating that the petitioners be allowed to
enforce the temporary restraining order.

The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., in turn, filed on June 25, 1979 a
petition to cite for contempt DECORP General Manager Jose T. Apigo for having instituted a criminal
complaint for theft in the Office of the City Fiscal of Dagupan City against Modesto R. Sabeniano for
allegedly and unlawfully tampering with the MC Adore hotel's electric meter by interchanging the
positions of the current leads at the terminal in the transformers thereby registering less electric
current used by the hotel than actually consumed therein.

The petitioners filed on June 25, 1979 a manifestation of compliance and urgent motion stating that
they had earlier registered their comment to the Amended Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Compliance with the Second Portion of the Resolution dated March 16, 1979 by way of their
comment on the private respondent's urgent motion dated May 31, 1979 and praying that the
amended urgent motion filed by the private respondent be denied and that the petitioners be allowed
to enforce the temporary restraining order contained in the resolution dated March 16, 1979.

This Court issued a resolution dated July 6, 1979 which reads:

In L-49520 (Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz-Pano, etc., et
al.), the Court Resolved to DEFER action on petitioners' counter-manifestation and
motion to strike out private respondent's manifestation and motion to cite Modesto
Sabeniano for contempt and their manifestation of compliance with urgent motion,
and respondent MC Adore Finance & Investment, Inc.'s petition for contempt and
opposition to petitioners' aforesaid motion to strike out and to cite Ms. Sabeniano for
contempt, until decision on the merit of this case.

On July 19, 1979, the petitioners filed a manifestation and supplemental motion to implement the
temporary restraining order alleging that on July 3, 1979, the petitioner Dagupan Electric Corporation
sent a billing letter to McAdore Finance and Investment, Inc. transmitting therewith the electric bill for
private respondent's power consumption during the month of June 1979 in the amount of
P90,269.26; that the said billing for June 1979 was based on a reading of the new electric meter
which was installed at private respondent's hotel on June 2, 1979 by the Board of Power and
Waterworks in the presence of the representatives of the parties in compliance with the resolution of
this Court dated May 28, 1979; that notwithstanding the installation of the new meter and the
rewiring of the connections in the meter system in private respondent's hotel which erased all doubts
as to the correctness of the billings of DECORP against, the private respondent in accordance with
the said resolution of this Court dated May 28, 1979, the private respondent has continuously
refused to pay its bills and prayed that the temporary restraining order dated May 14, 1979 be
ordered implemented so that the petitioners may proceed to disconnect the electric power from
private respondent's hotel.
The private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc., opposed the manifestation and
supplemental motion to implement temporary restraining order on the ground that to grant at this
stage the petitioners' several motions to implement the temporary restraining order so as to snow
them to disconnect the electric power from the private respondent's hotel "would amount not only to
a judgment but also to an order of execution thereof before the rights between the parties are finally
and irrevocably determined."

Stripped of verbiage unwarranted conclusions and irrelevant matters, the pertinent facts are that the
petitioner, Dagupan Electric Corporation DECORP is a domestic corporation with principal office
address at Delta Building, West Avenue, Quezon City; that pursuant to its business, it was granted
the requisite franchise to operate and maintain electric services in the City of Dagupan and other
towns in Pangasinan; that it has its principal office in Quezon City although its generating plant is
located in Barrio San Miguel, Calasiao, Pangasinan; that the private respondent, MC Adore Finance
and Investment, Inc., is also a domestic corporation with office at 148 N. Domingo, Cubao, Quezon
City; that said private respondent owns and operates the MC Adore International Palace Hotel at
Dagupan City; that on February 2, 1978, the private respondent, MC Adore Finance and Investment,
Inc., executed a contract for power service with the petitioner DECORP; that the petitioner DECORP
rendered full power service upon the premises of the hotel in March 19, 1978; that acting in the
belief that the June 1978 bill in the amount of 1'25,380.70 was erroneous, the petitioner DECORP
recalled the same and a corrected bill in the amount of P80,243.62 was sent to the private
respondent; that the private respondent failed and refused to pay the aforesaid bill; that this
prompted DECORP to issue on August 18, 1978 the usual 18-hours notice of disconnection in
accordance with the terms of the contract executed between the parties; that thereafter, the private
respondent complained with the Board of Power and Waterworks that the DECORP tampered with
its electric meters; that upon its own representation, the private respondent was able to secure a
telegram order issued by the Board of Power and Waterworks restraining DECORP from
disconnecting power services from the premises of the hotel pending resolution of the complaint;
that the parties allegedly negotiated a settlement and both arrived at an agreement before the Board
wherein the private respondent undertook to pay the accrued bills of June and July in the amount of
P76,058.38 and P77,609.70, respectively, and to pay the subsequent bills as they fall due; that the
private respondent allegedly refused to pay the accrued bills; that in view thereof, the petitioner
DECORP was constrained anew to serve the private respondent the 48-hour notice of disconnection
for its refusal to pay the accrued bills; that consequently, on November 27, 1978 after forty-eight
hours from notice had lapsed, the DECORP disconnected the power from the premises of the hotel;
that the private respondent filed a complaint with a prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction on
December 6, 1978 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City; that on the same day,
December 6, 1978, the presiding judge, Hon. Ernani Cruz-Pano, issued an order granting the
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the petitioner DECORP and its agents
to "restore immediately not later than 5:00 P.M., December 7, 1978, the electrical power of the
McAdore International Palace Hotel and resume the electrical supplies of all the electrical services
and facilities to said hotel to enable the plaintiff to operate it fully, under pain of contempt for violation
thereof that on December 8, 1978, the private respondent filed a petition to declare the petitioners in
contempt of court; that on December 8, 1978, the respondent judge issued an order, the pertinent
portion of which reads:

In today's hearing nobody appeared for defendant Dagupan Electric Corporation, the
Court finds that pursuant to Sec. 3, Rules of Court and without finally resolving
whether defendant's corporate officers may be adjudged in contempt, the Court finds
that their corporate officers, except Atty. Leonardo Baro may be held in custody until
the order is complied, as the Court finds no valid justification for this contumacious
disobedience. Defendant Corporation has its head offices in Dagupan City, the plant
can only act upon orders of the Quezon City head office. The Court pursuant to Sec.
3, Rule 71, Rules of Court orders the arrest and confinement of Isabelita Llames.
 president of defendant corporation, Primo Narvaez, General Manager of defendant
corporation, and Jose Apigo if by 12:00 o'clock midnight, December 8, 1978 the
mandatory injunction is not complied with, and for detention to continue until the
order is complied with. The Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary and
the Provincial Commander of the Philippine Constabulary in Pangasinan are ordered
to enforce this order if by midnight December 8, 1978 the mandatory injunction is not
complied with. This order to arrest is deemed cancelled if the restoration is made
within the aforesaid period, without prejudice to the Court considering whether the
respondent may be adjudged guilty of contempt correspondingly punished.

that on December 11, 1978, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the questioned
orders dated December 6, 1978 and December 8, 1978 on jurisdictional ground; that on December
19, 1978, the respondent judge issued an order denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration
and ordering the enforcement of the questioned order dated December 6, 1978; and that, however,
electric power on the premises of the hotel was not restored until December 22, 1978.

The main issue is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Branch XVIII at Quezon City,
has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-26502 entitled "MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. vs.
Dagupan Electric Corporation, et al." and, as a corollary issue, whether the respondent judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the
Dagupan Electric Corporation. to restore the connection of the electric power to the hotel in Dagupan
City owned and operated by MC Adore Finance and Investment Corporation.

The pertinent provision of the Judiciary Act of 1948 reads:

Sec. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue writ of
injunction,mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their
respective provinces and districts, in the manner provided in the Rules of Court.

The petitioners contend that the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has no jurisdiction
over the case because the act of disconnecting the power to the hotel of the MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc. took place in Dagupan City, outside the Province of Rizal and Quezon City.

The respondents submit that the act of disconnection was the result of an order issued by the
Dagupan Electric Corporation from its business office in Quezon City.

The Court of First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-26502.

The Dagupan Electric Corporation has its principal office in Quezon City where the business of the
corporation is managed by the Board of Directors. Decisions of the said corporation are made in
Quezon City. The employees of the Dagupan Electric Corporation in Dagupan City merely carry out
the orders issued by the officials of said corporation in Quezon City. Hence the acts sought to be
restrained are being committed in Quezon City.

The respondent judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order
directing the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the connection of the electric power to the
hotel owned by MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. The record shows that the respondent judge
conducted hearings and gave the parties full opportunity to present their evidence before issuing the
orders sought to be set aside. The questioned order dated December 19, 1978 which is self-
explanatory reads:

This case involves the disconnection of the electrical power of plaintiff's MC Adore
International Palace Hotel in Dagupan by Defendant Dagupan Electric Corporation
on November 27, 1978. Upon filing of the Complaint on December 6, 1978 and in
view of the representation of plaintiff that it had commitments to foreign and local
patrons, and that it is unable to operate the hotel, this Court issued mandatory
injunction on December 6, 1978 and set the case for hearing on December 11, 1978
at 9:00 o'clock.

The mandatory injunction was not enforced as executive officials of Dagupan Electric
Co. could not located. At the hearing of December I 1, i 978, in view of defendant's
representation that plaintiff was in arrears in electric bills for almost half a million
pesos, this Court suspended enforcement of the writ pending a fun hearing. The
hearing was reset for December 15, 1978 on which date the Court (received) the
evidence and (heard the) arguments of the parties.

From the evidence and arguments adduced by parties, it is undisputed that the
controversy between the parties arose from the act of defendant in changing the
billing of plaintiff for June 1978 from P25,380.70 to P80,243.62. Dagupan sent the
original bill for P25,380.70 on July 10, 1978; recalled the bill and changed the billing
to P80,243.62, after Dagupan personnel found a reversal of the polarity of the wiring
of MC Adore. The new billing was based on the average consumption of the hotel
from July 12 to July 17, 1978.

It is not contested that the electric meter installed on the premises was intact and no
tampering thereon was made. The unpaid bills as of November is only P138,000.00,
and not half a million, as earlier manifested.

Dagupan's action in disconnecting electric service is apparently premised at its

finding that the electric meter did not faithfully reflect the power consumption for June
1978; on the other hand, plaintiff suspects that adjustments were made by Dagupan
which resulted in an increased consumption reading. It is the stance of plaintiff that
its power consumption was reduced because of an energy conservation program;
that the reading for the first month of operation was quite high because of the testing
made on its central airconditioning system.

There is clearly a dispute as to the correct power consumption of plaintiff and it does
not appear to be fair that defendant should by unilateral action terminate its services
to plaintiff in the absence of any clear and definite finding that a reversal of the
polarity of the hotel wirings had caused an abnormal drop in meter reading.
Defendant appears to rely heavily on the report of Margarito Gatbonton, Utilities
Regulation Engineer of the Board of Power, dated September 4, 1978. This report
however has not yet been approved by the Board of Power.

It would also be prejudicial to the public interest that operation of plaintiff's hotel
worth 75 million pesos, in which the Development Bank of the Philippines has an
exposure of almost 57 million (75%) should be paralyzed because of this dispute.
 On the question of jurisdiction, both parties are residents of Quezon City, as they
have their principal offices in Quezon City. The disconnection order was initiated and
had its life and source in Quezon City. The mandatory injunction is addressed to the
corporation in Quezon City. The Dagupan plant acts only upon order of its officers in
Quezon City.

The cases cited by defendant are in opposite In Tan (64 SCRA 364) the injunctive
order was addressed to officials with official residence outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Moreover, in the cases where
the Supreme Court ruled that the district court has improperly issued the writ
(Palanan 22 SCRA 1186; Ruiz, 38 SCRA 559, Cudiamat 22 SCRA 695, and Tan, 64
SCRA 364) no private right of ownership was involved. Rather they involved licenses
or privileges granted by government agencies with offices located beyond the district
court's territorial jurisdiction. Where private rights are involved the Supreme Court
had upheld the issuance of the writ. In Gonzales vs. Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, (18 SCRA 297) the injunction against the Secretary of Public
Works who had his office in Manila, issued by the Court of First Instance of Davao,
was upheld. This involved the demolition of a dam in Davao.

Here we have a case of the interference of plaintiff's property rights, with situs in
Quezon City by a corporation situs with situs in Quezon City. The exercise of will by
defendant had its origin in Quezon City.

This Court can grant relief when that exercise of will causes irreparable prejudice as
in the instant case.

The Court therefore finds the Motion for Reconsideration to without merit and denies
the same.

The writ of mandatory injunction issued by this Court on December 6, 1978 is

reinstated and its immediate enforcement is ordered.

The plaintiff is however ordered to deposit with the Court the sum of P100,000.00
representing more or less one-half of the unpaid billings as of November 1978, and
thereafter to deposit monthly beginning January 1979 P35,000.00 for delivery to
defendant. It is likewise ordered to post additional bond of P150,000.00. Compliance
by plaintiff must be made not later than Friday, December 22, 1978.

Let copies of this Order be served upon the parties and their respective counsel by
the Sheriffs of Quezon City and Dagupan City.

SO ORDERED. 12

It is clear from the foregoing order that the respondent judge did not act capriciously or whimsically
in ordering the Dagupan Electric Corporation to restore the connection of the electric power to the
hotel in Dagupan City of the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc..

The various incidents regarding the correctness of the monthly bill presented by the Dagupan
Electric Corporation to the MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. can be better heard and resolved
by the respondent judge. Meanwhile, it appearing that a tested meter has been installed on June 2,
1979 by the Board of Power and Waterworks in the premises of the hotel the MC Adore Finance and
Investment, Inc. is directed anew to pay the monthly bills presented by the Dagupan Electric
Corporation beginning June 1979. If the MC Adore finance and Investment, Inc. fails to do so within
ten (10) days from notice of this decision, the Dagupan Electric Corporation s authorized to
disconnect the electric power from the hotel

The correct amounts due prior to June 1979 shall be resolved by the respondent judge after hearing
the parties.

The motion for contempt against Modesto Sabeniano and the motion for contempt against Jose T.
Apigo are both denied for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is are by dismissed but the MC Adore
Finance and Investment. Inc. is directed to pay the monthly bills as presented by the Dagupan
Electric Corporation from June 1979. If the said MC Adore Finance and Investment, Inc. fails to do
so within ten (10) days from notice hereof, the Dagupan Electric Corporation may disconnect the
electric owner from the MC Adore International Palace Hotel at Dagupan City. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 15929 February 10, 2006

ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC., Petitioner,

vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., HONORABLE N. C. PERELLO, Presiding Judge of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-MUNTINLUPA, BRANCH 276 and SHERIFF FELIX
FALCOTELLO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The appellate courts denial of petitioner Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils., Inc.s petition to enjoin the
implementation of a writ of possession issued by Branch 276, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City in favor of private respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank) is the
subject of the present petition for review.

Under a loan agreement1 dated November 19, 1996, Asian Appraisal Holdings, Inc. (AAHI) obtained
a loan amounting to P442,500,000 from Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) for the construction of
Asian Star Building, a 20 storey commercial condominium built on lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967
and 2059692 located at the Filinvest Corporate City, Alabang, Muntinlupa City.

As security for the loan, AAHI executed a security agreement3 or real estate mortgage dated
November 19, 1996 over its property consisting of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and 205969
and the condominium built thereon including all units, parking slots, common areas and other
improvements, machineries and equipment. The real estate mortgage was registered with the
Register of Deeds on November 19, 1996 and duly annotated on the individual Condominium
Certificates of Title (CTC) on even date.

On November 17, 1999, AAHI entered into a contract to sell4 with petitioner for the purchase of Units
1004 and 1005 covered by CTC No. 546665 and CTC No. 546676 , respectively, and the right to the
exclusive use of parking slots P515, P516, P517, and P514 covered by CTC No. 54986,7 CTC No.
54987,8 CTC No. 54988,9 CTC No. 5498510 (the subject properties), respectively, for a total purchase
price of P23,571,280.

On December 22, 1999, the parties executed an addendum11 to the contract to sell whereby AAHI
assigned to petitioner the right to the exclusive use of parking slot P504 covered by CTC No. 54975
for a consideration ofP600,000, which petitioner paid on even date.

By separate letters12 dated March 23, 2000, AAHI and Solidbank informed petitioner of the real
estate mortgage forged by them and was advised to remit its monthly amortizations for the units and
parking slots it purchased to Solidbank. Petitioner was also requested to inform Solidbank of the
total installments it had paid for these units and parking slots and the balance still due thereon13

Petitioner which occupied the condominium units as its place of business had, by October 2001, fully
settled its obligation to AAHI in the total amount of P26,588,409.30.14

On October 21, 2000, as AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation, Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank), to which the banking operations of Solidbank were integrated, filed before
the Muntinlupa RTC a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage.15

AAHI not long after filed on October 30, 2000 also before the Muntinlupa RTC a complaint16 against
Solidbank, for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-196, and raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC.

On October 31, 2000, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction to the highest bidder,
Metrobank, to which a Certificate of Sale was issued.17 The Certificate of Sale was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City and annotated on the individual CTCs on April 4, 2001.18

On January 24, 2002, Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession19 of the properties subject of the foreclosed mortgage. The petition was docketed as
LRC Case No. 02-007 and raffled to Branch 276, RTC of Muntinlupa. The petition was granted and a
writ of possession was issued on April 9, 2002.20

Also on April 9, 2002, petitioner filed before Branch 256 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 00-196 (AAHIs
complaint against Solidbank for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction) a motion for
intervention,21 to which it attached a complaint-in-intervention22 with prayer for the annulment of the
extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery of title, and damages and for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Metrobank to consolidate its title and
to take possession of its properties.

The court Sheriff on April 15, 2002 issued a notice to vacate23 which was served on May 16, 2002
upon all building occupants who were advised to make the necessary arrangements with Metrobank
regarding their occupancy.24

In the meantime, the Motion for Reconsideration of the April 9, 2002 Order of Branch 276 filed by
AAHI was denied by Order25 dated May 13, 2002, prompting it to file before the appellate court a
petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioner filed on June 18, 2002 a separate petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction with the appellate court,26 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71217,
also to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession issued by Branch 276 of the Muntinlupa
RTC. In its petition, petitioner alleged that its complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196
pending in Branch 256 is its principal action but as the said court could not enjoin Branch 276 from
implementing the writ of possession, both courts being of equal jurisdiction, it had no choice but to
file the petition with the appellate court.27

On August 22, 2002, the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals granted petitioners prayer for, and
issued a temporary restraining order28 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71217. By Decision29 of January 22, 2003,
the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals denied, however, petitioners prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the subject
properties.30

The motion for reconsideration of the above-said Resolution of January 22, 2003 having been
denied by the appellate court by Resolution31 dated July 23, 2003, petitioner now comes before this
Court on a petition for review, alleging that the appellate court committed grave and palpable error in
denying its prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction in flagrant violation of laws and jurisprudence.32

The petition fails.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.33 Petitioners only prayer in
CA-G.R. No. 71217 is "for the preservation of the status quo, that is, petitioner, having in possession
over the subject properties for several years, shall retain such possession until the controversy [Civil
Case No. 00-196 before the said trial court [Branch 276, RTC of Muntinlupa City] has been finally
resolved and respondents be prevented from taking over such possession."34

Clearly, what petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for preliminary injunction
which is a provisional and extra-ordinary remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of
things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be
heard.

An original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however. Under
B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for annulment of judgments of
the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.35

The appellate courts jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is limited to actions or
proceedings pending before it, as Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules clearly provides:

SECTION 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted by the
court where the action or proceeding is pending. x x x (Emphasis supplied),

or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus under Section 7 of Rule 65, thus:

SECTION 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. The court in which the petition is
filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent
from further proceeding in the case. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, petitioners complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 was pending before
Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate court. Petitioners petition before the
appellate court does not show, nay allege, that in issuing the writ of possession, the Muntinlupa RTC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for it to be treated as
either one for certiorari36 or prohibition.37

Thus, for want of jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should have been dismissed
outright.

At all events, it is well-settled that an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction is not
appealable. 38

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 159696 November 17, 2005

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO,* Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Certiorari will issue only to strike down acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction; or those
executed with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Alleged errors committed in the
exercise of jurisdiction are reviewable by timely appeal and cannot, as a rule, be deemed fit subjects
of this extraordinary writ.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the
January 14, 2003 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70605, granting
respondents Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Also assailed is the July 29,
2003 Resolution3 of the CA denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The first assailed
Resolution states in full:

"This treats of the Urgent Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction dated December 2, 2002 filed
by [respondent] through counsel with this Court.

"No Comment on the same was ever filed by the Office of the Solicitor General which is handling this
case for and in behalf of the [Petitioner] Civil Service Commission despite opportunity given it, per
Resolution dated November 8, 2002.

"This Court, after taking into consideration the allegations and the arguments set forth in this motion
filed by [respondent] to support his stand, opted to grant [respondents] application for the issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction at this stage of the proceedings considering that he is entitled to
the relief demanded and that the implementation of the assailed Resolution dated April 3, 2002 of x x
x Civil Service Commission and the Order implementing it issued pursuant thereto, would probably
work injustice and would cause irreparable damage to [respondent].

"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by [herein respondent] is hereby GRANTED. Let [the] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction be issued enjoining, restraining and prohibiting public respondents [herein petitioner], their
representatives and/or anybody acting in their behalf, from implementing CSC Resolution dated April
3, 2002 and to recall the order implementing it, if any issued pursuant thereto, upon the posting of a
bond in the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, to be executed to the
[petitioner] or parties enjoined, to the effect that [herein respondent] will pay to [herein petitioner] or
parties all damages which he or they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should
finally decide that [herein respondent] is not entitled thereto."4

The Facts

The factual antecedents are narrated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:

"On December 22, 1995, a Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for
Preventive Suspension and Disarming was filed by the stockholders and board members of United
Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC) against SPO1 Rimando Gannapao before the Philippine National
Police, Inspectorate Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

"Pursuant to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 dated July 21 1996, a Summary
Hearing was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service of the National Headquarters PNP against
[respondent] for the alleged moonlighting. [Courts comment: Records show that prior to the
investigation conducted by the Office of Legal Service, however, another pre-charge investigation
had been held for the same case by the Headquarters Support Services also of the National
Headquarters of the PNP. The investigation appears to have been dismissed upon the
recommendation of Atty. Joselito Casugbu, who found the complaint to be one of pure harassment.5]

"On November 26, 1997, the Philippine National Police Chief Recaredo A. Sarmiento II rendered a
Decision imposing the three (3) months suspension of [respondent], the dispositive part of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Headquarters finds respondent SPO1 RIMANDO A.

GANNAPAO GUILTY of the charge of serious irregularities in the performance of duties, thus, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the police service
without pay.

"On February 6, 1998, [respondent] filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the PNP Director General Santiago L. Alio in [a] Resolution dated April 14, 1998.

"[Respondent] appealed the PNP Resolution to the National Appellate Board (NAB), National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM). The appeal was dismissed in a Resolution dated December 29, 1999.

"On February 10, 2000, [respondent] filed a Petition for Appeal with the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG). The appeal was denied and the penalty of three (3) months suspension
of petitioner was affirmed in a Resolution dated July 18, 2000.
"Thereafter, [respondent] appealed to the Civil Service Commission praying the setting aside of the
penalty of three (3) months suspension and/or for the Commission to conduct a hearing or a
reinvestigation alleging lack of due process.

"On April 3, 2002, the Civil Service Commission rendered Resolution No. 020487, the dispositive
part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Rimando A. Gannapao is hereby DISMISSED. However, the order
dated February 26, 2001 of then DILG Secretary Alfredo S. Lim affirming the suspension of
Gannapao for a period of three (3) months is modified to dismissal from the service.

"On May 30, 2002, Gannapao filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals assailing the
Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.

"On January 8, 2003, CSC through the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on the
Petition specifically stating among others that Gannapao was not entitled to a preliminary injunction.

"On January 14, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting Gannapaos motion for
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining, restraining and prohibiting CSC from
implementing its assailed CSC Resolution No. 020487 dated April 3, 2002 dismissing [respondent].

"[Respondent] filed its motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated July 29,
2003."6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals granted respondents prayer for a preliminary injunction enjoining the CSC
from enforcing the latters assailed Decision pending appeal. The CA based its ruling on the
probability that the immediate execution of the CSC Decision might cause injustice and irreparable
damage to petitioner.

Hence, this Petition.7

Issue

Petitioner submits this sole issue for our consideration:

"The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for the
Issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of Respondent Gannapao."8

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Sole Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

As an extraordinary remedy, a writ of certiorari issues only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Absence of jurisdiction is the
lack of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause. On the other hand, excess of
jurisdiction means that an act -- though within the general power of the tribunal, board or officer -- is
not authorized. Hence, the act is invalid with regard to that particular proceeding, in respect of which
the conditions that authorize the exercise of the general power are wanting.9

Petitioner attacks the CA for issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction despite the Commissions
finding that private respondent was guilty of misconduct. The OSG adds that the injunctive relief
violates the Administrative Code and the CSC rules stating that administrative disciplinary penalties
shall be immediately executory, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal.10

We hold, however, that neither the Administrative Code nor the CSC rules deprive courts of their
power to grant restraining orders or preliminary injunctions to stay the execution of CSC decisions
pending appeal.11 Moreover, a courts issuance of a preliminary injunction, when proper, is expressly
authorized by Section 2 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

"Sec. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. -- A preliminary injunction may be granted by the
court where the action or proceeding is pending. If the action or proceeding is pending in the Court
of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any member thereof."

Furthermore, Section 82 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 19-9912 recognizes the authority
of the CA and the Supreme Court to issue restraining orders or injunctions, as follows:

"Section 82. Effect of Pendency of Petition for Review/Certiorari with the Court. -- The filing and
pendency of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals or certiorari with the Supreme Court shall
not stop the execution of the final decision of the Commission unless the Court issues a restraining
order or an injunction. (Emphasis provided.)

Having appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the CSC,13 the CA clearly has the discretion to issue
an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction to secure the rights of private respondent pending appeal of
his dismissal. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, the exercise of judgment by the
courts in injunctive matters should not be interfered with.14

Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise defined, grave
abuse is the exercise of power in an arbitrary or a despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice
or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty, or a refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.15

Certiorari will not issue to cure errors in proceedings or to correct mere erroneous conclusions of law
or fact. The burden is upon petitioner to demonstrate that the questioned writ constitutes a whimsical
and capricious exercise of judgment. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which, as a rule, are reviewable by a timely appeal16of the final disposition of the case.

Issuance of Preliminary

Injunction Justified

Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court prescribes the grounds for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, as follows:
"(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

"(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

"(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual."

Based on the foregoing, the requisites for the issuance of the writ are the following: (1) the existence
of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damage.17 In taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, a court has the duty to determine whether the requisites for the grant of the injunction are
present in the case before it.18

In the present controversy, however, the assailed Order does not state the basis for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA made no findings of fact or law indicating that any of the
elements essential for the grant of an injunctive writ existed. After merely stating that it took "into
consideration the allegations and the arguments set forth" in the Urgent Motion filed by Gannapao,
the CA immediately concluded afterwards that respondent was entitled to the relief demanded.

In this connection, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in Garcia v. Burgos:19

"It has been consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which
requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case,
than the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that should never be extended
unless to cases of great injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate
remedy in damages."

Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and fair play, this Court scrutinized the records of the case
and, indeed, found sufficient grounds for the grant of the injunctive Writ. Prior to the finality of the
CSC Decision dismissing him, private respondent has a clear and unmistakable right to his current
position in the police service. Unquestionably, the right to employment, oftentimes the lowly
employees only noble source of bread and butter, is entitled to protection by the State.20

Moreover, the immediate implementation of the not yet final penalty of dismissal from the service
would surely cause private respondent (and his family) irreparable damage. As pleaded in his Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction,21 his salary and
benefits as a policeman are his familys only source of income.

Furthermore, in the said Urgent Motion, as well as the Petition22 filed by private respondent before
the Court of Appeals, he incessantly asserted that the case against him had already been dismissed
in an earlier PNP pre-charge investigation. When the case was reopened by the PNP Office of Legal
Service, he allegedly moved for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of res judicata.

Instead of ruling on the issue of whether the prior dismissal was in fact a bar to the reopening of the
case, the PNP Office of Legal Service merely considered the filing of the Motion to Dismiss as a
waiver of his right to file an answer. Then it proceeded to rule on the case on its merits. He
subsequently appealed to the CSC his three-month suspension, which had been affirmed by the
DILG. Specifically, he claimed lack of due process and requested the CSC to grant him a hearing.
Not only did it affirm the assailed Order of the DILG, it moreover increased the penalty to dismissal
from the service.

Under the above circumstances, it appears that private respondent, without prejudging his case on
its merits, has raised a prima facie defense of lack of due process. We hasten to add that the
question of whether or not he was denied due process is one of fact that the CA is better equipped
to determine. That the CA saw it fit to issue the questioned Writ to protect his rights in the interim
was within the reasonable exercise of its judicial discretion. We find no arbitrariness or
capriciousness -- much less personal bias, hostility or animosity -- in the exercise of its prerogatives.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180206 February 4, 2009

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, represented by REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., City
Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY. MELCHOR CARLOS R.
RAGANES, CITY BUILDINGS and ARCHITECTURE office, represented by OSCAR FLORES;
and PUBLIC ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, Represented by EMMANUEL REYES, Petitioners.
vs.
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Officer-National Commission on Indigenous People-CAR,
ELVIN GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN and LAZARO BAWAS, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioners, the City Government of Baguio City, represented by its Mayor, Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the
Anti-Squatting Committee, represented by Atty. Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes; the City Buildings and
Architecture Office, represented by Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety Office,
represented by Emmanuel Reyes and later substituted by Gregorio Deligero, assail the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated April 16, 2007, and its Resolution2 dated
September 11, 2007, which affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against the demolition orders of petitioners.

The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed Decision:

The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio City,
Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas,
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed
Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation
of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and
Republic Act No. 7279.

Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued
informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17
to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter
private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio
City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the
Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively
called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative
Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-CAR-
06.

In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses
stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and
continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in
Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus,
contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and
ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.

On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued
the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons
acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006;
Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition
Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total period of
twenty (20) days.

Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2006 granting the
private respondents application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive bond
each in the amount ofP10,000.00.3

Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners,4 the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of
the NCIP over the action filed by private respondents and affirmed the temporary restraining orders
dated October 165 and 19, 2006,6 and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006,7 granting the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the NCIP. The appellate court also ruled that
Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).

Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction
such as the one filed by private respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases
pending before it.

Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private
respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA.

Petitioners contend that private respondents are not entitled to the protection of an injunctive writ
because they encroached upon the Busol Forest Reservation and built structures thereon without
the requisite permit. Moreover, this Court, in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals,8 had already
declared that the Busol Forest Reservation is inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how
long, cannot convert the same into private property. Even assuming that private respondents have a
pending application for ancestral land claim, their right is at best contingent and cannot come under
the protective mantle of injunction.

Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims as it is
needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining forests in Baguio City and is the
citys main watershed.
Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued pursuant to the police power of
the local government. 1avv phi1

In their Comment9 dated March 1, 2007, private respondents defend the jurisdiction of the NCIP to
take cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that
the NCIP may only issue such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies. Private respondents also
contend that the IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are
no ancestral lands in Baguio City.

As members of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native to Baguio City, private respondents are
treated as squatters despite the fact that they hold native title to their ancestral land. The IPRA
allegedly now recognizes ancestral lands held by native title as never to have been public lands.

Private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral land claims. In
fact, Proclamation No. 1510 dated April 27, 1922, which declared the area a forest reserve, allegedly
did not nullify the vested rights of private respondents over their ancestral lands and even identified
the claimants of the particular portions within the forest reserve. This claim of ownership is an
exception to the governments contention that the whole area is a forest reservation.

Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to order the demolition of certain
structures is not absolute. Regard should be taken of the fact that private respondents cannot be
issued building permits precisely because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a
requirement for the issuance of a building permit under the National Building Code.

Petitioners Reply to Comment11 dated June 11, 2008 merely reiterates their previous arguments.

We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIPs jurisdiction.

The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well
as their rights thereto.12 In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the
NCIPs assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted
all remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council
of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved.13

In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the NCIP over
claims and disputes involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions that may be brought
before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule III thereof provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the
implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the
following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
 a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of
ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICCs/IPs;

c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary

laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and

settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled
under customary laws; and

b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of

Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by,
and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A.
8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of
registration.

In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with the
foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition,
whether private respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. In their petition14 filed before the NCIP,
private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City, were asserting
ownership of portions of the Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands.
Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent the enforcement of the
demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition traced private respondents ancestry to
Molintas and Gumangan and asserted their possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral
lands. The petition also alleged that private respondents claim over these lands had been
recognized by Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas and Gumangan as having
claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reservation.15

Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the nature of the action
and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal,16 squarely qualify it as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO. 1avv phi1

The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of injunction. Sec. 69 thereof states:

Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.The NCIP shall have the power and authority:
 a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed
before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, agreements, and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just
determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this
Act;

c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties
therefor; and

d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not
restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case
or seriously affect social or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]

NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV,
which provides:

Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.A writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order may be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and
69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a petition, that the
acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This
power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights
of the parties.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders
and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action
is for injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties
to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause
them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the
injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private
respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.

Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even provides that no
restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in
any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the

interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.17

Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and necessarily the
jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, which states:

SEC. 78. Special Provision.The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Charter and all
lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified
by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or acquired
through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain
valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of the
City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis supplied]
lavvphil.net
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its exemption
from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of
prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA
demands that the citys charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.

The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents ancestral land claim was
indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected by an
injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show
that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are
violative of said right.18

Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents
ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15
explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. It provides:

Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-
seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered by
the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water and timber, the protection
of the water supply being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to be
subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the following described
parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain
Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:

The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in
Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.19 The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such
precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with
jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.

All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the
Commission.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP No. 96895 dated April 16, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 11, 2007 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Case No. 31-CAR-06 entitled, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro
Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City, et al. is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. CA-01-32. January 14, 2003]

REYES vs. DEMETRIA

EN BANC

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 14 2003.
A.M. No. CA-01-32 (Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Justices Demetrio G. Demetria, Ramon A.
Barcelona and Roberto A. Barrios [Special Third Division]; Atty. Teresita A. Marigomen, Division Clerk of Court,
Special Fourth Division and Mr. Efren R. Rivamonte, Special Sheriff, Mailing Section.)

This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Demetrio G. Demetria praying that the
Resolution en banc dated January 23, 2002 be reconsidered and that he be absolved of all administrative
charges leveled against him. In compliance with our Resolution dated July 16, 2002, Division Clerk of Court
Caroline G. Ocampo-Peralta, of the Court of Appeals, and complainants Heirs of the late Justice Jose B.L.
Reyes, filed their respective Comments.

In Our Resolution, respondent Demetria was found guilty of gross *misconduct: (a) by issuing a temporary
restraining order with the signature of only two out of three justices of the Court of Appeals; (b) by enforcing
the decision of the appellate court notwithstanding the fact that the same is pending appeal with the Supreme
Court and (c) by showing his keen interest in the immediate execution of the decision despite the lack of
authority of the Court of Appeals to appoint a Special Sheriff.

In support of his motion, respondent claims that: he was denied due process; he is not guilty of gross
misconduct for the failure of one of the Justices of the Court of Appeals to sign the Resolution granting the
issuance of a temporary restraining order; and, he is not guilty of misconduct "in allegedly directing the
appointment of a special sheriff".

After reviewing our Decision promulgated on January 23, 2002 and the records of the case, we find that
respondent's motion for reconsideration is partly meritorious.

Respondent was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for disregarding existing rules of procedure in
issuing a temporary restraining order which bore the signatures of only two justices of the Court of Appeals.
We are constrained to rectify the same considering the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:

"Section 5. xxx xxx xxx

"xxx. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial declaration
to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the ground for which it was
issued.

"However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary restraining order shall
be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining order
issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders." (emphasis supplied)

and Sections 9 and 10, Rule 3 of the then prevailing Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals which
provide:

"Section 9. Action by a Justice. - The following may be considered and acted upon by the Justice to whom
the case is assigned for study and report:

"xxx xxx xxx;

"b. Motion or petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining order, and other
auxiliary writs;

"xxx xxx xxx"

"Section 10. Absence of the Justice Assigned to the Study and Report. -When the Justice to whom the case
is assigned for study and report is absent, the motions and incidents enumerated in the proceeding
section may be acted upon by the Chairman or by the other member of the Division to which that
Justice belongs. If the members of the division are all absent, any motion for the issuance of a
restraining order shall be referred to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action.
"All other matters not mentioned in the proceeding section shall be cognizable by the Division." (emphasis
supplied)

Clearly therefrom, even only one (1) member of the Court of Appeals * may issue a temporary restraining
order. Thus, on this matter, respondent ** could not be held guilty of gross misconduct.

Nevertheless, we maintain that the issuance of temporary restraining order by only one or two justices of the
Court of Appeals must be exercised sparingly, that is, only in case of extreme necessity where there is
compelling reason to abate or avoid a grave injury to a party.

However, we find no justifiable reason to sustain respondent's claim that he was not given due process when
the Court found that he is guilty*** of gross misconduct in directing the appointment of a special sheriff in
the absence of any hearing or investigation. Movant-respondent insist that he merely inquired as to the
possibility of the appointment of a sheriff and points to the fact that the directive to the Chief of the Mailing
Section to appoint a special sheriff to carry out the writ of execution pending appeal was made by all three
members of the Division and not solely by him.

An examination of the record reveals that the directive referred to by respondent is Annex "B" attached to the
Comment of Justices Ramon Barcelona (now retired) and Roberto Barrios which reads as follows:

"Sirs:

"Quoted hereunder for your information is a resolution of this Court.......SECOND.........DIVISION)

dated....September 21, 1998....

"CA. G.R. SP No. 47156 METRO MANILA BUILDERS, INC.,

"CA-G.R. SP NO. 47720 versus HON. Cesar_____ ET.AL..

"In view of the letter of Justice Demetrio Demetria (Ponente) dated September 21, 1998, the Chief of the
Mailing Section is hereby directed to appoint a special sheriff to execute the decision of this Court dated August
21, 1998.

"WITNESS the Honorable...EMETERIO C. CUI...Chairman, Honorable..RAMON A. BARCELONA...and the

Honorable...DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA...Members this 21st .of..September.1998.

"Very truly yours,

"(Sgd.) CAROLINE G. OCAMPO-PERALTA

"Division Clerk of Court"1

Respondent, in his present motion for reconsideration, does not refute the letter mentioned in the about-
quoted minute resolution of the former Second Division showing indubitably that it was upon his instruction
that a special sheriff is appointed. Instead, respondent merely insists in his present motion for reconsideration
that the appointment of a special sheriff was authorized by all three (3) Justices of the Court of Appeals which
however does not justify the wrongful appointment of a sheriff in said court.

Needless to emphasize, respondent had been given the opportunity to be heard and as pointed out by
complaints in their Comment, respondent had been explicit in his Comment dated June 18, 2001 that he "does
not see the need for him to file his Comment to the instant complaint considering that he had already been
dismissed from office in A.M. No. 00-7-09 and, even in the event that said dismissal is reconsidered, he would
nevertheless resign or retire from the service, hence, this case has been or will be rendered moot and
academic"2.

* Considering that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct in enforcing the decision of the Court of Appeals
despite knowledge of the designation of the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court and in causing the
designation of a special sheriff despite utter lack of authority to do so thereby showing unusual interest therein,
the imposition of a fine of P20,000.00 is in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence in 19983, when the
complained resolution were issued.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.